The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2000) Vol. XXXVIII

The Technology of Metaphor

Martin A. Coleman
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

A word is dead
When it is said,
Some say.
I say it just
Begins to live
That day.
— Emily Dickinson

Language is not a little, airtight, clean, finished container of something. It's permeable, alive. It moves.
— Julia Alvarez[1]

According to Larry Hickman, John Dewey's general philosophical project of analyzing and critiquing human experience may be understood in terms of technological inquiry (Hickman 1990, 1). Following this, I contend that technology provides a model for Dewey's analysis of language and meaning, and this analysis suggests a treatment of linguistic metaphor as a way of meeting new demands of experience with old tools of a known and understood language. An account of metaphor consistent with Dewey's views on language and meaning avoids a strict dualism of literal meaning and metaphorical meaning as well as the explanatory shortcomings of a nondualistic theory like that found in Donald Davidson's well-known paper "What Metaphors Mean" (1978).[2] A Deweyan explanation of

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Martin Coleman is a graduate student in the Department of Philosophy at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. An article entitled "Emerson's 'Philosophy of the Street'" recently appeared in Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society. *His areas of interest include Classical American Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, and Ancient Greek Philosophy.*

metaphor, or what might be called the technology of metaphor, reveals continuity between literal and metaphorical meaning making the distinction one of degree rather than kind.

According to Hickman, technology for Dewey is not "naive" or "straight-line" instrumentalism that employs value-neutral tools and set procedures, formulas, or recipes (Hickman 1990, 13). For Dewey, tools and instruments are rife with potentialities which allow them to evolve in application. Technology, on this view, is human productive skill used in altering human environments and in accommodating humans to those environments (Hickman 1990, 70). This involves not merely shuffling or rearranging, but reshaping and transforming antecedent materials for the purpose of producing something new that solves a problem, for the purpose of making a tool. On Dewey's view, language and meaning result from a transformation of raw materials by evolving methods. Such methods can be used to meet further communicative needs in a particular situation by producing metaphors.

It follows that language is a tool. It is, as Dewey calls it, "the tool of tools" and "the cherishing mother of all significance" (LW.1.146)[3] in that it makes further tools possible. As a tool, language embodies sequential connections in nature and denotes perception and acknowledgment of the connections (LW.1.101). To embody a connection is to have meaning and to have the ability to bring about further meanings.

The meanings embodied in language are the result of the establishment of relations between human beings and their environments. This begins with what Dewey calls an *impulsion*, a blind surge of energy that is a movement of the whole organism into its environment. It is a drive to continue existing and proceeds from need (LW.10.64-65). The environment of the live creature is a world with obstacles as well as neutral and favorable conditions. Converting obstacles and neutral conditions into beneficial means of support is the process that engenders in the live creature awareness of the intent that is implicit in impulsion (LW.10.65). Awareness of intent changes blind impulsion into purpose, and this is key to the establishment of relations and, therefore, meaning.

Attempts to overcome obstacles begin with what has been gained in prior experiences. This is, as Hickman writes, a "*going outside* the immediate situation" in search of "a *tool* with which to operate on" the problematic conditions (Hickman 1990, 21). Going outside the immediate situation constitutes reflective experience which is itself a tool used to resolve a problematic situation (Hickman 1990, 41). The prior experiences sought out as tools are rooted in what were once blind, impulsive activities, in an interplay of natural energies (LW.10.30). What sets humans apart from other creatures is *consciousness* of relations in nature established through this interplay of energies.

Through consciousness humans transform cause and effect into means and consequences. This is the birth of meaning.

The transforming of an impulsion into a purpose and of prior experiences into means is a double change that gives rise to *acts of expression*. The raw material of impulsion and prior experiences are both transformed in the production of an act of expression (LW.10.66). Acts of expression do not include spontaneous cries, screams, grunts, or movements attendant upon pain, anger, pleasure, or relief (LW.10.67). These outward discharges are not expressive in themselves even though they may be signals to observers. But they are the *beginnings* of meaningful signs, of language. Such "natural ebullitions" are the "basic *material* of language," but they must first be shaped into "instrumentalities for a purpose"; these are raw materials for the "manufactured article" that is speech (LW.1.140; MW.8.66).

Cries and movements are transformed into expression as their producer learns that particular acts bring particular consequences, thereby becoming aware of the *meaning* of what he or she does (LW.10.68). One also can learn that the behavior of others is preparatory to certain consequences and so has meaning. In responding to the meanings of things, one occupies the standpoint of a situation that is shared by another person. Something is then common in two different centers of behavior. This common standpoint is essential to and distinctive of communication, language, and meaning (LW.1.140). What is shared or common is a perception of a thing as it may function in the experience of the other; it is shared anticipation. If shared anticipation is the essence of communication, then understanding is manifested in coordinated activity.

Dewey writes:

> The heart of language is not "expression" of something antecedent, much less expression of antecedent thought. It is communication; the establishment of cooperation in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership. (LW.1.141)

The act of expression or communication yields something new, giving rise to language and bestowing meaning on events. Language and meaning arrive on the scene together in the expressive act. Communicative behavior is marked by awareness of intent or meaning which is regulated by cooperation.

Meaning is primarily a property of behavior. Secondarily, meaning is a property of objects. A thing acquires meaning as it becomes a locus of common activity, a means to ends, in other words, a tool. When events or things take on meaning and become objects, they take on what Dewey calls a double life (LW.1.132). What an event or thing is in its immediacy is

distinct from and incommensurable with what it *can* be or its relationship as a means to some end. When a bare event acquires meaning, "potential consequences become its integral and funded feature" (LW.1.143) in the sense of a second life.

When an event or thing takes on meaning and is related to particular consequences, the relationship must be distinguished and retained in order to keep the object from reverting to what it is in immediacy. The thing in its immediacy is far too transient to be of use. The flux of immediate experience must first be fixed by some easily repeatable and controllable act such as a gesture or spoken sounds before anything can be intentionally utilized (LW.1.146-7). A sign or language is a tool that fixes the flux and in this way deflects a meaning from the stream of immediacy. Without language to fix means-ends relationships, no tool could come to embody a connection and there could be no meaning. In this way language is the tool of tools.

While meanings do originate in social interaction, things used and enjoyed can be considered apart from social interaction, that is, they can be considered in their interactions as things and energies external to living creatures. To consider things in this way is to distinguish *proximate* meanings from *ultimate* meanings. In their ultimate meanings, consequences of the interplay of energies external to living creatures enter into relations with humans and human experience; "they enter finally into human action and destiny" (LW.1.149). Dewey gives the example of fire which enters into human experience as a fascinating spectacle, a potential danger, and a beneficial tool. The proximate meaning is the combustion of materials, the production of light and heat, and other consequences given in terms of nonliving energies. It is a meaning "without direct reference to human behavior" (LW.1.150-1).

In science, proximate meanings are the means by which human situations are modified, varied, and extended. Meanings are refined by abstracting away consequences from social situations, and this permits greater control of final meanings in human situations. Things are defined by consequences conveyed only by the relations of symbols. In the manipulation of symbols, new consequences can be discovered, experimentation is possible, and so new meanings can be bred and new experiences had. Symbols marking proximate meanings are highly refined tools that can be extensively manipulated.

The distinction between proximate and ultimate meanings can be considered as the difference between meaning that has a purely external reference (as in the case of symbols or words) and meaning that presents itself directly as belonging to an experienced object. In the first case, the symbol stands for an object or action, and it has meaning in the sense of standing for something else in systematic relation to other symbols. In the

second case, it is feelings, differences in *quality*, and not relations that mean something. In this case, meaning is directly had rather than stood for or pointed to (LW.1.198). Meaning is inherent in the experienced object, and, according to Dewey, no code or convention of interpretation is required (LW.10.89).

Hickman casts this distinction in terms of *extrinsic* and *intrinsic* meanings (Hickman 1990, 40). A thing has extrinsic meaning when it is an instrumentality; it has intrinsic meaning when it is enjoyed for its own sake.

In *Art as Experience*, Dewey draws this distinction again but in terms of *statement* and *expression*. A statement has meaning by standing for something; an expression presents its meaning in immediate experience. "Statement sets forth the conditions under which an experience of an object or situation may be had," while "expression ... does something different from leading to an experience. It constitutes one" (LW.10.90-1). Statement has intent while expression is immediate realization of intent. Statement is generalized and leads to many different things of the same kind. The meaning of an expressive object is individualized and has "a local habitation." Dewey thinks the distinction may be best illustrated by the remark, "Science states meanings, art expresses them" (LW.10.90).

As an example of a statement, Dewey suggests a signboard that gives directions to a city. The signboard does not present any experience of the city, but it does give conditions for experiencing the city. Dewey cites scientific statements as the most helpful mode of statement.

The distinctions that Dewey makes suggest a narrower distinction within the linguistic realm, namely, the distinction between the *literal* and *metaphorical*. Literal meaning can be understood as a linguistic analogue to extrinsic meaning, while metaphor can be understood as a counterpart of intrinsic meaning.

The literal meaning of a word is, like any tool, the relationship between means and ends embodied in it. In its strictest literal meaning, a word is a symbol related to other symbols and having purely external reference to a meaning abstracted from human experience. This is a limiting case and seems unlikely to actually obtain since *any* symbol is immediately had and so constitutes an experience no matter how enervated.[4]

A linguistic metaphor is more an expression than it is a statement, and so it enters and is intended to enter into human affairs as an immediate experience to a degree that a mere symbol standing for something does not. Its meaning is immediately realized in experience. The literal meaning of the words used in a metaphor is often false, silly, or trivial. This meaning seems to be overshadowed or replaced by the metaphorical meaning, but actually it is transformed. and their

Words with literal meanings carry "an almost infinite charge of overtones and resonances" which have been picked up through use, that is, through experience. The charged words provide raw material to be refined and transformed into metaphors just as natural ebullitions and awareness of intent were transformed into meaningful words (LW.10.245).

The interflow between statement and expression or extrinsic and intrinsic meaning makes rigid compartmentalizing of the two kinds of meaning unsound. Hickman writes, "There is a continual passing back and forth in consciousness between them; each has some of the flavor of the other" (Hickman 1990, 27-28). And Dewey writes, "There exists no disjunction between aesthetic qualities which are final yet idle, and acts which are practical or instrumental. The latter have their own delight and sorrows" (MW.10.330).

When a spring day is a delicious peach to be sucked, savored, and devoured, salient accumulated values, overtones and resonances of words used literally are fixed and retained in metaphor. Metaphor is a further growth out of literal language. Words, as tools, as meaningful, are experienced *immediately* in addition to their function as mere symbols, and *that* immediate experience is fixed in metaphor. The words are no longer used in a statement but are an expression of immediately realized meaning.

Dewey writes that when meaning is introduced it "is extended and transferred, actually and potentially, from sounds, gestures and marks, to all other things in nature" (LW.1.137-8). A meaning is a generalization of consequences of particulars. It is a relationship found in particular experience and marked out because it is useful in other situations. Meaning spreads as aspects of immediate experiences are brought under established means-end relationships. Things otherwise mute in their immediacy find a voice and become meaningful.

The products of the art of communication, that is, meanings spread throughout nature (including words), are materials for further acts of expression. What is distinctive about literary arts, poetry, and metaphor is that they take their material not from mere sounds or marks on a page, but rather from sounds or signs *as words*, objects already subjected to the transforming art of communication. Dewey writes, "The art of literature thus works with loaded dice; its material is charged with meanings they have absorbed through immemorial time" (LW.10.244).

Material is charged with meanings as a result of a fixed relationship in nature, a tool, being employed in subsequent particular situations. Meaning marks the way a thing issues in experience, but the meaning does not and cannot tell the whole story. No meaning fixes a thing entirely in its immediacy, because no immediate experience is entirely repeatable.[5] An object is rife with further possibilities in immediate experience,

possibilities not explicit in stated meanings. Because of this, a tool as a means to a fixed and known end also brings qualitatively new experiences with every application. A meaning as a means-end relationship includes unexpressed potentialities. These potential meanings are spread throughout nature in communication and find a voice in further expressive acts. These meanings accumulate in the actual usage of words in communication and can be taken up and expressed in metaphor.

Given that the metaphor is a work of art, it, to use Dewey's words, "clarifi[es] and concentrat[es] meanings contained in scattered and weakened ways in the material of other experiences" (LW.10.90). Clarification and concentration is a refinement of antecedent materials in order to produce a new object. An explanation of this refinement is aided by consideration of the notion of *pervasive quality* as discussed in Dewey's 1930 essay, "Qualitative Thought" (LW.5.243-62).

Pervasive quality is a regulative factor in thought. It is what holds together details. Consider the following example: An account is related to a listener who follows and understands every detail. But the listener believes the story to be about Jane when really it is about Jean. After hearing the full account, the listener learns that the story really is about Jean. At that point every detail remains the same, yet their color and weight change. They hang together in a different way. The story is now different in that the underlying pervasive quality has changed.

Every thought is subject to pervasive quality. Thinking does not occur without pervasive quality. Nothing is given apart from thinking and then later assigned quality by thought. To think otherwise is to deny thought a role in determining the subject matter of knowledge and to restrict the role of thought to "setting forth results ... of knowledge already attained in isolation from the method by which it is attained" (LW.5.245).

To elucidate this view, Dewey introduces the terms *situation* and *object*. "Situation" denotes a complex existence, the various parts of which cohere due to a quality that dominates and pervades throughout. "Object" denotes an element distinguished and abstracted from the whole. Objects necessarily are determined in relation to a situation. To fail "to acknowledge the situation leaves, in the end, the logical force of objects and their relations inexplicable" (LW.5.246). Objects are outcomes of inquiry or reflection; they "are the *objectives* of inquiry" (LW.12.122). The situation that prompted the inquiry is necessary to explain the meanings and values of objects. Otherwise, objects are regarded as self-sufficient and self-enclosed entities leading nowhere and bearing mechanical and arbitrary connection rather than intellectual connection.

A situation cannot be made explicit or articulated. Anything made explicit is a distinction of the situation and, thus, an

object. Distinctions are guided by awareness of pervasive quality. This awareness often begins as a vague impression, a hunch, an intuition. This is the beginning of reflection and of analysis of the undifferentiated situation.

Pervasive quality is recognized only if a situation is problematic and demands resolution into helpful objects. Awareness of pervasive quality corresponds to awareness of intent in blind impulsion. In both cases resistance calls out reflection in order to solve a problem.

Distinctions in a situation emerge as the pervasive quality of a situation is "symbolized in an intellectual and propositional form" or put into words (LW.5.254). Dewey writes,

> the quality, although dumb, has as a part of its complex quality a movement or transition in some direction. It can, therefore, be intellectually symbolized and converted into an object of thought. (LW.5.254)

The movement or transition is a directedness toward a goal, a means-end relation. This is precisely what symbols or words fix for future use. A pervasive quality is symbolized by stating "limits and ... [the] direction of transition between them" (LW.5.254). These limits are the subject and predicate of a proposition. The subject represents a pervasive quality as means or condition, and a predicate represents an outcome or end towards which the subject moves (LW.5.255). In the proposition, "That tastes sweet," "That" and "sweet" mark the limits of the moving quality, and "tastes" defines the direction of that movement.

Dewey applies what has been said about pervasive quality to a discussion about association of ideas. An underlying pervasive quality is essential to the connections in thought that are often taken as examples of associations of ideas. Since the connections made in metaphors are especially striking examples of phenomena often regarded as associations of ideas, it seems reasonable to further apply Dewey's conclusions to the present discussion of metaphor.

According to Dewey, when a troubling thought calls to mind the sting of an insect or where changing fortunes suggest the ebb and flow of tides, the association of these ideas cannot be explained by physical or temporal conjunction. So many other things could be said to be conjoined with any given element in space and time that any particular association requires further explanation. Similarity explains nothing since association is prior to similarity; the association is made first in order to assert similarity. Neither the idealistic identification of form n or an actual existential identity among differences can explain similarity, because, according to Dewey, form is not an element among others

that admits of isolation. Identity of form results from comparison and is not prior to reflective analysis.

Pervasive quality, as that which holds together details and connects thoughts, explains association and similarity. It shows that thinking is controlled association rather than association being the result of thinking. Pervasive quality as explanation avoids appeals to psychical connection of ideas or idealistic identification of the ontological and logical (LW.5.260).

The notion of *assimilation* explains how pervasive quality functions in association. For example, recognition of pervasive quality enables one to assimilate a spring day to a peach. Assimilation is the basis for further recognition of similarity and so is prior to the perception of similarity, but it does not itself involve any direct comparison. Assimilation comes first and does not necessarily result in a judgment of likeness. The further act of judging likeness is made possible by symbols, after the pervasive quality is first put into words.

Dewey writes, "'Assimilation' denotes the efficacious operation of pervasive quality; 'similarity' denotes a *relation*. *Sheer* assimilation results in the presence of a single object of apprehension" (LW.5.261). To identify something as a particular thing is to assimilate the present experience to accumulated prior experiences, that is, the present experience is experienced as qualitatively continuous with the prior experiences. Dewey writes that "the net outcome of prior experiences gives a dominant quality ... to a perceived existence" by which it is identified as a particular object of prior experience (LW.5.261). That is, prior experiences furnish the pervasive quality for identifying a present experience.

When one picks out a spring day as a spring day this is sheer assimilation. And when one picks out a spring day as a peach without yet making a comparison, this too is sheer assimilation. The difference between the two cases of assimilation is the likelihood of resistance to the assimilation. In the case of assimilation of a spring day to a spring day there is not likely to be resistance to the assimilation and no qualitative irritation that demands soothing. No further distinctions are made and no inquiry regarding the object is carried out.

In the case of assimilating a spring day to a peach, the quality of the identification will likely be unsettling and disturbing. Dewey writes, "Passage from this object to some other implies resistance to mere assimilation and results in making distinctions.... The result is an explicit statement or proposition" (LW.5.261). The situation may become problematic and may then be resolved into further distinct terms: the single object of apprehension, the spring day/peach, comes apart, and a relation of similarity is established. A proposition is formulated, and inquiry proceeds in order to determine the warrant for its assertion.

The distinction between the literal and the metaphorical seems to emerge as one between the absence and presence of resistance to assimilation. To say this present experience is what it literally is implies no resistance to assimilation, whereas the case of metaphor does indicate resistance. But what is the distinction between a metaphor and a mistake? This determination depends on context, and on this more than on a speaker's intention. If the single object of apprehension comes apart, is formulated as a judgment of similarity relevant to the situation, and *then* leads nowhere regarding the settling of the situation, then one would probably want to call it a mistake. For example, assimilating the experience of a piece of rubber tubing to that of a snake would be a mistake in the context of a naturalist's fieldwork. But in another context, as the object is distinguished and a relation of similarity is established, the similarity could prove to be fruitful. Identifying coiled tubing as a snake in a description of a place where one felt uncomfortable and threatened might be an enlightening metaphor in conveying the speaker's immediate experience of the place. Context is more important than intention because assimilation (which seems to be unintentional by definition) that encounters resistance may turn out to be the best way in which to communicate the immediate experience of the speaker.[6]

A metaphor, then, is a case of assimilation which encounters resistance and yields a fruitful judgment of similarity. But what is the difference between a metaphor and any other judgment of similarity, say a simile?[7] There seems to be a functional difference in that sometimes a simile is more appropriate than a metaphor. The difference essentially is one of degree. A metaphor denotes a stronger qualitative connection between experiences. While the resistance to assimilation distinguishes it from the literal, the metaphorical marks and maintains the identification of some qualitative aspects of different experiences. So it may be that a spring day is not just *like* a peach, but one really may smell, taste, and feel in a way identical to and continuous with the experiencing of a ripe, juicy piece of fruit. And the end of the day may leave one with the same general, sensuous satisfaction that one experiences after consuming an exceptional peach. Perhaps the difference is clearer in the case in which one says that X is *like* a pig and that Y *is* a pig. The simile states similarities based on limited likenesses. X may exhibit some isolated behavior that is similar to that of a pig, but experiencing X does not seem continuous with experiencing a pig. The metaphor expresses more strongly a transferred purpose or response, that is, a readiness to respond to Y in a way that is identical to and continuous with the way in which one would respond to a pig.[8] Y may behave in a way that "crosses the line," is not mere mimicry, and appears in salient ways quite continuous with the actual behavior of a

pig. The difference between simile and metaphor seems to be one of strength of response to an object.

The famous richness of metaphor is explained by the infinite concreteness of experience from which it draws its meaning. All meanings, no matter how literal, as means, point to consequences that are unique experiences. As John J. McDermott says, "Experience ... teems with relational leads" (McDermott 1981, xxv). And so the tools that lead to experience teem with potentialities. It is the often unacknowledged richness of literal meaning in the experiences to which they point that leads to metaphors and their richness.

The insights that metaphor intimates, suggests, or brings to fruition are new determinations of a situation. The resistance to assimilation that prompts new determination varies in intensity. When the resistance to assimilation is great and yet a qualitative connection remains, then a metaphor may turn out to be the only way to say something that must urgently be said, for example, in scientific discourse. In other cases, a heightened sensitivity to the slightest resistance may give rise to metaphors. Attention to pervasive quality, a commitment to not letting it slip by as situations are determined along well-worn tracks of the literal, can give rise to poetry and penetrating insights into human existence—often at the same time. A determined ignorance of pervasive quality (as much as that is possible) is akin to the shunning of ultimate meanings.

Because of their ability to express new qualitative relations and modes of response, metaphors can prove useful in opening new fields of experience and activity. This is true not only in poetry but also in fields which are more often characterized by the use of language and symbols that fall closer to the literal end of the spectrum. In fact, Edward O. Wilson writes in his book, *The Diversity of Life*, that

> The best of science doesn't consist of mathematical models and experiments, as textbooks make it seem. Those come later. It springs fresh from a more primitive mode of thought, wherein the hunter's mind weaves ideas from old facts and fresh metaphors and the scrambled crazy images of things recently seen. To move forward is to concoct new patterns of thought, which in turn dictate the design of the models and experiments. Easy to say, difficult to achieve. (Wilson 1992, 5)

This scientist's words seem to summarize the discussion to this point. The primitive mode of thought of the hunter's mind is the fundamental effort to overcome obstacles by drawing on past experiences. Weaving and concocting are technological transformations or means of altering environments. Fresh metaphors emerge from the concoction and bring new patterns

of thought. And all of this is aimed at moving forward, growing, spreading meaning, and promoting further experiencing.

The metaphor of the universe as a fantastically complex mechanism moved science beyond the Medieval period and enriched human experience immensely. The tool of the mechanistic metaphor led researchers to respond to their experiences in new and productive ways by leading them away from essences and ends and toward relations and instrumentalities. But no tool works equally well in all situations. And situations that result from modification by a tool may have outgrown that very tool. Put another way the tool may wear out in proportion to its modification of subsequent situations until it becomes impotent or even an impediment, and then new tools are called for.

To say that tools wear out or become outmoded is a general way of saying that an expression is subject to becoming a statement. Original works of art can come to *stand* for something rather than express meanings in themselves. Literary arts are especially subject to conversion from expression to statement. They are, says Dewey, "most subject to convention and stereotype" (LW.10.245). This is to say that metaphors are mortal. What were once vibrant expressions become rigid, conventional statements or what are often called dead metaphors.[9] The poetical, the expressive, the metaphorical can be, as Dewey says, "rubbed down by attrition in use to be mere counters" (LW.10.246). Repeated use makes the metaphor less striking as resistance to assimilation is worn away until it becomes functionally literal. Ironically, metaphors are killed off by the same thing which makes their raw material so fertile for new acts of expression—actual use in communication. A cycle of life, growth, and death is now apparent in human expression.

The last sentence (and both of the opening texts) taken with the title may prompt one to remark on the mixing of organic and technological metaphors. This mixing is, following Dewey, intentional. Dewey writes of the "fruit of a technology [that] can breed further technology" (LW.6.66) and the "[i]ncreased maturity of ... procedures and techniques" (LW.15.85). I hope to have shown how language as a fruit of technology breeds the further technological product of metaphor through increased maturity of linguistic techniques.[10] In other words, the present discussion has been an attempt to naturalize technology and show how human technological activity grows out of organic changes in the particular area of a certain linguistic activity, namely the area of metaphorical expressions.

It is the continuity of organic changes with technological processes that is fundamental to the continuity of natural ebullitions with language as well as the further continuity within language of the literal with the metaphorical. With the production of metaphor one sees the turning back of linguistic

experience "upon itself to deepen and intensify its own qualities" (LW.10.41). There can be no clear-cut distinction between kinds of meanings, and so no clearly distinguished kinds of meanings called literal and metaphorical; rather, there is expansion and growth of meaning (as well as stagnation and death making the way and calling for further growth). Language is not closed off or separated into neat compartments. It moves toward new meanings.[11]

Notes

[1] Quoted in Lizette Alvarez, "It's the Talk of Nueva York: The Hybrid Called Spanglish," *New York Times* 25 (March 1997) A, 1:5.

[2] Davidson denies any meaning to metaphors beyond the literal meaning of the words used. Any effects of metaphor are intimated, invited, suggested, provoked, or shown rather than meant; but how this occurs is not explained.

[3] Standard reference to John Dewey's work are to the critical (print) edition, *The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882-1953*, edited by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969-1991), and published in three series as *The Early Works* (EW), *The Middle Works* (MW), and *The Later Works* (LW). These designations are followed by volume and page number. "LW.1.146," for example, refers to *The Later Works*, volume 1, page 146.

[4] This is why Dewey says that in a pronounced instance of meaning (that is, in the essence of an object as he functionally defines it) "feeling and understanding are one; the meaning of a thing is the sense it makes" (LW.1.144) with sense being understood as the immediate qualitative difference that is had in the experience of the meaning.

[5] LW.1.150; LW.10.51; LW.10.100.

[6] Of course, a mistake may also indicate something about a speaker's immediate experience; but insofar as it is a mistake, it is not means of communication—it signals rather than expresses something about the experience of the speaker.

[7] A simile is a comparison using "like" or "as." For example, "words are like currency."

[8] Such a response would, of course, depend on one's prior experiences with pigs. Perhaps in the case of this particular phrase one would most likely respond as one had seen others respond when using this phrase; in other words, this particular metaphor is conventional—more dead than alive with extralinguistic experiences.

[9] Davidson gives the examples "mouth of a river" or "mouth of a bottle." "Mouth" is used literally in these phrases, but Davidson supposes that once upon a time bottles and rivers did not literally have mouths.

One could think of clichés as sharing a fate similar to dead metaphors; one might say they are birds of a feather. Yet it is worth thinking about how further experiences can sometimes reanimate what has been pronounced dead (in other words, I do not want to be read as discounting the meaningfulness or depth of clichés).

[10] This is not to suggest absolute priority of literal meaning. As

discussed, statement and expression are inextricably bound up in all communication.

[11] Thanks to John J. McDermott, Thomas M. Alexander, Larry A. Hickman, Michael W. Allen, Richard E. Hart, and Sarah A. Blackman for inspiration, suggestions, and advice. An earlier version of this paper was read at the 1998 meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy at Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

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