SOMETHING STOIC IN PLATO'S *SOPHIST*

VANESSA DE HARVEN

1. Introduction

The Stoics have often been compared to the earthborn Giants in Plato's *Sophist*, primarily in passing but also, more recently, in greater depth and with diverging opinions about the lessons drawn by the Stoics in reaction to Plato.[1] The Giants appear in the famous Battle of Gods and Giants, which traces a never-ending debate between the Friends of the Forms (Gods) and the Sons of the Earth (Giants), both of whom make fatal concessions in the fight over *being*, *what is*, or *existence* (εἶναι, τὸ ὄν, οὐσία) — whether it is body, as the earthborn Giants hold, or rather Forms, as the other-worldly Gods hold (245 E 6–249 D 8).[2] With the Eleatic Visitor moderating the discussion, first the savage Giants who say that *being* is body and refuse all further discussion are hypothesized to be civilized and amenable to a conversation about *being*. These hypothetically civilized Giants concede that there are incorporeal things (e.g. the virtues) and therefore that *being* is not, after all, the same as body; from this point they are induced to accept the Visitor's '*dunamis* proposal' that *being* is the

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[1] By 'the Stoics' I mean Stoics of the so-called early and middle periods, excluding the Roman era.

[2] Text of the *Sophist* is by E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, J. C. G. Strachan (eds.), *Platonis Opera*, vol. i (Oxford, 1995). For 'εἶναι', 'τὸ ὄν', 'οὐσία' I use the terms '*being*', '*what is*', and '*existence*' interchangeably, and italicize to signal their technical use, following L. Brown, 'Being in the *Sophist*: A Syntactical Enquiry', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 4 (1986), 44–70, and 'Innovation and Continuity: The Battle of Gods and Giants, *Sophist* 245–249' ['Innovation'], in J. Gentzler (ed.), *Method in Ancient Philosophy* (Oxford, 1988), 181–208; J. Brunschwig, 'La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême' [*TGS*], in J. Barnes and M. Mignucci (eds.), *Matter and Metaphysics, Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum* (Napoli, 1988), 20–127 ('The Stoic theory of the supreme genus and Platonic ontology', in J. Lloyd (trns.), *Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1994), 92–158, in English translation); V. Caston, 'Something and Nothing: The Stoics on Concepts and Universals' ['Something and Nothing'], *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 17 (1999), 145–213; *pace* D. T. J. Bailey, 'The Structure of Stoic Metaphysics' ['Structure'], *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 46 (2014), 253–309 at 257, on which see M. Alessandrelli, 'L'ontologia stoica del qualcosa, corpi, incorporei e concetti' ['Qualcosa'], *ILIESI digitale Memorie*, 2 (2016), n. 12, and A. Bronowski, *The Stoics on* Lekta: *Everything There Is To Say* [*Lekta*] (Oxford, 2019), 150 (n. 73).

capacity or power (δύναμις, *dunamis*) to act or be acted upon.[3] Then the Friends of the Forms are pressed to concede that in being known, the Forms and hence *being* are not changeless after all.

The comparison of the Stoics to the earthborn Giants takes its start from the well-known Stoic commitment that (all and) only bodies *exist*.[4] But the Stoics do not simply equate *being* or *existence* with body; rather, they take what *exists* to be what is capable of causal interaction, doing and undergoing, and then show that only bodies meet this criterion. Furthermore, bodies are not all there is. The Stoics make Something (τί) their highest ontological genus, set over both bodies that *exist*, or have *being*, and incorporeals that *subsist* (ὑφεστάναι, *huphestanai*, or have ὑπόστασις, *hupostasis*)[5] — these include time, place, void, and the sayables (λεκτά, *lekta*), roughly the meanings of our words. This much is relatively uncontroversial, but there is more to the story — both for the Stoics and for Plato.

At issue are questions about what in the *Sophist* the Stoics were reacting to, if they were engaged with the dialogue at all; how the Stoics are and are not like the Giants in particular; what use they make of the famous *dunamis* proposal that *being* is whatever has the capacity to act or be acted upon; and to what extent they are Platonizing with their incorporeal entities. With these four open questions in mind, I will reexamine Plato's challenges in the *Sophist*, and then offer a new account of the Stoics as responding to Plato with an elegant ontology and sophisticated one-world metaphysics.

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[3] I follow L. Brown, 'Innovation', and M. L. Gill, Philosophos*: Plato's Missing Dialogue* [*Philosophos*] (Oxford, 2012), in calling this 'the *dunamis* proposal'; it is sometimes called 'the Eleatic Principle', e.g. Bailey, 'Structure'; A. Marmodoro, 'Stoic Gunk', in A. Marmodoro, *Everything in Everything: Anaxagoras' Metaphysics* (Oxford, 2017), 156–85, and 'Stoic Blends', *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 32 (2017), 1–24; K. Vogt, 'Sons of the Earth: Are the Stoics Metaphysical Brutes?' ['Brutes'], *Phronesis*, 54 (2009), 135–54.

[4] I will typically say, for convenience, that 'only' bodies *are* or *exist* instead of saying 'all and only'; it is the commitment to only bodies *existing* that is at issue for the Giants anyway, since in being too ashamed to corporealize or eliminate they admit that some incorporeals have *being*, and no one argues that some bodies do not have *being*.

[5] I italicize '*subsistence*' and its cognates as well as *existence* et al., in order to indicate their technical use; likewise, ahead, '*obtaining*' (ὑπάρχειν, *huparchein*, or having ὕπαρξις, *huparxis*).

2. Open questions

Let us take stock of the rather wide variety of interpretations in light of our four open questions.

First, what in the *Sophist* are the Stoics responding to?[6] Most everyone agrees that the Stoics are

engaged with the Battle of Gods and Giants, but there is some disagreement about whether they

were looking to the Parmenidean discussion of *non-being* or not,[7] and yet more disagreement about

what lessons were drawn from the *Sophist*. We might think of these disagreements as a series of

dichotomies. The opening question concerns whether the Stoics are engaged in ontology and

metaphysics or not, with Katja Vogt arguing they are not.[8] Then, among the others, there is a

disagreement about whether the Stoics are engaged in metaphysics or in ontology, with D. T. J.

Bailey on one side arguing that they are not counting their entities (engaged in ontology), but rather

grounding them in terms of fundamentality and dependence (engaged in metaphysics).[9] Finally,

among those who take the Stoic project to be ontological, there is a disagreement about whether the

Stoics are giving an account of *being* or not, with Ada Bronowski arguing that they are not,[10] and

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[6] For skepticism about any influence of the *Sophist* on the Stoics, see J. Sellars, 'Stoic Ontology and Plato's *Sophist*' ['Stoic Ontology'], *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, 54 (2010), 185–203; given the broad consensus that the Stoics were engaged with the dialogue, I take that much as given, and endeavor to show here just how much of the *Sophist* is reflected in Stoic metaphysics; note that by focusing on the *Sophist*, I do not deny that they had other influences within Plato (notably the *Timaeus*) and beyond.

[7] YES: M. Alessandrelli, *Il problema del λεκτόν nello stoicismo antico: origine e statuto di una nozione controversa* [*Il problema del λεκτόν*] (Firenze, 2013) and 'Qualcosa'; P. Aubenque, 'Une Occasion Manquée: la genèse avortée de la distinction entre l'"etant" et le "quelque chose"' ['Occasion Manquée'], in P. Aubenque and M. Narcy (eds.), *Études sur le Sophiste de Platon* (Napoli, 1991), 365–85; Vogt, 'Brutes'. NO: Brunschwig, *TGS*. N/A: Bailey, 'Structure'; Bronowski, *Lekta*.

[8] Vogt, 'Brutes', argues that the Stoic response to the *Sophist* is to turn away from questions of *being* and *non-being* altogether, indeed that the Stoics are not engaged in metaphysics or ontology at all. The Stoics take their motivation in the Visitor's observation that the notion of *being* is as puzzling as the notion of *non-being*, and the idea that 'we inevitably have to face the well-known difficulties about not-being if we frame philosophy as the study of being' (149). As a result, the Stoics are not engaged in metaphysics as a Platonic or Aristotelian science of *being* at all, i.e. as a distinct study of *what is* that goes beyond the particular investigations of physics, logic, and ethics to give some deeper understanding of reality.

[9] Bailey, 'Structure', 256, sees the Stoics as manifesting the same philosophical project as Plato and Aristotle, namely a debate over *how* particulars and incorporeals exist, whether as fundamental or dependent; thus they are engaged in metaphysics, making bodies fundamental and incorporeals dependent, rather than in ontology.

[10] Bronowski, *Lekta*, 127–28, argues that for the Stoics 'being' is not a doctrinal or technical term at all; to say that only bodies exist is not to say that bodies have *being* as discussed in the *Sophist*, but that they exist in a loose and non-technical sense, in the manner of bodies; for further detail see my notes 13 and 50. On the other hand, see 326, where Bronowski embraces a technical sense of 'existence', taking Bailey, 'Structure', to task for his concerns about the term.

Jacques Brunschwig, Pierre Aubenque, and Michele Alessandrelli that they are.[11]   Thus it bears

revisiting the *Sophist* to determine what challenges and leads are present in Plato's text, before

making the comparison with Stoic evidence.

Second, in what respects are the Stoics like and unlike the earthborn Giants? Brunschwig

and Vogt both align the Stoics with the original, untamed Giants,[12] while Aubenque, Alessandrelli,

and Bronowski all see the Stoics pursuing a middle ground or amalgam of views.[13]   This question is

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[11] Brunschwig, *TGS*, argues at length that the Stoics developed their highest ontological genus, Something, in response to the Battle of Gods and Giants. Rather than broadening *being* to include incorporeals, as the civilized Giants do, the Stoics develop a second, distinct ontological criterion for being Something *non-existent*; this criterion at once rejects Plato's Forms from the ontology, and admits their own line of incorporeals, while leaving the *being* of bodies untouched. Aubenque, 'Occasion Manquée', urging Brunschwig to go further in his optimism about the Stoic response to Plato, contributes a close reading of the *Sophist* showing that the crucial commitment of the Gods and Giants alike, which underwrites the paradox of their concessions, is Plato's own commitment to the interentailment of *something* and *being* or *what is*, which is what underwrites the preceding Parmenidean paradox of saying *what is not*. As Aubenque shows, once *something* and *being* are prised apart, there is nothing paradoxical about saying that the sophist, or one who speaks falsely, says *something* that *is not*. Nor, likewise, is there anything paradoxical in the Stoic ontological genus Something set over *being* (bodies) and *non-being* (incorporeals). Alessandrelli, *Il problema del* λεκτόν, 7–17; 'Qualcosa', 13–5, takes the ontological criterion for *existence* to be the true and proper focus of the Stoic response to the *Sophist* — but in stages. According to this developmental account, Zeno (the founder of the school) found his inspiration for Something as distinct from *being* in the Parmenidean problem of *non-being*, and called the incorporeals Somethings rather than *beings*. At this stage of Stoic doctrine, Something is not yet an ontological genus set over bodies (*being*) and incorporeals, which leaves the inchoate class of incorporeals open to the charge of being nothing at all. It is only after developing the number of incorporeals and reflecting on this worry about their dubious ontological status, and after being interrogated by their critics about what bodies and incorporeals have in common, that Chrysippus *could* introduce the ontological status of *subsistence* to mark the objectivity of the incorporeals, and only then that Something *could* be elevated to the status of ontological genus set over bodies and incorporeals, *being* and *subsistence*, as an answer to what they have in common (namely that they are objectively real). Cf. Brunschwig, *TGS*, 26, 60, 95–109 who argues in opposite fashion that we can tell Something is *original* to Zeno because the extension developed later is problematic

[12] Brunschwig, *TGS*, 72–3, on the grounds that they equate body with *existence*, avow that soul is body, and corporealize the virtues. Vogt, 'Brutes', in that they refuse all discussion of *being*, looking instead at the earth and taking physics to give us the most basic understanding of the world, and in that they corporealize the virtues. The Stoics differ from the brutish Giants, however, in their understanding of body according to which reason is the only cause, for the cosmos and its individual agents alike; according to K. Vogt, 'A Unified Notion of Cause' ['Unified'], *Rhizomata*, 6 (2018), 65–86, the real key to understanding Stoic corporealism is not to be found in the *Sophist*, but in Socrates' intellectual autobiography in the *Phaedo* (with connections to the *Hippias Major*), where he seeks to assimilate natural causes to reason, the causation of the cosmos to rational agency.

[13] Aubenque, 'Occasion Manquée', argues that the Stoics are not properly assimilated to the original Giants, who remain trapped by the Platonic assumption that *something* and *being* are inseparable; they should be seen, rather, as forging a creative alternative that identifies and rejects this crucial piece of Platonic baggage. Alessandrelli, 'Qualcosa', sees the Stoics as forging a middle ground, like and unlike the original earthborn Giants insofar as they inherit and perfect their brute materialism, corporealizing the virtues, and unlike the civilized Giants, who do not restrict the *dunamis* proposal to bodies. Bronowski, *Lekta*, 149–59, sees the Stoic ontology as an amalgam of all views in the Battle. She sees a 'double reversal' of their position in the Battle of Gods and Giants, first in that the Stoics extend corporeality rather than extending *being*, i.e. they assimilate the incorporeals embraced by the civilized Giants to body (they corporealize the virtues); and second, in that they twist the *dunamis* proposal to confirm corporeality rather than *existence*. Then the Stoics embrace the Gods' spirit of ontological breadth, which recognizes both *being* and *becoming*, and in this are motivated to make Something the highest genus set over *being* and *non-being*; and while they also agree with them that the *dunamis* proposal applies only things that

relatively straightforward, except for one wrinkle concerning the original, untamed Giants. While everyone agrees that the Stoics are corporealizing the virtues, there is disagreement among the two groups as to whether the Stoics are like or unlike the original Giants in doing so; Brunschwig, Vogt, and Alessandrelli take the brutish Giants to corporealize the virtues, while the others do not. Here too, then, it bears looking at the text again to get clear on Plato's Giants, and then reassessing how the Stoics are like or unlike them.

Third, while everyone agrees that the Stoics are making use of the *dunamis* proposal in one way or another, its precise role is subject to debate. Here too the debate can be seen as a series of dichotomies. The opening question concerns whether the *dunamis* proposal is used as a measure of *being* or of corporeality, with Bronowski and Vogt arguing for the latter.[14] Then, among those who take the *dunamis* proposal as a measure of *being*, there is a question about whether it serves as an ontological criterion or rather, as Bailey argues, a measure of fundamentality.[15] Finally, among those who take the *dunamis* proposal as an ontological criterion for *being*, there is disagreement about whether the Stoics use just this one criterion to distinguish between *being* and *non-being*, so that what these entities have in common is being Something (Aubenque, Alessandrelli),[16] or whether they

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are *becoming* (so that it is not a criterion for *being* at all), the Stoics depart from them in recognizing *becoming* as body — which does *exist*, but not in any of the senses used in the *Sophist*.

[14] Vogt, 'Brutes', argues that the *dunamis* proposal in Stoic hands does not tell us about *being*, for there is no study of *being*, but about corporeality and nature, bodies and causality; and in this they are like the brutish untamed Giants, refusing the *dunamis* proposal as an answer the question, 'What is *being*?'. As described in the last note, Bronowski, *Lekta*, takes the Stoics to divert the *dunamis* proposal from *being* to corporeality, restricting it (in solidarity with the Gods) to *becoming* and not *being*. Also in favor of the *dunamis* proposal as the criterion for body, see M. Reesor, *The Nature of Man in Early Stoic Philosophy* (New York, 1989), 13; D. Sedley, 'Hellenistic Physics and Metaphysics' ['Physics and Metaphysics'], in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1999), 355–411 at 285; and Sellars, 'Stoic Ontology', 186; against, see Alessandrelli, *Il problema del λεκτόν*, 13.

[15] According to Bailey, 'Structure', 256, in identifying the fundamentally real (as he renders 'εἶναι', 'τὸ ὄν', 'οὐσία') as the bodily, the Stoics turn the *dunamis* proposal against Plato to ratify their distinctly anti-Platonist materialism. However, as he sees it, the *dunamis* proposal is not an ontological criterion so much as a measure of fundamentality — to have *being* is to be fundamental. Only bodies for the Stoics are independent and fundamental, and hence only they have *being*.

[16] Aubenque, 'Occasion Manquée', 377, takes the *dunamis* proposal to establish for the Stoics, at once, the *being* of bodies, the *non-being* of incorporeals, and what they have in common, namely being Something. Alessandrelli, *Il problema del λεκτόν*, 13–4, likewise takes the *dunamis* proposal alone to determine the ontological status of bodies (since they pass) and incorporeals (since they fail).

recognize two distinct ontological criteria and thereby sidestep the question of what is common to

being and *non-being* (Brunschwig).[17] Thus, again, it bears returning to the *Sophist* to assess whether the

Visitor's *dunamis* proposal is ontological or metaphysical in spirit, and to examine the demand for a

common account of bodies and incorporeals, before turning to the role of the *dunamis* proposal for

the Stoics, including whether they sidestep the question of what bodies have in common or, rather,

take it head on.

Fourth, there is the open question concerning the extent to which the Stoics are Platonizing

with their incorporeals, which is reflected in scholars' understanding of what it means for the

incorporeals to *subsist* (ὑφεστάναι, *huphestanai*, or have ὑπόστασις, *hupostasis*) and to *obtain* (ὑπάρχειν,

huparchein, or have ὕπαρξις, *huparxis*). On one end of the interpretive spectrum, what it means to

subsist and *obtain* is not addressed, either because the Stoics are turning away from metaphysics

altogether, as Vogt holds, or because they are engaged simply in ontology and working in terms of

existent and *non-existent* Somethings, as Aubenque and Brunschwig hold. Alessandrelli does address

what it means to *subsist*, taking it to be a Chrysippean advance to introduce the term as a label for the

modus essendi of the incorporeals, which for Zeno were simply Something *non-existent*, and hence

vulnerable to the charge of being nothing at all.[18] By elevating Something to the highest ontological

genus set over bodies that *exist* and incorporeals that, now, are said to *subsist*, Chrysippus alleviates

these Zenonian worries and responds to challenges from their critics about what bodies and

incorporeals have in common (being Something objectively real). So with Alessandrelli the term

'*subsistence*' is a sort of ontological marker, but as such it is silent on the incorporeals' *way* of being, i.e.

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on the metaphysics of the incorporeals. And the language of *obtaining* does not indicate an

ontological status for Alessandrelli, but refers, rather, to what really has the status of *existing*, i.e.

bodies.[19] The Stoics are not especially engaged in metaphysics, on this view, let alone Platonizing.

Bronowski, on the other hand, takes the language of *subsistence* to be much more than a

marker of reality, signaling that the incorporeals are not only mind-independent and objective, but

on a metaphysical par with bodies; bodies and incorporeals are inter-dependent and co-constitutive

of reality, because of their ontological status.[20] Thus, on this view, the Stoics are very much engaged

in questions of fundamentality and dependence. Now, Bronowski's focus is on the sayables (λεκτά,

lekta) in particular, and it is here especially that we see the Platonizing dimension of this

interpretation. Bronowski's account of the sayables as states of affairs holding together the structure

of reality, or perhaps being the structure of reality, treats them as abstract entities, akin to Russellian

facts, but with two modes of being real.[21] The sayables on the one hand *subsist* independently of the

physical world, waiting to be actualized by the causal interactions of bodies; then, when these are

actualized by the physical world, they have a different ontological status, they now (in addition)

obtain as facts; and the same holds for time, which *subsists* in the past and future, but also *obtains* in

the present. Thus, for Bronowski, the language of *subsistence* and *obtaining* signals the Stoics'

metaphysical commitment to two different modes of reality, or ways of being, both of which find

the Stoics Platonizing with their incorporeals.

Bailey is also focused on *subsistence* and *obtaining* as different ways of being, and takes *obtaining*

to be an actualizing relation; unlike Bronowski, however, Bailey takes this actualizing relation to

establish that all the incorporeals are metaphysically dependent on or, in the language of

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[19] Alessandrelli, 'Qualcosa', 21–2.
[20] Bronowski, *Lekta*, 167–69, 225, 330–31, 339; cf. M. Boeri, 'The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals' ['Bodies and Incorporeals'], *The Review of Metaphysics*, 54 (2001), 723–52, who argues that bodies and incorporeals are reciprocally dependent.
[21] Bronowski, *Lekta*, 229, 294–95, 324–40, 343, 360–65, 407–8.

contemporary analytic metaphysics, *grounded* in bodies.[22] The incorporeals, on Bailey's view, *subsist* as

'offices' or 'roles', e.g. the office of being *the president of the United States*, or of being *a statue of David*,

or of being *my watch*, and they depend on bodies 'occupying' or 'filling' those roles in order to

obtain.[23] By grounding their incorporeals in body the Stoics both reverse the position of Plato and

Aristotle, making incorporeals dependent on bodies, and defuse the paradox of saying that both in

some sense are (since they won't *be* in the same way). So Bailey and Bronowski stand opposed in

making the incorporeals dependent and independent, respectively.

Or do they? Bailey's offices are immaterial objects that *subsist* whether they are occupied or

not, so the sense in which incorporeals are ontologically dependent on body is rather attenuated.

Further, this kind of dependence does not seem to me to be engaged in the same metaphysical

project as Aristotle's realism *in rebus*, which makes (incorporeal) universals ontologically dependent

on (corporeal) primary substances; on the contrary, the independent *subsistence* of the incorporeals is

an avowedly Platonizing interpretation of the Stoics. Hence I group Bailey and Bronowski together,

different as their views are, because both take the incorporeals to be independently *subsisting*, both

see *obtaining* as a change in ontological status, and both embrace the idea of a permanent, unchanging

form or structure of the world. Indeed, both see the Stoics as Platonizing in ways that have been

underappreciated.[24]

With these varying degrees of Platonizing about the incorporeals among those who find the

Stoics responding to the *Sophist*, then, it bears revisiting the text to reevaluate what sort of challenges

Plato poses there before adjudicating how to understand the Stoic response. I turn now to the

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[22] Bailey, 'Structure', 255.

[23] On the model of Pavel Tichý's philosophy of intentionality, Bailey, 'Structure', n. 31. As Bailey sees it, only some story as logically complex as this theory of offices can address his central explananda (268–69): the Stoics' 'competing mania[s] for analyzing all manner of entities as corporeal and as incorporeal' (254); and the Stoics' three ways to be, the *being* enjoyed by bodies, the *subsistence* enjoyed by incorporeals, and a third way, *obtaining*, enjoyed by incorporeals when they bear a special actualizing relation to bodies (261, 268).

[24] Bailey, 'Structure', 262–64, 276–78; Bronowski, *Lekta*, 165–69.

Sophist with these four open questions in mind, to reconsider what the Stoics are likely to have taken up there.

3. The *Sophist*

The question of *being* and *non-being* arises in Plato's *Sophist* at 237 A 2 in consideration of the sophist as one who makes copies. What even is a copy, if it is not *what is* and therefore nothing at all? And if *something* (τί) must be *what is* or else nothing (237 C 7–E 2), then whatever counts as *what is* (whether Forms or body) classifies all other candidates, real as they may seem, as nothing at all. Hence the debate is a never-ending stalemate.[25]

As Aubenque has shown, this false dilemma only results from the Visitor's ignoring the possibility that *something* could be the genus of two species: *what is* and *what is not*.[26] The consistency with which the Visitor equates *something* and *what is* makes this alternative conspicuously absent, and hence a challenge the Stoics are likely to have taken up in making Something their highest ontological genus. In addition, this stretch of text reveals two more challenges: to make *what is not* a countable individual (238 A 1–C 12), and to make it utterable (φθεγκτόν), sayable (ῥητόν), and rational (i.e. not contradictory, not ἄλογον) (238 D 1–239 B 10). Christine J. Thomas labels this series of challenges 'the *tinos* requirement': (1) to say how *what is not* can have *being*, (2) how it can be one, and (3) how it can be available for thought and discourse without contradiction, in sum to say that *what is not* is *something*.[27] Thus the *Sophist* right away reveals ontological concerns; in particular for counting its entities, and for saying that *what is not* somehow has *being*, which is to say (given the

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[25] I italicize '*something*' to indicate its technical use in this portion of the *Sophist*, and continue to capitalize for the Stoics' highest ontological genus (τὸ τί).

[26] Aubenque, 'Occasion Manquée', 373–75.

[27] C. J. Thomas, 'Speaking of Something: Plato's *Sophist* and *Plato's Beard*', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 38 (2008), 631–67 at 637–42, offers a careful analysis of these puzzles, and argues that Plato is less permissive with his ontology than is often assumed, in particular that he accepts the *tinos* requirement, i.e. the metaphysical constraint that discourse always be of some one existing countable thing (or several), and that he recognizes the problems this requirement brings for a theory of content.

conspicuous absence of this option) that *what is not* may yet be *something* — even if it is not *what is*. It also reveals semantic concerns, since all of this remains in pursuit of the sophist who says *what is not*.

However, the Visitor goes on, it is not just *what is not* that makes us ridiculous. The Presocratics — 'everyone who has ever in their judgment [about *what is*] rushed headlong into delimiting the things that *are*, how many and of what sort they are' (ὅστις πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὥρμησε τοῦ τὰ ὄντα διορίσασθαι πόσα τε καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν, 242 C 4–6) — show us that *being* is just as confused as *non-being*.[28] For example, if *what is* is two, e.g. hot and cold, and both *are* and each is *one*, then either they are not really two but rather three (including *being*), or they are not two but one (since both are *being*) (243 D 8–244 A 2).[29] So now the *Sophist* reveals concerns for unity and wholeness in cosmology, i.e. how it is possible to make one out of many. This is where the Battle of Gods and Giants, 'a certain never-ending battle' (ἄπλετος μάχη τις, 246 C 3), is introduced, to show from a different perspective that *what is* and *what is not* are equally confused.[30] In their first

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[28] For discussion of which Presocratics Plato has in mind, see Brown, 'Innovation', 185–89; L. Campbell, *The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, with a revised text and English notes* [*Sophistes*] (Oxford, 1867), lxxiv–lxxvi, 116, 122–23; F. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* [*PTK*] (New York, 1935), 218–30; F. Schleiermacher (ed.), W. Dobson (trns.), *Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato* (London, 1836), 257–58; A. E. Taylor, *Plato the Man and His Work* [*Plato*] (London, 1926), 383.

[29] Thus *being* is not just as confused as *non-being* because *being* always leads back to *non-being*, as Vogt argues; it is confused in its own right, without reference to *non-being*. And while *being* and *non-being* do stand or fall together, it is not simply because *non-being* is the unavoidable problem case; this is confirmed at 249 E 2–3 and 250 E 1–2.

[30] There is debate about the how the perspectives of the Presocratics and Giants on *being* differ from each other. Brown, 'Innovation', argues that the Presocratics are discussing how many *beings* there are, whereas the Giants are discussing what kind they are, or what they are like (and neither is asking, what is *being*?). T. Clarke, 'The Problem of Being in Plato's *Sophist*' (unpublished), argues against this interpretation of the distinction; his suggestion is that while the Presocratics of the previous discussion are trying to make precise determinations about what there is, the Gods and Giants are interested in 'meta-ontological' questions about the nature of *being*; thanks to Tim for discussion and correspondence on this point. Cornford, *PTK*, 228–29, 242–48, suggests, following Campbell, *Sophistes*, 116–18, that the Gods and Giants are speaking with less exactness (in contrast to the precisifications of the Presocratics) and getting at the fundamental issue of the philosophic debate (materialism or idealism), and that the Battle is intended as a complete review of all philosophers' views about 'the real', including Parmenides, other Presocratics, Plato's followers, and maybe Plato himself. G. Grote, *Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates*, vol. iii (London, 1888), 202, suggests that the first group are those who hold there to be a definite number of 'Entia' and the second are 'those who do not recognise any definite or specific number of elements or Entia' but deal instead with what kinds of things are *beings*. I am inclined to follow Cornford on this, and also agree with Clarke (and to an extent Grote) that the Gods and Giants are at least addressing the question of what *being* is, even if they are somewhat brutish in their efforts (as I think).

appearance, the earthborn Giants, representing the Presocratics,[31] are characterized as fearsome (δεινοὺς) philosophical savages.[32]

> οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ πάντα ἕλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διισχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴ τίς το φήσει μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν. (246 A 8–B 3)

Those who drag all things down to earth from the heavens and the invisible, inartfully [ἀτεχνῶς] grabbing stones and trees with their hands. For those who take hold of all such things avow only this to be: what has to it a certain impact [προς βολὴν] and tangibility [ἐπαφήν], those who define body and being as the same, but if any of the others should say that something that is not body has being, they are completely contemptuous and unwilling to hear anything else.

The savagery of these Giants consists first in their simply asserting that *being* is body, and second in refusing to discuss the matter; they insist that *being* is body and are unwilling to hear anything else about it. Their uncivilized demeanor, in both regards, is later underscored by their description as 'those who *drag* all things down into body *by force*' (τῶν εἰς σῶμα πάντα ἑλκόντων

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[31] See Brown, 'Innovation', and Cornford, *PTK*, 218–30, for arguments that the Giants represent the Presocratics of the previous discussion. Cornford also argues that Parmenides is grouped with the Gods in the Battle and Heraclitus with the Giants (241–49); Gill, *Philosophos*, 76–100, likewise argues that the Giants take the side of Heraclitus in particular, and the Gods of Parmenides.

[32] It is in response to the quoted description given by the Visitor that Theaetetus describes the Giants as fearsome, and says he has already met with a good number of them (246 B 4–5). Taylor, *Plato*, 384, takes Theaetetus' familiarity to signal that we are dealing with 'the crass unthinking corporealism of the "average man" rather than the doctrine of any particular "school"'; Cornford, *PTK*, *ad loc.*, takes the group to include philosophical materialists as well, though not any thinker in particular, so much as a tendency of thought. Campbell, *Sophistes*, lxxv and 127, takes the familiarity to be expressed by Plato, as opposed to the Visitor, and to indicate that the Gods represent friendly but misguided members of the Academy. I agree with Cornford on this, particularly given that the Visitor has said at 245 D 12–E 8 that they have not gone through all the detailed accounts, and that the objective of the current discussion is to have them *all* in view; this shows that the relevant group is neither ordinary people nor any particular thinker, but philosophical materialists generally.

βία, 246 C 10–D 1, my emphasis). So, the Visitor proposes to hypothesize a better (βελτίους), gentler (ἡμερώτεροι) breed of Giants, 'willing to answer less wildly than they actually do' (νομιμώτερον αὐτοὺς ἤ νῦν ἐθέλοντας ἄν ἀποκρίνασθαι, 246 D 4–7, trns. N. White).[33] It is in contrast to these hypothetically civilized Giants that a third aspect of the savagery of the original, untamed Giants is made explicit. Although the civilized Giants maintain that soul is a certain kind of body (perhaps tangible but not visible), they are too ashamed to say either that the virtues are body or that they are nothing at all. In this they are contrasted with the original Giants, who contend that 'everything which is unable to be squeezed by the hands is *absolutely nothing*' (πᾶν ὅ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν εἰσίν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστίν, 247 C 5–7, my emphasis). Thus, although the option to corporealize the virtues is open to the untamed Giants, it is not the move they make; rather, they say that if the virtues are not tangible, then they are absolutely nothing.

This eliminative aspect of the original Giants' savagery has been overlooked and can answer the second of our open questions, to what extent the Stoics are like the original, untamed Giants.[34] Everyone agrees that the Stoics corporealize the virtues, and this is correct; but in corporealizing the virtues, it will not be correct to say that the Stoics are like the original, savage Giants (as Brunschwig, Vogt, and Alessandrelli do). Nor, of course, will they be like the civilized Giants, who are too ashamed to corporealize the virtues. In that moment, admitting that the virtues *exist* but are not bodies, the civilized Giants fold altogether on their commitment to body as *being*, since *being* now includes incorporeals. They are also subject to a further challenge, to say what entities as different as bodies and incorporeals could possibly have in common, what could be true of them both at one

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[33] N. P. White (trns.), *Sophist*, in J. Cooper (ed.), *Plato Complete Works* (Hackett, 1997), 235–93.
[34] Brunschwig, *TGS*, 68, takes the two options offered to the civilized Giants at 247C to characterize the original Giants, which is to miss the eliminative aspect of their savagery and to conflate what the Visitor asks with what the original Giants say.

and the same time.

εἰ γὰρ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώματον, ἐξαρκεῖ. τὸ γὰρ

ἐπί τε τούτοις ἅμα καὶ ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις ὅσα ἔχει σῶμα συμφυὲς γεγονός, εἰς ὅ βλέποντες

ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγουσι, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥητέον. (247 C 9–D 4)

For if they are willing to admit something incorporeal, even something small, among

the beings, it is sufficient. For it is required of them to say this: what has come to be

that is naturally united, at once, with these [sc. incorporeals] and with those inasmuch

they have body, to which they look when they say that both are.

The reformed Giants may be more civilized for their willingness to enter discussion, but they

are not very sophisticated, or principled in their position, and again are not sure what to say. The

Visitor quickly offers the *dunamis* proposal that *being* is ‘what has any certain sort of capacity at all,

that is of a nature either to do anything whatever to something else or to undergo even the smallest

thing by the agency of the foulest, even if only once’ (τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν τινα κεκτημένον δύναμιν

εἴτ’ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιουν πεφυκὸς εἴτ’ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου,

κἄν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἅπαξ, 247 D 8–E 3). Notice that the *dunamis* proposal, by design, is a thin criterial

notion designed to cover two very different kinds of *being*; the *dunamis* proposal is *ex hypothesi*

insensitive to different *ways* of *being*. The discussion is not engaged with questions of

fundamentality and dependence, or the relation between bodies and incorporeals. Indeed, the

dunamis proposal could not function as it needs to, as what is common to contrary kinds, if it were

meant to differentiate things in terms of fundamentality. So the *dunamis* proposal, ‘*in situ*’, is clearly

an ontological criterion, rather than a metaphysical notion.

But this does not mean that the demand for the Giants to say what bodies and incorporeals

have in common is an ontological demand, or that the Giants necessarily accept the *dunamis*

proposal as an adequate response to the demand. In fact, it is explicit that the Giants accept the

dunamis proposal provisionally, only absent a better alternative that could yet arise: 'maybe something else will occur to them and to us later' (ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εἰς ὕστερον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τούτοις ἕτερον ἂν φανείη, 247 E 7–248 A 1). With this option conspicuously open, there is reason to think that Plato's challenge to the civilized Giants is to go beyond a merely ontological criterion, to a metaphysical account of what entities as different as bodies and incorporeals could possibly have in common insofar as they both *are*, or are *something*, i.e. to resist the two-worlds move. Lesley Brown describes Plato's message to the Presocratics, in the guise of the earthborn Giants, along these lines, as a call to engage in both ontology and metaphysics:

> [T]hose who pontificate about *onta* or *ousia*, enumerating basic principles, or declaring being to be confined to a certain kind of thing, owe us an account of their theorizing. They must give at least criteria for counting something in or out, or, better still, an account of what it is to be. Now it is highly likely that most of the theorists whom Plato takes to task did not in fact conceive of themselves as giving any sort of account of being. Parmenides, and Plato himself, are the two obvious exceptions to this. It is as if Plato's message to the others is: nowadays we expect such thinkers to be more self-critical, to state and defend their criteria for being, even to say what it is to be, before plunging into extravagant theorizing on the number and nature of beings (*posa kai poia ta onta*). Metaphysics and ontology should replace cosmology.[35]

My suggestion is that the Stoics could have understood the *Sophist* this way too, seeing themselves as akin to the earthborn Giants, savage and civilized, and that they could have aimed to respond on the Giants' behalf, breathing new life into their corporealism both by stating their

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[35] Brown, 'Innovation', 204; cf. 192–93.

criteria for counting things in or out and by saying what it is to be before rolling out their cosmology.

Turning now to the Gods, their position 'from some invisible aëry hold' is that only the Forms have *being* and everything else, including whatever meets the *dunamis* proposal, belongs to the realm of *becoming*.[36] The Gods' response to the Visitor's questioning is the move to two worlds, the contrary worlds of *being* and *becoming*. It is the stability of the Forms that earns them the status of *being*, in contrast to the flux of the material world, because this stability makes them fit to be the objects of knowledge (248 A 10–13). And it is this epistemological concern that the Visitor now turns on the Gods to force a parallel challenge to the one given to the Giants (248 B 2–4). While the Giants were handed a metaphysical challenge, to say what bodies and incorporeals could possibly have in common such that both have *being* (or are *something*), the Gods are handed an epistemological challenge, to say what sort of cognitive association (κοινωνία) could possibly be common to perception (by the body) and reasoning (by the soul).[37] Again the *dunamis* proposal is offered, but the Gods are resistant to admitting that the Forms might be acted upon and hence change by being known.

It is noteworthy that the Giants' metaphysical challenge follows from their brutish commitment to one world (the corporeal world of *being*), while the Gods' epistemological challenge follows from the high-mindedness of their move to two worlds (the incorporeal world of *being* and the corporeal world of *becoming*), which is immediately undermined by their own brutish rejection of the *dunamis* proposal as common to both. It is not often noted that the Friends of the Forms are described as 'insisting *violently* that true being is certain non-bodily Forms that can be thought about' (νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι, 246 B 7–8, trns. N. White,

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[36] Campbell, *Sophistes*, 116.

[37] For discussion of κοινωνία, see T. Irani, 'Perfect Change in Plato's *Sophist*', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 60 (2022), 45–93.

my emphasis).[38] Thus the Gods are just as contemptuous as the untamed Giants in their violent

refusal to hear anything else about *being*, including even the *dunamis* proposal, and the sophistication

of their two worlds move is rather blunted by their own savagery. In fact, the Friends of the Forms

never even concede the point; it is the Visitor who ultimately takes a stand against the Gods (at 248

E 7–249 C 9), and then calls on the philosopher 'to refuse the claim that the all is at rest, either from

those saying the one [sc. Parmenides] or those saying there are many forms [sc. the Gods], and to

not listen at all to those, again, moving *what is* in every way [sc. the Giants, presumably], but like a

children's wish, so long as *what is* and the all is moving and unmoving, to say "both together"' (μήτε

τῶν ἕν ἤ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἴδη λεγόντων πᾶν ἑστηκὸς ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τε αὖ πανταχῇ τὸ ὄν

κινούντων μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκούειν , ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίδων εὐχήν, ὅσα ἀκίνητα καὶ

κεκινημένα, τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν συνασμφότερα λέγειν, 249 C 10–D 4).

　　The idea behind the children's wish is that when faced with a choice between exclusive

alternatives, only a child would make the irrational demand for both, ignoring that it is impossible to

conjoin exclusive alternatives. Cornford illustrates this point by the question 'Which hand will you

have?' and, quoting a letter from Mary Lamb, 'Which do you like best?'.[39] The children's plea is

phrased in terms of motion and rest, whereas the foregoing discussion takes place in terms of bodies

and incorporeals with the Giants, and in terms of *becoming* and *being* with the Gods (as well as bodies

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[38] Or that they leave the discussion early on — once they reject the *dunamis* proposal and say that neither knowing nor being known is a case of either doing or undergoing (248 B 2–C 9), the Gods are no longer represented in the discussion; the ensuing conversation concerning change, life, soul, and mind that follows (248 E 7–249 C 9) is conducted in the first person, between Theaetetus and the Visitor, who reach agreement about what *we* will be convinced by (248 E 8), about what *we* will admit, say, deny, concede (249 A 2–B 3), and ultimately that *we* must use every argument we can to fight against anyone who does away with knowledge, understanding, or intelligence as *they* do (249 C 6–8). I appreciate Michael Augustin pointing out this important detail in the text; see M. Augustin, *Self-Instantiation in Plato's* Parmenides *and* Sophist [*Self-Instantiation*]. Diss. University of California, Santa Barbara (2018), for arguments that the Battle has a tripartite structure (Giants-Gods-Visitor/Theaetetus), the third part being signaled in part by this switch to the first person. Campbell, *Sophistes*, *ad loc.*, does observe: 'The Stranger's practiced ear discerns that from their serene height they reply with scorn'. It is possible to read 'βιαζόμενοι' in the passive rather than middle voice, but I have not found any that do, e.g. Cornford, 'maintaining with all their force,' and there is no other indication that they are being compelled, whether by reason or something else; I thank Rachana Kamtekar for this suggestion.

[39] Cornford, *PTK*, *ad loc.*

and incorporeals).[40] Of course, the Gods maintain that bodies and *becoming* are in motion and subject to the *dunamis* proposal, while Forms are completely at rest and not subject to the *dunamis* proposal, so the connection is not far to find;[41] and if the Giants are Heracliteans for whom all *being* is in motion (since *being* is body and there are no Forms), then the plea will apply equally to them.[42] Here ends the Battle of Gods and Giants.

Before proceeding to give a positive account of *being* and *non-being*, the Visitor puts forth one last challenge, personified by the Late Learners: 'let's give an account of how we call the very same thing, whatever it may be, by many names' (λέγωμεν δὴ καθ' ὅντινα ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἑκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν, 251 A 5–6) how a thing can be both one and many, i.e. how a person can be one even 'when we name him several things, when we apply colors to him, shapes, sizes, evils, and virtues; in all these cases and countless others we say not only that he is human but also good and indefinitely many different things' (πόλλ' ἄττα ἐπονομάζοντες, τά τε

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[40] Though when the Visitor moves to the first person at 248 E 7–8, he does include motion alongside life, soul, and wisdom. I would like to remain neutral on several interpretive questions here: (1) whether *for Plato* the *dunamis* proposal is a definition (G. E. L. Owen, 'Plato on Not-Being', in G. Vlastos (ed.), *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays*, vol. i*:* Metaphysics and Epistemology (Garden City, 1971), 223–67; Gill, *Philosophos*) or a mark of being (Cornford, *PTK*; Brown, 'Innovation'); (2) whether it survives *for Plato* (YES: Brown, 'Innovation'; Brunschwig, *TGS*; Gill, *Philosophos*; Irani, 'Perfect Change'; F. Leigh, 'Being and Power in Plato's *Sophist*', *Apeiron*, 43 (2010), 63–85; J. M. E. Moravcsik, 'Being and Meaning in the *Sophist*', *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, 14 (1962), 23–78; Owen, 'Plato on Not-Being'; G. Vlastos, 'An Ambiguity in the *Sophist*', *Platonic Studies* 2nd edn. (Princeton, 1981), 270–322. NO: Augustin, *Self-Instantiation*. MAYBE: Cornford, *PTK*, 239); and (3) whether the *dunamis* proposal is modified here by the children's wish so that *being* is now defined in terms of both motion and rest as part of its nature (e.g. Brunschwig, *TGS*; Gill, *Philosophos*; Irani, 'Perfect Change'; Moravcsik, 'Being and Meaning in the *Sophist*;* Owen, 'Plato on Not-Being'), or the children's wish is rather that *being* should include in its *extension* both corporeal and incorporeal things (e.g. Augustin, *Self-Instantiation*; Brown, 'Innovation'; Cornford, *PTK*; D. Keyt, 'Plato's Paradox That the Immutable Is Unknowable', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 19 (1969), 1–14. In other words, I do not wish to weigh in on whether Plato intends for the Forms to remain immutable or not. However, I will suggest that *for the Stoics* the challenge to be inclusive, so that the ontology includes both bodies and incorporeals in its extension, is distinct from the challenge of the children's plea to make *being* (namely body) such that it has both motion and rest. To this extent, then, I do lean toward Gill et al. in taking the children's plea to be about the *nature* of *being* rather than its extension; it is still possible that the Stoics saw it one way and Plato another, and to that extent I do remain agnostic about Plato.

[41] I am skeptical that the Gods are refusing to call what is *becoming* 'body', as Bronowski, *Lekta*, 151, argues.

[42] The Giants are never explicitly described as committed to all things being in motion, except in the children's wish; it is perhaps an assumption about body that all parties agree to implicitly, or perhaps there really is a move to single out Heraclitus, who has been invoked earlier in the discussion, as Gill, *Philosophos*, argues (see n. 32). Another possibility is that the other materialists are also committed to their bodies being always in motion, albeit in different ways (either coming together or pulling apart through love and strife, or atoms in eternal motion, or however else the material principles change to produce the world of our experience).

χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς, ἐν οἷς πᾶσι ἑτέροις

μυρίοις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν εἶναι φαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερα ἄπειρα, 251 A 8–B 3).

Although the Visitor is dismissive of the Late Learners, he makes it a point to keep their challenge in

view: 'Then let's direct our questions now both to these people and also to the others we were

talking with before. That way our account will be addressed to everyone who's ever said anything at

all about being' (ἵνα τοίνυν πρὸς ἅπαντας ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ τοὺς πώποτε περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὁτιοῦν

διαλεχθέντας, 251 C 9–D 3, trns. N. White). Thus the logical challenge of the Late Learners, to say

how one thing can be called many or have many things predicated of it even while remaining one,

stands as a dialectical bookend to the physical challenge of the Presocratics, to make one out of

many with a completely corporealist cosmology.

I propose that we have now found eight distinct challenges that are likely to have been

salient to the Stoics in the *Sophist*, each one represented below by a character in the text:

(i)	Parmenides	*Commit the patricide*: (1) Prise apart *something* from *being*, and show that *what is not* is still (2) a countable individual, and (3) a proper object of thought and discourse — state and defend your criteria for counting something in or out
(ii)	Giants	*Defend the Giants*: Say what it is to *be*, and deliver unity without Form in a completely corporealist cosmology — make one out of many
(iii)	Gods	*Reform the Giants:* Dare to say that soul and even the virtues are bodies — corporealize, do not eliminate
(iv)	Children	*Reconcile the Gods and Giants*: Make *being* capable of both rest and change — hear the children's wish

(v)	Late Learners	*Silence the Late Learners*: Deliver predication without plurality, show how one thing can be called many (colors, shapes, sizes, evils, virtues, et al.) even while remaining one — make many out of one
(vi)	Battle	*Be inclusive*: Do not 'drag all things down from the heavens and the invisible to earth' (εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου πάντα ἕλκουσι, 246 A 8–9) — recognize both bodies and incorporeals
(vii)	Visitor	*Be principled about your inclusivity:* Go beyond a thin ontological criterion to a one-world metaphysics — find the common ground
(viii)	Sophist	*Save the sophist*: Give a theory of meaning and be able to say something even when it does not represent the world as it is — say *what is not*

With respect to our open questions, we have already found that these challenges are both ontological (concerned with counting) and metaphysical (concerned with *ways* of being Something), but questions about *being* are not treated as questions about fundamentality; further, *being* is indeed problematic, but not because it leads to *non-being.* Secondly, we have seen that the original, untamed Giants do not corporealize the virtues, so at least insofar as the Stoics *do* corporealize, we can see already that they are not to be equated with either the savage Giants, who are eliminativists, or the civilized Giants who are too ashamed to corporealize. Hence I have put the challenges above simply in terms of 'the Giants', signaling that the Stoics will be descended from the original and civilized Giants, but not quite like either one. Third, we have seen that the *dunamis* proposal, designed to be insensitive to different *ways* of *being,* is an ontological patch for what is really a metaphysical challenge; and, fourth, that this challenge is to give a one-world metaphysics of bodies and incorporeals, including the semantic dimension of our world. Let us turn now to the Stoics with these challenges in view, and the interpretive questions that remain open.

4. Stoic ontology

The Stoic response to Plato's first challenge, *Commit the patricide*, state and defend your criteria for counting something in or out, is to introduce not just one, but, as Brunschwig has argued, two distinct ontological criteria: one for *what is*, and one for *what is not* but is nevertheless Something. I will take each in turn. First, in giving the criterion for *what is* we find the Stoics turning the *dunamis* proposal against Plato, to admit only bodies; as Hahm puts it, they (and the Epicureans) 'have grossly perverted its intent'.[43] They start with the premise that *being* is the capacity to act or be acted upon, to do or undergo (Plut. *Comm. not.* 1073 D–E (= SVF ii. 525)).[44] Then they show that only bodies meet this criterion (Aët. *Plac.* 4. 20. 2 (= SVF ii. 387); Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 15. 14. 1 (= LS 45G); Cic. *Acad.* 1. 39 (= LS 45A); Sen. *Ep.* 106. 5 Gummere; Cleom. *Cael.* 1. 1. 66–67; 1. 1. 99–100 Todd; D.L. 7.55 (= LS 33H); S.E. *M.* 8. 263 (= LS 45B)).[45] From these premises they can conclude that only bodies *are* (Alex. Aphr. *In Top.* 301. 19–25 (= LS 27B); Plot. 2. 4. 1 (= LS 44g); 4. 1. 28 (= SVF ii. 319); S.E. *M.* 10. 3–4 (= LS 49B)).[46] Thus the *dunamis* proposal is not a criterion for bodies or corporeality, but rather for *being* — as originally proposed in the *Sophist*. Since the *dunamis* proposal is the major premise of the syllogism, and the commitment that only bodies can act or undergo is the minor premise, textual evidence that only bodies can act or undergo does not establish that the *dunamis* proposal in Stoic hands is criterial for body and not for *being*. On the contrary, as Long & Sedley say, 'It is essential to see that the capacity to act or be acted upon,

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[43] D. Hahm, *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology* [*Origins*] (Ohio, 1977), 12.

[44] I cite parenthetically the chapter number and letter of passages as they appear in A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* [LS], 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1987), e.g. 45G, following; when passages do not appear in LS, I cite the volume and passage number from H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* [SVF], 4 vols. (Tuebner, 1903–1905), as here; and when passages do not appear in LS or SVF I give no further citation, but do indicate the editor, as with the Seneca and Cleomedes passages, following.

[45] Only bodies meet the criterion for *being* because, first, doing and undergoing require contact (Simpl. *In Categ.* 8. 302. 30–31 (= SVF ii. 342)), and, second, only body has the solidity and resistance required for contact (Nemes. *Nat. hom.* 78. 7–79. 2 (= LS 45C); 81. 6–10 (= LS 45D); D.L. 7. 135 (= LS 45E); Galen *Qualit. incorp.* xix. 483. 13–16 (= LS 45F).

[46] LS numbers with lower case letters refer to passages appearing only in volume ii. See Hahm, *Origins*, 12, for the idea that the Stoics follow the Epicureans in syllogizing this way (Lucretius 1. 444–446, Rouse, Smith).

though peculiar to bodies, is not advanced as a defining characteristic of body *per se*.[47] Furthermore, that it is *being* and *non-being* that is at issue for the Stoics is confirmed by Plutarch, who complains that it is absurd for the Stoics to say that 'there is something but it is *what is not*' in reference to the incorporeals, or as Cherniss renders the commitment, 'something is but is non-existent' (εἶναι μέν τι μὴ ὄν δ' εἶναι, *Comm. not.* 1073 D–E (= SVF ii. 525)).[48]

Thus we can confirm that the *dunamis* proposal is used by the Stoics as an ontological criterion for *being*, and not for corporeality.[49] And while the criterion is certainly causal, as Vogt emphasizes, this attention to causation is not to the exclusion of *being*; on the contrary, the commitment to *being* as the capacity for causal interaction is as much about *being* as it is about causation. And there is no reason to think, with Bronowski, that 'being' does not have doctrinal purport when the Stoics say that only bodies have *being*, or that Something is the genus of *being*, etc.[50] We can also see that there is no indication that what is at issue with the *dunamis* proposal is the fundamentality of *being* and *non-being*, or of bodies and incorporeals as Bailey has urged. It is simply a thin ontological criterion for *being*.

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[47] LS, 273; likewise, J.-B. Gourinat, 'The Stoics on Matter and Prime Matter: "Corporealism" and the Imprint of Plato's *Timaeus*', in R. Salles (ed.), *God and Cosmos in Stoicism* (Oxford, 2009), 4–70 at 56, says that acting and being acted upon are a property rather than a definition of body (but cf. Gourinat 'Les stoïciens et le dualisme', *Chôra. Revue d'études anciennes et médiévales*, 13 (2015), 165–84 at 179, where it is offered as a definition of body and the Stoics are equated with the Sons of the Earth). Contrast with Hahm, *Origins*, 3, 11, who takes the *dunamis* proposal to be a *second* definition of body (alongside solid three-dimensional extension with resistance), and J. Mansfeld, 'Zeno of Citium. Critical Observations on a Recent Study', *Mnemosyne*, 31 (1978), 134–78 at 158–67, who finds the two definitions in tension. Marmodoro, 'Stoic Gunk', 156, 171; 'Stoic Blends', 2, 13, takes the *dunamis* proposal ('that only the causally powerful exists') to be the Stoics' motivation for their 'extreme physicalism', i.e. corporealism, so she is in agreement that it is *being* rather than corporeality that is at issue (though this is not her focus); however, she goes on to assimilate Stoic causation to the colocation of blending, denying that this is a physical interaction between bodies and casting it instead a case of 'sharing subjects' according to which the passive body shares in the properties and/or structure of the active body by being compresent with it, but not by being qualified by it or by interacting, and in this she stands on her own.

[48] H. Cherniss, *Plutarch Moralia*, vol. xiii, part ii (Cambridge, Mass., 1976).

[49] Brunschwig, *TGS*, 60, 72–3, 86–7, treats the *dunamis* proposal as a criterion for 'corporeal existence', taking corporeality and *existence* as equivalent; however it is clear he is committed to the *dunamis* proposal as a criterion for *being*, so he remains in contrast to Bronowski, *Lekta*, and Vogt, 'Brutes'.

[50] I am not moved by the argument in Bronowski, *Lekta*, 127–28, that *being* has no doctrinal purport generally because it is sometimes said that the incorporeals <u>are</u> such and such, e.g. that assertibles (ἀξιόματα) <u>are</u> true or false. It is a mistake to think that if some uses of 'being' are technical then they must all be technical; the pervasiveness of the copula, and the preponderance of non-technical uses of the verb 'to be' do not undermine so much as underscore the technical uses; see n. 2 for bibliography.

*   *   *

So much for *what is*, now on to *what is not*. Alessandrelli and Aubenque take the *dunamis* proposal to be the only ontological criterion, determining at once *what is* and *what is not*. However, failing to meet the *dunamis* proposal is not sufficient to differentiate the incorporeals from nothing at all. For this, there must be a second criterion that recognizes those things that, while *non-existent*, are nevertheless Something. So I take Brunschwig to be right about there being two ontological criteria rather than one, although I differ from him on the details of the second criterion, and in that I take this criterion to respond to Plato's patricide in the *Sophist*. Whether the Stoics use the second criterion to abdicate the challenge to say what bodies and incorporeals have in common, as Brunschwig argues, or whether being Something objectively real is a sufficient response to this challenge, as Alessandrelli and Aubenque take it, remains to be seen.

The second criterion screens for those things that are not bodies, and thus do not *exist* or have *being*, but are nevertheless Something that *subsists* (τὸ ὑφεστός, Galen *Meth. med.* 10. 155. 1–8 (= LS 27G)). Recall that the patricide over *what is not* itself contained three challenges: (1) to prise apart *something* from *being*, (2) to show that *something* without *being* is nevertheless a countable individual, and (3) to show that *something* without *being* is a coherent object of thought. To the first, as Aubenque emphasizes, the path that allows *something* and *being* to come apart is conspicuously absent in the *Sophist*, and the Stoics clearly embrace this option by making Something the genus of *being*, which is said only of bodies, and of the incorporeals as *non-beings* (Alex. Aphr. *In Top.* 301. 19–25 (= LS 27B); Sen. *Ep.* 58. 13–15 (= LS 27A), S.E. *M.* 10. 218 (= LS 27C)). And, as I will argue, in stating and defending a second criterion for counting Something in or out, the Stoics offer two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being Something, which correspond to

the second two challenges of the patricide.[51] I will begin with the second condition on being

Something, availability for thought. That the Stoics were thinking along these lines is attested by

Sextus Empiricus.

> εἰ γὰρ τὸ οὔτι διδάσκοιτο, ἔσται ἡ διδάσκεται τί […] καὶ μὴν εἰ διδάσκεται τί, ἤτοι
>
> διὰ τῶν οὐτινῶν διδαχθήσεται ἤ διὰ τῶν τινῶν. ἀλλὰ διὰ μὲν τῶν οὐτινῶν οὐχ οἷόν
>
> τε διδαχθῆναι· ἀνυπόστατα γάρ ἐστι τῇ διανοίᾳ ταῦτα κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς.
>
> (S.E. *M.* 1.15 … 1.17 Bury (27C+))[52]
>
> For if what is not something [τὸ οὔτι] were to be taught, it would be something,
>
> inasmuch as it is taught […] And if, indeed, something is taught, either it will be taught
>
> through what are not something [τῶν οὐτινῶν] or through what are something
>
> [τινῶν]. But it is not possible for it to be taught through what are not something; for
>
> these have no subsistence for the mind [ἀνυπόστατα … τῇ διανοίᾳ], according to the
>
> Stoics.

This passage reports that being *subsistent* (ὑπόστασστος) for the mind or intellect, i.e. available

to thought, is criterial for being Something for the Stoics.[53] What has no *subsistence* for the mind is

not Something; therefore, what is Something must be *subsistent* for the mind. And anything that is

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[51] I have argued elsewhere (V. de Harven, 'How Nothing Can Be Something: The Stoic Theory of Void' ['Nothing'], *Ancient Philosophy*, 35 (2015), 405–29) for this second criterion, but offer here an updated version of it. I show there how the spatial incorporeals (place, room, surface, and void) are both countable and proper objects of thought; time, like void, is counted at the cosmic level so that it is the whole of time that is Something, rather than individual times.

[52] See also S.E. *M.* 1. 29, 11. 224 Bury. Bronowski, *Lekta*, 127–28, takes this passage as evidence that the Stoics did not make a distinction between the *being* of bodies and that of incorporeals; on this view, it seems Alexander isn't complaining about distinctions they *do* make between the being of bodies and incorporeals but, rather, correctly pointing out that the Stoics *fail* to make a clear distinction between their being. However, the testimony of Galen *Meth. med.* 10. 155. 1–8 (= LS 27G), about the Stoics' 'linguistic quibbling' over the distinction κατὰ γένη between the *existent* (τὸ ὄν) and the *subsistent* (τὸ ὑφεστός) shows this reading cannot be correct. Alessandrelli, 'Qualcosa', 6–7, 13, takes this passage to show that Something is not yet operating as a genus; this seems unlikely for such a late and generic report.

[53] As Caston, 'Something and Nothing', also argues. Note that my inferring from this passage that the Stoics take *subsistence* for thought as criterial for being Something does not suppose Sextus himself is saying this or making this inference in his polemic here. All that Sextus attributes to the Stoics is that what is not Something has no *subsistence* for the mind, and that is all he needs to draw the conclusion that what is not Something cannot be taught; but this does not mean *we* cannot infer from the report that what is Something *is subsistent* for the mind.

not Something has no *subsistence* for the mind; therefore what is *subsistent* for the mind or available to thought is Something.[54] Now what sort of availability for thought is this? My suggestion is that availability for thought is criterial of reality insofar as the relevant sense of availability lies with the world, not the mind; to be available for thought this way is to be an impressor (φανταστόν), something real, or among what there is. It is not because I think something, that it must be real (let alone that my thinking makes it real), but because something is real that it is available to be thought about.

This reading of the thinkability criterion is importantly different from a Meinongian interpretation like Victor Caston's, which finds the Stoics motivated by concerns about intentionality and intentional objects in cases where the object does not exist, resulting in a highly permissive criterion that admits anything at all that is conceivable.[55] The Stoic appeal to availability for thought, as I will argue, is not motivated by concerns about meaning and reference; it is, rather, an appeal to the objective features of the world as it really is. To say that what is not Something has no *subsistence* for the mind is simply to say that such (putative) things cannot excite an impression in us, just as Sextus' third argument against *what is not* argues: what is taught becomes learning in us by exciting (Bury, for κινοῦν) or setting in motion (Bett) an impression (φαντασία), but *what is not* cannot do this and therefore is not teachable (1. 11–12).[56] To be *subsistent* for the mind, then, is to be an impressor (φανταστόν), and to be an impressor is to be real — not a figment of the imagination (Aët. *Plac.* 4.

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[54] Thus I disagree with Bronowski, *Lekta*, 161–62, that this passage gives us a map of the Stoic ontology, which includes Somethings and Not-Somethings (a class of entities intermediate between Something and nothing at all). The express parity of reasoning (1. 16) with the earlier dichotomy *what is* and *what is not* (1. 10–14), where there is no reason to think *what is not* refers to entities intermediate between *what is* and nothing at all, shows this cannot be the correct interpretation of the text. R. G. Bury, *Sextus Empiricus. Against the Professors* [*Against Professors*] (Cambridge, Mass., 1949) even renders the argument using 'something' and 'nothing'.

[55] Caston, 'Something and Nothing', 154–56; by 'Meinongian', Caston means a theory that rejects the presupposition that having an attribute entails having some kind of *being*; a Meinongian view can make attributions independent of questions of *being*, *existence*, and *subsistence*. LS, 164, also cast Stoic *subsistence* as Meinongian, but in passing. G. Watson, *The Stoic Theory of Knowledge* (Belfast, 1966), 92–6 first introduced Meinong and Russell to the conversation.

[56] Bury, *Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicians* [*Against Logicians*] (Cambridge, Mass., 1935); R. Bett, *Sextus Empiricus. Against Those in the Disciplines* (Oxford, 2018).

12. 1–5 (= LS 39B); D.L. 7. 49–53 (= LS 39A, D+); 7. 157; S.E. *M.* 8. 70 (= LS 33C)). Thus, we can see that creatures of fiction and falsehoods are not the kind of thing we would expect to find as teachable or the sort of thing to seek as Something in light of this piece of evidence in Sextus.[57]

Another important piece of evidence for the kind of availability for thought the Stoics have in mind is the following famously perplexing passage, from Sextus' *Against the Logicians* (which argues against the specific discipline of logic, as books 7 and 8 of *Against the Professors*, which are a continuation of the schema introduced in book 1). It is offered in response to the challenge: how can the logician's demonstration (ἀπόδειξις, which is composed of incorporeal sayables) be the agent of an imprint (τύπωσις) or an impression, let alone an infallible cataleptic impression, given that incorporeals cannot act or be acted upon? This is an instance of the third argument, that *what is not* cannot excite an impression in us (1. 11–12) and that what is not Something has no *subsistence* for the mind (1. 17) — but this time we get the Stoic response to this persistent challenge.

> ὥσπερ γάρ, ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ ὁπλομάχος ἔσθ' ὅτε μὲν λαβόμενος τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ παιδὸς ῥυθμίζει καὶ διδάσκει τινὰς κινεῖσθαι κινήσεις, ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ ἄπωθεν ἑστὼς και πως κινούμενος ἐν ῥυθμῷ παρέχει ἑαυτὸν ἐκείνῳ πρὸς μίμησιν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φανταστῶν ἔνια μὲν οἱονεὶ ψαῦοντα καὶ θιγγάνοντα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ποιεῖται τὴν ἐν τούτῳ τύπωσιν, ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ κοινῶς τὸ σῶμα, ἔνια δὲ τοιαύτην ἔχει φύσιν, τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς φαντασιουμένου καὶ οὐχ ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὁποῖά ἐστι τὰ ἀσώματα λεκτά. (S.E. *M.* 8. 409–10 (= LS 27E))[58]
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> For just as, they [the Stoics] say, the trainer or drill-sergeant sometimes imposes order and teaches him to make certain motions sometimes by taking the boy's hands, and

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[57] And insofar as the Stoics are not motivated by concerns about intentionality, Bailey's comparison of the incorporeals to Tichý's offices is further to find as well.

[58] Translation is an amalgam of choices made by LS; Bett, *Against the Logicians* [*Against Logicians*] (Cambridge, 2005); and Bury, *Against Logicians*.

other times presents himself to the boy for imitation by standing at a distance and moving in an orderly way, so too some impressors [φανταστῶν], as if they were touching and taking hold [θιγγάνοντα] of the commanding faculty, make their imprint in it, of the sort that white and black and body generally are, while other impressors have this sort of nature: with the commanding faculty being impressed [φαντασιουμένου] on the basis of [ἐπί] them and not by [ὑπό] them, of the sort that incorporeal sayables [λεκτά] are.

The Stoic response illustrated by the drill sergeant is to make a distinction between cases where the impressor and the agent of the impression are one and the same, and cases where the agent and the impressor come apart, i.e. when the impressor is an incorporeal incapable of causal interaction (8. 406); in the latter case, the soul itself is the agent of the impression, being impressed on the basis of (ἐπί) an incorporeal, which is grasped by the mind and not the senses.[59] The surrounding context makes clear that what is at issue is whether the commanding faculty of soul can be the agent of its own impressions (8. 406–8), where the corporeal agent is distinct from the non-sensory impressor; and it is by ignoring this option to make impressor and agent distinct that Sextus generates his puzzles and rejects the Stoic solution.[60]

Thus, I take the drill sergeant passage to confirm that being a non-sensory impressor (being *subsistent* for thought) entails being objectively real, among the furniture of the world, part of what

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[59] It is hard to know how to render the preposition 'ἐπί' here to capture the contrast with 'ὑπό', which conveys corporeal agency. I follow Bett, *Against Logicians*, with 'on the basis of', but I would be open to 'on the occasion of' as well; Bury, *Against Logicians*, goes with 'as a result'; LS go with 'in relation to'.

[60] Bury, *Against Professors*, renders the point just this way: 'it is we who form presentations from them'; Brunschwig, *TGS*, 74–5, observes that it could *only* be the commanding faculty acting on itself. Without getting into the details of what leads up to the drill sergeant case, Sextus' closing complaint that the Stoics have failed to deliver an incorporeal impressor (since, as he sees it, the drill sergeant makes an impression in virtue of being a body) confirms that this is the Stoic path (8. 410). By saying that it is really the drill sergeant as a body that makes the impression (presumably since the boy is seeing him and thus being impressed by (ὑπό) him like white and black and color in general), Sextus rebuffs the Stoic candidate for the job of agent (the commanding faculty), equating the corporeal agent of the impression with the impressor (the incorporeal) all over again, and ignores the incorporeal pattern of the drill sergeant's motions as a candidate for the job of impressor.

there is, like the order of the drill sergeant's motions, and like sayables in a demonstration.[61] That

sensory and non-sensory impressors are considered real and not merely intentional objects is

confirmed by their explicit contrast with figments of the imagination (cited above), which are

apparitions corresponding to *nothing in reality*. Being a proper object of thought and discourse, then,

is being a non-sensory impressor in the way that the patter of the drill sergeant's motions is: as a

feature of reality that we grasp by the mind rather than the senses.[62] So the first part of the

Something criterion screens for objectivity.

*   *   *

However, this thinkability criterion by itself still leaves room for entities like Plato's Forms to count

as Something. Justice itself, the Friends of the Forms might yet respond, is intelligible and

incorporeal and available to be thought about by anyone at all, and so counts as Something. But it is

a hallmark of Stoic theory that they reject Plato's Forms and embrace only particulars (Simpl. *In.

Categ.* 105. 5–16 (= LS 30E); Stob. 1. 135. 21–137. 6 (= LS 30A); Syr. *In Metaph.* 104. 17–21 (= LS

30G)), so thinkability is merely a necessary condition of being Something, not sufficient by itself. In

addition to whether a putative or candidate entity is available to thought, then, the Stoics also ask: is

it, as Plato challenges, some *one* thing that we can count, refer to, and quantify over as an individual?

Can we legitimately apply unity and plurality, so that Something is always some *one* thing (and a *pair

of somethings*, two, and *somethings*, several)? This is the second of the two individually necessary and

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[61] Thus I disagree with Bronowski, *Lekta*, 181–93, that this passage reports a psychological distinction between two ways to receive a sayable. First, it does not follow from the fact that *sometimes* the impressor is not the agent that it *never* is. Second, the relevant similarity between the pattern of the drill sergeant's motions and the sayables is nothing more than their both being incorporeal impressors, distinct from the corporeal agent of their impressions; they are analogous, the drill sergeant's pattern is not itself a sayable.

[62] I do not want to put the point about objectivity in terms of being mental or extra-mental, as Bronowski, *Lekta*, does, because I take the Stoics to recognize some entities that are both mind-dependent (i.e. products of thought) and objective, notably the sayables, but also those things that are neither corporeal nor incorporeal, like creatures of fiction and limits (but not concepts).

jointly sufficient conditions for being Something: particularity. Brunschwig has suggested that the

Stoics' famous Not Someone paradox is a test for particularity.[63]

ἄξιον δὲ ζητεῖν κατὰ τοὺς ὑπόστασιν διδόντας τοῖς εἴδεσιν καὶ γένεσιν εἰ ῥηθήσεται

τάδε εἶναι. (1) καὶ γὰρ καὶ Χρύσιππος ἀπορεῖ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας εἰ τόδε τι ῥηθήσεται.

(2) συμπαραπλητέον δὲ καὶ τὴν συνθήσειαν τῶν Στωικῶν περὶ τῶν γενικῶν ποιῶν,

πῶς αἱ πτώσεις κατ' αὐτοὺς προφέρονται καὶ πῶς οὕτινα τὰ κοινὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς

λέγεται καὶ ὅπως παρὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τοῦ μὴ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν τόδε τι σημαίνειν καὶ τὸ

παρὰ τὸν οὗτιν σόφισμα γίνεται, παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως, (3) οἷον 'εἴ τις ἔστιν ἐν

Ἀθήναις, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν Μεγάροις. <ἄνθρωπος δὲ ἔστιν ἐν Ἀθήναις· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν

ἄνθρωπος ἐν Μεγλαροις>'. (4) ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὔ τις ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστί τις ὁ

κοινός· ὡς τινὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐλάβομεν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο

ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος 'οὗτις' κληθείς. (Simpl. *In Categ.* 105. 6–16 (= LS 30E))[64]

It is worthwhile to inquire of those who give being to forms and genera whether they

will be called thises [τάδε]. (1) And in fact, Chrysippus puzzles about the form,

whether it is to be called a 'this something' [τόδε τι]. (2) One must also take into

account the Stoics' custom concerning generically qualified things — how according

to them cases (πτώσεις) get expressed [προφέρονται], in their school how universals

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[63] Brunschwig, *TGS*, 84–6. Note that Brunschwig takes the paradox to show that Forms *are* Not-Somethings, which I do not. I take the test to be for whether Forms are Something or not. It's not that universals *are* Not-Somethings but that they are *not* Somethings; this is confirmed by Simplicius' diagnosis in (4) and his point about how the sophism gets its name: from the failure to be Someone. Note the distinction between the hyphenated 'Not-Something', which signals an interpretive commitment to the class of Not-Somethings between Something and nothing, and 'Not Something', which does not.

[64] See J. Mansfeld, 'Versions of the Nobody', *Mnemosyne*, 37 (1984), 445–47, for a thorough review of the *variae lectiones* of this argument; cf. P. Crivelli, 'The Stoics on Definitions and Universals', *Documenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale*, 18 (2007), 89–122 at 103–4, who argues that the argument can only be applied to men and self-instantiating universals; and S. Bobzien, 'How to give someone Horns: Paradoxes of Presupposition in Antiquity', *History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis*, 15 (2012), 159–184 at 182, who cites a variant of the argument (D.L. 7. 187) as evidence that the Stoics were aware of problems with substituting indefinite expressions for definite or anaphoric pronouns.

[τὰ κοινὰ] are said to be not somethings [οὔτινα], and how their ignorance of the fact that not every substance signifies a 'this something' gives rise to the not someone [οὖτιν] sophism, which relies on the form of expression. (3) Namely, 'if someone is in Athens, he is not in Megara; <but humanity is in Athens; therefore humanity is not in Megara>'. (4) For, humanity is not someone [οὔ τις]; for the universal is not someone [οὔ … τις]; but we took him as something in the argument, and that is why the argument has this name, being called the 'not someone [οὖτις]' argument.

As we have seen with the first condition on being Something, our ability to think about an entity is not constitutive, causal, or even explanatory of its being Something, but it is criterial since only what is real is available for anyone (any arbitrary individual) to think about. Likewise, passing the Not Someone, or οὖτις (*outis*) test is not explanatory of an entity's particularity, but indicative of it and hence criterial of its being some one thing. The test in question at (3) is this: *If something is in Athens, then it is not in Megara* — whatever makes the conditional come out true (when the antecedent is true) passes the test. Given the assumption in (2) that Forms are universals (κοινά), it is obviously false that if the Form of human is in Athens, then it is not also in Megara. That it is the particularity of an entity that is at issue in this use of the paradox is made clear by the reference in (1) and (2) to 'thises' (τάδε) and to the Stoics' *ignorance* in treating Form as a 'this something' (τόδε τι), as well as by the diagnosis of the result in (4), namely that the Form of human was taken as someone, i.e. someone particular.[65]

It is clear that Socrates will pass the Something test because as a body he is a particular unable to be in two places at once. Less obvious is that Socrates' place also passes the test in virtue

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[65] Brunschwig, *TGS*, 84, suggests we might reinterpret this non-Stoic terminology (i.e. τόδε τι) as a disjunction so that Chrysippus puzzles whether Forms are *either* this *or* something; I do not think it necessary to interpolate the 'or' since it can stand as Simplicius' diagnosis of the Stoic mistake, put in his own terms, and thus does not require putting the phrase in Chrysippus' mouth to begin with.

of Socrates being a particular.[66] What I mean is that the dependence of the incorporeals on their underlying bodies — the fact that they inherit their physical properties from the bodies on which they *subsist* — is explanatory of why they meet the Something criterion.[67] This dependence and inheritance can be understood on the model of the flow of traffic. The flow of traffic is not reducible to, or nothing but the corporeal cars in motion that we see (*by* which we are impressed), nor is it the motion of the cars; it is something distinct from, and yet clearly dependent on the motion of the cars that underlie it, which is grasped by the mind (*on the basis of* which we are impressed). The very existence (or in Stoic parlance, *subsistence*) of a certain flow of traffic (the rate at which the cars are moving) depends on the cars, and so do all the particular properties of that flow of traffic, e.g. being fast or slow, smooth or stop-and-go, in Athens or Megara in just that way. The flow of traffic thus inherits its properties from the underlying, or 'host' cars in motion, including being here or there, among the rest of its fully particular qualities. However, the flow of traffic is not the same thing as or nothing but the cars, or their motions (which are also corporeal); it is something distinct, an incorporeal, that arises from the cars in motion: the pace at which they are going.

Likewise, the incorporeals inherit their particular physical characteristics from the bodies on which they depend. For instance, time is not the same thing as the world's change, but the *rate* of the world's change or motion; and this is not to equate time with motion, but to identify a further entity that is not visible or otherwise accessible to the senses, as motion is, but rather an intelligible

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[66] In this, and in the application of the test to mass terms and incorporeals, I differ from Brunschwig, *TGS*; Crivelli, 'The Stoics on Definitions and Universals' (see n. 64); and Alessandrelli, 'Qualcosa' (who denies the incorporeals are particulars).
[67] The dependence of the incorporeals on body is somewhat controversial; though some take it for granted (e.g. B. Inwood and L. P. Gerson, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*, 2nd edn. [IG] (Indianapolis, Cambridge, 1988) in their glossary entry for '*subsist*'; Graeser, *Zenon von Kition: Positionen und Probleme* (Berlin, New York, 1975), and 'The Stoic Theory of Meaning', in J. M. Rist (ed.), *The Stoics* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1978), 77–100), many take one or all of the incorporeals to be independent of body. For arguments that the spatial incorporeals place, void, room, and surface are dependent on body, see de Harven, 'Nothing'. For the kind of ontological dependence I have in mind in contemporary terns, see Feature Dependence in K. Koslicki, 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence,' in F. Correia, B. Schneider (eds.), *Metaphysical Grounding, Understanding the Structure of Reality* (Cambridge, 2012), 186–213.

entity accessible to the mind (*on the basis of which* we can be impressed). Further, the temporal extension of this world here cannot be there, as the temporal extension of that world (not that there are other worlds for the Stoics, but speaking hypothetically). In just the same way, the extra-cosmic void extending infinitely from all sides of this world cannot be there, extending infinitely from that world. Because time and void arise from *these* bodies, and not *those*, they cannot be there while also being here. So too, the three-dimensional extension that is the place of my car depends for its particular size and shape on my car; and just as my car cannot be in Megara if it is in Athens, neither can its place be in two places at once. In all these cases, the incorporeals that arise are particulars because they depend on particular bodies for their *subsistence*. This inheriting of particularity explains why these entities pass the Not Someone test. Because incorporeals are grounded in body, on the model of the flow of traffic, they count as Something; if they were not grounded in body this way, they would lack the particularity for which the Not Someone test screens.

Although we can explain why Stoic bodies and incorporeals meet the criteria for *existence* and *subsistence*, respectively, the ontological criteria for *existence* and *subsistence* are themselves thin, concerned only with counting entities in or out, and not with fundamentality. That something can do or undergo, meeting the *dunamis* proposal, is silent with respect to fundamentality, just as being a proper object of thought and discourse is. These criteria by themselves yield only a *sorted* ontology with entities of different kinds (those that *exist* and those that *subsist*), and not a hierarchical or *grounded* ontology that relates the entities to each other in terms of fundamentality and dependence (giving different *ways* of being real, explaining *how* these entities *exist* or *subsist* in relation to each other).[68] However, this concern with counting and ontological criteria does not mean the Stoics are

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[68] J. Schaffer, 'On What Grounds What', in D. Chalmers, D. Manley, R. Wasserman (eds.), *Metametaphysics* (Oxford, 2009), 347–83 at 355, offers the following useful diagram:

not also concerned with grounding and metaphysics. Rather, the Stoics are concerned *both* with counting and with grounding, but as distinct enterprises. Stoic ontology, counting their entities by the two criteria described above, is one thing. And Stoic metaphysics, grounding their incorporeals in body (on the model of the flow of traffic just sketched) and giving them a common, i.e. one-world, account, is another. More on the grounding of the incorporeals ahead, in Section 6, 'Stoic Physicalism'.

<center>∗   ∗   ∗</center>

For now, returning to the first of our challenges from Plato's *Sophist*, *Commit the patricide*, we can see that the Stoics are indeed stating and defending their criteria for counting things in or out of the ontology. First, they adopt (or, rather, coopt) the *dunamis* proposal for *being*, and they do so, not by savagely equating *being* with body and refusing all further discussion, but by distinguishing between an ontological criterion for *existence* (the *dunamis* proposal) and what meets it (bodies). In addition, the Stoics introduce a second ontological criterion, this one for *subsistence*, and they use it to count intelligible and incorporeal individuals that, while *non-existent* and incapable of contact, are nevertheless Something. In all this the Stoics are not only responding to the Battle of Gods and Giants, but reaching further back into the *Sophist* to strike their blow in the patricide of Parmenides: (1) they prise apart *something* from *being*, and show (2) (by the not Someone test) that *what is not* can be counted, and (3) (by the thinkability criterion) that it is a proper object of thought and reference. Far from turning away from questions of *being* and *non-being*, then, Stoic ontology faces them head on.

In lieu of three thousand further words:

Flat: *Sorted:*   *Ordered:*

5. Stoic corporealism

Now I will show how Stoic corporealism responds to Plato's next four challenges: *Defend the Giants*, deliver unity without Form in a corporealist cosmology; *Reform the Giants*, corporealize the virtues, don't eliminate; *Reconcile the Giants*, hear the children's wish for both motion and rest in *being*; and *Silence the Late Learners*, show how one thing can be called many even while remaining one.[69] The heart of Stoic corporealism, as one would expect, is the earthborn commitment to body as *being*, which is made explicit by Clement (*Strom.* 2. 436 (= SVF ii. 359)) and Diogenes Laertius, in the following:

> (1) σῶμα δε ἐστι κατ'αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία, καὶ πεπερασμένη καθά φησιν Ἀντιπατρος ἐν β' Περὶ οὐσίας καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ. καὶ παθητὴ δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ αὐτός φησιν· εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἄτρεπτος, οὐκ ἄν τὰ γινόμενα ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐγίνετο· (2) ἔνθεν κἀκεῖνος ὡς ἥ τε τομὴ <μὴ> εἰς ἄπειρον ἐστιν ἥν ἄπειρον <οὐκ εἰς ἄπειρον> φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος (οὐ γάρ ἐστί τι ἄπειρον, εἰς ὅ γίνεται ἡ τομή. ἀλλ' ἀκατάληκτος ἐστι) [...] (3) καὶ τὰς κράσεις δὲ δι' ὅλου γίνεσθαι, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαγος ὀλίγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται, εἶτα συγκρασθήσεται. (D.L. 7. 150–51 (= LS 50B+ … 48A+))[70]

> (1) Substance [οὐσία] is, according to them, body [σῶμα], and it is limited, according to what Antipater says in the second book of *On Substance* and Apollodorus in the

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Physics. And it is also malleable [παθητή], as that same one says; for if it were immutable [ἄτρεπτος] the things that come out of it could not come about; (2) whence <that one also says> divisibility [ἡ τομή] is into infinity [εἰς ἄπειρον] (which Chrysippus says is infinite [ἄπειρον] <but not into infinity>; for there is not some infinity at which the division arrives, but it is unceasing). (3) And also that blendings [κράσεις] come about whole through whole [δι’ ὅλου] according to what Chrysippus says in the third book of the Physics, not by surface contact and juxtaposition.

As (1) reports, *being, existence*, or *substance* (οὐσία) is body, and the Stoics define body (σῶμα) as *solid, three-dimensional extension with resistance* (D.L. 7. 135 (= LS 45E); Galen *Qualit. incorp.* 19. 483. 13–16 (= LS 45F); S.E. *M.* 11. 226 Bury). There are several things to note about this definition. First is that solidity differentiates body from the spatial incorporeals, which are non-solid extension (Galen *Qualit. incorp.* 19. 464. 10–14 (= LS 49E); Themist. *In Phys.* 104. 9–19 (= LS 48F)), and solidity makes body capable of contact, hence capable of causal interaction (Nemes. *Nat. hom.* 81. 6–10 (= LS 45D); S.E. *M.* 8. 409 (= LS 27E)). Second is that the Stoics are not hylomorphic thinkers for whom all body is a composite of matter and form or quality; solidity, resistance, shape, size, et al. are not components or parts of body (S.E. *M.* 11. 226 Bury; cf. Galen *Qualit. incorp.* 19. 483. 13–16 (= LS 45F); Plot. 6. 1. 26. 17–28 (= SVF ii. 315); Plut. *Comm. not.* 1085 B–C Cherniss). For the Stoics, body as such (solid three-dimensional extension) is metaphysically simple — in this the Stoics defend the Giants and go beyond the thin ontological criterion for *being* to say what it is to *be* a body. In order to hold that only bodies *are* in any robust or thick sense, at least some bodies must not be composed of anything further.

Third, in contrast to the Epicureans, who are atomists, the Stoics say that the cosmos is finite and that body is completely malleable (παθητή) and continuous (1), hence divisible to infinity without reaching minima (2) and subject to through and through blending (κράσις δι’ ὅλου) (3). To

understand this inference we need to observe, fourth, that this Stoic conception of solid body —

malleable as opposed to rigid — brings with it an account of resistance (ἀντιτυπία) as a mutual,

responding blow, a repercussion, rather than the complete rebuffing or ricochet of atomism. This

explains why body is not only subject to penetration, i.e. divisible or cuttable, but divisible to infinity;

it is always possible to take another cut. This conception of solid body also means that body is

entirely changeable, with no absolute shape, size, or density (though always being of some shape,

size, and non-zero density or other); the Stoic conception does not presume body to be full, but to

come in degrees of rarity and density. Therefore being malleable also licenses the innovative Stoic

theory of through and through blending. According to this rather radical theory, two (or more)

independent bodies mutually interpenetrate and become completely coextended — while remaining

whole (intact) and independent.[71] This colocation of bodies that are not dense but rare, and not

rigid but penetrable, is the physical mechanism by which the Stoics deliver their corporealist

cosmology.[72]

Because body as such (solid three-dimensional extension) is metaphysically simple, not being

composed of anything further (like matter and form), the Stoics can declare their fundamental

entities, the two principles (ἀρχαί), to be distinct and independent bodies: divine active reason

(λόγος) and passive matter (ὕλη) (D.L. 7. 134 (= LS 44B); Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 15. 14. 1 (= LS 45G);

Alex. Aphr. *Mixt.* 224. 32–225. 10 (= SVF ii. 310); Calc. *In Tim.* 289 Magee). And because the Stoic

principles are blended with each other through and through, they are everywhere in interactive

sympathy (συμπάθεια) with one another. Further, because the Stoics cast their principles in

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[71] For a defense of this view, see V. de Harven, 'The Resistance to Stoic Blending', *Rhizomata* 6 (2018), 1–23. For welcome support on this point, and an illuminating history of scholarly resistance to the possibility of colocation, see G. Betegh, 'Colocation', in T. Buchheim, D. Meissner, N. Wachsmann (eds.), *ΣΩΜΑ. Körperkonzepte und körperliche Existenz in der antiken Philosophie und Literatur* (Hamburg, 2016), 393–422.

[72] Note that while Marmodoro, 'Stoic Gunk', 'Stoic Blends' also takes colocation to be the mechanism of unity and cosmology, we offer very different accounts of that colocation; I do not think that causation is to be assimilated to blending, or endorse the idea of 'sharing subjects' as an alternative to interaction between agent and patient, nor do I embrace a distinction between cosmic unity, object unity, and causal unity.

explicitly causal roles — as divine rational *agent* and its slack *patient* — they can deliver unity and

order in the cosmos without Form. This causal unity between two bodies is importantly different

from the ontological unity of matter and form offered by hylomorphic accounts. First, when two

(or more) bodies interact, they unite in bringing about a change, e.g. the activities of the knife and

flesh are one in causing there to be cutting. In the cutting of the flesh the activities of the agent and

patient are not just inseparable, but one and the same activity. This is not to say that the flesh and

the knife become one and the same thing, of course. However, in the case of a total blend of agent

and patient bodies, the result of the causal interaction is a new *entity*: the rational agent unifies and

sustains the compound, tarring the ark inside and out as Philo puts it, so that a new individual is

generated and sustained (Philo, *Quaest.* 2. 4 (= LS 47R)). This account of generation and unity holds

for all individuals of the *scala naturae* — all plants, animals, humans, and the cosmos itself are

generated out of nothing more than two fundamental bodies (Stob. 1. 129–130. 13 (= LS 47A); 1.

177. 21–179. 17 (= LS 28D)).[73] This is how the Stoics meet Plato's second challenge, *Defend the*

Giants, and deliver unity and order without Form in a completely corporealist cosmology.[74]

*   *   *

Now we turn to how the Stoics meet the third challenge, *Reform the Giants*, and dare to corporealize

the virtues. Scholars are in agreement that the Stoics respond to Plato by taking the path the Giants

would not and corporealizing the virtues with a schema that has come to be called the Categories; as

A. A. Long puts it, the Stoics are 'seizing the nettle' that their predecessors would not.[75] This

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[73] See also LS chapter 47.

[74] The fact that the cosmos is structured and unified immanently, by the divine rational agent, shows that the Stoics have no need to posit an independently subsisting, unalterable form of the cosmos awaiting bodies to get realized — whether sayables as the structural articulations of ontology (Bronowski, *Lekta*) or the incorporeals as independently *subsisting* offices (Bailey, 'Structure'); on the contrary, this kind of Platonizing is precisely what the Stoics do without.

[75] A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics*, 2nd edn. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1986; 1st edn. 1974), 153. The Stoics themselves do not call their schema 'Categories', a label that has been imposed by the sources and taken up in the scholarship. It is an open question to what extent the Stoics were aware of and responding to Aristotle, whose works were not in circulation at the time; nevertheless, I will continue to refer to this explanatory schema as the Stoic Categories for the sake of convenience.

explanatory schema makes each of us four, 'all people, animals, trees, furniture, implements and clothes' — substrates (ὑποκείμενα, *hupokeimena*), qualified individuals (ποιά, *poia*), individuals disposed (πὼς ἔχοντα, *pōs echonta*), and individuals relatively disposed (πρός τί πως ἔχοντα, *pros ti pōs echonta*) (Plot. 6. 1. 25. 1-3 Armstrong; Plut. *Comm. not.* 1083 A–1084 A (= LS 28A); Simpl. *In Categ.* 66. 32–37 (= LS 27F)).[76] The qualified individual is itself of two kinds, the commonly qualified (κοινῶς ποιόν) and the uniquely or peculiarly qualified individual (ἰδίως ποιόν) (Dex. *In Categ.* 23. 25–244 (= SVF ii. 374); Simpl. *In Categ.* 48. 11–16 (= LS 28E); *In De an.* 217. 36–218. 2 (= LS 28I); Syr. *In Metaph.* 28. 18–19 (= LS 28G)). For example, this quantity of marble is the substrate (ὑποκείμενον) of a statue (κοινῶς ποιόν), namely the Nike of Samothrace (ἰδίως ποιόν), which has a certain patina (πὼς ἔχον) and stands at the top of the stairs (πρός τί πως ἔχον). In each case, to be F (made of marble, a statue, this statue, this color, and here) is to be a body in a certain state or arrangement.

The task of the Categories is to give a corporealist account not just of the virtues (the case on which the civilized Giants folded), but of all the identity and persistence conditions, kinds, and qualities of individual bodies once built (whatever the scope of Plato's Forms, his challenges are not just about the virtues, but about qualities generally) — what makes *this thing* F? And they do this by taking that given individual and analyzing it according to four different metaphysical aspects, making many out of one.[77] Each of us, every individual, is the following four bodies.

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[76] I render 'ποιά' as 'qualified individuals' to capture the fact that the second category is *the qualified*, or *a qualified thing*, or *something qualified* (ποιόν, *poion*, singular), in contrast to a *quality* (ποιότης, *poiotēs*), in support of which see D. Sedley, 'The Stoic Criterion of Identity' ['Criterion'], *Phronesis*, 27 (1982), 255–75, and LS, 172–76. I consistently call the second Category the ποιόν, in the neuter, even though it is sometimes given as ποιός, masculine, to capture that this category covers all manner of individuals.

[77] Interpretations of the Categories run wide, from semantic to ontological to physical. The metaphysical aspects view is endorsed by Brunschwig, 'Stoic Metaphysics' in B. Inwood (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (Cambridge, 2003), 206–33; LS; and Sedley, 'Criterion' and (with some differences) 'The Stoics and their Critics on Diachronic Identity' ['Diachronic'], *Rhizomata* 6 (2018), 24–39. I defend the aspects view summarized here in de Harven, 'Stoic Corporealism'.

1) A substrate (ὑποκείμενον) that constitutes a qualified individual (ποιόν), like a lump of clay constitutes a statue, as plant matter constitutes a tree (or, as David Wiggins puts the same point, as a tree is constituted by the set of its molecules), and as a portion of divine breath (πνεῦμα, *pneuma*) constitutes a soul.[78] The substrate is identified as substance (οὐσία) (Plut. *Comm. no*t. 1083 C–D (= LS 28A4); Stob. 1. 178. 15–179. 17 (= LS 28D8–12)), which we have seen is body (solid three-dimensional extension); and for the substrate constitution is identity — corporeal substance (a portion of body as such) can change qualitatively in indefinitely many ways, but it cannot survive the addition or subtraction of any portion of body whatsoever (it survives no growth or diminution) (Calc. 292 (= LS 44D); 293 (= LS 44E); Plut. *Comm. not.* 1083 C–D (= LS 28A4); Stob. 1. 132. 27–133. 11 + 133. 18–23 (= LS 28q); 177. 21–178. 2 (= LS 28D1); 178. 7–10 (= LS 28D4)). A thing's substrate is its corpulence.

2) A uniquely qualified individual (ἰδίως ποιόν) that persists through growth and diminution and all qualitative change *except* change to its uniqueness, from generation to destruction, e.g. the Victory of Samothrace, el Árbol del Tule, and Socrates; likewise, the commonly qualified individual (κοινῶς ποιόν) that persists unchanging through the life of the individual, e.g. a statue, a tree, a human — the identity conditions and kinds (i.e. genus and species) of all individual bodies are stable lifelong states of the constituent substance (Plut. *Comm. not.* 1083 C–D (=LS 28A4-5); Stob. 178. 12–21 (= LS 28D6-8)).

3) An individual disposed (πὼς ἔχον) in various and sundry ways, which is the qualified individual (ποιόν) in a further state, arrangement, or condition, e.g. the statue having a

certain patina, the tree being gnarled with age, and Socrates being wise; these qualities are not the uniquely individuating or lifelong genus and species, but all the other qualities, which come in different degrees of stability, from momentary and fleeting (e.g. running, sticking out a fist, having impressions, being on guard) to stable and permanent (e.g. being virtuous) (Plut. *Virt. mor.* 440 E–441D (=LS 61B); Sen. *Ep.* 113.2 (= LS 29B); S.E. *PH* 2. 81 (= LS 33P2); *M.* 11. 23 (= LS 60G2); Simpl. *In Categ.* 212. 12–213.1 (= LS 28N)).

4) An individual disposed standing in certain relations to other things (πρός τί πως ἔχον), e.g. the Nike of Samothrace at the top of the stairs, el Árbol de Tule inside a churchyard, and Socrates the husband of Xanthippe (Plut. *St. rep.* 1054 E–1055 A (= LS 29D); Simpl. *In Categ.* 165. 32–166. 29 (= LS 29C)).

These four Categories stand to each other in a nested, one-to-one mereological relation such that each constitutes the next as its substrate, e.g. the hand (ποιόν) underlies the fist (πὼς ἔχον), which in turn underlies the fist held high (πρός τί πως ἔχον) (Philo, *Aet. mund.* 48 (= LS 28P); Plot. 6. 1. 30. 24–28 Armstrong; Plut. *Comm. not.* 1077 C (= LS 28O1), 1083 C-D (= LS 28A4, quoted below), Stob. 177. 21–179. 17 (= LS 29D)). Thus it is bodies all the way down: all of the Categories are bodies and nothing incorporeal is ever invoked or required in the analysis of identity conditions, kinds, or qualities.[79] The relation of clay to statue is not the relation of matter to form; and neither is the relation of hand to fist, nor of a fist to a fist raised in the air. The hand does not become a fist by receiving a quality, fistiness (to borrow Stephen Menn's example), in addition to what is already there (nor should we expect it to); it is simply the hand arranged in a certain way, and it is plain that

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[79] Not even with the individual relatively disposed, as Gourinat has suggested in correspondence; while there is no intrinsic change to the individual disposed at this stage, since the fourth Category captures how the individual disposed is related to *other* things external to it, this does not mean we should supply an incorporeal instead. The individual relatively disposed is related to other *bodies* (in fact, everything else there is in the corporeal world), and there is no reason to think the Stoics treat relations as incorporeals or hypostatize them in some other way.

the hand and the fist have different identity and persistence conditions.[80] All manner of qualities are subject to this analysis, those that are unique and those that are common, those that are lifelong and those that are fleeting, those of the body like running and sitting, and those of the corporeal soul like the virtues. This, in brief, is how the Stoics meet Plato's third challenge, *Reform the Giants*, corporealize, do not eliminate.

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

In addition to rehabilitating the Presocratics (in the guise of the Giants), the Categories also show how the Stoics meet Plato's fourth challenge, *Reconcile the Gods and Giants*, and hear the children's wish to make being capable of both motion and rest. Here is how Plutarch describes the relevant Stoic commitment:

> (1) δύο ἡμῶν ἕκαστος ἐστιν ὑποκείμενα, τὸ μὲν οὐσία τὸ δὲ <ἰδίως ποιος>, (2) καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ῥεῖ καὶ φέρεται, μήτ' αὐξόμενον μήτε μειούμενον μήθ' ὅλως οἷόν ἐστι διαμένον, (3) τὸ δὲ διαμένει καὶ αὐξάνεται καὶ μειοῦται καὶ πάντα πάσχει τἀναντία θατέρῳ, (4) συμπεφυκὸς καὶ συνηρμοσμένον καὶ συγκεχυμένον καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μηδανοῦ παρέχον ἅφασθαι. (Plut. *Comm. not.* 1083 C–D (= LS 28A4))

> (1) Each of us is two substrates [ὑποκείμενα], the one substance [οὐσία], the other <a uniquely qualified individual [ἰδίως ποιόν]>; (2) and the one is always in flux and motion, neither growing nor diminishing nor remaining as [οἷον] it is at all, (3) while the other remains, and grows and diminishes and undergoes all the opposites of the other, (4) while being naturally united [συμπεφυκός], fitted together [συνηρμοσμένον] and commingled [συγκεχυμένον] with it, and nowhere giving sense-perception a grasp of the difference.

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[80] S. Menn, 'The Stoic Theory of Categories', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 17 (1999), 215–47.

With respect to (1), recall that substance (οὐσία) is body, and that body as such, i.e. solid three-dimensional extension, is completely malleable; it has no shape, size, density, or determinate quality per se, yet it is always of some definite size and shape or other. Nevertheless, as (2) attests, although a thing's corporeal substance (its substrate) is subject to this kind of qualitative flux, it maintains its identity so long as it has no body added to or taken away from it — for body as such, constitution is identity. The uniquely qualified individual, on the other hand, as (3) tells us, has the opposite identity and persistence conditions: it *is* subject to growth and diminution (it undergoes quantitative change), but cannot change in its uniqueness (it is qualitatively at rest).   The Stoic response to the children's plea thus delivers the seemingly impossible twice over: that *being* should be, at once, both in motion and at rest. A body at rest quantitatively (body as such, or the substrate) can be in motion qualitatively, and a body at rest qualitatively (the uniquely qualified individual) can be in motion quantitatively (subject to growth and diminution).

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We can also see how the Stoics meet Plato's fifth challenge, *Silence the Late Learners*, and say how a person can remain one even while being many things, e.g. of a certain shape, size, color, moral character, and a million others. As I have emphasized, the move from one Category to the next is not a matter of adding any entity to what was there before, thereby risking plurality. When clay is arranged in the shape of a horse, no entity (i.e. a Form) has been added to it; the sculptor generates a statue by altering the shape of the clay, and this is not the acquisition of a distinct entity, e.g. the Form of statue, except on hylomorphic assumptions (Stobaeus 1. 177. 21–179. 17 (= LS 28D)). Likewise when a hand is arranged so as to make a fist, there is no need to seek some entity, fistiness, beyond the hand. Each one of us is indeed indefinitely many Fs, qualified in a million different ways, and body now includes many more entities than ever before — hence Brunschwig's

'inflationist somatology' label is apt.[81] But this permissiveness in no way jeopardizes the unity of the

individual, and the Late Learners are silenced.

* * *

Just as the predicational challenge of the Late Learners (to make many out of one) serves as a

bookend to the physical challenge posed to the Presocratics (to make one out of many), so does the

Stoics' inflationist somatology in the Categories stand to their corporealist cosmology. These

complementary explanatory enterprises together give metaphysical substance to the core

commitment of Stoic corporealism, that only bodies *are* or have *being*: first insofar as the cosmology

begins from two fundamental bodies (the principles), and delivers unity by the through and through

blending of these agent and patient bodies (meeting the challenge to *Defend the Giants*); and second,

insofar as nothing is left out of account, and the schema of the Categories succeeds in corporealizing

not only the soul and its virtues, but qualities generally, without appeal to Forms or incorporeals or

any other added ingredient (meeting the challenges to *Reform the Giants*, *Reconcile the Gods and Giants*,

and *Silence the Late Learners*).

6. Stoic physicalism

Three challenges remain: the challenge of the Battle itself, *Be inclusive*, and recognize both bodies and

incorporeals; the Visitor's challenge, *Be principled about your inclusivity*, and be able to say what bodies

and incorporeals have in common beyond a thin ontological criterion like the *dunamis* proposal; and,

finally, the sophist's challenge with which we began, *Say* what is not, and give a theory of meaning

that accommodates false speaking. There is ample evidence that the Stoics recognize both bodies

and incorporeals, so their response of the Battle to be inclusive is easy to find (S.E. *M*. 10. 218 (= LS

27D); 10. 234 Bury; Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1116 B-C Einarson and De Lacy) and easy to meet — in fact,

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[81] Brunschwig, *TGS*, 72.

even the hypothetically civilized Giants admit there are incorporeals. The Visitor's challenge, to bridge the two worlds and give a principled one-world metaphysics for bodies and incorporeals is much more formidable.

Brunschwig takes it to be formidable enough that the Stoics expressly sidestep the issue by having two distinct ontological criteria, one for *existence* and one for *subsistence*.[82] Alessandrelli takes the demand to be unavoidable given the presence of both bodies and incorporeals, which threaten to make the world 'dangerously discontinuous from an ontological point of view', and he is satisfied with being Something objectively real as an answer to what they have in common.[83] But these are just two ways to avoid the Visitor's metaphysical challenge, falling back into ontology and the two-worlds trap that the Giants (and, for the matter, the Gods) were not able to avoid. So, the challenge remains: to go beyond ontological criteria and give a one-world metaphysics of what it is for incorporeals to *subsist* in a world where only bodies *exist*. And a response to this challenge just is an answer to our last open question about the incorporeals — to the extent that the Stoics succeed in this one-world endeavor, they will not be Platonizing with their incorporeals.

We saw above in the discussion of the Something criterion that the ontological dependence of the incorporeals can be understood on the model of the flow of traffic, which inherits its properties and *subsistence* from the moving cars that underlie it, without being nothing but the cars in motion. This is a non-reductive model insofar as the flow of traffic is something distinct from the moving cars, as the pattern made by the drill sergeant is distinct from his motions. And it is a physicalist model: in both cases these entities are incorporeal, but clearly also physical and spatiotemporal because of their dependence on body (i.e. because their properties are inherited from

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[82] Brunschwig, *TGS*, 60.
[83] Alessandrelli, 'Qualcosa', 17–9.

their 'host' bodies). This model applies to all the incorporeals, I suggest, giving univocity to the kind and a thick metaphysical account of their *subsistence*:

— Place (τόπος) is non-solid three-dimensional extension (διάστημα), which it inherits from the bodies that occupy or delimit the place (Galen *Qualit. incorp.* 19. 464. 10–14 (= LS 49E); Stob. 1. 162. 8–26 (= LS 49A)); e.g. the place my car is parked depends for its extension on my car, and the place I could park my car depends for its extension on the cars around it delimiting the parking place.

— The extra-cosmic void (τὸ κένον), too, inherits its three-dimensional extension from body, namely the edge of the cosmos at which it begins; and because there is no other cosmos to delimit the void, it extends infinitely out in all directions (Galen *Qualit. incorp.* 19. 464. 10–14 (= LS 49E), Cleom. *Cael.* 1. 1. 17 (= SVF ii. 538)).

— Time (χρόνος) is not spatial, but it is described in the same terminology as place and void, as extended, and as dependent on the motion of bodies: 'Time is the extension of the world's motion; *and so* it is infinite, just as number in its totality is said to be infinite' (χρόνος δ' ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως δίαστημα· οὕτως δ' ἔστιν ἄπειρος, Stob. 1. 105. 8–10 (= LS 51D, part, my emphasis)). The reason it follows from time's being the extension of the world's motion that it is infinite is that the world's motion is infinite — the Stoics are committed to an everlasting recurrence of world cycles; thus it is clear from Stobaeus' inference that time depends on the world's motion that underlies it.

— The sayables (λεκτά), too, depend for their subsistence on underlying body: the rational impression (φαντασία λογική) (D.L. 7. 43 (= LS 31A7); 7. 49 (= LS 33D); 7. 55–56 Dorandi; 7. 63 (= LS 33F); 7. 159 Dorandi; Galen *PHP* 2. 5. 12 De Lacy; Sen. *Ep.* 117. 13 (= LS 33E); S.E. *M.* 8. 70 (= LS 33C)). The soul is itself a body, a portion of divine active breath (πνεῦμα, *pneuma*); now, when we see something or think about something

(i.e. have a rational impression), that breath is in a certain state or condition (it is an individual disposed in the language of the Categories), so it too is a body. Further, the rational impression has propositional content that it bequeaths to the sayable. When we are impressed either by (ὑπό) or on the basis of (ἐπί) something, we receive information from the impressor (the world as it is), and because the human soul is rational, endowed with language and inference, the impression has propositional content from the moment it hits the commanding faculty of soul (ἡγεμόνικον).[84] Thus even the sayable is like the flow of traffic, in being an incorporeal impressor that depends for its (semantic) properties on underlying body (the rational impression).

My view, then, is that the language of *subsistence* is much more than an ontological marker signaling that the incorporeals are objectively real and not nothing. And far from sidestepping the challenge to say what bodies and incorporeals have in common, the Stoics take it head on. The language of *subsistence* is the language of ontological dependence, and in particular of non-reductive physicalism.[85] First, the term 'ὑπόστασις' and its cognates, deriving from the verb 'ὑφίστημι', *to place, set, or stand under*, by itself suggests the dependence of one thing on something else that underlies. Against this, it is true that there is an ordinary language sense of 'ὑπόστασις' as actual reality or existence. However, as a piece of Stoic theory, wherein '*existence*' is a technical term defined by the *dunamis* proposal, '*subsistence*' cannot be synonymous with '*existence*'. The Stoics are

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[84] For arguments that the rational impression is contentful on its own, rather than getting its content from the sayable, see V. de Harven, 'Rational Impressions and the Stoic Philosophy of Mind', in J. Sisko (ed.), *The History of Philosophy of Mind: Pre-Socratics to Augustine*, vol. i of R. Copenhaver and C. Shields (eds.), *The History of the Philosophy of Mind*, 6 vols. (New York, London, 2018), 215–35, building on the seminal work of A. A. Long, 'Language and Thought in Stoicism' ['Language and Thought'], in A. A. Long (ed.), *Problems in Stoicism* (London, 1971), 75–113; 'Representation and the Self in Stoicism' ['Representation'], in S. Everson (ed.), *Companions to Ancient Thought*, vol. ii (Cambridge, 1991), 101–20; 'Stoic psychology and the elucidation of language' ['Stoic psychology'], in G. Manetti (ed.), *Knowledge Through Signs: Ancient Semiotic Theories and Practices* (Turnhout, 1996), 109–31.

[85] The fact that the phrase 'non-reductive physicalism' comes from the philosophy of mind should not prevent us from appreciating the salient point of comparison, which is that both theories offer a middle road between other-worldly dualism and reductive or eliminative materialism.

not speaking loosely, and Galen mocks them for their 'linguistic quibbling' (μικρολογίαν) between *existence* (τὸ ὄν) and *subsistence* (τὸ ὑφεστός) (Galen *Meth. med.*, 10. 155. 1–8 (= LS 27G)).

Furthermore, the incorporeals are sometimes described not just as *subsisting*, but as *subsisting in consequence* (παρυφίσταται), or even being consequent (παρακολουθοῦν) on body (Simpl. *In Categ.* 8. 361. 10 (= SVF ii. 507); S.E. *M.* 11–12 (= LS 33B); Stob. 1. 106. 5–23 (= LS 51B); Cleom. *Cael.* 1. 1. 64–5 Todd).[86] And, as I argue elsewhere, the details of each incorporeal bear out this dependence.[87] To *subsist*, then is to be Something whose properties are inherited from the underlying body (or bodies) on which it depends.

Contrast this with another dependence view introduced by Émile Bréhier and revived by Wolfhart Totschnig, which takes the incorporeals to be 'surface effects at the limit of bodies', a shadow's existence, or something like the Doppler effect.[88] They are ontologically dependent in being the effects, events, or actions of body; however, crucially, this view equates these effects, and thus the incorporeals as a whole, with sayables. Time, place, and void are all themselves sayables, epiphenomenal facts at the surface of being, or actions and events at the periphery of bodies; as such, the incorporeals have the ontological status of *obtaining* (ὑπάρχειν), and they are said to *subsist* (ὑφεστάναι) when they are being thought about or apprehended. However, first, there is no textual

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[86] Unfortunately, the language of *subsistence* cannot be decisive, no matter how intuitive. Though many, including those without a stake in this debate, see these terms as indicating dependence (R. Gaskin, *Simplicius, On Aristotle's "Categories 9–15"* (Ithaca, 2014), *ad* 361. 10–12 and 15–17; A. C. Lloyd, 'Parhypostasis in Proclus', in G. Boss, G. Seel (eds.), *Proclus et son influence: actes du colloque de Neuchâtel, juin 1985* (Zürich, 1987), 145–57 at 148–49 and 154–57; A. A. Long 'Language and Thought', 'Representation', 'Stoic psychology'), it is not required, and those pursuing the independence of the incorporeals can also resist this linguistic datum (Bronowski, *Lekta*, 113–17, 166–69, 328–29; M. Frede, 'The Stoic notion of a *lekton*' ['*Lekton*'], in S. Everson (ed.), *Language, Companions to Ancient Thought*, vol. iii (Cambridge, 1994), 109–128 at 118; Sedley, 'Physics and Metaphysics', 399).

[87] For the spatial incorporeals see de Harven, 'Nothing'; for time and the sayables, as well as a more detailed and up-to-date treatment of the spatial incorporeals, see V. de Harven, *Everything Is Something: The Unity of Stoic Metaphysics* (unpublished).

[88] W. Totschnig, 'Bodies and Their Effects', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 95 (2013), 119–47; É. Bréhier, *La Théorie des Incorporels dans l'Ancien Stoïcisme* (Paris, 1908), endorsed by P. Hadot, 'Zur Vorgeschichte des Begriffs "Existenz" ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ bei den Stoikern', *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, 13 (1969), 115–27 at 115; cf. the parallel view that also reduces the rest of the incorporeals to λεκτά, but takes them to be mental constructs, our own impositions on reality, e.g. J. Christensen, *An Essay on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy* (Copenhagen, 1962); Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics, a preliminary study* (Leiden, 1972), 'The Stoic Theory of Meaning'; and G. Watson, *The Stoic Theory of Knowledge* (with a Kantian bent).

evidence that place, void, or time are considered sayables; second, seeing the incorporeals as dependent on body does not make them effects in the technical sense required to equate them with sayables (more on effects as sayables shortly); and, third, only time and the sayables are said to *obtain*, whereas all the incorporeals are said to *subsist*, so any account that says all the incorporeals *obtain* is swimming upstream of the textual evidence.[89] So, while I appreciate the idea of the incorporeals as dependent on body in the manner of shadows, and even as epiphenomenal results of bodies, this does not make them all sayables, or states of affairs.

My understanding of the incorporeals as dependent entities stands in further contrast to a variety of *in*dependence views, e.g. David Sedley takes them to be physical, but independent on the grounds that there cannot be bodies without presupposing place, or motion without presupposing time;[90] and Marcelo Boeri takes the incorporeals to be necessary conditions for the existence of bodies, as their 'temporal, locative and linguistic determinations', concluding that bodies and incorporeals are therefore reciprocally dependent.[91] I appreciate Boeri's one-world insights and resistance to a Platonizing interpretation of the incorporeals based on their immanence in this world, as well as Sedley's strongly physical reading, but the fact that where there is body there is place, and where there is motion there is time does not establish either the ontological co-dependence or independence of place or time.[92]

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[89] I disagree with Totschnig, 'Bodies and Their Effects', 137–38, that because some incorporeals are said to *obtain*, therefore *subsistence* cannot be their *only* way of being; *obtaining* is not a way of being at all.

[90] Sedley, 'Physics and Metaphysics', 399–400, followed by Brunschwig, 'Stoic Metaphysics', 249, and A. Ju, 'The Stoic Ontology of Geometrical Limits', *Phronesis*, 54 (2009), 371–89 at 376. But motion need not presuppose independent spatiotemporal intervals; it's true that reducing space and time to underlying body would leave motion without objective coordinates, but that's because it leaves motion without spatiotemporal coordinates altogether. If space and time are not reduced to, but rather ontologically dependent on bodies, however, the objective spatiotemporal coordinates are not thereby threatened; indeed, it is a live option in contemporary metaphysics to understand space and time relationally rather than substantivally, without thereby threatening the objectivity of space-time.

[91] Boeri, 'Bodies and Incorporeals', 751.

[92] This amounts to a modal-existential analysis that is silent on metaphysical questions about fundamentality and ways of being, so the inference to their co-dependence in not licensed; in this spirit, Schaffer, 'On What Grounds What', 363–64, remarks that supervenience 'is invoked to fake ordering structure within a flat ontology'.

I am also resistant to the independence advocated by Bronowski, that sayables are not semantic entities but rather metaphysical items: facts, states of affairs, or truths available to be said.[93] This 'metaphysical reading' of the sayables, developed by Michael Frede, takes its start from passages that seem to class the effects of causes as predicates (κατηγορήματα, *katēgorēmata*), which are themselves incomplete sayables (D.L. 7. 63 (= LS 33F)).[94] The surface effects view also makes this interpretive move, so what I say here against sayables as facts, events, or states of affairs speaks to Totschnig et al. as well. I will use the following passage from Sextus to illustrate:

> εἴγε Στωικοὶ μὲν πᾶν αἴτιον σῶμα φασι σώματι ἀσομάτου τινὸς αἴτιον γίνεσθαι, οἷον σῶμα μὲν τὸ σμιλίον, σώματι δὲ τῇ σαρκί, ἀσομάτου δὲ τοῦ τέμνεσθαι κατηγορήματος· καὶ πάλιν σῶμα μὲν τὸ πῦρ, σώματι δὲ τῷ χυλῳ, ἀσωμάτου δὲ τοῦ καίεσθαι κατηγορήματος. (S.E. *M.* 9. 211 (= LS 55B))[95]

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[93] Bronowski, *Lekta*, 89, 157, 166–69, 260–61, also argues that because the incorporeals are real and part of a cosmic structure (σύστημα, *systēma*), they must be ontologically independent (or at least co-dependent) entities; however, realism about the incorporeals does not make them ontologically dependent or independent. I also resist the idea that being incorporeal just is being independent, and that being independent in the manner of incorporeal Forms is a job that the Stoic incorporeals are called on to fill.

[94] Frede, '*Lekton*', and 'The Stoics on Clear and Distinct Impressions', in M. Burnyeat (ed.), *The Skeptical Tradition* (Berkeley, 1993), 65–93. Others who embrace the view include J. Barnes, 'Meaning, Saying and Thinking', in K. Döring, T. Ebert (eds.), *Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer* (Stuttgart, 1993), 47–61, and 'Meaning', in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, M. Schofield (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1999), 193–213; Bobzien, 'Logic', in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1999), 83–157 at 95, and *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford, 1998), 23–5; J.-B. Gourinat, *La Dialectique des Stoïciens* (Paris, 2000), 117, '"Les causes sont causes de prédicats": sur un aspect de la théorie stoïcienne de la cause', in C. Natali, C. Viano (eds.), *Aitia II avec ou sans Aristote. Le débat sur les causes à l'âge hellénistique et imperial* (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2014), 65–93 (but in 'The Ontology and Syntax of Stoic Causes and Effects' ['Ontology and Syntax'], *Rhizomata* 6 (2018), 87–108, he argues for a certain middle ground between the metaphysical and mind-dependence views, according to which sayables as the effects of causes are connected to thought as what the mind grasps); LS, 200–2, in a certain tension with the avowed mind-dependence of sayables; Shogry, 'Impressions', 8–9, who describes the sayables as abstract objects that convey meaning; and Vogt, 'Unified'. I call this the metaphysical view because of its focus the sayables as metaphysical or ontological items, but I don't want to suggest that the surface effects view is not also metaphysical in spirit; it's not the best label for the view, insofar as it suggests other views are not metaphysical, but it tracks the emphasis in Frede and Bronowski.

[95] See also Clem. *Strom.* 8. 9. 26. 3–4 (= LS 55C); 8. 9. 29. 1–2 Stählin and Fruchtel; 8. 9. 30.1–3 (= LS 55D); Stob. 1. 138. 14–139. 4 (= LS 55A).

The Stoics say that every cause [αἴτιον] is a body that becomes the cause to a body of something incorporeal. For instance the knife, a body, becomes the cause to the flesh, a body, of the incorporeal predicate [κατηγόρημα] 'being cut.' And again, fire, a body, becomes the cause to the wood, a body, of the incorporeal predicate 'being burnt'.

There are three elements to the analysis: the *cause* (αἴτιον, *aition*), which is a body, e.g. a knife; that *to which* it is the cause, another body, e.g. flesh; and that *of which* it is the cause, an incorporeal predicate (κατηγόρημα, *katēgorēma*), e.g. *being cut*. The guiding principle of the metaphysical view seems to be that as the effects of causes, predicates must have some kind of status as metaphysical entities rather than as logical or linguistic entities. After all, causation is physics and the physical world is indifferent to what we think and say, so these must be predicates in the sense that Aristotle's attributes and Platonist immanent Forms are, not as linguistic entities but as metaphysical items. Here is how Frede puts it.

> [H]ere we have a metaphysical notion of a *lekton*. We are not concerned with the meaning of expressions, or intentional objects or contents of thoughts, but with facts; whether or not anybody has thought of them or will ever think of them, whether or not they get stated is completely irrelevant. The point is the metaphysical point that there is an item like Socrates' being wise which is not to be confused with either Socrates or wisdom, but which, though not a body, nevertheless has some ontological status, since it is the kind of item of which a cause, properly speaking, is the cause. Here the notion of a *lekton* seems to be the notion of a true thing to say, just as the notion of a predicate had been the notion of a something truthfully predicated of something. And one can see why the term *lekton* would have been appropriate. We

do not understand the world properly unless we take into account that there are not only bodies, but also truths about bodies, which themselves are incorporeal.[96]

But, as I will argue, the role of sayables in the causal context does not pull in the direction of facts or states of affairs, or sever the sayables from their logical and linguistic roles. First, let us observe that the sayables are not central or even especially relevant to the storied Stoic account of causation, and they make no appearance in physics or cosmology, so this gives us good reason to doubt that these few passages give us the original notion, or even a central notion of a sayable.[97] Further, the focus in the *Sophist* on true and false speaking gives good reason to expect the sayable to be semantic — as we have seen, the last of Plato's challenges is to *Save the sophist*, and say *what is not*. Third, the sayables have well-attested dialectical roles as the bearers of truth value, what enters logical relations, and what we share in communication (among others, including psychological roles as the objects of assent and impulse) (S.E. *M.* 8. 11–12 (= LS 33B); 8. 69–70 (= LS 33C+); Stob. 2. 97. 15–98. 6 (= LS 33J2–3)). Not only that, one might think that the very name of the entity, λεκτόν, or what is sayable, which comes from the verb 'to speak' (λέγειν), tells us that these are inherently semantic entities.[98]

More importantly, the causation passages do not support a metaphysical notion of sayables as facts or states of affairs to begin with. It would indeed be problematic to find incorporeals, which are incapable of causal interaction, in the causal chain of an avowedly corporealist system. My

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[96] Frede, '*Lekton*', 115–16.

[97] E.g. R. J. Hankinson, *Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought* (Oxford, 1998), 242, n. 7, mentions this wrinkle only in a footnote, and, even then avoids ontological commitment. And if the sayables were indeed central to physics, then it is quite strange that Diogenes' list of specific topics of physics (D.L. 7. 132 (= LS 43B)) does not include the sayables, particularly given that causation is among the generic topics. Hence, presumably, the emendation of 'ταύτα' to 'λεκτά' in IG; cf. Gourinat, 'Ontology and Syntax', for arguments that causes and effects should, despite their conspicuous absence on the list, be considered 'one of the main "metaphysical" issues' alongside those that are listed. Vogt, 'Unified', argues for a minimal, unified notion of a cause according to which a Stoic cause is that because of which (δι' ὅ), a rational maker different in kind from its effects.

[98] And the passive modal sense according to which 'λεκτόν' means something that *can be* said, does not license treating the sayables as metaphysical (rather than semantic) entities with the modal status of attributes or states of affairs that get actualized by belonging to bodies and become available to be said.

suggestion is that the Stoics do not in fact put sayables in the causal chain when they cast them as what causes are *of* — causes are not *of* effects, we might say. Part of the problem is that there is no single Greek term corresponding to our 'effect'; and while this translation makes for more natural English than 'that of which the cause is a cause', it also suggests an additional entity in the causal chain where there isn't one.

Setting aside the surface grammar of 'effects', then, we can see that the role of the sayable in the causal context is not to be found in the causal chain. Not that there aren't effects in the Stoic causal chain, but that the Stoic causal chain is found in the cause *to* relation between bodies; the effect of a knife cutting flesh is *to* the flesh, another body. All causal interaction is the cause *to* relation between bodies. The cause *of* relation, on the other hand, is not a part of the causal chain, or part of a metaphysical story of causation, but rather, part of an epistemological story. The relation between corporeal causes and the predicates they are *of* is a truthmaking relation, a correspondence between the world as it is and the things we say about it.[99] It is well known that the Stoics hold a correspondence theory of truth, so this relation is readily available for us to apply to this context (D.L. 7. 65 (= LS 34E), S.E. *M*. 8.100 (= LS 34I)).[100] For a sayable to be true is for it to correspond to the world as it is, to say things as they are; and for a body to be the cause *of* a sayable is for the world to make the sayable true.

We have independent evidence that the role of sayables as what causes are *of* is epistemological rather than physical or metaphysical, concerned with explanation rather than efficient causation. Clement tells us that being the cause *of* something is a matter of being conceived of or grasped a certain way, which certainly suggests an epistemological context (Clem. *Strom.* 8. 9.

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[99] I do not mean to invoke here debates about the truthmaker relation in contemporary metaphysics.

[100] J. Hankinson, 'Stoic Epistemology', in B. Inwood (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (Cambridge, 2003), 59–84 at 78; LS, 206. See also the report that for the Stoics 'A definition is a statement of analysis matchingly expressed' (ὅρος ἐστὶ λόγος κατ' ἀνάλυσιν ἀπαρτιζόντως ἐκφερόμενος, Galen, *Meth. med* 19. 348. 17–349. 4 (= LS 32D)); likewise, D.L. 7. 60 (= LS 32C); S.E. *M*. 8. 85–86 (= LS 34D).

29. 1–2 Stählin and Fruchtel). Stobaeus is more explicit: he reports that whereas the cause is *the because* (ὅτι, δι' ὅ), that of which it is the cause is *the why* (διὰ τί) — thus that *of which* a cause is a cause is the explanandum; then he adds that an explanation (αἰτία) is the account (λόγος) of the cause (αἴτιον), or the account of the cause insofar as it is a cause, the explanans to the explanandum (Stob. 1. 138. 23–139. 4 (= LS 55A3–4)).[101] So the cause *of* relation is not physical or metaphysical, but epistemological. For a body to be a cause *of* a sayable is to be what makes the sayable true, and to give an account of that cause is to explain why the sayable is true. The knife is a cause *to* the flesh *of* certain predications being true, e.g. 'It is cut', but presumably also indefinitely many others, e.g. 'It hurts', 'It bleeds', 'It is fatal', 'It is indifferent to my happiness'.

Now, it is true that there has to be a sayable there to be made true, but it does not follow that in order to be what gets said, the sayable must be there as a fact, state of affairs, or truth waiting to be said. To meet this desideratum, it is not necessary to attribute to the Stoics an ontological layer of truths, or an unalterable form or structure of the world apart from the immanent god. Rather, the logical order is that the sayable first *subsists* according to the rational impression, and it then is either true or false. If there were no humans in the world, there would be no sayables because there would be no rational impressions; but there would still be a world with order and

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[101] A word about the translation 'explanation' for 'αἰτία' and 'account' for 'λόγος'. S. Bobzien, 'Chrysippus' Theory of Causes', in K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), *Topics in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford, 1999), 196–242 at 198–99, argues against understanding 'αἰτία' as a propositional item or a kind of causal explanation, classing an αἰτία as an incorporeal. Instead, she argues (200–3), we should understand the αἰτία as a corporeal cause, as the divine rational agent responsible for the world order, taking Stobaeus to report that the αἰτία is λόγος, i.e. the active principle. I am in strong agreement that an αἰτία is not a propositional item or an incorporeal of some kind; indeed, as Bobzien emphasizes, this is not a term of art we find anywhere except this passage. By that same token, however, I am also resistant to giving 'αἰτία' doctrinal import as the active cause and thus taking it to be a corporeal entity. I urge instead a deflationary reading of both 'αἰτία' and 'λόγος' in this context. I think we can render 'αἰτία' as 'explanation', in contrast to 'αἴτιον' as 'cause', without reifying and having to give it the status of a sayable or other incorporeal. To say that an αἰτία is a λόγος of the cause is just to say in rather ordinary language that an explanation is an account of the cause. Thus neither of these terms is a technical term in this context, except to the extent that 'αἰτία' is being used here, locally, in contrast to 'αἴτιον'. Given the contrast between *the because* and *the why*, which tells us that the incorporeal predicate is treated as an explanandum, followed immediately by the gloss of αἰτία as an account of the cause, we have good grounds to say that the context is explanatory or epistemological. Thus we can render 'αἰτία' as 'explanation' without introducing new causal entities of the sort Bobzien rightly rejects.

causation. In denying that there are metaphysical truths, facts, or states of affairs awaiting (but indifferent to) our saying them, I do not undo the objectivity or structure of the world. When I deny that Stoic truths are the counterpart to Aristotelian forms or Platonist immanent Forms, I do not thereby deny that there are truths or that the world is truly as it is. I just don't take Stoics truths to be metaphysical entities like facts or states of affairs. Stoic truths are true sayables, semantic entities that depend for their content and *subsistence* on rational impressions, and they are made true when they correspond to the world as the immanent god makes it.

But being made true has no metaphysical or ontological import for the sayables; being made true is not a matter of being actualized or otherwise promoted in the ontology.[102] This brings me to the question, what it means for a sayable to *obtain*.[103]

> μόνον δ' ὑπάρχειν φησὶ τὸν ἐνεστῶτσα, τὸν δὲ παρῳχημένον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὑφεστάναι μέν, ὑπάρχειν δὲ οὐδαμῶς, †εἰσὶν ὡς καὶ κατηγορήματα ὑπάρχειν λέγεται μόνα τὰ συμβεβηκότα, οἷον τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑπάρχει μοι ὅτε περιπατῶ, ὅτε δὲ κατακέκλιμαι ἢ κάθεμαι οὐχ ὑπάρχει. (Stob. 1. 106. 18–23 (= LS 51B4))[104]
>
> [Chrysippus] says that only the present obtains [ὑπάρχειν], and that the past and future subsist [ὑφεστάναι] but in no way obtain, just as predicates [κατηγορήματα] are said to obtain only when the attributes [συμβεβηκότα] exist [εἰσὶν], for example 'walking' obtains of me when I am walking, and does not obtain when I am lying down or sitting.

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[102] The surface effects view takes predicates to be events or states of affairs that are brought into being by the causal interaction of bodies; hence they are described as shadow-like and exemplified by the Doppler effect. The metaphysical view takes predicates to be states of affairs that are not brought into being by the causal interaction of bodies but, rather, actualized by the world; hence the likeness to Aristotelian attributes or Platonist immanent Forms as metaphysical items. My focus here is on the metaphysical view that coming to *obtain* is a change in ontological status from *subsisting* to *obtaining*, but I continue to hold that coming to *obtain* is not to come into being either; when I say that *obtaining* has no ontological import *at all*, I mean this to cover both the surface effects view and the metaphysical view.

[103] The translation of 'ὑπάρχειν' as '*obtaining*' is due to M. Schofield, 'The Retrenchable Present', in J. Barnes, M. Mignucci (eds.), *Matter and Metaphysics*, *Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum* (Naples, 1988), 331–74.

[104] Here I accept 'εἰσὶν' and take it as the verb with 'μόνα τὰ συμβεβηκότα', which I take to be the attributes in the world and not predicates; see LS, vol. ii, 302.

We are told here that only the present *obtains* (ὑπάρχειν, *huparchein*) in contrast to the past and future, which merely *subsist* (ὑφεστάναι, *huphestanai*), *just as* (in the way that) predicates (incomplete sayables) *obtain* only when the attributes or accidents (τὰ συμβεβηκότα, *ta sumbebēkota*) they predicate exist or are, i.e. when the world really is that way.[105] So, when I am walking, the predicate 'walking' is true of me, in which case the predicate is said to *obtain* (S.E. *M.* 8. 85 Bury); and likewise when a portion of time is present, or happening now, it *obtains*. My proposal is that these are said to *obtain* because they correspond to the world's attributes *as* they are occurring, and that this is not a change of ontological status. All sayables and all of time always have the ontological status of *subsisting* according to their underlying bodies (rational impressions and the world in motion, respectively). In addition to (and not instead of) that ontological status, when they correspond to the world *as* it is occurring — *in the manner* that is occurring, in the case of sayables, and *when* it is occurring, in the case of time, i.e. when sayables are true and some time is present — they *obtain*. What *obtains* is what is actually happening, but only in the innocent sense of 'actual' as being occurrent, 'In action or existence at the time; present, current'; not in the metaphysically loaded sense 'opposed to *potential, possible, virtual, theoretical, ideal*'. [106]

There is something special about the present and the true, the now and the world's truths, that legitimately earns the title of *obtaining*. But coming to *obtain* is not a case of ontological switching, from *subsisting* to *existing*, from incorporeal to corporeal, from possible states of affairs to actual fact, or from the weaker status of a proposition, predicate, or case to the stronger status of fact, attribute, or quality. To *obtain* is simply to correspond to the world in a certain way — it is just a relation, with no implications for the ontological status of the incorporeal. So, again, in addition to

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[105] The term 'συμβεβηκότα' is not Stoic language, and its use in this context does not suggest that the Stoics are pursuing the sayables as Aristotelian or Platonist immanent forms; it is, rather, an ordinary way for Stobaeus to report that predicates *obtain* when they correspond to the world as it is.
[106] *Actual*, defs. 4 and 3, respectively, in *Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford, 1961).

subsisting as an incorporeal grounded in the world's motion as time always does, the present is said to *obtain* when it *subsists* according to the current unfolding of events, when it corresponds to things as (when) they are happening (as opposed to how they were or will be). Similarly, in the case of the sayables, the way the world is will make sayables, which *subsist* according to rational impressions, *obtain* whenever the sayables state things as (in the manner that) they are. The world makes certain sayables true, and when it does, they *obtain*; but sayables have the ontological status of *subsistence* whether they are true or false, whether they *obtain* or not. As A. A. Long puts it: 'The *hyparxis* of a *lekton* indicates its truth-value, not its ontological status'; whether true or false, sayables 'co-exist with a rational presentation, and this definition is not confined to veridical *phantasia*'.[107]

Thus I am also resistant to the suggestion of Bailey that Stoic incorporeals should be thought of as offices or roles, e.g. the office of *being my watch*, that get actualized and *obtain* when they are occupied by bodies. He argues for the view first on the grounds that time *obtains* when it is occupied by present motions, second on the grounds that sayables are occupied by bodies when they *obtain*, and finally on the grounds that it is natural to extend this account of *obtaining* to place and void.[108] I reply that there is no evidence that the Stoics spoke this way, in terms of either time or the sayables being occupied. In fact, the language of being occupied (and unoccupied) only occurs in the context of place and void *subsisting* — but these spatial entities are never said to *obtain*. Further, offices depending on bodies to occupy them, even if it were the Stoic view, is not a genuine case of ontological dependence, since Bailey's incorporeals *subsist* without variation across all possible worlds; coming to be occupied does not bring the incorporeals into being.

Notwithstanding the difference between offices being occupied and sayables becoming facts, both Bailey and Bronowski are Platonizing the Stoics with *obtaining* as the actualization of

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[107] A. A. Long, 'Language and Thought', 93.
[108] Bailey, 'Structure', 260–76.

independently *subsisting* sayables cast as the unalterable form or structure of the cosmos. But this Platonizing conception of *subsistence* is neither a required interpretation of the Stoics nor a desired reading of the *Sophist*. So, I disagree that nothing less than a metaphysical story as complex as offices and their occupants can explain the presence of both bodies and incorporeals, and the distinction between *being*, *subsistence*, and *obtaining*.[109] I hope to have offered a simpler alternative: bodies have the ontological status of *being* (two of them fundamentally, all others being composed out of these two principles), while incorporeals have the ontological status of s*ubsisting* (inheriting their properties and *subsistence* from underlying body). When time and sayables correspond to the world as (when and in the manner) it is occurring, they are said to *obtain*; and this is not instead of *subsisting*, but simply a correspondence to the world — *obtaining* is a relation, not an ontological status.[110]

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Now we can see how Stoic physicalism meets the last three challenges of Plato's *Sophist*. That the Stoics meet the challenge of the Battle itself, *Be inclusive*, and recognize both bodies and incorporeals, was the starting point of this section. Much more formidable was to show how the Stoics meet the Visitor's challenge, *Be principled about your inclusivity*, and go beyond ontological criteria to say what it is for incorporeals to *subsist* in world where only bodies *exist*, i.e. bridge the two worlds. This is a metaphysical challenge to say what such different, even contrary-seeming entities, could possibly have in common. What bodies and incorporeals have in common is not just that they both meet an ontological criterion, or merely that both are objectively real, but that both are spatiotemporal

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[109] Bailey, 'Structure', 264, 268–69.
[110] Thus I agree with Alessandrelli, 'Qualcosa', 21–2, that *obtaining* is not a change in ontological status, but disagree that to *obtain* is for a body to really *exist* or really have the status of *existing*.

inhabitants of this one physical world.[111] The univocal dependence of the incorporeals on body

makes them of this world, no longer contrary to bodies, but dependent on them for their *subsistence*.

And this remains true even in meeting the last challenge, *Save the sophist*, and give a theory of

meaning that accounts for being able to say something even when it does not represent the world as

it is — say *what is not*. To say *what is not* is to utter a false sayable that *subsists* but does not *obtain*.

Given that sayables *subsist* according to the rational impression (a body), and given that sayables

subsist this way whether they are true or false, the Stoics have met the challenge to say *what is not* by

reference only to the physical world.

Far from Platonizing with their incorporeals, then, the Stoics offer us an innovative non-

reductive physicalism. The Stoics are non-reductive insofar as the incorporeals are never cast as

nothing but body, and clearly count as Something, and they are physicalist insofar as the incorporeals

are all spatiotemporal entities dependent on body for their properties and *subsistence*. And this settles

the fourth open question, to what extent the Stoics are Platonizing with their incorporeals.

7. Conclusion

I will close by working my way back up the rest of our open questions about how the Stoics respond

to Plato's *Sophist*. The third question was about the role of the *dunamis* proposal, both in the *Sophist*

and for the Stoics, which we considered as a series of dichotomies. What we have found is, first,

that the *dunamis* proposal is not a criterion of corporeality, but of *being*, the subject taken up by the

Stoics out of the *Sophist*. Second, that both in the *Sophist* and for the Stoics, the *dunamis* proposal is a

thin ontological criterion for *being* that merely counts things in or out, rather than a measure of

fundamentality or independence. The *dunamis* proposal is, by the Visitor's own design, insensitive to

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[111] Including even the sayables, which are spatiotemporal entities because they depend on rational impressions for their *subsistence* — meaning and language are earthborn too for the Stoics.

different *ways* of *being* and the Stoics take it over as such — but this does not mean they are not thinking about dependence and fundamentality, or *ways* of being Something; on the contrary, I have argued that the Stoics are very much delivering a hierarchical, ordered ontology. Third, we have found that the *dunamis* proposal is not the Stoics' only ontological criterion, but one of two by which the Stoics count things in or out of the ontology.[112]

The second open question concerns how the Stoics are like and unlike the earthborn Giants, in particular the original, savage Giants. We found that the original Giants in the *Sophist* are eliminative about the virtues, so the Stoics are already unlike the savage Giants insofar as they corporealize the virtues (by the Categories) rather than eliminate them. They are also far from savagely refusing all discussion and brutely equating *being* with body. On the contrary, they are crafty in coopting the *dunamis* proposal as a criterion for *being*, from which they infer that only bodies have *being* or *are*, and creative in crafting a second criterion for being Something. Thus the Stoics are not like the savage Giants; but neither are they like the civilized Giants who give up on their corporealism, nor are they a mere pastiche of these views. They are, rather, evolved Giants with a sophisticated corporealism, an innovative non-reductive physicalism, and a groundbreaking ontology that sets Something over *being* and *non-being*.

This brings us to the first and final open question, what in Plato's *Sophist* are the Stoics reacting to, and how? Are the Stoics engaged in ontology, or in metaphysics, or perhaps neither? My answer is, both. With two criteria by which to count things in or out (as Something), one for *being* and another for *subsistence*, it is clear that the Stoics are engaged in ontology and that the term '*being*' has doctrinal purport, for the Stoics just as for Plato (though not the same doctrinal purport, of course). But treating the *dunamis* proposal as an ontological criterion that counts things in or out, does not preclude a concern for fundamentality and dependence, i.e. grounding. In fact, the Stoics

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[112] Or, as Gourinat, in correspondence, would prefer to say: 'tinology'.

are concerned with both counting and grounding, both with *which* things are Something (ontology) and the different *ways* of being Something (metaphysics). We have found that body can be fundamental for the Stoics, but not *all* bodies are fundamental — only the two principles; all other bodies, including the cosmos itself, are composed out of and hence dependent on the two fundamental bodies for their *existence*. One way to be a body, then, is to be fundamental, like the two principles, and another is to be a composite of those principles, and hence dependent on or grounded in them.[113] Yet another way to be a body is to be constituted by another body as a substrate, e.g. the statue constituted by clay, or the fist by the hand; the distinctness of their persistence conditions (the clay and hand preexist and survive the statue and fist they constitute) reveals that this is also a case of ontological dependence, hence a second kind of grounding.[114] And yet a third kind of grounding is the dependence of the incorporeals on the underlying bodies from which they inherit their spatial, temporal, or semantic properties and their *subsistence*.[115] Thus we find the Stoics engaged in both ontology and metaphysics. What in the *Sophist* are these evolved Giants responding to, then? Everyone from the formidable father Parmenides to the hapless Late Learners.[116]

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

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[113] In the manner of Constituent Dependence in Koslicki, 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence'.

[114] But this does not make the substrate fundamental, since that is itself the total corpulence of the given thing, which is (proximately) a blend of matter and breath (πνεῦμα) and ultimately of the two principles. This second kind of grounding is not quite like any of Koslicki's varieties, but might be welcome as a further kind, 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence", 211, n. 25.

[115] In line with the Feature Dependence of Koslicki, 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence'.

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