

# What is nonconceptualism in Kant's philosophy?

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**Abstract** The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the sense that they represent in a relative, perspective-independent manner. The fourth is the construal of Kantian sensible intuitions as non-conceptual content. In this paper, I support the alternative view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as iconic *de re* presentation of objects without representational content.

**Keywords** Sensible intuition · Non-conceptualism · Direct reference · De re mode of presentation

## 1 Blindness as lack of representation

In the contemporary debate over the nonconceptual content of sense perception, Kant is seen as advocating the side of the conceptualists. While nonconceptualists see the alleged “Kantian model of experience” as the greatest challenge to anyone claiming that sense perception possesses nonconceptual content (Gunther 2003, p. 23), conceptualists, on the other side of the controversy, like McDowell, attack nonconceptualism, referring to the alleged “Kantian insight” that conceptual capacities are supposedly required “to make it intelligible that experience is not blind” (1994, p. 60). The pivot passage is Kant's famous *dictum* that, without

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thoughts or concepts, sensible intuitions are blind (A51/B75). As Gunther emblematically puts it:

In its slogan: “thoughts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”, Kant sums up the doctrine of conceptualism. (...) According conceptualism, no intentional content, however portentous or mundane, is a content unless it is structured by concepts that the bearer possesses. (Gunther 2003, p. 1)

Those on both sides of the controversy seem to agree that Kant was the greatest exponent of conceptualism in the history of philosophy. Kant’s *dictum* has been misconstrued as reflecting the conceptualist assumption that, without conceptual capacities, sensible intuition refers to or represent nothing. Nonetheless, what Kant had in mind with this famous *dictum* was something quite different. Without general concepts, sensible intuitions are blind not in sense of referring to nothing (conceptualism), but rather in the sense of providing no *knowledge* of the objects to which sensible intuitions refer. For one thing, without the general concepts involved in the specification of what it is represented, the subject cannot *understand* or know what her sensible intuitions actually represent. Thus, blindness does not reflect a lack of reference, but rather a lack of understanding and of propositional knowledge about what is represented.

The passage that better supports this reading is this famous one:

If a savage <Wilder> sees a house from a distance, for example, with whose use he is not acquainted, he admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as someone else who is acquainted with it determinately as a dwelling established for humans. But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is different in the two. With one it is *mere intuition*, with the other it is *intuition* and concept at the same time. (*JL*, introd., V, Ak, 9: 33; p. 544–545)

Kant’s point is that sensible intuition and concepts are two different and quite independent *forms*, or ways, of cognizing the same dwelling place. Prior to and independently of the conceptual recognition <erkennen> of the seen object *as a dwelling established for humans*, the savage is already able to refer to the same object and to represent it nonconceptually *as the bodily particular that appears from a certain distance, with a given shape*, etc. Thus, the savage’s sensible intuition is blind, but not in the sense that it represents or refers to nothing. Rather, it is blind to the fact that what the savage sees is a dwelling established for humans. In other words, without the empirical concept of a dwelling established for humans, the savage simply cannot *understand* and hence *know* what his sensible intuition represents.

However, Kant’s rejection of conceptualism can be traced back to the pre-critical period of his long philosophical career. In an opusculum of that period <FSS>, he had already distinguished rational propositional knowledge <Erkenntnis> from non-rational animal cognition in the following terms:

I would go still further and say: it is one thing to differentiate <unterscheiden> things from each other, and quite another thing to recognize the difference

between them <den Unterschied der Dinge zu erkennen>. The latter is only possible by means of judgments and cannot occur in the case of animals, who are not endowed with reason. The following division may be of great use. *Differentiating logically* means recognizing that <erkennen dass> a thing A is not B; it is always a negative judgment. *Physically differentiating* <physisch unterscheiden> means being driven to different actions by different representations. The dog differentiates the roast from the loaf, and it does so because the way in which it is affected by the roast is different from the way in which it is affected by the loaf (for different things cause different sensations). (*FSS.*, § 6, Ak, 2: 60; p. 104)

Kant's opposition can be couched in the terms of Dretske's well-known opposition between non-cognitive and cognitive seeing. The dog (a non-rational animal) sees things: the roast, the loaf, and even the difference between them insofar as he is able to discriminate between them (non-cognitive seeing). However, he does not *see that* the roast is not a loaf or that the loaf is not a roast (cognitive seeing). The capacity to know things does not entail the capacity to know the truth of propositions.

The same idea recurs throughout Kant's different books of logic in which he establishes a hierarchy for the levels of cognition. The main opposition is now drawn between propositional knowledge <erkennen dass> and knowledge by acquaintance <kennen>. According to *Blomberg Logic*, the hierarchy is described as follows:

We now want briefly to indicate the degrees of the representations of all cognitions.

First degree: "in general, *to represent* something <sich vorstellen> is the most universal and most usual[,] also the easiest cognition of a thing. But *representing* something, where *consciousness* is combined with it, is distinct from simply *representing*, where we are frequently not even conscious to what these representations are actually related."

2nd degree, namely, *to be acquainted* <kennen>, "then I am acquainted with what I represent."

3. "the following degree is *to understand* something, i.e., to be acquainted with something through the understanding, or to be acquainted with something distinctly through a distinct concept." (*BL.*, fifth section, § 139, Ak. 24: 132–133; pp. 103–104)

In the *Jäsche Logic*, the hierarchy is described as follows:

The first degree of cognition is: *to represent* something;

The second: to represent something with consciousness, or *to perceive* (*percipere*);

The third: *to be acquainted* with something (*kennen; noscere*), or to represent something in comparison with other things, both as to *sameness* (*Einerleiheit*) and as to *difference*;

The fourth: to be acquainted with (*kennen*) something *with consciousness*, i.e., to *cognize* it (*erkennen; cognoscere*). Animals are *acquainted with* (*kennen*) objects too, but they do not *cognize* (*erkennen*) them. (*JL.*, VIII, Ak., 9: 65; p. 569)

In the first hierarchy, what matters to us is the opposition between the second and third levels, while, in the second, the opposition between the third and fourth levels matters most. Non-rational animals are *acquainted with* <kennen, noscere>, say, the roast in the relevant sense that they represent it in comparison with other things, say, the loaf. To put this into the language of *FSS*, they are acquainted with <kennen> the roast in the sense that they physically discriminate it from other things, say, the loaf, by being driven to different actions by his different sensations, caused by the roast and loaf, respectively. Nevertheless, non-rational animals are incapable of becoming acquainted with the roast with *consciousness* in the crucial sense of being conscious of the roast *as* a roast or of being *conscious that* it is roast. In the language of *FSS*, non-rational animals are unable to *know or recognize that* <erkennen dass> the roast is not the loaf or, vice versa, the loaf is not the roast (categorical propositions), insofar as they are unable to recognize <erkennen dass> that what falls under the extension of the concept of the roast does not fall under the concept of the loaf and vice versa.

Kant not only recognized the fact that sensible intuitions are prior to and independent of any concepts. The duality of sensible intuitions and concepts is one of the structuring elements of his first *Critique*. For this reason, he adverts to this duality in order to convince his readers of the “unavoidable necessity” of a Transcendental Deduction (A88/B121), which is the very core of the first *Critique*:

The categories of the understanding, on the contrary, do not represent to us the conditions underwhich objects are given in intuition at all, **hence objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding**, and therefore without the understanding containing their *a priori* conditions (A89/B122, the emphasis in bold is mine).

Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, **for intuition by no means requiresthe function of thinking**. (A91/B123, the emphasis in bold is mine)

In a series of recent papers and books (2006, 2008), Hanna has the great merit of having restored the historical truth of Kant’s position, namely, the assumption that our basic perceptual engagement with the world is not mediated by concepts or other intellectual capacities. In Hanna’s reading, Kantian sensible intuitions are mental states with robust and essential nonconceptual content. The main line of defense for a nonconceptual content reading of Kantian sensible intuitions derives from the known arguments in favor of nonconceptualists themselves. The leading idea is that these arguments have a distinctly Kantian provenance.

Even though the conceptualist reading of Kant’s position is no longer questioned, what nonconceptualism amounts to in Kant’s philosophy remains an open question. In this paper, I support the alternative view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as an iconic *de re* presentation of objects without representational content.

## 2 Blindness as singular direct reference

The fact that Kant was not a conceptualist encourages the reading of Kantian sensible intuition as nonconceptual content. Hanna’s interpretation is the case in

point. Furthermore, to the extent that sensible intuition “is as non-epistemic, non-conceptual, and otherwise unmediated” (2006, p. 132), Hanna also construes Kant’s empirical realism as “perceptual direct realism.” Further, especially impressed by the referentialist tradition in philosophy of language, he construes Kantian sensible intuition as an “essentially singular directly referential term” (2000, p. 21), that is, as the mental analog of direct referential terms. His basic idea refers back to Strawson’s famous essay on the first *Critique*:

The duality of intuitions and concepts is in fact but one form or aspect of a duality which must be recognized in any philosophy which is seriously concerned with human knowledge, its objects or its expression and communication. These are three different directions of philosophical concern rather than three different concerns. The theory of being, the theory of knowledge, and the theory of statement are not truly separable; and our duality necessarily appears in all three, under different forms. In the first, we cannot avoid the distinction between particular items and the general kinds or characteristics they exemplify; in the second, we must acknowledge the necessity of our both possessing general concepts and becoming aware in experience of things, not themselves concepts, which fall under them; in the third, we must recognize the need for such linguistic or other devices as will enable us both to classify or describe in general terms and to indicate to what particular cases our classifications or descriptions are being applied. (1966, p. 23)

Let us call this overall view a *simplified picture*. What supports the simplified picture is the overtly suggestive analogy between the directness of reference of singular representation and the directness of reference of some singular terms. If some singular terms pick out their objects directly in the sense that reference is not mediated by the satisfaction of any descriptive conditions, singular representations also pick out their objects directly in the sense that reference is not mediated by the satisfaction of any conceptual conditions. Moreover, in the same way that direct singular terms refer to their objects even when the available descriptions of the objects are false or vague, singular representations also refer to their objects when the available conceptions of the objects are false or vague (Hanna 2006, pp. 100–101). Singular representations are then essential indexicals.

However, the analogy supporting the simplified picture breaks down in two important ways. As Hanna himself recognizes, directly referential terms are terms (a) whose referents exist in the actual world; (b) that do not express Fregean senses or “modes of presentation” as their semantic contents; (c) whose semantic values are their referents themselves (2006, p. 157). They are singular terms of sentences whose content is the so-called singular proposition consisting of the very objects and properties referred to by the respective sentential terms.

To begin with, singular or object-involving propositions are incompatible with Kant’s classical view on logic according to which all propositions are ultimately categorical propositions, that is, relation between concepts: “to be true, categorical judgments constitute the matter of the remaining judgments” (*JL.*, Ak, second section, §24, 9: 105; p. 601). Singular representations cannot figure as terms of judgments. Even atomic predicative judgments necessarily involve *singular*

*concepts* <conceptus singularis> as their subject-terms. In the proposition that Caesar is mortal, I refer to Caesar as the individual (whoever he is) *that I think* satisfies some identifying condition expressed by the concept “Caesar” (that is, the individual who uniquely satisfies the characteristics <Merkmale> expressed by the proper name “Caesar”). In this sense, reference is always carried out by concepts or descriptions and, hence, there is no place in Kant’s view on propositional contents either for (i) directly referential terms or (ii) singular propositions.

Nevertheless, it is no accident that singular representations cannot figure as referential terms of judgments. To be sure, singular representations do refer to objective entities in the relevant sense of being mind-independent entities (as we shall see in the next section). Nonetheless, to the extent that singular representations pick out their objects in an essentially perspective-dependent way, they are subjective in this other relevant sense. On the other hand, judgments of experience (in opposition to judgments of perceptions) aim to represent the reality (in the empirical sense) in a perspective-independent manner. When I judge that “bodies are heavy,” I claim that “It, the body, is heavy” rather than “If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight” (B 142). This is the reason concepts must figure in judgments.

### 3 Blindness as lack of objective reference

As is well-known, there are two quite different readings of Kant’s idealism. In a first interpretation, the way things appear to us <Erscheinung> is the very object of sensible intuition, that is, a “mere representation” or a mind-dependent entity. As Longuenesse reminds us, in the *Critique*, the overall textual evidence favors this reading: A30/B46; A49/B67; B164; A369; A372; A375; A376; A377; A386; A387; A390; A392; A491/B519; B521; A494/B522; A495/B523; A496/B524; A499/B527; A537/B565; A539/B567; A563/591; A564/B592. Moreover, according to her, in this reading, Kant endorses a sort of *perceptual indirect realism*; we perceive things outside us only by perceiving our own mental states:

**Kant can say that the very same things that “as” things in themselves, exist outside us, appear to us only “as” appearances, namely by means of representations “in us.”** We should then conclude that Kant’s conception of perception is **an indirect realist one (things do exist in themselves outside us, but we perceive them only by means of states of consciousness in us)** combined with what he calls a “formal idealism”, namely the view that space and time are *nothing but* ways in which we intuit things, and nothing outside our way of intuiting them. (1998, p. 21, the emphasis in bold is mine, that in italics is hers)

However, contrary to what Longuenesse states, if “mere representations” were the immediate objects of awareness, we could never be aware of mind-independent things outside us in the transcendental sense. To be sure, Kant claims that the objects we are immediately aware of are appearances of things that exist outside us in the transcendental sense, that is, as they are in themselves. But he also holds that we can have no access to those things outside us as they are in themselves. This suggests he could not possibly endorse the claim that we are aware of the things

outside us in transcendental sense *indirectly*, that is, by being aware of their appearances. Indeed, in the first, standard interpretation, we are *immediately* aware of things outside us, but only in the empirical sense according to which things outside us are “mere representations” of the outer sense. Thus, the only doctrine compatible with this first interpretation is a new version of the old Berkelian idealism. While original Berkelian idealism claims that external objects we are aware of are “collections of sense-data,” the new version would hold that the objects outside us (in the empirical sense) we are aware of are nothing but the rule-governed connectedness of our own representations (Strawson 1966, p. 52).

The second interpretation is the one developed and defended by Allison (2004). In this reading, the object of sensible intuition is considered mind-independent, but seen “as” dependent on our cognitive capacities. Longuenesse dubbed this reading “internalization of the object to representation,” that is, internalization of the point of view of representing subjects (1998, p. 20).

However, I think that this idea is better couched in terms of the well-known Fregean opposition between *reference* and its *manner of presentation*. To hold that sense representation is representation of the way things appear to us is to hold that we always refer to something unknown in itself by means of the way the objects affect our human mind. This reading is suggested in those passages in which Kant criticizes the doctrine of materialism on the grounds that it mistakes the physical manner of presentation for the unknown referred object itself:

The materialism, on the other side, have the least ground, since then one’s concepts would lack determination, and one would take the difference **in the mode of representing objects, which are unknown** to us as to what they are in themselves, for a difference in these things themselves. (A380, the emphasis in bold is mine)

For matter (whose community with the soul excites such great reservations) is nothing other than a mere form, or **a certain mode of representation of an unknown object**, through that intuition that one calls outer sense. (A385, the emphasis in bold is mine)

But the opinion that the soul could still continue to think after all community with the corporeal world has been terminated would be expressed in this form: that if **the mode of sensibility through which transcendental (and for now entirely unknown) objects appear as a material** world should cease, then not all intuition would thereby be terminated, and it might well be possible for the very same unknown object to continue to be cognized by the thinking subject, even though obviously not in the quality of bodies. (A394, the emphasis in bold is mine)

To be sure, Kant’s talked of “mere representations” and of appearances is quite tricky. For, unless one clearly has in mind the crucial Fregean opposition between *reference* and the *mode of presentation* of reference, one can easily be misled into thinking that the “mere representation” itself is the referred object of sensible intuition. Still, in all these quotes, it is crystal clear that appearance is not the referred mental object of sensible intuition, but rather the mode or manner in which the unknown object appears to me or is represented to me.

However, if the way things appear to us <Erscheinung> is the sensible mode of apprehending the object and its properties rather than the mental object of sensible intuition, the further question is whether sensible intuition is already able to represent objects in space and time. According to Strawson, for example, concepts of objects are also required for the representation of mind-independent entities. He makes an important distinction between the two senses of an object. In the “light” sense, the “object” is everything that can be a particular instance of a general concept. In contrast, in the “weight” sense, an object carries the connotations of “objectivity.” The subject represents the object in the weight sense when she *knows* that the mind-independent entities falling under general concepts are mind-independent, that is, they hold irrespective of the occurrence of any particular experience of awareness of the object (1966, p. 40). It follows that without concepts of objects, sensible intuitions are blind in the crucial sense of not representing mind-independent entities. Based on this fundamental assumption, Strawson construes the Kantian Transcendental Deduction as an argument against a hypothesis of a purely sense-datum experience according to which the *esse* of the objects of our experience is its *percipi* (1966, p. 59).

In fact, this is an old intellectualist reading of Kantian sensible intuition whose primary source is the famous letter from Beck in which he complains that

The *Critique* calls “intuition” a representation that relates immediately to an object. But in fact, a representation does not become objective until it is subsumed under the categories. Since intuition similarly acquires its objective character only by means of the application of categories to it, I am in favor of leaving out that definition of “intuition” that refers to it as a representation relating to objects. I find in intuition nothing more than a manifold accompanied by consciousness (or by the unique “*I think*”), a manifold determined by the latter, in which there is as such no relation to an object. (*Letters*, Ak, 11: 311; p. 396)

Allison endorses Beck’s complaint and claims that, without concepts of objects, sensible intuitions “cannot fulfill their representational function,” being rather what, after Walsh, he calls *proleptic* representations (2004, p. 82). Following the same line of thought, Henrich also claims that, without concepts of objects, sensible “presentations” do not refer to objects and must therefore be deemed “mere representation” (1994, pp. 130–131).

It goes without saying that, without concepts of objects, sensible intuition cannot conceptually represent what appear *as* objects; in other words, without concepts of objects, the subject cannot refer to what appears to her *knowingly*, that is, an entity which exists independently from being intuited by someone. However, it is a *non-sequitur* to infer from there that, without concepts of objects, sensible intuition does not refer to objects, *at least when “objects” are understood as mind-independent bodies and their physical monadic properties and relations*. To assume that to intuit sensibly mind-independent bodily particulars in space and time requires concepts of objects is a sort of hyper-intellectualism alien to Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Let us take a look at Kant’s answer to Beck’s complaint:



The fashioning <Bestimmung> of a concept, by means of intuition, into a cognition of the object is indeed the work of judgment; **but the reference of intuition to an object in general is not.** (*Letter to Beck*, Ak., 11: 311; pp. 396–397, the emphasis in bold is mine)

Kant's stance is unequivocal. Reference to mind-independent particulars does not require concepts of objects. These are required for the *knowledge* that what is represented existed independently of being intuited.

#### 4 Blindness as lack of knowledge of mind-independent particulars

According to Burge, Kant's main project is the explanation of the constitutive conditions for our *awareness* of mind-independent entities *as* mind-independent. However, this project has been confused with another quite different project, namely, the project of accounting for the constitutive conditions of objective representation. That is what Burge dubbed *individual representationalism* (2010).

Burge is certainly right in emphasizing that Kant's project is not the explanation of the conditions of representation of mind-independent entities in space and time. Nonetheless, as Burge himself recognizes, there are different concepts and grades of objectivity (2010, pp. 46–54). Following him, we might distinguish *subject-matter* views from *relational* views on objectivity. To begin with, on the subject-matter parameter, sensible intuitions are objective for Kant both in the sense of representing real, existing things in space and time (A28/B44) and in the sense of representing mind-independent entities. Moreover, on the subject-matter parameter, sensible intuition represents mind-independent entities like bodies as well as their physical attributes, such as impenetrability, hardness, and color (A21/B35). Indeed, the assumption of sensible intuition of bodies and of their physical attributes is central in Kant's theoretical philosophy. Except from space and time, as the forms of sensible intuition, we do not need any further capacity to represent general conditions in order to represent bodies and their physical properties.

However, things change when we consider the relational conception of objectivity. To begin with, we have to take into account the *horizontal* notion of objectivity centered on the relations or connections among the representations. In this view, objectivity means for Kant *necessary* connections among sense representations themselves, for example, between the sense representation of a bodily attribute (for example, "heavy") and the sense representation of one or more bodily particulars (for example, "bodies"). In contrast, subjectivity means for Kant a *contingent* connection among sense representations. In the second edition of the *Critique*, the horizontal conception is rooted in the *vertical* one. The representation of the attribute of heaviness is necessarily connected to the representation of bodily particulars because of the objective connection between heaviness and bodies:

E.G., "Bodies are heavy." By that, to be sure, I do not mean to say that these representations necessarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition, but rather that they belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of the apperception in the synthesis of intuitions, i.e., in accordance with

principles of the objective determination of all representations insofar as cognition can come from them, which principles are all derived from the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. (B142)

The relational conception of objectivity here means *relative independence of the subject's particular perspective*. Although sensible intuitions of a heavy body do represent mind-independent bodily particulars as heavy, the association between the sense representation of the attribute of heaviness and the sense representation of a bodily particular is still subjective in the relevant relational sense of being *dependent on the subject's particular perspective*; in other words, the association is contingent on the bodily particulars often appearing heavy to me. Things change completely, when I judge that *bodies are heavy*. First, by judging, I conceptually represent the attribute of heaviness *as a property* belonging to particulars *in a relative perspective-independent way*, that is, independently of the subjective way the representation of the attribute of heaviness is associated with the representation of particulars. Second, I also represent conceptually the bodily particulars *as substances*, that is, as physical substrates to which the properties, like the property of heaviness in question, belong to (in the relative perspective-independent way). In Kant's words,

Only in this way does there arise from this relation a judgment, i.e., a relation that is objectively valid, and that is sufficiently distinguished from the relation of these same representations in which there would be only subjective validity, e.g., in accordance with laws of association. In accordance with the latter I could only say "If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight," but not "It, the body, is heavy," which would be to say that these two representations are combined in the object, i.e., regardless of any difference in the condition of the subject, and are not merely found together in perception (however often as that might be repeated). (B142)

To be sure, the individual does not need to represent conceptually what appears to her as an object in order to represent real bodies and their properties in space and time. Otherwise, small children and animals would never be able to intuit bodies and their physical properties. Burge is right when he claims that Kant's project is not to account for the conditions of sense representation of bodies and their physical qualities. Still, Kant's project is certainly not restricted to the explanation of our *conception* of mind-independent entities *as* mind-independent. He also aims to account for the conditions of representing objectively in the relative perspective-independent sense. Whether or not Kant is right, the inevitable conclusion is that he is also an individualist representationalist in the sense Burge presents.

Therefore, Burge's reading of the *dictum* does not exhaust its full meaning. Certainly, by claiming that, without concepts, sensible intuitions are blind, the *dictum* takes no position on whether sensible intuition can represent mind-independent bodily particulars and their physical attributes. As we saw, the blindness of sensible intuition is foremost a lack of understanding and hence lack of knowledge of what is represented or referred to. Still, to the extent that concepts are required to represent bodily particulars and their physical attributes in a relative

perspective-independent way, without concepts of objects, sensible intuitions are also blind in the relevant sense of representing bodies, but only in a perspective-dependent way.

## 5 Blindness as lack of content

As we saw, Kant holds that sensible intuitions refer to their objects and their properties immediately, that is, regardless of whether the objects and properties satisfy any identifying conditions imposed by the descriptive content of concepts. The further problem is whether such reference can be viewed as representational content in the contemporary sense. According to Hanna,

Non-conceptual cognitive content in the contemporary sense is, for all philosophical intents and purposes, identical to *intuitional* cognitive content in Kant's sense. Indeed, in my opinion the contemporary distinction between non-conceptual cognitions and their content, and conceptual cognitions and their content, is essentially the same as Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts. (2006, p. 85)

An initial approximation suggests an experience has non-conceptual content when (i) it has its own representational content, that is, it places its own accuracy conditions on the world. When these conditions are met, the experience is veridical or accurate; when they are not, it is falsidical or inaccurate. Furthermore, (ii) an experience has non-conceptual content when its subject does not need to possess the concepts required for the canonical specification of the content in question.

This original definition is still characterized by a series of ambiguities, however. To begin with, non-conceptual content is understood either as an aspect of the content displaying the same propositional content as the correspondent perceptual beliefs or as content without a propositional structure. According to the assumption that nonconceptual content is propositionally structured, there are two further alternatives. First, the nonconceptual content of perception can be seen as a *Fregean* proposition consisting of nonconceptual modes of presentation rather than the entities themselves. Given that assumption, the major argument in defense of the non-conceptual content of experience is based on the so-called fine-grained view of the content of experience, the so-called argument of fineness of grain. The idea is as simple as that: however fine-grained the concepts are, they cannot capture the richness of detail of what sense perception represents. Thus, it is usually claimed that we are able to discriminate infinitely more hues of color than we can conceptualize.

The thesis of the nonconceptual content of experience is also supported by the opposite assumption that the content of experience is coarse-grained. According to that assumption, the content of experience follows a *Russellian* proposition (consisting of entities) rather than a Fregean proposition (consisting of modes of presentation). This is what Tye dubbed *robustly non-conceptual content* of experience (Tye 2009). According to his solution to Jackson's knowledge argument, the same coarse-grained Russellian proposition can be presented through two or

more fine-grained Fregean thoughts. However, according to Hanna, Tye's robustly non-conceptual content of experience is not nonconceptual enough. It is only *contingently* non-conceptual, but not essentially nonconceptual; although it is not specified by concepts in the *actual* perceptual states in which they occur, there is in principle no reason why it could not be conceptually specified in states other than those actual perceptual states (2008, p. 10). According to Hanna, we find in Kant content that is essentially nonconceptual in the sense that it could not be, even in principle, conceptually specified.

The main lines of defense of the nonconceptual content reading of Kantian sensible intuition derive directly from the arguments in favor of the nonconceptual content of experiences themselves. The leading idea is that these arguments have a Kantian provenance. Now, the question is whether sensible representations (either intuition or imagination) have content in the technical and contemporary sense of the term as the simplified picture claims. In other words, it is crucial to determine whether Kantian sensible representations place their own accuracy conditions on the world such that, when these conditions are met, sensible representations are veridical or accurate and, when they are not, they are inaccurate or illusory.

First, sensation only refers to something when it becomes *cognition*, and sensible cognitions are understood as knowledge of things rather than knowledge that something is the case. When the selvage meets the house for the first time, his sensation refers to house to the extent that he knows by acquaintance something that he does not understand. In the same sense, I knew Berlin by acquaintance when I visited the city for the first time. Now by acquaintance, the selvage can know the house *better* or *worse*, depending on the time he spends contemplating the house, depending on the distance he was from the house, depending on the state of his vision, and other such factors. By the same token, by acquaintance, I can know Berlin better or worse depending on the time I spend visiting the city. If I had lived in Berlin for four years, I would certainly know the city better than someone who has spent only a week or a month there. Still, I would not know the city as much as a Berliner who grew up there. The crucial point is that knowing things better or worse by acquaintance neither means nor even implies representing them veridically or illusory. So if sensations only refer to their objects when the perceiver knows the objects by acquaintance, reference cannot be understood as veridical or illusory representation.

Interestingly, Hanna not only holds that, according to Kant, sensible representations possess their own accuracy conditions. He goes further and construes Kant's well-known examples of "encapsulation" of the faculty of sensible intuition (see A297/B354) as cases of what is dubbed in philosophy of mind *veridical illusions*, that is, perceptions that are in fact inaccurate or falsidical but appear to be veridical (e.g., a straight stick in water that appears to be bent).

Nonetheless, Kant claims that the senses *per se* never delude. In other words, they are neither veridical nor falsidical. In the first *Critique*, he says,

Truth and illusion are not in the object, insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it insofar as it is thought. Thus it is correctly said that the senses do not err; yet not because they always judge correctly, but because

they do not judge at all. Hence truth, as much as error, and thus also illusion as leading to the latter, are to be found only in judgments, i.e., only in the relations of the object to our understanding. (A294/B50)

Kant's stance is consequently unequivocal. Sensible representations do not place accuracy conditions on the world, and there is an obvious reason for that. Sensible representations refer to bodily particulars and to their physical properties, but only insofar as these entities appear to the subject in an egocentric, relative perspective-dependent way. Only judgments of experience, by representing what appears as perspective-independent entities by means of concepts, are subject to error. According to Kant, the error <Irrtum> is affected only through.

the unnoticed influence of sensibility on understanding, through which it happens that *the subjective grounds* of the judgment join with the objective ones, and make the latter deviate from their destination. (A 294/B350-51)

The very same line of reasoning is found in the *Anthropology*:

***The senses do not deceive.*** This proposition is the rejection of the most important but also, on careful consideration, the emptiest reproach made against the senses; not because they always judge correctly, but rather because they do not judge at all. Error is thus a burden only to the understanding. Still, ***sensory appearances (species, apparentia)*** serve to excuse, if not exactly to justify, understanding. Thus the human being often mistakes what is subjective in his way of representation for objective (the distant tower, on which he sees no corners, seems to be round; the sea, whose distant part strikes his eyes through higher light rays, seems to be higher than the shore (***altum mare***); the full moon, which he sees ascending near the horizon through a hazy air, seems to be further away, and also larger, than when it is high in the heavens, although he catches sight of it from the same visual angle). And so one takes ***appearance*** for ***experience***; thereby falling into error, but it is an error of the understanding, not of the senses. (*Anthr.*, § 11, Ak., 7: 146; p. 258)

In other words, the error only occurs when the understanding, under the unnoticed influence of the faculty of sensible intuition, mistakes what subjectively appears to us in a relative perspective-dependent way as the objective way things really are in a perspective-independent way. Thus, there is no place for *veridical illusions* in Kant's view on sensible intuition. According to him,

Illusion <illusio> is still no deception <fraus> of the senses, it is a hasty judgment which the following one immediately contests. We love such illusions considerably, e.g., we are not deceived by an optical box, for we know that it is not so; but we are moved to a judgment which is immediately refuted by the understanding. Delusions <Blendwerk> are to be distinguished from the deceptions of the senses; with a delusion I discover the deception. Because the objects of the senses induce us to judge, the errors are assigned to the senses falsely, since they are properly attributable to the reflection on the senses. We note accordingly the proposition: the senses do not deceive <*sensus non fallunt*>. This happens not because they judge correctly, but

rather because they do not judge at all, but in the senses lies the seeming <Schein>. (VM., Ak., 28: 234; p. 52)

The very same distinctions are found in the *Anthropology*:

*Delusion* <Blendwerk> which is produced in the understanding by means of sense representations (*praestigiae*), can be either natural or artificial, and is either *illusion* (*illusio*) or *deception* (*fraus*). The delusion by which one is compelled to regard something as real on the testimony of his eyes though the very same subject declares it to be impossible on the basis of his understanding, is called *optical delusion* (*fascinatio*).

*Illusion* is that delusion which persists even though one knows that the supposed object is not real. (*Anthr.*, Ak., 7: 149; p. 261)

Cases of encapsulation of sensible intuition are rather cases of what Kant calls illusion <illusio> in opposition to deception <fraus>. We are *deceived* when we mistake what subjectively appears to us in a relative perspective-dependent way as the objective way things really are. Moreover, we are *deluded* when we know that the way things objectively are is not the way they appear to us even though things persisting appearing to us in the same subjective way as before.

## 6 The presentational view

### 6.1 Blindness as *de re* manners of presentation

Let us begin by reviewing some well-known Kantian claims. “Representation” <Vorstellung; repraesentatio> is the foremost Kantian word for mental states whose function is to refer to something. When representation is considered only as a mental state <Modifikation des Gemüts> resulting from the affection of the mind <Afektion>, it is called *sensation* <sensatio>. However, when representation is considered in its referential relation to some object, it is called *cognition* <cognitio> (A320/B376). *Cognition* is of two kinds, either intuition or concept. Conceptual cognitio is the representation of objects that takes the form of a propositional knowledge <cognoscere>. Sensible cognitio is the representation of objects that takes the form of knowledge by acquaintance <noscere>.<sup>1</sup>

The state of mind that refers to objects by means of affection <Afektion> or by means of acquaintance is what Kant calls *singular representation*. In contrast, the mental state that refers to objects by means of *functions* (“the unity of action of ordering different representations under a common one,” A68/B93) is what Kant calls *general representation*. General representations refer to objects indirectly in the sense that the reference is mediated by the reference of other representations (either mediated by the reference of other concepts or ultimately mediated by the reference of sensible intuitions). Importantly, this means that general representations refer to an object only insofar as the subject *recognizes that* <erkennen dass>

<sup>1</sup> I am especially indebted here to an anonymous referee who that gave me the opportunity to re-write this section and deepen my interpretation.

the object in question falls under the extension of the concept. It is in this sense that Kant characterizes general representations both as representations *by means of* notes <Merkmale> <repraesentatio per notes communes> and as thoughts, or *discursive* representations. (*JL.*, first section, §I, Ak., 9: 91, p. 589)

However, if general representations refer to an object to the extent that the subject thinks that the object falls under the extension of a concept, the question is what it means to represent or refer to an object intuitively. An initial approximation suggests singular representations refer to objects *immediately* in the negative sense that their reference is independent of any conceptual reference to them. That is what Kant has in mind when he says “that intuition is called the representation which can be given prior to all thinking” (B132). In this negative sense, singular representations are essentially nonconceptual indeed, even though they are not nonconceptual content in the contemporary technical sense of “representational content.”

The further question pertains to what it *positively* means to say that singular representations refer to objects un-immediately. We saw, first, that sensible cognition is the representation of objects that takes the form of knowledge by acquaintance, that is, a knowledge based on some direct contact with the object. We also saw that singular representation refers to an object insofar as it results from the *affection* <Afektion> of the mind by the object. In the *Dissertation*, Kant explains why:

The various things which affected the sense are co-ordinated by a certain law of the mind. Moreover, just as sensation which constitutes the **matter** of sensible representation is, indeed, *evidence for the presence of something* sensible, though in respect to its quality it is dependent upon the nature of the subject insofar as the later is capable of modification by the object in question, so also the **form** of the same representation is undoubtedly *evidence of a certain reference or relation in what is sensed*, though properly speaking is not an outline or a schema of the object, but only a certain law, which is inherent in the mind <lex quaedam enti insita> and by means of which co-ordinates for itself that which is sensed from the presence of the object. (*Diss.*, §4, AK, 2: 392–393; pp. 384–385; Kant’s emphases are in bold; mine are in italic)

Sensations evidence the presence of the object insofar as there are law-like connections <lex quaedam enti insita> between tokens of sensation and instances of the object that is affecting the mind: the same mental effects refer to the same causes of affection. Here, the opposition between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description helps clarify how singular representations refer to their objects. Knowledge by description is the propositional knowledge of truths or facts, that is, knowledge that something is the case. A rational being knows (by description) that a roast is not a loaf, and that a loaf is not a roast (categorical propositions). In contrast, knowledge by acquaintance is the objectual knowledge gained in virtue of the fact that the subject is directly in contact with some object or, in Kantian terms, due to the fact that the mind is affected by the object. The dog knows the roast and the loaf by acquaintance insofar as he is differently affected by them. Now, if general representations refer to objects indirectly insofar as the subject knows that <erkennt dass> the object falls under the extension of a given

concept, singular representations refer to their objects directly insofar as they result from an affection, putting the mind in direct contact with the object (knowledge by acquaintance). In this sense, we can say that singular representations *present* the object to the mind.

Nonetheless, immediate presentation should not be mistaken for the referentialist idea of perspective-free acquaintance. Even presenting an object directly in the sense indicated, the object is always referred to from a certain perspective, under a manner of presentation. Thus, the opposition between singular and general representations can be further clarified in terms of the opposition between *de re* and *de dicto* modes of presentation. General representations present their objects descriptively because reference is determined satisfactorily, that is, by the subject's *knowledge that* the referent satisfies the conditions expressed by the concept. For example, when I represent something *as* a house, the reference is determined satisfactorily, that is, by my *thought that* the object satisfies the conditions expressed by the concept of a house, viz. of having windows, of having doors, of having a roof, etc.

In contrast, singular representations present their objects in a *de re* manner because reference is determined relationally, that is, by the blind fact that the mind is causally affected by the object. A famous letter to Herz further explains this:

What is the ground of the relation of the in us which we call “representation” to objects? If a representation comprises only the manner in which the subject is affected by the object, then it is easy to see how it is in conformity with this object, namely, as an effect that accords to its cause <als eine Wirkung seiner Ursache gemäss sei>, and it is easy to see how this modification of our mind can *represent* something, that is, have an object. (*Letter to Herz*, Ak, 10: 130; p. 71)

Thus emerges the following picture. Singular representations are mental states that present an object in a *de re* mode in the sense that reference is determined relationally (rather than satisfactorily), that is, by the *blind* fact that the mind is affected by the object; that is, by the blind fact that the subject is acquainted or causally related to the object. When I see a house, the reference is determined relationally, that is, by the blind fact that the object affects my visual sense. That singular representation puts the subject in direct contact with the house insofar as his mind is affected by it, and the emerging sensation evidences the presence of the house.

Now, there are different ways of understanding the *de re* modes of presentations in contemporary literature. According to Bach, *de re* modes of presentation are mental types whose tokens determine a different referent with respect to a context (Bach 1987, p. 12). In a possible reading of singular representation following this view, singular representations possess context-independent *de re* modes of presentation. They are type-individuated by the sensations and forms that are normally connected to the type of objects whose presence they evidence. So if the linguistic mode of presentation of a demonstrative “that house” is roughly **the salient object referred to by this demonstrative (that house)**, the *de re* manner of



presentation of the objects of singular representation is roughly **the object that normally causes this sensation with this form.**

However, if the *de re* manner of presentations *à la* Bach provide a perfect characterization for Kantian singular representations understood as sensible cognitions in general (either sensible intuitions or imaginations), it does not fit well for characterizations of singular representations understood as sensible intuitions. For one thing, for Kant, sensible intuitions are essentially object-dependent. This means that, if, *qua* sensible representation, in general, singular representations are type-individuated by sensations and forms, *qua* intuitions specifically, they are also token-individuated by the very objects they present. It is in this sense that Kant says that “our mode of intuition is dependent on the existence of the object” (B72).

Therefore, *qua* intuitions specifically, singular representation have *de re* senses in the way suggested by McDowell after Evans rather than *de re* modes of presentation *à la* Bach. According to McDowell, *de re* modes of presentation are *senses* because they determine their reference and because they belong to the representational content itself. In opposition to the *de re* modes of presentation of reference *à la* Bach, the distinctive feature of the *de re* sense is its strong object-dependence: it would not exist if the object did not exist. Likewise, for Kant, if the putative object of a sensible intuition does not exist, then there is no authentic sensible intuition. (*Prol.*, §9, Ak., 4: 282; p. 34)

Thus, my proposal comes to the following. While singular representation *qua* sensible representation in general (sensible intuition and imaginative representation) have *de re* manners of presentations *à la* Bach, singular representations *qua* intuitions in particular have *de re* senses *à la* McDowell. Needless to say, there is no contradiction here. *Qua* sensible representations in general, singular representations are type-individuated by means of the same sensations and forms they share with other sensible representation of the imagination. However, *qua* intuitions in particular, singular representations are further token-individuated by the very objects they present. Therefore, while a singular representation *qua* sensible cognition presents its object as **the object that normally causes this sensation with this form**, *qua* intuition it presents its object as **the object causing this sensation here and now**. In this last sense, the *de re* manner of presentation of the object of sensible intuitions can be characterized as the *mode of the donation* of the object. It is worth noticing that, by saying that singular representations have these manners of presentation, I am not implying (i) that, beside the object, singular representations refer to these modes of presentation or (ii) that the perceiver is conscious of them.

Now we face once more the crucial distinction between contemporary views and the Kantian conception. Even though *de re* manners of presentation determine reference relationally rather than satisfactionally, they are seen through contemporary philosophy as modes of presentation of the objects belonging to singular or object-involving propositions. However, as we saw, neither the object itself nor the *de re* manner of presentation of the object can figure into propositions just because these are always thought by Kant as a relation between concepts.

The question now is whether Kantian singular representations can be seen as what today is called “mental indexicals.” I have rejected the simplified view for

several reasons, among them the fact that singular representations do not encode objective meaning of indexical expressions, constant from occurrence to occurrence. Now, if singular representations do not encode the objective meaning *qua* sensible cognitions, they are type-individuated by sensations and forms that are also context-independent. In this sense, a singular representation refers to an object under a *de re* manner of presentation à la Bach, roughly as **the object that normally causes this sensation**. For example, sensible representation presents a house as the object that normally causes a typical sensation. When the sensation results from the present affection of the mind by the house, the subject sees the house. However, when the sensation results from some earlier affection, the subject imagines the house:

But we differentiate the sensible faculty of cognition into: the faculty of the senses themselves, and the imitated cognition of the senses. **Sensible cognition arises** either entirely from the impression of the object, and then this sensible cognition is a representation of the senses themselves, or sensible cognition arises from the mind, but **under the condition under which the mind is affected by objects**, and then sensible cognition is an imitated representation of the senses. E.g., the representation of that which I see; further the representation of the sour, sweet, etc., are representations of the senses themselves. But if I make present to myself a house that I saw earlier, then the representation arises now from the mind, **but still under the condition that the sense was previously affected by this object**. (*VM.*, Ak, 28: 230; p. 49; the emphasis in bold is mine)

In the contemporary literature, *de re* modes of presentation of objects à la Bach are usually characterized as “mental object-files” storing the information gained on the basis of the acquaintance-relation with the object. In Kant, the crucial information about the object that normally causes a type of sensation is stored as a mental image of the object. Now, considered a sensible representation in general (and not as sensible intuitions), singular representations are “mental indexical[s]” indeed: under the same *de re* manner of presentations, different tokens of a same mental type do refer to different objects (or to none) in different contexts.

The last question I want to address concerns the structure of sensible singular representation. I want to support the view that singular representations are iconically structured rather than propositionally structured. The judgment “the house is white” represents in the relevant sense that it places truth-conditions on the world expressed by corresponding categorical propositions. When these conditions are met in the world, the judgment is true, when not, it is false. The conditions are met when the only object in the extension of the subject-concept “house” is also in the extension of the predicate-concept “white,” or in Kantian terms, when the concept-predicate “white” is *determined* by the singular concept of the house, that is, when the color white belongs to the singular concept of the house as one of its marks.

In contrast, the iconic representation of a white house represents (presents) its object in the different sense of picturing it. The picturing fulfills three conditions. First, it always presents its objects from a perspective. Second, it is modeled as a map-like structure. An iconic representation pictures an object because there is

some degree of isomorphism between the elements of the picture and the elements of the object. Lastly, the information conveyed by iconic representation about its object is coded in analog form rather than in digital form. A signal carries the information that an object S is F in digital form when it carries no additional information about S that is not already nested in S's being F. A sign carries the information that S is F in analog form when it carries more determined information about S than that it is F (Dretske 1981, p. 135).

To begin with, as we have emphasized throughout this paper, sensible representations always present their objects from a perspective, namely, from the egocentric point of view of the perceiver herself. Moreover, as a matter of fact, Kant rules out the traditional idea that a sensible representation pictures an object in the sense that it *resembles* it. Still, for Kant sensible representations of objects do require some degree of isomorphism between the elements of the representation and the elements of the object. He leaves no doubt about it in this *Fragment*:

The author purports that the representation of a thing that is to be found in the soul has the same sort of similarity with the represented thing as a painting has with the depicted object. But I assert that this is false, and prove it thus. When I see a house, then according to this opinion there is a depiction of the house in my soul which is similar to the represented house. Now since similar things differ only with regard to their magnitude, a tiny house is depicted in my soul which, however small it is, must still occupy some space—which is impossible. Likewise, when I feel the vibration of the air, the sensation of which I call sound, I can well say that within my soul there is also such a vibration—but what could be vibrating there? We can prove the same thing from experiences. Can somebody who tastes something sour say that his representation depicts for him pointed and cone-shaped particles of salt, which stimulate his gustatory nerves? Yet with a microscope one sees that they are really thus constituted. Etc.

What is it then in the representation that is in agreement with the represented things? Since the representation borrows its ground from the represented thing, **it agrees with the latter in that it is composed out of its partial concepts in the same way that the whole represented thing is composed out of its parts.** E.g., one can say that the notes of a musical piece are a representation of the harmonic combination of the tones—not as if a note were similar to a tone, but because the notes have a combination among themselves like that of the tones themselves. (*HN.*, II, *Notes to the body of meier's auszug aus der vernunftlehre*, Ak., 16: 77–78; p. 35. My emphasis)

Lastly, for Kant while general representations of objects carry information coded in digital form, singular representations of objects carry information coded in analog form. So when I represent something as a tree, my general representation carries information that the object has trunks, branches and leaves, and other such features. However, it carries no additional information about the object that is not already nested in the fact that the object is a tree. In contrast, when I see a tree, my singular representation carries more determinate information about the object than the fact that it is a tree (e.g., its size, figure, age. That is why Kant says,

To make concepts out of representations one must thus be able *to compare, to reflect, and to abstract*, for these three logical operations of the understanding are the essential and universal conditions for generation of every concept whatsoever. I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on that which they have in common among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves themselves, and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree. (*JL.*, §6, Ak. 9: 91; p. 592)

## 7 Answering possible nonconceptualist objections

As we remarked in the introduction, the main line of defense of the nonconceptual content reading of Kantian sensible intuition derives from the known arguments in favor of nonconceptualists themselves. The leading idea is that these arguments have a distinctly Kantian provenance. My aim in this last section is to show that my proposal (the presentational view) can also accommodate the same powerful intuitions that motivate the nonconceptual content reading of Kantian sensible intuitions. For one thing, those are arguments directly against conceptualism rather than in favor of the nonconceptual content view of experience.

In his paper (2008), Hanna listed at least seven arguments that figure prominently in the literature in support of the nonconceptual content view. I re-introduce six of the seven with a few modifications.

- 1- *From infant and non-human animal cognition.* To be sure, normal infants and some nonhuman animals are capable of sensible cognition (intuition and imagination), although they lack possession of concepts. Still, it does not follow necessarily from that that their nonconceptual cognitions are mental states with non-conceptual contents. The fact that sensible representations are iconic presentations without content accounts for their distinctive behavior. The dog discriminates the roast from the loaf to the extent that he distinguishes them based on the different sensations resulting from each of them.
- 2- *From phenomenological fineness of grain.* To be sure, our normal human perceptual experience is so replete with phenomenal characters and qualities that we could not possibly possess a conceptual repertoire extensive enough to capture them. Still, we can easily account for this fact under the assumption that sensible representations are iconic presentations without content. My sensible intuition of a specific shade of red carries more determinate, more specific information about that color than the fact that the color is red.
- 3- *From perceptual discrimination.* The assumption that sensible representations are iconic presentations without content also accounts for the fact that it is possible for normal human cognizers to be capable of perceptual discrimination without also being capable of re-identifying the objects discriminated.
- 4- *From the distinction between perception and judgment.* The best available explanation for the fact that sensible representations and judgments are not only

distinct but also quite independent of each other is the assumption that sensible representations are iconic presentations of objects without content.

- 5- *From the opposition between thing-knowledge and knowing-that.* It is possible for normal human subjects to know objects by acquaintance without knowing (by descriptions) any truths and facts about them, and, vice versa, it is possible to know truths and facts about someone without knowing them by acquaintance. Now the assumption of sensible representations of iconic presentations of objects without content is what best account for this fact. For one thing, sensible representations are cognitions of objects rather than nonconceptual representations of facts or singular propositions.
- 6- *From the theory of concept-acquisition.* Any reasonable theory of concept-acquisition must assume that simple concepts are acquired by normal human cognizers based on the sensible intuitions of the objects falling under these concepts. Therefore, before placing any accuracy conditions on the world, sensible representation must pick out objects, making them available for conceptualization by means of comparison, reflection, and abstraction.

## 8 Works of Kant

References to Kant's works are given in the German Academy edition: *Gesammelte Schriften*, herausgegeben von der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. (Berlin: 1902–1983; 2d ed., Berlin: De Gruyter, 1968, for vols. I–IX). They are indicated as follows: abbreviation of the title of the work, followed by Ak., volume, and page. For the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the references are shortened, in keeping with current practice, to the pagination of the original edition indicated by A for the 1781 edition, and B for the 1787 edition.

*Anthr.:* *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, Ak 7 (1798). *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. V. L. Dowell, rev. and ed. H. H. Rudnick (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978).

*Diss.:* *De Mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis* Ak. 2 (1770). *Inaugural Dissertation*, trans. David Walford in collaboration with Ralf Meerbote. Ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

*FSS.:* *Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren* Ak. 2 (1762). *The False subtlety of the four syllogistic figure*, trans. David Walford in collaboration with Ralf Meerbote. Ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

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*JL.:* *Jäsche Logik*, Ak. 9 (1800). *Logic*, ed. J. B. [Jäsche Logic], in *Lectures on Logic*, ed. and trans. J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 521–640.

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*Prol.: Prolegomena zu einer jeden kiünftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*, AK. 4 (1783). *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward As Science*, in *Philosophy of Material Nature*, trans. J. W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985).

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