

account of Cournot's ideas on the foundations of infinitesimal calculus as well as discussing some of his own views. Franco de Oliveira takes Poincaré to agree mostly with Cournot's realism about infinitesimals; however, he underemphasizes the fundamental disagreements with Cournot that Poincaré expresses in his paper. In particular, Poincaré expresses disagreement with the naive realism that he thinks is at the basis of Cournot's views. Therefore, Poincaré's paper on Cournot in fact provides little ground to believe that a realism about infinitesimals (and a positive attitude to nonstandard analysis, had he lived long enough to see its development) can be attributed to Poincaré.

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Eric Watkins, ed. *The Divine Order, the Human Order, and the Order of Nature: Historical Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 272. \$74.00 (cloth).

For at least a few decades in the twentieth century, in philosophical research and quite likely in most classroom teaching as well, there was a single dominant narrative about the history of European philosophy. According to this narrative, the seventeenth century was the century of the continental rationalists (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and sometimes Malebranche), the eighteenth century was the century of the British empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and very occasionally Reid), and the period ends with Kant synthesizing the two traditions and thus bringing the progression of the early modern period to its fruition. This story focused primarily on theoretical philosophy (epistemology and metaphysics), with very little attention paid to value theory.

This narrative has been under fire for a long time. The current volume also challenges this dominant account. While explicitly acknowledging that alternative stories have arisen, the editor does not think that any of these stories brings together theoretical (epistemology and metaphysics) and practical (ethics and social-political) philosophical concerns as fully as possible (xvii). The aim of this volume, then, is to offer and develop a new narrative that will bring the theoretical and practical together more effectively. By focusing on "order within modern philosophy—its various kinds (natural, moral, divine, and human), the different ways in which each is conceived, and the diverse dependency re-

lations that are thought to obtain among them,” the perspective of the volume “has the potential to combine metaphysical, epistemological, scientific, and moral considerations into a single narrative” (xviii).

The papers in the volume are all very good or better. All address the theme of order to some degree or another, and as a whole, the volume does indeed address issues in both theoretical and practical philosophy. While the book is primarily aimed at an audience of scholars working actively in the early modern period (many of the papers offer original solutions to central puzzles in early modern philosophers), advanced and talented undergraduates as well as graduate students can get a sense of some crucial trends and issues in the seventeenth through eighteenth centuries by grappling with these papers. It is a successful volume.

One of the most engaging themes that appears in a number of the papers in the book is the evolution of the idea of law, a concept closely related to (indeed, often taken to be the source or the expression of) order. A number of related ideas emerge throughout the papers that deal with this topic. In the early modern period, the idea emerges that laws can apply beyond the domain of rational beings by governing nonrational nature as well. There is also increasing tolerance for the belief that there could be laws without God as their source. Thus, there is a shift from thinking of laws as prescriptive and applying to the practical, normative order only to the belief that laws can be descriptive and relevant in theoretical philosophy, too. Yet another development sees the movement away from taking laws as causally constitutive of regularities in a metaphysically robust way toward taking laws as descriptions of regularities derived from experimental philosophy with no strong connection to metaphysical underpinnings. In brief, throughout the early modern period, there is an increasing anthropomorphism as well as an increasing naturalism, and these trends can be traced by looking at the concept of laws and its relation to order.

Papers by Marilyn McCord Adams, Daniel Garber, Tad Schmaltz, Peter Harrison, Donald Rutherford, Martha Brandt Bolton, and Eric Watkins all deal with various aspects of the theme of law, both corroborating the general trends noted above and also sometimes underscoring important deviations from these trends. Many of these authors deal with other rich themes in addition to that of the nature of laws, although I focus only on the issue of law. Adams’s paper shows how Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham reserve the idea of law (God-given) for rational creatures only (9–10, 17, 24), while nonrational natural regularities emerge from the (also God-given) natures, or *owers*, of things. Garber notes not only that laws in the early modern era were newly seen as applying to the non-conscious, nonrational world (45–46) but also that in some thinkers, laws serve as the source of order in nature even “when the idea of a transcendent

God is rejected” (46). His focus in this characteristically original paper is on the latter trend, noting how both Spinoza and Hobbes call on lawful order despite rejecting a transcendent God as explanatory of phenomena in the natural world (65). Schmaltz picks up this trend away from thinking of God as the source of laws for rational creatures only and expands the story to include both practical and theoretical philosophy. He traces the evolution of the idea of law through Malebranche to Berkeley to Hume, noting not only the eventual removal of God from the picture entirely in Hume (106) but also the movement from Malebranche’s focus on God’s laws serving his own glory (109) to Berkeley’s focus on God’s laws serving human happiness (118–19). Schmaltz thus emphasizes the concurrent moves to naturalism and anthropocentrism through these 2 centuries. Harrison’s focus is on theoretical, not practical, philosophy, and he frames his discussion of laws within what recently has been characterized as the speculative versus experimental philosophy debate (133–36). Focusing on Descartes, the Cambridge Platonists, and Newton, Harrison notes two radically different approaches to laws: one that connects laws with metaphysical considerations, such as the nature of God (132), and a second that disengages laws from metaphysics rather taking them to be “derived from observations or experiments” (132). Rutherford and Bolton both address Leibniz, noting his departure from many of the trends on the concept of law suggested above. Rutherford, for example, grapples with the issue of whether laws or powers (active *natures*) are theoretically primary for Leibniz (149), and in the process, we see that Leibniz represents a breach in the trend away from accounting for order by focusing on powers/natures and toward laws, for both are relevant in his work. Bolton deals with the issue of what Leibniz means by monadic striving, noting the role played by both efficient mechanical cause and final cause of a specific variety in Leibniz’s account, thus emphasizing that laws in the natures of things, for Leibniz, are not merely efficient but also for the sake of a good without thereby being desire-like (178ff.). In his essay on Kant, Watkins also argues for a break from the general trends noted above, for he dissents from a dominant interpretation that holds that Kant dispenses “with the view that God is the ultimate legislator, or lawgiver, both of the moral law and of the laws of nature” (219). Rather, Watkins examines a key moment in each of the three Critiques to show that God figures in a crucial way in Kant’s system.

Papers by Steven Nadler and Robert Merrihew Adams both deal with the opposite of order, namely, deviations from order, or evil. Nadler deals with a puzzle in Maimonides given that he seems to say “of the intellectually perfected person that he is literally protected from suffering any harm in the world” (35). Nadler argues for a naturalistic reading of Maimonides that makes sense of this belief (38–39). Adams’s focus is on Malebranche and his complex theory of

causation, including the vexed problem of human free will. Adams provides a powerful account of how humans might have free will even while God is the only genuine cause (100), a crucial conclusion for dealing with evil given Malebranche's theological commitments.

Andrew Chignell addresses rational hope in general and in Kant. Chignell argues that for Kant, since we cannot know whether God disrupts the world's noumenal order by performing a miracle, and since we therefore can believe that he might do this in the form of improving our characters, we can rationally hope that he might so improve our characters. In this fashion, God's order and human moral order may well interact for the betterment of our moral characters.

Not many of the individual papers in this volume bring together both the theoretical and the practical under the broad theme of order, for most focus on one or the other of these broad areas of philosophy. Nonetheless, Watkins, in his introduction, does an admirable job of drawing on these individual papers to show how a unified theoretical-practical account of the early modern period can emerge from the idea of order (xxvi–xxviii). Still, it is not clear that a theme such as the problem of evil, which has been driving some scholarship in early modern philosophy for some time now, could not just as easily achieve exactly that kind of unified account—after all, it may be well argued that evil, taken to be disorder, presupposes the theme of order. Finally, the cast of characters treated in the volume is as standard as they come; perhaps dealing with the usual figures is helpful in drawing a contrast with the old narrative, which relied on basically the same philosophers. Still, recent research has alerted us to the active and diverse community of philosophers at work in this period, and including some figures further from the inner core of the canon would have lent this volume even greater freshness. These are small quibbles, however, for the book is exciting and successful.

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Jennifer Mensch. *Kant's Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013. Pp. xi+246. \$45.00 (cloth).

In *Kant's Organicism*, Jennifer Mensch provides an intriguing account of the seminal role the life sciences played in the original formation and subsequent unfolding of Kant's theoretical philosophy. Mensch's central conclusion—that