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Augustinian Elements in Heidegger's Philosophical Anthropology:
A Study of the Early Lecture Course on Augustine

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As Steven Crowell has shown, Heidegger's departure from Husserl concerned the philosophical place of the human being.¹ For Husserl, anthropology like biology is an ontic science that has nothing to do with transcendental phenomenology. For Heidegger, by contrast, phenomenology's discovery of the field of constitution urgently calls for a radically new conception of what it means to be a human being. Such an investigation is not an *ontic* inquiry but rather forms the basis of *ontological* research into intentionality. Husserl does not realize his student's difference on this matter until after the 1927 publication of *Being and Time* and its careful analysis of Dasein,² but this difference in fact emerges a decade earlier as Heidegger struggles to find his authentic voice.

The earliest lecture courses point to Heidegger's concern for a new articulation of the human being with the aim of understanding intentionality.³ In particular, his summer semester 1921 lecture

¹ "For Husserl, there is no legitimate sense in which I can still speak of myself as a 'human being' after the [transcendental phenomenological] reduction. Yet behind this view stands nothing but a transparent and unresolved naturalism on Husserl's part. ... But why should the *philosopher*, concerned with the *phenomenological* question of 'who I am,' cede the term to the psychologist or anthropologist from the outset? If one takes the presuppositionlessness of phenomenology seriously, it would make more sense to refer to the natural kind (the topic of third person investigations) as *homo sapiens* or *anthropos* and keep 'human being' as the neutral term for the *site* of the philosophical question of what I am." "Does the Husserl/Heidegger Feud Rest on a Mistake? An Essay on Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology," *Husserl Studies* 18 (2002): 136.

² And the fallout over the *Encyclopedia Britannica* article (1927-28). See Edmund Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927-1931)*, ed. and trans. Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).

³ See, for instance, the winter semester 1921-22 lecture course: "What has always disturbed me: did intentionality come down from heaven? If it is something ultimate: in which ultimacy is it to be taken? ... In regard to all categorical structures of facticity, intentionality is their basic formal structure." He also says that "the basic sense of phenomenology" is the task of dismantling the history of spirit to determine "how and to what extent intentionality has been seen." *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung, Gesamtausgabe* 61, ed. Walter Bröcker and Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985), *Phenomenological*

course, “Augustine and Neo-Platonism,” amplifies the Augustinian analyses of human life in Book X of the *Confessions*.⁴ He thinks Augustine goes far in articulating the complex structure of life, and he thinks that the modern Cartesian tradition (and for Heidegger, this includes Husserl as well) turns from such facticity toward the evidence of the *cogito*.⁵ He thus sees himself as reaching back behind modernity to recover Augustine’s fuller account of life.⁶ And yet, this is no mere restatement of Augustine, for, as we will see, he is also interested in purging Augustine of what he thinks is the Greek and specifically Platonic metaphysics of value. In this paper, we show the convergence of the two thinkers and identify the Augustinian elements in Heidegger’s own thinking as they emerge in his careful interpretation of factual life in Augustine. Then, we turn to their divergence and examine Heidegger’s critique of Augustine’s “axiological” interpretation of the central phenomena. We offer a defense of Augustine by calling attention to the *historicity* of the desire which discloses the good.

I. CONVERGENCE: THE ISSUE OF FACTICITY

In the lecture course, Heidegger’s chief aim is to unpack the Augustinian analysis of “facticity.” Theodore Kisiel says Heidegger first introduced this term at the end of the summer semester 1920 lecture course “to refer to the primary reality of factic life experience.”⁷ One year later, Heidegger’s grasp of this phenomenon is decidedly enriched by his exploration of Augustine.⁸ Heidegger centers on the Latin

Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 131/98.

⁴ “Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus,” in *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens, Gesamtausgabe* 60, ed. Matthias Jung, Thomas Regehly, and Claudius Strube (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995), “Augustine and Neo-Platonism,” in *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004), appendix II, note 8. Throughout we will simply refer to the section of this volume.

⁵ Appendix II, note 8.

⁶ Heidegger aims to correct Dilthey’s reading of Augustine as an epistemologist, a proto-modern. It was Dilthey, however, who had inspired Heidegger to find in early Christianity (Paul, Augustine) the emergence of historical existence. See Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1993), 100-108.

⁷ *The Genesis*, 497.

⁸ As it had in the winter semester 1920-21 lecture course on St. Paul, likewise published in *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*. There Heidegger brings out the enactment character of Christian factual life. Glossing 1 Corinthians 7:28, he writes, “In order to raise the relational sense of factual life

molestia as Augustine's expression of facticity, and in the course he follows Augustine in unfolding its constitutive elements. Care is the fundamental character of factual life, namely a striving for authentic self-possession through delight in God, and temptations are directions *against* this self-possession and *into* the world. Facticity is care's struggle with the possibility of this falling, and *molestia* thus emerges as the *how* of the being of life. Though the lecture course deals with the whole of Book X of the *Confessions*, Heidegger's interest rests in the features we just mentioned.⁹

a. Care and the distinction between use and enjoyment

Following Augustine, Heidegger articulates the central place of caring (*curare*) in life.¹⁰ We are ever dispersed by the troubles of life but care recalls the dispersion into a unity. Paraphrasing Augustine, he writes, "For 'in multa defluximus' we are dissolving into the manifold and are absorbed in the dispersion. You demand counter-movement against the dispersion, against the falling apart of life."¹¹ That is, we oscillate between the many (*multum*) and the one (*unum*). Delight (*delectatio*) continually pulls us in the direction of the many, which Heidegger takes to be "the life of the world in its manifold significance." We must resist and hold ourselves together as one, which he calls the authentic.¹² So, we have a basic movement between authentic unity on the one hand and inauthentic dispersion on the other. But within the inauthentic dispersion (*defluxus*) itself there is yet further conflict between fearing and desiring:

experience, one must be careful that it becomes more 'difficult,' that it is enacted *en thlipsesin*. The phenomena of enactment must be entwined with the sense of facticity. Paul makes of enactment a theme." Both Augustine and Luther are credited with recognizing that the tribulation of factual life can only "won" through grace and not one's own efforts. § 32.

⁹ Heidegger devotes the first half of the course to showing that Augustine is a proto-phenomenologist more concerned with the *how* of enactment than the *what* of content: "The primacy of the relational sense, or of the sense of enactment, is remarkable." § 10. For this reading, § 9 is central. At the end of § 13a, Heidegger even suggests that Augustine's method of confessing (*confiteri*) is interpretive; we can see that this points forward to Heidegger's own hermeneutic phenomenology.

¹⁰ Note the English translators render Heidegger's word for *cura*, *Bekümmern*, as "concern" to differentiate it from the word for *cura*, *Sorge*, in *Being and Time*. But since both German terms translate the same Latin term, we will quietly change all translations of *Bekümmern* to "care."

¹¹ § 12 a.

¹² Here Heidegger uses *Being and Time*'s key term, *das Eigentliche*.

In the *defluxus*, factual life forms out of itself, and for itself, a very determinate direction of its possible situations, which are themselves awaited in the *defluxus: delectatio finis curae*. Now this *curare* has a relational sense which changes in the historical-factual complex of life. It is enacted as *timere* and *desiderare*, as fearing (retreating from) and desiring (taking into oneself, giving oneself over to). The *multum* is the manifold, the many significances in which I live.¹³

These conflicts are not theoretically taken in but are lived through as a matter of care; fearing and desiring are not experienced indifferently but as either good or bad, a cause of joy or sorrow.¹⁴ Now, dispersion into the many is recollected into an authentic unity in continence (*continentia*) understood as moderation and not abstinence.¹⁵ Such dispersion of life and its corresponding call to continence are not occasional but continuous. God commands us to endure (*tolerare*) “molestias et difficultates,” troubles and difficulties.¹⁶ Again paraphrasing Augustine, although equally speaking in his own voice, Heidegger writes, “...life is nothing but a constant temptation.”¹⁷ Factual life is this laborious historical oscillation between the world and the authentic. The significance of this oscillation is that it is only in the authentic that God is given: “In the concern for the selfly life, God is there.”¹⁸

In the text, Heidegger notes the connection of care to use (*uti*) as dealing-with.¹⁹ Oskar Becker’s notes for the course, included as the second appendix to the published text, flesh out this connection. There Heidegger says that use and enjoyment, *uti* and *frui*, constitute care. In *frui* we enjoy the eternal God, but in *uti* we use something for the sake of *frui*. Referring to *De Doctrina Christiana*, he characterizes the basic difference between use and enjoyment as follows: “In enjoyment, we are said to possess eternal and unchangeable things. The appropriate comportment to the other things is *uti*, since precisely through this, we will attain to the *frui* of what is genuine.”²⁰ Heidegger says that enjoyment is

¹³ § 12 b. Heidegger makes use of the triple schematism of intentionality introduced in winter semester 1919-1920. These are the relating sense, content sense, and enactment sense. See Kisiel, *The Genesis*, 493.

¹⁴ § 12 b.

¹⁵ It is crucial for Heidegger’s analysis that conflict remains. Consequently, this “moderation” is not to be understood as an Aristotelian virtue in which the passions are integrated.

¹⁶ § 12 a.

¹⁷ § 12 a. Cf. *Confessiones*, X.28(39).

¹⁸ Appendix II, n. 6. Translation modified. See also § 12 b.

¹⁹ § 12 b, n. 127.

²⁰ Appendix II, n. 2.

the “basic characteristic of the Augustinian *basic posture toward life itself*.”²¹ Everything in the world is for the sake of (*uti*) enjoyment of God (*frui* or *delectatio*). Care, then, as the structure of experience, is a striving (*appetitus*) for enjoyment.²² He sees temptation as rooted within enjoyment itself and its basic twofold possibility of dispersion or continence (*defluxus* or *continentia*). Thus, when something that should be used becomes an object of enjoyment, the soul is dispersed. By contrast, in continence the soul holds itself in an authentic unity.

b. Temptations and the fear of the Lord

We recall that Heidegger is interested in a new understanding of the human being in light of the universal problematic of constitution or intentionality. In the possibility of temptation (*tentatio*), he finds the ground for intentionality. There are three temptations or directions of dispersion.²³ The division into three temptations comes from the First Letter of John: desire of the flesh, desire of the eyes, and ambition of the world.²⁴ Heidegger, following Augustine, offers a phenomenological explication of each. He is careful to call attention to the fact that Augustine’s analyses are not objective or theoretical but rather flow from his factual existential manner of enactment; in other words, it flows from “how” he

²¹ § 12 b, n. 127. Because its correlate is the *pulchritudo*, it has an “aesthetic moment.” Though Heidegger sees this aesthetic meaning as a Neo-Platonic influence, he is careful to differentiate Christian *fruitio* from the Plotinian intuition because the Christian understanding is “rooted in the peculiarly Christian view of factual life.”

²² Later in the course, Heidegger makes this amplification: “In all experience as *curare*, the basic tendency of *delectatio* (*uti—frui*), a *curare* characterized in different ways, is co-present, thus co-present is always a certain *appetitus*, as striving for something” § 14 a.

²³ § 13 a.

²⁴ *concupiscentia carnis, concupiscentia oculorum, ambitio saeculi*. 1 John 2:15-17. It should be noted, though Heidegger does not do so, that the three temptations are not treated simply in the final pages of Book X but in fact play an ordering role throughout the *Confessiones*. See Frederick J. Crosson, “Structure and Meaning in St. Augustine’s *Confessions*,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 63 (1989): 84-97.

experienced them and still now experiences them.²⁵ Each of these is a “direction of the possibility” of dispersion.²⁶

(1) Dispersion in the direction of the surrounding-worldly: Heidegger takes the **desire of the flesh** to be “the *dealing-with* that enjoys.”²⁷ This dispersion takes the form of “absorption,”²⁸ in which the object of enjoyment, through each of the five senses, becomes the preoccupation of the self. Consequently, the self as self is passed over and loses itself in what it enjoys.

(2) Dispersion in the direction of the communal-worldly: **Desire of the eyes** is the “curious *looking-about-oneself* that only wishes to get to know.” In this temptation, the content of the intention is not dealt-with as it is in desire of the flesh. Rather, the relation to the object is one of a distanced looking in such a way that the self is not engaged.²⁹ Anticipating *Being and Time*’s analysis of curiosity, he defines this seeing as a theoretical interest focused solely on objectivity: “[T]he ‘seeing’ is: only looking at, considering, bringing to one’s cognizing givenness, letting something become an object for oneself as the object of mere taking-cognizance-of.”³⁰ Here again it is the surrounding world and not the self that is the focus; the self is not had in this looking-about.

(3) Dispersion in the direction of the self-worldly: The third form of temptation, **ambition of the world**, has the self as its focus in a supposedly authentic sense. It is “with” the self in such a way that “the *self-significance* becomes *finis delectationis* [the end of delight].”³¹ The self at issue, though, is the

²⁵ § 13 a -b. Cf. Appendix I, on § 15 a. Heidegger cautions that the treatment of temptations in chapters 30 and following are not “the mere hair-splitting reflections of a pedantic moralizer” but need to be understood out of the basic question of experiencing God himself. § 12 b.

²⁶ § 13 a. In the winter semester 1920-21 lecture course, Heidegger formally articulates “world” in three directions: the surrounding world, communal world, and self-world. § 3. Here in the summer semester 1921 lecture course, the temptations are paired with these three senses.

²⁷ § 15 a.

²⁸ In the winter semester 1920-21 lecture course, Heidegger analyzes the phenomenon of absorption in connection with the “attitudinal” as opposed to the “phenomenological” understanding. The attitudinal understanding objectifies and severs the original, living relation because it overlooks the self: “... I focus away from *myself* toward the *matter*.” § 9a. Such an attitude is derivative and flows from a “tendency” of factual life to fall into objects. § 9c, § 4.

²⁹ § 14 a.

³⁰ § 14 b. Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, 18th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001), *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962), 171/215.

³¹ § 15 a.

self of the communal world, not the self in the authentic sense.³² One struggles to be loved or feared by others. In such a struggle, the “self is lost for itself in its ownmost way.” One strives to be pleasing before others as a good “supposedly one is and has in oneself” even though such a good is a gift from God.³³

By yielding to one of these directions of temptation, God is lost as an object.³⁴ For it is only through the complex enactment of love and fear of God that the self is had and God is given, and temptation pulls one away from the possibility of love of God and a proper fear of God towards dispersion in the many. Heidegger says that it is no discrete act or acts that present God, but only the complexity of an authentic factual existence. With Augustine, he distinguishes two kinds of fear, an impure fear (*timor non castus*) and a pure fear (*timor castus*). In impure fear, which is also called servile fear (*timor servilis*), God is not loved in himself but is loved because of fear of punishment. By contrast, in a pure fear, God is loved for himself and what is feared is not the loss of any good other than the majesty of God.

The first fear (*timor servilis*), the “fear of the world” (from out of the surrounding world and the communal world), is the anxiousness that grips and overwhelms a person.—By contrast, *timor castus* is the “selfly fear” that is motivated in authentic hope, in the trust that is enlivened from out of itself. This fear forms itself within myself from out of the relation in which I experience the world, in connection with life’s care for authentic self-experience.³⁵

Heidegger thus interprets Augustine’s distinction of two fears in light of the temptation to fall from authenticity to inauthenticity. Kisiel calls pure fear the “precursor” of *Being and Time*’s analysis of anxiety.³⁶ In fact, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger himself will point to Augustine’s distinction between two fears as significant for his analysis of *Befindlichkeit*, disposition.³⁷

³² § 15 b.

³³ § 15 d.

³⁴ Appendix II, note 7.

³⁵ Appendix II, note 7. Translation modified.

³⁶ Kisiel, *The Genesis*, 490.

³⁷ Heidegger notes that Scheler follows Augustine and Pascal in taking love as a disposition. *Being and Time*, 139/178. He also notes Augustine’s treatment of *timor castus* and *servilis*. *Being and Time*, 190/235 note iv.

c. ‘Molestia’ as facticity

Heidegger’s explication now takes a step beyond Augustine’s own program, thematizing the three forms of temptation in light of *molestia*, facticity. In fact, he says that “the *tentatio* in our interpretation” has been “but an opportunity to lead toward decisive phenomena—*molestia*.”³⁸ The different senses of *molestia* determine the three forms of temptation, but Heidegger says he is going further than Augustine himself, because Augustine’s axiologization largely passes over the connection.³⁹ Augustine’s analysis of temptation gives important but undeveloped indications that *molestia* is the *how* of experiencing. What interests Heidegger most is the *possibility* experienced in a temptation—that *molestia* “can” pull life down. Here *possibility* is experienced, and its corresponding conflict of care is the very opening of Dasein: “Experiencing possibility, living in the open, keeping open, opening authentically.”⁴⁰ He distinguishes the meaning of *molestia* as an “objective burden” from the sense he has in mind as an “opportunity” or an “*existential* possibility” for authentic self-possession.⁴¹

The connection, then, between temptation and *molestia* is possibility: “*Possibility* is the true ‘burden.’”⁴² This possibility is the strife in which I live, my facticity: “*Life = temptation (Vita = tentatio)*.” This possibility increases (1) the more fully care lives its directions of experience and (2) the more the “being” of such a life is had through coming to itself.⁴³ Both of these features come together in the mineness of historical facticity: “Now the life in which something like *molestia* can be experienced at all ... is a life whose being is *grounded* in a radical having-of-oneself. It is a having-of-oneself that takes effect only in enactment, and fully only in *its* historical facticity.”⁴⁴ In the “having-of-oneself” that is

³⁸ Appendix I, note on § 13 g.

³⁹ § 15 b.

⁴⁰ Appendix I, note to § 12 a.

⁴¹ Appendix I, note to § 13 a, b.

⁴² Appendix I, note to § 12 a.

⁴³ § 17 a.

⁴⁴ § 17 a.

molestia, there is simultaneously the possibility of falling and the “opportunity”⁴⁵ to arrive at “the *being* of its ownmost life.”⁴⁶

I can never appeal to a moment that is shut down, as it were, in which I supposedly penetrate myself. Already the next moment can make me fall, and expose me as someone entirely different. For this reason, insofar as the having-myself can be enacted at all, it is always in the pull away from and toward this life, a to and fro.⁴⁷

Molestia is not a burden to be overcome through asceticism but an “opportunity for earnestness.”⁴⁸ The suffering of possibilities in temptation sounds a fundamental theme from *Being and Time*, namely anxiety before the possibilities one is thrown into: “The falling, the ability to fall and the future of falling, increase the anxiety and reveal: I learn (*disco*)!” Experience is uncertain; it is an historical and existential affair. With temptation, one finds oneself “between these possibilities that impose themselves, and over which one does not reign.”⁴⁹ Such thrownness is the heart of factual life. Though he thinks Augustine did not investigate the connection of temptation and facticity, Heidegger does say that Augustine clearly understood the “anxiety-producing character” of the facticity of Dasein.⁵⁰

d. Anticipations of ‘Being and Time’

In *Being and Time* six years later, care, temptation, and facticity take on systematic significance. Heidegger is at great pains to overthrow the modern worldless subject by elucidating the human manner of existence as ever bound up with the world, as being-in-the-world. Care becomes understood as the basic character of such an existence. Augustinian care, oriented toward delight in God, is now oriented to the phenomenon of being. In the lecture course’s analysis of the three forms of temptation or directions of dispersion, we find the basis of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein and the falling from authenticity into

⁴⁵ Heidegger calls opportunity a “character of enactment.” Appendix I, note § 13 a, b.

⁴⁶ § 17 b.

⁴⁷ § 13 d.

⁴⁸ *Gelegenheit des Ernstes*. Appendix I, note to § 17. Translation modified.

⁴⁹ Appendix I, note to § 12 a. “Conflict within factual life itself—in the *deflere*—the unrest—being thrown (*das Geworfenwerden*).”

⁵⁰ § 16.

the anonymity of the they.⁵¹ In the lecture course, while discussing desire of the flesh, Heidegger anticipates *Being and Time*'s analysis of inauthenticity as follows:

The *Dasein*, the self, the being-real of life, is an absorption. The self is being lived by the world, and all the more strongly so if it in fact thinks that it lives authentically in such existence [*Dasein*]. This "being-lived" is a special How of facticity, and can only be explicated on the basis of the authentic sense of existence [*Existenz*].⁵²

At issue is the very character of our pre-theoretical existence, and *Being and Time*'s analysis of *Dasein* expounds this along lines opened by Heidegger's reading of Augustine. Thus, before the modern Cartesian tradition of the *cogito*, Heidegger finds in Augustine a vital and complex account of factual life with resources for approaching the question of being.

II. DIVERGENCE: THE QUESTION OF AXIOLOGY

Despite these important Augustinian moments in Heidegger's philosophizing, there are yet important divergences. In the lecture course, Heidegger criticizes the axiologic dimension of Augustine and rejects the concept of the highest good (*summum bonum*). He hints at this intention in the full title of the course "Augustine and Neo-Platonism." Though he never arrives at an interpretation of Neo-Platonism but expends all his energies on Augustine, he seeks to extricate Augustinian facticity from Augustine's commitment to a Neo-Platonic hierarchy of goods. Thus, what Heidegger thinks needs to be suppressed is precisely that which his fellow phenomenologist Max Scheler had recovered from Augustine.⁵³

a. Axiology

⁵¹ In the winter semester 1921-22 lecture course on Aristotle, the themes of care, temptation, and facticity continue. Heidegger repeats the analysis of the three forms of temptation as inclination, distance, and sequestration. He intends to grasp their basis in the movement of ruination, which echoes the Latin *ruina*, decay, a theme from the Augustine course.

⁵² § 15 a.

⁵³ Appendix I, note on § 17. Since Augustine roots the hierarchy in his concrete metaphysics, Heidegger thinks it is not as "removed" as it is in Scheler. Appendix II, note 3. In this regard, Heidegger also criticizes Franz Brentano's combination of a phenomenology of "emotional acts" and an axiology. Such a combination runs counter to the task of phenomenology. Appendix II, note 6.

Heidegger says that Augustine was not able to grasp the connection between temptation and facticity. He did not see that “the selfly *Dasein*, the existence, bears in different ways a *molestia*, is attached to it, and thus determines itself in its facticity.”⁵⁴ Instead, he says, Augustine interpreted the phenomena in an axiologizing manner as a preference of values.⁵⁵ For Augustine, a temptation is a pull away from resting in God to resting in a lesser good. A temptation shifts “the *cura* from its direction toward *summum bonum*” towards a lesser *bonum*.⁵⁶ In what Heidegger calls axiologization, a hierarchy of goods is theoretically posited, and a kind of preferring or calculation takes place among them: “Through the axiologization, the character of calculation, leveling, and ordering posits itself in the self-conception, interpretation, and conceptuality ..., that is, the authentic care is disfigured and viewed as concealed calculation.”⁵⁷ The problem with axiologization is that it is a “concealed giving-in” which avoids the terrible, the difficult, and the questionable in the direction of delight and comfort.⁵⁸ Rather than such calculation, he wants to understand the phenomenon as the “existential concern”⁵⁹ of a historical self.⁶⁰ Mentioning Luther,⁶¹ he names this concern with the Latin *iustitia*, which he defines as “the authentically and originally sense-like directedness..., in its entirety, of the factual experience of significance.”⁶² In existential care, there is a conflict between two directions of loving and the emphasis is on the very

⁵⁴ § 15 b.

⁵⁵ Appendix I, note on § 15 b-d.

⁵⁶ § 15 c.

⁵⁷ Appendix I, note on § 15 c.

⁵⁸ Appendix I, note on § 17 and note on § 15 b-d. In this regard, Heidegger calls Catholicism “an inferior bustling activity,” because he says it avoids the earnestness of facticity for delight and comfort. Appendix I, note on § 17.

⁵⁹ Appendix I, note on § 15 b-d.

⁶⁰ Appendix I, note on Four Groups of Problems.

⁶¹ Heidegger sought an Augustine shorn from Greek philosophy, a Lutheran Augustine. Oscar Becker’s notes record an excursus in which Heidegger roots the *summum bonum* in the patristic and Platonic interpretation of Romans 1:20: “For the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” Heidegger thinks that only the early Luther of the Heidelberg dissertation “really understood this passage for the first time.” Appendix II, note 3. Heidegger paraphrases Luther’s rejection of a metaphysical interpretation of the passage: “The presentation [*Vorgabe*] of the object of theology is not attained by way of a metaphysical consideration of the world.” Yet aside from this prohibition, he does not provide a positive exegesis of the verse.

⁶² § 15 d. Heidegger identifies three characteristics of Augustine’s analysis of sin: theoretical, aesthetic (sin is ugly), and enactment. The final character is the “decisive” one. Appendix II, note 4.

character or how of the endurance of the temptation. Rather than flee the factual, one must ever again confront it. The axiological interpretation misses the full force of the phenomenon.⁶³

b. Aristotle's 'for-the-sake-of-which'

Heidegger says that Augustine's axiologization is ultimately Platonic in origin,⁶⁴ and already in the 1921 lecture course Heidegger betrays his preference for Aristotle over Plato. For Augustine, temptation is a falling or failure of attention away from the object of the whole desire to a fleeting and discrete object of desire, but for Heidegger temptation rather reveals the basic labor of existence between authenticity and inauthenticity. In this, he tends more toward a certain feature of Aristotelian philosophy and a prudence (*phronesis*) not so much concerned with the good life as with authenticity.⁶⁵ In a footnote in *Being and Time*, he indicates the shift to Aristotle in his interpretation of Augustinian care:

The way in which "care" is viewed in the foregoing existential analytic of Dasein, is one which has grown upon the author in connection with his attempts to interpret the Augustinian (i.e., Helleno-Christian) anthropology with regard to the foundational principles reached in the ontology of Aristotle.⁶⁶

Now, in our lecture course, there is little indication that the interpretation of Augustine is being driven by foundational principles of Aristotelian ontology, though it is clear that it is actively set against Platonic metaphysics.⁶⁷ Nonetheless, the interpretation that is enacted is as it were ready-made for the Aristotelian categories operative in *Being and Time*. Though he does not make the identification, the basic use-enjoyment structure of care, purged of its relation to the highest good, is close to Aristotle's determination of the good as the for-the-sake-of-which (*hou heneka*). In *Being and Time*, the good is repeatedly taken to

⁶³ Axiologization passes over the original dialectic of authenticity and inauthenticity. As such, ambition of the world is misinterpreted as a resting in the self whereas it is in fact only the communal-worldly self that emerges. § 16.

⁶⁴ Appendix II, note 3.

⁶⁵ But see Aristotle's hint of authenticity in *Nicomachean Ethics*, X.7, 1178a1-3.

⁶⁶ *Being and Time*, 199/243 note vii.

⁶⁷ Heidegger does call our attention to the connection of authenticity to Aristotle's *ousia* and the *tode ti*. § 12 b.

be Aristotle's for-the-sake-of-which, that is, a "practical" good, and not the Platonic good.⁶⁸ Care, determined primarily as being "ahead-of-itself" means that Dasein always is "for the sake of itself."⁶⁹

c. Augustinian desire

I think Heidegger's view of the good misses the full Platonic-Augustinian understanding of philosophic-theologic *eros* and the good it discloses. On the basis of his view of the good, it seems no irruption of the other in desire is possible. That is, his interpretation of desire does not go beyond *need*, in which the desire folds back upon the self. For Augustine, however, spiritual desire, in contrast to other desires, is always exceeded in fulfillment; it thus ecstatically disrupts the for-the-sake-of-which of the self.⁷⁰ Consequently, his hierarchy of goods is not the result of a theoretical value-projection on the part of the subject. Rather, differences in goods are disclosed through the historical enactment of desire and the basic differences in fulfillment: certain desired goods, when attained, are loved less, and certain desired goods, when attained, are loved more. The former fall short of desire's expectation, the latter exceed it.⁷¹ The difference that distinguishes goods, then, is the very enactmental character of love in desire's fulfillment.

Now, on the Augustinian analysis, love seeks to rest in what is loved.⁷² The first mode of desire, ever frustrated, yields no rest for the heart, but the second mode of desire, ever exceeded, yields rest for the heart in its ecstatic fulfillment. The use-enjoyment division merely reflects Augustine's experience of

⁶⁸ Aristotle introduces it in conscious opposition to Plato. See *Nicomachean Ethics*, I.6-7, 1096a17-1097a24. Heidegger follows only one of the senses of Aristotle's *hou heneka*. For Aristotle, *hou heneka* ambiguously referred not only to the good that we who use things are but also to the good of each thing itself, its *telos*. *Physics*, I.2, 194a34-194b1. In § 15 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger does hint at the good of each thing, but this is limited to artifacts. 70/99.

⁶⁹ *Being and Time*, 236/279. Dasein is oriented towards itself: "In Dasein's being, the context of references or assignments which significance implies is tied up with Dasein's ownmost being—a being which essentially can have no involvement, but which is rather that being *for the sake of which* Dasein itself is as it is." *Being and Time*, 123/160.

⁷⁰ *De Doctrina Christiana*, I.42.

⁷¹ This Augustinian theme finds recent expression in Jean-Luc Marion. See, among other things, "The Saturated Phenomenon," *Philosophy Today* 40 (1996): 103-124, and *In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena*, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002).

⁷² For this and what follows, see *Confessiones*, Book IV, chapters 10-12.

this difference. Such a difference would not be possible to determine prior to experience, but only careful experience could disclose it. Such differentiation, then, is wholly historical and not axiological as Heidegger understands the term. Moreover, it is this experienced difference itself that grants significance to factual life and its movement toward authenticity in God. For Augustine, then, temptations are resisted not through calculation, but through fidelity to one's self, one's history, and the God who reveals himself through both.

CONCLUSION

Heidegger returns to Augustine to find a richer explication of the historicity of the self than that afforded by Descartes and Husserl. In this, he is careful to extricate Augustine from his Greek philosophical influences, which he takes to be basically Platonic. By doing so, he hopes to recover the facticity of life prior to theorization and calculation. We argued, though, that Heidegger's axiological interpretation of Augustine misses the fact that the hierarchy of goods is given in experience. Augustinian desire — and the division of goods it discloses — is historically enacted; by consequence, Augustine's struggles against temptations were not the result of calculation but the continuous historical struggle for fidelity to his ownmost desire for the happy life.

Heidegger offers a powerful and insightful reading of Augustine that helps bring to the fore much of what is most original in Augustine's philosophizing. His interpretation, though, does not reach a properly temporal level of analysis at this point in his development. Allow me to conclude by drawing some speculative parallels between the structure of the *Confessions* and *Being and Time*. Heidegger's lecture course on *Confessions*, Book X, belongs to the first division of *Being and Time*, the preparatory analysis of Dasein's being-in-the-world. What remains is to turn to the next book: Augustine's analysis of time as the distention of the soul (*distentio animi*) in *Confessions*, Book XI, and Heidegger's temporal analysis of Dasein in the second division of *Being and Time*, both of which belong together.⁷³ We would

⁷³ The editor of the summer semester 1921 lecture course reports that Heidegger bundled some notes from the course, particularly on the issue of temptation, apparently for his winter semester 1930-31

then see even more clearly that for both Augustine and Heidegger we humans are not simply one class of beings among others, but, as the very openings of presence, we are wholly unique and worthy of questioning: *Quaestio mihi factus sum. Quid amo?*⁷⁴

seminar, “Augustine, *Confessiones* XI (on time).” *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 260. Both Jean-François Lyotard and Paul Ricoeur maintain that Augustine is the source for every subsequent phenomenology of time, Heidegger’s included. Lyotard, *The Confession of Augustine*, trans. Richard Beardsworth (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000), 73; Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 16.

⁷⁴ “I am made a question to myself. What do I love?” This is Heidegger’s paraphrase of Augustine. § 17 b. Cf. *Confessiones*, X, 6(8) and 33(50).