Source:	Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai - Philosophia
	Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai - Philosophia
Location:	Romania
Author(s):	Adrian Costache
Title:	THE BEING OF HISTORY, THE PLAY OF DIFFÉRANCE AND THE PROBLEM OF MISUNDERSTANDING
	THE BEING OF HISTORY, THE PLAY OF DIFFÉRANCE AND THE PROBLEM OF MISUNDERSTANDING
Issue:	3/2013
Citation style:	Adrian Costache. "THE BEING OF HISTORY, THE PLAY OF DIFFÉRANCE AND THE PROBLEM OF MISUNDERSTANDING". Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai - Philosophia 3:179-190.
	https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=145670

THE BEING OF HISTORY, THE PLAY OF DIFFÉRANCE AND THE PROBLEM OF MISUNDERSTANDING[*]

ADRIAN COSTACHE[**]

ABSTRACT. Beginning with the second decade of the last century, after a fierce critique of W. Dilthey and the Historical School's epistemological approach, philosophical hermeneutics has assumed the position of "official" philosophy of history of our times. In the present paper we would like to show that in spite of this position philosophical hermeneutics proves nevertheless incapable to answer one of the two basic questions confronting any philosophy of history whatsoever, namely "How is history to be known?," making historical science problematic. For if the being of history really is tradition as philosophical hermeneutics argues, and if the essence of tradition is language then, on the one hand, the very stability of historical meaning presupposed by any epistemological process will always be displaced by the play of what Derrida calls "difference". And, on the other hand, even if historical meaning were stable enough so as to be known, it could not be grasped because, we will try to argue, the process of understanding as philosophical hermeneutics describes it is always permeated by misunderstanding.

Key Words: Epistemology of History; Historical Knowledge, Dilthey; Heidegger; Gadamer

1. Introduction. On the Tasks of a Philosophy of History

The task with which history confronts philosophy, the task of a philosophy of history is a two-fold one: First of all, the philosophy of history has to show what history is by answering such questions as "What makes an event historical?," "How can something that is happening now have an impact on what is going to happen in the future?," "How is the past given in and for the present?" And,

---

[**] *Postdoctoral Fellow of the Romanian Academy, Iaşi Branch*

second of all, the task of the philosophy of history is to show how can history be known considering its peculiar ontological constitution. For history truly is particular in this sense considering that, in contrast to what is called "nature" in the terms of classical metaphysics, history is never given to us as an object standing in front of and, thus, opposed to the subject. On the contrary, as Dilthey has already shown,[1] no matter how one wants to define it precisely, history is inexorably tied to man, to humanity. This means that the rapport of the knower to history is actually a rapport from subject to subject. On the other hand though, and still in contrast to nature, history is never given to us in a here and now. It is given as the trace of something that has been present but is not anymore or as something that will be but is not yet.

These two tasks have never been considered equally important and have always been approached preferentially throughout the history of the philosophy of history. In the 19th century, for the Historical School and Wilhelm Dilthey, its most prominent theorist, the second line of questioning mentioned was considered central, "What is history?," "What makes a historical experience historical?" being taken as secondary questions to be approached just in passing. Later on though, in the 20th century, for thinkers such as Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer the central question was the ontological one about being of history, this time the epistemological questions being considered secondary. In fact, for Heidegger and Gadamer it was precisely because it did not start with the ontological question that the epistemological inquiry of the Historical School ended up in aporia and, eventually had to be abandoned.[2] For by keeping strictly within the confines of the epistemological approach, Dilthey's "critique of historical reason" fails to anchor history in experience as its Kantian model was asking and thus ends up reducing it to a form of history of ideas. Otherwise put, by not starting with "What is history?" the Historical School, just like Hegel it wanted to overcome, ends up missing the reality of history by reducing it to pure spirit.

2. The Aim of the Paper and a Question of Method

But despite that Heidegger and Gadamer themselves were the ones who brought to light the primacy of the ontological question of history showing also the need to overcome the Historical School's epistemological approach, they do

---

[1] Wilhelm Dilthey, *Selected Works. The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*, vol. 3 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 101-02.

[2] See in this sense my "For a Post-Historicist Philosophy of History. Beyond Hermeneutics," *Logos & Episteme* II, no. 4 (2011): 489-505.

not actually go further than the latter on the path they open.[3] Despite Heidegger's extensive inquiries into the question of being and irrespective of Gadamer's tarrying on the matter of tradition (considered to be the substance of our historical being)[4], its rationality and the necessity of its rehabilitation, in the end, both philosophers come to determine the being of history in terms of language or, better put, *as* language. But is language something other than spirit? Is it not the very means whereby the spirit comes about?

Our contention is that by putting the problem of the being of history in terms of language philosophical hermeneutics fails to give a satisfactory answer not only to "What is history?" but also to "How can history be known?". This is what to show in the present paper.

Before proceeding we should tarry a moment on the legitimacy of the task. For can we still pose such an epistemological problem in connection with a philosophical endeavor which argues that with regard to the question of history epistemology leads to aporia? Irrespective of how strange it might sound, the answer to these questions is yes. And, in fact, the legitimacy of such an epistemological problem from the point of view of philosophical hermeneutics was explicitly affirmed by Gadamer in *Truth and Method* and was indirectly hinted by Heidegger in *Being and Time*. In the Introduction to his magnum opus Gadamer writes:

> "The following investigations start with the resistance in modern science itself to the universal claim of scientific method. They are concerned to seek the experience of truth that transcends the domain of scientific method wherever that experience is to be found, and to inquire into its legitimacy. Hence the human sciences are connected to modes of experience that lie outside science: with the experiences of philosophy, of art, and of history itself. These are all modes of experience in which a truth is communicated that cannot be verified by the monological means proper to science."[5]

In his turn, in §7 of *Being and Time*, after discerning the three originary meanings of hermeneutics or, better put, after establishing the three fundamental senses in which the phenomenology of Dasein is hermeneutic, Heidegger is careful enough to note also another sense: "the methodology of those humane sciences which are historiological in character."[6] This idea that the methodology of the human

---

[3] See again idem.

[4] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London & New York: Continuum, 2004), 278.

[5] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London & New York: Continuum, 2004), XXI.

[6] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962), 62/[38].

sciences with everything it entails is "derivative" from an ontological inquiry into the possibility of historiography, this idea that ontology provides the basis or the foundation for epistemology shows clearly that the epistemological questioning of history ought not to be abandoned, but pursued.

For pursuing it we have two ways at our disposal corresponding to the two modes in which philosophical critique can be done—immanent and transcendent.

3. The Transcendent Critique. The Problem of the Unity of Historical Meaning

The transcendent critique of philosophical hermeneutics is based on Jacques Derrida's idea of différance and aims to show that insomuch as the being of history is determined as language and insomuch as historical meaning is instituted as the sole object of study of the historical sciences, this object becomes ungraspable. The Play of différance in language deprives meaning as such and historical meaning in particular of its unity and identity.

Derrida arrived at the idea of différance completely independently of the problematic of history. In fact, this problematic is not even mentioned in *Of Grammatology* and *Speech and Phenomenon* where différance is first discussed and it is merely hinted at in Derrida's later work. If différance proves of importance for our inquiry this is because it is developed in the course of an investigation into the question of meaning unfolding as a deconstructive reading of Ferdinand de Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics* and Edmund Husserl's *Logical Investigations*.

At first sight, from Husserl's phenomenology and especially from Saussure's structural linguistics to Heidegger and Gadamer's ontology of language there might seem to be a gap too wide to be bridged speculatively in a legitimate manner. Irrespective of the differences that separate these philosophers though, they all have a one important thing in common, namely the core presupposition that language is ontologically constitutive of the world or, more generally put, of being. Just as for Gadamer "to have a world […] is to have language"[7] and just as for Heidegger language constitutes the "house of Being,"[8] just the same for Saussure language is the ontological condition of any entity whatsoever. And this because for him "without language, thought is a vague, unchartered nebula. There are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language."[9]

---

[7] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 440-41.

[8] Martin Heidegger, "What Are Poets For?" in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York & London: Harper Colophon Books, 1975), 132.

[9] Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), 111-12.

But what exactly is this différance with an "a," not the usual "e"? Even though necessary in order to bring to light how différance renders historical meaning ungraspable, a question of the form "what is?" is not the most felicitous in this case. For as Derrida says, "différance is not, does not exist, is not a present-being (*on*) in any form"[10] So différance cannot be seen or heard and thus it does not belong to the order of the sensible. But it does not belong to the intelligible one either because it is "neither a word, nor a concept."[11] If the thought of différance came to somebody's mind though, this happened through its effects as movement, or process articulating the two fundamental meaning of the Latin verb "differer" still audible in the French "différer." In the first sense of "différer" the process of différance sends first of all to the action of

> "…putting off until later, of taking into account, of taking account of time and of the forces of an operation that implies an economical calculation, a detour, a delay, a relay, a reserve. […] *Différer* in this sense is to temporize, to take recourse, consciously or unconsciously, in the temporal or temporizing mediation of a detour that suspends the accomplishment or fulfillment of 'desire' or 'will,' and equally effects this suspension in a mode that annuls or tempers its own effect."[12]

In the second sense of "différer" the process of différance sends to

> "to be not identical, to be other, discernible. When dealing with *differen(ts)(ds)*, a word that can be written with a final *ts* or *ds*, as you will, whether it is a question of dissimilar otherness or of allergic and polemical otherness, an interval, a distance, *spacing*, must be produced between the elements other , and be produced with a certain perseverance in repetition."[13]

The articulation and intertwining of the two meanings of "différer" constitutes the crucible of différance. The effects of this articulation are to be found everywhere. But nowhere are they more poignant and readily apparent as in the problematic of the sign, especially the linguistic sign.

By definition a sign, every sign is something that stands for and sends to something else, be this "something else" a meaning or a reference, i.e., an idea or a real object or state of facts in the outside world. Which comes to say that, by definition, every sign becomes what is by deferring the present of the thing for which it stands from the present and is, in the end, the sign of an absence. Hence the movement of *temporization*. But no sign exists by itself and no sign draws its

---

[10] Jacques Derrida, "Différance" in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 6.

[11] Idem., 7.

[12] Idem, 8.

[13] Ibid.

signifying power from itself but, rather, from the code showing exactly why this sign in particular will send to that particular meaning or reference and not another, and why it sends to one meaning or reference and not many. In the case of the linguistic sign its signifying power comes from the language to which it belongs.[14] If we take a closer look at the code of language the *spacing* of différance will become apparent as well.

We know already from Saussure that languages are, as Pierre Richard puts it, "diacritical realities"[15] presenting themselves as systems of differences without positive terms. For, as Saussure showed in his seminal *Course in General Linguistics*, the linguistic sign is constituted as an unmotivated bond between signifier and signified set in place just because each of these is different than all the other signifiers and signifieds of that language. That is to say, the linguistic sign is constituted by the multiplicity of "lateral"[16] relations it has with all the other signs of the language to which it belongs. This is something that Gadamer himself knew very well for in *Truth and Method* he notes explicitly: "…every word breaks forth as if from a center and is related to a whole, through which alone it is a word."[17]

Because of this though, every linguistic sign uttered and thus given in the present bears the trace of the past signs uttered and thus present before it but also of the future ones to be uttered. Any sign presently given finds itself inhabited by a past present and a future present. However, if the sign given in the present moment it to maintain its identity though, if it is to remain different than all the other signs that precede and follow it, then its presentation in the present must be separated by an *interval* from all the other signs formerly given in the present and also those that will be given in the future. In and through this interval assuring the identity of the sign the *spacing,* the "becoming-space of time"[18] of différance appears.

If we piece together différance's movements of temporization and spacing though we will see how meaning in general and thus historical meaning in particular can never become fully present, that its presentation will always have a rest depriving it of its unity and identity, rendering it ungraspable. Ironically, the unity and identity of meaning is put in question precisely by what assures the unity and identity of the sign. Différance's movement of temporization characteristic of the sign

---

[14] Following a long semiological tradition initiated by Ferdinand de Saussure Derrida distinguishes between sign and symbol in terms of the nature of the bond between signifier and signified, the sign being characterized by an unmotivated bond, whereas the sign by a motivated one. At the same time, following the same tradition, Derrida takes the case of language as paradigmatic for all the other systems of signs.

[15] Jean-Pierre Richard, *L'Univers imaginaire de Mallarmé* (Paris: Les Éditions du Seuil, 1961), 25.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 454.

[18] Derrida, "Différance," 13.

postpones for a later moment the presentation of its meaning. But if we bear in mind that no language is ever made but always in the making, if we bear in mind that, insomuch as it is spoken, the elements constituting its system are constantly subject to transformation, we can understand that différance's movement of spacing is infinite and thus the full presentation of the sign's meaning is indefinitely deferred. Because of this, obviously, the borders of meaning are displaced and its unity is put in question. Due to this no language is actually able to completely mean what it says.

Hence the fundamental reason why as soon as historical meaning is circumscribed in terms of tradition, which is in its essence language, historical knowledge in general and historiography in particular become impossible. For a clear circumscription of the hermeneutic object to be known, a sharp delimitation from other things and, above all, the univocal recognition of its unity represents the fundamental condition, perhaps even the precondition of any act of knowledge wha However, this condition proves impossible to fulfill once meaning becomes inexhaustible or, otherwise put, once its polysemy becomes indefinite. How can a thing with an indeterminate number of facets be known? And, what is more, how can a subject know an object deprived of a fixed and stable identity due to the movement of perpetual differentiation in which it is caught? The answer to these questions is simple and announces itself between the lines: in fact, such a thing cannot be known.

This is the first way of demonstrating philosophical hermeneutics' failure to account for the possibility of historical knowledge after it determines the being of history as language. Such a demonstration might not convince everyone insomuch as it is based on a transcendent critique of philosophical hermeneutics. We all know very well with how many problems we are confronted by the idea of critique in philosophy. Precisely because of this we will have to take a step further and take recourse also to another way of demonstrating philosophical hermeneutics' failure to account for the possibility of historical knowledge, one founded on an immanent critique.

4. The Immanent Critique. The Problem of Misunderstanding

If in the first approach we attested philosophical hermeneutics' failure to account for the possibility of historical knowledge by showing that the historical meaning it institutes as object of study is ungraspable, in this second approach we would like to show how the process of understanding whereby any historical object is to be known is in fact a process of misunderstanding.[19] Or, better put, we

---

[19] This second approach is based on an argument developed in full detail but for a completely different purpose in our book *Înțelegere, tradiție, neînțelegere. O interpretare critică la Adevăr și metodă* (Iași: Institutul European, 2012).

would like to show how understanding and misunderstanding are inextricably intertwined. In order to do this we would like to focus on another bold claim Gadamer makes in *Truth and Method* several hundred pages from the moment where he determines the essence of tradition as language and institutes it as the true object of study of the human sciences. In this context, in a section dedicated to the problem of "Language and Concept Formation,"[20] turning against a long metaphysical tradition inaugurated in Greek thought, Gadamer affirms the "fundamental metaphoricity of language" and shows that the transfer of meaning from a semantic horizon to another is, in fact, not just a rhetorical figure but, actually, its constitutive principle. As Gadamer notes:

> "Transference from one sphere to another not only has a logical function; it corresponds to the fundamental metaphoricity of language. The well-known stylistic figure of metaphor is only the rhetorical form of this universal – both linguistic and logical – generative principle."[21]

If we correlate this statement with the Gadamerian idea that "the fusion of horizons that takes place in understanding is actually the achievement of language"[22] it becomes manifest that this fundamental metaphoricity has to be active and must make its presence felt in any understanding whatsoever. And this, of course, not just in the sense that the interpretive discourse in which the endeavor of understanding gets expressed will inevitably include metaphors but, rather, in a strong sense, namely that the movement of metaphorization structures any endeavor of understanding.

At first sight it might seem that this idea of a movement of metaphorization structuring understanding does nothing but to reaffirm the "as"-structure of understanding discovered by Heidegger in *Being and Time*[23] and thus to reaffirm its ontological nature. As we know already from Aristotle,

> "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy."[24]

Such transference though, is never done arbitrarily but is always based on a prior, most of the time inexplicit, comparison between the species or the species and the genus involved by the metaphor. As Aristotle adds,

---

[20] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 427-36.
[21] Idem., 429.
[22] Idem., 370.
[23] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 189 [49].
[24] Aristotle, *The Works of Aristotle*, ed. W. D. Ross, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Chicago & London: Enciclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1952), 1457b [5], 693.

"The simile, as has been said before, is a metaphor, differing from it only in the way it is put; and just because it is longer it is less attractive. Besides, it does not say outright 'this' is 'that', and therefore the hearer is less interested in the idea."[25]

The epistemic value of metaphor deriving from the fact that it is constituted on the backdrop of a comparison and its predicative form ('this' is 'that') makes Gadamer's affirmation of the "fundamental metaphoricity of language" a clear indication of his will to restate the ontological nature of understanding and its apophantic character. However, a closer examination of the workings of metaphor reveals that there is something more at stake here, or, better put, something different.

First of all, in the light of what has been said in the previous section of the paper, it is manifest that the transference of meaning involved by every metaphor is not a transference from one word to another just as the comparison behind every metaphor does not take place between two single things or state of facts. As Gadamer himself observed, every word is constituted by its relation to the "whole of language" or as Max Back, one of the most important theorists of metaphor in the 20th century observes, every word becomes meaningful through a "system of associated commonplaces"[26] understood as the "opinions and preconceptions to which a reader in a linguistic community, by the very fact that he speaks, finds himself committed."[27] That is why metaphorical transference takes place rather between two *horizons* of meaning.

This first aspect to be observed about the workings of metaphor gives us also the first strong reason why the process of understanding is structured like the movement of metaphorization. For, as Gadamer showed in *Truth and Method,* understanding too takes place between two horizons of meaning, specifically as a "fusion of horizons"[28] – that offered by the tradition in which the interpreter finds him or herself inextricably situated and that of the hermeneutic object.

Second of all, if we recall the dynamic character of language, the fact that it is never made but always in the making, we understand that the metaphorical transference of meaning is not uni- but, rather, bi-directional and that, as Max Black argues, it presents itself as a true interaction whereby each of the two horizons of meaning involved by the metaphor are applied to the other. That is to say, in a metaphor such as "Man is a wolf." – to take recourse to one of the most

---

[25] Aristotle, *The Works of Aristotle*, ed. W. D. Ross, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Chicago & London: Enciclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1952), 1410b [15], 662.

[26] Max Black, "Metaphor," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 55(1954-1955): 287.

[27] Paul Ricœur, *The Rule of Metaphor. The Creation of Meaning in Language*, trans. Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin, and John Costello (London & New York: Routledge, 2004), 101.

[28] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 305.

famous examples in the theory of metaphor – one is not saying something about man in particular but is actually applying the horizon of meaning of the idea of "wolf" to that of the idea of "man" and ones does this just as well as one applies the horizon of meaning of the idea of "man" the horizon of meaning of "wolf." A metaphor such as "Man is a wolf." humanizes wolfs and, by extension, all the other creatures of the kind by qualifying them implicitly as intelligent, social, protective of their own, etc., and, at the same time, tells us something about the bestiality of man, drawing attention to its brutality, instinctual nature, lack of compassion for the others, egoism, etc.

This second important aspect of metaphorical transference gives us the second reason why it can be said that the movement of metaphor structures the process of understanding. For, as Gadamer showed, understanding too presupposes an application of meaning[29] and insomuch as it takes place as a "*fusion* of horizons" this application too cannot be but reciprocal.

But even though it is based on a comparison and puts two horizons of meaning in interaction, no metaphor ties *each* meaning of one horizon to a meaning of another and thus no metaphor is able to bring to light *all* the meanings of the horizons involved. That is why, as Max Black remarks,

> "The metaphor selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the principal subject by *implying* statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject."[30]

Insomuch as the working of metaphor and the movement of understanding are in fact analogical processes though, this suppression of meaning taking place in metaphorical transference must appear also in understanding. Thus, no wonder that when tackling the case of translation, considered to be paradigmatic for the movement of understanding, Gadamer too writes strikingly[31] in exactly the same terms:

> "However faithful we try to be, we have to make difficult decisions. In our translation if we want to emphasize a feature of the original that is important to us, then we can do so only by playing down or entirely suppressing other features. But this is precisely the activity that we call interpretation. Translation, like all interpretation, is a highlighting. A translator must understand that highlighting is part of his task."[32]

---

[29] Idem., 310.
[30] Black, "Metaphor," 291-92.
[31] "Strikingly" because there is no mention of Max Black in *Truth and Method* and, if we are not mistaken, anywhere else in Gadamer's work.
[32] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 387-88.

Despite the fact that both Black and Gadamer acknowledged the suppression of meaning involved by both the movement of metaphorization and of understanding, neither[33] of them seems willing to draw the immediate epistemological conclusion deriving from this: If metaphor is able to expand a horizon of meaning by making it interact with another and if it can further our knowledge of the thing it predicates only by suppressing some of its aspects then, in fact, metaphor furthers our knowledge of the thing it predicates only by making us forget what we knew about it or by losing our knowledge, of our grasp of it. And if understanding always involves both (and at the same time) a highlighting and a suppression of meaning of the thing to be understood, then understanding is at the same time misunderstanding. That is to say, every thing given to our understanding, by the very movement whereby it is understood, it also falls prey to our misunderstanding. Every thing understood, precisely when it is understood, it is also misunderstood.

If we bear these in mind then we can see why the process of understanding as described by Gadamer and Heidegger does not actually grant us access to the object of study in the historical sciences, no more than it closes it, and thus that it closes the possibility of historical knowledge. We include Heidegger here even though our arguments were developed exclusively in connection with Gadamer's thought because he shares Gadamer's basic premises. As he explicitly notes in *Being and Time* for him too understanding is lingual in nature, language and understanding being two co-originary existentiale of Dasein[34] and, as we noted already, it also involves taking something *as* something. It seems safe to extend to Heidegger a conclusion drawn in the margins of Gadamer's thought because for him too understanding seems to be in a way metaphorical.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion it appears not only that the philosophical hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer does not actually go further than Dilthey and the Historical School in the understanding of the being of history, rendering it more problematical, but it fails to account also for the epistemological question of history making it impossible to know. For by determining the historical object to be known in terms of

---

[33] This failure to draw the immediate conclusion from metaphor and understanding's suppression of meaning is to be held against Black less than against Gadamer for the American philosopher concludes his inquiry by at least warning us against the "dangers" of metaphor: "No doubt metaphors are dangerous – and perhaps especially so in philosophy. But a prohibition against their use would be a willful and harmful restriction upon our powers of inquiry." (See Black, "Metaphor," 294.)

[34] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 182 [42] - 210 [166].

language it displaces its unity and identity, thereby rendering it ungraspable. And such a historical object would still be ungraspable even if its unity and identity were not lost for the process of understanding whereby it ought to be grasped is actually at the same time a process of misunderstanding.

These conclusions show that history is still a mystery to us and that it should be questioned anew.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aristotle. *The Works of Aristotle*. Edited by W. D. Ross. 2 vols. Vol. 2, Chicago & London: Enciclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1952.

Black, Max. "Metaphor." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 55 (1954-1955): 273-94.

Costache, Adrian. "For a Post-Historicist Philosophy of History. Beyond Hermeneutics." *Logos & Episteme* II, no. 4 (2011): 489-505.

———. *Înțelegere, tradiție, neînțelegere. O interpretare critică la Adevăr și metodă*. Iași: Institutul European, 2012.

Derrida, Jacques. *Margins of Philosophy*. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982.

Dilthey, Wilhelm. *Selected Works. The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*. Edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi. Vol. 3, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method*. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. London & New York: Continuum, 2004.

Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962.

———. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. New York & London: Harper Colophon Books, 1975.

Richard, Jean-Pierre. *L'Univers imaginaire de Mallarmé*. Paris: Les Éditions du Seuil, 1961.

Ricœur, Paul. *The Rule of Metaphor. The Creation of Meaning in Language*. Translated by Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello. London & New York: Routledge, 2004.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. *Course in General Linguistics*. Translated by Wade Baskin. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959.