***The problem of morality based on metaphysics after Nietzsche’s ‘Death of God’***

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**Master’s Degrees by Examination and Dissertation**

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**ABSTRACT**

The critique of Metaphysics and Morality occupies a central place in post-modern philosophy. The decline and decadence of absolute truths about the true nature of reality, was presented by radical changes in scientific progress. Nietzsche’s proclamation of the Death of God will be set as the starting point for the critique and personal reflection. Nietzsche’s new conception of man, breaks off from traditional understanding, inherited from the pre-Socratics. Nietzsche is not a post-modern philosopher who is against morality, but rather opposed to the traditional way of moral evaluations, which have historically been based on different metaphysical models that presupposes a world replete of universal truths. This work deals with the proposition given on the impossibility of morals based on transcendental truths given a stronger version of Nietzsche´s Will to Power and the implication of such findings on the most practical aspects of our daily lives and future moral evaluations.

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**INTRODUCTION**

The study will proceed with an investigation on the problem of morality based on metaphysics to further establish ‘values’ that are life-affirming and encompass perspectivism. Nietzsche`s request for a revaluation of all values, leads us to a non-conformist way of thinking that can be based on some of his most famous concepts such as a stronger version of *Will to Power*.

Nietzsche evaluates traditional morality through an etymological researching method, in which he analyses the origins of different concepts that humans have been labelling as *good or evil.* Nietzsche’s critique is undoubtedly linked to his conception of what is to be human, and his concept of the *Will to Power* as a quasi-metaphysical antidote*.* Meanwhile, metaphysics is seen as the arbiter of absolute truths that seek to blur man and demand a moral philosophy that is rather seen as nihilistic. Instead, life is elevated as the most important value and from which, we should establish a criterium that will support a correct evaluation of moral concepts.

The critique of metaphysics and morality occupies a central place in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Initially, it will be shown how the concept of the Will to Power dissolves the basis of metaphysics in which the absolute truths reside. Not only the platonic dualistic legacy is under attack, but also centuries of Christian morality. Furthermore, this reflection will be focusing on how Nietzsche intends to fill in the existential vacuum left by his attack on the moral establishment.

Nevertheless, this research rather aims at examining whether Nietzsche has managed to free himself from metaphysics and construct a new way of evaluating values detached from the traditional true world view.

**PART 1**

**1.1 The Death of God and Nihilism**

The idea of the death of God sums up the effects of the Age of Enlightenment and Industrialisation had in the late nineteenth century Europe - that is, the idea that we could not continue to rely on religion and metaphysics to base existing moral assumptions that have been defended throughout centuries. The post-modern crisis that began in the late nineteenth century, signals for the need to fill in the gap left by His death, but also revaluate all our values, and not fall into the temptations of following an ascetic idealism, which enforces the idea to this day, that there are absolute universal truths, and we must keep thriving according to them.

By proclaiming the death of God, Nietzsche also feared the risk of man succumbing into a new form of nihilism based on a crisis of values - “man *against* the world, of man as a "world-negating" principle, of man as the measure of the value of things”[[1]](#footnote-1). What defines nihilism is above all a devaluation and depreciation of life itself at the cost of some absolute and universal truth”. Despite many interpretations, and Nietzsche being quite opposed to Christian values, he admits that a gap was left and was at risk of being replaced by another nihilistic doctrine or ascetic ideal such as science and the principle of equality.

This philosophical tendency to replace a nihilistic doctrine by another one its noticeable when we find Plato filling in the gap left by the Pre-Socratic cosmological views. Plato’s theory of forms surged as the new basic principle of an orderly universe that was unattainable through our senses, since our bodies are imperfect and only our souls through their faculty of reason could see the ultimate reality. Unfortunately, the devaluation of the natural in return for a world repelled of imperfections, had a negative impact in the history of valuing. Plato stated that everything that constitutes matter is an imperfect copy of another reality which resulted in a template form for the evaluation of values as *forms*. However, according to Nietzsche “There are no moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena”[[2]](#footnote-2). Furthermore, in the name of an ultimate reality, man learnt to despise his own natural desires, and has a result became frustrated and angry by rejecting his own will – that is the Will to Power!

**1.2 The will to power: The natural and the theory of forces**

The will to power was developed from two main sources: Schopenhauer and the Pre-Socratics. Schopenhauer sculpted the concept of Will from the idea that everything in the universe was propelled by an incessant enigmatic force - “Will”. Also, from Pre-Socratic thought, Nietzsche realised that the leading force driving civilization was power, *the will to power*, more than anything else useful or immediate. The Will to Power is defined as the basic psychological impulse beyond all our actions. Nietzsche rejects a theory of forces based only in the laws of physics. His notion of will to power looks instead for a unification of both *Dionysian* and *Apollonian* forces of our psyche (the creative and qualitative). From the unification of these two ‘forces’, casual explanations dry out and we assist a dialectical struggle only between the two. It’s a term that reflects upon many ‘psychological phenomena, such as sublimated creation, self-overcoming, will, drives, intentional activity conscious of its own goals, moral praxis, or ascetic religious patterns’[[3]](#footnote-3) . It is however, disputable that the will to power explains the force that drives all our thoughts and inevitably our *becoming*. I will nevertheless defend a stronger version of the concept throughout this thesis to create a logical cohesion, and to give more advantage to a monistic interpretation.

Christianity basis its doctrine on obedience, submission, love and compassion. It is important to notice the dualistic system enriched in Christian metaphysics – good and bad. In Nietzsche`s eyes this was too nihilistic and a subtle perversion of the Will to Power. It is also important to point that the notion of will to power seems to lead to a circular argument, since the will to truth or reason seems to become subordinated to the will to power, making it almost impossible to form moral divisions and value monism seems to be the best respond to such a problem.

The concept of the will to power must therefore not be based on metaphysical hypothesis, but rather on the observation of physiological and psychological needs where there is life or being, which links this concept to an ontological perspective, but also to an inorganic or quantum entity as they are also conducted and formed by a vital force. Within an unauthorised interpretation, the cosmological aspect can be clearly seen through the scientific method and observation that the universe (like our consciousness) is constituted by vital forces that are in constant conflict and dispute between each other, and despite its constant overlapping does not destroy but also creates, and it’s our conscious that gives value to its incessant pursue for power.

Will to Power can be explained by cognitive faculties, but also through unconscious expressions such as unvoluntary body movements. A wheelchair user might want to go for a walk and lift off of his chair, but although he has the conscious or process of reasoning to do so, his body will not let him. The dialectical intensification of life shows how someone’s will to power ‘strives to overcome anything that curbs the being’s intensification or affirmation’. Physical force is the motor expression of this imposing will, but for which alone cannot exercise a display of power for it needs the qualitative aspect (Apollonian) to transform and give aim to its psychological function.

From Nietzsche, but also a Darwinist perspective, the organic is structured by the same principle of vital resistance and continuous *becoming*, where those that exercise greater *power* over another dominates and determines our world. Nietzsche took seriously the idea that the will to power might be a fundamental principle operating throughout the cosmos. In GS 1067, Nietzsche characterises it as “a monster of energy, without beginning, without end...my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating the eternally self-destroying…”. This also defends a stronger version of the concept.

Despite finding some similarities between Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power and Darwin’s ‘survival of the fittest’, there is opposition. Darwin is concerned with the “survival of the fittest” whereas Nietzsche opposed this theory since his idea of will to power is not conditioned in any way by a merely conservation of the human species and our survival. The will does not care about preservation as ‘casual explanations do not apply in the mental domain of the human will…(and) mere preservation of being leads to stagnation’[[4]](#footnote-4) as opposed to *becoming*. Meanwhile, Nietzsche identified some form of nihilism in Darwin due to the *static view* that whatever our instinct commands is for the good of our species, and not necessarily ourselves denies the Dionysian view of self-love and *becoming*.

As opposed to Darwin, the Will to Power occurs from an exchange of different forces of *becoming* that are also what makes the way to a non-static value system. Also, Nietzsche criticised the idealization of scientific progress - “Mankind surely does not represent an evolution toward a better or stronger or higher level, as progress is now understood. This “progress” is merely a modern idea, which is to say, a false idea (…) the process of evolution does not necessarily mean elevation, enhancement, strengthening.”[[5]](#footnote-5). This implies that evolution does not necessarily mean improvement according to an idealization of the same, and this represents a powerful message against the metaphysical stance from which morality was based on. The will to power seems to overcome everything, including the will to truth and absolutism within it.

Nietzsche refers to Plato for attempting to reduce multiplicity into an absolute metaphysical stance: by minimizing the multiplicity of the physical or sensible world into an idea of eternal perfect forms; and also, by vanishing the multiplicity of beings and different realities into an idea of absolute singular truths. The cartesian model also attempted to find a unifying substance, which contradicts the organic multiplicity, and its different forces. Physiology suggests the reciprocity between the multiplicity and coordination between different forces but denies that all its plurality can be seen as one identity only. According to Nietzsche, everything is seen as organic different forces interlinked by a net of different worlds and realities that act according to their will creating a relativism of different perspectives that would make impossible the case of living up to moral norms. The intricate relation of forces of the will to power, and its number of variables is incalculable to the point that the eternal becoming has no starting point to observe its causes.

**1.3 Master and Slave Morality**

Since antiquity, truth has always been under the *aegis* of the thing-in-itself or a true world. This true world, transcendent, as denounced by Nietzsche was the basis for the construction of most western moral systems. However, Nietzsche unleashes a perspectivist notion, in which truth is only a created value (that can be revaluated), and not something forcibly established by a dogmatic or ascetic ideal. Truth is always historical and changing (influence from Heraclitus), and the only thing possible is that of *becoming*. The truth about life is not to be found in metaphysics, but rather in what we decide to make out of it for ourselves - “life, nature, and history are 'not moral'[[6]](#footnote-6). The formulation of moral imperatives brought by metaphysics contradicts the irrational, but also a ‘strong’ Will to Power. From this concept, rather than a true world perspective, we diagnose an incompatibility between the ethical and ontological, which cannot longer be considered systematically grounded.

We realise through the geneology that a) the history of morals breaks with a millennial notion that moral concepts should be taken for granted, and that throughout centuries morality order has been in conflict with the natural, against vital forces, or against our will and what our nature tells what is actually good and bad. b) that genealogy of morals reflects upon the reconstruction of the genesis of morals, as well as attributing value to those morals., ending their absolute *status.* c) we also verify a fiery discourse denouncing all the nihilism and anti-vitalist relationship with the historical and metaphysical tradition. Nietzsche attempts to find out “the origins of our moral prejudices” [[7]](#footnote-7)and realises that words such as “good” and “evil” are historically linked respectively, with the “noble or rich” and “commoner or poor”.

Nietzsche exemplifies that ‘Good’ was mistakenly identified… and did not originate among those to whom goodness was shown! Rather it has been ‘the good men’ themselves, that is the noble, the powerful… as opposed to all the low, the low-minded, the vulgar, the plebeian’[[8]](#footnote-8). Nietzsche gives different examples of how language framed our perception and reference to values. He uses examples taken from the ancient languages and also from German, “Must not our actual German word *gut* mean ‘the *godlike*, the man of godlike race?”. Once the “good” and “bad” is revealed, translated as the superior and inferior man, it starts missing its representative value – “Bonus accordingly as the man of discord, of division, *Entzweiung* (duo), as the warrior, shows one what in ancient Rome ‘the Good’ meant for man”[[9]](#footnote-9). The linguistic dichotomy associated to value duality becomes questionable once we start digging on its relative and historical predisposition.

From the above analysis, universal notions of good and bad have been created by man in power and resented commoners, who had an aim to identify something as good if it suited their natural will. The master’s morality originates from their strength, wealth, beauty, and all the attributes that affirmed their superiority, whereas the slave’s morality is shaped from a reaction or opposition to the master’s values. The master’s values are self-affirming, self-determining, self-defining and active in aspect whereas slave morality is only reactionary. The slave feels resentment and a thirst for revenge, thus not creating values but forming them from a sentiment of anger and rebellion. Hence, the man of resentment creates values that do not benefit themselves, but rather spoil those values already formed in accordance with the nature of the strongest - “the slave revolt in morality begins when the *resentment* itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the resentment of those being who are prevented from a genuinely active reaction and who compensate for that with a merely imaginary vengeance”[[10]](#footnote-10).

The resented slave morale consists in overshadowing noble values. Since the slave had no access to wealth or political power, he used what he had left, his envious insight. The problem is that his intelligence was not used to formulate values that could be useful to himself. The power of the individual and constant *becoming* are seen as ideas to abdicate for the slave morality preaches compassion and self-procrastination originated in *resentment*. When the slave or commoner lacks the self-determination to accept and defend his own values, he creates ascetic ideals that deny self-affirming vitalist desires in return for an afterlife promised by metaphysics.

An important conclusion from the genealogy is the fact that slave morality has only achieved the creation of resented and unfulfilled man. A society that cultivated anger and resentment in the name of “good” and “evil”, represented a setback to the vitalist values, defended by the strong men in history. The concept of will to power rejects, in accordance with the theory of forces and organic natural world, a morality based on metaphysics.

**PART 2**

**2.1 An ontological interpretation**

Nietzsche discredits any moral truths based on a metaphysical, because of its anti-natural world and incompatibility with the ontological interpretation of the Will to Power. Through an existential interpretation of morality, we reach a level of discussion in which we wonder how much sacrifice can be sustained in the name of a demanding morality that makes idealisations over basic instincts and individualism. Nietzsche calls for a new moral system based on an ontological argument which would allow him to look at a new way of doing morality based on the psychoanalyses of mankind, and how man situates himself in the world within himself. From a naturalist ontological view of his concept of will to power, Nietzsche would consider an existential analyses not as radical as for example, Heidegger’s *Dasein.*

Heidegger identifies how Nietzsche’s vitalist thought is based upon the will to power, a concept within the realm of metaphysics, because it impeded the expansion of thought, and had forgotten the problem of Being in itself. “In distinction from mastering beings, the thinking of thinkers is the thinking of being.”[[11]](#footnote-11). Just like the idea of the theory of forms or even the idea of God as the metaphysical ground to justify a philosophy such as a deterministic moral theory, the will to power overlooks the problem of being, explaining it only as in relation to a striving force. Nietzsche clearly makes a distinction between the apparent and real as he attempts to denounce that the history of thought was nothing but an illusion. Nevertheless, Heidegger concludes that the illusion of will to truth had only been replaced by the concept of ‘will to power’. The will to power is according to Heidegger, understood as the entirety of Being, the fundamental predicate to a metaphysical philosophy. The conceptual generalisation of will to power as the predicate, undervalues the question of Being, closing opportunities for its interpretation.

Heidegger depicts the will to power as a metaphysical principle to establish values. Nevertheless, the devaluation of the master morality is identified by Nietzsche as being nihilist, but this way of thinking reminds us of the same type of *resentment* that Nietzsche argued against in slave morality. Nietzsche’s refusal to identify something as “good” or “bad”, since everything in life from thought to action is determined by the will to power, makes extremely hard for the philosopher to create a new philosophy of morals freed from metaphysics. Despite all its vitalism and recognition that metaphysics inclines humankind to a slave morality, Nietzsche seems to be using the same methodology to create a new philosophy that determines life and action, according to one principle, the will to power.

“Nietzsche understands his own philosophy as the countermovement against metaphysics (…) As a mere countermovement, however, it necessarily remains trapped (…) Since all it does is turn metaphysics upside down (…) to such a degree that it is sealed off from its essence and, as metaphysics, is unable ever it think its own essence”[[12]](#footnote-12). In direct criticism to Nietzsche, the will to power is in itself the new unifying value that fundaments the revaluation of all values. Instead of basing values on the basis of the existence of a deity or an afterlife, he turns to his concept that is based in valuing our organic and natural forces. Another important criticism noted by Heidegger is that Nietzsche seems to undermine reason in relation to the will to power and its organic entity only. Seemingly, metaphysicians use the same process of thought from which all form of reasoning must be derived from a concept that denies its own process. The reverse of values is used in the same nihilistic form as Heidegger describes it as his "countermovement to metaphysics’

In other words, essence (Being) comes to be understood as the will to power. The self-affirming nature of the will to power impedes the surging of the question of *being* that Heidegger had occupied himself with. In providing a concept to protect the undetermined nature of Being, Nietzsche not only makes it impossible to question what is *being*, but also creating values based entirely in one main concept he seems to deny all other possible arguments. As Heidegger argues: “Despite all his overturnings and revaluing of metaphysics, Nietzsche remains in the unbroken line of the metaphysical tradition when he calls that which established and made fast in the will to power for its preservation purely and simply being, or what is in being, or truth”[[13]](#footnote-13).

For the above reasons, Nietzsche can be seen as a counter-metaphysician, but since both philosophers have two radical interpretations on the nature of Being, both can be accused of still of using metaphysics. The fact is that when looked at Nietzsche’s philosophy from Heidegger’s ontological argument side, reason is not only replaced by the will to power, but also diluted in its corporal multiplicity.

**The nature of values**

Despite, Heidegger’s criticisms on the effectiveness of Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical argument in relation to the formula used to evaluate morality, we must turn to the question raised above on the nature of values. How do they come to exist in first place? Nietzsche claimed that the world in itself is valueless, and its man who creates different morals. Consequently, the rejection of moral realism seems inevitable, since moral perspectivism are embodied of valueless meaning. Nevertheless, values are created by a group of people or by individuals that can be accepted or denied by some. People value according to their needs, wishes or what is important to them. This is evident when we look at different societies, and their different values and historic relation. Furthermore, the importance found in Nietzsche’s perspectivism is that values are collective or personal expressions that have a common or personal feeling attached. Nietzsche would emphasised on the ‘values’ that matter to a will to life according to a will of power. Instead of rejecting morality completely, Nietzsche only questioned morality because of its foundations had been shaken, and also a firm belief in subjective and anti-metaphysical based morality as if it could exist independently of the collective or find a common basis on a vitalist proposal that was not rigid with maxims that were not life affirming. Just like a secular Buddhist monk, he “updates” his values by instructing followers to examine evidence and to include the efficacy of the ´practices` prescribed. The Buddhist ´practice(s)`are able to stand alone with no metaphysical presuppositions.

However, like in Buddhism, Nietzsche defends that only a few extraordinary people like Napoleon are able to create true new values, and be able to find harmony between their conscience or type-facts and their self-determination. However, if only the great and strong are those who can create genuine values, then ordinary people’s evaluation of values are nothing, but a reaction to those already established by the strong. Whereas slave morality is reactive, strong men’s values are self-determining and natural. In Nietzsche’s argument only self-determination or active valuing makes it possible for morality to still have some substantiality, since it doesn’t derive from a reactive force.

**2.3 Self-determination**

Nietzsche defended the idea that morality originates in our conscious, but consciousness alone is nothing without action to fundament it. The strong men are those who follow their will regardless of an utilitarian summing up of different individual wills. Strong men defend and act according to their own norms that the majority would look at with disregard because of the principles and consequences given to them if not acting accordingly. Following the master morality, implies that self-determination is the key factor to determine what is good and bad. Self-determination begs for innovation, and one’s own invention, but also self-control and self-legislation as Nietzsche pointed out[[14]](#footnote-14). Nietzsche is not advocating anarchy and self-indulgence as self-determination, but rather that one must follow their will regardless of any *resentment*. If one is only able to follow their will without any “self-legislation”, one would fall into an abyss within themselves. For this reason, we must accept that Nietzsche was not against the master morality and even use it as an example from which he could call for an urgent ‘revaluation of all values’. The self-determining aspect of the will resumes in the striving for power, and therefore we must persevere and have some sense of self-control. If we were not to have any self-control, no aspirations would materialise. As Nietzsche would point out “self-determination requires self-control and self-control requires a long will’[[15]](#footnote-15).

Nietzsche states that our drives and habits have a tendency to be tyrannical[[16]](#footnote-16), and for that reason we must have a “well-structured soul”. In here, we can note the similarities between Plato and Nietzsche, in the sense that both defend the “masters” of a hierarchical society. Notwithstanding, Plato advocates a much more self-disciplined aspect of a “well-structured soul” since he basis his argument in a metaphysical world in which there is a greater good. The perfection described in his “world of ideas” contrasts with the everchanging forces of our will to power and its *becoming*. For Nietzsche, a “well-structured soul” is characterised by its multiplicity of forces or different physiological and psychological conditions regardless of some rigid metaphysical formula based on absolute truth.

Self-determination is not found in slave’s morality since their will is filled with short aspirations and only reactive responses. If people became aware of their strive for power, they would turn their pursuits for higher goals, instead of metaphysical promises detached from our own conscious. “Higher-types” are not fooled by their desires or fears, and they are able to be self-determined which makes them better at decision-making. As an example, we could argue that Napoleon was a “higher-type” since he never became inattentive in following his own will to power. He did what was right to him, and with his `well-ordered soul’ was capable of revaluating the efficacy of values he was raised with.

Higher types are self-legislators, but nonetheless their values are still based in a common moral framework, even if they can be neglected. Despite this aspect, Nietzsche seems to deny that self-legislation requires some type of preposition. A child learns self-control through copying behaviour mechanisms. A person does not acquire values alone, but rather through copying and sharing of experiences and then modifying them according to their own will. I would claim that we all have a reactive response to the world outside our conscious and therefore, we cannot solely rest in contact with our own will and aspirations, and even the ‘higher types’ had to accept or react to a world that exists independently of their wishes. The difference would seem that the master have creative power whereas the slave only basis their values on some form of reaction towards the norms created by their superiors.

**2.4 The anti-metaphysical argument**

Whereas the thesis of moral impossibility based on metaphysics rejects any prepositions based on intuition, a traditional school would use any maxim based on ‘sentimental’ assumptions. Intuition always had a great importance in metaphysics as metaphysicians assumed that morality exists not only as categorical imperative, but also as common shared feeling. However, this can always be questionable from a perspectival argument. We could say that is incorrect to swear at someone because we have this common feeling that dictates swearing as “bad” for a different number of reasons. However, to label swearing as something absolutely “bad” is not entirely true, since swearing might be a necessary human response to some form of abuse or attack on our values.

It is an uncontested fact that for ´shared practice`, morality is undeniable. Common sense also makes it impossible to deny morality as it depends on it to make actional coherence. It is also taken for granted, the idea that metaphysical intuition on morality has its main aim to lead humanity to a better path, because it is assumed that there is an absolute truth out there. This way, Nietzsche’s philosophy is anti-intuitive from a metaphysical standpoint. We can also assume that Heidegger’s criticism is not looking into this anti-intuitive aspect that goes against the way of doing metaphysics at least on a traditional scope. The will to power breaks away from philosophical tradition, since it does not permit for human action to be labelled as good or bad, or as a principle from which different moral concepts can be derived from, since those actions have always been part of a multitude of different wills.

In the context of the above reflection, we could think of the consequences for ordinary people, who would then question how to conduct their actions. This question is evident since the ‘death of god’. The idea of “God” here despite being evidently directed at moral concepts formed from a Christian base could easily be applied to Descartes “cogito ergo sum”, Kant’s “categorical imperative” or even Aristotle’s “golden mean”. Even concepts such as democracy or parenthood can be left at stake once those metaphysical irrefutable truths are left with no truth in themselves or the ‘thing-in itself’. The multiplicity of will to power does not comply with value dualism. For Nietzsche, morality was only an intuitive illusion created by guilt and fear resulting in a psychological mechanism of self-denial.

Once again, Nietzsche does not advocate the end of morals, but rather a revaluation. He sees it as an opportunity for men to free themselves from the chains of guilt and detrimental compassion and pity to embrace a vitalist new morality post god that had as its only maxim anything that is life-affirming. This is not to say that Nietzsche is only replacing God by the Will to Power as the cornerstone for his philosophy of morality as otherwise, we could infer Heidegger’s criticism from it that he was still embracing metaphysics. What the will to power achieved instead was the consummation of a vitalist philosophy as opposed to a nihilistic and metaphysical one dictated by a dead god.

A true world becomes non-existent, and without wanting to succumb into nihilism, Nietzsche offers us his eternal return to justify some form of moral construct, as we would not possibly want to keep repeating something regretful for all eternity. Nietzsche was not against a new morality that promoted a more dynamic and life affirming interpretation of our will to power within the realm of eternity. But nonetheless, his philosophy is not a guide for us to think like him, but one from which we can guide ourselves and reach our own sense of what is to be of value.

If we are to reject any metaphysics of a true world, we run the risk of losing meaning to a valueless reality. If there are no absolute truths, and even scientific truths are conditioned by the historical background in which they are in (Kuhn), then what are left with? If Nietzsche is not defending the end of morality per se, but rather in favour of a revaluation, where to start? If truth is relative and historical, then why is Nietzsche so opposed to a slave morality? The main percept is that life is there for the making, we are the masters of ourselves, and therefore we must look at master morality as a guide. By adhering to it we are affirming what is most important for the basis of meaning from within ourselves when revaluating all values, and that life is the most important of all values. It is still possible to have norms that can be more flexible and be reflected upon, like the Buddhist Practice. Morality becomes nothing else than an interpretation of the confrontation of different wills, instead of basing it on feelings of guilt and self-denial.

Aware that he needed some form of metaphysical basis, Nietzsche turns to his concept of the *eternal return*. Nietzsche writes: “This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more’[[17]](#footnote-17). If we are going to live this life repeatedly, then we must follow our will to power so that we cannot regret any actions as otherwise we would be condemning ourselves to an eternal repeated life of regret. From this perspective, Heidegger believes that Nietzsche is still holding to some difficulties detaching himself from metaphysics since he still needs a ‘concept’ or preposition when trying to create a formula to revaluate all values in a world post-god. Heidegger claims: ‘Nietzsche’s doctrine does not overcome metaphysics (…) essentially other than a flaccid historiological reminiscence of ancient doctrines concerning the cyclical course of cosmic processes (…) assisting those machinations that are oblivious to Being’[[18]](#footnote-18)

Nonetheless, even if Nietzsche failed to avoid metaphysics, he envisions a post-modern world, in which philosophical reflection could occupy itself revaluating established norms. Instead of transcendental metaphysics we would be able to interpret human action under the optics of other schools such as philosophy of the mind or type-facts (without falling for maxims). For example, a specific behaviour would stop being determined as good or evil under the physiological and cognitive structures.

Heidegger’s second attack on Nietzsche is that he found some form of nihilism when the latter proclaimed the “death of god” or the “(d)evaluation of all values”. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche interpreted (within his perspectivism) that nihilism meant the negation of life in the face of peace and security. Heidegger does recognise that Nietzsche’s attack on nihilism but only as a “countermovement to metaphysics”[[19]](#footnote-19), since the concept of the will to power can be interpreted as having a metaphysical basis for running still through maxims and evaluations that ruled out any further possible ontological interpretation of Being. In some way I agree with this objection for the particular seemingly contradiction that despite the will to power representing a constant *becoming*, Nietzsche still falls for the idea that values could be revaluated under physiological or psychological grounds. However, by adhering to a stronger concept, we can claim that Nietzsche still avoids metaphysics. From a stronger concept we conclude that everything is always becoming, always striving, always willing. Nevertheless, it still falls under a logical fallacy if we were to say that there are no absolute ideas once we agree with this or other interpretations of the will to power. Despite the concept being flexible and not allowing for permanent truths, we are still faced with the fact of its ever *becoming* that represents itself as a value ‘entangled within the metaphysical tradition he inherited’[[20]](#footnote-20).We can clearly make a comparison with the will to power to a more obscure and cosmological will from Schopenhauer.

Furthermore, Heidegger believes that Nietzsche was only able to create his subjective truth, using his own language and metaphysics, and “in fact, metaphysics reaches its highest possible point, a point so high, in fact, that humanity will no longer be able to hide from itself its own truth: it`s essential subjectivity.”[[21]](#footnote-21). For these reasons Heidegger’s interpretation has some credibility, especially when concepts such as ubermensh or eternal return only seem to form parameters for further subjective valuation, independently of being life-affirming or not. The will to power is an attempt to overcome the idea of God, in order to allow for a revaluation of all morals, etc. In Heidegger’s view this seems far too determining and leaving no scope for further ontological basis (Being) of thought. It must be also noticed that Nietzsche seems to be connecting metaphysics to psychology (type-facts) by connecting will to power or ubermensh to both valuation and being. At times, Nietzsche even tells us “to impose upon becoming the character of being – that is the supreme will to power”[[22]](#footnote-22). However as opposed to Heidegger, I would defend that Nietzsche stronger version of will to power because it deconstructs even subjectivity leaving no absolute truths, since all wills are ever changing and impossible to grasp, unlike the idea of a Christian god that has a list of numerous everlasting characteristics (omnipotent, all-beloving, etc). His subjective truth is deconstructed once we understand that under perspectivism even subjective truths can be changed as opposed to metaphysical maxims that cannot change for the sake of its analytical interpretation. The will to power is far too broad and flexible to allow the destruction and creation of itself through the process of *becoming*.

I would also oppose Heidegger’s view, since Nietzsche never states that is the will to power that the determines the ESSENCE of being. When he speaks of Being, he means beings (everything alive in fact as I have stated earlier – the strongest version of will to power), and not Being in the ontological sense – “what Heidegger means by “Being” is meant “becoming” by Nietzsche”[[23]](#footnote-23). “Becoming” it’s only another meaning to describe the continuous clash of different forces within the concept of will to power. Despite using nihilism as a form to oppose metaphysics, it does not mean he is a nihilist. It rather serves as an inside tool job to unmask how life opposing the whole enterprise of metaphysics and its consequence for human flourishing. His description of metaphysics is equal to comparing it to a long bastion of Christianity and religions used by the weak (the majority of humanity) to preclude the strong from flourishing and bringing the rest of us all to a more life-affirming way of doing things. Metaphysics and nihilism have the same proacted intention to protect the weak and destroy the life-affirming values of the stronger.

Overall Heidegger’s criticism is based on the idea that the will to power is the solely basis for a new revaluation of moral and “it subjects both spirit and body to a metaphysics of the will to power as command, calculative thought, and the positing of values`[[24]](#footnote-24). Furthermore, Nietzsche also seems to have failed to ‘find a new scale of values, not in some schema imposed upon life by a transcendent world, but in life itself (since) his physiology his rooted in a metaphysics of will to power`[[25]](#footnote-25). The ‘logic of metaphysics’ seems to play a part on this criticism. On one hand, Heidegger assumes that a strong version of will to power seems to only serve as an archetype for another nihilistic philosophy that resents the weak in favour of the strong. Heidegger accuses the will to power as a translation of ‘becoming’ that means moving from one thing to another without ever being the same. Being loses its own ground leading to a nihilistic and metaphysical philosophy, ‘In the essential unity of the two thoughts (will to power and eternal recurrence), the metaphysics that is approaching consummation utters its final word’[[26]](#footnote-26). According to Deleuze, Nietzsche, gives a different interpretation to Being that is intrinsically linked to his concept of ‘becoming’ within the parameters of the will to power and all things. Deleuze notes that ‘becoming’ from nothing makes no sense as ‘becoming’ means “becoming of something which already is”[[27]](#footnote-27). Also, Deleuze interprets will to power as a concept created to give a non-mechanistic explanation of force rather that providing an ontological solution to the problem of being. On the other hand, Nietzsche could have accused Heidegger of substituting God with the questioning of Being.

**2.5 An objection to morality**

Morality is a system of rules that determines what actions are good or bad. At times, some actions can overlap in meaning and interpretation, but as I will defend later on, Nietzsche defends value monism. Nevertheless, all set of values must had been based in absolute truths even for higher types, otherwise the rules would have become too flexible and would have not supported self-determination. Kant solution for this problem was an undemanding moral theory, based on the categorical imperative, which does not rely solely on religion. If one acts ‘good’ it’s because they know it’s their duty to do so. This does not mean that we must become martyrs as this would contradict our duty to do good for ourselves. However, Nietzsche claimed that one must continue to have a critical approach to whatever is determined as a “good” set of rules. Nietzsche’s “main objection to morality is its absolutism”[[28]](#footnote-28).

In order to avoid accepting morality based on absolute ideas, including an *undemanding* categorical imperative, Nietzsche argues against the biggest precepts that metaphysics relies on - that of free will, but also the natural and universal application based on the similarity of human beings from which the categorical imperative derives from. Furthermore, Nietzsche claims in favour of a master morality that “a person striving for great things will regard anyone he meets upon his path either as means or as postponement and an obstacle’[[29]](#footnote-29). Clearly the master morality is not concerned with any universal imperatives. One must ask however whether this argument leads in favour of those sceptical that believe the master morality to resemble some kind of Machiavellian philosophy. I would argue against, since the biggest contribution of Nietzsche’s argument is that we must call into question how we value, instead of positing all hopes in universal evaluations. From a self-reflective approach, one must be able to reflect on the moral constraints, and adopt values including new ones that are life-affirming. We must remember Nietzsche when he claims that values are interchangeable and have no worth in themselves, unless for those who created them.

Morality based on metaphysics punishes those who create values (the higher-types) from flourishing and continue their self-determination in the pursue of their inner desires. Slave morality is based on *resentment* and therefore, requires no morality in itself but only a reactive interpretation and dispute against those already established values. In this sense we could conclude that the masters are those who possess morality whereas the slaves lack their own morals, so they react against those values already in place to agree with their own agenda which is to overcome the master’s morality. The master’s morality on the other hand, depends only in self-determination and creativity. It is active and non-reactive; it is subjective and opposed to universal norms. As I have defended above, Nietzsche states that the will to power is irrational, and never follows any *categorical imperative*, it’s vitalist in its core and does not fall for the predicament of practicability as seen in Kant’s universal approach who leaned against the value of subjective truth.

In my work experience, I see the clear impacts of a true world deluded by a sense of universal based morality. We pretend to act against the institutionalization of children services, but all we do is trying to make them fit in accordance with the moral framework we live in. It could be here criticised that without those regulatory bodies, abuse would prevail, and that the “moralization of institutions” is necessary to contain the “bad instincts” of some people’s will to power. Nevertheless, Nietzsche could have responded to this criticism by saying that “moralizations of institutions” are only necessary, because we created a morality based on true worlds that do not exist and on the value of security as feared by the consequences of not adhering to its ‘good policies’. But “good” is not always collective, and without individualist evaluation, we all become slaves to a system that Nietzsche feared so much. As Nietzsche once defined morality, “it is nothing other than obedience to customs (…) customs, however, are the traditional way of behaving and evaluating (…) The free human being is immoral because in all things he is determined to depend upon himself and not upon tradition: in all the original conditions of mankind, “evil” signifies the same as “individual”, “free”[[30]](#footnote-30).

**2.6 Democracy and Equality**

Nietzsche also attacks equality in social practice since we were all equal there would be no self-determination and less of what we could call ‘human flourishing’. Higher types would have nowhere to look down and the lower types would lack direction. It is true that if we were equal there would be no ways of contemplating alternative and improved realities. Mass Democracy and equality are attacked by Nietzsche, because “Democracy represents the disbelief in great human beings”[[31]](#footnote-31). In this sense, we could argue that Nietzsche is a kind of “esoteric moralist”[[32]](#footnote-32) who valued morality only if catered to the needs of those “very few” who like him value vitalism and human flourishing above security of the moralization of pity.

It is accepted that in an unequal society, poverty is stricken, people are not raised with prospect of opportunities and flourishing, even hindering the higher types creativity. I believe this not to be the case, because higher types include anyone who is willing to seek ‘truth’ and who is a self-legislator. The higher type is that one that asserts “to live is to live dangerously”. In a very equal society, stagnation presents itself as a risk.

Foot on the other hand criticises such position by asking “How could one see the present dangers that the world is in as showing that there is too much pity and too little egoism around?”[[33]](#footnote-33). We could argue in Nietzsche’s defence that equality and other values such as altruism represent a problem as they embody ‘potential’ higher types to disvalue their worth and creativity. In equal society, only the lower type has something to gain as they will be able to find security and a sense of belonging. Also, equality attempts to avoid the suffering of masses at all costs, which is a pre-requisite for creation and even “self-love”. Nietzsche goes even further by stating that egoism is needed for human flourishing. Great importance is given to values such as altruism and equality, when in fact egoistic actions “have hitherto been by far the most frequent actions, and will continue to be so for all future time”[[34]](#footnote-34)

Even if the idea is disturbing, there are numerous reasons to agree with Nietzsche. An equal society enshrined in the different nations constitutions have resulted in a decrease of artistic productivity in Europe. Even without morality based on metaphysics we are faced with the problem of the invasive post-modern psychology that negatively determines the ‘new moral’ based on the scientific method and ‘absolute’ conclusions. Surely a hint of madness and self-determination is sometimes needed to create some of the most beautiful works of art or even some scientific advances. Nietzsche points out that “the whole past of the old culture is built on violence, slavery, deception, error (…) We do not need forcible new distributions of poverty, but rather gradual transformations of attitude”[[35]](#footnote-35).

Foot also argues[[36]](#footnote-36) that Nietzsche’s attack on morality and modern values such as equality hide something hideous, since in a more unequal society not all individuals could have the opportunity to work on their creative and productive force. Indeed, without equality not everyone would have right to receive an education and reveal some of their most amazing ideas. This optimism is criticised by Nietzsche, and I would also argue that the degeneration of meanings and globalization of values such as love, longing, and creation throughout different cultures will eventually lead to a single world view that will result in an “invented happiness” and nihilistic approach. If we become too worried about other`s rights, we find ourselves falling for the same tricks that morality based on metaphysics represented for more than a millennium. Instead of a God, the last man will proclaim equality and oblige everyone through law to obey to the same values at the expense of creativity and living life to its full potential. As Nietzsche warned: everything in him (tyrannical man) that is kin to beast of prey and serpents, serves the enhancement of the species “man”.[[37]](#footnote-37)

Science and the ascetic ideals objects individuality which on the other hand, is nothing but an anti-vitalist process of controlling people for the “greater good” of a never attainable progress or unhappy capital gain. Moral norms are changed and twisted for the political or financial argument based on universal scientific ‘revelations’. This true world view distorts what is good for the individual, and their self-determining nature. Moralization also brings wars (not only religious), conflict between forces, and it has been proven to never be practical or able to be followed through. Hence it goes against our physiology and psychology, and it can never be put into practice, without some deterring effect on us as self-legislators. Thus, we can also conclude that Nietzsche’s argument reinforces the invalidation of moralization on a universal level.

**2.7 Naturalism and Fatalism**

More reasons why Nietzsche opposed moral universalism it’s because he was a naturalist and fatalist as he favoured one’s character to be determined by natural facts, and is fatally affected by external factors. In Ecce Homo, fatalism is evident in statements such as “I took myself in hand, I made myself healthy again” the conditions for this (…) is that one be healthy at bottom” as if to say that no matter how healthy someone’s lifestyle might be, their health will always be constrained from the start until the end of life. A heavy smoker might never get lung cancer, whereas a non-smoker might get it.

Nietzsche argues about “accepting oneself as fated’[[38]](#footnote-38). The reason for this, is that despite one’s response to different life situations according to their fixed natural character, the same circumstances one finds himself are not fixed by subjective natural facts (type-facts only), but instead by fatalism. We must remember that the will to power is not fixed itself, but rather chaotic and irrational, and for that reason fatalism is compatible with Nietzsche’s concept. Also, another reason to embrace fatalism, is that we are unaware of our natural will, and that “to become what one is, one must not have the faintest notion what one is”[[39]](#footnote-39). We must not feel sorry for ourselves, but accept what is given to us (similarities to eastern thought), and if unhappy try to modify it within our self, our consciousness. Like a blank canvas, our life is initially in a state of nothingness, and it is the responsibility of each person, as the artist, to give meaning to it. We are the ones to give meaning to the forces of the will.

Furthermore, we cannot change the natural deterministic factors, but we can contribute to the meaning given to the environment in which we live and perceive. The creative input is what we need to add to morality, instead of following a rigid universal path. Some critics would state that the choice “to create” is ignoring “type-fact determinism” as “the particular way in which one is moved to try to change oneself… will be determined by how one already is”[[40]](#footnote-40). Nietzsche would have also mentioned that “to create” also means self-determination. Self-determination avoids the autonomy condition argument from determinism. Once one becomes master of oneself and his desires, he will be able to “choose”. As in a blank canvas paint is thrown at it defined by deterministic type-facts, but if the blank canvas was a person that would have consciousness of itself, and whilst not being able to change facts, with our imagination and evaluations we are able to adapt and “modify” circumstances and re-interpret them in a vitalist way. For these reasons, Nietzsche embraced the idea of master morality, and therefore he was not a “critic of all morality’[[41]](#footnote-41). In Daybreak, Nietzsche pointed out that morality “speaks to us too”. What Nietzsche criticises is the negative aspects of the morality of the cross and of resentment.

**2.8 Type-facts and moral norms**

Instead of morality based on Christian values, Nietzsche advocates a new morality based on the “type-facts” (psycho-physical traits) that constitute a person. The reason for this, is because type-facts determine what is in one’s will, and what is good for a person, despite all its subjectivity and lack of reference points to create a universal code of values. Values are relative. To determine something as good or bad is to ignore all the bigger picture and the perspectival character of knowledge itself. Since type-facts determine our values, it becomes difficult to accept a universal account of morality as prescribed by metaphysics.

Also, Nietzsche argued that the higher types are in fact, the ones “who determines values and directs the will of millennia by giving direction to the highest natures”[[42]](#footnote-42),and therefore demand freedom to be creative as “moral life (as we know it) is essentially inhospitable to the truly creative life”[[43]](#footnote-43). The slaves or “the ideas of the herd should rule in the herd but not reach out beyond it”[[44]](#footnote-44). This argument leads us to the conclusion that instead of declaring the end of morality as we know it, different norms and values must be adapted to each type of individual based on their nature and character. However, it can be argued that in reality none of us would be willing to be labelled as a higher or lower type, even because the argument contradicts the idea of perspectivism and temporality that Nietzsche defended himself.

Some of the ideas of the herd had to be fought with great strength, not only in physical terms but also through creativity. Even if the stories of the bible are nothing but a lie, they are full of creativity, and have “directed the will of millennia’ by giving direction not only to the herd, but also to the “highest natures”[[45]](#footnote-45). Nevertheless, we find ourselves in contradiction, since the problem seems to lie on the influence of a universal morale. If we had different laws for different types of people, then the judicial and political system would collapse, and many higher types would have never flourished. When Nietzsche, speaks of “favourable conditions” he intrinsically relates to what is best for the individual, whereas morality is focused on the interests of the “majority”, which also includes the “higher-types”, in a more normative and pragmatic way. Without laws and moral conduct, “life” - the most important of all values (even for Nietzsche) would be in as much risk as the lower value of creativity itself.

In my own reflection there is no such agents that we can nominate as higher or lower type since I believe Nietzsche to have coined these two connotations with two different characters of people in order to show us that there is no such thing as common feeling or interest in metaphysics and in life as our *becoming* are different and deserve being admired and seen as arbiters of virtues without falling for resentment based on transcendental opinions. His hyperbolic language style allows to have a flexible interpretation of what these two types of people mean for him and for us when interpreting his philosophy without having to fall for accusations that he really meant a superior race or some favouritism for the elites. The master rather meant to be those who mastered their will and their becoming accepting their wishes and fulfilling them with no regret or fear.

Nietzsche’s criticises morality based on metaphysics and its normative agenda, because harms the higher-types and the value of life. Higher types are defined by valuing life above all, whereas the lower-types value things from a metaphysical perspective, one that does not value life for all its ambiguities. Instead, Nietzsche “takes ‘life’ (…) to be decisive for determinations of value”[[46]](#footnote-46)

Morality lacks naturalism and has a “tendency hostile to life”, and this is precisely the focus of Nietzsche’s critique. In Ecce Homo Nietzsche shows this hostility from Christian morality and inclination to look at instincts of life such as sex as something “unclean”. Self-love, envy, indulgence, etc. are categorised as bad when in fact, they are “profoundly necessary for flourishing”[[47]](#footnote-47). One important note here is that the will to power is in itself life. Without will to power there is no life, and life is the sole factor for revaluating values. For something to be considered ‘valuable’ it must agree with one’s will to power and lead the way between animal to ubermensh. The problem with Christian morality is that values only what could be defined as ‘good’. Anything ‘bad’ such as suffering or envy must be avoided, despite helping to grow and value life in itself. Instead, man should look for excellence and not for universal predicaments. Perspectivism points to different levels of suffering that can also be subjective. For Nietzsche, suffering is a precondition for those individuals wanting to achieve greatness, whereas Christianity only has supported the impediment of such. The normative aspect of moral evaluations, without man’s own system of virtues is harmful for anyone wanting to flourish and live according to their conscious evaluation.

**2.9 A stronger will**

Since I am discussing the value of different moral norms, it is important to notice that striving for excellence should be the main task of moral philosophy according to Nietzsche. Schacht states “his perspective is a privileged one’[[48]](#footnote-48)in which, ‘there is nothing to life that has value, except the degree of power”[[49]](#footnote-49). Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical stance would also indicate that he was not in favour of any realism given about value. Nevertheless, many scholars cast doubts on whether Nietzsche presupposed a ‘doctrine’ of will to power as the standard for the revaluation of all values. This is because later in life he seems to have abandoned such doctrine and even opposed it. The concept in itself seems too metaphysical and absolute in the form of premise, despite the multiplicity that characterises it.

Clark has attacked this concept by arguing that it is only presented in one of his published works and that the will to power is too strong to become flexible enough to allow any form of perspectivism. Despite, many passages proving that Nietzsche rejected causality, he also claim at times that “The will no longer moves anything, hence does not explain anything either--it merely accompanies events; it can also be absent. The so-called motive: another error. Merely a surface phenomenon of consciousness, something alongside the deed that is more likely to cover up the antecedents of the deeds than to represent them’[[50]](#footnote-50). From passages such as this, we can argue that theories about the essence of reality are only projections of the “phenomenon of consciousness” and therefore, any strong forms of the doctrine of will to power should be avoided.

I would deny Clark and Kaufman’s interpretation of the “doctrine”, ‘posited as the best psychological explanation for a wide variety of human behaviors’[[51]](#footnote-51), simply because there are many other passages that seem to suggest a stronger version of the will to power without invalidating perspectivism and basing the will to power as the explanation for all human behaviour. As Leiter would also defend, reasons to overstate it as a ‘doctrine’: the hyperbolic rhetoric and also the polemics that this style led to[[52]](#footnote-52). In fact, I would claim that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is based on a stronger will to power concept because the same one denies causality which means that even at smallest atom level, it would become impossible to identify X in a multiplicity of causes. The same applies for human psychology.

The values of Christianity lack the inclusion of this stronger version of will to power, not only because it opposes the same principle of an endless state of constant struggle and overcoming which denies absolute happiness as an end to achieve. The values of liberal institutions also seem to “undermine the will to power’[[53]](#footnote-53), because like Christianity they are expressions (protecting and elevating the weaker to a position of power) of the same in a nihilistic form and they oppose our will to power in all its Dionysian form, besides representing an ambiguity with power itself. Within the different facets of will to power, Nietzsche seems more inclined to a life-affirming ‘doctrine’ in which the will to power helps us sustain the idea that we are the sole evaluators of morals and not based on gods or democratic rulers governed by the principle of equality that could only benefit the weaker in detriment of the stronger. Since, the will to power is not static and can be easily moulded according to the nature of the evaluator since it’s all about our becoming, defending a less strong “doctrine” would imply that the will to power is only one aspect of life and metaphysics still has a role to play. If this was to be the case Nietzsche could have some difficulty in defending vitalism against nihilist accusations. In any case, a “doctrine” that is too strong, also seems to validate Heidegger’s charges that Nietzsche did not allow for another ontological interpretation which contradicts perspectivism and embraces another metaphysical endeavour. We must recall the fact that the main reason why Nietzsche was against metaphysics to formulate new value systems was its nihilistic nature with religious tones.

If the will to power was to become only one aspect of interpreting the psychological or a maxim to represent the value of life, then we could interpret that Nietzsche only favours the strong. My proposal here is to defend a stronger version, to support the idea that it’s all a matter of perspectivism (‘a matter of taste’) when looking at his philosophy. Nietzsche created a philosophy that serves as a guide to support us in thinking by ourselves and not exactly like him. He wanted us to find our own tools to value from a life-affirming perspective. Nietzsche’s values are related to health versus sickness and power vs weakness which is highly connected to his stronger notion of the will to power. This is also not defending dualism since the will to power has no boundaries or definition in its different representations as a matter of perception, hence the use of aphorisms for its flexibility of interpretation as himself at times seems to have conceived. If Nietzsche defended will to power as only one aspect of life, then we could start interpreting it as only the will of the strong since only they can seize power and use the same power as determining in reorienting the revaluation of all values. It would also contradict his value monism as seen further ahead.

**3.0 Valuing as a matter of taste**

As mentioned above, perspectivism based on type-facts seems to be more useful when finding a criteria to create our own value system, and it would also seem that the will to power serves as the preposition for a new revaluation of the same without affecting an ontological argument. Foot argues that will to power serves as a basis to attribute value, and points that there is “a similarity between the way we attribute value (aesthetic value) to art objects, and the value that Nietzsche attributes to a certain kind of man’[[54]](#footnote-54). Indeed, Nietzsche defended the higher types in relation to the lower types, based on the fact, that the latter only represents a reactive force. This reactive force is characterised by resentment and transcendental metaphysics which only leads to the undermining of vitalist and life-affirming values. Foot also suggests that “the higher type of man – is one who has value in himself”, he is the one who creates values. Nietzsche favours a new value system aiming to “producing a stronger type” within a revaluation of morals, in the midst of an ‘utilitarian’ value system, based on “the greatest good for the greatest number”[[55]](#footnote-55). Metaphysics have only so far served the interests of the weak, which is also similar to a utilitarian philosophy that borders nihilism.

For Nietzsche, instead of utilitarian views on morality, aesthetics becomes one of the founding aspects to consider when revaluating values. For example, Nietzsche says that ‘To appraise the value of a man according to how useful he is to men, or how much he costs, or what harm he does them”[[56]](#footnote-56) is subjective and just like a work of art it is not the cost of materials or how popular the work is that should define its evaluation. Works of art are relative in as much as value systems are. The problem with this is that a moral system requires universalism to become sustainable. Moral systems based on subjectivity are inexistent and impractical. On the other hand, most would agree that a revaluation is needed, but revaluating does not mean rejecting all the previous moral norms. Nietzsche himself did not refuse all moral norms given to him at birth or he would have not been able to make an etymological survey of the same.

Here I maintain my conclusion that Nietzsche did not try denying morality but has rather identified values that were no longer needed within the perspective of an incessant present moral crisis. Nietzsche’s assessment only denies morality based on nihilism and transcendental metaphysics. A higher type is a creator of his own moral norms, and this is what Nietzsche is asking us to do – to rethink any given universal moral norms. If those values such as pity are not life affirming, then they should be avoided, just like envy should be avoided for a devoted Christian. Also, Nietzsche is not asking to think whether or not the higher types should be more valuable, but rather to appreciate their life affirming virtues that should appeal to us all.

My argument is that Nietzsche did not oppose morality but rather the morality of the lower types which has universally imposed on a dualistic value system (good and bad). “The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd – but not reach beyond it”[[57]](#footnote-57). From this statement we can maintain the argument in favour of moral relativism rather than its complete denial. Also, this does not imply that the lower type’s judgment is wrong for themselves. It simply implies that their judgment should be kept for themselves as it can be harmful for the flourishing of the higher types – “herd morality is good for the herd but bad for higher men”[[58]](#footnote-58). It’s the universal way of creating values based on metaphysics rather than basing it on life affirming values that Nietzsche opposes to. His worry over the “death of god” reveals an anxiety because he knows that morality is still very needed.

Nietzsche denies the objectivity of moral values at a universal level as “nature is always valueless”[[59]](#footnote-59) and since values cannot be found in the laws of physics, he turns to aesthetics as the sole guide to make our own evaluations of morality as a ´matter of taste` rather than basing in a true world view. As cogito ergo sum stands for Descartes, so does vitalism and aesthetics stand as maxims for Nietzsche. It is however, as a matter of taste and reason inquiry that he thinks that our type-facts should be the basis for morality as it fits with his life-affirming concepts. Nietzsche’s naturalism also bears the possibility of a morality designed for each individual based on on the physiology and psychological characteristics of the individual.

This relativism on matters of taste causes problems to create a new moral system, but should we undermine our type-facts and possible *becoming* in order to have a more practical universal system? Nietzsche would say no, but once again this is a ´matter of taste` and how much we are willing to alienate some personal values in order to safeguard other aspects related to public law and coexistence in a ‘civilized’ society. Nevertheless, I would argue that Nietzsche did not oppose morality, but recognised that “there are no moral phenomena at all, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena”[[60]](#footnote-60) (BGE Epigrams&Interludes #108). This view is also shared by Schopenhauer and Eastern philosophies.

Another problem pointed out by Brian Leiter is that Nietzsche seems to concede objective non-prudential value judgments despite his anti-realism. If it is a fact that X is a higher type, and Y a lower type, then this implies a counterfactual statement, in the sense that it provides us with an objective judgment. Whether Nietzsche is anti-realist, or anti true world views, then the above argument could be also be interpreted as a ´matter of taste` which is based on his perspectivism and naturalism.. In fact, Nietzsche recognises the possibility of two different types of morality, despite criticising specific moral systems. This is not to say that it is evident that Nietzsche “permits one to make objective non-prudential value judgments like: the good of the higher type is superior to the good of the lower type”[[61]](#footnote-61). It is arguable that he does seem to make evaluative judgments and reveal his preference for the higher types. Also, his anti-realism seems under attack once he makes a clear distinction between high and low, but as Brian points out they are “names of values, just like good and evil”[[62]](#footnote-62) which Nietzsche also opposes in value monism, since value dualism only seems to represent a linguistic tool to identify and evaluate actions.

Evaluations based on vitalism rather than transcendental truths could become the benchmark for a new revaluation of all morals. Nietzsche’s evaluations were prescribed for ‘whose ears are related to ours’[[63]](#footnote-63), and despite him making objective evaluations this does not mean a contradiction in his anti-realism, since his perspectivism did not established any logical maxims. Nietzsche has made his own evaluations according to his type-facts or what they ought to be for himself and ‘Zarathustra’s followers’.

Metaphysical ethical arguments are attacked equally with a ferocious rhetoric against the language of absolute true world views, opting out instead for the use of aphorisms which offered “an art of interpretation” leading the reader to think for himself. Nietzsche not only forewarns for the case of metaphysics but also for modern science and the “psychologists” whose enterprise consists in assembling a system of values based on universalism and practicability in detriment of what is good for each individual.

I would argue that critics frequently misunderstand Nietzsche through the use of the same ‘logic of metaphysics’ and the ‘language of truth’, very much in the same way Heidegger accused Nietzsche of doing so. Nietzsche revaluation of all values based on a subjective will to power attempts however, to undermine this process and is not concerned with falseness or errors of judgment if they are ultimately life-affirming. Nietzsche states: “We do not object to a judgement just because it is false… The question is rather to what extent the judgement furthers life… to give up false judgements would be to give up life, to deny life’[[64]](#footnote-64). If metaphysics can support values that are life-affirming, then Nietzsche represents no opposition.

The same way he also does not oppose the morality of the herd as long as it`s not universally imposed. Nietzsche also forewarns us against mass democratisation and equalitarian views would become the new tools of absolutism in a rather dualistic form of thinking that stretches far away from the horizon of enlightenment found in value monism that lends a more a respected way of balancing the understanding of all parties. There is no good and evil only subjective evaluations. How to work in society without universal norms? Nietzsche never said he was against but rather defended a system of moral virtues based on his concept of will to power. For example, equality is valuable as long as its life affirming, and therefore, values such as gender equality would have no opposition in Nietzsche’s way of thinking.

The above argument can be summarised as follows: (a) all moral based metaphysics presupposes an objective truth of value, (b) there are no absolute truth of value in a transient and fatalist world, (c) false absolute moral truths harm higher types in the sense that restrains their creative force that fits with a strong conception of will to power. A strong version of this concept allows us to oppose absolutism in the ‘language of truth’ and ‘logics of metaphysics’.

Indeed, Nietzsche also uses normative judgments of moral, but he acknowledges “untruth as a condition of life : that means to resist familiar values in a dangerous way ”[[65]](#footnote-65). Although Nietzsche fatalism disregards any possible re-approximation between master and slave, he seems hopeful that one day the post-modern society will revolutionise the way moral norms can be interpreted through the development of psychology not as a universal science, but rather as a way of supporting introspection and revealing our type-facts and realise that we are all sinners worth of redemption. By turning to the “physiological interests" in the things our bodies need and the "psychological interests" in the things the individual may consciously desire: Nietzsche also reveals an "ontological interest" common to all men”[[66]](#footnote-66).

**3.1 ‘Yes to everything’**

Nietzsche is in favour of ontological monism as opposed to the cartesian dualism. For him *Being* was not something detached from life as if Being and Life were one thing. Instead, Heidegger wanted us to only look inside us for that ultimate essence of *Being* as aleatory from Life. Here Nietzsche seems to deny dualism as much as *advaita vendanta* does, since both deny separation in concepts such as growth and decay, expansion and retraction, good and bad! As Richardson points out: “Nietzsche intends to offer instead a monism about values (…) by which ‘value monism’ refers to the claim that intrinsic value lies in a single property (…) everything has the same value (…) his value monism holds that good is the only value”[[67]](#footnote-67). This position reveals that for Nietzsche everything is good, and we only have degrees of the same value. Some actions are better than others, but that does not mean an absolute ‘bad’, but instead an hierarchy of values without a base or top. For this reason, we accidently find the argument for which Nietzsche says ‘yes to everything’ as the new formula to evaluate values within a new vitalist perspective: ‘a Yes-saying without reservation even to suffering, even to guilt, even to everything questionable and strange about existence’[[68]](#footnote-68). His main concepts sum up this position:

1)Will to Power affirms the existence of a continuous fight for power, for life, a struggle between forces never to cease otherwise nothing would replace something.

2) Eternal Return is also about saying ‘yes to everything’ as one must accept things as they are, even suffering. If we don’t accept it, we are doomed to live the same life repeatedly full of regrets and sorrows. We must accept things as life becomes the ultimate value, the only value, replacing Being and also the cartesian dualism found also in Christian doctrine of good and bad.

3) Amor-fati as the formula that affirms his fatalism. One must accept everything as it is and love his own fate, as one has no other option.

4) Finally, the Dionysian also as “affirmation of the world as it is” for all its good and bad, trying somehow cross a bridge with the Apollonian. This alliance provides support for a strong concept of will to power.

Once again, everything is good and a ‘matter of taste’: “nothing in existence should be excluded, nothing is dispensable”[[69]](#footnote-69). Indeed, there is some opposition to my defence. Firstly, if we say ‘yes’ to everything’ then the notion of value loses its meaning. Nietzsche himself seems to have denounced some things as bad. However, if we defend perspectivism and deny value dualism as a ‘matter of taste’ the metaphysicians defence falls apart. “The fundamental faith of metaphysicians is the faith in opposite values”.[[70]](#footnote-70)

In spite of that, in a post-modern world in which science seems to be taking over every aspect of our lives value dualism prevails. Furthermore, scientific research prompt us to think all morals proceed from empathy. We would imply from these that someone immoral is that one that lacks empathy. And while selfishness can be as benign as ‘live and let live”, at the other extreme lies the national-socialism and alike. Some would argue that Nietzsche was a lot close to the Hitler end of the spectrum than the Golden Rule of Aristoteles. I would conclude that morality lies in the boundary conditions practiced through behaviour. These boundaries as seen throughout the centuries have always restraint the higher types or anyone else from flourishing as pointed earlier. The point here is that Nietzsche defends perspectivism, vitalism and flourishing of man for a greater good, since good is the unity of value. Hence, morality is relative, and not all about empathy and boundaries. Even ‘psychopaths’ or national-socialists can choose to act ‘morally’ whether or not they lack empathy. Morality is historically and situationally driven and so are its boundaries. The latest to be stricken by the passing of time was the death of the old archetype of morals that requires a revision or revaluation in the light of new post-modern society.

The new way to ‘revaluate all values’ after the death of god, should be about finding ways to conciliate the difference forces of our will(s) to power and celebrate life for what its making. Different will(s) to power or *becoming* confront each other values all the time and morality is the discipline that attempts to construct boundaries so that we can live in a harmonised society. The only boundaries should be based in avoiding any nihilistic idealism. Nietzsche argues that the greatest are those who combine opposites without the need for boundaries - “this most affirmative of all spirits; in him all opposites are fused together into a new unity. The highest and the lowest powers of human nature”[[71]](#footnote-71).

Some would also argue that Nietzsche is being guided by the emotive force, but the fact that traits such aggressiveness or feelings of suffering have something of good. In WP 272, Nietzsche argues that his ‘purpose’ is “to demonstrate the absolute homogeneity of all events and the application of moral distinctions as occasioned by perspective; to demonstrate how everything praised as moral is identical in essence with everything immoral and was made, as in every development of morality, with immoral means and for immoral ends”.

**PART 3**

**3.1 Revaluation and Eastern monism**

As Heraclitus once said: “Sea: purest and foulest water, for fish drinkable and sustaining, for humans undrinkable and deadly” and also, as J. Richardson pointed out “good requires bad not just for contrast, but as an element in itself: good is always an overcoming of a bad” [[72]](#footnote-72). As controversial as it might seem the suffering and self-determination of some individuals who we could call ‘masters’ led the way for development of human rights that we all take for granted nowadays.

Nietzsche believes that value-monism should be inspired by Dionysus, but I would argue also in favour of an eastern philosophical aspect within his historical perspective - that there is no real value dualism, but rather a succession of different situations that are intertwined. It’s a human condition translated into the concept of will to power, the perpetual strive to overcome a current state of affairs. This idea of *becoming*, or life as will to power and ‘good’ as a concept to overcome the bad. Good is willing to overcome, rather than a goal-state reached. Deleuze goes even further by saying that “man must turn against himself, must destroy himself in order to make room for the overman”[[73]](#footnote-73). This interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of Dionysus seems too radical as it expresses a form of brutal nihilism. Instead the solution for the revaluation seems to be much more similar to the Buddhist thought that we must avoid this overcome of current states and try to live content within the boundaries of our own suffering. To renounce this fact, is to renounce life for what its making, and condemn ourselves to an unworthy eternal life. The Buddhist accepts Life for what is just like Nietzsche without succumbing to nihilism or even metaphysics since its practices are part of a process of learning and change.

More similarities could be found in the Indian philosophy of advaita vendanta that defends an anti-dualistic view of the world. In particular, the fact that both Nietzsche and Advaita agree that everything is transient and in a state of perpetual flux. Time, space and causality are not objective`, but cognitive products. Mind is a subjective and changes continuously without any predicates but that of will to power or ever *becoming*. As Sri Nisargadatta Maharaj [[74]](#footnote-74)eloquently notes: “The world as seen from the mind is subjective and private world, which changes continuously. In opposition to the restless mind, with its limited categories – intentionality, subjectivity, duality, etc – stands supreme the limitless sense of ´I am`.” The illusory reality is neither good or bad. Once we comprehend that reality is valueless, that we are the solely contributors of value, we no longer need morality as we know it, just like the Buddhist notion of bodhisattva who instinctually acts only out of love and kindness, and therefore needs no laws. Morality represents only a stepladder to a better understanding of what is beyond good and evil. We must understand the relativism of things, so that we will no longer act out of lust, hate or desire. Hence no need for the absolutism of religious metaphysics which is counteractive with its own formula in producing a valuation of acts in dualistic form. Thus the revaluation of all values represents the path to enlightenment to help us living in accordance with our will to power or with our ever *becoming*.

**3.2 *Becoming* and the new morality**

When Nietzsche argued “to live life is to live dangerously”, he is not necessarily advocating the absence of order and saying we should do whatever we might feel like doing. As Evans & Reid defended: “What is demanded is the formulation of alternative modes of existence that are not afraid to have reasons to believe in this world.”[[75]](#footnote-75)Nietzsche wants to free us from a world where every new value must become a new imperative. He wants us to create a new morality based on the subjectivity and particularity of a determined situation.

Human values cannot be reduced only to morality, they must neither be reduced to the ‘greatest’ value of happiness nor to hedonism. They must be relative narratives. The overcoming is what becomes value itself – “The self is to be actively produced as a non-stable subject that does not seek to emulate some normative standard, but instead forcefully challenges the vulnerable ground which it is said to occupy”[[76]](#footnote-76). The ‘revaluation of all values’ means to revaluate all that is *becoming* for a more life-affirming morality as opposed to a nihilistic one. His new morality is one that places life in the seat of God. Nietzsche is not preoccupied with the after but with the path to a never ending state-reached goal. To “live life is to live dangerously” means to live life to its full potential so that we will never regret anything that is life-affirming. The new morality should be something that always seeks truth in the process of continuous *becoming*, and not something static and universal. This require us all to cultivate a critical sense of being as opposed to the Heideggerian “Dasein” that leads to nothing. This new morality would accept other`s views and ‘matters of taste’ if these are life-affirming in the process of *becoming* which is vitalist. Also, there is no absolute value dualism to confirm something to be good or bad, but only things that we can call virtues and other we must despise if not life affirming. The will to power is the departing point to a new understanding of power and becoming that helps to understand morality instead of basing in transcendental metaphysics.

**CONCLUSION**

To conclude this dissertation, I would like to at last safeguard this ‘new morality’ based on Nietzsche’s four virtues. “The four virtues are – Honest towards ourselves, and to all and everything friendly to us; brave in the face of our enemy; generous towards the vanquished; polite at all times: such do the four cardinal virtues wish us to be(come)[[77]](#footnote-77)”. He adds that politeness is a very good thing, but should not be confused with submission, rather signified in words such “ointment” and “would cement us together”. It is evident that Nietzsche wanted to bring back ancient Greek virtues and with nowadays information possible to align with some eastern philosophy for its value monism.

I would also consider the fact that in some respect Christian morality has some degree of ‘good’ some its values are ‘yes-saying’. In WP 1004, Nietzsche says, “to attain a height and bird’s eye view, so one grasps how everything actually happens as it ought to happen; how every kind of “imperfection” and the suffering to which it gives rise are part of the highest desirability”. Within his own perspectivism he accepts the idea of metaphysical perspective as long as they belong to the sphere of the particular and not universal. Zarathustra himself says: “this is my good and evil… Good for all, evil for all”[[78]](#footnote-78). Particular metaphysics yes, but universal and ‘autocratic’ no. The partiality of my own constructed evaluation of morals allied to the four virtues would simple be the ‘new morality’. In advanced democracies this view seems to be increasingly shared by most people, but to accept a morality without a firm basis like god, we find the trouble of either relying on an autocratic world regime with no choice or in a lighter way look for pragmatic religions or ways of life such as that found in some schools of Hinduism and Buddhism.

Since life is about striving and becoming, we can evaluate a particular value by how it stands according to our particular judgment and will. Morality is only a step to a status of enlightenment in a never-ending goal of virtues not valued by a god but by man himself. Perspectivism is the ultimate ´hammer` to a new vitalist morality with no boundary norms.

As stated in the introduction, Nietzsche constructed a philosophy for himself and a guide for others in a post-modern world. Nietzsche is against dogma and universalism, and advocates individualism and vitalism. The ‘new morality’ is a type-fact morality driven by internal impulses rather than by reactive forces which has much more in common with eastern thought than with a millennium of nihilism embedded in western metaphysics.

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