

Perplexity and Philosophical Progress

HELEN DE CRUZ
Saint Louis University

Abstract: Perplexity is an epistemic emotion with deep philosophical significance. In ancient Greek philosophy, it is identified as a catalyst for philosophical progress and personal philosophical transformation. In psychological terms, perplexity is the phenomenological sense of lacking immersion in the world, a state of puzzlement and alienation from one's everyday surroundings. What could make such an emotion philosophically useful? To answer this question, I examine the role of perplexity in Jane Addams's political theory and ethics. Addams, a social reformer and American pragmatist philosopher, regarded perplexity as an emotion that arises out of specific situations, such as being part of a social settlement, union actions, or trying to surmount gender expectations. Perplexity allows us cognitive distance from our everyday customary morality and ordinary habits of thinking, and this pushes us to become creative in our philosophical reflection. I contextualize perplexity in Jane Addams's social reforms, and examine the relevance of her ideas today.

Key words: perplexity, Jane Addams, American pragmatism, social settlements

Of what use is all this striving and perplexity? Has the experience any value?—Jane Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1902), 63.

1. INTRODUCTION

Ancient Greek philosophers have proposed that *aporía* (ἀπορία), a state of puzzlement or perplexity, is foundational to philosophy. When we are in that state, our inquiries have reached an impasse, and we feel at a loss for any solution. In Plato's Socratic dialogues, *aporía* plays a crucial epistemic role. It is only when Socrates's interlocutors reach this impasse in their attempts to analyze a concept, such as knowledge or virtue, that they can begin to make progress. For example, in the *Theaetetus*, Socrates asserts a link between wonder, perplexity, and philosophy. Socrates and Thaetetus debate the

definition of knowledge. As is usual, Socrates's unwitting interlocutor starts by venturing a definition of knowledge, which is defective. Socrates presents him with a barrage of absurd consequences that leave him dizzy with perplexity. In these dialogues, perplexity is a necessary state to make philosophical progress, and it is personally transformative. You cannot advance philosophically without being genuinely perplexed (Matthews 1997).

Cast in the terminology of cognitive science and philosophy of mind, perplexity is a specific form of affect, to be specific, an *epistemic emotion* (Morton 2010). Epistemic emotions are affective states that draw our attention to gaps in our knowledge, and that highlight discrepancies between our mental states and the world as we experience it. They are self-reflective, concerning a subject's own mental capacities and mental processes. Other examples of epistemic emotions include doubt, curiosity, and surprise. Psychologists have identified perplexity as the feeling where one has "a sense of lacking immersion in the world, lack of spontaneous grasping of commonsensical meanings, puzzlement, and alienation" (Parnas et al. 2011, 200). Perplexity is a state of maladjustment between the self and the environment, where the individual is no longer able to "find everyday taken-for-granted meaning in the world" (Humpston and Broome 2016, 245).¹

Perplexity may seem like an unlikely candidate for a useful epistemic emotion (let alone a philosophically useful epistemic emotion) because it is a state where the agent is unsure how to proceed or what to do. Some epistemic emotions give us a clear path to action, for example, curiosity entices us to explore a place or situation we are curious about. Others motivate us to disengage with a solution or idea, for example, the feeling of error alerts us that we have made a mistake somewhere, even if we can't exactly say what it is (Arango-Muñoz and Michaelian 2014). Perplexity doesn't motivate us to either disengage or to engage in a specific action. However, as I will argue, in spite of this lack of immediate ties to action, and perhaps because of it, perplexity can be a crucial catalyst for philosophical change and for personal philosophical transformation.

The question of what it means to advance philosophically is a difficult one to answer. How do we know whether we have made any philosophical progress, and is philosophical progress even possible? Part of the difficulty is that philosophy does not have a fixed subject matter. As Mary Midgley (2018, 5) notes, philosophy is not a fixed set of puzzles to be solved. Rather, it is a

1. In a psychological context, the term "perplexity" is often used to describe the phenomenology of specific disorders, such as schizophrenia and psychosis. However, in the context of this paper, I will be using the term to denote an affect that is evoked in specific contexts and that also occurs in neurotypical individuals. In this sense, I am using the term in a way that is continuous with how philosophers have used it.

shifting discipline that “involves finding the many particular ways of thinking that will be most helpful as we try to explore this constantly changing world.” Given this fluidity in what philosophy does, notions of progress in philosophy are even more difficult to identify than in, for example, mathematics or science. Here, I will not address the thorny issue of whether progress in philosophy is possible, or what it would look like. Rather, I will consider a pragmatist way to think about philosophical progress: it is to adaptively respond to changing situations in our societies that philosophical inquiry deals with.

This paper will examine the role of perplexity in the political philosophy and ethical theory of the American pragmatist philosopher Jane Addams. My central claim is that perplexity can help us to advance philosophically in the following sense: it helps us to identify which philosophical approaches are promising, and which ones are no longer fit for purpose, especially in the face of changing circumstances. In section 2, I review Addams’s concept of perplexity and its relationship to the social settlement movement, which she helped to kickstart in the United States. Section 3 draws on Robin Zheng’s (2021) distinction between two modes of morality: one concerned with limits to what is permissible (the imperatival mode) and one that arises out of our limitations as moral agents in an imperfect world (the aspirational mode). Addams argues that it is hard to address ethical issues relating to what Zheng terms the aspirational mode, using our customary morality. Section 4 makes the pragmatist principles in Addams’s discussion of morality in her *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1902) more explicit and further extends them to show why perplexity is so philosophically valuable. It is valuable because it pushes us out of our ruts and reflexive thinking patterns and habits, and puts us in a better position to address structural wrongs, which our inherited moral views are poorly equipped to address. Section 5 links perplexity to philosophical progress using Addams’s discussion of American upper-class gender norms and the Covid-19 pandemic as illustrations.

2. PERPLEXITY AND THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENT MOVEMENT

Jane Addams (1860–1935) was a philosopher and innovator in the social settlement movement. She came from a prominent family; her father was a Republican politician and mill owner in Cedarville, Illinois. After earning her bachelors’ degree (which was still relatively rare for women at the time), she traveled extensively in Europe, where she encountered the idea of a social settlement. In general terms, settlements (also sometimes called social settlements) were communities in which middle- or upper-class people live and work among working-class people and where they set up facilities that improve the lives of the working-class people among whom they live.

At the time, settlements were sometimes regarded as a kind of monastery for people who were embarrassed by their privilege and sought to remedy this by offering on-site charity for the broader community. However, Addams (1899, 34) insisted settlements have “a sterner and more enduring aspect,” namely their relation to knowledge gathering. Drawing on the pragmatist idea that knowledge should always be useful, she argued that the dominating interest in knowledge has become its use. So she was interested in the conditions under which, and ways in which the knowledge we acquire may be

effectively employed in human conduct; . . . certain people have consciously formed themselves into groups for the express purpose of effective application. These groups which are called settlements have naturally sought the spots where the dearth of this applied knowledge was most obvious, the depressed quarters of great cities. (Addams 1899, 34)

Settlements thus served an epistemic need. They helped people who work there identify gaps in their knowledge and thus awaken epistemic emotions. Addams (1899, 36) characterized settlements as “an attempt to express the meaning of life in terms of life itself, in forms of activity.” This characterization of settlements demonstrates the intimate connection between ethics, politics, and epistemology in Addams’s views: a social settlement is a place where these three elements converge.

In September 1889 Jane Addams and Ellen G. Starr opened Hull House in Chicago. This settlement was inspired by Toynbee Hall, a social settlement in East London, which was a place where academics lived and worked, and had social gatherings and events that were open to the working-class people who lived in the area. Hull House was innovative in a number of respects. It presented a new model of social justice and care not just in Chicago, but more generally in the United States. The people Addams wished to help were newly-arrived (mainly European) immigrants who worked low-wage jobs and whose families often lived in dire, unhygienic, and joyless conditions. In Chicago, 68 percent of the labor force were such immigrants. They tended to work unskilled jobs, were regularly laid off, and their wages could barely support themselves and their families (Knight 2006). Prior to Hull House, assistance for these workers in Chicago and elsewhere was heavily conditional on factors beyond their control. Addams used pragmatist principles to look at the situation as it was (rather than some ideal state or market logic that poor people should adhere to) and offered unconditional help, including free kindergarten and daycare, healthcare, a public bath, free meals, a gym, and later also art classes and adult education (Schneiderhan 2011). Addams would also go on to advocate against child labor and for playgrounds, safe

public places where children of all social classes could play and socialize. Her experiences with Hull House led her to philosophize about topics that—at the time and still today—are deemed of marginal philosophical interest, such as garbage collection, childcare, and housework (Hamington 2019).

Perplexity plays a central role in Addams's epistemology and ethics. In her view, perplexity is an epistemic emotion that serves as a catalyst for philosophical transformation and deep social change. Addams does not provide a precise definition of perplexity anywhere, but we can glean its meaning throughout her writings. Seigfried characterizes her use of the term as follows:

“Perplexity” refers to someone’s personal involvement in a situation that baffles and confuses her, because her usual understanding and responses are inadequate to explain or transform a troubling situation. She can either continue to hold on to her assumptions or begin to call them into question. But in order to resolve the problematic situation in fact and not subjectively, she must first undergo a painful process of rethinking her presuppositions and values. (Seigfried 2002, xxv–xxvi)

This perplexity can occur in individuals who are involved in charity work and who experience empathy when they consider the plight of people who live in dire poverty. But it can also occur collectively, particularly as a result of unions organizing actions to demand better labor conditions: “in moments of industrial stress and strain the community is confronted by a moral perplexity which may arise from the mere fact that the good of yesterday is opposed to the good of to-day. . . . In the disorder and confusion sometimes incident to growth and progress, the community may be unable to see anything but the unlovely struggle itself” (Addams 1902, 172). Addams drew attention to the idea that stress on an entire community can lead us to a heightened awareness that our moral ideas are no longer fit for purpose.

3. PERPLEXITY AND THE UNFULFILLED THIRST FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS

This section will examine potential conditions that can make perplexity a catalyst for philosophical progress, focusing on Addams's views on ethics. Like other pragmatists (such as John Dewey and C. S. Peirce), Addams recognized that much of our everyday actions and decisions are unreflective. In everyday life, we unthinkingly go through a series of ingrained routines. However, there are situations where our everyday routines break down, where, as John Dewey (1939, 33) put it “there is something the matter”; this is a situation where “there is something lacking, wanting, in the existing situ-

ation as it stands, an absence which produces conflict in the elements that do exist.” When things run smoothly, we are not motivated to rethink our routines. When it is no longer possible to continue as we are, we have to take the time to pause, reflect, and be philosophically creative. Perplexity, precisely because it alienates us from our habits and surroundings, allows us to achieve a cognitive distance from our philosophical assumptions.

The role of disruptions of habit in our epistemic lives has been a staple of pragmatist philosophy. Addams focused on the role it plays in ethics, arguing that a lot of what we term morality has become automatic and reflexive. Morality is part of the habits that govern our daily lives:

Certain forms of personal righteousness have become to a majority of the community almost automatic. It is as easy for most of us to keep from stealing our dinners as it is to digest them, and there is quite as much voluntary morality involved in one process as in the other. (Addams 1902, 1)

Addams is clear that we have not met the moral demands placed upon us when we refrain from stealing dinners, because merely refraining from stealing and other impermissible moral actions does not constitute the entirety of a good moral life. For one thing, it leaves structural injustices (about why the wealthy community can enjoy these dinners and others cannot) unaddressed. The distinction between personal righteousness and structural wrongs anticipates Robin Zheng’s distinction between two modes of morality: the *imperative* and the *aspirational* (Zheng 2021). When we are engaged in morality in the *imperative* mode, we set hard constraints on what kind of actions we should consider to be live options, such as murder, theft, or slander. The *aspirational* mode arises out of the fact that we are limited creatures that operate under imperfect conditions. We are confronted with structural wrongs on a daily basis, which are not our personal responsibility to address but which we cannot comfortably ignore either. We know we are morally bound to do something, even though we cannot alter human-induced climate change, or wealth inequality, or homelessness all on our own. In Zheng’s view, we cannot reduce one moral mode to the other. When criticizing others, or reflecting on our own actions, it should be adapted to the mode in which one is operating.

Addams’s example about not stealing one’s dinner captures an important pragmatist insight about this distinction. In many cases, addressing shortcomings in the aspirational mode is far more difficult than addressing shortcomings in the imperative mode. This is not only because the aspirational mode often concerns structural wrongs and injustices, which are hard to address individually, but also because our moral habits can deal much more easily with firm constraints and fixed rules. Once we set ourselves firm stan-

dards for what is and isn't morally permissible, we can live our lives in accordance with that code without having to second-guess ourselves. We can rely on habits, and as philosophers since Aristotle have noted, encoding our moral principles into habits makes it far easier to live by them. However, when we go beyond these hard constraints we have no easy heuristics to fall back on. Is it permissible to take yet another flight to attend a conference? Should I give to this homeless person or that charity, if I gave earlier to another homeless person or another charity?

In such cases, it becomes easy to simply ignore any moral demands in the aspirational sphere, especially structural ones, where our own contributions only make a negligible difference. In this way, the middle- and upper-class people who did not steal their dinners and ate them with equal ease were not called to do anything to remedy the serious structural injustices that made their comfortable lives possible, including the low wages paid to factory workers who produced the goods they enjoyed and who were employed by them.

Jane Addams, like other pragmatists, held that truths (including moral truths) are never absolute but should be re-evaluated in the face of our changing circumstances and new information we have acquired. A pragmatist theory of truth does not imply a radical truth relativism, as not just anything can be a truth, but it does recognize that truths are agent-dependent. Truths have to play a positive role in our lives, or as William James put it, "The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons" (James 1909, 59). Similarly, in Addams's view, each generation, and the problems it faces, is posed a new test to "judge its own moral achievements" (Addams 1902, 2), and one cannot simply rely on the moral principles of previous generations. The problem with a morality that is constrained to the imperatival mode and that pays little attention to the aspirational mode is that it is not sufficiently sensitive to changing circumstance. It cannot flexibly respond to structural problems, particularly to bad outcomes that arise from individually unproblematic actions.

4. THE POSITIVE EPISTEMIC ROLE OF PERPLEXITY

We are now in a better position to understand why perplexity plays a positive epistemic role in Addams's view, and why Addams believed perplexity enables us to transform our ethical theories in a way that is responsive to the situations we are facing in each generation. Perplexity is a self-reflective state where an agent realizes that her habits (including moral habits) do not work anymore. The perplexity that arises from life in a social settlement helps a moral agent to go outside her comfort zone, and to realize how badly the

moral principles one grew up with serve other parts of the community. Addams sketched the moral challenge, as presented to her by her work in Hull House as follows:

All about us are men and women who have become unhappy in regard to their attitude toward the social order itself; toward the dreary round of uninteresting work, the pleasures narrowed down to those of appetite, the declining consciousness of brain power, and the lack of mental food which characterizes the lot of the large proportion of their fellow-citizens. (Addams 1902, 3)

Addams came from a wealthy family, which meant she was shielded from the effects of poverty while growing up. Her close proximity to poor, working-class immigrants at Hull House resulted in a deep sense of unease. Particularly, she noticed some under-studied aspects of poverty, such as the lack of mental challenge in unskilled labor and the lack of participation of working-class people in art and philosophy. Addams (1902, 3–5) characterized these negative epistemic emotions variously as “anxiety,” “bewilderment,” and “perplexity.”

In the light of these emotions, the morality of her social class no longer seemed satisfactory: the people who notice the dreary circumstances of those in deprived communities “fail to be content with the fulfillment of their family and personal obligations, and find themselves striving to respond to a new demand involving a social obligation” (Addams 1902, 4). Crucially, Addams argued that the state of perplexity should not be resolved immediately: “The conception of life which they hold has not yet expressed itself in social changes or legal enactment but rather in a *mental attitude of maladjustment*, and in a sense of divergence between their consciences and their conduct” (Addams 1902, 4; emphasis added).

The state of maladjustment, of being removed from ordinary routines and unreflective ethical attitudes, is a central element of the phenomenology of perplexity (Humpston and Broome 2016). Its epistemic value lies precisely in the fact that we experience a lack of immersion, a lack of feeling that all is alright with the world and we feel at home in it. It focuses our attention to elements in the world that do not accord with our values or that feel out of place. This makes perplexity philosophically valuable. In Addams’s case, perplexity led her to articulate new conceptions of ethics and democracy. She argued that settlements such as Hull House provide epistemic value, because they are not entrenched the way political and social institutions are. Institutions are so entangled in their own institutional mechanics that they have often lost sight of what they are for. Indeed “the hospitals, the county agencies, and State asylums, are often but vague rumors to the people who need them

most' (Addams, 1893, 44). Thus, Addams draws a distinction between the positive epistemic role of perplexity and the ability of social institutions to flexibly respond in the light of societal change:

Each institution, unlike a settlement, is obliged to determine upon the line of its activity, to accept its endowment for that end and do the best it can. But each time this is accomplished it is apt to lace itself up in certain formulas, is in danger of forgetting the mystery and complexity of life, of repressing the promptings that spring from growing insight. (Addams 1893, 44–45)

In this respect, extraordinary circumstances that we face, both as individuals and collectively, can help us scrutinize our institutions and the philosophical ideas behind them in the light of its disruptions. Perplexity has its limitations. Addams was clear that though perplexity can serve as a catalyst for change and philosophical innovation, it is not inevitable that personal and epistemic transformation happens. For example, one can have a lack of mindfulness in the face of changing circumstances and attempt to go on as normal, no matter how unsettling the situation is. She described how this tendency is pronounced in some upper-class women, who

in all the perplexity of industrial transition are striving to administer domestic affairs. The ethics held by them are for the most part the individual and family codes, untouched by the larger social conceptions. These women, rightly confident of their household and family integrity and holding to their own code of morals, fail to see the household in its social aspect. (Addams 1902, 103)

The women Addams criticized were firmly tied up in patriarchal structures, which (combined with lack of enfranchisement and reduced access to professions) made it hard for them to directly challenge these structures. Still, Addams did not let them morally off the hook. Similarly, "The man who chooses to stand aside, avoids much of the perplexity, but at the same time he loses contact with a great source of vitality" (Addams 1902, 273).

This section has shown that perplexity, in Jane Addams's view, is a state that allows us to question the epistemic and ethical status quo. When we are confronted with unusual circumstances, either external through industrial actions by unions, or self-elicited by participating in social work through a settlement, our ordinary moral ideas don't seem to hold up anymore. We can then take two directions: either attempt to go on as normal, or allow the perplexity of our new situation to take hold of us. I will now examine how perplexity can help us to achieve philosophical progress.

5. PERPLEXITY AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROGRESS

Many pragmatist philosophers, including Dewey, Addams, and Peirce have noted that we can slip into philosophical habits that are not as responsive to changing circumstances as they ought to be. Perhaps the most succinct formulation along these lines comes from Mary Midgley (2002, xxvii): “Philosophy, like speaking prose, is something we have to do all our lives, well or badly, whether we notice it or not. What usually forces us to notice it is conflict.” Due to changing social, ecological, and other circumstances, philosophical concepts we or our ancestors have formulated are no longer up to the work we want them to be doing. Perhaps they were never that good, but we did not notice due to our cognitive and social limitations, or because they have become so habitual and reflexive.

Perplexity focuses our attention on the fact that a philosophical concept might not be fit for purpose. Let us look at one example from Addams’s own work, her discussion of filial relationships and the gender expectations of parents for their grown-up daughters in upper-class families (Addams 1902, 73), in particular, the “perplexity and mal-adjustment brought about by the various attempts of young women to secure a more active share in the community life.” When adult daughters break the gender norms their parents expect them to adhere to, including marriage and being mothers and caregivers, they become a source of perplexity.

The parents try to assuage this sense of unease by trying to explain away their daughters’ plans and desires, they will say she is “carried away by foolish enthusiasm, that she is in search of a career, that she is restless and does not know what she wants” (Addams 1902, 73). The causes for this perplexity are firmly entrenched gender expectations for women among the nineteenth-century American upper class. Daughters were seen as a family asset, to be used to further connections through marriage, rather than as individuals with their own aspirations and goals. They were often permitted to travel to Europe and even to attend college, but this was all with the goal of making these women a more attractive asset and marriage partner. It was also commonly assumed that women had no ambitions beyond serving their family. When a daughter expressed a desire incompatible with that gender expectation, it was explained as willfulness and self-indulgence. It is only at this point that a genuine challenge of the philosophical presuppositions that govern family life takes place: perhaps the daughter, in Addams’s example, has ambitions beyond being a wife and mother. Her parents try to dismiss the motivations of the daughter rather than rethinking their entrenched philosophical suppositions.

However, such a radical rethinking is precisely what is called for. Addams (1902, 76) does not deny that family life can lay claims on a person. What is called for is a deep change in the philosophical structures that govern family life. As long as the family is not transformed to reflect and to respond to current societal demands, any attempt to conciliate filial demands and individual aspirations in the upper-class daughters Addams discusses will remain awkward and uneasy. Perhaps, speculating beyond Addams, one should resist compromise in such cases because compromise prevents institutions from transforming themselves. Addams recognized that it is hard for individuals to challenge deeply ingrained societal structures and to right structural wrongs. However, her actions (both in resisting traditional gender norms, in resisting suppositions about poverty and its causes and potential solutions) demonstrate that individual actions sometimes do make a difference. In some cases, they help to transform philosophical suppositions and institutions.

We live in philosophically interesting times. At the time of writing, the world is grappling with a pandemic and its wider effects. As some countries with access to vaccination are slowly reopening, the question arises: What just happened (or is happening)? What does this experience mean? It is very tempting to shake off the disorienting experience of elevated death rates, stay-at-home orders, and failing healthcare and social safety nets as something we would wish to forget, the sooner the better. There is a strong desire for a return to normal, a return to the status quo. As Kristina Wong (2021) puts it:

To state the obvious, we are living and surviving a collective trauma right now. I state the obvious because as trauma goes, many Americans seem to be in deep denial about the extent of our collective loss. The denial runs so deep, that some think the only way to survive this loss is to perform as if our run was never cancelled.

This failure to allow ourselves to be perplexed by the pandemic constitutes an epistemic failure, because it misses an important opportunity. As an epistemic emotion, perplexity does not motivate us to engage in any clear actions but to pause and to reflect. Rather than thirsting to go back to normal, we ought to examine how the pandemic has revealed how normal was suboptimal in many ways, for example, the pandemic has laid bare (in the United States and elsewhere) already-existing inequalities in healthcare, health outcomes and economic impact between various demographic groups (Valles 2020). In situations like these, we can choose to either ignore the perplexity and try to move on, or to let the perplexity take hold and scrutinize and try to improve

both the institutions that have been revealed as defective, and the philosophical presuppositions upon which these institutions are founded.

In conclusion, philosophers since Plato have accorded an important epistemic role to perplexity as a driver of philosophical progress. I have drawn on the work of social reformer and pragmatist philosopher Jane Addams to articulate why perplexity is so philosophically useful. Perplexity allows us to see the defectiveness in social institutions and in the philosophical presuppositions on which they rest.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Eric Steinhart, Sean Valles, Johan De Smedt, and Eric Schliesser, for their insightful comments on an early version of this paper. A few elements of this paper (in shortened and popularized form) have appeared in De Cruz 2020.

References

- Addams, Jane. 1893. "The Objective Value of a Social Settlement," in *Philanthropy and Social Progress*, ed. H. C. Adams, 27–56. College Park, MD: McGrath Publishing Company.
- Addams, Jane. 1899. "A Function of the Social Settlement," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 13: 33–55.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/000271629901300302>
- Addams, Jane. 1902. *Democracy and Social Ethics*. London: MacMillan.
- Arango-Muñoz, Santiago, and Kourken Michaelian. 2014. "Epistemic Feelings, Epistemic Emotions," *Philosophical Inquiries* 2(1): 97–122.
- De Cruz, Helen. 2020. "Thoughts on the Loss of Ethical Goods: Perplexity and the Pandemic," *APA Newsletter* 20: 12–14.
- Dewey, John. 1939. "Theory of Valuation," in *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science: Foundations of the Unity of Science*, ed. Otto Neurath, vols. 1–2, pp. 1–66. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hamington, Maurice 2019. "Jane Addams," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/addams-jane/>. Retrieved April 12, 2020.
- Humpston, Clara S., and Matthew R. Broome. 2016. "Perplexity" in *An Experiential Approach to Psychopathology*, ed. G. Stanghellini and M. Aragona, 245–264. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29945-7_13
- James, William. 1909. *Pragmatism and Four Essays from the Meaning of Truth*. Cleveland: Meridian Books.

- Knight, Louise W. 2006. "Garbage and Democracy: The Chicago Community Organizing Campaign of the 1890s," *Journal of Community Practice* 14(3): 7–27. https://doi.org/10.1300/J125v14n03_02
- Matthews, Gareth B. 1997. "Perplexity in Plato, Aristotle, and Tarski," *Philosophical Studies* 85(2/3): 213–228. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004294410762>
- Midgley, Mary. 2002. *Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature*. London: Routledge.
- Midgley, Mary. 2018. *What Is Philosophy For?* London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Morton, Adam. 2010. "Epistemic Emotions," in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, ed. Peter Goldie, 385–399. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Parnas, Joseph, Adrea Raballo, Peter Handest, Lennart Jansson, Anne Vollmer-Larsen, and Ditte Sæbye. 2011. "Self-Experience in the Early Phases of Schizophrenia: 5-year Follow-up of the Copenhagen Prodromal Study," *World Psychiatry* 10(3): 200–204. <https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2051-5545.2011.tb00057.x>
- Schneiderhan, Eric. 2011. "Pragmatism and Empirical Sociology: The Case of Jane Addams and Hull-House, 1889–1895," *Theory and Society* 40(6): 589–617. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-011-9156-2>
- Seigfried, Charlene H. 2002. "Introduction," in Jane Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, ix–xxxviii. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Valles, Sean A. 2020. "The Predictable Inequities of COVID-19 in the US: Fundamental Causes and Broken Institutions," *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 30(3): 191–214. <https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0012>
- Wong, Kristina. 2021. "Reflections on Shitty Performance Art, Crisis, and Isolating Ourselves Intentionally after Isolating Unintentionally." <https://www.macdowell.org/news/reflections-on-shitty-performance-art-crisis-and-isolating-ourselves-intentionally-after-isolating-unintentionally>. Retrieved June 20, 2021.
- Zheng, Robin. 2021. "Moral Criticism and Structural Injustice," *Mind* 130(518): 503–535. <https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa098>