Falsehood and Entailment

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Introduction

Here's a combination of views that might seem perverse:

> Entailment: S is justified in believing p only if S's evidence entails p
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> False Evidence: It is possible for a subject to have false evidence.

Entailment is naturally associated with infallibilist epistemologies, according to which one cannot be justified in believing something false. False Evidence, on the other hand, is naturally associated with fallibilist epistemologies. Hence, perversity. My aim in this paper is to make this combination of views seem more attractive. Each part of the combination is well motivated. Both Entailment and False Evidence are motivated by reflection on a problem that arises for any view that denies Entailment. In addition, False Evidence is independently motivated by considerations regarding basic perceptual beliefs. Thus, far from being perverse, this combination of views should be given more serious consideration.

Entailment Clarified

The formulation of Entailment above is a good first pass, but it is misleading in a number of ways and is in need of clarification. Depending on what assumptions are made, Entailment might seem trivially true or trivially false. As formulated, Entailment is trivially false if it is assumed that it is possible for a proposition to be non-evidentially justified for a subject (that is to say, justified but not in virtue of evidence that the subject possesses). Maybe perceptual justification is non-evidential justification (indeed, I argue that it is below). But the principle that I am interested in is not threatened by the possibility of non-evidential justification. In addition, it is *S*'s *total* evidence that is claimed to entail *p*—no proper subset of that total evidence need entail it. More precisely, then, the principle that I am interested in is closer to the following:

> Entailment: S is *evidentially* justified in believing p only if S's *total* evidence entails p.

Entailment might now seem trivially true, if we adhere to two assumptions that Timothy Williamson has defended. Suppose, first, that following Williamson (2000), we identify the total evidence a subject has with what she knows. And suppose, second, that following Williamson (2013) and Williamson (Forthcoming) we also identify what a subject is justified in believing with what she knows. Then, when S is justified in believing p, S knows that p by the second assumption, and so S's evidence entails p—because it includes p by the first assumption. But I assume neither of those two Williamsonian theses, and so triviality is avoided. Moreover, even if we do assume that a subject's evidence includes whatever she is justified in believing, that is not sufficient to make the principle that I am interested in true. The principle I am interested in has it that when a subject is justified in believing a proposition, then she has evidence whose justification is independent of that proposition itself that entail it. Even more precisely, then, the principle that I am interested in is the following:

> Entailment: S is evidentially justified in believing p only if S's total evidence includes propositions justified independently of p which entail p.

Entailment Defended

With those clarifications in place, suppose now that Entailment is false.[1] In that case, it is possible for a subject S to be evidentially justified in believing p even though S's total evidence (let's call it "E") does not entail p. For the sake of concreteness, let E = *No person has ever lived 130 years and Abel is a person*, and let p = *Abel will not live to 130 years*.[2] If you find the example not convincing, feel free to substitute your own. If you find no example convincing, you already believe Entailment.

Consider now the proposition that *not-E or p*. That proposition is obviously entailed by p. Hence, there is pressure to say that S is also justified in believing *not-E or p*. But note that E together with *not-E or p* entail p. Presumably, S is justified in believing the

[1]The problem I am about to present for any view that denies Entailment is related to the "easy knowledge" problem—see, for instance, Cohen (2002)—and, perhaps more directly, to Huemer's "problem of defeasible justification"—see Huemer (2001). Cohen poses the problem for theories that posit "basic knowledge", that is to say, knowledge from a source that doesn't require prior knowledge of the reliability of that source. Huemer thinks that his problem arises more generally for any theory that admits of defeasible justification. The issue of whether any closure principle is true is at the heart of both Cohen's and Huemer's problem. In contrast, the problem I am about to present arises for any theory that posits the possibility of justification by non-entailing evidence, not just for theories that admit of basic knowledge, and not even just for theories that admit of defeasible justification, for indefeasibility must not be confused with justification by entailing evidence. Moreover, as I argue below, Closure is not really at issue in my problem. For more on this problem, see Comesaña (2013a), Pryor (2013) and Comesaña (2013b).

[2]The assumption that E is the subject's *total* evidence makes this choice of E puzzling—which subject could be such that his total evidence is just that no person has ever lived to 130 years and Abel is a person? But we can assume that we are including only that part of E which is relevant to p, and that makes the assumption at least a bit more realistic. Adding complexity to make the case even more realistic will not alter the arguments that follow—see also Healy (Unpublished).

propositions in *E*.[3] If, in addition, *S* is justified in believing *not-E or p*, then *S* is justified in believing propositions which entail *p*. This does not get us all the way to entailment, however, because we still need to establish that *not-E or p* is part of *S*'s evidence and is itself justified independently of *p*. I take up these two issues below, but before that I argue that, in the case under consideration, *S* is indeed justified in believing *not-E or p*.

One way to argue that *S* is justified in believing *not-E or p* is by appeal to some version of a single-premise closure, like the following:

> Single-Premise Closure: If *S* is justified in believing a proposition *p* and *S* knows that *p* entails another proposition *q*, then *S* is justified in believing *q*.

Given that *not-E or p* is obviously entailed by *p*, we can assume that *S* knows the entailment (we could just tell her about it!). In that case, Single-Premise Closure entails that *S* is justified in believing *not-E or p*. Closure principles are the subject of widespread debate in the literature. There is considerable disagreement about whether any of them are even close to being true[4] (although single-premise closure principles are widely held to be more plausible than multiple-premise closure principles), and even within the camp of friends of closure there is considerable disagreement as to how exactly to formulate the true principles.

Fortunately, however, we need not appeal to any general closure principle to argue for the claim that *S* is justified in believing *not-E or p*. If anything, I am appealing to the much narrower principle that, whenever *S* is evidentially justified in believing *p* on the basis of *E*, then *S* is justified in believing *not-E or p*. This principle seems eminently defensible. Suppose that Mary believes that Abel will not live to 130 years based on the propositions that Abel is a person and no person has ever lived to 130 years. If we now asked Mary whether she is at least as confident of the proposition that *(either it is not the case that Abel is a person and no person has ever lived to 130 years) or Abel will not live to be 130 years* (parentheses added to disambiguate), then she better say "Yes". Mary's confidence in a proposition cannot be higher than her confidence that either the evidence on the basis of which she believes it is false, or else the proposition is true. Any doubts about that disjunction should transfer to doubts about the proposition in question. If we think for a moment of evidential justification on the model of an argument where the evidence are the premises and the conclusion is the proposition they justify, then the principle in question says that our justification for believing the conclusion cannot be lower than our justification for *dis*believing that the premises are true and the conclusion false. So, it is certainly not any general closure principle that I am relying on.

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[3]Which is not to say that the subject is justified in believing the big conjunction of all the propositions that constitute his evidence—after all, the small individual risks of being wrong in believing each proposition independently can combine to produce a big risk of being wrong in believing the conjunction, big enough to prevent her from being justified. But the subject may need to be justified in believing that smaller conjunction of all the propositions that are part of her evidence and are relevant to *p*. After all, if *S* is not justified in believing this smaller conjunction, why would she be justified in believing *p*? Not even this, however, is needed for the claim in the text to go through.

[4]See, for example, the debate between Hawthorne (2004) and Dretske (2004).

Indeed, some of the best arguments against closure principles are in fact arguments *for* this weaker principle. Joshua Schechter and Jim Pryor have argued against closure principles along the following lines.[5] Suppose that Mary is a mathematician who competently deduces[6] a certain mathematical proposition C from a proposition P she knows to be true, thereby coming to know C. The corresponding proof is long and complicated, but Mary is a skilled mathematician, and she performs the deduction flawlessly. In one continuation of the story, many of Mary's colleagues tell her that there is a subtle flaw in the proof. Mary doesn't see the alleged flaw, but she rationally defers to her many colleagues and lowers her confidence in C. In another, perhaps more realistic, continuation of the story, Mary reflects on the fact that the proof is complicated and that she is an excellent but fallible mathematician, and on this basis alone lowers somewhat her confidence in C (enough to no longer count as full-out believing C). In either of those cases, certain closure principles are violated–Mary knows P and competently deduces C from P, and yet fails to be rational in believing C.

But notice what is going on in those cases: Mary is not justified in believing C precisely because she has rational doubts about the proposition that it is not the case that P is true and C is false. In arguing against closure, then, philosophers like Schechter and Pryor are implicitly relying on the principle that I am defending here.[7]

So there are good arguments for holding that whenever *S* is evidentially justified in believing *p*, *S* is also justified in believing *not-E or P*. I now argue that *S* is justified in believing *not-E or P* independently of her justification for believing *p* and that the proposition that *not-E or P* is part of her evidence.

The two issues turn out to be related. Could *p* itself justify *not-E or p*? Well, remember that *p* is justified entirely on the basis of *E*—*p* is evidentially justified, and *E* is the subject's total evidence. So *p* can justify *not-E or p* only if *E* itself can justify *not-E or p*. To suppose otherwise would be to suppose that *p* (which is evidentially justified) can magically acquire justificatory powers not inherited from whatever justifies it. So, the question whether *p* can justify *not-E or p* reduces to the question whether *E* can justify *not-E or p*.

But *E* cannot justify *not-E or p*. *Not-E* obviously entails (and hence justifies) *not-E or p*. If *E* also justified *not-E or p*, then both *E* and *not-E* would justify the same proposition. But this cannot be. Suppose that I know that I will find out whether *E* or *not-E*, but I am not yet justified in believing *not-E or p*. I can then reason as follows: whatever I find out, I will be justified in believing *not-E or p*; moreover, that justification will not be due to my forgetting something or some other kind of strange change in my epistemic situation: it will be due strictly to my either learning that *E* or that *not-E*; therefore, I am already justified in believing *not-E or p*, contradicting our assumption.[8]

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[5]See Schechter (2013) and Pryor (unpublished).

[6]The "competent deduction" formulation comes from Hawthorne (2004), who in turn takes it from Williamson (2000).

[7]Notice that the principle states that the subject is justified in believing *not-E or p*, but it doesn't require her to believe it. In a widespread terminology, the principle is about propositionsal, not doxastic justification.

[8]For more arguments for the principle that if *E* justifies *p* then *not-E* doesn't, see Comesaña and Sartorio (2014).

So, given that p can justify *not-E or p* only if E can, and given that E cannot, then p cannot either. We have therefore established that if *not-E or p* is justified, then it is justified independently of p. Along the way, moreover, we have also established that E cannot justify *not-E or p*. Given that (by assumption) E is the subject's total evidence, we can then conclude that *not-E or p* is not evidentially justified for the subject. But we concluded before that that proposition is indeed justified for *S*. Therefore, *not-E or p* must be non-evidentially justified for *S*. Now, maybe not everything that a subject is justified in believing is part of his evidence. Arguably, for instance, p itself, in our example, is not part of *S*'s evidence (or not part of his basic evidence, if we want to make that distinction). This is related to the fact, appealed to above, that p does not have justificatory powers of its own, but rather only those it inherits from E. But propositions that are non-evidentially justified for a subject are prime candidates for being among the subject's evidence. After all, these propositions do not inherit their justificatory power from other propositions, and so there is no compelling argument for the conclusion that their own justificatory power should be restricted. What, for instance, would account for the parameters of such restriction? Could they not justify any other proposition? That seems excessive. But then, if they could justify some but not all other propositions, how are we to determine the set of propositions they can justify in a non-arbitrary manner? For these reasons, I conclude that non-evidentially justified propositions are part of a subject's evidence. But then, if *S*'s evidence includes the proposition that *not-E or p* besides including E, then *S*'s evidence entails p, contradicting our supposition that it doesn't. Therefore, Entailment is true.[9]

Notice that Entailment establishes a necessary, but not a sufficient condition on evidential justification. This is as it should be. The relationship between logical and epistemological notions is much more complicated than logic textbooks would have it. In order to get a plausible sufficient condition out of Entailment we would need to add that the entailment between the evidence and the proposition in question is obvious, but this does little more than bury the problem of the connection between logical and epistemological notions behind "obvious."[10]

From Entailment to False Evidence

Recall that I am not making the Williamsonian assumption that justification entails truth. One way for that assumption to be false is for it to be possible for a subject to be evidentially justified in believing p even though p is false. Under that assumption, my defense of Entailment amounts to a defense of False Evidence. For if a subject is evidentially justified in believing a false proposition, then, according to my argument, her total evidence entails that proposition. That can only happen if some proposition part of her total

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[9]Notice that Cohen's own solution to his problem, which consists in saying that we have a priori justification for believing in the reliability of the sources of our beliefs, brings him very close to committing himself to the possibility of false evidence—for there are possible subjects who are so justified even though the sources of their beliefs are not reliable. The same goes for the view in Wedgwood (2012).

[10]Which is not to say that we need a theory of epistemic justification before we can appeal to cases of justification, as I did when saying that *not-E* obviously entails *not-E or p*.

evidence is false.

Compare the position defended here with Williamson's. According to Williamson, a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if she knows it. Suppose now that a subject knows a proposition p because she infers it from another proposition q (which doesn't entail p). In that case, according to Williamson the subject's total evidence entails p, for the simple reason that it includes p. But let us suppose that the evidence on the basis of which she believes p (namely, q) does not entail p: the inference from q to p is ampliative. In that case, it is possible for another subject to also know q and to similarly come to believe p on its basis even when p is false. This subject, of course, does not know that p, for the simple reason that p is false in her situation. And yet her evidence for believing that p is exactly the same as the evidence that the first subject, who knows that p, has. Williamson's position has the unfortunate consequence that the first subject is justified in believing that p whereas the second is not.

The view defended here, by contrast, allows for both subjects to be justified in believing p. Given my argument in the previous section, both subjects will be justified in believing *not-q or p*, which, together with q, entails p. Of course, in the case where p is false, *not-q or p* will also be false. But for my view (as opposed to Williamson's) this is no obstacle to its being part of the subject's evidence.

Experientialism and False Evidence

We should distinguish three ways in which propositions enter into epistemically relevant relations. First, some propositions support others. It is hard to give examples without courting controversy, but perhaps it will be granted that the propositions that Pingu is a penguin and all penguins are animals support the proposition that Pingu is an animal. Second, subjects can possess propositions as evidence. Thus, it may be part of Beatrice's evidence that Pingu is a penguin. What exactly can make it the case that it is part of Beatrice's evidence that Pingu is a penguin is precisely the subject of this section, so I will not say anything further about it just now. Third, it may be that Beatrice believes that Pingu is a penguin, and perhaps this belief of hers forms the basis for further, evidentially acquired beliefs. We can make the same distinctions using the terminology of "reasons". Thus, first, that Pingu is a penguin is (let's say) a reason there is to believe that Pingu is an animal. Second, Beatrice may have the proposition that Pingu is a penguin as a reason to believe that Pingu is an animal. And third, it may be that Beatrice's belief that Pingu is a penguin is Beatrice's reason for believing that Pingu is an animal (both the reason for which she believes it and a reason for her to believe it). Of course, if a set of propositions S does not support a further proposition p, then one cannot be justified in believing p on the basis of S, even if if one has the propositions in S as reasons.

With these distinctions in hand, we can make a further distinction between inferential and evidential justification. A subject is inferentially justified in believing p when her justification for believing p derives in part, and in the right way, from her justification for believing some other proposition q. I say "in the right way" because it may be a merely causal condition for a subject to be justified in believing p that she be justified in believing

q, but this wouldn't count as inferential justification. For instance, it might be that no one can be justified in believing that water is wet without being justified in believing that 2+2=4, but that doesn't mean that the belief that water is wet must be inferentially justified by the belief that 2+2=4. Rather, inferential justification has to do with the *contents* of the beliefs. It is because *q* supports *p* that being justified in believing *q* gives a subject inferential justification for believing *p*. In this case, *q* is a reason there is to believe *p*, and believing *q* makes that reason the subject's.

A proposition may be non-inferentially justified for a subject and still be evidentially justified. This will happen if it is possible for a subject to have a proposition as a reason but not by believing the proposition. In that case, a subject may have *q* as a reason for believing *p* even if the subject does not in fact believe *q*. Plausibly, whenever one has *q* as a reason one is justified in believing *q*, but we do not believe everything we have a reason to believe. So, if it is possible to have *q* as a reason without believing *q*, then we may well be evidentially but non-inferentially justified in believing *p*.

All inferential justification is evidential justification, but not necessarily vice-versa. On the other hand, both inferential and evidential justification need to be distinguished from what I will here call "basic" justification.[11] Basic justification, if there is any, is both non-inferential and non-evidential. Thus, if a subject is basically justified in believing *p*, then she is justified in believing *p* but not on the basis of a reason *q*. Thus, there is no question about whether her reason for believing *p* is inferential (which would be the case if she were justified in believing *p* in virtue of being justified in believing *q*) or non-inferential but still evidential (which would be the case if she were justified in believing *p* in virtue of having *q* as a reason, but not in virtue of believing *q*). According to the view that I will propose, there is basic justification in this sense, and we can be basically justified in believing false propositions.

Suppose that Beatrice looks at Pingu and thereby comes to know that Pingu is a penguin. It should be agreed on all hands that, in this case, Beatrice is justified in believing that Pingu is a penguin, and that she has this proposition as a reason for believing further propositions. There is room for disagreement, however, regarding whether Beatrice's belief that Pingu is a penguin is inferentially justified or not. Some may think that the proposition *that Pingu is a Penguin* is not a good candidate for a non-inferentially justified belief, but is rather inferentially justified from some background knowledge together with basic perceptual beliefs—perhaps the belief that Pingu looks like a penguin, or perhaps even the demonstrative belief that Pingu looks like *this* (where how an object looks is understood to be a property of the object, not of the observer). For simplicity's sake, however, I assume that beliefs about things' being penguins can be amongst one's non-inferentially justified beliefs, but nothing substantive hangs on this.

We can now ask some questions about Beatrice. The main question is: is Beatrice's belief not only non-inferential, but also non-evidential? If the answer is "Yes", then we can ask a follow-up question: given that Beatrice clearly has the proposition that Pingu is a penguin as a reason, what gives her this proposition as a reason? Notice that the question here is not what justifies Beatrice in believing that Pingu is a penguin (by hypothesis,

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[11]Other authors use "basic" for roughly what I am calling non-inferential justification.

nothing does), but rather in virtue of what does Beatrice have as a reason the proposition that Pingu is a penguin. If the answer to the main question is "No", then we can ask the following follow-up questions: what is the evidence that justifies Beatrice in believing that Pingu is a penguin, and in virtue of what does she possess this further evidence?

According to one view, which I shall call "Phenomenalism", the answer to the main question is "No": Beatrice is non-inferentially but evidentially justified in believing that Pingu is a penguin. Moreover, Beatrice's evidence for believing that Pingu is a penguin is her experience with the content that Pingu is a penguin. And what makes it the case that Beatrice has this evidence is simply the fact that she does have this experience. Thus, according to Phenomenalism, Beatrice starts by having an experience with the content that Pingu is a penguin. This makes it the case that part of her evidence is the experience with the content that Pingu is a penguin. Having this evidence, in turn, justifies Beatrice in believing that Pingu is a penguin.

Non-Phenomenalist views answer the main question positively: Beatrice's belief that Pingu is a penguin is basically justified. Different non-Phenomenalist views will answer the follow-up question (namely, what makes it the case that it is part of Beatrice's evidence that Pingu is a penguin) differently. According to Factualism, it is the fact that Beatrice sees (or, more generally, perceives, or even more generally, knows) that Pingu is a penguin that makes it the case that it is part of Beatrice's evidence that Pingu is a penguin. Factualism and Phenomenalism do not exhaust all the possibilities, of course– indeed, the thesis I will be arguing for is neither Factualist nor Phenomenalist. But reflection on these two popular views gives us an argument for False Evidence.

First, Phenomenalism struggles with good cases. A good case is a case like Beatrice's, where everything is normal and the subject acquires knowledge through experience. According to Phenomenalism, something entirely about Beatrice, namely that she has an experience with the content that Pingu is a penguin, justifies her in believing that Pingu is a penguin. This violates what I will call the "subject-matter constraint" for evidential justification. The subject-matter constraint for evidential justification is the claim that a set of propositions S supports a further proposition p only if, collectively, the propositions in S have the same subject-matter as p. This is, notice, a constraint on support relations, but it sets a constraint on evidential justification indirectly, because a proposition's justificatory power is inherited from the support relations into which it enters. The subject-matter constraint is imposed *collectively* on the set of propositions S, and for a good reason. It may be that a proposition p does not have the same subject-matter as a proposition q, and yet it is part of a set of propositions S which do, collectively, have the same subject-matter as q. Take, for instance, the propositions that Mary got her dream job and that John is happy. They have different subject-matters: the first one is about Mary, the second one about John. But if we add to the first one the proposition that Mary's getting her dream job would make John happy, then the result is a set of propositions which do share subject-matter with the proposition that John is happy.

For the Phenomenalist, the proposition that Beatrice has an experience with the content that Pingu is a penguin is what justifies her in believing that Pingu is a penguin. But the subject-matter of the proposition that Beatrice has an experience with the content that Pingu is a penguin is Beatrice (and her experience, if you want, even her experience with

the content that Pingu is a penguin), whereas the subject-matter of the proposition that Pingu is a penguin is Pingu. Of course, Beatrice's experience itself has subject-matter (or, at any rate, so I will assume), and the subject-matter of Beatrice's experience is indeed Pingu. But to conclude from this that the proposition that Beatrice is having this experience has Pingu as a subject-matter would be a mistake. That Beatrice has an experience with the content that Pingu is a penguin is no more a proposition about Pingu than that the New York Times published an editorial about gun control is a proposition about gun control. Of course, the set of propositions *The New York Times published an editorial about gun control* and *When the New York Times publishes an editorial about X, X becomes an important topic* are, collectively, about gun control. But, for the Phenomenalist, it is the fact the Beatrice has the experience by itself that justifies her in believing that Pingu is a penguin.

There is, of course, a view according to which it is not *just* Beatrice's experience that justifies her in believing that Pingu is a penguin, but rather her experience together with some facts about the reliability of her experience. This is a version of Descartes' Classical Foundationalism. Classical Foundationalism does not run afoul of the subject-matter constraint, but it must face severe problems of its own: to mention just one, a belief about the reliability of your experiences with the content that p can justify you in believing p only if you additionally believe that you are having an experience with the content that p, but we do not ordinarily have such beliefs.

My objection to Phenomenalism based on its violation of the subject-matter constraint rests on an unreconstructed notion of subject-matter. It would be good to have a theory of subject-matter to back up this objection, but alas I do not. I nevertheless take it as a condition on such a theory that propositions about experiences do not, in general, share subject-matter with the content of those experiences.

Non-phenomenalist views, according to which *nothing* justifies Beatrice in believing that Pingu is a penguin, obviously and vacuously satisfy the subject-matter constraint. Vacuously, everything that justifies Beatrice in believing that Pingu is a penguin (namely, nothing) has the same subject-matter as the proposition that Pingu is a penguin. But why shouldn't there be a subject-matter constraint on what makes it the case that subjects have reasons? I return to this important question below.

A second worry about Phenomenalism has to with with its claim that what makes it the case that Beatrice has her experience as a reason for believing that Pingu is a penguin is simply the fact that she has that experience. In the inferential case, there is a clear distinction between the reason and the having of the reason—the proposition is the reason, and it is the subject's reason because she justifiedly believes it. If the Phenomenalist is right, then things are radically different in the non-inferential but still evidential case: the reason and the having of the reason are one and the same thing. Maybe things could be said to mitigate the strangeness of this claim, but it is a prima facie additional cost of Phenomenalism.

Even though, as I will argue, non-Phenomenalists do not have the same troubles with the good cases that Phenomenalists do, Factualists do have troubles with the bad cases. A bad case is one where the proposition believed does not amount to knowledge because it

is false, but matters are otherwise as much as possible like in a good case. In particular, let us concentrate on Claire, a subject in a bad case but who is phenomenally identical to Beatrice. Claire is not facing a real penguin, but nevertheless, Claire is having the same exact experiences as Beatrice.

I take it as a datum (there are philosophers who will disagree with me here, of course) that Claire is justified in believing that Pingu is a penguin, and that whatever justifies Claire justifies Beatrice. Factualists hold that nothing justifies Beatrice. Then, faced with the follow-up question regarding what makes it the case that Beatrice has the proposition that Pingu is a penguin as a reason, they answer that it is the fact that Beatrice knows (say) that Pingu is a penguin. Factualists can say that, similarly, nothing justifies Claire in believing that Pingu is a penguin, but this time they face an embarrassment with the follow-up question. They cannot say that what makes it the case that Claire has the proposition that Pingu is a penguin as a reason is that Claire knows that Pingu is a penguin, for Claire's Pingu is not a penguin, and so she does not know it. The Factualist might search around for another fact to play the part of what makes it the case that Claire has as a reason that Pingu is a penguin, but this search is doomed to fail. There need be no relevant non-phenomenal fact in common between the situation that Claire is in and the one Beatrice is in. In the extreme, Claire may just be hallucinating a penguin, in which case there is no object that is a penguin in front of Claire simply because there is no object in front of Claire. It is hard to see, therefore, how the Factualist is going to account for bad cases such as Claire's.

The Phenomenalist, by contrast, has a relatively easy time of accounting for bad cases. Just like the good case, it is a case of evidential justification. So, what justifies Claire in believing that Pingu is a penguin is exactly what justifies Beatrice, namely, their (identical) experiences as of Pingu looking like a penguin—and, in turn, what makes it the case that they have the experience as a reason is simply that they have the experience.

So, Phenomenalism gets it wrong about the good cases because it violates the subject-matter constraint, and Factualism gets it wrong about the bad cases because there need not be any fact about Pingu that makes it the case that Claire has the proposition that Pingu is a penguin as a reason. Although Phenomenalism fares better than Factualism regarding bad cases and Factualism fares better than Phenomenalism regarding good cases, however, their respective failures generalize, and neither theory fares particularly well regarding any case. Thus, Phenomenalism violates the subject-matter constraint in the bad cases as well as in the good ones. And Factualism violates the constrain that whatever makes it the case that Beatrice has the proposition that Pingu is a penguin as a reason is the same as whatever makes it the case that Claire has that same proposition as a reason. Given that no non-phenomenal fact makes it the case that Claire has the proposition that Pingu is a penguin as a reason, so too no non-phenomenal fact makes it the case that Beatrice has that reason, and so Factualism gets it wrong about the good cases as well as about the bad ones.

We can do better. The view that I favor holds (with Phenomenalism) that there is no justificatory difference between the good and the bad cases, but also (with Factualism) that they are both cases of basic justification. So, nothing justifies either Claire or Beatrice in believing that Pingu is a penguin, because they are both basically justified in believing

that Pingu is a penguin. But what makes it the case that both of them have the proposition that Pingu is a penguin as a reason is not any non-phenomenal fact such as their knowing that Pingu is a penguin, but rather the fact that they have an experience with the content that Pingu is a penguin. Because it gives primacy to experience in perceptual justification, this view shares aspects of Phenomenalism, but because it conceives of perceptual justification as basic it shares aspects of Factualism. I call the view "Experientialism."[12]

Experientialism gives us a very good argument for False Evidence. For, according to Experientialism, we have non-evidential justification for believing false propositions. Claire, for instance, has non-evidential justification for believing that Pingu is a penguin. And, as argued in the previous section, non-evidentially justified beliefs are prime candidates for being part of the subject's evidence.

Let me now come back to a question that I left unanswered before: why shouldn't there be a subject-matter constraint on what makes it the case that subjects have reasons? If there were, then Experientialism would fare no better that Phenomenalism, for whereas Phenomenalism has it that Beatrice's experience is her reason for believing that Pingu is a penguin, Experientialism has it that her experience is what makes it the case that she has the proposition that Pingu is a penguin as a reason. So, if the fact that the experience is not about Pingu is an objection to Phenomenalism, why isn't the same fact an objection to Experientialism?

To answer that question I want to first turn to inferential justification. Suppose that you are inferentially justified in believing p—that is to say, your justification for believing p derives in the right way from your justification for believing some other proposition q. The subject-matter constraint that I argued for has it that this cannot happen unless p and q share subject-matter. We shouldn't want to impose a similar subject-matter constraint on what makes it the case that you have q as a reason. In this case, that you are justified in believing q is what makes it the case that you have q as a reason. But the proposition that you justifiedly believe q need not (and will not, in general) share a subject-matter with the proposition that p—that you justifiedly believe q is about your belief and its justification, whereas p need not be about you at all. Your justifiedly believing that q is what makes q a reason you have to believe p. The subject-matter constraint is a reasonable constraint on what it takes for a proposition to support another proposition, but not a reasonable constraint on what it takes for subjects to *have* a proposition as a reason to believe another proposition.

For the Experientialist, having an experience with the content that p is what makes it the case that you have p as a reason to believe further propositions. That is to say, for the Experientialist experiences play the same role in non-evidential justification that beliefs play in inferential justification. Thus, just as it is illegitimate to impose a subject-matter constraint on the possession-conditions for inferential justification, so too it is illegitimate to impose a subject-matter constraint on the possession-conditions for non-evidential justification. This is why the subject-matter constraint is not a problem for the Experientialist. The Phenomenalist, by contrast, does not believe that an experience with the content that p just is what makes it the case that you have p as a reason to believe fur-

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[12] In Comesaña and McGrath (forthcoming) we call a view similar to this one "Propositionalism."

ther propositions. She may well believe this, but she believes in addition that having an experience with the content that *p* is your reason for believing that *p*. The subject-matter constraint is a legitimate constraint on the reasons you have, but not on your having of them. That is why the subject-matter constraint militates against Phenomenalism but not against Experientialism.

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