Abstract
This paper contains five observations concerning the intended meaning of the intuitionistic logical constants: (1) if the explanations of this meaning are to be based on a non-decidable concept, that concept should not be that of `proof"; (2) Kreisel"s explanations using extra clauses can be significantly simplified; (3) the impredicativity of the definition of → can be easily and safely ameliorated; (4) the definition of → in terms of `proofs from premises" results in a loss of the inductive character of the definitions of ∨ and ∃ and (5) the same occurs with the definition of ∀ in terms of `proofs with free variables".
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Díez, G.F. Five Observations Concerning the Intended Meaning of the Intuitionistic Logical Constants. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29, 409–424 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004881914911
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004881914911