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It Only Seems as if Zombies are Logically Possible, or How Consciousness Hides the Truth of Materialism: A Critical Review of The Conscious Mind

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  1. Program in Philosophy, Computers, and Cognitive Science, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, 13902, U.S.A.

    Eric Dietrich

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  1. Eric Dietrich
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Dietrich, E. It Only Seems as if Zombies are Logically Possible, or How Consciousness Hides the Truth of Materialism: A Critical Review of The Conscious Mind. Minds and Machines 8, 441–461 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008317225595

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