

WAS PLATO A VEGETARIAN?

1. Introduction

This question has seldom been asked, and perhaps for some good reasons. There are certain passages in Plato, that I will treat later, where it is clear that we have no duties toward animals. The only in-depth study of Greek vegetarianism, Johannes Haussleiter's *Der Vegetarismus in der antike*,¹ cites these passages, and reaches the conclusion that Plato was not convinced by any of the possible "arguments" for vegetarianism offered in antiquity, which I think can be categorized as follows: (A) Many of the ancient vegetarians² believed in *transmigration*, leading them to spare animals in the belief that animals were, or will be, human beings. The famous story, in Diogenes Laertius (VIII, 36), of Pythagoras asking a man to discontinue beating a dog, because he recognized the voice of a deceased friend in the yelp of the animal, is indicative of this tendency. (B) Another reason for ancient abstention from meat was the belief that flesh-eating was *injurious to the health* of either body or soul. The former belief was tied to ancient medical thought, whereas the latter was often associated with a more general commitment to moderation or asceticism. (C) But there was also among the ancients a *concern for animals* themselves: since animals suffer when they are killed (or are deprived of a life which is theirs if killed painlessly), and since we can live healthy lives on vegetal food, eating meat is cruel and ought to be avoided.³

Plato accepted none of these arguments, Haussleiter thinks, and the neglect of Plato's possible vegetarianism indicates that most commentators agree with Haussleiter. I am not necessarily attempting a refutation of Haussleiter's judgment in this paper. Rather, I: (A) show that the relationship between Plato and vegetarian thought is far more complex than anyone has yet noticed; and (B) claim in an original way that it is rational to believe that vegetarianism was, at the very least, a practice that Plato admired.

2. The Golden Age

There was a pervasive sense in ancient Greek culture that the past was better than the present. At times this belief took the form of a golden age of perfection in which vegetarianism was practiced.⁴ In terms of conceptual richness Plato does more with the myth of the golden age than any other thinker. As early as the *Gorgias* (523A, 523C) Plato works on the difference between the age of Cronus and the ages of Zeus. But there are many passages which suggest that Plato did not see the first men as a golden race in a paradisaic state.⁵ Therefore, Plato's appeal to these ages in a Hesiodic way must be in order to make a philosophic point rather than a historical one. A preliminary example comes from the *Republic* (415A). He who is fit to rule, the philosopher, has some gold in him; the guardians are to be of silver stock; while in the producing class are to be found bronze and iron. (It is interesting to note that none of the three classes in the *Republic* are of heroic blood.) If Plato does not believe that Hesiod's ages are true historic accounts, why does he allude to them? It seems that he uses them not as history, but rather as exemplifications of what *would* happen in history if any one of these groups ruled. Complete peace and moral progress are only possible in a golden age, i.e., an age dominated by philosophers.

It is highly doubtful that Plato thinks such an age could actually exist because this golden generation is not autonomous; it is determined by the decrees of Cronus.

But when the ages of Zeus are ushered in (the silver generation on), according to Hesiod, human beings determine their own fate. Thus, an age dominated by guardian types (silver) would be one of recklessness, due to a lack of control from the rational part of the soul. Even worse would be a stage of history in which power would be in the hands of producers (bronze, iron), for in such an age the dominant leit-motif would be the identification of justice with force. Thus, in a metaphorical way, Plato could be said to agree with Hesiod that the present age was one of iron. If this interpretation of this part (415) of the *Republic* is correct, then the whole work can be seen as an “as if” project. That is, Plato is imagining in his mind’s eye what that stage in history would be like *if* those who ruled were golden, like the gods. This interpretation not only does justice to this passage, but also to Book Two where this ideal city is mentioned for the first time (369C). This passage makes it clear that the *Republic* is a created city, whose real creator is the needs of people living in an age of iron (also 423A).

How does this relate to the issue of vegetarianism? Well, it is clear that Plato believed that at least some of the ancients were vegetarians; we learn this through the speech of the Athenian in the *Laws* (782). The question is whether Plato’s peculiar belief in the “golden boys” corresponds to his awareness of vegetarianism. The needed connection is found in the *Statesman* (269–274), in the famous myth of cosmic reversal. Here it can be seen that those men living in the age of Cronus were vegetarians. This link will enable me to unpack much in Plato’s attitude toward man and beast.

Plato’s reversal myth goes as follows: there is an era in which god (*theos*) himself guides the universe and gives it rotation, and an era in which he (i.e., Cronus) release his control. In this latter era the world revolves under its own influence, which is made possible by the fact that it has been endowed with reason by god. The Eleatic Stranger’s description of the age of Cronus suggests that all good things came without man’s labor. Man did not even have to plan or govern the universe. Tutelary deities or daemons did that for him by acting as shepherds to a flock. Savagery was nowhere to be found, nor preying of creature on creature; no strife whatsoever. Men had fruit without stint from trees and bushes; these needed no cultivation but sprang up of themselves out of the ground. This pastoral life even meant sleeping on the soft bed of grass offered up by the earth. The communion among animal species was such that human beings not only conversed with each other, but also with other animals, seeking to learn what they could from beings with special faculties that human beings lacked. Although it is not clear that these partners actually engaged in dialectic, the Eleatic Stranger makes it clear that they *could* have done so.

When this order of things came to its destined end, universal change was ushered in. Cronus and his regional deities withdrew their hands from the earth’s rudder, and destiny (*heimarmene*) took control of the world again. The shock of reversal in the world’s processes caused destruction of living creatures, and a period of recovery was needed. After this period of solace, the world ruled itself. At first it remembered the instruction it had received from god, but gradually its memory grew dim due to its bodily element. Whereas the world receives its order from god, it is also permeated by the chaotic and disorderly force of its bodily factor.

When, in this age of Zeus, the primacy of god (i.e., Cronus) is forgotten, the condition of chaos gradually asserts its way. Plato makes it clear that the present age

is one under the regency of Zeus. Bereft of the guardian care of Cronus' daemons, man became weak and helpless and was ravaged by wild beasts (perhaps because he could not communicate with them any longer). Now even the previously friendly beasts had turned savage, indicating that the change was not just an alteration in human nature. The earth no longer supplied food spontaneously, either, and poor man lacked any knowledge or tools to cultivate the soil. Let me leave man in this terrible predicament for just a moment in order to make two inferences.

(A) The point to the story of the ages in the *Republic* (that Plato is imagining what history would be like if golden types-philosophers ruled), when joined with the evidence of the *Statesman* (that those in the golden race under Cronus are vegetarians) seems to allow the inference that philosophers should be vegetarians. (B) However, as I have argued elsewhere,⁶ since the point to the myth of cosmic reversal in the *Statesman* is that the ideal universe under Cronus has never existed in the physical realm any more than the *Republic* has, vegetarianism also seems to be an unreachable ideal. This is not to say that vegetarian thought is of no use; it does supply the ideal background against which our treatment of animals should be judged, in the same way that the *Republic* provides the paradigm against which judgments of actually existing historical states are to be made. The consequences of this separation of paradigm and *praxis* will be considered later.

Plato's use of myth in the *Statesman* takes us to the heart of the issue of vegetarianism in Greek philosophy. As Vidal-Naquet has noticed,⁷ this myth is really a clever merger on the part of Plato of three logically distinct myths: the myth of planetary reversal; the myth of the earthborn (the *gegeis*); and the myth of a golden age under Cronus. He also notices that this last part of the overall myth, that dealing with Cronus, is treated in the *Republic* (378A) with great care since it can easily be distorted (presumably by those who would needlessly raise romantic hopes). Vidal-Naquet contends, rightly I think, that the paradise of the golden age was primarily an animal paradise for Plato. The pastoral vocabulary of the age under Cronus is replaced by a political vocabulary under Zeus.

Now back to the story. Man was in a pitiable state of deprivation, obviously the historical condition that Plato thought man originally found himself in, since the golden age is an ideal construction (or reality) that never concretely existed in *this* world.⁸ It was in order to meet these needs that the gifts of the gods Hephaestus and Prometheus are introduced by Plato. They gave to man fire (which is also a symbol for mind), craftsmanship, and other tools so that he could fend for himself.⁹ The very one who was at the origin of the status of social man, Prometheus, was also the one who furnished fire for cooking, and who was thus the one who was responsible for the break with animals (and gods?).¹⁰ Prometheus ensures the transition from the vegetarianism of the golden age to the human ages under Zeus with fire to cook a meat-eating diet. This allowed man to survive when his lot was less than sanguine. But this diet also severed man's friendly link with animals.

Prometheus allows one to see more clearly the function of the myth of the golden age of vegetarianism. As Vidal-Naquet has it, the age of Cronus is a slogan for philosophical and religious sects that are not satisfied with the existing civic order. Relying on Detienne,¹¹ he holds that in this situation some sort of cultural transcendence is called for, which can be in two directions. In the upward direction an attempt is made to implant in "our" world the vegetarian virtues of the golden age. This is what Pythagoras, Empedocles, Porphyry, etc., tried to do. In the down-

ward direction an effort could be made to enter into contact with bestiality through a Dionysian type of consumption of raw food, which in its extreme form could lead to cannibalism. This route of downward transcendence was taken by some of the Cynics.

One last word should be said about the age of Cronus. In the *Laws* (713) the Athenian draws an analogy between Cronus' daemons and the men they ruled, on the one hand, and human shepherds and the animals they tend, on the other. The point to be noticed is that dominion is not a license for eating. It would be unfathomable for Cronus' helpers to eat men just because they were superior in intelligence to them. The lesson for human dominion over animals seems clear enough, yet often curiously missed.

3. Socrates

The influence on Plato of the Orphics (who were vegetarian), Pythagoras, and the pervasive myth of a vegetarian golden age only tell half the story of his attitude toward vegetarianism. The other great influence was Socrates. What is most prominent in Socrates' view of eating is his indifference. It is said that when some rich men came to dinner his wife, Xanthippe, was ashamed of her meal. Socrates told her not to mind because if the visitors were reasonable they would put up with the meal, and if not there would be no need to care about them.¹² It is not that Socrates neglected his body, for he realized that no one could exist without nourishment, nor did he praise those who did neglect their bodies; rather, he disapproved of overeating.¹³ It can be remembered from the *Symposium* that Socrates was once an able soldier (220A). Whenever he accepted an invitation to dinner he very easily kept himself from eating too much, and he advised those who could not do so to avoid food that stimulated appetite. We are reminded here of Pythagoras' choice of foods before going on a fast.¹⁴ In fact, according to Xenophon, Socrates jokingly alluded to Homer to make his point: Circe turned men into pigs by feeding them stimulating foods.¹⁵

This simplicity in eating neither harmed Socrates' health (he seemed quite fit when he took the hemlock at age seventy) nor his ability to enjoy the foods he did eat.¹⁶ Socrates also realizes that his moderation is a privilege of the well-to-do, since the man who is hungry of necessity cannot afford to enjoy the little food he gets.¹⁷ Some modern philosophers have argued that one important way to ameliorate the plight of the hungry man is through a vegetarian diet in wealthy nations, which would save an incredible amount of grain for others.¹⁸ Although this modern argument from protein efficiency was beyond the bounds of anything Socrates could have thought of, he was aware of issues concerning the just distribution of food. In a chapter "On Table Manners" Xenophon describes how Socrates would even out the portions at a "pot luck" dinner so that none would be ashamed or hungry; for him "to dine well" meant doing no harm to one's soul in the course of a meal, a Pythagorean commonplace.¹⁹

As regards animals themselves Socrates seems to have had *some* degree of sympathy. Animals are tempted by many of the same desires that men are: gluttony, lust, and the like.²⁰ Some animals (e.g., lions) are capable of a considerable degree of courage (see *Laches* 196E), and others (horses, dogs, etc.) are capable of voluntary, as opposed to instinctively involuntary actions (*Lesser Hippias* 375A). Yet these examples seem to be exceptions to the rule. As in the case of Renaissance

humanism, Socrates' *humanism*, despite all of its commendable features, was hardly a boon to animals. According to Xenophon, Socrates believed that men were happier than beasts. One reason for this is the presence of speech in man, which animals lack, distinguishing Socrates from Pythagoras. In addition, animals are limited to certain times when they can have sexual intercourse, whereas human beings have the pleasure which comes from the sex which is available throughout the year. Who could disagree with Socrates here? And perhaps most importantly, man has the solace of perceiving the existence of the gods.²¹

Apparently Socrates took these human qualities and concluded that in comparison with other living creatures men were demigods themselves.²² But Socrates goes even further than this, according to Xenophon.²³ From the superiority of man, which even Pythagoras granted to a degree, Socrates seems to have concluded that animals are born and raised *for the sake* of man. To say the least, this transition needs support. To hold, as Xenophon says Socrates did, that the fact that men eat animals is evidence for the position that animals *should* be eaten clearly begs the question. Yet Socrates' influence on Plato regarding the eating of animals seems great, as will now be shown.

4. Plato and Animals

I previously reached the preliminary conclusion that for Plato the philosopher, ideally speaking, ought to be a vegetarian in order to (re)establish the link with animals found in the mythical golden age. I will now explore why this link is broken, a break which is symbolized by an ancient time of destruction when most animals perished (*Laws* 677E).

Given Plato's belief that an ideal rule (in the age of Cronus) would be one of concern for animals, it is curious that he so easily accepts the practice of meat-eating. He does not condemn hunting and butchering as arts practiced in order to get food (*Statesman* 288E); nor does he object to the raising of livestock for consumption (*Laws* 847E). The pleasure that one has when eating (*Greater Hippias* 298E) seems to include the eating of animal flesh. In fact, in the *Republic* (332C) the culinary art is described as the seasoning of meats (*opsois*), which are wholesome foods to eat (*Laws* 667B). If they were not wholesome, they would not be recommended to athletes; but they are (*Republic* 404C).

An apparent contradiction faces us. On the one hand, Plato looks at vegetarianism as an ideal worthy of striving for; on the other, he quite easily accepts less than ideal eating habits. This situation is not so much a contradiction as a particular instance of the more general theory-*praxis* dilemma in Plato's philosophy. A way of picturing this dilemma can be found in the *Republic* (501B): the philosopher must frequently glance in two directions. First, he must repeatedly keep his eye on the Forms of Justice, Beauty, Sobriety, and the like as they are in the nature of things, and alternately he must look at that justice, beauty, or sobriety that he is trying to reproduce in "this" world. When he does this he must mingle and blend in with the cave-like world around him, all the while making sure that he does not completely lose sight of the light of the Forms. No easy task. When it came to eating it seems that Plato somewhat abandoned his ideal in order to concentrate on what he thought were more important problems regarding justice in "this" world. But he did not completely abandon the ideal.

In the *Gorgias* (464-465) Plato puts restrictions on the art of cookery

(*opsopoiike*). He does this through one of his favorite devices, the four-term analogy, of which he gives two examples:

sophistic:legislation::rhetoric:justice
beautification:gymnastics::cookery:medicine

The first analogy deals with health of soul, and suggests that legislation and justice are the true arts that deal with the soul: legislation gives one principles to live by, justice gives one means of adjustment if legislation in any way fails. Sophistic and rhetoric are types of flattery that imitate the true arts, and anyone who is taken in by these forms of flattery can expect an unhealthy soul.

The second analogy tries to do the same for bodily health: gymnastics gives precise suggestions as to how to develop a healthy body, and medicine tells us how to cure the body if gymnastics fails (and eventually it must fail since no science is perfect). Beautification (Grecian formula?) consists in devices that feign youth or health, but do not truly give it. And cookery is a form of flattery that corresponds, in a way, to medicine. Cookery does not do the job of repairing the body as well as medicine because it is a routine (*empeiria*) that tries to produce gratification and pleasure (462D — presumably through sweetmeats, spicy sauces, and culinary exotica), whereas medicine more successfully uses (at times) unpleasant means to gain health. Cookery is not an art (*techne*) at all, because by exclusively devoting itself to pleasure without investigating the nature of pleasure it fails to give a rational account (*logos*) of itself (500B, 501A). All of this makes it clear that Plato was very much interested in proper diet, for without such a concern not only bodily health would deteriorate, but also health of the soul, because one who fell for the bottle of “snake oil” sold by mere cookery could also easily fall for the rhetorical devices of the sophist. In Pythagorean fashion Plato wants diet (*diatetike*) to be brought within the control of a mathematically based medicine.²⁴

Why did Plato not necessarily include abstinence from meat in such control? The aforementioned “two glances” passage in the *Republic* in part answers this question. But a deeper look into Plato’s thoughts on animals is needed. Animals, like men, can be anarchic (*Republic* 562E) because they are bursting with the spirit of liberty (*Republic* 563C). At times this unbridled energy can be channelled into courageous acts (*Laws* 963E), but more often than not this energy is irrational, an irrationality which, when found in the human animal (*Laws* 777B), is beastly (*theriodes*–*Republic* 571C). The gaining of wisdom comes when the beast within is tamed, analogous to the training of a real animal (*Republic* 493A). It is obvious that for Plato man, as the rational animal, is far superior to other animals, most notably because man has the language and knowledge of the Forms (*Phaedrus* 249B).

In two sections from the *Timaeus* (69C–77C, 90E–92C) I think we can see Plato’s attitudes towards man and beast more precisely than in the overworked (albeit beautiful) image of the charioteer in the *Phaedrus*. Here Plato talks of three sorts of soul that man possesses: (A) Man has an immortal soul that is a spark of divinity in him. As in the case of the Christian man made in his God’s image, it is largely this spark of divinity which allows Plato to retreat from his vegetarian ideal. That is, man’s superiority has been given a divine sanction. This soul is also the seat of reason and is located in the head. (B) Man has a mortal soul, which he shares with animals. It is not intrinsically irrational since part of it (in the upper chest, close to the head) is obedient to reason, and is the seat of passion, including pain. Since

animals do experience pain, for Plato, and yet can be eaten, it seems that Greek vegetarianism may, at times, hinge more on the question of whether animals have reason or divine sanction than mere sentience. The other part of the mortal soul is located in the lower belly, which acts as a receptacle for excess meat before excretion, so as to prevent gluttony. How convenient! (C) Finally, man has an unnamed, third kind of soul, which is the plant-like side to man, and has no part of reason at all. This soul is located below the navel and possesses no self-motion (i.e., freedom) whatsoever.

The appetitive part of the soul (*epithymetikon*) is the cause of the desire for food,²⁵ which in the *Phaedrus* is symbolized by the wayward steed. It is this (the mortal and third souls of the *Timaeus*) which must be tamed. But the appetitive part of the soul often raises its ugly head, even in poetry, as Rodman argues.²⁶ Plato's indictment of the poets is partially due to this denunciation of *mimesis*, which is bestial in character; the poets let some natural force like thunder or a growling animal to speak through them. Yet the eating of meat could be attacked on the same grounds: a *mimesis* of the carnivores. Perhaps it could be objected that the eating of meat is more due to a *humanism* than *mimesis*, as in the case of Socrates. But as Peter Singer would perhaps suggest,²⁷ Plato at this point would be in danger of succumbing to the Protagorean saying "Man is the measure of all things," a dictum that Plato would otherwise want to attack.

5. Three Texts

Vegetarianism seems to have posed a continuing problem to Plato, which is understandable when his similarities to Pythagoras are considered. Haussleiter emphasizes²⁸ some of these: there is a tradition which suggests that Plato visited Egypt, and he has some sort of belief in *metempsychosis*. Gorman notices that the idea of a communal mess hall (*syssition*) was kept alive by Plato.²⁹ But more subtle influences can also be found: Plato thought that only bread and relishes were necessary; all other foods were unnecessary (*Republic* 459A-C). He also believed, in Pythagorean fashion, that the origin of flesh is marrow, which God made out of triangles (*Timaeus* 73B).

It is not at all clear that Plato ever *completely* abandoned the Pythagorean vegetarian ideal, no matter how forceful the mores of his meat-eating, cave-dwelling fellows were. Three key texts force me to keep alive the possibility that Plato was a vegetarian, or at the very least, was supportive of vegetarian thought. The first is *Republic* 369D-373E. Here Socrates suggests, immediately after proposing the creation of the *Republic*, that the first and chief need of such a city is food: no small honor! Division of labor will produce not only food (barley meal, wheat flour, cakes), but enough food for a feast: relishes like salt, olives, cheese, onions, and greens; and desserts of figs, chick-peas, beans, myrtle berries, and acorns. These are foods of health and peace (presumably, peace with animals). Then Socrates is asked what foods would be eaten if he were not founding a *Republic* but a city of pigs. The reply: the delicacies (*tragemata*) that are now in use. These presumably include the sweetmeats (do pigs eat these?) which are noticeably absent from the diet of the citizens of Socrates' ideal city. That the *Republic* was to be a vegetarian city is one of the best kept secrets in the history of philosophy.

The second text is from the *Laws* (781E-783B), showing that this problem spans the different periods in Plato's career. Here the Athenian makes it clear that the

history of human institutions is immeasurably long, including the history of eating habits. *Every* sort of taste in meat and drink has been exhibited in the past; this leads one to wonder about the Greek practice of anthropophagy. Some people not only avoided such brutality, but also abstained from oxen and other more “acceptable” flesh. To eat such flesh was criminal, and to sacrifice it to the gods was a pollution; cakes and meal soaked in honey was considered much more pure. These unnamed people, who insisted on universal vegetarianism like the Orphics, can be none other than the Pythagoreans. Now comes the key point. Clinias adds (with no objection from the Athenian, i.e., Plato) that this vegetarianism is a widely current and highly credible tradition (*kai sphodra legomena te eikekas kai pisteuesthai pithana*). As in the *Republic*, the prime need of human beings is food, and vegetarianism is a current, highly credible way of meeting that need.

Finally, there is *Epinomis* 974D–975B. Here the Athenian (again, Plato) holds that some men may have been considered wise long ago, but are not considered so any more. Vegetarians are not in this category. The legend of these men (again, the Pythagoreans?) has it that they put a check on the devouring of flesh, and absolutely condemned the consumption of some animals. Their rule still has a blessing of the first order from the Athenian. The eating of barley and wheat is still admirable; it may not in itself bring wisdom (but not even the Pythagoreans believed this), but such eating does show an attempt to become the best person that one can become. Although the mythical elements in Pythagorean vegetarianism are gone, the practice still has an important place in the life of one seeking understanding.

6. Conclusion

The tragedy of Plato’s thought regarding vegetarianism is that he has left the impression that he has totally abandoned the practice and shunned its justification. As I think I have shown, there are not sufficient grounds for such an impression. In a way, the extent to which Plato keeps vegetarian theory alive represents a plea to return to the richer Greek conception of man as social and not intelligibly removable from his fellows³⁰ or his natural environment, which includes besouled, sentient animals. In the last analysis, Plato seems to tolerate meat-eating in a way analogous to Pythagoras’ tolerance of the less rigorous practices of the *akousmatikoi*. In neither case is the thinker in question a defender of the practice of eating meat.

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Notes

1. Johannes Haussleiter, *Der Vegetarismus in der antike* (Berlin: Topelmann, 1935).
2. These would include Pythagoras, Empedocles, Theophrastus, Seneca, Ovid, Plutarch, Plotinus, Porphyry, and others.
3. See Plutarch’s “Of Eating the Flesh” in his *Moralia* for a clear expression of compassion for animals as a basis for vegetarianism. There is also at least a fourth argument for vegetarianism in antiquity. See my “Vegetarianism and the Argument from Marginal Cases in Porphyry,” to appear in the *Journal of the History of Ideas*.

4. Those who attest to the belief that “originally” people were vegetarian include Hesiod, Empedocles, Theophrastus, Dicaerchus, Ephorus, Aratus, Diodorus Siculus, Ovid, and Porphyry (see his *De abstinentia*, a book length defense of vegetarianism); and others, perhaps including Homer and Plotinus. See my forthcoming book on *The Philosophy of Vegetarianism*, to be published by the University of Massachusetts Press in 1984, where the long and rich history of vegetarian thought in antiquity is treated in detail.
5. *Cratylus* 397, *Republic* 369, Book Three of the Laws, et al. For a full treatment of Plato’s thought on history see my *Plato’s Philosophy of History* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981).
6. *Ibid.*, Chapter Seven.
7. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, “Plato’s Myth of the Statesman, the Ambiguities of the Golden Age and of History,” *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* XCVIII (1978):132-141.
8. Again, see *Plato’s Philosophy of History* if this contention seems unsupported.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 48, 121, 134, especially regarding the treatment of Prometheus in the *Protagoras*.
10. Vidal-Naquet, pp. 133-134.
11. Marcel Detienne, “Entre betes et Dieux,” *Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse* VI (Autumn, 1972):230-246.
12. Diogenes Laertius, II, 34.
13. See Xenophon, *Recollections of Socrates*, trans. by Anna S. Benjamin (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), I, 2; also II, 1.
14. See Peter Gorman, *Pythagoras: A Life* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p.84.
15. Xenophon, I, 3.
16. *Ibid.*, I, 6.
17. *Ibid.*, II, 1.
18. See, e.g., James Rachels, “Vegetarianism and ‘The Other Weight Problem,’” in *World Hunger and Moral Obligation*, ed. by Aiken and LaFollette (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977).
19. Xenophon, III, 14.
20. *Ibid.*, II, 1.
21. *Ibid.*, I, 4.
22. *I b i d .*
23. *Ibid.*, IV, 3.
24. In addition to these passages from the *Gorgias*, see Diogenes Laertius, III, 85.
25. *Ibid.*, III, 90.
26. John Rodman, “The Other Side of Ecology in Ancient Greece: Comments on Hughes,” *Inquiry* 19 (1976), p.110.
27. Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation* (N.Y. Review, 1975), p. 216.
28. Haussleiter, III, 14. Also see F.M. Cornford, “Plato and Orpheus,” *The Classical Review* XVII (1903):433-445; and *Republic* 620A.
29. Gorman, p. 76.
30. See J. Baird Callicott, “Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair,” *Environmental Ethics* 2 (1980), pp.327-328.