JOHN CORCORAN AND WAGNER SANZ, *Disbelief Logic Complements Belief Logic.*
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Consider two doxastic states *belief* and *disbelief*. Belief is taking a proposition to be true and disbelief taking it to be false. Judging also dichotomizes: *accepting* a proposition results in belief and *rejecting* in disbelief. Stating follows suit: *asserting* a proposition conveys belief and *denying* conveys disbelief. Traditional logic implicitly focused on logical relations and processes needed in expanding and organizing systems of beliefs. Deducing a conclusion from beliefs results in belief of the conclusion. Deduction presupposes consequence: one proposition is a consequence of a set of a propositions if the latter logically implies the former. The role of consequence depends on its being *truth-preserving*: every consequence of a set of truths is true. This paper, which builds on previous work by the second author, explores roles of logic in expanding and organizing systems of disbeliefs. *Aducing* a conclusion from disbeliefs results in disbelief of the conclusion. *Aduction* presupposes *contrequence*: one proposition is a contrequence of a set of propositions if the set of negations or contradictory opposites of the latter logically implies that of the former. The role of contrequence depends on its being *falsity-preserving*: every contrequence of a set of falsehoods is false. A system of aductions that includes, for every contrequence of a given set, an aduction of the contrequence from the set is said to be *complete*. Historical and philosophical discussion is illustrated and enriched by presenting complete systems of aductions constructed by the second author. One such, a natural aduction system for Aristotelian categorical propositions, is based on a natural deduction system attributed to Aristotle by the first author and others.