

## The Function of Normative Process-Requirements

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### ABSTRACT

This paper discusses whether rationality, morality or prudence impose *process-requirements* upon us. It has been argued that process-requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process-requirements. First, process-requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary explanations of why a person possesses a certain degree of morality, rationality or prudence. However, I argue that these two functions are unable to show the existence of process-requirements. Instead, I propose a different essential function for process-requirements: they are necessary for attributing the correct degree of rationality, morality or prudence to a subject who is not entirely rational, moral or prudent. This function, I argue, necessitates the existence of process-requirements.

### 1. Introduction

It is commonly agreed that we are subject to different types of *normative requirements*. Arguably, *rational* requirements require us to be consistent and coherent; *moral* requirements require us to promote general goodness; *prudential* requirements require us to promote our personal good; *legal* requirements require us to do what the lawmaker prescribes of us; etc.

However, there is substantial disagreement about the *philosophical nature* of normative requirements. Among the issues debated are whether normative requirements are *cognitive* or *non-cognitive*,<sup>1</sup> *reason-giving* or *non-reason-giving*,<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Suppose you assert 'Morality requires me not to steal'. Then your assertion expresses a *cognitive* normative requirement if and only if it expresses a proposition. That is, (1) your assertion is either true or false; and hence (2) you can take a propositional attitude towards the proposition your assertion expresses. In contrast, your assertion expresses a *non-cognitive* normative requirement if and only if it is not the case that your assertion expresses a proposition. That is, (1) and (2) are both incorrect (cf. van Roojen 2009).

<sup>2</sup> Suppose prudence requires you not to jump out of the window. This is a *reason-giving* requirement if and only if you have a normative reason not to jump out of the window *because* prudence requires you not to jump out of the window. Otherwise, this requirement is *non-reason giving* (cf., for example, Broome 2008 and ms; Kolodny 2005; Southwood 2008).

1 *synchronic* or *diachronic*,<sup>3</sup> *narrow-scope* requirements or *wide-scope* require-  
 2 ments,<sup>4</sup> etc.

3 This paper concentrates on a fundamental issue regarding the nature of  
 4 normative requirements. It explores whether normative requirements impose  
 5 *process-requirements* upon us. This is indeed a fundamental issue, as the existence  
 6 of process-requirements is taken to settle other disputes pertaining to the nature of  
 7 normative requirements.<sup>5</sup>

8 In his influential ‘Why Be Rational?’, and its sequel ‘State or Process Require-  
 9 ments?’, Niko Kolodny (2005; 2007) contends that process-requirements are  
 10 indispensable for a system of *rational* requirements. He defends this view on the  
 11 basis of two claims: a system of rational requirements needs to fulfil certain  
 12 *functions*; only process-requirements can fulfil these functions. In particular,  
 13 Kolodny argues that process-requirements are necessary in order (1) to preserve  
 14 the correctness of our ordinary, process-based explanations of why a person is  
 15 rational and irrational; and (2) to ensure that a system of rational requirements can  
 16 guide our deliberations and actions. In consequence, Kolodny concludes that  
 17 without imposing process-requirements, a system of rational requirements fails to  
 18 serve its functions.

19 However, this paper argues that Kolodny’s defence of process-requirements  
 20 is less than successful. Though I accept (1) and (2) to be legitimate requirement  
 21 functions, I doubt that either function necessitates the existence of process-  
 22 requirements. Even if your failure to undergo some process, say *F*, explains  
 23 correctly why you are irrational (or not entirely rational), I will argue that this does  
 24 not entail that rationality requires you to *F*. Moreover, non-process-requirements  
 25 can also guide deliberations and actions. Consequently, Kolodny fails to present a  
 26 sound argument for the existence of process-requirements.<sup>6</sup>

27  
 28 <sup>3</sup> Rationality requires of you that if, ‘at time  $t_1$ , you believe that you were born in  
 29 London, then, at  $t_2$ , you believe that you were born in England’ expresses a *diachronic* require-  
 30 ment if and only if ‘ $t_1$ ’ precedes ‘ $t_2$ ’. If ‘ $t_1$ ’ and ‘ $t_2$ ’ refer to the same point of time, then this  
 31 expresses a *synchronic* requirement (cf., for example, Cullity 2008; Broome ms).

32 <sup>4</sup> Suppose you assert that rationality requires of you that you (intend to) *A* if you believe  
 33 that you ought to *A*. This expresses a narrow-scope requirement if and only if ‘rationality  
 34 requires’ governs just the consequent of this conditional, i.e., you (intend to) *A*. If, instead,  
 35 ‘rationality requires’ governs the entire conditional, then your assertion expresses a wide-scope  
 36 requirement (cf., for example, Broome 1999; 2007a; 2007b; Kolodny 2005; Brunero 2010;  
 37 Reisner 2009; Schroeder 2004; Fink 2010).

38 <sup>5</sup> For instance, Niko Kolodny rejects the view that the requirements of rationality are  
 39 *reason-giving*. On his view, this follows directly from the fact that some conditional requirements  
 40 of rationality take a *narrow-scope*, which for him is a consequence of the fact that rationality  
 41 necessarily imposes *process-requirements* (cf. Kolodny 2005).

42 <sup>6</sup> If my rejection of Kolodny’s defence of process-requirements succeeds, this paper also  
 43 shows that Kolodny’s argument in favour of narrow-scope requirements and his denial that  
 44 rational requirements are necessarily reason-giving is not sound.

1           Nonetheless, this paper does not amount to a rejection of process-requirements  
2 *per se*. Instead, I will show that process-requirements do in fact have an (alternat-  
3 ive) essential function within a system of rational requirements. In brief, I will  
4 argue that their existence is necessary to ascribe an accurate *degree* of rationality  
5 to those who *infringe* a set of *non*-process requirements.

6           Unlike Kolodny, however, I shall not restrict my analysis exclusively to  
7 requirements issued by *rationality*. Instead, I shall discuss the function generally  
8 of ‘normative process-requirements’, as I will call them. I will use the notion of a  
9 ‘normative requirement’ quite loosely, and apply it to all requirements issued  
10 by sources that are, at least seemingly, normative.<sup>7</sup> My focus will be on investigat-  
11 ing whether process-requirements have a legitimate function within a system  
12 of requirements that cannot be fulfilled by non-process-requirements, such as  
13 state-requirements.

14           The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 begins by defining process-  
15 requirements. I will define process-requirements in terms of their content, as  
16 asserting a positive relation between a subject and a process. In section 3 I will  
17 investigate whether any particular ‘requirement source’ that guides our behaviour  
18 needs to issue process-requirements. Furthermore, I will analyse whether the  
19 correctness of our ordinary, process-based explanations of particular degrees of  
20 a ‘normative property’<sup>8</sup> we possess (such as morality, prudence, or rationality)  
21 implies the existence of process-requirements. Section 4 then discusses two further  
22 questions: Could *all* normative requirements be process-requirements? Does the  
23 existence of process-requirements follow from a plausible constitutive account  
24 of normative requirements? Section 5 turns to my own argument in favour of  
25 the existence of normative process-requirements. I shall argue that process-  
26 requirements are necessary for attributing the correct degree of a normative prop-  
27 erty to those subjects who do not possess the maximum degree of that normative  
28 property.

29  
30           <sup>7</sup> I take it that requirements issued by morality, prudence, rationality, evidence are  
31 among those commonly perceived as normative. This is why I call them ‘normative’. Contrarily,  
32 I suppose that requirements of chauvinism, kickboxing or whaling do not seem to fall under this  
33 category.

34           <sup>8</sup> I will assume that every normative ‘requirement source’ (such as those listed in the  
35 previous note) comes with a corresponding normative property. Morality, for instance, clearly  
36 imposes *requirements* upon you. A plausible example of a moral requirement reads as follows:  
37 morality requires you not to show prejudice against people with a different skin colour. More-  
38 over, morality is a graded *property* you possess: if, *ceteris paribus*, you do not show prejudice  
39 against people with a different skin colour you will be more moral than if you do show such  
40 a prejudice. In this paper, I shall not try to work out the exact connection between each source  
41 and the corresponding property in this paper. Yet, I will return to their connection later in my  
42 argument. For more on the distinction between requirement sources and corresponding prop-  
43 erties, see Broome 2007a. For more on the connection between degrees of rationality and  
44 requirements of rationality, see Broome 2010. Arpaly 2000 also touches upon these issues.

## 2. Process-requirements defined

This paper focuses on the functions of process-requirements. But what are process-requirements? Suppose, at time  $t$ , a normative source of requirements  $N$  requires of a subject  $S$  that  $S$   $Xs$ .<sup>9</sup> Call this the ‘general-requirement schema’ ( $GRS$ ). When does the  $GRS$  represent a process-requirement?

In this paper, I shall endorse a *content-based* definition of process-requirements. That is, the *content* of a process-requirement signifies a relation between a subject and a process. The  $GRS$  therefore represents a process-requirement if and only if the proposition ‘ $S$   $Xs$ ’ signifies a positive relation<sup>10</sup> between  $S$  and a process.

What is a *process*? What is a *positive relation* between a subject and a process? Roughly, I shall associate processes with *change*. If a person or a thing undergoes a process, then this thing or person is changing, and *vice versa*.<sup>11</sup> Change is thus a necessary and sufficient aspect of processes, or so I will assume. Consequently, process-requirements require a subject to change in a certain way. As it will become evident later, my concern in this paper is with a particular type of process-requirement. I shall focus on requirements that demand a subject to change with the effect of ending up in a certain attitudinal state.

Associating *processes* with *change* is, I think, relatively uncontroversial. Yet it imposes a significant limitation: not every normative requirement whose satisfaction necessarily needs an *extended period of time* is a process-requirement. For example, to satisfy a prudential requirement to *retain* your attitude to intend to eat an apple a day necessarily needs time; you have to keep having an attitude over a certain *period*. *Retaining* an attitude is, by definition, not a way of changing. In fact, it is a way of *not* changing over a period.<sup>12</sup> So, if process-requirements

<sup>9</sup> I will refrain from putting a time index on ‘ $S$   $Xs$ ’. I assume that the period of time at which the requirement applies to  $S$  coincides with the period of time  $S$  can satisfy the requirement by ensuring that that  $S$   $Xs$ . That is, at every point of time the requirement applies to  $S$ ,  $S$  satisfies the requirement by seeing to it that  $S$   $Xs$ . I shall thus not discuss *remote* requirements. By this I mean requirements that apply to  $S$  *before*  $S$  can satisfy them. For a detailed account of remote requirements, see Michael Zimmerman 1987; 2007.

<sup>10</sup> The notion of ‘positive explanation’ will be explained below.

<sup>11</sup> Regarding processes, I shall remain agnostic about two things. First, I shall remain agnostic about whether change is conceptually prior to process, or *vice versa*. That is, I will ignore the question of whether a person or a thing undergoes a process *in virtue of* changing or whether a person or a thing changes *in virtue of* undergoing a process. Second, I will remain agnostic about whether processes constitute distinct events or, in fact, series of events. Both issues make no difference to my argument in this paper.

<sup>12</sup> To illustrate this, suppose you are required to *retain* your attitude of knowing that you were born in London. To satisfy this requirement you are not necessarily undergoing change. Being able, at time  $t$ , to retain your attitude, say  $A$ , presupposes that, at  $t$ , you *already* have  $A$ . This is not to exclude the possibility, of course, that there could be occasions at which you might need to undergo a process in order to remain in a certain state. Suppose, for example, that in order to

1 require one to *change*, then a requirement to *retain* an attitude is not a process-  
 2 requirement. Likewise, not all *diachronic* requirements will turn out to be process-  
 3 requirements.<sup>13</sup>

4 Why is this significant? Some philosophers equate process-requirements with  
 5 requirements whose satisfaction necessarily needs a period of time. They do not  
 6 seem to limit process-requirements to those requirements that a subject undergo  
 7 some *change*. Kolodny (2005, 517; my emphasis), for example, characterizes  
 8 process-requirements as telling us ‘how, going forward, one is to form, *retain* or  
 9 revise one’s attitudes’. But I think this characterization is incoherent. No doubt,  
 10 forming, retaining, and revising one’s attitudes necessarily takes time. One can  
 11 only form, retain or revise an attitude over time. But only *forming* and *revising*  
 12 one’s attitudes implies *change*. *Retaining* an attitude does not. You can retain an  
 13 attitude without altering at all.

14 There are two reasons why it is a mistake to equate process-requirements with  
 15 requirements whose satisfaction requires time. First, change, I take it, is a funda-  
 16 mental aspect of a process. Second, by thinking of any requirement to retain an  
 17 attitude as a process-requirement, we would undermine any meaningful distinc-  
 18 tion between *state-* and *process-*requirements. Roughly, *state-*requirements are  
 19 requirements whose content signifies a relation between a subject and a *state*.  
 20 No doubt, requirements to *remain* in some state are state-requirements: they are  
 21 requirements to *be* in a state for a certain period of time. If they were process-  
 22 requirements too, we would be forced to abandon a clear-cut distinction between  
 23 state- and process-requirements. Requirements to retain an attitude would turn out  
 24 to be simultaneously both process- *and* state-requirements.

25 Consequently, unlike Kolodny, I will not count requirements to *remain* in some  
 26 condition as process-requirements. Instead, this paper focuses on the function of  
 27 process-requirements whose satisfaction necessitates change, i.e., requirements to  
 28 form, revise or abandon one’s attitudes.

29 In defining process-requirements, I said above that the content of a process-  
 30 requirement needs to signify a *positive* relation between a subject and a process.  
 31 But what is a positive relation? What is the significance of this condition?  
 32

33 remain in the state of knowing that you were born in London, you might sometimes need to  
 34 undergo the process of entertaining the thought that you were born in Chelsea. Even so, the fact  
 35 that you remain in this state of knowing that you were born in London does not itself constitute  
 36 a process. Instead, the process consists in your entertainment of the thought that you were born  
 37 in Chelsea, which, in turn, ensures (perhaps causally) that you *remain* in the state of knowing that  
 38 you were born in London.

39 <sup>13</sup> A requirement counts as a diachronic-requirement if and only if its content consists of  
 40 a cross-temporal relation among a subject’s attitudes or actions. Suppose, for example, at  $t_1$ ,  
 41 rationality requires of  $S$  that [if, at  $t_1$ ,  $S$  believes that  $p$ , then, at  $t_2$ ,  $S$  believes that  $q$ ]. This will be  
 42 a diachronic requirement. But it is not necessarily a process-requirement. If, at  $t_1$ ,  $S$  believes  $q$  and  
 43 *retains* this state until  $t_2$ , then  $S$  can satisfy this requirement without changing.

1           Consider first a ‘non-positive’ (or ‘negative’) relation between a subject and a  
 2 process. Take the proposition that you do *not* form an intention to go skiing. Clearly,  
 3 this proposition denotes a relation between you and a process. Yet the truth of this  
 4 proposition does not imply that you undergo a process and consequently change.  
 5 It is possible that you simply *remain* as you are and satisfy this requirement.  
 6 In contrast, the proposition ‘You form an intention to go skiing’ denotes a *positive*  
 7 *relation* between a process and a subject. Its truth necessitates that you are  
 8 undergoing a process and changing. In this sense, it denotes a positive relation  
 9 between you and a process. In short, if the proposition ‘S Xs’ signifies a *positive*  
 10 *relation* between *S* and a process, then *S Xs* can be true only if *S* undergoes a process.

### 11 12 3. Two putative functions: evaluation and guidance

13 Preliminaries over, I now come to my main subject: the function of process-  
 14 requirements. Why should we suppose that any normative requirement source  
 15 must issue (at least some) process-requirements, and not just requirements on  
 16 states? What could be an essential function of process-requirements, justifying  
 17 their existence?  
 18

19           To begin with, consider a requirement of *rationality*. It is commonly accepted  
 20 that rationality requires one’s normative beliefs and intentions to cohere with each  
 21 other (cf., for example, Broome 2008; Kolodny 2005; and Raz 2005). Roughly  
 22 speaking, rationality requires a person to intend whatever she believes she ought  
 23 to do. Kolodny, among many others, endorses this idea. He formulates this  
 24 requirement of rationality as follows.

25           Necessarily, if you believe at *t* that you ought to *X*, but you do not intend at *t* to *X*, then  
 26 rationality requires you to form going forward from *t*, on the basis of the content your  
 27 [sic] belief, the intention to *X*. (Kolodny 2007, 373)

28  
29  
30 No doubt, the consequent of this conditional states a process-requirement. When-  
 31 ever you believe that you ought to *X*, and yet you fail to intend to *X*, rationality  
 32 requires of you that you *form* an intention to *X*, on the basis of your belief that you  
 33 ought to *X*. ‘You form an intention to *X*’ denotes unequivocally a positive relation  
 34 between you and a process. It thus represents a genuine *process*-requirement.

35           Kolodny (2007, 373) thinks that essentially this formula is correct. He explic-  
 36 itly prefers it to a similar *state*-requirement formulation:

37           Necessarily, if you believe at *t* you ought to *X*, then rationality requires of you that  
 38 you intend at *t* to *X*. (Kolodny 2007, 373)

39  
40  
41 This formulation does *not* express a process-requirement. Its consequent states  
 42 a requirement with the following content: you intend at *t* to *X*. This refers to a  
 43 relation between you and an attitudinal *state* of yours. To satisfy this requirement,  
 44 no change is required.

1 Kolodny prefers the process-formulation to the state-formulation. But should  
2 we prefer it too?

3 Kolodny attempts to justify his preference by arguing that process-  
4 requirements meet two significant functions that state-requirements are unable to  
5 meet.<sup>14</sup> First, to correctly represent our ordinary explanations and judgements  
6 about a normative property (i.e., the property of prudence, morality, rationality,  
7 etc.), we need to assume that the corresponding normative requirement source  
8 issues process-requirements. Second, if a normative requirement source is to be  
9 behaviour- or response-guiding, it needs to issue process-requirements. Only  
10 process-requirements can guide our actions.

11 I will reconstruct Kolodny's first argument in two steps: first, he asserts that our  
12 ordinary attributions of the property of rationality are not only sensitive to the  
13 *states* a person is in, but also to the *process* a person undergoes:

14  
15 [An] [. . .] important feature of our ordinary attributions of rationality and irrational-  
16 ity is that they attach not only to states, but also to processes. We judge that a person  
17 is rational or irrational not only in virtue of the state he is in at a given time, but also  
18 in virtue of how he transitions from one state to another over time. (Kolodny 2005,  
19 516–517)  
20

21 In a second step, Kolodny explicates this point as follows:

22  
23 In other words, one is rational or irrational not only in virtue of the attitudes that one  
24 has at any given moment, but also in virtue of how one forms, retains, and revises  
25 one's attitudes over time. (Kolodny 2005, 517)  
26

27 That is, our grade of rationality is not only explained by the states we are in, but  
28 also by the processes we undergo. From this, Kolodny infers that rationality issues  
29 *process*-requirements.

30 Call this 'Kolodny's evaluation argument'. In assessing this argument, I shall  
31 make two concessions: (1) some of our ordinary attributions of rationality are  
32 based on the processes one undergoes; and (2) this implies that one possesses  
33 one's degree of rationality in virtue of how one forms and revises one's attitudes.<sup>15</sup>  
34 But even so, does this show that rationality imposes process-requirements upon  
35 us?

36 Consider a normative requirement source  $N$  that comes with a corresponding  
37 normative property, say  $P_N$ . Morality, rationality or prudence could possibly serve  
38

39 <sup>14</sup> Though Kolodny (2005; 2007) presents his arguments in the domain of rational  
40 requirements, I will take the liberty in this paper to extrapolate his arguments to sources of  
41 normative requirements other than rationality.

42 <sup>15</sup> To be sure, this implication holds only if we assume that our ordinary, process-based  
43 attributions of rationality and irrationality are, at least sometimes, *correct*.

1 as such a source. These are requirement sources, yet they also constitute a corre-  
 2 sponding property: a certain degree of rationality, prudence or morality.<sup>16</sup>

3 Suppose, then, that a subject *S* possesses a *non-maximal degree* of  $P_N$ . That  
 4 is, *S* is, for example, not fully rational, moral, or prudent. Assume further that *S*  
 5 has a non-maximal degree of  $P_N$  in virtue of *S* failing to undergo a certain process,  
 6 say *F*. In the context of *Kolodny's evaluation argument*, I read “in virtue of” as  
 7 expressing an explanatory and/or (at least) a counterfactual relationship between  
 8 *S* failing to undergo *F* and *S*'s non-maximal degree of  $P_N$ . That is, if *S* were to  
 9 undergo *F*, then, *ceteris paribus*, (this would explain why) *S* had a different  
 10 (higher) degree of  $P_N$ . This implies, Kolodny claims, that *N* imposes a process-  
 11 requirement. It requires of *S* that *S* undergo *F*.

12 On the face of it, *Kolodny's evaluation argument* seems compelling. If you are,  
 13 say, irrational because you fail to change some of your attitudes, it seems plausible  
 14 that rationality requires you to change those attitudes so as to restore your ratio-  
 15 nality. Likewise, if you are immoral because you refrain from undergoing a certain  
 16 process, morality requires you to undergo that process. Consequently, some, if not  
 17 all, normative sources seem to impose process-requirements.

18 Though on the face of it this appears plausible, I doubt that it is a sound  
 19 argument. It presupposes the correctness of the following inference.

20 at *t*, *S* has a non-maximal degree of  $P_N$  because *S* not-*Xs*. (1a)

21 and

22 If, at *t*, *S* has a non-maximal degree of  $P_N$  because *S* not-*Xs*, (1b)

23 then *N* requires of *S* that *S* *Xs*.

24 Therefore

25 at *t*, *N* requires of *S* that *S* *Xs*. (1c)

26  
 27  
 28 This is not a sound argument: (1b) is incorrect. First, an explanation for why you  
 29 have a non-maximal degree of  $P_N$  may lie in the past: suppose, at present, you are  
 30 immoral because, some time ago, you decided to adopt the rule not to help anyone  
 31 in need. Suppose, further, that the fact that you adopted this rule explains, at present,  
 32 why you are not fully moral. If you had not adopted this rule, you would not be  
 33 immoral now. Even so, it is surely absurd to infer from this that *now* morality  
 34 requires you to *undo* the fact that, *some time ago*, you adopted a rule in the past.  
 35 In the *now*, necessity extends to the facts of the past – at least on a practical level.  
 36 Such a requirement would thus violate the principle that ‘morality requires’ implies  
 37 ‘practically can’. It is thus not a plausible requirement of rationality.

38 This perhaps also suggests a way to reform the inference. Maybe *N* requires  
 39 you instead to undo everything that constitutes an explanation of why you have a  
 40

41 <sup>16</sup> Intuitively, we can attribute a degree of a property  $P_N$  to a subject *S* that corres-  
 42 ponds to a normative requirement source *N* if and only if *S* is subject to a requirement issued by  
 43 source *N*.



1 non-maximal degree of  $P_N$  if you are practically able to do so. That is, suppose, at  
 2 present, you have a non-maximal degree of  $P_N$  because you not- $X$ . You are now  
 3 able to  $X$ . So,  $N$  requires you to  $X$ .

4 However, I doubt that this suggestion can fix the argument. Take a coherentist  
 5 version of rationality. Broadly speaking, rationality issues requirements that  
 6 require one to avoid certain conflicts among one's attitudes.<sup>17</sup> It requires you not  
 7 to believe contradictions, to intend the means necessary to your intended ends,  
 8 to intend to do what you believe you ought to do, etc. Suppose that currently you  
 9 happen to believe that you ought to undertake some physical exercise, but you have  
 10 no intention of doing so. You violate a requirement of rationality. Your failure to  
 11 intend to exercise has a clear explanation: your current laziness. This prevents you  
 12 from forming an intention to exercise.

13 Let us assume that you are practically able to undo your laziness. A bit of  
 14 strong-willed authority over your activities would guarantee just that. According to  
 15 the reformed argument, this would entail that *coherentist* rationality requires you  
 16 *not* to be lazy. Surely, this is absurd. *Coherentist* rationality requires you to be  
 17 *coherent*. Laziness does not *per se* constitute a form of incoherence among your  
 18 attitudes. It is thus not part of what rationality requires of one. Hence, the reformed  
 19 argument fails too.

20 In sum, we cannot infer the existence of process-requirements from the fact  
 21 that failing to undergo a process can explain why we lack some property that  
 22 corresponds to a source of requirements.

23 I now turn to Kolodny's second argument. One function of normative require-  
 24 ments, Kolodny assumes, is to be normatively *response guiding*. Normative  
 25 requirements need to guide our actions and function as sources of advice in our  
 26 deliberations. Kolodny argues that *only* process-requirements can be response  
 27 guiding. He, in fact, doubts that *non*-process-requirements are real 'requirements'  
 28 at all:

29  
 30 Being rational just is responding in the ways that process-requirements call  
 31 for. . . . [T]he very idea of a state-requirement is questionable. If rational require-  
 32 ments are normative, deontic, or response guiding, then they call for the subject to  
 33 *respond* in a certain way. It is clear how forming, retaining, or revising one's attitudes  
 34 so as to *avoid or escape* a conflict state might qualify as a response. But how might  
 35 *not being in* a conflict-state qualify as a response? Indeed, one feels driven to  
 36 interpret the claim that one is required not to be in a conflict state as simply the claim  
 37 that one is under a very general process-requirement: to avoid or escape that conflict-  
 38 state in any way one likes. (Kolodny 2005, 517)

39  
 40 Call this 'Kolodny's guidance argument'. In brief, Kolodny argues that only  
 41 process-requirements can be response guiding. I think his argument is confused.  
 42 To show why, I need to first elucidate the notion of 'guidance'. Look again at the

43  
 44 <sup>17</sup> For a precise description of this type of rationality, see Scanlon 2007.

1 *GRS*: at *t*, *N* requires of *S* that *S* *Xs*. What needs to be true of *S*, *N*, and *S* *Xs*, so that  
 2 it can be said that *S* is guided by a requirement of this form?

3 In principle, there are *two* ways in which a requirement can be guiding (cf.  
 4 Smith 1988). Here is the first: suppose *S* explicitly represents the requirement ('at  
 5 *t*, *N* requires of *S* that *S* *Xs*') as the content of a propositional attitude – for instance,  
 6 a belief that the requirement is correct, or an intention to satisfy it. *S* is then guided  
 7 by a requirement via mentally entraining the requirement in *S*'s reasoning. That is,  
 8 *S*'s representation of the requirement causes *S*, in the right way,<sup>18</sup> to ensure that  
 9 *S* *Xs*. For example, deliberating between whether to buy a new car or to donate the  
 10 money to Oxfam, you come to form a belief that morality requires you to donate  
 11 the money rather than buy the car with it. If the entertainment of this belief then  
 12 causes you, in the right way, to donate the money to Oxfam,<sup>19</sup> then you were  
 13 guided by the requirement. In fact, the attitude that represents the requirement  
 14 causes its satisfaction. I shall call this 'explicit-causal guidance'.<sup>20</sup>

15 Here is a second way in which a normative requirement can be guiding. Often,  
 16 we are guided by a requirement without having any explicit representation of it  
 17 (cf. Railton 2006). In this sense, a requirement may be guiding in that one  
 18 sub-consciously 'subscribes to' the requirement. Being guided by a requirement  
 19 then consists in a suitable disposition<sup>21</sup> to conform to or satisfy the requirement  
 20 when one is subject to it.

21 Imagine a case like the following: suppose, for example, prudence requires you  
 22 to buy a ticket when taking the Underground. The expected fine exceeds the money  
 23

24 <sup>18</sup> I need to add "in the right way" in order to avoid the problem of *deviant causation*.  
 25 Suppose, for example, that you are a deeply immoral person. You despise everything moral,  
 26 though you accept that morality requires things of us. A consequence of your immorality is that  
 27 you are reliably disposed not to do anything moral. Assume now that this disposition, in  
 28 conjunction with your moral-requirement belief, cause you to sign what you take to be a petition  
 29 against donating to Oxfam. Yet you are mistaken about the document you signed. It is not a  
 30 petition against Oxfam, but a cheque that will transfer your money to Oxfam. Consequently, your  
 31 belief in a moral requirement has caused you to donate money to Oxfam. Yet, surely, you have  
 32 not been guided by any moral requirement.

33 I will not try to define "in the right way" here. For a creative and promising answer to this  
 34 question in the context of reasoning, see Wedgwood 2006.

35 <sup>19</sup> For a poignant criticism of this transition to count as genuine reasoning, see Broome  
 36 2009, sect. 3, and 2006, sects. 3 and 5.

37 <sup>20</sup> One problem that arises in the context of causal-explicit guidance is the problem of  
 38 following a rule. Suppose *S* explicitly represents the requirement *R* as the content of one of her  
 39 propositional attitudes. Suppose this causes, in a non-deviant way, that *S* satisfies *R*. Then, the  
 40 following question arises: how can we *know* that *S* was in fact guided by *R*, and not by some other  
 41 requirement whose content is co-extensive with that of *R*? (cf. Wittgenstein 1953 and Kripke  
 42 1982). I shall not try to answer this question here. Instead, I will assume that there is an adequate  
 43 way of picking out the exact content of a requirement that a subject follows.

44 <sup>21</sup> I do not wish to define when exactly a disposition of this sort will count as suitable.  
 45 For a very informative discussion of the nature of such a suitable disposition, see Railton 2006,  
 46 13.

1 you save by riding free. Because you have been caught once without a ticket, you  
 2 have developed a reliable disposition to buy a ticket before entering the Under-  
 3 ground. Your disposition is so reliable that you expect yourself to buy a ticket  
 4 before riding the Underground. Furthermore, noticing that you forgot to buy a  
 5 ticket gives you a feeling of uneasiness, making you get off the train as soon as you  
 6 can. In this case, it seems plausible that your behaviour is, in one sense or another,  
 7 guided by a prudential requirement not to ride the underground without a valid  
 8 ticket. This is the case even without your being aware of the requirement. I shall  
 9 call this ‘dispositional guidance’.

10 Suppose a requirement *R* is guiding in the *explicitly-causal* or in the *disposi-*  
 11 *tional* sense. Does this imply that *R* is a process-requirement? Does *R*’s content  
 12 have to refer to a relation between a subject and a process?

13 I do not think so. Let us start with *dispositional* guidance. For this type of  
 14 guidance to imply the existence of process-requirements, it would have to be  
 15 the case that *all* dispositions are tied to processes. That is, you can only have a  
 16 disposition of the relevant kind to *G* if *G* is a way of changing. In other words, it  
 17 is not possible to have a disposition to *be* or to *remain* as one is.

18 No doubt, this would be an absurd view. One can be disposed to *be* or to *remain*  
 19 in the state of not believing a contradiction, for instance. Of course, such a  
 20 disposition, if reliable, will imply that one is changing one’s attitudes whenever  
 21 one detects a contradiction among one’s beliefs. Further, one will adjust one’s  
 22 beliefs in such a way that one is prone not to enter the state of believing a  
 23 contradiction, etc. But that does not imply that one cannot be disposed to *be* some  
 24 way. At least, I do not know how to construe a credible argument for this position.

25 The same, I think, holds for *causal-explicit guidance*. Some prudential require-  
 26 ments will require you not to undergo a certain process. For example, I am sure  
 27 that prudence requires me at the moment not to jump out of the window. Clearly,  
 28 this is not a process-requirement. Suppose I form a belief about this requirement,  
 29 or that I intend to satisfy it. I do not see why entertaining this requirement in  
 30 such a way cannot cause me, in a non-deviant or rational way, to satisfy it. In  
 31 this sense, requirements that are not process-requirements can be guiding in the  
 32 explicit-causal way.

33 Why then does Kolodny claim that only process-requirements are guiding?  
 34 I guess his reasoning is this. Let us assume that you are undergoing a process that  
 35 is guided by a normative requirement *R*. Suppose *R* guides you to undergo a  
 36 process *F*. For instance, the fact that rationality requires you to intend the means  
 37 necessary to your intended ends guides you to form a particular intention. Call  
 38 *R* the ‘guiding requirement’ and *F* the ‘guided process’. Kolodny reasons, or so I  
 39 assume, that for *F* to be guided by *R*, it is necessary that the *content* of *R* explicitly  
 40 refer to a relation between the subject *S* and the process *F*. In other words, the  
 41 content of the *guiding requirement* must state the *guided process*. But that is a

1 mistake. The content of *R* may refer to a relation between *S* and a *state*, and,  
 2 nevertheless, guide *S* to undergo *F*. For example, a requirement not to have  
 3 contradictory intentions may guide you to undergo a process of ridding yourself of  
 4 an intention that contradicts another intention of yours.

5 In sum, for *F* to be a guided process, it is not necessary that the content of  
 6 the guiding requirement *R* signify a relation between a subject and *F*. *Kolodny's*  
 7 *guidance argument* thus fails to show that for a normative source to be guiding, it  
 8 needs to issue process-requirements.

#### 9 10 4. *Two further arguments*

11 So far, I have argued that both of Kolodny's arguments fail to establish the  
 12 existence of process-requirements. Neither the putatively guiding function of  
 13 normative requirements, nor the failure to undergo a process required by a nor-  
 14 mative source explaining why one lacks a maximal degree of a normative property  
 15 entails the existence of normative process-requirements.

16 In this section, I shall turn to two further arguments concerning the existence  
 17 of process-requirements. First, I will discuss the view that *all* requirements are  
 18 process-requirements. Second, I will consider whether process-requirements are  
 19 the consequence of a possible constitutive account of normative requirements.

20 In 'Why be rational?', Kolodny goes beyond defending that *some* rational  
 21 requirements process-requirements. He states that he is "[. . .] inclined to think  
 22 [. . .] that *all* rational requirements are process-requirements" (Kolodny 2005, 517;  
 23 my emphasis). Can this be a coherent view?

24 I do not think that it can. Consider a rational requirement that takes the  
 25 following form: rationality requires you to undergo a process so that you end up in  
 26 *A*, where *A* signifies a (combination of) state(s). What must be true of you so that  
 27 you can be subject to a requirement of this form? One condition seems evident: at  
 28 *t*, it must not be the case that you *A*. Take, for example, a requirement to *form*  
 29 an intention to *A*. This requirement can apply to you only whenever you do *not*  
 30 already have such an intention.

31 Intuitively, this is evident. There is no point in requiring you to *form* an attitude  
 32 you already have. Here is an argument in support of this intuition. First, consider  
 33 under which conditions you *can*, at *t*, form an intention to *A*. Obviously, you can,  
 34 at *t*, form an intention to *A* *only if*, at *t*, you do not intend to *A*. More generally, one  
 35 cannot undergo a process to end up with a particular attitude as long as one does  
 36 not have this attitude.<sup>22</sup> Thus, if 'at *t*, rationality requires you to *X*' implies that 'at  
 37

38  
 39 <sup>22</sup> Compare this with the process of driving to LA. You cannot drive to LA if you are  
 40 already in LA. Or you cannot raise your arm if your arm is already raised. Likewise, you cannot  
 41 rid yourself of a belief that *p* if you do not believe that *p*.

1 *t*, you can *X*', then you can be subject to a requirement to *form A* only if you  
2 not-*A*.

3 Let us assume now that, at *t*, you are fully rational. That is, at *t*, you only hold  
4 attitudes that are coherent and consistent with each other. Could you, in this  
5 situation, be subject to a rational *process*-requirement, i.e., a requirement you only  
6 satisfy through *changing*? I do not think you could. If anything, rationality would  
7 require you *not* to change your attitudes, but to *remain* as you are. As explained  
8 above, this would not amount to a process-requirement.

9 Let us add now Kolodny's cautious assumption that *all* rational requirements  
10 are process-requirements. It would imply that a *fully* rational individual is *not*  
11 *subject to a single* rational requirement.<sup>23</sup> *A fortiori*, a fully rational individual  
12 would not *satisfy* one requirement of rationality.

13 This is implausible. Compare this result with other normative sources of  
14 requirements. Suppose you are perfectly moral. You do everything morality  
15 demands of you. This does not imply that you *evade all* moral requirements.  
16 Morality *still* requires you not to kill, to be kind to strangers, to keep your  
17

18 <sup>23</sup> Here is a way to doubt this: a fully rational individual could still be subject to  
19 process-requirements, as long as they are *future-oriented*. Suppose again that *at present* you are  
20 fully rational. This does not exclude you, one might argue, from being subject to the following  
21 requirement: rationality requires of you *at present* that *in one hour* you either *form* an intention  
22 to *A* or drop your belief that you ought to *A*. A necessary (and possibly sufficient) condition for  
23 this requirement to apply to you is, of course, that it is *now* true that *in one hour* you believe that  
24 you ought to *A*, yet you do not intend to *A*.

25 Arguably, this condition poses a first problem for the existence of future-orientated requirements.  
26 I assume that either you satisfy or violate a requirement, or else you are not subject to it  
27 (cf. Broome 2007a, 38). So, if you are subject to *R*, you either satisfy or violate it. Both the  
28 satisfaction and violation of *R*, however, depend on the truth or falsity of a proposition describing  
29 future events that have not yet occurred. Some philosophers deem such propositions neither to be  
30 true nor false, as this, they argue, would imply an incredible version of determinism. For a clear  
31 discussion of this problem, see Faye, Scheffler and Urchs (1997).

32 For the sake of the argument, I will ignore this potential problem. Consequently, if *R* applies to  
33 you, then you either satisfy or violate *R*. But even so, I argue that it remains implausible that a  
34 fully rational being is now subject to future-orientated process-requirements like *R*.

35 Recall that the issue at stake is whether you can be subject to *R* while being *fully rational*. For  
36 this to be possible, the fact that it is *presently* true that *in one hour* you fail to intend to *A*, despite  
37 your belief that you ought to *A*, cannot reduce your rationality *now*. For *now*, you are fully  
38 rational. So, your future incoherence cannot contribute negatively to your degree of irrationality  
39 *now*. But in contrast, the fact that *at present* it is true that *in one hour* either you drop your belief  
40 that you ought to *A* or you form an intention to *A* must contribute positively to your degree of  
41 rationality *now*. For it makes it the case that you *now* satisfy *R* – which is thus part of the  
42 explanation why you are *presently* maximally rational. Put succinctly, if *R* were to represent a  
43 correct requirement, then your future incoherence *would not* diminish your current rationality,  
44 whereas your future transition towards coherence *would* contribute to your current rationality.  
45 This is highly implausible. Hence, I doubt that one can be subject to future-orientated require-  
46 ments like *R* while being fully rational. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising the  
47 possibility of future-orientated process-requirements.

1 promises, *etc.* As an impeccably moral person you *satisfy* all of these require-  
 2 ments. Hence, you are subject to these requirements.<sup>24</sup>

3 In brief, a fully moral, rational or prudent individual is not subject to moral,  
 4 rational or prudential process-requirements. Therefore, it cannot be that *all* moral,  
 5 rational or prudential requirements are process-requirements. Morality, rationality  
 6 and prudence do not *only* demand change.

7 I now turn to a further argument in favour of the existence of normative  
 8 process-requirements. What *constitutes* a normative requirement? In other words:  
 9 what makes it the case that a normative requirement source *N* requires of *S* that *S* *Xs*?

10 In the domain of rationality, Andrew Reisner, among others, alludes to what  
 11 I shall call the *necessary-condition analysis*. Reisner (2009, 257 n5) writes “that  
 12 rational requirements should express necessary [. . .] conditions for rationality”.  
 13 Kolodny supports this view. He states “it is relatively clear how we might settle  
 14 questions about what rationality requires; it requires whatever is necessary for  
 15 coherence” (Kolodny 2005, 511). I take it that Kolodny uses “coherence” as  
 16 expressing a property identical to full rationality.<sup>25</sup> In short, rationality requires  
 17 whatever is (a) necessary (condition) for full rationality.

18 Extending this argument to normative sources of requirements other than  
 19 rationality, we can give the following account of normative requirements.

20 *Necessary-condition account.* Necessarily, for all normative sources *N*, *N*-  
 21 corresponding properties *P<sub>N</sub>*, subjects *S*, and propositions *S Xs*, *N* requires of *S* that  
 22 *S Xs* if and only if *S Xs* is a necessary condition for *S* to have a maximal degree of *P<sub>N</sub>*.

23 For example, if the fact that you eat lots of vegetables is a necessary condition for  
 24 you to have the property of full prudence, then prudence requires you to eat a lot  
 25 of vegetables. This account also stipulates when something is *not* required by a  
 26 normative source. For example, the fact that Sue’s counting the hairs in her  
 27 eyebrows is not a necessary condition for Sue to be fully moral entails that it is *not*  
 28 the case that morality requires of Sue that she count her eyebrow hairs.

29 Would the *necessary-condition account* of normative requirements guarantee  
 30 the existence of process-requirements? It certainly would. Suppose, at *t*, *N* requires  
 31 you to have a certain attitude *A*. Yet, at *t*, you lack this attitude. Hence, a necessary  
 32 condition for you to have a maximal degree of *P<sub>N</sub>* is to have *A*. Since you can have  
 33  
 34  
 35

36 <sup>24</sup> The same argument could be offered for legal requirements. Suppose you are subject  
 37 to the laws that apply in a particular legislative context *L*. Suppose in *L* you possess a maximum  
 38 degree of legality. That is, you do *everything* the law requires of you. Again, this does not imply  
 39 that you evade the laws that apply to you in *L*. Instead, you *satisfy* all of them.

40 <sup>25</sup> One might suspect that this makes Kolodny’s analysis circular, but it does not. As  
 41 explained in the introduction, ‘rationality’ in ‘rationality requires’ refers to a source of require-  
 42 ments. It refers to the fact that rationality issues requirements. ‘Rationality’ in ‘full rationality’  
 43 refers to a property. It is a property one possesses if and only if one satisfies all requirements one  
 44 is under. For more on this source/property distinction see Broome (2007; 2010).

1 *A only if you form A, forming A* will also be a necessary condition for you to have  
 2 a maximal degree of  $P_N$ . Thus,  $N$  will require you to *form A*. This is a process-  
 3 requirement. Its content signifies a positive relation between a subject, i.e., you,  
 4 and a process, i.e., the formation of  $A$ . Consequently, if the *necessary-condition*  
 5 *account* is correct, then we can infer the existence of process-requirements.

6 However, the *necessary-condition account* cannot amount to a *sound* defence  
 7 of process-requirements. For it is not correct. In fact, it is too inclusive. It implies  
 8 that rationality, morality or prudence necessarily require things of us that are  
 9 clearly *not* necessarily required by these normative sources.

10 Take a list of necessary conditions for  $S$  to be fully rational, moral or prudent.  
 11 This list will surely include properties like ‘being alive’, ‘having a mind’, ‘thinking  
 12 with propositions’, ‘being spatially extended’, etc. No doubt, nothing can have the  
 13 property of full rationality, morality or prudence without being alive, or having a  
 14 mind or being spatially extended. But it would be absurd to say that in virtue of *not*  
 15 having one of these properties,  $S$  violates a normative requirement. Take a stone, for  
 16 example. It neither violates a normative requirement nor fails to be entirely as it ought  
 17 to be in virtue of not being alive, or having no mind, etc. – though these are plainly  
 18 necessary conditions, in *any* context, for a stone to be fully rational, moral or prudent.

19 There is another shortcoming in any *necessary-condition account*. *Everything*  
 20 would be *subject to* the requirements of rationality were we to accept it: stones,  
 21 flowers, tumble-dryers, etc. We would need to specify necessary conditions for full  
 22 rationality for all these things. Again, this is a nonsensical consequence. Stones,  
 23 flowers and tumble-dryers are plainly *not* subject to any requirements of rational-  
 24 ity. We cannot, therefore, give an account of normative requirements in terms of  
 25 only specifying necessary conditions for full rationality. In consequence, the  
 26 necessary-condition approach fails to prove the existence of process-requirements.

### 27 28 5. *The function of normative process-requirements*

29 So far, none of the putative functions of process-requirements discussed above  
 30 have been able to prove the existence of process-requirements. Nonetheless, in this  
 31 final section, I shall defend process-requirements as being essential for any system  
 32 of normative requirements. Process-requirements do possess a unique function  
 33 that non-process-requirements are unable to execute.

34 My defence of process-requirements will focus on a particular type of process-  
 35 requirement. I will look at requirements to undergo a process with the effect of  
 36 ending up in a state of having a certain (combination) of attitude(s).<sup>26</sup> Such  
 37 requirements are not uncommon. I will argue that there are situations in which, for  
 38  
 39

40 <sup>26</sup> Alternatively, I will be concerned with requirements that require one to undergo a  
 41 process so that one ends up in a particular state.

1 example, morality requires you to form an intention to help your neighbours;  
 2 prudence requires you to drop your desire to play with guns; rationality requires  
 3 you to rid yourself of believing a contradiction, etc.

4 I shall refer to this type of normative requirement as a *teleological* process-  
 5 requirement. The ‘teleology’ consists in undergoing a process that *aims* at ending  
 6 in particular attitudinal state. If, for instance, prudence requires you to drop your  
 7 desire to play with guns, then this requirement aims at transforming you into a  
 8 state in which you are free of such a desire. In brief, I shall argue that teleological  
 9 process-requirements have the following function: they are necessary for ascribing  
 10 an *accurate* degree of a normative property to a subject. Put more precisely,  
 11 any system of normative requirements that lacks such teleological process-  
 12 requirements is unable to differentiate between: (a) a subject who is not entirely as  
 13 she ought to be, but who does nothing to redeem her normative failure; and (b) a  
 14 subject who is equally not as she ought to be, *yet* who is on her way to redeeming  
 15 this normative failure. I hope this view will become clear by the end of this section.

16 Before I can make this argument, however, I need to examine the *satisfaction*  
 17 conditions of teleological process-requirements. When does one *satisfy*, and when  
 18 does one *violate* such a requirement? Moreover, when does one *avoid* being  
 19 subject to a process-requirement?

20 To answer this, consider first a general formulation of teleological  
 21 process-requirements:

22  
 23 *General teleological process-requirement: At  $t$ ,  $N$  requires of  $S$  that  $S$  undergo a*  
 24 *process  $F$  so that  $S$  As,*

25  
 26 where the proposition ‘ $S$  As’ denotes an attitudinal state or a particular attitude the  
 27 process  $F$  terminates in. For instance, let ‘ $F$ ’ refer to the process of  $S$  forming a  
 28 belief that elephants are pink. Then, ‘ $S$  As’ signifies the state of  $S$  believing that  
 29 elephants are pink. In other words, the process  $F$  and the attitudinal state  $S$  As are  
 30 related such that  $F$  *aims* at realising that  $S$  As.

31 The following requirement covers the structure of the *general teleological*  
 32 *process-requirement*. Suppose, at  $t$ , prudence requires of Olivia that Olivia under-  
 33 goes a process of forming an intention with the effect that Olivia intends to reduce  
 34 her working hours. In short, at  $t$ , prudence requires Olivia to form an intention to  
 35 reduce her working hours. Call this requirement  $R_p$ . When does Olivia satisfy or  
 36 violate this requirement? In addition, when does Olivia avoid being subject to this  
 37 requirement?

38 It is clear when Olivia satisfies  $R_p$ . She satisfies it whenever: (1)  $R_p$  applies to  
 39 her;<sup>27</sup> and (2) the proposition forming the content of the requirement is true (i.e.

40  
 41 <sup>27</sup> By ‘ $R_p$  applies to her’, I mean that Olivia is subject to a requirement with the content  
 42 of  $R_p$ . In other words, the proposition that expresses  $R_p$  is true.



1 Olivia undergoes a process of forming an intention to reduce her working hours).  
 2 But when exactly are (1) and (2) the case?

3 I think that *prima facie* there are two plausible views on this. The first view I  
 4 shall call ‘completion-satisfaction’: assume that  $R_p$  applies within the period  
 5 between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ . In other words, for all times  $t$  within the period  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ ,  $R_p$  holds  
 6 true. Then Olivia satisfies  $R_p$  at every moment  $t$  within  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  for which it is true  
 7 that Olivia has *completed* the process of forming an intention to reduce her  
 8 working hours. In short, satisfying a teleological process-requirement is a matter  
 9 of *completing* the required process by ending up in the state the required process  
 10 aims at.

11 Does *completion-satisfaction* provide a correct view of when one satisfies a  
 12 teleological process-requirement? I do not think it does. In fact, it violates an  
 13 important constraint on normative requirements, namely that one *can satisfy* a  
 14 normative requirement *while* it applies to one.<sup>28</sup> I shall illustrate this below.

15 In section 4, I already mentioned one condition for Olivia’s being able to  
 16 undergo a process so that she will end up with an intention to reduce her working  
 17 hours: at  $t$ , Olivia can undergo this process only if, at  $t$ , she does not *already* intend  
 18 to reduce her working hours. That is, at  $t$ , one can form an intention to  $X$  only if,  
 19 at  $t$ , one does *not* intend to  $X$ . More generally, one cannot undergo a teleological  
 20 process aiming at forming a state as long as one is in that state.

21 Let us assume that a normative requirement implies *can* in the following sense:  
 22 if, at  $t$ , a normative source  $N$  requires of  $S$  that  $S$   $X$ s, then, at  $t$ , it is *possible* that  $S$   
 23  $X$ s. I take this to be relatively uncontroversial.

24 Though uncontroversial, it has a significant consequence: Olivia *can* form an  
 25 intention to reduce her working hours only if she does not intend to reduce her  
 26 working hours. So, Olivia is subject to a normative requirement to form an  
 27 intention to reduce her working hours only if she does *not* intend reduce her  
 28 working hours. Intuitively, this seems evident too. There is no point in normatively  
 29 requiring one to *form* an intention one already has.

30 Apply this result to what I called *completion-satisfaction*, i.e., the view that  
 31 you satisfy a process-requirement from the moment you begin successfully com-  
 32 pleting the process onwards. It implies a significant *application* condition for  
 33 teleological process-requirements such as  $R_p$ : Olivia *cannot* intend to reduce her  
 34 working hours while she is subject to  $R_p$ . Being subject to  $R_p$  presupposes that  
 35 Olivia does *not* intend to reduce her working hours.

36 Apply this to the view that one satisfies a teleological process-requirement only  
 37 once one *has* formed the attitude at which the required process aims, i.e.,  
 38 *completion-satisfaction*. It implies that Olivia must *violate*  $R_p$  for it to apply to her.  
 39 As long as Olivia is subject to  $R_p$ , Olivia infringes this requirement by not having  
 40

41 <sup>28</sup> Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007 defend this principle.

1 reached the state of intending to reduce her working hours. The application of a  
2 teleological process-requirement thus presupposes its violation.

3 This is significant. *Completion-satisfaction* implies that you *cannot satisfy*  $R_P$ .  
4 If it is not the case that you violate a teleological process-requirement, then you are  
5 not subject to this requirement. Consequently, you *cannot* satisfy a teleological  
6 process-requirement.

7 No doubt, this is an incredible result. It should lead us to abandon *completion-*  
8 *satisfaction* and consider an alternative account of when a subject satisfies a  
9 teleological process-requirement.

10 I now turn to another account as to when a subject satisfies a teleological  
11 process-requirement. Consider again  $R_P$  and assume that Olivia is under this  
12 requirement between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ . Within this period, I suggest that Olivia satisfies  $R_P$   
13 from the moment she *enters* a process of forming an intention to reduce her  
14 working hours *until* the moment she has successfully formed an intention to  
15 reduce her working hours. In other words, Olivia satisfies  $R_P$  exactly as long  
16 as she is *in the process* of (successfully) forming the intention to reduce her  
17 working hours.

18 Why does Olivia not satisfy  $R_P$  *before* she enters this process? The answer  
19 is trivial: Olivia is simply *not* undergoing the required process. Why does she  
20 not satisfy  $R_P$  *after* she has formed this intention? Because then, as explained  
21 before, Olivia is no longer subject to this requirement. Put generally, one satisfies  
22 a teleological process-requirement precisely in the period one undergoes the  
23 process of successfully forming the state the process aims at.

24 Let us call this ‘in-the-process satisfaction’. It gives us a view on which you  
25 *can* satisfy a teleological process-requirement *while* it applies to you. It thereby  
26 avoids the grave problems arising from *completion-satisfaction* requirements.  
27 But what could be an intelligible function of *in-the-process-satisfaction* process-  
28 requirements? Why should one suppose that a normative requirement source  
29 issues teleological process-requirements that you satisfy precisely as long as you  
30 are successfully undergoing change towards a required state?

31 In the remainder of this paper, I shall defend the following view: *in-the-process*  
32 *satisfaction* process-requirements are necessary to assign fine-grained degrees of  
33 any normative property to a subject. *Non-process-requirements*, such as state  
34 requirements, are unable to execute this function.

35 Suppose, at  $t$ , a normative source  $N$  requires Jack and Jim to intend to help their  
36 neighbours. However, both violate this requirement, as, at  $t$ , Jack and Jim have no  
37 intention of helping their neighbours. Suppose further that, at  $t$ , Jack and Jim are  
38 identical in every aspect save one: at  $t$ , Jack is deliberately undergoing a process of  
39 (successfully) forming an intention to help their neighbours, whereas Jim is not. I  
40 assume this implies – at least for some normative source  $N$  – that, at  $t$ , Jack has a  
41 higher corresponding property degree of  $P_N$  than Jim.

1           Why is this assumption correct? Suppose *morality* requires both Jack and Jim  
 2 individually to intend to help their neighbours. Their neighbours' house is about  
 3 to burn down and they can hear them screaming for help. Assume that while Jim  
 4 remains unmoved by this event, Jack has started deciding to do something about  
 5 the situation. This brings him to, at  $t$ , undergo a deliberate process to successfully  
 6 form the required intention. Even though, at  $t$ , both fail to be as they are ultimately  
 7 required to be, Jack seems at this point to be the *more moral* individual. He is  
 8 changing in a moral direction. For this, I assume, Jack deserves some normative  
 9 credit. We should ascribe a higher degree of morality to Jack than to Jim.

10          If this is correct, then it entails that teleological in-the-process-satisfaction  
 11 process-requirements have a significant function. Take again the normative  
 12 requirement source 'morality', and its corresponding property. How moral  $S$  will  
 13 be, at a given point of time, will depend on the ratio of moral requirements that  
 14  $S$  satisfies/violates at  $t$ . I assume there will be a function from requirement  
 15 satisfaction/violation to the degree of the normative property.<sup>29</sup> If this is the case,  
 16 it will guarantee the correctness of the following 'minimal comparative principle'.  
 17

18           *Minimal comparative principle.* Necessarily, for all times  $t$ , subjects  $S$ , requirement  
 19 sources  $N$ , and degrees of normative properties  $P_N$ , if, at  $t$ ,  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  are subject to the  
 20 same requirements of  $N$ , then, at  $t$ ,  $S_1$  has a higher degree of  $P_N$  than  $S_2$  if and only  
 21 if, at  $t$ ,  $S_1$  satisfies at least one more *requirement* of  $N$  than  $S_2$ .  
 22

23          Put succinctly, two subjects that are under the same set of normative requirements  
 24 cannot have different degrees of a normative property unless one of them satisfies  
 25 a requirement that the other does not satisfy. With this principle in mind, let us  
 26 consider looking again at the example of Jack and Jim above. I said that, at  $t$ , Jack  
 27 is *more moral* than Jim because in one aspect of his attitudes, Jack is intentionally  
 28 moving in a moral direction. Unlike Jim, Jack is, at  $t$ , on his way in undergoing a  
 29 deliberate process that will redeem his violation of a moral state-requirement,  
 30 namely to intend to help his neighbours. Given the *minimal comparative principle*,  
 31 this can be so only if Jack satisfies at least one more *moral requirement* than Jim.  
 32 As Jack and Jim are otherwise morally identical, the satisfaction of this additional  
 33 requirement must be regarded as the only difference that holds between Jack and  
 34 Jim: the fact that, at  $t$ , Jack, unlike Jim, is undergoing the process of forming this  
 35 intention to help his neighbours. This is what satisfies the additional requirement  
 36 and makes Jack more moral than Jim.

37          Consequently, we need to suppose that both Jack and Jim are subject to at least  
 38 one teleological *in-the-process satisfaction* process-requirement. This requirement  
 39

40           <sup>29</sup> I do not take this to be a linear function. Some requirements will be more significant  
 41 that others. Their satisfaction will lead to a higher increase of your degree of a normative property  
 42 than the satisfaction of less significant requirements. Nevertheless, I assume that the satisfaction  
 43 of an additional normative requirement will always – all other things being equal – lead to some  
 44 increase of the degree of your normative property.

1 will read as follows: at  $t$ , morality requires of both Jack and Jim individually that  
 2 each deliberately form an intention to help his neighbours. Jack *satisfies* this  
 3 requirement because, at  $t$ , he is undergoing a deliberate process of forming an  
 4 intention to help his neighbours. Jim *violates* it because, at  $t$ , he is not forming  
 5 an intention to help his neighbours. This requirement, therefore, marks the nor-  
 6 mative difference between Jack and Jim. It gives us a means of conducting a fitting  
 7 normative appraisal of them.

8 In sum, the function of normative process-requirements is this: suppose, at  $t$ , a  
 9 normative requirement source  $N$  requires you to be in a particular attitudinal state  
 10  $A$ . However, at  $t$ , you not- $A$ . Assume now that you can increase your degree of  $N$ 's  
 11 corresponding property,  $P_N$ , by, *ceteris paribus*, successfully undergoing a certain  
 12 type of process that will lead you to  $X$  at  $t_1$ . Moving in the 'right direction' will thus  
 13 give you some normative credit. This can be so, however, only if by undergoing  
 14 this process you satisfy a normative requirement you did not satisfy before under-  
 15 going the process. Consequently, you must be subject to a requirement that you  
 16 satisfy only while successfully forming the attitudinal state  $A$ . Such a requirement  
 17 will need to have the following features. First, its content will have to define a  
 18 positive relation between you and a process of forming  $X$ . Second, you will have  
 19 to satisfy it in the period in which you are successfully forming  $X$ . These two  
 20 features in fact constitute a definition of teleological process-requirements. Their  
 21 outlined function therefore guarantees their existence.

## 22 23 6. Concluding remarks

24 This paper discusses the existence of normative process-requirements. Process-  
 25 requirements are often held to fulfil two essential functions: first, they are suppos-  
 26 edly necessary to ensure that a normative source of requirements can guide our  
 27 behaviour; second, process-requirements are thought necessary for the correctness  
 28 of our ordinary, process-based explanations of our degrees of a normative property.  
 29

30 I argue, however, that both these putative functions are unable to establish the  
 31 existence of process-requirements. First, to be guiding is not an exclusive function  
 32 of process-requirements; non-process-requirements can also guide our behaviour.  
 33 Second, the fact that degrees of normative properties depend counterfactually or  
 34 explanatorily on processes we (fail to) undergo is logically too weak to prove the  
 35 existence of process-requirements. If this were sufficient to prove the existence of  
 36 process-requirements, it would imply, for example, that normative requirements  
 37 require us to undo everything that counts as an explanation of why we do not have  
 38 a full degree of a normative property. This would lead to implausible requirements.  
 39 Neither function can thus establish the existence of process-requirements.

40 However, I am not denying the existence of process-requirements altogether. In  
 41 fact, I argue that process-requirements do have an(other) essential function within

any system of normative requirements. Process-requirements are necessary to assign the correct degree of a normative property to those subjects who violate a set of normative state-requirements, yet who are undergoing a process to redeem this failure. A system of *non*-process-requirements could not evaluate such subjects correctly. It could not differentiate between those on the one hand who violate a set of state-requirements, yet who are in the process of changing this and those on the other who are infringing the same set of requirements, and yet remain unmoved to redeem this infringement. Process-requirements are consequently a significant part of a system of normative requirements. They are needed for a correct normative evaluation.

This conclusion may have significant ramifications for the nature of normative requirements. For example, Kolodny premises two views on the existence of process-requirements: first, that some requirements of rationality take a narrow scope; and second, that these rational requirements are thus not reason-giving. As far as the analysis and conclusions of this paper are concerned, this could still amount to a sound argumentative route. However, I doubt that process-requirements necessitate the narrow-scope form of rational requirements, or indeed of any other type. I also doubt, therefore, that the existence of process-requirements jeopardizes the reason-giving nature of rational requirements. Yet these issues have not been touched in this paper, and still remain subject to further analyses.\*

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