Abstract
This article further explains and develops a recent, comprehensive semantic naturalization theory, namely the interactive indexing (II) theory as described in my 2008 Minds and Machines article “Semantic Naturalization via Interactive Perceptual Causality” (Vol. 18, pp. 527–546). Folk views postulate a concrete intentional relation between cognitive states and the worldly states they are about. The II theory eliminates any such concrete intentionality, replacing it with purely causal relations based on the interactive theory of perception. But intentionality is preserved via purely abstract propositions about the world that index, or correlate with, appropriate cognitive states. Further reasons as to why intentionality must be abstract are provided, along with more details of an II-style account of representation, language use and propositional attitudes. All cognitive representation is explained in terms of classification or sorting dispositions indexed by appropriate propositions. The theory is also related to Fodor’s representational theory of mind, with some surprisingly close parallels being found in spite of the purely dispositional basis of the II theory. In particular, Fodor’s insistence that thinking about an item cannot be reduced to sorting dispositions is supported via a novel two-level account of cognition—upper level propositional attitudes involve significant intermediate processing of a broadly normative epistemic kind prior to the formation of sorting dispositions. To conclude, the weak intentional realism of the II theory—which makes intentional descriptions of the world dispensable—is related to Dennett’s ‘intentional stance’ view, and distinguished from strong (indispensable) intentional realist views. II-style dispositions are also defended.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Chisholm, R. (1957). Perceiving. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Colyvan, M. (2008). Indispensability arguments in the philosophy of mathematics. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/mathphil-indis/.
Crane, T. (2008) The problem of perception. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/perception-problem/.
Cummins, R. (1996). Representations, targets and attitudes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dahlbom, B. (Ed.). (1995). Dennett and his critics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Dennett, D. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dilworth, J. (2004). Naturalized perception without information. The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 25, 349–368.
Dilworth, J. (2005a). The reflexive theory of perception. Behavior and Philosophy, 33, 17–40.
Dilworth, J. (2005b). Perceptual causality problems reflexively resolved. Acta Analytica, 20, 11–31.
Dilworth, J. (2005c). A naturalistic, reflexive dispositional approach to perception. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 43, 583–601.
Dilworth, J. (2006a). A reflexive dispositional analysis of mechanistic perception. Minds and Machines, 16, 479–493.
Dilworth, J. (2006b). Perception, introspection and functional consonance. Theoria, 4, 299–318.
Dilworth, J. (2008a). Semantic naturalization via interactive perceptual causality. Minds and Machines, 18, 527–546.
Dilworth, J. (2008b). The propositional challenge to aesthetics. British Journal of Aesthetics, 48, 115–144.
Dilworth, J. (2008c). The abstractness of artworks and its implications for aesthetics. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 66, 341–353.
Dilworth, J. (2009). Semantics naturalized: Propositional indexing plus interactive perception. Language and Communication, 29, 1–25.
Dilworth, J. (2010). Realistic virtual reality and perception. Philosophical Psychology, 23, 23–42.
Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the flow of information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Evans, G. (1982). The varieties of reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fodor, J. (1987). Psychosemantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fodor, J. (1990). A theory of content and other essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fodor, J. (1998). Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fodor, J. (2008). Lot 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fodor, J., & Lepore, E. (2002). The compositionality papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Handfield, T. (Ed.). (2009). Dispositions and causes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. (1997). Finkish dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 143–158.
McKitrick, J. (2003). A case for extrinsic dispositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, 155–174.
Molnar, G. (1999). Are dispositions reducible? Philosophical Quarterly, 49, 1–17.
Peacocke, C. (1992). A study of concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Quine, W. (1980). On what there is. Reprinted in From a logical point of view, 2nd ed. (pp. 1–19). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ramsey, W. (2007). Representation reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ross, D., Brook, A., & Thompson, D. (2000). Dennett’s philosophy: A comprehensive assessment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sosa, E., & Kim, J. (2000). Epistemology: An anthology. Oxford: Blackwell.
Steup, M. (2008). The analysis of knowledge. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/knowledge-analysis/.
Thagard, P. (2008). Cognitive science. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/cognitive-science/.
Wilson, R., & Keil, F. (2001). The MIT encyclopedia of the cognitive sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Dilworth, J. More on the Interactive Indexing Semantic Theory. Minds & Machines 20, 455–474 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9204-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9204-0