Democracy Without Preference

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I. INTRODUCTION

I s democracy fundamentally a competitive or a cooperative
endeavor?[1] Some voters, both elected representatives and pri-
vate citizens, base their votes on parochial interests or desires,
while the votes of others are shaped by the apparent best interests
of the whole political community. Which of these, if either, is the
proper task of the democratic voter? It is a separate question how
one morally ought to vote, since it is a separate question whether
and how democracy imposes any moral requirements or bestows
any moral legitimacy. I do not address the moral question directly
in this paper. Instead, I want to ask which of these tasks, if either,
is given by the idea of democracy.

The idea of democracy is a contested matter, but I shall take its
core to be rule by the people by way of voting. This is not to say
that voting is the most important democratic political activity prac-
tically, but only conceptually. Other features of democratic life,
such as free expression, political participation, and equal considera-
tion get their democratic credentials (though these are not their
only moral ground) from an association with popular rule through
voting.

Is the Wisconsin senator's task to promote, say, the dairy in-

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dustry without taking into account the impact on the economies of
other states? It could reasonably be argued that the public interest
is best served if voters (representatives or direct voters) do not try,
individually, to promote it. Perhaps they should, instead, do the
best that can be done for themselves or their constituency, and the
competition between the interests of constituencies will, if power is
distributed equally, produce the socially best outcome.

At least in some contexts, the adversarial (or Invisible Hand)
argument is plausible. Recently, the predominant models of demo-
cratic choice have been of this variety. Social choice theory, in fact,
has been developed largely by liberal welfare economists, whose
stock in trade is the Invisible Hand of the perfect free market and
its close, imperfect, variants.[2] Some of their work is meant to apply
mainly in the economic sphere, but much of it is explicitly meant as
a contribution to the theory of democratic, political, social choice
where one participates by voting rather than trading.[3]

Most of the many theoretical interpretations currently employed
describe a vote as an expression of a *preference*. This reflects, in
many cases, adherence to something like an Invisible Hand model
of democratic social choice. However, different theorists use
"preference" to mean different things. I shall argue that under
any acceptable interpretation, votes must be aggregable, advoca-
tive, and active. *The heart of the argument below is the attempt to demon-
strate the failure of preference interpretations to meet these three conditions.*
The paper ends with arguments in favor of interpreting votes not
as any sort of expression of individual preferences, but rather as
statements that certain policies are in the common interest. This
distinctively Rousseauean proposal may not be acceptable in every

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[2] I have in mind, for example, the work of Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice
and Individual Values* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1951,
1963 (First and Second Editions)); I. M. D. Little, "Social Choice and Indi-
vidual Values," *Journal of Political Economy* 60 (1952), pp. 422–432; A. K.
Sen, *Collective and Social Welfare* (San Francisco, Calif.: Holden-Day, 1970,
currently published by North-Holland, Amsterdam).

[3] "First, it will be assumed that we wish to treat *candidates* equally. . . .
Second, we wish that all *voters* should be treated equally; *we are seeking to
model democracy.*" Kenneth Arrow, "Current Developments in the Theory
of Social Choice," *Social Research* 44 (1977), pp. 607–622. Reprinted in
Brian Barry and Russell Hardin, eds., *Rational Man and Irrational Society?*
(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 252–263. Quotation
from p. 252 in Barry and Hardin, my emphasis.

way; that is not my claim. This interpretation is shown to succeed where several of the most tempting interpretations could not, namely in meeting the three conditions, Aggregability, Advocacy, and Activity. Should this concluding positive argument be thought to fail, the prospects for an acceptable understanding of the task of the voter are all the more dim. Before enunciating and defending the three conditions on theoretical interpretations of voting, it must be considered whether such interpretation is necessary at all.

We may distinguish two senses of "interpretation of voting": *empirical* and *theoretical.* An empirical interpretation of voting is an interpretation of actual performances of the act of voting. There will be many true descriptions of any act of voting, some of which would be more relevant for democratic theory than others. The kind of interpretation I shall be considering, however, is not empirical, but theoretical.[4]

A theoretical interpretation asks, "what kind of action is referred to in a good theory of democracy by the term 'vote'?" A theorist of democracy, working before anyone had ever voted on anything, would have no voting acts which could be empirically interpreted. Still, the theory would include voting, and we might reasonably ask what sort of action voting should be in that theory. This cannot be assumed to be the same as what the voter ought to do. That is a separate question, whose answer depends on a prior theoretical interpretation of voting. Whether one ought, morally or prudentially, to vote honestly, or even vote at all, partly depends on what voting is—on the theoretical interpretation of voting.

This second, theoretical kind of interpretation of voting is, however, parasitic on the first, empirical kind. For example, to interpret votes theoretically as being expressions of interests is to assert that *in a properly working democracy* votes would be (empirically

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[4]The idea of an interpretation of a vote is not just mine. Rousseau offers a theory which sees votes as opinions on the General Will. Arrow assumes that votes express preferences. Wollheim argues that votes are ought-judgments. (J. J. Rousseau, *On The Social Contract* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983); Arrow, 1951, 1963, *op. cit.*; Richard Wollheim, "A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy," *Philosophy, Politics, and Society*, 2nd series, ed. P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1962).) Still, these say nothing about what an interpretation of a vote is.

interpretable as) expressions of interest. Theoretical interpretations assert the appropriateness of certain empirical interpretations in a properly working democracy. These are not, however, empirical claims; they are claims about what sorts of social choice procedures are democratic.

Why does democratic theory need a theoretical interpretation of voting? It is important, first, whether *any* adequate interpretation is possible. If no adequate interpretation were possible, or consistent with the concept of democracy, then no argument could be made that a policy's being passed by majority vote conveys any justification or legitimacy on it. If votes express interests, desires, choices, ought-judgments, opinions or some such thing, then one can sensibly investigate the relation between majority rule and moral or other normative requirements. Suppose we said a vote is just a tool; it can be used by the voter in any way he or she pleases, to express desires, opinions, etc. All that matters is the bottom line — voting for x merely increases the chances of x's being enacted. This account of the matter shows that we can still *imagine* democratic social choice without assuming any interpretation. Still, it is difficult to see what could be said in favor of democratic choice on this account unless we know what a person is supposed to be doing in voting.

Consider two kinds of argument that votes need no interpretation in order to engage with moral theory.[5] The first argument notes that we needn't interpret votes in order to see that a system of making social decisions by voting will result in less outright physical conflict than would be seen in a system where each individual simply exerts whatever force is available in order to influence the course of events. A similar rationale might support giving two continually fighting children mallets made out of foam rubber, in order to channel their violence into a less destructive form. According to this view, it is this reduction of violent conflict that morally recommends democratic choice, and no interpretation of voting seems to be implied or required.

Yet, this view cannot really do without any interpretation of voting. Under what conditions can the combatants be expected to

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[5]The importance of these alternatives was made clear to me in a discussion with Robert Adams and Marilyn Adams.

contain their efforts within these less violent bounds? Those who fare better under the restricted form of battle can be expected to stay with it as long as others do, but those who fare less well than they would if they resorted to more forceful means might be expected expeditiously to return to their wooden bats while the others are still fighting with only toys. Why would the physically and otherwise more powerful members of a society limit themselves to voting when they can apparently do better with a real fight? A powerful state, whatever its form, can reduce conflict as compared with the level of conflict in the mythical state of nature. However, to whatever extent democratic procedures are *especially* effective at preempting violent struggle, it must be owing to the prevalence in the society of a certain view, or theory of democracy according to which voting can be expected to yield outcomes that are fair, or optimal, or some such thing. Unless the participants believe that democratic choice has something else to recommend it, it will not have the virtue of preempting violent conflict, and there can be nothing else to recommend it without some interpretation of voting. So far, of course, this says little about what the *proper* interpretation is; that is the question I propose to take up.

The second way f denying the need for any theoretical interpretation of voting is to argue that majority rule, or some similar voting procedure, can be shown to be a *fair or just* way of making social choices, even without worrying about what votes mean. For example, in Rawlsian fashion, perhaps such a method would be agreed to in an initial position of fairness. However, on Rawls's view (which is the most fully articulated version of the sort of theory in question) this would be plausible only if there were no alternative under which all groups could expect to do better. What about the alternative of having choices made by experts in, say, economics and sociology? In order to be recommended to those in the original position, democratic choice must be shown to have a certain tendency to improve the situation of all groups, or at least a greater tendency than such alternatives. How could such a claim about a voting procedure be sustained without a theory of the nature of voting? Indeed, Rawls himself denies that the democratic pedigree of a decision gives it any special authority. Democratic choice is to be recommended to the extent that it has the property of arriving at arrangements which themselves are just on independent grounds. Democratic choice, in Rawls's view (and in his termi-

nology) yields no pure procedural justice.[6] Democracy's creden-
tials as a perfect or imperfect procedure must, it seems, include a
theoretical interpretation of voting.

These considerations support the need for a theoretical inter-
pretation of voting. However, it is not only important that *some*
interpretation of voting be possible. The adequate interpreta-
tion(s) will almost certainly have further consequences for both
political theory and our understanding of actual democratic prac-
tice (though I do not consider any in this paper). If, for example,
the only adequate interpretation of a vote is that it is a statement
on the common interest (though this is stronger than the claim I
defend below), then further questions are raised about what
common interests are, their possibility and likelihood, their dis-
coverability (in theory and practice), the justification of pursuing
them contrary to the minority's opinion, etc. It is not as though
there were a theory of democratic social choice into which one
could simply plug in any desired interpretation of voting without
significantly affecting the rest of the theory. The interpretation of
voting is an important part of a theory of democracy.

II. THE THREE A'S

The following three conditions are constraints placed by the
concept of democracy on any adequate theoretical interpretation
of voting.

The Aggregability Condition

Democratic social choices must be determined by the cumulative
impact of multiple inputs.[7] Consider a rule which is constructed by
listing all possible sets of inputs in one column, and then in an
adjacent column randomly entering various possible social choices.

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[6]*A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971),
pp. 356–381.

[7]"Cumulative" does not imply that the inputs are in any sense "cardi-
nal," since the number of those voters with a certain ordinal ranking can
be compared with the number of those with another ordinal ranking. This
is to consider these rankings cumulatively. In the present sense, even
Arrow's thorough ordinalism (*op. cit.*, 1951, 1963) treats similar inputs
cumulatively.

A rule that assigns to each set of inputs the social choice which happens to be next to it in the random list does not consider similar inputs cumulatively, and this alone disqualifies it as a democratic choice procedure.

Relevantly similar inputs should be considered cumulatively in a democratic procedure, but inputs which are similar in some ways can be different in others. Being cast on the same day, or in the same town, are extraneous sorts of similarity from the standpoint of democratic social choice. While votes could be aggregated, in the sense of being counted, according to some such criterion of similarity, votes which addressed the issue at hand in the same way would not necessarily be counted together. The appropriate kind of similarity is similarity with regard to the issue at hand in a given case of social choice. Inputs are similar in the relevant way if they stand in the same relation to the issue they address.

For any two votes that are aggregable they take either the same position or different positions on the issue, and votes that take the same position as each other are relevantly similar for the purposes of democratic choice. Two votes cannot be said to take the same or different positions on an issue unless they both take *some* position on that issue. The Aggregability Condition requires just this: *there must be some single issue on which, for any pair of the inputs, they take either the same or a different position.* This can be less awkwardly, though also less accurately, stated as follows: two inputs are relevantly similar if they constitute the same answer to the question posed by the choice procedure, and they are aggregable as long as they constitute answers to the same socially posed question at all. This "social question" analogy is useful but only approximate since desires, for example, can address the same issue, and so can be aggregable in the present sense, even though desires, not being acts at all, are never themselves answers to questions. The question analogy also supposes that there *is* a socially posed question, and this need not be literally true. The "social question" analogy, then, is intended only as a shorthand device for representing what it is for inputs to address the same issue.

The Advocacy Condition

Democratic inputs must be for or against certain choices, as distinct from being just opinions that something is the case. Later I

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will argue that some opinions can be for or against things in the required way, but the opinion that the moon is made of green cheese, for example, is not for or against anything, and so cannot be a democratic input. A survey is often different from a voting procedure in this way. Votes, I shall say for now, advocate certain choices (though this gloss of the Advocacy Condition will be refined in Section V). To advocate something, say x, is to be *for* it, and to be against x is to be for not-x. Therefore, inputs can be advocative by being *either* for or against some policy.

If democratic inputs were not advocative, then even a unanimous outcome would be indeterminate as to which social choice is called for. Consider this example: there is a tribe whose social choice of where to dig a well is based on a poll of individual opinions as to where there is water. This may seem democratic, but only if we assume that the social choice would be to dig where the people expected water to lie. But suppose the governors' choice were intentionally to dig far away from the suspected location of water, perhaps out of meanness, or as an attempt to undo the regime by creating a shortage. This choice, too, would be *based on* the individuals' opinions on the location of water. If the inputs are only opinions on the location of water, neither choice is any more faithful to the inputs than the other. There is no way to judge the faithfulness of a social choice to these inputs because opinions on the location of water are not, *by themselves*, for or against anything. It may be objected that in such a case as the tribe in search of water, the context could make it clear that a statement on the location of water is also an act of advocating digging there. However, these inputs *would* then be advocative; they would not be counter-examples to the Advocacy Condition, since they *meet* it.

The presence of advocative inputs, those which are for or against some choice, does not immediately solve the sort of problem raised by the case of the tribe and the water. A social choice could still be based on acts which advocate some choice by choosing to do the opposite of what is advocated. It is a condition on democratic social choice procedures that the social choice is based on the votes *in the sense of doing what is advocated* (rather than, say, the opposite). This condition on democratic social choice *procedures* necessitates an Advocacy Condition on democratic *inputs*.

The Advocacy Condition, then, requires just this: that the inputs be "off the fence" that most simple statements are on. If this can be

accomplished without inputs being straightforward acts of advocacy, that will suffice. The name "Advocacy Condition" will be retained in any case to recognize the measure of truth in the association in ordinary language of "voting" with advocacy.[8]

Ballots in real social choice procedures could perhaps include the possibility of something labelled "none of the above," and it might be thought that this is a problem for the Advocacy Condition. If this option received a large majority, either the social choice would be not to enact any of the other alternatives (and perhaps hold another vote with other alternatives), or the next most supported alternative would be considered to see if it received enough votes to win (for example, majority, plurality, etc.). In the first case, where none of the alternatives is enacted, "none of the above" functions as the name of a policy, a vote for which is an act of advocating it, namely, the policy of doing none of the above. This raises no problem for the Advocacy Condition.[9]

In the second case, those supporting the "none of the above" option are ignored from the standpoint of social choice. Whether they *should* be ignored or not in the procedure is not the question here. Given that they are ignored there is no reason to regard their acts as inputs, since, regardless of their number, they could not win. Such responses as "none of the above" could have political significance of various kinds in the larger political system, but the present study is confined to democratic social choice, and from that standpoint such responses are irrelevant unless "none of the above" names an actual possible social choice (as above). The case of "none of the above" is different from that of abstention, which is treated below, under the Activity Condition.

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[8]The view that votes advocate choices finds support in J. L. Austin, *How To Do Things With Words* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 151ff. In his tentative classification of types of illocutionary force, the second category is called Exercitives: "An exercitive is the giving of a decision in favour of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it. . . . It is a very wide class; examples are, . . . command, fine, vote for. . . ."

[9]The story goes (in this case via Martha Gibson) that a candidate for governor of a southern state had his name legally changed to "none of the above" and won a majority of votes. Clearly in this case a vote for "none of the above" could be advocative.

The Activity Condition

Suppose there were a method, perhaps involving some amazing machine, for discovering the preferences of people without the individuals performing any acts at all (this is a coherent idea only on certain understandings of "preference"). Could a procedure with these individual characteristics as its inputs be a democratic social choice procedure? The question is not whether the passive method is as morally defensible as a real voting procedure, but rather whether such a passive procedure is democratic. The third condition on the theoretical interpretation of democratic inputs is that *they must be acts.* The concept of democracy requires this, whether or not morality even requires that social choice be democratic.

Appealing to the concept of democracy is problematic, since there is little agreement on the details of the concept. The term has acquired such positive moral connotations that if some political procedure is justified, some are tempted to say that it thereby counts as democratic. This use of the term has the disadvantage of preventing the very formulation of the question whether the property of being democratic ever justifies political procedures. A more common use of the term is to cover any procedure of making social choices in accordance with the interests and desires of the citizens, regardless of whether the citizens are in any way agents or authors of the social choice. This at least allows the question to arise whether democratic procedures are justified by their being democratic. However, by failing to distinguish government *for the people* from government *by the people* it suppresses the question whether there is any important moral difference between them. It is clear that these two ways of using the term both fail to recognize important distinctions. Thus, these uses may be agreed to be unfortunate. "Republicanism" might be a useful term for referring to government, or social choice, in the interests of the people. If the word "democracy" is to be reserved for government by, and not just government for, the people, the quintessential democratic entity, a vote, ought to be conceived as an act.

Voting procedures are often sensitive in various ways to inactivity. *Abstentions* can block enactments, for example. Is abstention a kind of democratic input which is not active, and therefore a difficulty for the proposed condition that democratic inputs must

be acts? Abstention, whether or not it is an act itself, is abstention *from* some act. The act abstained from must surely be the act of voting, of offering one's input to the social choice procedure. It is true that failing to vote can affect the procedure, and one might abstain for that very reason, but abstaining does not thereby become a democratic *input*. Abstention, like bribery, can be a way of intentionally influencing the procedure, but neither is aggregated by democratic choice procedures. One might still object by demonstrating that some procedures actually aggregate abstentions. Some procedures may distinguish an abstention from the failure to vote at all by, for example, asking individuals to make their abstentions known. For example, a system in which voting was legally required of citizens might nonetheless allow them to specify by their vote that they endorse none of the proposed alternatives. However, this would be no counterexample to the Activity Condition, since abstentions of this sort are clearly acts.[10]

Democracy essentially involves the activity of the people in the process of governing. Democratic social choice must therefore be regarded as aggregating acts of some sort.

III. Varieties of Preference

In contemporary discussions of voting procedures, where any interpretation of votes is offered at all, votes are usually said to express *preferences*.[11] The term "preference" is unfortunately

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[10]They are, however, apparently not advocative, and so are not allowable as an interpretation of democratic inputs.

[11]Arrow, 1951, *op. cit.*; Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1953), and their successors in the theory of voting explicitly connect voting and preferences. Not all of them explicitly relate their views to democracy, though Arrow is unambiguous (see Arrow, 1977, *op. cit.*; p. 257 in Barry and Hardin, 1982, *op. cit.*: ". . . we are seeking to model democracy." See also Arrow, 1963, *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 85, 90, 120). Some others in the Arrow tradition are similarly explicit: for example, Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Kurt Baier, "Welfare and Preference," in *Human Values and Economic Policy*, ed. S. Hook (New York, N.Y.: New York University Press, 1967); William Riker, *Liberalism Against Populism* (San Francisco, Calif.: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1982), esp. Chapter One; Michael Dummett, *Voting Procedures* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 1.

vague, and seems to mean different things in the works of different writers. Even though "preference" is somewhat vague, its popularity as an interpretation of democratic inputs may reflect an implicit recognition of what I am calling the Advocacy Condition. It is difficult (though, as I shall argue later, not impossible) to see how votes which could not be described as expressing a preference could be votes for or against anything, as votes must be, and this may account for the prominence of preference interpretations of voting.

The everyday usage of the word "prefer" is of little help in understanding the use of the word by theorists of social choice. For in everyday usage, to prefer chocolate to vanilla, or Mozart to Beethoven, is to like one better than the other. This usage is apparently not adopted by any social choice theorist. A use that is, in some ways, close to the everyday use is that to prefer A to B is to want it more. Wanting something more is distinct from liking it better, since one can, for various reasons, want A more than B even while liking B better than A. For example, one may want the food that is more nutritious, despite liking junk food better.

Since the argument of this paper was originally composed there has emerged a small literature on "epistemic" or "cognitive" or "deliberational" models of democracy. Even though the attempt is to develop an alternative to the standard economic understandings of social choice, Elster, at least, retains a preference interpretation of voting. See p. 112 of "The Market and the Forum" in Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds., *Foundations of Social Choice Theory* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Joshua Cohen seems, so far, to be leaving the issue open by describing inputs to deliberative-democratic procedures as "preferences and convictions." See "The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy," *Social Philosophy and Policy* 6 (1988), and "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in Hamlin and Pettit, eds., *The Good Polity* (London, England: Basil Blackwell, 1988). Cohen also discusses Coleman and Ferejohn's treatment of an unambiguous "judgment" interpretation of voting. See Jules Coleman and John Ferejohn, "Democracy and Social Choice," and Cohen, "An Epistemic Conception of Democracy," both in *Ethics* 97 (1986). In "Rousseau's General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective," *American Political Science Review* 82 (1988), Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld interpret Rousseau as holding judgment-based voting to have profound epistemic value. See also the separate replies by Jeremy Waldron and David Estlund along with a rejoinder by Grofman and Feld collectively titled "Democracy and the Common Interest: Rousseau and Condorcet Revisited," in *American Political Science Review* 83 (1989). In her recent book, *Natural Reasons* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1989) Susan Hurley briefly suggests some advantages that cognitive interpretations of voting may possess over preference interpretations.

One might well wonder why anyone who means to discuss wants or desires (I shall use the terms interchangeably) would speak of preferences. There is perhaps the following justification. Given a choice between one kick in the shins or two, which do you prefer? Strictly speaking it is probably false to say you want one kick more than two; you probably do not want either, at all. Even if you have no other choice, you do not come to desire a kick in the shins. We can, however, phrase the situation in terms of desire: you want not-two-kicks-in-the-shins more than you want not-one-kick-in-the-shins. Or we can speak of a desire/aversion continuum, where strength of desire runs in the same direction on the continuum as weakness of aversion. The whole thing is made simpler by using "is preferred to" to mean "is higher on the desire/aversion continuum" or some similar formula. A theorist who wishes to speak of desires for or against, or of desires and aversions, may choose the term "preferences" for the sake of simplicity of expression. One of the interpretations of votes to be considered, then, is that they express *desires*.

In the work of some writers, social choice is closely associated with utilitarianism. The term "preference" is used, apparently univocally, in both contexts. Modern utilitarians who recommend maximizing preference satisfaction may, of course, mean desire satisfaction. However, "preference satisfaction" is often intended rather to mean "(objective) interest satisfaction" or more simply "welfare." For example, John Harsanyi[12] espouses a form of utilitarianism which operates on the "real interest" of individuals, and "what is really good" for them. Still, he uses the term "preferences" since he argues that a person's interests are best understood as what she rationally prefers, or what she would manifestly prefer under certain ideal conditions. Utilitarian moral theorists who speak of preferences often have in mind *interests*, and so this is a second likely meaning of "preference" in some social choice and democratic theory as well.

Behaviorists in the philosophy of psychology understand mental states as nothing more than dispositions to behave in certain ways under certain circumstances. Social choice theorists with behavior-

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[12]John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in A. Sen and B. Williams, eds., *Utilitarianism and Beyond* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

ist leanings[13] define a preference for A over B as a disposition to choose A over B in certain circumstances. A complete individual preference ranking is a summary, on this account, of all of an individual's dispositions to choose. By interpreting votes as preference rankings these theorists mean to interpret inputs as complete lists of the individuals' dispositions to choose between the available alternatives in a given instance of social choice. Therefore, I will also take up the interpretation of democratic inputs as *dispositions to choose*.

It might be thought appropriate also to consider the interpretation of votes as choices themselves, and not only dispositions to choose. However, it is a common mistake to assume that the voter's alternatives are certain social states, or policies. The social states, or government policies that are named on the ballot are alternatives confronting the society, not the individual. The society must choose between policy A and policy B; the choice is properly called a social choice. Except in the case of a dictator a social choice is never also an individual choice.[14] The individual's only choice in this procedure is between different ways of *voting*. How voting is to

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[13]Arrow, 1963, *op. cit.*, shows behaviorist leanings when he says on pages 109–110, "The essential point of the modern insistence on ordinal utility is the application of Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Only observable differences can be used as a basis for explanation. . . . [W]elfare judgements [are] to be based only on interpersonally observable behavior."

[14]The connection between choice and power is reflected in *Funk and Wagnall's* first definition of "choose": ". . . take by preference." There is a situation which might be described as a vote which is at the same time a choice. That is the situation of a voter whose vote wholly determines the social choice regardless of the votes of others (what Arrow calls a dictator, in his technical use of that term). But at most one individual can be a dictator in this sense in any given instance of social choice. Therefore, there remains no ground for the theoretical interpretation of votes as choices, even if occasionally an individual's votes can be empirically interpreted as a choice. This point is seen clearly by Gibbard, Satterthwaite and others who have emphasized that the question of which social alternative rationally to vote for is not the same as the question which social alternative rationally to choose. There may be good reasons to vote for a less preferred outcome. Gibbard and Satterthwaite prove a strong theorem about the pervasiveness of such situations. See Allan Gibbard, "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," *Econometrica* 41 (1973); and M. A. Satterthwaite, "Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions," *Journal of Economic Theory* 10 (1975).

be interpreted remains an open question. Voters do have to make choices of a certain kind, but voting is not choosing.

Where votes are interpreted as preferences, then, this can be more precisely understood as interpreting them as desires, interests, dispositions to choose (or, as we shall see, individual reports of one of these three). Under which of these interpretations, if any, do votes meet the three conditions on democratic inputs, Aggregability, Advocacy, and Activity? The answer, I shall now argue, is that none of the six interpretations passes this test.

IV. PREFERENCE INTERPRETATIONS DISQUALIFIED

Interpretations of votes as desires, interests, or dispositions to choose do meet the Aggregability Condition. My desire for funding of the arts seems intuitively to be aggregable with your desire either for *or* against such funding (though the details of such aggregation remain unclear) and the same would seem to go for interests in it, or dispositions to choose it. They are also advocative in the required sense. That is, they are "for or against" certain choices; they are "off the fence." In themselves, however, all of them fail as democratic inputs, since none is an act. No argument is required here beyond what has already been offered in defense of the Activity Condition itself.

Desires, interests and dispositions to choose are not themselves acts, as democratic inputs must be, but desire *reports*, interest *reports*, and disposition-to-choose *reports* (hereafter "disposition reports") *are* acts and so they seem to succeed where desires and interests themselves fail. This adds three more possible versions of the view that votes are or express preferences. However, reports fail where the states themselves succeed, namely in the area of aggregability. First, we can grant, for now, that such reports are advocative in the required way. Second, it is true that unlike the desires, interests and dispositions themselves, reports are acts. They may meet the Advocacy Condition, as did the states themselves, and they clearly meet the Activity Condition, which desires, interests, and dispositions failed. However, they fail the Aggregability Condition since they are never reports on some single issue. This claim requires some expansion.

Reports (like desires, interests, statements, beliefs, etc.) are not aggregable with other reports unless they all address the same

issue. The notion of an aggregate report is somewhat obscure even where the component reports do address the same issue, but if I am reporting on the weather, and you are reporting on the score of a baseball game, no real aggregate report is possible. The problem with interpreting democratic inputs as individual reports of one's own desires, interests, or dispositions is that each voter is reporting on a different issue: Smith reports on Smith's desires, interests or dispositions, Jones reports on Jones's states, and so on.

It is no good to say that there is a single issue here, represented by the single question,[15] "What is your desire (interest, disposition)?" When a school teacher places at the top of each student's printed exam the question, "What is your name?" there is, it is true, a sense in which each person faces the same issue. The issue faced by one student is *formally*, or *syntactically*, of the same type as that faced by each of the others, but this is not the sort of similarity that is required in order for the answers to be aggregable. Aggregability requires that the students face the same issue in the distinct sense that their answers all represent the same person as having a certain name. They must face the same issue in a *semantic*, rather than a syntactic sense, or in virtue of *content* rather than form. If the question at the top of each exam were, "What is your *teacher's* name?" the students would all face the same issue in the way required for aggregation, in a way that would allow us to imagine deriving an aggregate answer from the individual answers.[16] Similarly, if the issue faced by all voters were the nature of Smith's desires, their answers would be aggregable. But voters who are asked about their own desires face the same issue only in the

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[15]See the earlier discussion of the Aggregability Condition for more on this "question analogy."

[16]"What is your teacher's name?" as a question to each of the members of a single class happens to address the same issue from the standpoint of form as well as content. If, however, the teacher were the father of one of the students, and that student were asked the name of her father, while the others were asked the name of their teacher, the issues faced would be different in form, but similar in content. Jerry Fodor, "Methodological Solipsism," in *Representations* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press and Bradford Books, 1981) discusses these alternative criteria of similarity, but in the case of psychological attitudes, rather than what I call "issues." I follow Fodor in characterizing the distinction in terms of form vs. content, and syntax vs. semantics. The distinction should be clear even if the aptness of these descriptions is doubted.

irrelevant formal sense; in the required semantic, or content-based sense, each voter faces a different issue from that of every other voter. Because of the inevitable indexicals, "I," or "my," individual reports of desires, interests, or dispositions are, for this reason, not aggregable.[17] Let us call this the *Indexical Problem*.

It may seem surprising that the aggregability of desires them-selves cannot somehow be worked into desire reports. Clearly, if the content of a desire were aggregable and could, without change, serve as a desire report, then both would be aggregable. But since the content of a desire is just a proposition or a state of affairs, it does not exhibit the nature of its "container," desire. It could as well be the content of a belief rather than a desire; the differences between the two types of mental state do not lie in their contents. Since they don't, themselves, exhibit the kind of state of which they are the contents, desire contents cannot ever provide all that is needed in a desire *report*, which must be partly *about* desire. So the aggregability of desires themselves cannot be appropriated by de-sire reports in this direct way.

While the content of a desire can be merely [that p], a desire report must include this desire content, *and* that it is the content of a desire. While this shows that the desire content cannot be the whole of a desire report, it doesn't yet show how the indexical problem arises. That is in virtue of a third required component of a desire report: *whose* desire it is. Again, this is not a necessary feature of the *desire* that is reported, but a necessary feature of a desire *report*. Whatever words, gestures, or other actions are used to report desires, interpreting them as desire reports involves taking all three components to be present—the desire *content*, its being the content of a *desire*, and its being the desire *of* the person

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[17]David Hume seems to deploy a similar point to preclude founding morals on certain views of self-love: "Avarice, ambition, vanity, and all passions vulgarly, though improperly, comprised under the denomination of self-love, are here excluded from our theory concerning the origin of morals, not because they are too weak, but because *they have not a proper direction*, for that purpose. The notion of morals, implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation. . . ." Hume requires of the set of moral judgments, as I re-quire of democratic inputs, that they have a common object. Hume seems further to be requiring agreement, but his main point here is the one about "direction." See David Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Principles of Morals*, page 80 in Raphael, ed., *The British Moralists*, emphasis added.

reporting. My desire [that p] is not about me at all, but my state-
ment or report [that I have a desire that p] clearly is. That is why
reports, unlike desires themselves, are subject to the Indexical
Problem and are not, therefore, aggregable in the required sense.

The point about aggregability has a philosophically substantial
role in the critique of Invisible Hand views of democracy. Democ-
racy involves multiple individuals addressing some single issue, but
the Invisible Hand view does not. Indeed, the hand that shapes
such public issues is supposed to be invisible in just that sense—it
is not the hand of any individual. This is a pivotal conflict between
democratic and Invisible Hand views of social choice.[18]

Of the following interpretations of democratic inputs—desires,
desire reports, interests, interest reports, dispositions to choose,
and disposition reports—none is at the same time active and ag-
gregable. Desires, interests, and dispositions are not active, while
reports are not aggregable. But, it may be asked, why not regard
the Activity Condition as being met by the report, and the Aggre-
gability Condition met by the interests or desires themselves? The
desires, interests, and dispositions themselves are, admittedly, ag-
gregable when they are on the same issue, so if I report a desire
for x, and you report a desire either for x or not-x our desires
themselves are in principle aggregable. The Activity Condition, as
stated, says that the input must itself *be an act*, and the present
objection does not meet that requirement. However, the require-
ment itself needs further defense in this context.

The Activity Condition is an implication of the fact that "democ-
racy" refers to rule by the people, as argued above, and rule by the
people is a stronger requirement in the present context than *par-
ticipation* by the people. Consider an example of participation
which is not rule by the people. Suppose that in some society, the
social choices are made in accordance with astrological doctrines.
The positions of various planets and stars are consulted and inter-
preted according to canons of astrology, and social choices are
made by a king in accordance with what the heavens "indicate."
Our question is this: if the astrological data were gathered and
presented by the citizens, even all citizens, would their participa-

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[18]The requirement that inputs be on a single issue turns up, for dif-
ferent reasons, in Rousseau's discussion of factionalization. For discussion
see Grofman and Feld and replies and rejoinder cited in note 11.

tion in this procedure constitute rule by the people? Clearly it would not. The astrology case is like the objector's proposal in that in both cases the only activity of the citizens is their actively *delivering or presenting* the procedure's inputs. The inputs themselves are facts which could, in principle, have been discovered in some other way. It is these facts that determine the social choice, and not the citizens. At best it is the king who, constrained by the astrological facts, makes the social choice. The people participate, but they do not rule in any way. Therefore, participation does not always meet the Activity Condition.

An objector might say that the case is a bad analogy. In the astrological case it might be said that the king is not basing the decision on any *facts about the citizens*, and this is where it strays from true democracy. On the model of democratic choice proposed by the objector, where desires or interests are reported by individuals, the government does base the decision on facts about the citizens. However, this objection misses the point, as we can see if we simply suppose that astrology is a reliable indicator of the interests of the citizens. This would give the king access to relevant facts about the citizens, and they would be known through citizen participation. However, the procedure remains undemocratic.

The issue here is, at root, the agency of the voter in the social decision. If the king, or the social choice mechanism simply aggregates facts about the voter, and bases the social decision on these facts, we may (or may not) have a case of rule for the people, but we certainly do not have rule by them. It is not that they are not agents at all; surely they all are agents, in some acts. Rather, what is lacking is any ground for thinking of them as agents *of the social decision.* Altering the story so that these facts about them are actively presented by them ensures that they are agents in at least one act, but we never doubted this. We may grant this much; we might now be willing to say that what is done *depends* on an action of theirs (though this needn't be true since the facts they present are, in principle, independently obtainable). But it does not provide any new reason for thinking that what gets done is an action of theirs. The argument is not about whether rule by the people is superior to rule for the people in any way. The point is that rule by the people is a necessary condition (it may also be sufficient, but that does not matter here) of a system's being democratic. The Activity Condition, then, legitimately requires that the very thing

which is aggregated by the social choice procedure is an act, so that the people can be agents or authors of the social choice (though this is not guaranteed merely by meeting the Activity Condition). Desires, interests, dispositions to choose, and reports of each, all therefore fail since none is both active and aggregable.

V. VOTES AS COMMON-INTEREST STATEMENTS

Self-interest statements have already been discussed (under the description "interest reports"), and they were found not to be aggregable with one another, since they are not all statements on the same issue. Statements about the interests of others ("other-interest statements" for brevity) would, however, be aggregable if the statements were all about the same interests of the same others (for example, "x is in Smith's interest"). Other-interest statements can in principle be aggregable, and, as with all statements, active as well.

Other-interest statements, however, are not advocative. This is consistent with holding that one can advocate a policy for the sake of others. But merely saying that something is in the interest of certain others is not necessarily to make an advocative statement. A white South African businessman's statement that foreign dis-investment is in the interest of members of the black majority is not necessarily an advocative statement, even though there is no reason to think it impossible for him to advocate disinvestment for the sake of the blacks. One can advocate certain things for the sake of others alone, and in the proper context saying that it is in their interest can be an act of advocacy. Still, the statement is not advo-cative in itself (or "intrinsically"), and this is what is required of democratic inputs by the Advocacy Condition.

Intrinsic advocacy may look like a new, undefended condition. In fact, however, if we distinguish "intrinsic" from "contextual" advocacy, we see that it *must* be intrinsic advocacy that is at issue in the Advocacy Condition. We're not considering the act of voting itself, but rather the interpretations of it.[19] Actual acts of voting are typically not speech acts at all, but hand raisings, box

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[19]"Interpretation" has a process-product ambiguity. Here and throughout it means the product.

markings, and the like. If some voting act is properly interpreted as, for example, an other-interest statement, it is in virtue of the *context* of the real, non-linguistic voting act. If the voting act were itself thought to be advocative, then it could be accurately interpreted only by a statement that is *intrinsically* advocative. But, by hypothesis, we're considering voting acts that are accurately interpreted as other-interest statements. If these statements are not intrinsically advocative, then the acts they accurately interpret are not advocative intrinsically or contextually. It is irrelevant to ask at this stage whether other-interest statements can themselves be contextually advocative. There is no relevant context left to consider once we've arrived at the proper interpretation of the voting act. If voting acts must be advocative either contextually or intrinsically, they must admit of an interpretation that is advocative *intrinsically*. As for acts which, in the context, are interpretable as other-interest statements, they remain on the fence—they are not advocative. And saying so does not deny that a speech act which is an other-interest statement might be advocative in some contexts.

Self-interest statements are not aggregable, and other-interest statements are not advocative. This may seem to establish that *no* interest statements can be both advocative and aggregable. However, that would require the additional premise that *all* interest statements are either self-interest statements or other-interest statements. Interest statements are of *three* kinds: self-interest, other-interest, and *common*-interest. A common-interest statement is one which says that something is or is not in *our* interest, in the interest of those in some group which includes the speaker. Recall that self-interest statements were shown to be inaggregable, though perhaps advocative, and other-interest statements shown to be aggregable, though not advocative. In the space that remains I will argue that common-interest statements, while keeping the activity possessed by any statement, combine the advocacy of the self-interest statements with the aggregability of common-interest statements. Hence, common-interest statements can be shown to be aggregable, advocative, and active. Therefore, inputs which, in context, are interpretable as common-interest statements will meet all three conditions.

The first step is to show that *self*-interest statements meet the Advocacy Condition. If they do, then since common-interest statements effectively include a self-interest statement, common-

interest statements will be shown to meet it as well. It is important at this stage to keep in mind that the goal is not to find an interpretation of voting under which voting is an *act of advocacy*. To meet the Advocacy Condition an interpretation need only be "off the fence," anything but solidly neutral, and that is all that will be shown. Indeed, interpretations of voting that are straightforward advocacy appear to be subject to separate serious difficulties.[20] Since common-interest statements include self-interest statements, if the latter puts one off the fence then so does the former. Of course, this would not be so if other parts of common-interest statements put one off the fence in the opposite direction. But the other parts are other-interest statements, and those are solidly on the fence. That is why the self-interest component is enough to put common-interest statements off the fence. It is an unanswered pressure in one direction.

The conclusion is not that one *advocates* the whole package for the beneficial bit, just that a common-interest statement is off the fence, advocative, in a way the other interpretations we have considered are not. As noted, it is dangerous unreflectively to assume that more advocacy would be better. The argument I will offer presently, that self-interest statements meet the Advocacy Condition, amounts to an important elaboration of that condition.

It is not necessary, in order for a statement to be advocative in the required way, that it be associated with any actual desire of the speaker. *What qualifies self-interest statements as advocative is a certain general relation such statements bear to desire.* While it is possible for such a statement not to be associated with a corresponding desire, such an absence of desire is anomalous. This can be shown in two steps. First, under normal conditions a statement that something is the case will be associated with a judgment or belief on the speaker's part that the alleged state of affairs obtains. In other words, a statement that p, in the absence of a speaker's belief that

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[20]There is the problem of how one can both stongly advocate a policy through voting, and also advocate that the majority rule when one is in the minority. The best-known discussion of this problem is Richard Wollheim, "A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy," in Laslett and Runciman, *op. cit.* I discuss the significance of this problem in light of its many criticisms in "The Persistent Puzzle of the Minority Democrat," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 26 (1989). See also note 23 of the present article.

p, is an anomaly. Therefore, a statement that something is in one's own interest, without the speaker's believing it, is anomalous.

Second, under normal or ideal conditions a person's belief that something is in his or her interest is associated with a desire for that thing. The argument is not that people always, or even most of the time, want whatever they think best for them; I do not mean to take a stand either way on that question here. But when people do not want what they think best for themselves, however often it may occur, it is an anomaly. It is an event in need of special explanation. This much seems to be admitted if the phenomenon is described, as it usually is, as a *weakness* of a certain faculty, namely the will. Whatever the truth about whether one can fail to want what one thinks best for oneself, it would constitute, in a sense not to be pursued further here, a failure of a certain kind, and in that way it is an anomaly.

Consider the two steps together. (1) Self-interest statements are normally accompanied by self-interest judgments or beliefs, and (2) these are normally (as distinct from "frequently") associated in the subject with a desire for the thing judged to be good. By a reasonable sort of transitivity we find that self-interest statements are, in normal circumstances, associated with desires. Self-interest statements are, except in anomalous cases, accompanied by desire, and *even in these anomalous cases the statements are advocative*, since even in these cases their nature is such that if circumstances had been normal they would have been accompanied by desire.

Self-interest is here held to be specially related to motivation in a way that other-interest is not. However, this does not entail psychological egoism or any view about how rare or common other-interested motivation is. However common it may be, the connection in a given case between the motivation and the *particular* "other" will be contingent in a way that the connection between motivation and the believed interests of the self is not. This is so even if it is not just contingent that one will have many other-interested motives.

Is this admittedly weak sense of advocacy consistent with the original statement of the Advocacy Condition? As mentioned earlier, it is clearly a condition on democratic social choice that the social choice must be according to what the inputs are "for" rather than what they are "against." No such condition can be formulated for inputs that are not advocative in the sense of being "off the

fence." We can see that the present weak sort of advocacy serves the purpose embodied in the Advocacy Condition. Inputs must, in the context, have a certain directionality. *The condition does not require that they count as advocating a policy in a straightforward way.* The property of being advocative in this special sense is, in this way, weaker than (though described by analogy with) simple acts of advocating some action. Common-interest statements are not necessarily acts of advocacy, but they have the kind of directionality which is exemplified by usual acts of advocating something. They are, I shall say, *weakly advocative*, and this is all that is required by the Advocacy Condition.

I have said that a common-interest statement effectively includes a self-interest statement, but this would not be true if "common interest" were understood as the interest of the group *as a group*. If there is thought to be such a thing as an interest of a group where the interest is not reducible to the interests of the individuals of the group, opinions on this matter would not be (even weakly) advocative. They would be special cases of other-interest statements, even where the speaker is a member of the group. I do not doubt that groups have irreducible interests of this kind, at least in the sense that a group can thrive apart from whether any of its members are thriving (for example, a political action organization in support of and made up of AIDS patients). Similarly, it is possible for the group to be in danger of extinction without any members being in such danger; they may just go their separate ways. What I do doubt is that an opinion about the irreducible interest of any group, even one of which the subject is a member, constitutes advocacy of the sort required of a vote.[21] It is not always, or even normally, associated with any desire.

The case of South Africa is again convenient here. The nation is a group whose very existence is threatened by demonstrations of members of the black population. Repressive measures may well be necessary for the survival of the nation, and are in that sense in

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[21]If there is such a thing as the members "identifying" with the group this would involve a special conception of "self" in which the interest of the group would not be distinguished from the interests of the individuals. "I" gives way to "we." In this case group-interest statements would be indistinguishable from common-interest statements, and so this is no clear alternative to my proposal despite the importantly different metaphysics.

its interest. However, this is not to say it is in the interest of any of its members; it may be in the interest of some, or it may be against the interests of all if, for example, repression will lead to bloody rioting and mayhem despite the survival of the nation. The statement of a black South African that repressive measures are in the interest of the nation is not intrinsically advocative of those measures in the manner required of a vote. For these reasons, common-interest statements are acceptable inputs only where a common-interest includes the interest of the individual whose opinion it is, for only then is the Advocacy Condition met.

The common-interest statement interpretation is, I believe, similar to Rousseau's interpretation of votes as statements on the General Will. However, some may read the General Will as the singular will of the group. Space precludes criticism of that interpretation here, but for present purposes it suffices to note that only on the less collectivistic reading I favor are Rousseau's inputs advocative, for reasons given in the preceding few paragraphs.[22]

Common-interest statements, those that address the issue of whether something is in the interest of every member of a certain group which includes the speaker, are aggregable with common-interest statements of other members of the group. If you and I each report our own interests, the reports are not aggregable. But if I report our interests, and you report our interests, we address the same issue—the interests common to every member of a group in which you and I are both members. Common-interest statements are therefore *aggregable*. They are *advocative* since they include self-interest judgments, which are normally accompanied by desires, and they are *active* since all statements are acts.

The interpretation of votes as common-interest statements succeeds where the preference interpretations fail. Two disclaimers are in order: first, the six preference interpretations of voting which I have discussed (desires, interests, dispositions to choose, and reports of each of these) are not exhaustive of preference interpretations, and so I do not pretend to have explicitly defeated

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[22]Rousseau is sensitive to the feature of proper democratic voting which I represent in the Advocacy Condition: ". . . why do all want the happiness of each among them, if not because there is no person who does not apply this word *each* to himself, and does not think of himself while voting for all?" Rousseau, *op. cit.*, Book II, Chapter IV, p. 33.

all such interpretations. Still, the arguments against these six appear to have more general force against various possible preference interpretations. If, as is likely in a preference interpretation, votes are interpreted as either individual states, or reports by individuals of their states, they will not be both active and aggregable.

Second, even among non-preference interpretations, the common-interest statement interpretation is not held to be the only one which meets the three conditions. For example, interpreting votes as ought statements or prescriptions may also meet them. I leave it for another paper to argue that these interpretations are subject to serious difficulties which do not afflict the common-interest statement interpretation.[23]

The arguments I have given for common-interest statements seem also to work for common-desire statements, and so from the standpoint of meeting the three conditions, common-interest statements and common-desire statements are equally successful. However, if we look beyond the three conditions we can see at least one respect in which common-interest statements have a certain primacy. On the usual understanding of desire, it is highly unlikely that there could be social policies of any specificity that are desired by every member of a political community.

The chances are somewhat improved under a theory which allows that real wants differ from apparent wants. If a certain policy is in fact best for all, then it might be argued that, since everyone wants what is best for them, everyone really wants this policy whether they realize it or not. However, this view achieves plausibility for common desires partly by assuming common interests. A statement that x is really desired by everyone virtually amounts to a statement that x is in everyone's interest. This is, of course, no objection to a theory's distinguishing real from apparent wants. However, it militates for the primacy of common-

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[23]See my "The Persistent Puzzle of the Minority Democrat," *op. cit.* Ought statements and prescriptions are the most salient cases of intrinsically advocative statements other than interest statements. They are beyond the scope of the concentration on preference interpretations in the present paper. In the cited paper they fall victim to difficulties afflicting any "favoring" or *strongly* advocative interpretations of voting. That paper and this one, in conjunction, mark a fine line between too much and too little advocacy in the theoretical interpretation of voting. See also note 20.

interest statements over common-desire statements, since the latter are plausible only when they virtually amount to the former.

The interpretation of votes as common-desire statements is closer than the common-interest interpretation to Rousseau's interpretation of votes as General Will statements. However, I would argue (if space allowed) that Rousseau's theory rests common will or common desire on common interests in the way just discussed. As he says, "We always want what is good for us, but we do not always see what it is. The populace is never corrupted, but it is often tricked, and only then does it *appear* to want what is bad."[24] Unless desires have this close relation to interest, the sheer improbability of a policy being desired by everyone is sufficient to relegate common-desire statements to the back burner as an interpretation of votes. Of course, it is far from obvious that there are any common interests, but this possibility cannot be dismissed immediately, by inspection, as in the case of common desires.

If the argument of this paper is correct, then to the extent that voters in the real world address only their own interests, the method of social choice is less than fully democratic. But how real-world votes are to be interpreted, I cannot say. If it were thought that only self-interested voting is psychologically possible, then the present argument would bode ill for the possibility of democracy. Some say common sense favors that view of voting. In political science it is subject to empirical challenge.[25]

However it is that actual voters do or could vote, the concept of democracy places constraints on what is to count as proper democratic voting. These constraints preclude the interpretation of voting that is most influential in the social sciences and in the general public, that votes express preferences.

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[24]Rousseau, *op. cit.*, Book II, Chapter III, p. 31, my emphasis.
[25]See, for example, D. R. Kinder and D. R. Kiewiet, "Sociotropic Politics: The American Case," in R. G. Niemi and H. F. Weisberg, eds., *Controversies In Voting Behavior* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), and David Sears, *et al.*, "Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting," *American Political Science Review* 74 (1980).