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WANTS AND ACTS
LOGICAL, CAUSAL, AND MATERIAL CONNECTIONS

A Thesis
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of
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by

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By EDWARD ALLEN FRANCISCO

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Complies with the University regulations and that it meets the accepted standards of the Graduate School with respect to originality and quality

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iv
THE GRAMMAR OF 'WANT' AND 'DESIRE' - 1	1
Transitivity, Inequivalency, and Intentionality.	3
Objects, Belief Conditions, and Avowals.	24
Ordinary Sanctions for Talk about Unconscious Desires.	55
Objects and Accusatives.	68
Accusatives.	68
Intentional Contexts	71
Referential Opacity and Referential Transparency	73
THE GRAMMAR OF 'WANT' AND 'DESIRE' - 2	79
<u>Desiderabilia</u>	81
Wants and Lacks.	102
Wants and Wishes	109
<u>Homo Distractus</u>	120
WANTS AND ACTS	130
'If S wants to <u>a</u> , then, <u>ceteris paribus</u> , S will <u>a</u> ' (L_1).	131
Advocacy of L_1	131
Objections to L_1	132
Wants as Dispositions: L_1 Again.	145
Wants as Hypothetical Constructs	148
Wants as Theoretical Constructs.	152
The Tripartite Logical Web (L_2).	154
Acts as Criteria for Wants (L_3).	157
Descriptive-Dependency (L_4) and Causation.	158
Action Theory and Ontology	164
NOTES.	167
REFERENCES	180
VITA	184

ABSTRACT

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This inquiry is addressed to two questions: (1) what if any logical relations might exist between the concepts of desire and action (as they and the distinctions to which they commit us are ensconced in ordinary parlance), and (2) what if any causal or significant non-causal (i.e., material) relations might ever exist between instances of desire and action?

It is held that any credible move to deal with such questions must initially, and at some length, specify the employment conditions for the terms 'want' and 'desire'. This is accomplished in the first two chapters wherein a set of premises is generated for the argument of the inquiry which is presented in full and concluded in the third and final chapter. Premises generated devolve from treatment of the following major topics: (a) the grammar of 'want' and 'desire', (b) the ontological status of wants, (c) first-person and third-person want ascriptions, (d) the sorts of things which may be desired (desiderabilia), (e) wants and lacks, (f) wants and wishes, (g) the 'conflicts' of desires and reason and desire, (h) four major candidates for logical relations between wants and acts, (i) the issue of causation, and (j) the placement of Desire in an adequate ontology of man.

It is argued that every major candidate for a logical relation between wants and acts (or our warrant for believing that such a connection exists) breaks down upon analysis; that little warrant exists for construing wants as causes of acts; that wants and acts are related in significant non-logical and non-causal (i.e., material) respects; and that any fully adequate theory of human action must undertake ontology, placing the category of Desire squarely in the foreground.

This project represents neither a general theory of desire nor a general theory of human action. It is rather conceived as a propaedeutic to any such inquiry. It is essentially revisionist in intent, setting out on the one hand to challenge existing claims about wants and acts and, on the other hand, proposing a more satisfactory approach to the issue. In no sense is it suggested that recent Anglo-American contributions are without merit. It is rather argued that they are often inadequate contributions vis-á-vis the larger requirements for an adequate theory of human action.

THE GRAMMAR OF 'WANT' AND 'DESIRE' - 1

What relation could conceivably exist between wanting to be a virtuous man and in fact being one, or between wanting a vintage wine and getting one?

More generally and more formally, (1) what if any logical relations might exist between the concepts of desire and action (as they and the distinctions to which they commit us are ensconced in ordinary language), and (2) what if any causal or significant non-causal (i.e., material) relations might ever exist between instances of desire and action? These are the questions to which this inquiry is addressed.

Prior to any credible move to deal with such questions, one must, with some subtlety, be able to specify the employment conditions for 'want' and 'desire'. Loosely but conveniently titled "The Grammar of 'Want' and 'Desire'", the first two chapters of this discussion are conceived to provide those specifications. In doing this we will, in effect, generate a set of premises (as well as independent conclusions) for the actual argument of the inquiry which will be concluded in the third chapter. Addressed to questions 1 and 2, that argument is, to put the matter too simply but succinctly: (1) that every major candidate for a logical connection between wants and acts, or our warrant for believing that such a connection exists, breaks down upon analysis; (2) that little warrant exists for characterizing wants as causes of acts; (3) that wants and acts are related in important material (i.e., synthetic and 'quasi-analytic') and existential respects.

But it is not the purpose of this inquiry to formulate either a general theory of action or a general theory of desire. The purpose is rather, and more narrowly, to focus upon 'desire' and 'want' with a view to deciding what conceptual links they might have with 'action', 'doing', and 'behavior'. The primary point of investigating these links centers about the roles which they play in the customary business of accounting for and justifying that which we are inclined to do, intend to do, are doing, and have done. For it appears indisputable enough that any statements about such links which further clarify what we are about when we aim to render our desires and actions intelligible are manifestly worthwhile. Moreover, the less direct but no less worthwhile end of more rigorously stating just how ordinary and technical usages of these terms may differ is furthered by such clarifications. The latter of these ends is not itself an end of this inquiry; it rather provides yet another reason for undertaking to accomplish the former.

It is recognized however, that in view of myriad colloquial disparities, and the osmosis which obtains between technical and conventional language systems, that what counts as 'ordinary parlance' can be a matter of serious dispute. But it is not the case that the osmosis is so systemic, or the disparities so multiple, that we are quite unable to identify clear, cross-sectionally representative instances from such systems. Maintaining the contrary position would effectively constitute a denial of the distinction in question. The procedure of this inquiry will, for the most part then, be that of selecting and examining certain common locutions which are manifestly ordinary rather than technical in nature or derivation, locutions which center about the concepts expressed by 'desire', 'want', 'action', and their conceptual cognates.

As a propaedeutic to such an inquiry, an examination of the grammar of 'desire' and 'want' must be furnished if any real weight is to be attached to subsequent claims about the concepts which are expressed by them. As a matter of establishing groundwork and basic distinctions this initial project is a necessarily lengthy one. However, it will afford considerable economy for later developments.

Transitivity, Inequivalency, and Intentionality

Beginning then, it is initially important to determine whether 'desire' and 'want' are strictly substitutable terms in both their verbal and nominative forms. As verbs, both are transitive (the intransitivity of 'want' shall be considered later), i.e., as predicates either of sentences or of sentential clauses both require an accusative for the completion of their meanings. Considered syntactically, both verbs are formulas which satisfy the schematum 'V:___' where some variable substantive term or infinitive phrase 'Ø' must be introduced into the formula if that formula is to produce a strictly well-formed function, i.e., if complete (though not exhaustive) sense is to be produced.

The apparently clear exception to this general requirement is given by the simple constructions 'S desires' and 'S wants' where 'I' is a substitution instance of 'S'. Certainly these are atypical constructions since, if we care to report that desiring obtains, we shall usually as well care to report either that which is desired or that there is something ('S desires something') such that S desires it. Though atypical, 'S desires' is surely not senseless; it is information-giving and it is syntactically acceptable. But it is only nominally information-giving and the requirements of transitivity, namely the occurrence of

some 'Ø' in 'V:___', appear unfulfilled.

A solution is provided by an appeal to the distinction between depth and surface grammar whereupon 'S desires' is analyzable as an essentially cryptic locution, i.e., as an ellipsis for one of the following (or some very similar construction): 'S desires Ø' (where 'something' is a substitution instance of 'Ø'), 'S has a desire', 'S is in a state of desiring', and 'S is a being that desires'. Only the first of these constructions involves a straightforwardly transitive use of 'desire' while the second employs 'desire' as a noun and the third and fourth employ participial and present tense forms of the verb as modifiers in a predication (although the fourth does involve what might be spoken of as a 'generically transitive' use of the verb whereby it is implied that S is the sort of being such that certain objects can stand to S as-desired but not implied that any object-specification is in the offing). Where 'S desires' is an ellipsis for 'S desires Ø', as when the object is ostensibly indicated, then 'desire' is behaving transitively and 'S desires' is elliptically (though not strictly) well-formed. Strictly, the object desired must be denoted by a grammatical object 'Ø' as in 'S desires Ø' in order that 'V:___' be satisfied (as in 'V:Ø'). And if every non-transitive analysis of the occurrence of 'desire' in 'S desires' produces a depth-grammar construction which does not employ 'desire' as the predicate of a sentence, but rather involves the use of a surface-grammar surrogate for a depth-grammar noun, modifier, 'generically-transitive' verb, or some other part of speech, then no exceptions thereby exist to the claim that 'to desire', qua predicate simpliciter, is transitive and satisfies 'V:___'. The distinction between elliptical and strict transitivity accounts for the fact that the lack of a grammatical

object for 'desire' qua predicate does not introduce nonsense; but the distinction is one between modes or sorts of transitivity and not one between transitive and intransitive occurrences of 'to desire'.

It is at this point that an important difference between the verbs 'desire' and 'want' emerges. Although each is transitive, it is not true that each is transitive in precisely the same way. That is, 'desire' appears to be a strictly intentional verb in that, when it occurs as the predicate of a sentence, it requires both that (1) its grammatical object denote and intentional object,¹ i.e., an object which is in some sense predicable of a mind, and (2) that its subject term denote either a being which can have intentional objects (an intending being) or a non-intending being presented as if it were an intending being, as in 'The earth desires the moon'. The concept expressed by 'desire' is an intentional concept and its occurrence consistently produces, it would appear, an intentional context, i.e., a context which we can provisionally describe as one which in some way involves an intending being (denoted by a subject term) in intending (signified by a transitive verb) some state of affairs (denoted by an accusative).

On the other hand, 'want' is certainly not a strictly intentional verb. Certain senses of 'want' are intensionally equivalent to the non-intentional senses of 'lack', 'require', and 'need' and do not produce intentional contexts. Examples are provided by the sentences 'The photograph wants depth' and 'The lawn wants mowing'. In making sense of these sentences we are not constrained to conclude that the referents of 'the photograph' and 'the lawn' are to be regarded as if they were intending beings, although, given the right context, it might be clear that such

a conclusion is warranted. Given that not every occurrence of the verb 'want' produces an intentional context it is clear that not every such occurrence requires either a grammatical object which denotes an intentional object or a subject term which denotes an intending being. Accordingly, there is a clear difference between the employment conditions for 'desire' and 'want'.

Although it appears that the grammatical object of a predicative occurrence of 'desire' must denote an intentional object, an object which consists of certain 'descriptions'² of the desired state of affairs, it need not and often must not denote merely an intentional object; for object specification typically involves reference to manifest or 'actual' objects or states of affairs not commonly regarded as essentially mental or intentional in nature such that something about some such thing is desired.

It is quite important to exercise care with this introduction of descriptions since it is often true that the desiring being is unable to offer a description of the object (and here we avoid prejudicing the inquiry by insisting that only language-users are capable of desiring). The point is rather that something on the order of a concept of the object desired (whether it is believed to exist or not) must be held by the desiring being, especially if we are to make sense of the desire for a unicorn and the like.³

Surely it is not necessary that the concept of a particular thing or state of affairs be held but only that a concept be held. But the term 'concept' is troublesome since it suggests some rather comprehensive or refined idea of the basic nature of a thing, whereas the idea of

a thing desired is often much more like a notion, involving as it does only a certain schematum of the thing which is quite partial. One might claim to desire 'that' without even having a belief as to what sort of thing it is while nevertheless desiring it because of some perceived or inferred feature of the thing which is considered desirable. The term 'concept' is, on the other hand, very suitable since it connotes intentionality, ideation, and judgment. Subsequent practice shall be, therefore, to employ 'concept' to talk about desiderative objects while remaining mindful that restrictions of the sort indicated may be in force.

It should be noted that, although there is general agreement (Taylor and Goldman, for example) that a necessary condition for desiring \emptyset is that the desirer have a concept of \emptyset , there is no unanimity on that point. The position that not merely any clear idea but no idea whatsoever of the object of desire need, in certain cases, be held by the desirer, has been maintained by David A.J. Richards.⁴ But the examples which he offers as a defense for this claim ("the adolescent boy who first experiences the twinges of sexual desire, without realizing what the desire is," "the grown woman who may experience a general uneasiness without realizing it is the desire for children," and "animals and babies have desires, yet we often would not want to attribute to them thoughts or beliefs" [*italics mine*]) are unsatisfactory. First, it is by no means obvious that animals and babies have desires (unless 'desire' be defined in purely behavioral terms; and I shall argue that it cannot be so defined) since we do not share a language with them through which avowal evidences could be acquired, having thereby only behavioral grounds for predicating desires of them. Secondly, each case which Richards cites

actually appears to involve either (1) a marginally conscious desire, (2) the experiential symptoms of a marginally conscious or unconscious desire, (3) an instance of one sense of appetite 'appetite' being a term which need not but generally does connote intentionality. Neither instances of (1) nor instances of (2) lend Richards the support he needs to make his position tenable. And with respect to (3), we can observe that the Janus-term 'hunger', for example, can point to a mere physiological or experiential disquietude (appetite) as well as to a desire (appetite) for the sorts of things which are believed to ameliorate such disquietude. We can therefore say of an infant that it is hungry without thereby attributing any desires or beliefs to the infant. And one can say that one's appetite persists even though one is quite filled and has no desire for more. The point is that 'desire' is not analytically 'contained' in either 'appetite' or 'hunger' per se; nor is it analytically 'contained' in either 'twinge' or 'uneasiness'.⁵ Moreover, the advent of heretofore unexperienced twinges with the advent of adolescence does not directly warrant concluding that these are indeed manifestations of sexual desire, especially if the 'warrant' stands on the presumption that such twinges will eventually be desideratively linked by the person in question to the sexuality of himself and others. That would very likely involve an appeal to the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc.

The only explanatory strategy to adopt in such cases, if we are to maintain that desire indeed exists, is an appeal to unconscious or preconscious or peripherally conscious states such that the desirer has a concept of the object but is unable to avow either the desire or his

conceptual perspective on that object. The plausibility of such intentional states will be considered; but whatever their plausibility, they appear to be necessary posits for sustaining Richards' position, posits, it seems clear, which he would not be willing to accept.

Provided for the moment then, that 'desire', taken as a verb, requires that its grammatical object denote an intentional object, it might appear that (given the examples of 'want' which do not satisfy this rule) we now have a clear distinction between the employment conditions for these verbs. But there is clearly a sense of 'to want' which functions in precisely the same manner. This shall be designated as the intentional form ('to want_i') of the infinitive as distinguished from its non-intentional privative form ('to want_p', signifying lack) which is illustrated by the examples of the photograph and the lawn. This is not to suggest that the concept of privation has nothing to do with the concept of desiring and wanting_i. The whole question of what relations hold between desiring, wanting, and wanting_p is a very significant one, and it will be tendered considerable attention in the subsequent chapter. The claim then is that 'to desire' has only an intentional form whereas 'to want' has both an intentional and a non-intentional form. Obviously however, the form of 'to want' which we are concerned to elucidate is the intentional form since this is the only form of that verb which provides the putatively direct link to action which is substantive to our inquiry. Of course one may want_i something which one believes oneself to want_p, such that one may want_{i-(B)p} some thing or state of affairs. But wanting_p is of interest here only insofar as it may be seen to play a role in wanting_i.

At this point it might appear that we would be far better off by confining subsequent analysis to the term 'desire' since it is characterized by the intentional form of discourse without remainder. However, a number of decisive reasons exist for not following this strategy. Firstly, the term 'desire' is generally given a more restricted employment in ordinary parlance vis-á-vis the employment given 'want', suggesting on the whole greater affective intensity and being generally closer to an intentional sense of 'having an appetite for'. Secondly, given that this restriction largely (but not invariably) applies, there concomitantly exist a host of locutions involving 'want' which do not typically involve 'desire' and which are of considerable significance for deciding the primary issues undertaken here. A possible technical move of course is that of construing 'desire' quite neutrally, thereby stripping it of such restrictions. But the point of this project is to observe the distinctions in ordinary language wherever they might lie with a view to laying out the actual explanatory patterns to which we appeal rather than those which might be more optimal in some respect. Consequently then, we shall remain mindful of such restrictions and proceed accordingly.

It should be noted that the intentional-privative distinction, as advanced at this point, is a probationary one, calculated to draw out certain basic syntactical and semantic features of and contrasts between the verb forms of 'desire' and 'want'. It remains, for example, to point out that there exist both privative and non-privative species of wanting,₁ as well as that complex hybrids of these elements (conditional contexts, suppositional contexts, etc.) often constitute the sense which a given usage of one of these verbs will have.

Furthermore, the intentional form of a transitive verb should not be regarded as the same sort of thing as a transitive verb of action, the latter requiring as it does that there be an object of that action (denoted by a grammatical object) and either an agent qua acting or a cause (denoted by a subject term or subject description) where such a verb occurs as the predicate of a sentence or a well-formed sentential clause.⁶ On the contrary, neither desiring nor wanting_i simpliciter consists in action to, with, on, or vis-á-vis an object (inclusive of intentional and physical objects) and one need not be an agent qua acting for it to be correctly said that one desires or wants_i something. For suppose that it is invariably true that, for any intending being x we pick, if x is a desirer (taken non-generically) at t , then there exists at least one action event predicable of x qua agent, namely, x is doing something at t . From this it would follow that if from age t_x to age t_{x+20} x desires that he become a being of sort \emptyset , such a desire being a standing desire (rather than an occurrent desire),⁷ x would be doing something at any randomly selected instant between t_x and t_{x+20} . And surely this is not true. The distinction between residual or standing desires and occurrent desires is roughly analogous to the distinctions between having a concept and using or appealing to it or having the memory of an event and remembering that event. (This distinction will be refined and drawn more closely near the end of the present section.) One need not be indeed remembering E or appealing to ψ or occurrently desiring \emptyset in order that one may reasonably be said to have the memory of E , the concept of ψ , or the desire for \emptyset . (However, it would indeed be odd, if not altogether wrongheaded, to maintain that someone has such

a memory, concept, or desire, if there is no evidence that this person has ever remembered E , used or appealed to ψ , or occurrently desired \emptyset .) To predicate a standing desire of an intending being is not to predicate either an experience or an event (either conscious or unconscious) of that being; it is rather to predicate of that being a disposition or propensity to have certain occurrent (whether conscious or unconscious, thematic or non-thematic) desires which are systemically characteristic of that being for, loosely speaking, an 'extended period of time'.

Now the above argument, based on the idea of a standing desire, does not demonstrate that it is never the case that desires consist in actions by agents with respect to (hereafter, 're') objects; it rather demonstrates that not every case of desiring can be analyzed in this way. Accordingly, this is sufficient for showing that 'to desire' is not a transitive verb of action per se. But the larger issue of whether this verb can ever occur as a transitive verb of action remains. The crux of the matter is clear: what sort of object is the object of a desire and what would action re it consist in? Certainly it is indisputable that desiring \emptyset or wanting_i \emptyset simpliciter, i.e., considered quite independently of any behavior which might come as a result of such desiring or wanting_i (e.g., effort to bring about \emptyset), does not involve acting on, or vis-á-vis, or doing anything to or with any entities or states of affairs in the world which are not 'in' or properties of the intentional states of the desirer. Presumably then, the action characteristic of desiring or wanting_i simpliciter would involve action re some other sort of object.

To narrow the situation, let us consider 'S desires (wants_i) \emptyset ' where ' \emptyset ' does not refer to any actually existing entity or state of affairs. What then could serve as an object re which the desirer qua desiring acts? The only apparent candidate for such an object is the intentional object of the desire. It is at this point that extreme care must be exercised with respect to the phrase 'the intentional object of desire'. That which is desired is not the intentional object of the desire.⁸ The intentional object involved in 'S desires \emptyset ' is a concept of \emptyset and the object of desire here is \emptyset itself. If that which one desires in 'S desires a long-lost painting by Rembrandt' is the concept of a long-lost painting by Rembrandt rather than such a painting then the act of searching would be very odd, for one would already have the concept in question. Consequently, it is a mistake to understand the claim that ' \emptyset ' in 'S desires \emptyset ' denotes an intentional object to be the claim that S desires the intentional object. Rather, in desiring \emptyset the desirer intends \emptyset and the intentional object of the desire is nothing more than the object of the desire, \emptyset , as regarded by the desirer. The intentional object of a desire is simply not the object of that desire. Oedipus, the object of Jocasta's desire, is identical with the person that is Jocasta's son, although it is clearly not true that 'my son' is part of the analysis of the intentional object of her desire for Oedipus. Indeed, once 'my son' does become part of the analysis of her beliefs about Oedipus her desire for Oedipus vanishes. So if desiring involves action re the intentional object of a desire this cannot be so because the intentional object is that which is desired.

One possible move at this point would be to hold that talk about intentional objects opens the way toward a mistaken reification of what is actually a specific cognitive and perhaps dispositional relation between the desirer and actual or possible states of affairs and that it is, accordingly, a category mistake to even consider action re intentional 'objects'. It would indeed be a mistake to think of intentional objects as entities in the same sense in which a physical object is an entity; but there as well seems to be a correct sense in which we can speak of using, critically examining, and restructuring our concepts, i.e., of acting with as well as upon them (but not in the same sense in which one stands upon the carpet). But even allowing this opening for action re intentional objects, there seems to be no way in which it is applicable to desiring or wanting, simpliciter. Although a concept of that which is desired must be in force, using or examining that concept is quite another thing.

Yet another strategy for maintaining that 'to desire' can function as a transitive verb of action would involve holding that desiring, understood as involving regarding, is an action, since, so the argument would go, regarding something consists in doing something. However, this move seems to trade on the active quality of the present participle ('. . . ing'), especially insofar as 'desiring' and 'regarding' may look like terms that pick out episodes or events. But even if they do, and I have argued that they need not (supra, n.7), insofar as an event occurs nothing follows about actions. And it is surely not true that every instance of regarding some x consists in doing anything re that x. For I can expect something of that x, thereby regarding that x in a particular way, and clearly not be undertaking to act re that x. But even in

those cases where (1) regarding x is purposive or deliberate and consists in doing something (e.g., examining, evaluating, etc.) re x and (2) where such action 'characterizes' a particular desire (for surely it does not characterize standing desires), it characterizes that desire itself only incidentally. That is, desiring x consists in holding a certain attitude toward x; and although one might be regarding x (qua acting re x) while holding this attitude, holding that attitude is not itself thereby rendered an action. (cf. p.16 re: distinguishing agent-attributable acts from consciousness-activity.)

Now we might suppose, somewhat implausibly, that regarding qua acting is a necessary condition for a certain sort of desire (e.g., occurrent, fully conscious desire). But from the fact that A is a necessary condition for B, and the fact that P is a property of A, it does not follow that P is a property of B. If travelling to New York (doing something) is a necessary condition for my being in New York, it does not follow that my being in New York consists in doing anything. Rather, getting to New York consists in doing something. Or, my verifying the premises and validating the argument might be a necessary condition for my believing the conclusion. But my eventual belief that the conclusion is true does not itself consist in doing anything. Similarly, if my carrying out some cognitive or perceptual operation re x is a necessary condition for my coming to hold or continuing to hold a desiderative attitude toward x, it does not follow that my holding that attitude consists in carrying out such an operation. Rather, I hold that attitude toward that which I am (or have been) examining, evaluating, etc.

At this point then there seems to be no convincing premise available on which to hinge an argument for 'desire' and 'want_i' being transitive verbs of action. But it has become a matter of somewhat common usage to speak of 'intentional acts' as well as to regard intending as an activity. Surely, if all intentional acts are acts of the sort which involve an agent doing something re an object, then occurrently desiring involves such action and 'desire' and 'want_i', taken non-dispositionally, would therefore be transitive verbs of action. But at the very best only certain sorts of intentional acts are of this sort (e.g., critically examining one's concepts). For example, neither favoring \emptyset nor being pleased by the prospect of \emptyset appears to involve doing anything either re \emptyset or re one's concept of \emptyset . Therefore, desiring per se cannot be rightly regarded as invariably consisting in action on the basis of a claim (1) that desiring is an intentional act and (2) that every intentional act involves doing something re one's concepts, *sensa*, etc. But if the term 'act' in the phrase 'intentional act' is understood to range over certain sorts of states of affairs, one of which would not involve any agent-action-object relation, then holding that desiring is an intentional act does not require holding that desiring involves acting qua agent re an object; nor does it require holding that 'desire' is ever a transitive verb of action.

Indeed there does seem to be a sense in which one could speak of intentional acts which do not involve an agent-action-object relation, to wit, consciousness-as-attending-to or consciousness-as-apprehending might be spoken of as an activity of consciousness rather than as an action by an agent. This would in effect allow that a certain class of

events exists (in that the class is not null) which stands between the class of actions and the class of happenings stricta dicta, namely, a class of events elements of which are predicable only of intending beings, those elements being relational in structure (i.e., intentional acts consisting in a certain relation between a consciousness and its objects), which are neither purposive nor deliberate in nature. And these need not be events in the sense in which an event occurs if and only if some change occurs. They are events in the sense in which they are datable in the biography of the desirer. Of course insofar as attending to or apprehending something is a deliberate, purposive, or voluntary event, then that event is also an action rather than an activity in the technical sense (as introduced above with respect to intentional acts). But the technical notion of activity for characterizing intentional acts which are not agent-attributable actions would, if plausible, be admissible with respect to saying of occurrent desires that, qua occurrent, they are associated with certain activities although this would clearly not be admissible with respect to standing desires per se since the latter are dispositions. Paradigmatic instances of intentional acts, taken as instances of consciousness-as-attending to, are provided by cases of what phenomenologists have spoken of as pre-reflective or pre-theoretical consciousness. In pre-reflective consciousness subject and object are not juxtaposed as discrete relata. Rather, in the language of Hegel, they experientially cohere in an identity-in-difference. The congealed residuum of an ego or an agent is not an element in its noetic structure. The caption 'pre-reflective consciousness' points to a distinctive ontology which is neither suited to nor served by the

ontology of reflective consciousness. We frequently speak, albeit metaphorically of 'being lost in the music', 'being absorbed by the book', etc. When we move beyond the pre-reflective level our ontology accordingly changes. But even here, when, in desiring, an ego qua discrete subject emerges, the ego is not qua desirer a doer of actions.

Before concluding the matter of whether 'to desire' is ever a transitive verb of action, we must momentarily turn to the matter of the intensional inequivalence of 'desire' and 'want' for a few additional distinctions. Taken as verbs, it has been determined that the fundamental difference between them centered around the fact that 'to want' clearly does not invariably require that its grammatical object denote an intentional object whereas this, with certain qualifications (supra, n.7), very much appears to be the case with 'to desire'.⁹ Patterns similar to those which characterize the verbal forms of 'desire' and 'want' emerge upon analysis of their nominative forms.

When speaking of a being's (either intending or non-intending) wants we are generally referring to its objective species or sortal needs rather than to those things which we believe or know the being to want_i and care to assert that it wants_i. To speak of desires on the other hand is to invariably speak of distinctive relations which obtain between an intending being and objects intended, distinctive relations which can be roughly and provisionally characterized as involving an intending being's 'assenting' to a proposition of the form 'Let it be the case that \emptyset ' where ' \emptyset ' designates either an actual or non-actual state of affairs.¹⁰ [As we have already implicitly determined, an alternative way of characterizing this 'distinctive relation' in which desiring

consists takes the following form: 'S desires_{oc(st)} \emptyset ' is equivalent to 'S holds (is disposed to hold) an attitude of endorsement with respect to \emptyset '. The details of this matter will be progressively refined. Momentarily however, it must not be thought that either 'holding an attitude of endorsement' or 'assenting' to a proposition of the form 'Let it be the case that \emptyset ' is equivalent to 'consenting to the occurrence of \emptyset '. Consenting is much more like allowing (with or without reservations) than underwriting (i.e., endorsing) a state of affairs. And surely desiring (and wanting_i) \emptyset involves underwriting ' \emptyset ' in some respect, even if the desire can (in some technical sense) be described as emotionally compulsive (unless 'desire' has been quite technically defined as well). Equally, it must not be thought that this sense of 'holding an attitude of endorsement' is anything like 'being inclined to recommend for others'. Furthermore, desiring typically has a certain sui generis quality about it which is quite unsuspected by 'consenting'. Lastly, it is important to avoid taking 'assenting' too literally since assenting could look very much like doing something. In its present form, this depiction of the desiderative relation, although essentially accurate, is indeed misleadingly simplistic; but a probationary appeal to the optative prefix, 'Let it be the case that . . .', does provide nominal assistance in setting out the nature of the relation.] Consequently, we do not speak of a being's desires to speak of things which it may lack but with respect to which it does not bear an attitude of endorsement (i.e., which it may want_p but not want_i). But to speak of a being's wants may indeed be to speak of things with respect to which it has no, nor could have any, beliefs or concepts. And of course desires are not predicated of non-intending

beings (unless considered as if they were intending beings.) The above points at hand then, our excursion through the issue of whether desiring ever consists in doing anything has enabled us to discover the essentially attitudinal nature of desire and, to that extent, provided the groundwork for our finally determining just why desire does not ever consist in action. In a word, an action is an event but desiring consists in holding a particular attitude and is per se no more an event than is holding a moral point of view. We must neither collapse desiring into the fact that we would not allow that a desire for \emptyset exists if the alleged desirer has never desideratively intended (an event) \emptyset (consciously or unconsciously) nor suppose that thinking of \emptyset (an event), when the desire for \emptyset is occurrent, renders the desire per se an event qua 'going on' or 'happening' in the psyche (although it is an event insofar as it is datable).

In this respect then, my view of occurrent desire is quite different from Goldman's (supra, n.7). Furthermore, Goldman's characterization appears too narrow in that there are many cases of desire which consist neither in desideratively intending some \emptyset nor in a mere disposition to desideratively intend some \emptyset . Suppose that Williams wants to mow the lawn, decides to mow the lawn, and begins mowing the lawn. Surely, insofar as Williams is desideratively intending mowing the lawn we can say that he occurrently desires mowing the lawn. But while mowing the lawn Williams may turn his attention to plans for the evening meal, a trip to the theater at nine o'clock, etc. In such a circumstance, although Williams is not thinking of mowing the lawn, he is nonetheless presently undertaking a project for the sake of satisfying a desire. And to that

extent we can (and do) say that the desire in question is a present feature of Williams' comportment toward self and world, i.e., that it exists occurrently. We would not characterize it as a standing (Goldman) or latent (Alston) desire qua 'unaroused'. Williams' desire to mow the lawn while mowing it and thinking of dinner is just not like his standing desire that his number not be drawn in the federal military conscription lottery. But it may be importantly similar to his standing desire to become president of his corporation during any stretch of activity undertaken to bring about his presidency. To say, while Williams is mowing the lawn, that he occurrently desires to mow the lawn, is to say no more than that Williams is engaged in a particular project with respect to which he holds an attitude of endorsement.

We are systematically misled insofar as we construe desires as mental events of the same ontological status as sensations and thoughts. To speak somewhat metaphorically, occurrent desire, rather than some phenomenal content of mental life, is more correctly an occurrent element in the topology of mental life--a distinctive form of comportment toward and comprehension of self and world. Desire is more like the dramatic setting of a play than any particular piece of action on the stage. If Williams tells me at two o'clock that he wants to go to the theater at nine o'clock, and if I later tell someone else that Williams wants to go to the theater at nine o'clock, I am not committing myself to saying that Williams is presently thinking of going. Rather, I am only saying that Williams' attitudes are such that, were we to ask him about the matter, he would be able to sincerely say "I want to go to the theater at nine o'clock."

Recapturing the primary line of discussion at hand here, a final set of points concerning the relations of 'want' and 'desire'. One sense of 'want', taken as a noun, is intensionally equivalent to 'lack', taken as a noun, as in 'There now exists a want of confidence in the chairman', whereas 'desire' can be given no such employment. Taken as nouns then, 'desire' and 'want' differ in sense and range of usage much as they do when considered as verbs, the concept of an intentional object being fundamental to the analysis of these differences. But before moving on to the required consideration of the intentional and linguistic natures of desiderative objects and object-denoters, it should be noted that no mention has been made of either alleged intransitive usages of 'to want' or perlocutionary usages of this verb to command, request, and recommend, the former being illustrated by a sentence like 'I shall not want for companionship' and the latter being illustrated by sentences like 'You want to do this first' and 'You want to undertake this project since it will guarantee the fulfillment of your larger purposes'. It must be admitted here that the alleged intransitivity of certain usages of 'to want' is puzzling, even in such a case as that provided by 'I shall not want'. For if wanting in 'I shall not want' amounts to lacking or being deficient simpliciter then it becomes very difficult to regard such a sentence, if used to make a statement, as intelligible. If a lack or deficiency exists, then, it seems clear, there is a lack or deficiency of something; i.e., 'want' in 'I shall not want' cannot intelligibly stand alone, without reference, even if that reference be only contextually implied or a matter of conventional implicature. And if 'want' in 'I shall not want' is occurring in its intentional form, then that

occurrence is transitive and elliptical. But whatever the resolution of this matter might be, the philosophical importance of alleged intransitive usages of 'to want' is confined to the relation between wanting and lacking and this relation shall be comprehensively examined midway through our inquiry.

With regard to the perlocutionary usages of 'to want', insofar as they amount to commands and requests, they are of importance to this project only insofar as they affect an analysis of the relations between wanting and wishing; and such an analysis shall be undertaken just prior to investigating the primary question, namely, the logical connections between the concepts of desire and action as well as the causal connections, if any, between their instances. However, it should be noted that there is yet another perlocutionary function which 'to want' can have, a function which is interesting but which shall be given no further attention. In saying something like 'You want to undertake this project since it will guarantee the fulfillment of your larger purposes' one would surely not be presuming to report to one's interlocutor that he as a matter of fact has such a want_i. Rather, if one were not commanding or requesting that the project be undertaken, one would be, at the least, recommending that it be undertaken, the 'want' statement here functioning like a conditional or hypothetical 'ought' statement: 'If you want this to happen, then you ought to do that'. In this case then 'want' functions as a conditional directive, where it is both recommended that undertaking the project be wanted_i (i.e., desideratively intended) and that there be action in a manner appropriate to that want_i, i.e., that the project in fact be undertaken.

Recommending that someone want_i/desire something can look very odd since it is often true that that which would be involved in acting to bring about wants_i and desires is something about which we have weak, tentative, or non-existent beliefs. But insofar as one can be shown that doing something would be instrumental for bringing about a state of affairs which is already desired, then there is a ready sense in which one can consequently come to desire to do that thing. It is rather unlikely that such 'coming to desire' consists in producing a desire. More plausibly, what is recommended is that someone perceive desiring \emptyset as 'constitutive' of his already desiring ψ , constitutive not of his present desire for ψ (in the sense of \emptyset 's being actively desired) but rather constitutive of its satisfaction conditions.

Having undertaken an examination of the divergences between 'want' and 'desire', the transitivity of 'want_i' and 'desire', and the role of intentionality in the concept of desire, we are now obliged to conduct a more intensive inquiry into the notion of a desiderative object as that notion happens to be in force in ordinary parlance.

Objects, Belief Conditions, and Avowals

It is commonly if not universally agreed that the proposition expressed by the sentence 'Every desire has an object' is logically true. It could not but be true that every desire has an object since 'having an object' is analytic of the concept expressed by the word 'desire'. Moreover, being analytically true, this proposition is not susceptible to empirical disconfirmation. It would follow then that any putative instance of a desire without an object would in fact be an instance of having mistakenly identified something as a desire. Notably, this

position is rarely advanced in the form of the proposition expressed by 'Desire has an object', although it could be. The 'explanation' for this, it would appear, rests with the equally fundamental consideration that desiring is an essentially particularized phenomenon, the objects of desiring thereby marking off particular desires, each of which is identifiable by reference to its object. The abstract noun 'desire' does little more than point toward a distinctive way in which objects can be intended.

Although I shall argue that this position is basically correct, I shall also argue that it requires considerable defense and refinement. This position is, after all, something of an axiom for a sizable portion of recent action theory¹¹ and classical psychology; it cannot be responsibly advanced by fiat even if it is regarded as indisputably true. For upon analysis, just what a desire having an object amounts to becomes a less than tidy matter. In an effort to capture some of the character of this issue, an appeal will be made to the following set of sentences. To preserve the naturalness of these sentences, no attempt will be made to force the word 'desire' into contexts where 'want' fits more appropriately.

1. I desire nothing.
2. I know what I want.
3. I don't know what I want.
4. I have no idea of what I want.
5. I don't know if I want \emptyset .
6. I don't know if I want anything at all.
7. I believe that I want \emptyset .
8. I believe that I want something.
9. I want some \emptyset but I don't know which \emptyset .
10. I desire, but there is nothing which I desire.
11. I am a desiring being.

In sentences 2 - 9 desire is presented vis-á-vis an object even if that object is only implied, confused, introduced with reservations,

conditions, or doubts. Sentences 1, 10, and 11 do not fit this scheme in any apparently straightforward manner. The procedure then will be to first deal with 1, 10, and 11 since they offer any immediate chance which might exist for producing a counterexample to the claim in question here. Subsequently, 2 - 9 will be considered.

At the outset it must be agreed that 1, if employed as an avowal statement, would not, on the face of it, be a senseless form of words. Yet surely 'nothing' is the grammatical object of 'desire' in this case and it has been previously argued that the grammatical object of an 'S desires \emptyset ' formula must denote an intentional object. But how indeed could 'nothing' denote an intentional object? If we hold that 'nothing' does not denote an object, then do we have the avowal of a desire without an object? But of course 1 is not employed to affirm the existence of a desire and is, on the contrary, employed to affirm that the speaker has no desire (either in an absolute sense, which is unlikely, or in the limited contextual sense of having no desire for anything under consideration). How then are 'desire' and 'nothing' functioning in 1? One way of handling 'nothing' in this case is to argue that 1 is intensionally equivalent to a universally quantified sentence with a denial following the quantification, to wit, 'For anything that I might pick, it is not the case that it is desired by me', thereby distinguishing the logical form of 1 from its grammatical form. This, I believe, is a satisfactory rendering of 1; but it does not yet explain how 'desire' followed by 'nothing' is actually functioning, contrary to surface appearances, like 'I do not desire' would function in 'I do not desire anything'.

At least one solution seems to be provided by drawing an analogy between the way 'desire' (taken as a verb) functions when it is the predicate of a sentence (or sentential clause) and the way particular-introducing terms or descriptions function. In his essay on descriptive metaphysics, P.F. Strawson sets forth the following position on particular-introducing terms in which he appeals to his doctrine of existential presupposition:

As we have already seen, when an expression which looks as if it might be used to make an identifying reference to a particular (or, for that matter, to a plurality of particulars) is followed in a sentence by the word 'exists' (or 'exist'), we cannot coherently take the first expression as functioning in a particular-referring way, i.e., as making an identifying reference to a particular (or to certain particulars). To attempt to do so would make the sentence unconstructable. We must rather take it as asserting the existence-presupposition of the use of the expression in question in a particular-referring way. Fortunately there are idioms available which allow us to escape from the misleading suggestions of the form described; and these are the idioms which are reconstructed in logic by the device of existential quantification.¹²

Strawson's point is that 'this F exists' is existentially presupposed by the occurrence of 'this F' in 'This F is a \emptyset ' and that it is not the case (contra Bertrand Russell) that the existence of the F in question is asserted by anyone using 'This F is a \emptyset ' to make a statement. Given this, Strawson concludes that 'this F' in 'This F exists' cannot be functioning presuppositionally since that would render the sentence either unconstructable ('This F that exists, exists') or, far worse, involve us in holding that existence is herein predicated of the F in question. Now the same point can be made for the manner in which 'desire' (and, of course, 'want_i') functions. A presupposition attaches to the occurrence of 'desire', namely that a state of affairs 'stands' to the subject intending being (whether that relation be occurrent or dispositional) as

desired. Ontological problems of immanent objectivity aside,¹³ 'desire' presuppositionally introduces the existence of a relation between an intending being and a state of affairs (whether this state of affairs or any aspect of it exist manifestly or not) which is desideratively intended, i.e., it introduces the existence of an intentional object.

It is for just this reason that 1 is unambiguously understood to mean that the speaker does not desire. That is, the word 'nothing', when functioning as the grammatical object after 'desire' or 'want₁', serves to set aside the presuppositions attaching to 'desire' just as 'exist', when following an ordinarily particular-introducing subject term serves to set aside the existential presuppositions which characterize such terms. To hold that 'desire' in 1 is functioning presuppositionally is to render 1 unconstructable. This is chiefly because 'nothing' in 1 does not denote an object in particular but rather ranges over all possible objects by introducing universal quantification followed by negation; i.e., the logical form of 1 actually follows the form of 'For all x, if x is a state of affairs, then it is not the case that I desire x'. Accordingly, no exception is afforded by 1 to the general claim that '∅' (taken as a particular-introducing term or description, even if that particular be a 'general state of affairs') in 'S desires ∅' introduces an intentional object (taken as a concept of a state of affairs) since 'nothing' is not in fact a particular-introducing term, ranging as it does over all possible states of affairs.

More positively, where the grammatical object of an occurrence of some form of 'to desire' (or a 'value assignment' '∅' in a nominative formula 'N(for):__') picks out some particular state of affairs, that

grammatical object (or 'value assignment') indicates the degree of object specification either available to or disclosed by the speaker. Such disclosure involves of course an interplay between that which is literally specified by the grammatical object or value assignment and that which is contextually or conventionally implied. Unlike any existentially presuppositional occurrence of a subject term, 'desire' does not itself pick out a particular; rather, it presuppositionally indicates that some particular state of affairs 'stands' to some intending being qua desired. The act of producing object specification does not consist in asserting the object presupposition attaching to this usage of 'desire'. Rather, it satisfies the transitive formula 'V:___' or the nominative formula 'N (for):___' by operating as a selectional factor, introducing some degree of object delimitation and identification.

Strictly speaking then, 'desire' in 'S desires something' is not functioning presuppositionally since this would render the sentence 'S desires (something) something' unconstructable just as 'John (exists) exists' is unconstructable. And unless the ordinary object presupposition of 'desire' is asserted by the use of 'something' (or some word or phrase which means the same), then 'something' is always part of the presuppositional analysis of any occurrence of 'desire' (except in those cases where 'desire' is functioning generically). That is, 'S desires a' is analyzable as 'S desires (log. presupp.: something, to wit,) a'. In such sentences, the presupposed (but non-asserted) 'something' operates as a kind of depth-structure variable and 'a' as a constant, 'a' thereby introducing object specification. This presuppositional feature explains our readiness to ask what is desired if we are told that someone

desires or has a desire. If I were to say either 'I desire . . . ' or 'I have have a desire . . . ', only to be interrupted before continuing, it would be quite natural for my listener to later ask, 'Now, what is it that you desire?'.¹⁴

It should not be concluded from all of this that we never have reason to use a sentence like 'S desires something', believing as we might that such a construction is merely redundant. It is no more redundant than 'John exists'. On the contrary, among many other things, 'S desires something' is used to indicate (1) lack of object specification, (2) that something is indeed desired, (3) and that it is not being merely said that S is a desiring being, as it might be thought if the ambiguous 'S desires' were used instead.

As we confine ourselves to the place of 'desire' and 'want_i' (which conforms to the syntactical and semantical features of 'desire' set out above) in ordinary language then, the claim that every desire has an object turns out to be the same sort of claim as that provided by the position that 'to desire' and 'to want_i' are transitive verbs. There is no point in formulating conjectures along the lines of the chicken-and-the-egg dilemma about whether these verbs are transitive because a certain sort of mental state always has an object or whether every such mental state has an object because of the transitivity of these verbs. That would probably involve undertaking to 'solve' a gratuitous philosophical puzzle. The point is that the concept expressed by 'a desire' (nominative form) functions to pick out mental states (or dispositions to be in such states) which are characterized by intentional objects as well as that there is an object presupposition which attaches to the predicative forms of 'desire' (with the minor

afforementioned exceptions) which is reflected in their transitivity.

Provisioned with this analysis, it can now be seen that sentences 2 - 11, if intelligible, can only raise questions about the manner in which a particular desire can be said to have an object. Taken in one way, 10 is straightforwardly inconsistent. That is, if the first occurrence of 'desire' in 10 is functioning presuppositionally (where 'I desire, . . .' is an ellipsis for 'I desire \emptyset , . . .' where 'something' is a suppressed, non-asserted substitution instance of ' \emptyset ') then the second half of the sentence constitutes a denial of that presupposition. (It would not be formally correct to say that 10 involves a contradiction between assertions; it rather involves an inconsistency between a logical presupposition and an assertion.)

It seems clear that 10 does not have the same logical form as that of 1. Regarding 10 as a skeletal formula, a possible and more natural variation on that formula ('I desire [something], but there is nothing in particular which I desire') could open the way for its intelligible usage. For example, the above variation on 10 could be used to assert (given the correct context) what would be more explicitly asserted by a usage of 9. In such a case, that which is desired is some element of a class of things although no particular element of that class is in fact desired. There is nothing especially troublesome about this case since there is a clear sense in which someone using '10(var.)' or 9 can be said to desire a particular. The only feature of this case which is to the side of center is the lack reasonably full object specification.

But suppose that in claiming or elliptically implying that he desires something a speaker maintains that he is entirely unable to offer

even the most general characterization of this 'something'. Can such a combination of claims be intelligible? Yes, but if and only if the desirer has some concept of the intentional object (indeed, if he doesn't he could be doing little more than intending a word) and is for some reason unable to handle it linguistically. However, if the speaker argues that the block to such characterization is not a linguistic one but rather and simply the utter lack of any object specification, then we shall surely find such a position unintelligible. How indeed could anyone desire something simpliciter, quite independently of any existential concerns, plans of action, experiences of deficit, etc.?

An example of just how broad this idea can be while still satisfying the conceptual requirements for desire is provided by the fact that it is possible to unpack certain occurrences of a sentence of the form 'I desire something' in this way: 'I desire something (since I believe that I need something although I do not know what it is that I need)'. Perhaps a person believes that something about his life is out of joint and believes as well that something is needed if the situation is to be amended. He desires that, whatever it might be, which he believes himself to need, but hasn't any detailed idea of what that might be. Accordingly, the object of his desire can be only nominally described as 'that thing, whatever it might be, which I believe myself to need'. In such a case the desirer would have his object ambiguously, believing that he is in want_p of something, he knows not what, which he wants_i.

The remaining way in which the sense of 10 can be construed involves understanding 10 to mean 'I desire (generically transitive), but it is not now true that I hold either as occurrent or a standing desire with

respect to any (absolute or contextual) state of affairs'. Admittedly, we are certainly pressing 10 to the limit of its intelligibility by offering this as a candidate for its illocutionary act-potential. But a context in which this might function appropriately is not unimaginable. The primary point here is that when 'desire' in 'I desire' is introduced generically, there is nothing necessarily odd or logically inconsistent about following this up with, for example, a remark like '. . . but there is nothing which I now desire', where 'now' is understood to range over both occurrent and standing desires. Given the appropriate context and emphasis, it is possible for 10 to be used so that 'now' becomes part of its semantic deep-structure while not being part of its syntactic surface-structure. All things considered then, and as we should expect, no exception to the truth of the claim that 'Every desire has an object' is afforded by any plausible analysis of 10. The important points introduced with respect to the example provided by 10 centered about the way in which the truth of this claim is preserved in each of the situations created by a different rendering of 10. As it turns out, in dealing with the final rendering of 10 an analysis of 11 was simultaneously accomplished. One can truthfully claim to be a desiring being without its being true that one now has either an occurrent or standing desire for anything (either absolutely or contextually). It will be helpful to present this point more formally.

- (A) Neither 'S is a desiring being' nor 'S desires' logically implies (i.e., commits us to the claim) that S now has either an occurrent or a standing desire for anything (taken either absolutely or contextually).

Taken in its most absolute sense, a statement made by the use of 10, as improbable as its occurrence might be, would amount to nothing more than

a claim about the species nature of the speaker. But the important point is that one can intelligibly make such a statement in the language, ranging in its extension either absolutely or contextually. It remains then to investigate what having an object might amount to in the examples produced by sentences 2 - 8.

Conspicuously, each represents an epistemological issue. Something is known, believed, or doubted about whether one wants_i something or about what one wants_i. Firstly, it should be noted that one might want to adopt a move like that made by Wittgenstein, with respect to the inappropriateness of saying that one knows that one is in pain, by holding that it is equally inappropriate to say that one knows that one desires (wants_i) something or that one knows what one desires. On this accounting then, 2 would be a systematically misleading locution. But certainly the analogy with pain does not hold for desire, precisely because sentences like 3, 6, and 8 are not prima facie odd. (Also, cf. earlier argument against identifying desires and sensations, supra, 7-8) For example, 2 can be employed to indicate a resolute posture with respect to what one wants in the face of any attempts which might be made to dissuade one. Equally, 6 can be employed to indicate a conditional feature of wanting something; i.e., in saying 'I don't know if I want anything at all' one might be pointing out that, for the moment, not enough information is at hand in order for one to avow a desire. One might favor something in some respects but not yet be inclined to assent to the proposition expressed by 'Let it be the case that this comes about'. Or one might be simply unsettled about how one stands with respect to a given possibility, employing 6 or some form of 6 to indicate this. This range

of possibilities holds for sentences 3 - 8. Again, to precisely set out what has been established in this regard, the following principle holds for our ordinary usage of 'desire' and 'want₁'.

- (B) Epistemological claims about the existence or objects of particular desires, as in 'S knows (believes, is sure, etc.) that S desires \emptyset ' and 'S knows (believes, etc.) that Q desires \emptyset ', are not logically (i.e., conceptually) ruled out by any feature of the concept of desire as it is expressed by 'desire' and 'want₁'.

But of course the important issue here is whether one can in fact desire something and yet honestly claim (as in 3 - 8) to have doubts or only tentative beliefs, either about whether one desires something or about what one desires. If we consider only occurrent conscious desires which are, in every respect, thematically at-hand (i.e., which are not in any sense peripherally conscious) then avowals having the form of sentences 3 - 6 (provided that one makes no conceptual or purely verbal errors) could not be honestly made; and equally, sentences 7 and 8, if employed as hedges on certainty, could not be honestly used. For ex hypothesis, one does indeed desire something and one is fully aware of the desire and its object. I could no more doubt that I have such a desire than I could now doubt that I am dealing with a philosophical issue. But it is all too inviting to assimilate all cases of desiring to this central case. For example, one can have a standing desire for \emptyset and be unable to remember that, when originally considered, it was realized that Ψ stood to \emptyset as instrumentally necessary and acceptable and that one, accordingly, occurrently desired Ψ as well. The desire for Ψ is a second-order or extrinsic desire, and it is a standing desire vis-á-vis the standing desire for \emptyset . But it is easily imaginable that, although one might certify a standing desire for \emptyset , that one could forget

that ψ stands to \emptyset as instrumentally desirable, and thereby be unable to certify a disposition to occurrently desire ψ , i.e., a standing desire for ψ . (Surely, momentarily forgetting the desirability of ψ is not in itself enough to anul a disposition to occurrently desire ψ .) Upon recalling that ψ does stand to \emptyset in this way, one may well remark, 'Yes, I now realize that ψ is something that I want'. But prior to such recollection or revelation, using a variation of sentence 5, one could honestly and legitimately say in such a situation, 'I don't know that I desire ψ ' or, in response to a query about whether one desires ψ , 'Why should I desire ψ ?'. Standing desires, taken as dispositions to have certain occurrent desires, are not invariably readily certifiable. Consequently, on this evidence alone, it is clear that one can indeed have doubts or tentative beliefs or no occurrent beliefs about whether one desires something which, in fact, one does desire.

- (C) 'S knows (believes) that he desires \emptyset ' is not logically implied by 'S desires \emptyset '. That is, our concept of desiring does not involve a requirement that, quite invariably, the desirer must either believe, suppose, or know that he desires something which he does in fact desire.

The only conceptual basis for holding that principle C is false involves a commitment to what Sigmund Freud spoke of as "the first shibboleth of psychoanalysis,"¹⁵ namely the identification of the psychological with consciousness, a tradition stemming from the models advanced by Descartes and Locke. Such an identification has been recently opposed by Ilham Dilman who speaks of the mistaken idea "that there can be no distinction between the identity or reality of a wish or feeling and the subject's consciousness of it"¹⁶ and by Thomas W. Smythe who speaks of the supposition that "the human mind is entirely transparent to

self-consciousness, and that consciousness is the essence of the mental."¹⁷ We falsely hold that principle C cannot be true when we reduce all desires to the sort of desire (i.e., occurrent-conscious-thematic desire) which is easily certifiable by the desirer. Such certifiability is accounted for, as Alvin I. Goldman recognizes, by the fact that such desires carry with them an implicit and non-reflective awareness of them.¹⁸ But we must be very careful about this matter of awareness of occurrent conscious desires. One is generally not aware of such a desire as one might be aware of a discrete sensation. More correctly, conscious desires inform one's conscious intentional setting, i.e., if you will, they in part constitute the topology of that intentional setting. To speak of desires is to speak of a distinctive comportment of the subject toward some state of affairs, either occurrently or dispositionally. It is much more satisfactory, I think, to say that thematic-occurrent-conscious desires are non-reflectively certifiable as opposed to saying that they are objects of awareness. Furthermore, Goldman makes this "awareness" claim for occurrent desires generally. And this involves a gloss over certain significant distinctions. It is not the case that all occurrent desires are readily certifiable. Rather, only those which are quite thematically conscious afford any such guarantee (setting aside, of course, errors which might devolve from inattention to the desire, improper use of words, etc.); for aside from the possibility of occurrent unconscious desires, it appears that many desires non-thematically arise and decay in a virtual instant. Certification of such desires therefore often consists in remembering. And one can clearly fail to remember or think that one remembers when one does not.

Now it may appear that there is some conceptual error in talking about non-thematically conscious desires. But certainly if we take anything more than a severely narrow and technical view of consciousness, the notion of stratifications within attention is a quite natural one. Remaining mindful of the fact that this inquiry proposes to deal with the conceptual schemas which we ordinarily rather than technically appeal to, whatever such common distinctions we make must be incorporated into this accounting of desire and action. In particular, we often distinguish between being intently and non-intently aware of/involved with/concerned about certain things as well as between being currently and generally aware of/etc. certain things. Combining forms, we can be non-intently yet currently aware of something. This distinction has been captured by the figure-ground or theme-context relation introduced and much discussed in Gestalt psychology and recent phenomenology. The ground or context stands to the figure or theme (1) as something of which we are non-thematically conscious or (2) as something which non-thematically constitutes part of our conscious posture toward our projects, self, and world. Although most such desires are probably first thematically conscious, it does seem likely that many arise and are satisfied in a strictly non-thematic manner.

Suppose that before constructing a cabinet I calculate a certain series of steps for the project and that I have both an occurrent desire to construct the cabinet as well as an occurrent desire to execute each of the steps which I have decided upon, each such desire being conscious. That is, I want to build a particular sort of cabinet and, after procedural design, I want to execute that project in a quite specific,

serialized way. That series of steps constitutes my action-plan. While intently working on the third step, which perhaps involves measuring and sawing lumber carefully, I do not desire to execute the subsequent steps in precisely the same way that I now desire to measure and saw lumber carefully. That is, I non-thematically desire to execute the subsequent steps whereas I thematically desire to carefully measure and saw. The way in which I am postured toward the object of the desire to execute the third step is not precisely like the way in which I am postured toward the object(s) of the desire(s) to execute the subsequent steps. Accordingly, the way in which the latter desires 'have' their objects is different from the way in which the former desire 'has' its object.¹⁹

To introduce yet another distinction, citing the previous example, further suppose that upon completing the third step the cabinet maker is now prepared to execute the fourth step, but having been so intently involved with the third step, that he is now unable to recall what that fourth step would consist in. The fourth step is a particular which can be uniquely described; but the cabinet maker is momentarily unable to recall that description. He has an occurrent, conscious, and thematic desire to execute that step without being able to determine just what that step happens to be. This then is a case where one in fact has a desire which is conscious and thematic about which one could honestly claim ignorance (occurrently) of its object. Sentences 2 and 3 could therefore be employed appropriately in such a context. One can know quite well that one desires something, for which one had (occurrently) a uniquely identifying description, which one is now unable to specify. To designate this phenomenon, we could say that such a desire has its

object in a suspended way. Accordingly, we can adopt the following principle.

- (D) 'S occurrently and thematically desires \emptyset ' and 'S occurrently had, at an immediately prior time, a fully determinate concept of \emptyset ', taken together, do not logically imply (i.e., do not commit us to the truth of) 'S occurrently has a fully determinate concept of \emptyset '.

Reviewing the current situation then, it has been seen that one can be mistaken about the fact that one desires something (principle C) as well as that one can be unable to specify what it is that one desires even if one knows that one has the desire in question (principle D). It remains to determine whether one can believe that one desires something which one in fact does not desire.

Considering the example of the cabinet maker once more, it is possible that upon reflection he decides that the fourth step consists in doing a, b, and c such that a certain result R will be insured by this procedure. At this point he is willing to say, even resolutely, that doing a, b, and c is the correct description of his desire's object, a description which he had momentarily forgotten. Accordingly, he now claims that his desire to execute the fourth step amounts to his desire to do a, b, and c. But his recollection of the matter may be faulty of course. It may be that, as originally planned, the fourth step consisted in doing x, y, and z. Are we to say then that he now believes falsely that he desires to do a, b, and c, or even that he no longer desires to do x, y, and z? I think not.

We are neither obliged to deny that he now in fact desires to do a, b, and c nor obliged to deny that he still desires to do x, y, and z. He now desires, as he did previously, to execute the fourth step

correctly, i.e., according to his original action-plan. As a consequence of ignorance and false belief, he now desires to do a, b, and c, mistakenly regarding that as being identical with the original specification of the fourth step. We should accordingly say that the cabinet maker has a meta-desire (executing the fourth step correctly) which has been twice specified, once incorrectly, in terms of distinct desires. Since doing x, y, and z is what executing the fourth step correctly consists in, and since the cabinet maker has the meta-desire to execute the fourth step correctly, then there is a clear sense in which he desires to do x, y, and z, even if he would now dispute that he has such a desire. He desires to do x, y, and z in effect, or by implication, as one who desires to do whatever is best might have little or no idea of just what that might amount to, desiring whatever it amounts to nevertheless. This point can be formulated as the following principle.

- (E) 'S believes that he does not desire \emptyset ' does not logically imply (i.e., does not guarantee the truth of) 'S does not desire \emptyset '.

Any equivocation on 'desire' in the two parts of principle E is only apparent. That is, it is obviously possible for someone who desires something (in this case, by implication) to believe, quite categorically, that he does not desire that thing, i.e., that there is no sense in which he desires it. Principle E would still hold however even if it took the following narrower form:

- (E') 'S believes that he does not desire \emptyset by implication' does not logically imply 'S does not desire \emptyset by implication'.

All of this is true simply because one is not always aware of what one's desires amount to, i.e., the degree to which they are less than fully

determinate in concept is the degree to which one can fail to realize what sorts of fully specific states of affairs can qualify as instances of the desired state of affairs.

An analogy can be drawn between this sort of desire and the act of requesting. If someone requests anything of sort A that I might readily secure, and unknown to him I can secure only one thing x of sort A, a thing which will surely be distasteful to the soliciter, I might say of him that 'He didn't know what he was asking for'. But I wouldn't thereby mean to suggest (or be obliged to maintain) that he didn't, in effect (or, by implication), make a request for x, although he surely did not make a specific request for x.

This means then that there is a sense in which ' \emptyset ' in 'S desires \emptyset ' need not denote an intentional object; for in saying that S desires \emptyset by implication we are not suggesting that S has even a concept of \emptyset . But if \emptyset (implicandum) is desired by implication, then there must be a Ψ (implicans) which is not so desired, i.e., a ' Ψ ' in an 'S desires Ψ ' which denotes an intentional object. This can be characterized as 'S desires Ψ (implic: \emptyset)'.²⁰ This means that the non-intentional occurrence of ' \emptyset ' is parasitic upon the intentional occurrence of some ' Ψ ', i.e., parasitic upon the possible and legitimate intentional occurrence of some ' Ψ ' rather than upon the actual occurrence of some ' Ψ '.

If the cabinet maker discovers his mistake he may claim that, after all, doing x, y, and z was what he 'really wanted to do all along'.²¹ But it wouldn't follow from this that he did not, even for a moment, indeed desire to do a, b, and c. However, the cabinet maker, prior to discovering his error, does believe that he has desired something all along

which he has not in fact desired all along. This sort of mistaken belief about a desire rests with the possibility of believing falsely that one remembers. Prior to discovery, the cabinet maker believes falsely that the specification of his desire to execute the fourth step has been, from the start, the performance of a, b, and c, when in fact it has not.

With respect to the basic question at issue then, is there any remaining candidate situation for believing falsely that one desires something (ruling out, of course, cases where we incorrectly identify the desired object as in 'I desire this \emptyset ' when 'this' does not refer to a \emptyset)? Insofar as we appeal to memory, the testimony of others, and motivational theories which appeal to unconscious desires, it does seem clear that we can end up believing wrongly that we have a given desire which stands as an explanans to patterns of or recurrent manifest instances of certain desires. To explain compulsive hand washing one might conjecture that it is due to a desire to emulate the cleanliness of one's mother and that this, in turn, is even further rooted in a fear of her disapproval. But it may rather be the case that the compulsion follows from a hatred of the father, who was a slovenly character. But as long as we confine ourselves to the realm of beliefs about one's desires which are not grounded in theories or opinions based on evidences about oneself it looks as though it cannot be true that one can falsely believe that one desires something. Again, this appears to be true with the proviso that we don't have a case of mistaken identification, inattention to the details of the desiderative object, purely verbal errors, or faulty understanding of what concept is expressed by a given word.

Theories and opinions aside, a conclusion along the lines of that reached by Smythe appears warranted:

It is much harder to produce a case where someone is totally mistaken about whether he has a desire which he believes he has. Perhaps one can be ignorant of his desires, but the statement 'If P believes he desires S, he desires S' must be construed as quasi-analytic, or as conceptually connected with talk of desires. If one is correct in his assessment of the object of his desires, and knows how to apply 'desire' and its near relatives correctly, then when he sincerely believes he has a desire it might be conceptually misleading to suppose his belief could be false.

But it is important to point out that this position is not being adopted either dogmatically or without reservation. After all, a significant portion of the recent literature has been devoted to the issue of incorrigibility, i.e., to the question of whether there exists either a class of beliefs or a class of statements which, when held or uttered sincerely, cannot in principle be significantly (i.e., non-verbally) faulty. If we hold that there can be neither beliefs nor statements of this sort then the proposition expressed by the sentence 'If S believes he desires \emptyset , he desires \emptyset ' cannot be logically true, no matter what restrictions we place upon it, simply because it would be logically possible that one be mistaken in believing that one desired something on any given occasion (although not, clearly, on every occasion).

It will be helpful at this juncture to present two well-argued rebuttals to any advocacy of the notion of epistemic and propositional incorrigibility, rebuttals advanced by J.L. Austin in Sense and Sensibilia and by A.J. Ayer in The Problem of Knowledge. Subsequently, brief consideration will be given to their applicability to beliefs and claims about desires. Since Austin's position is presented in slightly more general terms we will begin with it.

This idea that there is a certain kind, or form, of sentence which as such is incorrigible and evidence-providing seems to be prevalent enough to deserve more detailed refutation. Let's consider incorrigibility first of all. The argument begins, it appears, from the observation that there are sentences which can be identified as intrinsically more adventurous than others, in uttering which we stick our necks out further. If for instance I say 'That's Sirius', I am wrong if, though it is a star, that star is not Sirius; whereas, if I had said only 'That's a star', its not being Sirius would leave me unshaken. Again, if I had said only, 'That looks like a star', I could have faced with comparative equanimity the revelation that it isn't a star. And so on. Reflections of this kind apparently give rise to the idea that there is or could be a kind of sentence in the utterance of which I take no chances at all, my commitment is absolutely minimal; so that in principle nothing could show that I had made a mistake, and my remark would be 'incorrigible'.

But in fact this ideal goal is completely unattainable. There isn't, there couldn't be, any kind of sentence which as such is incapable, once uttered, of being subsequently amended or retracted.²³

Thus, there is always the possibility, not only that I may be brought to admit that 'magenta' wasn't the right word to pick on for the colour before me, but also that I may be brought to see, or perhaps remember, that the colour before me just wasn't magenta. And this holds for the case in which I say, 'It seems, to me personally, here and now, as if I were seeing something magenta', just as much as for the case in which I say, 'That is magenta'. The first formula may be more cautious, but it isn't incorrigible.²⁴

In section vi of the second chapter of The Problem of Knowledge Ayer undertakes to answer the following questions: 'Are mistakes about one's own immediate experience only verbal?' He decides that, although they may be, that they need not be merely verbal. What follows is a very brief segment of his extended argument.

Suppose that two lines of approximately the same length are drawn so that they both come within my field of vision and I am then asked to say whether either of them looks to me to be the longer, and if so which. I think I might very well be uncertain how to answer. . . . But if I can be in doubt about this matter of fact, I can presumably also come to the wrong decision. I can judge that this line looks to me to be longer than that one, when in fact it does not. This would indeed be a curious position to be in. Many would say that it was an impossible position, on the ground that there is no way

of distinguishing between the way things look to someone and the way he judges that they look. After all he is the final authority on the way things look to him, and what criterion is there for deciding how things look to him except the way that he assesses them? But in allowing that he may be uncertain how a thing looks to him, we have already admitted this distinction. We have drawn a line ²⁵ between the facts and his assessment, or description, of them.

In allowing that the descriptions which people give of their experiences may be factually mistaken, we are dissociating having an experience from knowing that one has it. To know that one is having whatever experience it may be, one must not only have it but also be able to identify it correctly, and there is no necessary transition from one to the other; not to speak of the cases when we do not identify ²⁶ our experiences at all, we may identify them wrongly.

Now the position which is at stake here, as previously stated, is that as long as we confine ourselves to the realm of beliefs about one's desires which are not grounded in theories or opinions about oneself, opinions based on evidences, then it looks as though it cannot be true that one can falsely believe that one desires something. But before this can be defended it is necessary to deal with the claim, which has been recently advanced by several philosophers, that we know of our desires only on the basis of evidences and inferences drawn from them.

The usual manner in which this thesis is presented involves an appeal to our being cued by our feelings and 'incipient behavior' to the fact that we hold a particular desire. Such feelings and behavior tendencies constitute evidence which, according to certain correlations in our experience, warrants an inference to a desire. Now it is not incumbent upon a defense of desires which are believed to exist without inference that we argue that such inference never occurs. Rather, it need only be argued that such inference is not always involved in holding such a belief.

First, the claim that we are always and initially cued to the existence of those of our desires which we know to exist presupposes that we always already want things before we can know that we want them. That would involve us in always discovering our desires which, prior to discovery, must be presumed to exist either preconsciously or unconsciously. (And, of course, since it is always possible to make either an evidential or a formal mistake in drawing an inference, it is accordingly always possible to be mistaken about whether one has a particular desire.) Consider the case where an individual is presented with three objects, which he did not previously know to exist, where he is asked to say if he wants any one or combination of the objects. If the individual appears to be studying the objects it is reasonable to suppose that he is involved in the complex procedure of judging values, utility, beauty, etc., which involves the interplay of both feeling and considered assessment. We would likely characterize this as a case of his 'making up his mind about what, if anything, he wants'. But surely, no matter how much feelings and urges may be involved, we should not want to say either that such feelings and urges just are desires or that they constitute evidence for his desiring one or more of the objects in some sense prior to his 'making up his mind'. (It is at this point that Goldman goes astray when he claims that wanting x is "roughly equivalent with" feeling favorably toward x;²⁷ for I can feel favorably toward the prospect of my companion, who has asked me for an opinion, placing a painting on the near wall without its being true that I indeed want him to do this.) Insofar as one, in a virtual instant, 'goes on' a state of feeling and certain beliefs in avowing a desire, it certainly does not follow that one is inferring to that

desire. At most it follows that these are facts and considerations which figure into the appearance of a desire. They are not inferences which have as their conclusion 'I desire'. They are inferences, which in the broadest sense, have as their conclusion something like, 'This is desirable in that respect and not in this, etc.'. And insofar as any of these amounts to a cognitive action then it would constitute the business of 'coming to desire' or of 'adopting a desiderative attitude toward'.

But desiring would not consist in adopting an attitude; it would consist in holding that attitude. Holding a desiderative attitude no more consists in doing something than does holding a moral point of view. Again, we mustn't be misled either by the active quality of the present participle ('. . . ing') or by any inclination to assimilate cases of holding an attitude to cases of holding an object, as in holding up a collapsing wall, or to cases of the sort represented by holding an office or holding a spacial position. The latter cases represent the substance of intelligible responses to the question 'What is S doing?' whereas the former (holding an attitude or point of view) do not.

And aside from whether such things follow or not, it certainly appears quite implausible that inferring is, as a matter of fact, what we invariably do. It certainly involves maintaining that, lack of consistent experiential confirmation to the side, this is, nevertheless, what we invariably do. To put the matter more colorfully, without considerably more attention to engineering and a ready stock of good timber, there is little reason why we should undertake both to build and then to dwell in this conceptual house. William Alston, in his otherwise excellent essay, "Motives and Motivation," appears to hold to such an inference view:

"Similarly, it is not implausible to suppose that when I know 'straight off' that I want to play golf, I am actually [*italics mine*] going on subtle features of the state of feeling and the incipient action tendencies that are aroused when the subject comes up."²⁸ In rebuttal, Charles Taylor holds that our present scheme requires that we be able to sometimes identify our desires 'directly', without decoding signs, i.e., "without our having to recognize it first under some other description, as feeling or behaviour of a certain sort."²⁹ With these several arguments alone, I shall surely not presume to have roundly settled this matter. Nevertheless, with what warrant has been presented, and for the sake of moving to the primary question, it will be subsequently presupposed that the inference view, whatever its adequacies, cannot be fully adequate.

Now, if we can assimilate all avowals about one's own mental states to the sorts of cases which Austin and Ayer rest their arguments upon (and our conceding that should require further argument), and if their arguments are decisive with respect to those cases, then, apparently, a claim like 'I want that; bring it to me immediately', if uttered soberly and sincerely, without vacillation caused by simultaneous conflictual wants, and without verbal or conceptual errors, would nevertheless be a corrigible one. (It is not entirely clear to me, provided that all of these error-free conceptual and behavioral conditions obtain, that either Austin or Ayer would still maintain the corrigibility of such a claim. This is simply because all of the sorts of examples of such mistaken claims involve an appeal to such errors.) That is, the putative report, 'I want that', could be a mistaken one. But given all these restrictive conditions, which are neither wildly implausible nor for that matter

uncommonly instantiated, how indeed could one be mistaken in saying, 'I want that; bring it to me immediately'? If the inference view were correct then one could have inferred to a desire incorrectly. But suppose for the moment that the inference view is adequate for how one would 'come to know' that he held this desire. Presumably then, once he inferentially knew this he would be warranted in saying, 'I want that'. Further suppose that some minutes later he again states that he wants the object in question, having spent those few minutes intently thinking about something else. To what can he appeal (albeit in some non fully conscious manner) when saying confidently that he has the desire in question? Are we to assume that he again undertakes to infer from behavioral and affective cues that he desires? Or are we to assume that he felt warranted in avowing the desire previously, remembers that feeling of warrant, and in some curious way moves from the memory of that warrant to a warrant for reiteration? Neither of these, I believe, is a very plausible characterization of what would likely occur. However we should characterize his statements, they would not commonly (if at all) be grounded in appeals to inference or recollection.

A partial solution to this question rests, I believe, with a consideration of the fact that we would often be wrong in maintaining that one could be mistaken, epistemically mistaken, in saying something like 'I want x'. Protocol mistakes of inappropriate speech aside, one is mistaken when one believes that a false proposition is a true one. Accordingly then, with respect to those propositions which we can err in believing true (for some propositions may not have a truth value, viz, future-tensed proposition), any sentence which expresses such a proposition is a

sentence which one could be mistaken in uttering (excluding cases of mention from those of use). However, although all instances (except cases of mention) of someone's using a sentence like 'I want x' result in statements of a kind, some are nevertheless neither propositional statements, (and thus neither true or false) nor, consequently, opportunities for someone's being epistemically mistaken in saying something (except, of course, where the object has been misidentified). This is to say that the character of such an utterance is, often, performative rather than descriptive.³⁰ That is, in saying something like 'I want x', it is frequently not one's point to describe a state of affairs, to wit, one's own state of mind. Rather, the point is to declare something as wanted.

In declaring something as wanted, I do not first consider my state of mind, determine that, yes, as a matter of fact, I do want a particular state of affairs to obtain, and then articulate that determination. However, in reporting that I want something it is, precisely, my point to describe myself. Now it is certainly clear that any use of 'I want x' to make a statement has, what we could loosely call, descriptive force. But the distinction between a declarative (performative) and a reportive (descriptive) occurrence of 'I want x' rests with the fact that in the former case it is not the speaker's point to describe himself whereas in the second it is. The descriptive force of a declarative use of 'I want x' follows from the fact that, in so declaring, one does purport to hold a certain attitude; and such purporting warrants an interlocutor's presumption that the attitude in question is held by the speaker. We may say that a declarative usage serves to describe the speaker in that a warrant is provided for the appropriate presumption. But to say that my

statement serves to describe me is not at all the same as saying that my point in making the statement is to describe myself.

Suppose that a child, upon studying a selection of candies, finally and resolutely states 'I want this'. Surely it is unlikely that the child's point is to describe himself in such a way that a request is made or an order given. Rather, and what is more likely, the child is declaring his endorsement for (i.e., is underwriting, subscribing to, etc.) the prospect of his getting a particular candy. We do, of course, often make requests and issue commands in describing ourselves, as with the remarks "I am famished" and "I have grown quite weary with your behavior", provided that each occurs in an appropriate context of conventions, expectations, subject-matter, etc. But in saying 'I want x', I am often simply endorsing my getting x. That makes such an utterance (not the desire itself) an illocutionary act in that I do something in saying something. And that which I do can be done either sincerely or insincerely in that I will either have, fail to have, or 'have' ambivalently the attitudes and intentions which I purport to have. But the insincere utterance of 'I want x' need not be the utterance of a false proposition. (Indeed, we should probably be better off in disallowing that a case of knowingly asserting a false proposition could ever be a case of insincerity, holding rather that it must be, simply, a case of lying.) The exceptions to this are, simply, those cases where 'I want x' is used descriptively and perhaps reportively, as in a context of self-description or, more specifically, in response to a query about my state of mind, etc. And, of course, 'I want x' can be used as the conclusion of an inference to a desire. Such usage would be descriptive rather than declarative in

nature, for it would not involve a present determination to subscribe to the state of affairs in question.

These exceptions accounted for then, suppose that someone, S, declares, sincerely declares, he wants x. Now in so declaring he purports to hold an attitude of endorsement with respect to the prospect of his getting x. But to say that S sincerely makes his declaration just is, ex hypothesis, to say that he holds the attitude which he purports to hold. This is a frank tautology. But it is a significant tautology, for it shows that someone can want something and say he wants it without being able to be mistaken (epistemically) in saying that he does. But the reason that he cannot be mistaken lies with the fact that there is no belief involved here. Indeed, it would be remarkably odd for someone to declare 'I want x' and, in the same breath, to talk about his belief that he wants x. This means that Smythe's formulation of the matter (supra, 44) must be altered. Rather than holding to 'If P believes that he desires S, he desires S' we should introduce 'If P sincerely declares he desires S, he desires S'. (Even if in some deeper, more analytical and unconscious sense, we can argue that he didn't 'really' endorse the acquisition sincerely, because perhaps he has repressed hostility toward x, we are not thereby obliged to deny that, so far as conscious endorsement is concerned, the desirer endorsed the acquisition sincerely. If, odd as it may be, I join the military and claim that I do this because I want to, then even if we feel obliged to explain this action in terms of guilt feelings about my previously having failed my father's expectations for me, we are not thereby obliged to deny that I nevertheless do want to join the military.) If someone were to ask me (Q₁) "Do you want to go?",

I could reply (in principle at least) without consternation. But if I were asked (Q_2) "Do you believe that you have a desire to go?", where I am not being asked to state my judgments about the desirability of going, then I would be quite puzzled. For Q_2 would suggest that I could be mistaken in answering Q_1 . But an answer to Q_1 consists (generally) in either a declaration of endorsement, a withholding of endorsement, or a declaration of endorsement for the contrary. And one can't commit the sort of epistemic error we are interested in by doing anything like that. For a speaker to use or respond to sentences which raise questions about his beliefs about the existence of his desires, if such use or response is not fraudulent, immediately shifts the whole matter into a realm where it makes sense to talk about evidences for one's desires, e.g., into the realm of unconscious desires. But in cases where a speaker declaratively says 'I want x', we are already in danger of appropriating a systematically misleading way of talking when we say things like "The speaker is fully aware of his desire for x", as if his desire were in one corner and his 'awareness' of it in another.

This is not to set aside our earlier distinction between thematic and non-thematic occurrent conscious desires. To say that someone consciously desires something is to say that this desire in part constitutes his intentional setting. And a conscious desire can non-thematically constitute my intentional setting, as when in desiring to mow the lawn I mow it while planning my evening meal. But, however it might constitute my conscious intentional setting, insofar as it does, I could (provided I can use the language and haven't forgotten about the appropriate \emptyset) readily and sincerely declare that desire.

In view of all the foregoing argumentation then, I shall hold to the following position.

- (F) There is a certain order of statement conditions such that, if these conditions are satisfied and a sentence of the form 'I want/I desire x' is employed to make a sincere statement, then it follows that the speaker does indeed desire x.

Ordinary Sanctions for Talk about Unconscious Desires

It is at this point that we finally come to the matter of unconscious desires. The issues broached and principles advanced in the preceding section were largely conceived as preparatory for dealing with the question of whether sanction exists in ordinary parlance for talk about unconscious desires. The point of undertaking the matter of the warrant or lack of warrant for talk about unconscious desires lies with the obvious bearing which such desires would, if admitted, have upon any analysis of the relation between desire and action. I do not propose to broach an extended defense of either side of the issue. Rather, it is necessary to decide whether any significant feature of at least some notion of an unconscious desire would be fundamentally unlike the sorts of desires which we have previously considered. Further, no consideration will be given to matters of psychic structure which involve some appeal to 'the unconscious', 'a hidden reality', 'censors', etc. More specifically, I shall be concerned to deal with those distinctive epistemic elements of unconscious desires which, as traditional presumptions have it, mark them off in a conceptually significant way from conscious desires. I shall argue along with Smythe and against B.F. McGuiness, Alasdair MacIntyre, R.S. Peters, and Goldman that talk about unconscious desires does not involve any fundamental conceptual innovation vis-á-vis our

'customary' or 'ordinary' talk about desires.³¹ This will, of course, not be argued to be the case for every conceivable notion of unconscious desires but, rather, for a particular notion of unconscious desire which is both (1) not accounted for by what we are typically inclined to include under the caption 'conscious desire', and (2) discoverable to have an already de facto admissibility into ordinary language. In preparation for this argument, it will be helpful to selectively recite several of the principles for which prior argument has been advanced.

- (B) Epistemological claims about the existence or objects of particular desires, as in 'S knows (believes, is sure, etc.) that S desires \emptyset ' and 'S knows (believes, etc.) that Q desires \emptyset ', are not logically (i.e., conceptually) ruled out by any feature of the concept of desire as it is expressed by 'desire' and 'want_i'.
- (C) 'S knows (believes) that he desires \emptyset ' is not logically implied by 'S desires \emptyset '. That is, our concept of desiring does not involve a requirement that, quite invariably, the desirer must either believe, suppose, or know that he desires something which he does in fact desire.
- (E) 'S believes that he does not desire \emptyset ' does not logically imply (i.e., does not guarantee the truth of) 'S does not desire \emptyset '.

Although it is clear that a Cartesian predisposition to rather generally assimilate the set of psychological states which we have to the set of psychological states which we know that we have has characterized much of our thinking about these matters, thinking which consequently finds it difficult to regard talk about 'unconscious states' as intelligible talk, it should also be noted that Sigmund Freud contributed to this conceptual ambient by rigidly distinguishing between conscious and unconscious ideas. In his profitable volume, The Self in Transformation, Herbert Fingarette recapitulates this point very nicely:

There is, then, a radical difference in nature or "quality" between what is denoted by "unconscious idea" and what is denoted by "conscious idea" (or "preconscious idea"). The simple change of adjective is a misleading simplicity. The dichotomy "unconscious idea - conscious idea" suggests a change in a single property, but Freud's phrase "they no longer retained anything of the qualities" suggests a complete change of ontological status. ³²

Fingarette continues by pointing out that Freud emphasized that the nature of unconscious processes is a "shrouded secret," "unknowable," and something of which we are "unable to form a conception." But it is all too inviting to move from the claim that the nature of these processes is unknowable to the claim that the existence of some such processes is unknowable.

What then does the difference between conscious and unconscious states consist in? First, there exists a climate of opinion which holds that unconscious states (and therefore a species of desire) are either ex hypothesis unknowable or, in some sense, states of which the subject is unaware. Secondly, there exists the attitude, well-represented by Goldman, that "the notion of an unconscious desire is one that violates one of the main criteria for the ordinary notion of a desire. . . . It is part of our notion of an ordinary (occurrent) desire that an agent is aware of his desire."³³ [italics mine]

Now, if it is true that our ordinary concept of a desire carries with it the awareness of that desire by the desirer, and if it is also true that unconscious desires are ex hypothesis unknowable, then clearly it is true that unconscious desires are quite unlike what we ordinarily conceive desires to be. But if we take the weaker characterization of unconscious desires (i.e., desires of which the desirer is unaware) then the distinction between the concept of unconscious desire and our ordinary concept of desire becomes much more difficult to draw since the

arguments already advanced in support of principles C and E, if cogent arguments, show that Goldman and others who endorse his position are mistaken about what is in fact 'conceptually alive' in ordinary parlance. Most importantly, (1) principle C states that from the fact that someone desires something, his knowing or even believing that he desires it is not guaranteed, and (2) principle E states that if someone believes that he doesn't desire something, his not desiring it is not thereby guaranteed. This is to say that our ordinary concept of a desire does range over cases where the desirer is not aware of one of his desires. But, this is not true of our concept of an ordinary desire. For an ordinary desire is a typical desire, the central case, etc. And that sort of desire is indisputably the sort of which the desirer is aware, i.e., which is non-inferentially certifiable. Goldman has wrongly assumed that the descriptions 'our ordinary concept of a desire' and 'our concept of an ordinary desire' denote the same concept. Accordingly, the claim that the concept of an unconscious desire violates one of our main criteria for a desire is presented in a confused way when the above two descriptions are treated as identical. But even if we confine our attention to ordinary desires, i.e., desires of which we are aware, there is as yet nothing quite radically exceptional about unconscious desires (regarded as those of which we are unaware) vis-à-vis standing desires, desires by implication, etc. That is, considered from the epistemic perspective of the desirer not being aware of one of his desires, there is nothing conceptually innovative about unconscious desires in view of the presence of principles C and E as a feature of our ordinary talk about desires. However, insofar as one, a`la Freud, adds to a schema of what an unconscious

desire can be like the property of that desire (or the desire on which it is parasitic) never having been immediately certifiable or of its now being in principle unknowable, then principles C and E certainly cannot 'cover all the bets'; that is, such a notion of an unconscious state would indeed vary significantly from that which is already in force in ordinary parlance. And if any of this represents the idea of unconscious desire which Goldman has in mind when drawing his distinction then it is clear that he is correct about that distinction. Of course, one could forever remain unaware that one desires some \emptyset by implication. But that would only be because one could remain ignorant of a certain significant description ' \emptyset ' of the state of affairs picked out by some ' Ψ ' which denotes the intentional object of a desire, of which, in the case of conscious desires, the desirer is aware. But treatment of any clearly technical innovation is not an aim of this inquiry. The task here is rather to discover if any notion of an unconscious desire has some degree of admissibility in our language, given certain epistemic characterizations of that notion.

But even the technical claim that certain desires, to wit, unconscious desires, are such that, once unconscious, they are at any subsequent time quite unknowable to the desirer, is a claim which furrows a bogus breach between conscious and unconscious desires. It is precisely this dogma which Dilman adroitly exposes:

Why then do we think that there is no direct way of establishing the truth of a claim to the effect that one has an unconscious wish to hurt a friend? Why are we inclined to pass from the harmless truism that a person cannot know that he has such a wish while the wish is unconscious to the falsehood that he cannot ever come to know that he has or had such a wish? The answer, briefly, is that we think that there can be no change where the mind is concerned, no change from ignorance to

knowledge, no change in consciousness, which is not a change in the identity of what a man wishes. This is the idea that there can be no distinction between the identity or reality of a wish or feeling and the subject's consciousness or apprehension of it.³⁴

Dilman suggests that it is an axiom of psychoanalytic procedure to bring the patient to see something new about himself which he had not suspected, i.e., to see what he wants and had not suspected that he wants, not merely what he once wanted. Of course, insofar as the desire in question remains unconscious, then the desirer 'sees' that he has such a desire indirectly, i.e., on the basis of evidence, interpretation, and inference. He inferentially knows that he desires something. He knows of the desire qua unconscious. But psychoanalytic procedure also presumes to erode certain motivated 'blocks' which render some of our desires unconscious, i.e., it aims to make conscious what is unconscious. Indeed, if psychoanalytic therapy held to the notion that unconscious desires cannot be exposed qua desires then every pretension to therapy would be vitiated. On the contrary, psychoanalysis is committed to a distinction between being in a mental state and apprehending that mental state with the proviso that such apprehension is often possible. (The grounds for making such a distinction have already been provided by arguments advanced by Ayer with respect to the incorrigibility issue, supra, 45-46.)

If we grant then that ordinary talk about desires does not involve the inadmissibility of not being aware of some of our desires, and also that unconscious desires need not in principle, and therapeutically must not, be viewed as incapable of being exposed, what characterization can be given of unconscious desires? It seems that if by 'unconscious

desires' we are to signify more than what is merely signified by 'desires of which the desirer is not aware', then we must distinguish such desires from standing desires and desires by implication. I shall argue that it is already admitted in ordinary language that one can desideratively intend a state of affairs without being cognizant of that intentional activity. And I shall employ 'unconscious desire' as a caption for both this kind of occurrent desire and for the disposition to have this kind of occurrent desire. Further, and in line with this strategy, I propose to generally follow Smythe by introducing the notion of privileged access as an epistemic criterion for distinguishing between conscious and unconscious states. Although somewhat lengthy, it will be very helpful to present Smythe's proposal in full:

However the notion of privileged access is to be further specified, it seems to involve at least the following feature: a person can know his own psychological states without any evidence, or without basing his knowledge on any other knowledge, and no one else can have such knowledge of the psychological states of the person in question. I shall adopt the following criterion for a conscious state of a person:

P is in a conscious state C \equiv P, and only P, does in fact have privileged access to C.

When a person lacks privileged access to his psychological states, the psychological states will be unconscious. This differs from saying that unconscious mental states are those that are unknown to the subject. For a person may have knowledge of his unconscious psychological states, but it will be knowledge that is based on evidence, such as reflections on his own behavior, his acceptance of the correct judgments of others, and so on. Any psychological state of a person will be unconscious unless he does in fact have privileged access to it. . . . Psychological states are states for which a person can have privileged access, but may not.³⁵

As Smythe notes, this is a very general criterion for conscious and unconscious states in that it does not include a typographical map of the varieties of privileged access vis-à-vis sensations, images, beliefs,

etc.³⁶ The criterion is rough in many respects, failing for example to distinguish between cases of ignorance, false belief, and disposition (e.g., desire by implication, mistaken identification, standing desire, etc.) on the one hand and conscious and unconscious states on the other. But this can be handled by pointing out (1) that the existence of a standing desire does not, of itself, constitute the existence of a mental state and (2) that since 'Ø' in 'S occurrently desires Ø by implication' does not denote an intentional object, the primary issue of evidence and access here exists vis-á-vis a description of the desired state of affairs and not vis-á-vis the existence of the mental state of occurrently desiring some Ø where 'ψ' and 'Ø' are extensionally equivalent. Further, the term 'access' is a bit troublesome vis-á-vis conscious states since it is most suitable for third-person and first-person inferential claims. But this criterion does have utility, provided it is used judiciously. However, I care to avoid any identification of 'having privileged access to' with 'having privileged knowledge of' which just may be involved in Smythe's formulation. For it is possible for me to offer an interpretation of my feelings, feelings to which I have privileged access, which is weak or mistaken. (Again, this point is part of the import of the Austin-Ayer arguments against 'in corrigibility'.) In saying 'I suppose I feel contempt for her', I may be offering an interpretation of my feeling, albeit tentatively, which may be off the mark. And insofar as some conscious desires may be generated and consummated in a strictly non-thematic manner, perhaps in a virtual instant, there is both a sense in which the desirer does not know (thematically at least) of these desires as well as some chance that the desirer will be unable to subsequently

(depending on the lapse of time) avow their existence. But this is not to suggest that the desirer does not have privileged access to such desires; for he can at any juncture consider an immediately prior mental state and recall (not infer to), with some comprehensiveness, the existence of previously non-thematic conscious desires. To this general point, i.e., to the distinction between privileged access and privileged knowledge, Dilman states that John Wisdom once remarked in a radio talk that "it is a common mistake to identify the fact that a person has, necessarily has, a way of knowing what's in his own mind which no one else has, with the claim that he can't be mistaken about his own mind. That's a very different matter indeed."³⁹

The primary point here is that in saying that a person P is in a conscious state C, we are saying that P has a non-evidentiary 'access' to C, i.e., that P can know that he is in C without appeal to evidence. We are not saying that whenever P is in C that he will know that he is in C, simply for those reasons adduced by Ayer (supra, 45-46 n.25 & n. 26) as well as for the obvious reason that no subject will know at any given time all of the significantly true propositions about his conscious states. The likelihood of a subject not knowing of his unconscious states is considerably greater however as a simple result of the possible conjunction of the above factors with non-immediate (i.e., inferential) access to these states to which the subject is limited. Nor are we suggesting that for any possible C you pick that it will be such that a clear and distinct description of it is possible in principle. The only point is that P's 'access' to a psychological state of sort C, or to any of the content of C, is not mediated by access to some other state or some

evidence coupled with inferences.

It might be suggested that a consideration of dream states raises difficulties for the 'privileged access criterion' since it appears that (1) we have privileged access to dream states, and (2) dream states are non-conscious states. But the difficulties are only apparent rather than genuine. Any objection to our criterion along these lines incorrectly assimilates all conscious states to waking states. In saying of a dreaming person that he is 'not conscious' or 'unconscious' we mean only that he is not conscious of certain sorts of things (namely, his immediate environment). We do not mean that there is quite strictly, no content of consciousness whatsoever when dreaming. In dreaming, we are conscious of one set of phenomena and not of another. In concurrence, William James (Principles of Psychology) has remarked: "The world of dreams is our real world whilst we are sleeping, because our attention then lapses from the sensible world. Conversely, when we wake the attention usually lapses from the dream world and that becomes unreal."³⁸ It would be a very odd fact indeed that a subject upon entering a dream state can usually report the details of that dream, upon being immediately awakened, if we held that he couldn't have been conscious of his dream content since he was, after all, 'not conscious'. The error here would rest on an identification of 'having conscious states' with 'being conscious'. The latter is an idiom of ordinary parlance for having certain sorts of conscious states. 'Being conscious' and 'having conscious states' are neither intensionally, nor extensionally equivalent expressions. Similarly, 'being unconscious' and 'having unconscious states' are not equivalent expressions, (and none of this of course rules out the possibility of unconscious dream states.)

The important question at this juncture then is this: do we allow, as a matter of conventional wisdom, that a person can have mediated or evidentiary access to his desires, i.e., access which is not privileged? I believe that the correct answer to this is unquestionably affirmative. Insofar as we appeal as we do to schematizations of all or some portion of our behavior and psychic life, we can feel obliged to postulate the existence of a desire qua explanans, or as an element in an otherwise complete pattern, which we did not previously suspect holding or imagine certifiable in any way.³⁹ We are especially apt to make such postulations where so-called compulsive desires persist in the presence of strong conscious countervailing factors, supposing as we do that a causal generative relation exists between conscious states and postulated unconscious states. Where a conscious desire or recurrent pattern of conscious desires is anomalous, and where we have no reason to doubt the desirer's testimony that he has no explaining conscious desire, we are likely to consider the possibility of an explaining unconscious desire. Of course there is an enormous epistemological problem here with respect to how we can ever be satisfied that such explanatory posits refer to actual mental states. But if they ever do refer, then our correct belief that they do will be a belief mediated by explanatory and evidentiary procedures. As Goldman observes, the subject "does not have the sort of non-inferential, unmediated knowledge of these wants as he has of his normal, conscious wants."⁴⁰ I shall allow therefore that de facto talk about lack of privileged access to some of our own mental states occurs in our customary 'language-game' and that unconscious states, regarded as those to which we do not have such access, are accordingly already

admitted into the language-game. But it must be repeated that the border-line between a simply forgotten and a repressed desire, or the question of whether dispositions to have occurrent desires constitute mental states, are issues with respect to which our epistemic criterion offers no perspicuous resolution.

It must be recalled moreover that nothing on the order of an incorrigibly shrouded and compartmentalized view of unconscious states is being either treated or advocated here. Indeed, based on the epistemic criterion of privileged access, it might be far more suitable to distinguish conscious states from something like paraconscious or circumconscious states, thereby avoiding the thoroughgoing 'deep hole' connotation which the term 'unconscious' tends to involve. This characterization as well heads off any readiness to simply view unconscious states through the spectacles of a medieval morality play where unconscious states are, almost invariably, surreptitious operatives on the beguiled innocence of consciousness. Moreover, this characterization of unconscious states in no way commits us to the existence of any such states, although given this perspective, it does seem clear that there are many such states predicible of any given personality. Furthermore, since certain desires are hereby regarded as those to which one does not have privileged access, it is allowable that a proper subset of such desires consists of those to which we cannot have privileged access. Admittedly, I am unable to determine that a sanction for the admissibility of such a set of desires is already in force in ordinary parlance. But, and quite importantly, our 'criterion' does not commit us to talking about such desires, if there be any.

Lastly, this model of mental states, formulated epistemically rather than in terms of psychic structure, does allow us to take the superegoic idea of repressed desires seriously. The processes of such repression are notoriously difficult to talk about; and such talk stands somewhere between evolving concepts and the accumulation of empirical findings. But as explanatory posits, repressed desires have a ready plausibility in a number of cases where the appeal to desires which are certifiable by the desirer appears inadequate, especially where we seek to account for the existence, structure, and import of thought and behavior which appear to be fundamentally symbolic. Freud himself offered what is perhaps the best statement of the advantages afforded by entertaining unconscious states as elements in a psychology:

All these conscious acts remain disconnected and unintelligible if we insist upon claiming that every mental act that occurs in us must also necessarily be experienced by us through consciousness; on the other hand, they fall into a demonstrable connection if we interpolate [*italics mine*] between them the unconscious acts which we have inferred. A gain in meaning is a perfectly justifiable ground for going beyond the limits of direct experience.⁴¹

As a final entry into our set of principles, the term 'unconscious desires' will therefore be admitted as a caption for those desiderative states of our own to which we do not have non-evidentiary access.

- (G) S unconsciously desires $\emptyset \equiv S$ does not have privileged access to either (1) one of his mental states, namely, the state of his occurrently desiring \emptyset or (2) to his disposition to occurrently desire \emptyset .

If the desirer has insight into the existence of an unconscious desire, thereby rendering the fact of the desire conscious, he does so through the mediation of evidence and inference. And so far as the subject accordingly comes to believe that he has a particular unconscious desire,

that belief thereby becomes an element in his self-concept; the desire is no longer merely inferred, but constitutive of his experience of himself. Indeed, it may well be that such insight can result in such a desire (1) becoming conscious, (2) being annulled, or (3) being defused by the emergence of countervailing conscious desires.

Objects and Accusatives

Before concluding this first unit on the grammar of 'want' and 'desire' it is important to consider three topics: (1) the relation between the grammatical accusative and the object of a desire; (2) intentional contexts; (3) referential opacity and referential transparency. With respect to the first of these tasks, the point will be to simply and generally provide a topography of the possible relations between an accusative ' \emptyset ' in a sentence of the form 'S desires \emptyset ' and the intentional object of that desire (which will sometimes be spoken of as a non-grammatical accusative). The second project will consist of briefly introducing the notion of an intentional context to further clarify the behavior of 'want' and 'desire'. And the third and final project will involve certain amendments to the notion of an intentional context vis-à-vis the introduction of the opacity and transparency of such contexts.

Accusatives

Somewhat en passant in his discussion of hedonism in the tenth chapter of Ethics, Nowell-Smith introduces a very suggestive distinction between the manifest and 'internal' accusatives of a desiderative proposition: "Rightly or wrongly, he [the hedonist] is inviting us to construe 'pleasure' as an internal accusative [italics mine] after the verbs

'desire' and 'enjoy'." ⁴² If the hedonist were correct then, whenever one were to say something like 'I want to do whatever is right', one would want at least two things: (a) doing what is right, and (b) pleasure. Variously, one would want to do what is right, and more fundamentally, one would want doing what is right to be pleasurable. Accordingly, 'pleasure' would be an internal accusative of any desire whose object might be putatively quite specific and quite limited. Regarding Nowell-Smith's distinction as insightful and germinal, I have elected to expand and revise the distinction in the form of a topographical model. There is no presumption to definitiveness here. The point of offering such a model is the more modest one of aiming to introduce yet further clarity into the study of how we talk about our desires.

I. Grammatical Accusatives:

The grammatical accusative is simply that word or form of words which functions as the object of the transitive verbs 'want,' and 'desire'. The schematum 'V:___' is satisfied by some ⁱ'Ø' to produce 'V:Ø'. Nominative occurrences of 'want,' and 'desire', as in 'S has a desire for Ø', are similarly ⁱ completed by the occurrence of some 'Ø' in the schematum 'N (for):___'.

II. Designated Accusatives:

- A. Primary Form. Those actual and/or possible states of affairs which are denoted by the grammatical accusative. For example, a recount is designated by 'a recount' in 'Hartke wanted a recount'.
- B. Elliptical Form. Those actual states of affairs which are designated by an ostensive reference and not designated by a grammatical accusative, as where a child points to an object and says 'I want'. More generally however, the grammatical accusative of a desiderative claim, when considered quite independently of contextual occurrence, designates ambiguously. For example, if I were to say 'I want to play the piano', and we were to consider the mere form of words involved, it would be quite unclear as to whether I meant by this that I want to learn how to play the piano, that I want to play

this (or that) particular piano, that I want to now play some piano or other, or that I want to be able (in whatever way) to play the piano (taking 'piano' generically). But of course the use of language involves far more than a 'mere form of words', and contextual setting typically renders any literal ambiguity quite unproblematic. In any case, where one says something like 'I want to play the piano', given the literal ambiguity, the grammatical accusative must be functioning as an ellipsis for some more specific description of playing and 'the piano'. But precisely what sort of ellipsis it is customarily becomes clear through the combination of inflectional and contextual factors. If the statement is nevertheless ambiguous, then a call for a more elaborate accusative is in order.

- C. Conditional Form. Those cases where the designated accusative is introduced conditionally, i.e., cases in which it is introduced provided that it is (or is not) a thing of a certain sort, does (or does not) have certain properties, or would (or would not) have certain consequences. This is to be distinguished from cases where the conditions are not themselves designated but rather implied in some fashion, or, for that matter, intended but not implied at all (see below, III, B and C). For example, I might say, 'I want to accompany you, provided you'll allow me an opportunity to speak with him as well.' In this case, I do not claim that it is my desire to accompany him simpliciter; rather, the desire to accompany him is conditional upon at least one designated state of affairs. Consequently, the above statement would involve the avowal of something like a desire in escrow; holding a strict attitude of endorsement with respect to accompanying him will come about provided that he assures me of, etc. (cf., Ch. 2, p. re: partitive intentional objects). However, it should be recognized that we may say something like 'I want \emptyset only if ψ ' and not use the words literally, indicating only a strong desire that ψ obtain, not an uncompromisable condition. In such a case then, an avowal of a desire for \emptyset would be involved.

III. Material Accusatives:

Accusatives which are not designated but which nevertheless constitute part of the analysis of what is desired.

- A. Internal Accusatives. Accusatives which are fundamentally and 'in the final analysis' part of the analysis of what is desired. Candidates for such accusatives include 'pleasure' and 'goodness'. Seldom are these

accusatives designated grammatically; but when they are, they merely make explicit what is customarily internal. Such accusatives, if there be any, would be seldom the-matically intended by the desirer and would in some cases, presumably, have to be regarded as unconsciously intended accusatives.

- B. Implied Accusatives. Accusatives which are implied rather than designated. The implications may be consequences of contextual setting, customary understandings of what conditions attach to the designated accusative, oral inflection, and sentence structure. If a friend knows that I always take my coffee with sugar and without cream, then as a matter of conventional implicature, he will know what counts as my getting a cup of coffee if I were to ask him for a cup. If I were to say, 'I want a cup of coffee', taken quite literally, getting a cup of black coffee would have to count as satisfying the request. But we typically indicate our desires in contexts where much of what constitutes the specific and undesigned satisfaction conditions for these desires is implied and understood.
- C. Unimplied Accusatives. Typically these accusatives constitute the myriad details of what is desired (which do not surface either in grammar or context), details to which the desirer, in the case of conscious desires, has privileged access.

Intentional Contexts

It is generally held that terms or phrases like 'looks for', 'expects', 'believes', and 'desires' occur in sentences which are intentional since the psychological attitudes signified by such terms and phrases require intentional objects. In this section I shall confine myself to the presentation of a set of criteria for such intentional contexts, reserving the subsequent section on referential opacity and transparency for any revisions in this schematum which appear appropriate. Since Chisholm has provided a very succinct and well-formed characterization of intentional contexts, I shall provisionally endorse that position, subject to later revisions. The purely formal description which Chisholm provides is as follows:

First, let us say that a simple declarative sentence is intentional if it uses a substantival expression - a name or a description - in such a way that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies either that there is or that there isn't anything to which the substantival expression truly applies. . . . Secondly, let us say, of any noncompound sentence which contains a propositional clause, that it is intentional provided that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies either that the propositional clause is true or that it is false. . . . A third mark of intentionality may be described in this way. Suppose there are two names or descriptions which designate the same things and that E is a sentence obtained merely by separating these two names or descriptions by means of "is identical with" (or "are identical with" if the first word is plural). Suppose also that A is a sentence using one of those names or descriptions and that B is like A except that, where A uses the one, B uses the other. Let us say that A is intentional if the conjunction of A and E does not imply B.

Applying Chisholm's criteria to the case of 'desire' and 'want_i' we can produce the following examples which illustrate, respectively, each of his three tests. Consider the sentence, 'Nathaniel wants to become a virtuous man.' Clearly, if this sentence is to be intentional it must qualify under the specifications provided by the first criterion. And it does. Neither the sentence in question nor its contradictory implies either that there is or that there isn't anything to which the substantival expression 'a virtuous man' truly applies. Accordingly, the sentence is intentional; or variously, the sentence defines an intentional context. Secondly, consider the sentence, 'I want it to be true', where 'it' refers back to a proposition expressed by some other sentence. Again, neither 'I want it to be true' nor its contradictory implies either that the proposition referred to by 'it' is true or that it is false. (This example fulfills the logical requirements of Chisholm's second criterion while taking a form which is more natural than strict.) Therefore, the sentence is intentional. And finally,

consider the sentences, 'Oedipus is identical with the man who solved the riddle of the Sphinx, 'Jocasta desires , the man who solved the riddle of the Sphinx', and 'Jocasta desires Oedipus'. It would appear that the conjunction of the first and second of these sentences does not imply the third and that the second sentence is accordingly intentional. However, I shall argue that the matter is not quite so simply represented.

Referential Opacity and Referential Transparency

Chisholm's third criterion for an intentional context, resting as it did on the lack of implication between two sentences, was not presented truth functionally. It seems clear that the sort of implication which Chisholm had in mind here was not the weak, truth functionally defined, notion of material implication. We are quite able to decide whether the conjunction of 'Clark Kent is identical with Superman' and 'Lois Lane desires Superman' implies 'Lois Lane desires Clark Kent' independently of assigning truth values to these sentences. Accordingly, we must be dealing with some form of logical implication which is ruled out in a particular kind of context.

Of course the idea of logical implication is a notoriously difficult and complex idea. But W.V. Quine has captured the general shape of the idea in his volume, Philosophy of Logic, in the following way:

One closed sentence logically implies another when, on the assumption that the one is true, the structures of the two sentences assure that the other is true. . . . Logical implication rests wholly on how the truth functions, quantifiers, and variables stack up. It rest wholly on what we may call, in a word, the logical structure of the two sentences.⁴⁴

If material implication were all that were involved in the Superman-Kent-Lane example then an implication could hold if only the implicandum

were true. But regarding the matter logically rather than materially, it is clear, on the assumption that the conjunction of the identity statement with either of the other two is true, that the truth of the remaining sentence is not assured. This is simply because we desire, guarantee, expect, and know things under certain 'descriptions' and names. Since one may not know or be familiar with something under all of its true descriptions, and under all of its names, then there is no prima facie warrant for moving from the fact that something is desired under description or name D_1 to the position that it is desired under some other description or name D_2 . This is to say that an intentional context is a referentially opaque context. Although there is some dispute over just what sorts of contexts can be regarded as opaque (or transparent) there is virtually no dispute over what opacity (and transparency) amount to. A suitable characterization is provided by Jerrold J. Katz.

A context is referentially opaque if substitutivity of identicals fails, that is, if (6.63) holds. (6.63) A context 'X - Y' is referentially opaque in case, given a true identity statement, say, 'a = b', the statements 'XaY' and 'XbY' can have opposite truth values.⁴⁵

A context is nonopaque, or referentially transparent, if the statements formed from this context by first filling the blank with one term of a true identity statement and then filling it with the other will have the same truth value.⁴⁶

The substitutivity of identicals fails in an intentional context. Such a context is accordingly referentially opaque. If the substitutivity of identicals (say, a and b) were guaranteed by the logical form of some context 'X - Y', the 'XaY' and 'XbY' would always have the same truth value. Such a context would be referentially transparent. In view of this then, for any a and b that we pick, if $a = b$, then the conjunction of 'a = b' and 'XaY' will logically imply 'XbY'. For example,

suppose that Shakespeare was identical with Bacon. From this fact, and the fact that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet, it would follow that Bacon wrote Hamlet. The substitutivity of identicals holds. But, given such an identity, from the fact that Jonson knew that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet, it would not follow that Jonson knew that Bacon wrote Hamlet. The substitutivity of identicals fails. The latter context is both intentional and opaque. But upon close examination, Chisholm's formulation of the third criterion looks like an alternative formulation of referential opacity simpliciter. If Chisholm considers an intentional context and a referentially opaque context to be precisely the same thing, then I suppose that this is quite alright. But he doesn't seem to think that at all. Rather, his characterization of intentional contexts occurs within the specific setting of, general talk about terms like 'expecting' and 'hoping', i.e., intentional concepts. Accordingly, I shall regard an intentional context as a species of opaque context; i.e., one in which intentional terms play the role which determines such opacity.

Up until this point I have followed Chisholm in depicting the behavior of terms which express intentional concepts as invariably productive of intentional contexts, i.e., of a species of referentially opaque contexts. However, I now wish to introduce a point which has been largely overlooked in the literature, a point which will demonstrate that there is a clear sense in which each such term can behave in a referentially transparent way. This will amount to showing that the usage of terms which express intentional concepts does not invariably produce intentional contexts. And this will accordingly show that Chisholm's claims about the behavior of such terms have been too broad.⁴⁷ Consider

a case in which an object is known to S under the description (D_1) 'a coffee cup on the far table'. Now it just so happens that that object is also correctly described as (D_2) 'Findlay's favorite coffee cup'. Now suppose that S picks up the object as a matter of intention. Letting the object be neutrally denoted by ' x ', we can say that 'S intentionally picked up $x(D_1)$ ' but not that 'S intentionally picked up $x(D_2)$ '. However, we can say that 'S picked up $x(D_2)$ intentionally'. The first of these sentences is referentially opaque whereas the latter is referentially transparent. The word 'intentionally' in the latter modifies the act of picking up the cup independently of any D_n for x . But the word 'intentionally' in the first sentence modifies the act as an act vis-à-vis some D_n for x held by S, namely D_1 . We cannot say that S set out to pick up Findlay's favorite cup, but we can say that he set out to pick up a coffee cup which, as a matter of fact, was Findlay's favorite.

By introducing appropriate replacement names or descriptions for the existing accusative phrase, at least some intentional contexts can be tailored to produce a referentially transparent context. But it must be recognized that the resulting context would no longer be intentional. It would simply be context using a term which expresses an intentional concept which is not productive of referential opacity. Importantly, such cases would be parasitic upon referentially opaque cases. That is, 'S picked up $x(D_2)$ intentionally' can be true only if some 'S intentionally picked up $x(D_n)$ ' is true.

Typically, contextual factors make it clear that a transparent usage is in force. It is therefore somewhat artificial to seek out a particular form of words which guarantees (or generally involves) a

transparent occurrence of 'desire' and 'want_i'. Of course one can make the matter linguistically explicit by saying something like, 'In desiring x, S desired y, although S didn't know that they were one and the same individual and would almost certainly have denied a desire for y'.

Further, there are certain cases which clearly involve a transparent usage simply because it is clear that the desirer could not possibly know the desired object under the description in question. For example, one could intelligibly say something like, 'In 1944 she wanted to marry the man who was to become president in 1960'. Equally, we oftentimes refer to an object (or state of affairs) under a particular description, and say that someone desires it, without thereby meaning to suggest that it is desired under precisely that description. If Jones tells Smith that he wants the box of spare parts, and Smith tells Johnson that Jones wants the box on the top shelf, Smith would be using 'want' in a referentially transparent way, provided that Smith believes that it is not or may not be Jones' belief that 'the box of spare parts' and 'the box on the top shelf' are extensionally equivalent. (Typically however, if 'the box of spare parts' and 'the box with a cobra in it' were extensionally equivalent we would withhold saying that Jones wants the box with a cobra in it on the common belief that were Jones to learn of this equivalence, he would surely not want the box of spare parts unconditionally (cf., supra, 70).

In conclusion then, we can once again say that it is not true that every occurrence of a ' \emptyset ' in a context having the form 'S desires (wants_i) \emptyset ' is the occurrence of a term which denotes an intentional object. (This was earlier observed to be the case with desires by implication.) We can

correctly say things like, 'Jocasta desired Oedipus', without being linguistically or conceptually committed to a straightforwardly intentional occurrence of 'desire', as long as a transparent occurrence of 'desire' is warranted and/or intelligible. It has long been a misconception both that words like 'desire' and 'want' occur quite strictly in referentially opaque contexts and that the grammatical accusative of an intentional verb always denotes an intentional object. But it is as well true that the opaque cases are the central cases. Those cases in which the grammatical accusatives do not denote an intentional object are essentially parasitic upon cases which do involve such denotation. As a formal device, 'Jocasta desires Oedipus' can be represented as 'Jocasta desires Oedipus (i.e., the man who solved the riddle of the Sphinx)'.

THE GRAMMAR OF 'WANT' AND 'DESIRE' - 2

At this juncture of our discussion, having already inquired into the general ontological and epistemological features of wanting, we must now provide detailed responses to four quite specific questions: (1) "What sorts of things may be desired?"; (2) "What is the relation between wanting and lacking?"; (3) "What is the relation between wanting and wishing?"; and (4) "How should we understand the ideas of (a) desires in conflict, and (b) reason and desire in conflict?".

Just as it was necessary to determine the admissibility of unconscious desires in coming to decide the relations between wanting and doing, so it is necessary to determine, for example, whether a theory of action which deals with wanting must also deal with wishing, for it has often been held that this is not the case. Similarly, by appeal to the employment conditions (i.e., the 'grammar') of 'want' and 'desire', a detailed survey of the sorts of things which may be desired (desiderabilia) is indispensable for understanding the relation between action and desire. For example, do certain putative non-action-desires turn out upon analysis to be action-desires? Can one intelligibly be said to want to do and try to do that which is logically impossible to do? In wanting to do something must one believe that it is within one's power to do it? And as regards wants and lacks can one ever be said to want to be doing that which one believes oneself to be doing, or want a physical object which one believes one has? Equally, the relations between desires and

between reason and desire surely have everything to do with the relations between wanting and doing.

Although, for example a general canvassing of desiderabilia is necessary for deciding what is directly relevant for a theory of action and what is not, much of what is said about that which is not is nonetheless germinal for framing a general theory of desire. In the main however, even if it is not fully manifest at the time, each argument anticipates the final argument of this inquiry. As an inquiry into the connections between wants and acts, our scope constitutes but a fragment of any comprehensive treatment of that topic. For the basic task set herein is that of assessing candidate logical connections between action and desire as well as the matter of whether desires may ever be said, in a philosophically productive way, to be the causes of acts. Less rigorously and more suggestively, and in keeping with the Platonic and Hegelian influence which is present here, some attempt will be made to place desire at the center of any adequate ontology of man; homo qua homo desiderans. Some attention to this concern is given in the fourth section of the present chapter. Momentarily however, we must turn to the matter of addressing questions (1) - (4).

In Action, Emotion, and Will (1963)⁴⁸ Anthony Kenny analyzes the syntax of desiderative statements with a view to determining (1) the purely formal characteristics of desiderabilia, and (2) those desiderabilia which are formally most fundamental. Since this analysis is closely reasoned in the main, germinal, provocative, and the most extended of its kind, I propose to consider a number of its elements point by point.

Desiderabilia

Kenny initiates his analysis of wanting by observing that many sentences of the form 'I want \emptyset ' (where ' \emptyset ' is an accusative following the verb 'want') are "expandible" into sentences of the form 'I want to V \emptyset ' (where ' \emptyset ' is an accusative following another verb 'V'). Although this is correct, we should say, more carefully, that ' \emptyset ' in 'I want to V \emptyset ' is an accusative following some 'V' where 'V' is either some verb 'v' or an infinitive phrase of some verb 'v'. It is clear that Kenny is concerned to treat wanting_i here rather than wanting_p since 'I want_p \emptyset ' is obviously not expandible into 'I want_p to V \emptyset '. Basically, Kenny's analysis takes the following shape: every intelligible use of the sentence 'I want_i x', where 'x' denotes or specifies a tangible object, must be analyzable (expandible) into an expression of the form 'I want to V x'; every intelligible use of a sentence of the form 'I want e', where 'e' specifies some experience, expresses a desire to do or undergo certain things and must be analyzable into an expression of the form 'I want to V(x)'; all other desiderative utterances express either desires to do or undergo certain things or desires for certain states of affairs to come about, the former being analyzable into 'I want to V (x)' and the latter into 'I want \emptyset to V' (where ' \emptyset ' ranges over objects, persons, properties, and states of affairs).

Since, on his analysis, desires for tangible objects, experiences, and doing or undergoing certain things are all analyzable into 'wanting to V(x)', Kenny concludes that the uses of 'want' reduce to two fundamental schemas: 'wanting to V (x)' and 'wanting \emptyset to V'. Kenny appears to consider both as fundamental since neither is more perspicuously

expandible into any other sentential schematum. However, it must be recognized that every sentence of the form 'I want to V (x)' can be faithfully transcribed into a sentence of the form 'I want \emptyset to V' where ' \emptyset ' designates some state of affairs and 'to obtain' satisfies 'to V'. Agreed, many such transcriptions would produce quite poor English. But the philosophical point here is that every desire, regardless of the specific and convenient linguistic form which may be used to express it, is a desire for some state of affairs to obtain. (The matter of whether 'to obtain' is invariably future-tensed will be considered shortly.)

In effect, this is Kenny's point when he argues that one never wants a tangible object x simpliciter. Rather, one always wants to stand in some relation to x where that relation is (1) specifiable as a certain state of affairs, and (2) part of the analysis of what is desired in desiring x. We may say that 'I want x' is expandible into 'I want the state of affairs "my V-ing x" to obtain'. In holding that 'I want x' must be expandible into 'I want to V x' Kenny is arguing that every desire for a tangible object is a desire to get that object where what counts as getting it is part of the analysis of what is desired in desiring that object. Being able to say what counts as getting x is a condition for the intelligibility of saying 'I want x' where x is a tangible object. This is not to say that the desirer must have any beliefs about the means for getting x; rather he must have a concept of the state of affairs 'my getting x'. The satisfaction conditions for a tangible object-desire are given in the desirer's concept of what counts as his getting the object in question. However, 'getting x' is not a sufficiently schematic term for us to understand what, generally speaking, constitutes the satisfaction conditions for a tangible object-desire. Kenny holds that what

counts as getting x may be generally described as 'having x in one's power' which is, simply, 'to be able to V x'. Having x in one's environment' cannot be regarded as either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the satisfaction of such a desire; using 'the environment of S' in an extensionally significant way, however we delimit that environment, it will clearly be possible (1) for S to get some x without x being within that environment, and (2) for some x to be within that environment without S thereby having it.

However, although there is obvious merit in Kenny's approach, it is difficult to see that he has drawn the concept of 'having x in one's power' closely enough for it to function as a sufficient condition for getting x. My legislators have the power to levy taxes against my dwelling, severely enough perhaps to force my sale of that dwelling. Accordingly, there is a sense in which my dwelling is within their power, for they can have a direct say in what is and will be true of that dwelling. But surely, insofar as my dwelling is within their sort of power, they do not thereby have that dwelling. The issue of whether some quite special power over x must be held by S if S is to have x accordingly arises. Secondly, although it might appear that Kenny introduces 'having x in one's power' and 'to be able to V x' as intensionally equivalent, it is certain that they are not: "For 'to have X in one's power' is simply [italics mine] 'to be able to \emptyset X'; and what ' \emptyset ' is to be replaced by in any particular case depends on what the relevant X is." (113) One may be able to describe (to V) x or remember x without either having x in one's environment or having x in one's power; it is not the case that values for 'V' in the function 'to be able to V x' are assignable only if

x is in the subject's power. However I am convinced that Kenny should be understood in the following unobjectionable way: if some sentence of the form 'S has x in his power' is true then some sentence of the form 'S is able to V x' will be true.

Nevertheless, in view of my reservations with respect to the adequacy of the concept of 'having x in one's power', I cannot rest fully satisfied with Kenny's general descriptions of what counts as getting a tangible object. A candidate solution, about which I am not fully decided, involves shifting from 'having x in one's power' to 'having proximate power over x'. Introduction of this restriction appears to facilitate a ready solution to the case of the legislators; the legislators do not have x because they do not have proximate power over x. But consider the following case: $S_1 \neq S_2$, S_1 legally owns x and S_2 holds x in safekeeping for S_1 . Surely both S_1 and S_2 have x, although in different senses of 'have'; but does either have proximate power over x? Neither has proximate power simpliciter over x; but S_1 has proximate legal power over x and S_2 has proximate physical power over x. We can therefore distinguish between 'having proximate power simpliciter over x' and 'having a mode of proximate power over x'. Both S_1 and S_2 have a mode of proximate power over x; my legislators, on the other hand, have a mode of mediate (non-proximate) power over my dwelling. These distinctions at hand then, we can offer 'having at least one mode of proximate power over x' as a candidate description of what counts as getting x where 'x' denotes a tangible object. Of course the descriptive potency which any of this may have rests quite fundamentally upon the extent to which the concept of 'proximate power' can be framed clearly and rigorously. And certainly

any attempt to frame a comprehensive general theory of desire should include an attempt to deal with that issue. Since, however, such a project, although important, is marginal to the immediate inquiry, the above remarks must stand as a considered suggestion.

Kenny argues that one further condition exists (a condition of intelligibility presumably) for all cases of wanting a tangible object. What is wanted must not be known by the wanter to be in his power (cf., "Wants and Lacks," p. 102, n.54). This thesis, advanced in a slightly different form much earlier by Aquinas and more recently as a rather common article of belief among philosophers, is generally formulated in the following way: no subject can intelligibly believe that he does not lack (i.e., that he has) a tangible object x and yet want x. Or, to frame the matter in our own notation, the thesis is that 'S wants_i x' entails 'S does not believe that he does not want_p x'. Strictly speaking, this position, which is Kenny's position, is quite faulty, although a weaker claim along these lines is warranted. An extended demonstration of the confusions involved in holding to this position will be provided in the immediately following section on wanting and lacking.

Although Kenny does not offer an explicit pronouncement on sentences of the form 'I want S' (where 'S' designates a person), it does seem clear that he should not be prepared to treat persons qua persons as tangible objects simpliciter. For suppose that an obsequious person S_1 were to say 'I want a commander'. Surely his getting a commander (S_2) would not consist in having that commander in his power (having S_2 in one's power); rather, it would consist in his being able to follow someone's commands (being able to V S_2). Obviously, insofar as persons are treated as if

they are just another sort of manipulable item, e.g., a commodity, then what counts as getting a person will align with the general description of what counts as getting a tangible object. But insofar as consent is ingredient in what counts as getting a person, and insofar as the desire expressed by an 'I want S' sentence is understood to have such a satisfaction condition, then that sentence is analyzable into both (1) 'I want to V S₂', and (2) 'I want S₂ to V', where 'V' and 'V' may not be identical. Foster may have a choice between Fox and Twain as his partner in a tennis doubles competition, and he may strongly prefer Twain, saying to a friend 'I want Twain'. But it may be true that it is quite up to Twain, given Foster's desire, to bring it about that he and Foster become partners. Provided that Foster is aware of the need to have Twain's consent in this matter, part of what Foster wants is that consent where getting that consent is part of what counts as getting Twain as a partner. In this case, 'I want Twain' is analyzable into '(I want) (to be the partner of) (Twain)' and, subsidiarily, into '(I want) (Twain) (to want to be my partner)'. It should be clear that these analyzans are not intensionally equivalent expressions; given appropriate contexts, each can apply independently of the other. If I want S₂, and I believe that the consent of S₂ is not required for getting S₂, then the second analyzans does not apply. Or I may say 'I want S₂' and mean by this only that I want S₂ to come to need me in some way such that, in so needing me, I would be getting S₂. But my wanting S₂ to come to need me need not involve me in wanting to do, be, or experience anything to or with S₂; that is, the first analyzans need not apply. Of course we could always convert syntax and tense from active to passive voice, changing 'I want S₂ to

need me' to 'I want to be needed by S_2 '; but in doing this we only trivially satisfy the form of the first analyzans. And the detailed requirements for an adequate analysis of an 'I want S' sentence are not even nominally depicted here; but clearly factors like stress, voice, gesture, and context must be considered. The fundamental point to be made by this somewhat attenuated treatment of the matter is simply this: insofar as there is a range of intersubjective possibilities between full coercion and full consent, there is a parallel range of satisfaction conditions for desires for persons. The general topology of this situation is represented by analyzans 1 and 2 above.

It is quite misleading, Kenny argues, to think that ' \emptyset ' in 'I want \emptyset ' may range over experiences. 'I want e' is "not a natural form of expression", and rather than say 'I want a visual experience of x' we would more naturally say 'I want to see x'. This claim is qualified however by the admission that there exists one exception to this general rule of appropriate usage: experience words which "contain in themselves a desirability characteristic" may naturally occur as the direct object of 'want' (e.g., 'the pleasure of. . .', 'the unusual experience of. . .', 'thrill', 'ecstasy', etc.). However, Kenny maintains, one never simply wants a thrill but rather wants the thrill of doing or undergoing something; a thrill is not some special sensation over and above doing or undergoing something. And a thrill is not wanted as a special sensation over and above wanting to do or undergo something. In calling such doing or undergoing a thrill (ecstasy, pleasant, etc.) we justify the desire for such an event to come about. In conclusion then, Kenny states that "there is no ground . . . for admitting sensations as a special class of desiderabilia along with tangible things." (117)

Consistently and inexplicably Kenny shifts between talk about experience words and talk about sensation words as if they were identical; but surely they are not, the latter constituting a proper subset of the former. Secondly, although I think that Kenny is essentially correct in saying that 'I want e' is a typically unsuitable way of using the language, I think as well that he has overlooked certain distinctive forms of 'I want e' sentences which are natural and which do not involve 'desirability-characterizations' in the accusative. Instances include 'I want experience' (in a context which specifies the sort of experience in question) and 'I want a spiritual experience' (which, unlike 'I want a visual experience', is neither odd nor stylistically incondite). And although 'I want a spiritual experience' does express a desire to do or undergo certain things, it need not be true that the desirer has any quite specific idea of what is to be done or undergone. In such a case, we can not determine an informative analyzans ('I want to V') for such a sentence.

These details aside however, what of Kenny's substantive claim that there is no ground for admitting sensations as a special class of desiderabilia? I am not decided about any move that might be made to insinuate sensations (or experiences) into a special class of desiderabilia, but I am certain that Kenny has oversimplified the matter. Although I must agree that every desire for an experience or a sensation, when expressed, expresses as well a desire to do or undergo certain things, I must dissent from the conclusion that experiences and sensations cannot be distinct desiderabilia. It is true that there are no such things as thrill-sensations or pleasure-sensations; Nowell-Smith has correctly observed

that "the philosophical phrases 'sensation of pain' and 'sensation of pleasure' are fatal corruptions of the ordinary phrases 'painful sensation' and 'pleasant sensation'."⁴⁹ If Nathan desires the pleasant sensation of Natasha's caress ('S desires e'), then it is not merely true that Nathan desires to undergo something, namely Natasha's caress; rather, Nathan desires to undergo Natasha's caress for the sake of (and on the belief that it will result in) his having a pleasant sensation. Where sensations are involved, we frequently desire to do or undergo certain things for the sake of having certain sensations where the desire to have those sensations is the reason for our desiring to do or undergo the appropriate things. We cannot reduce Nathan's desire for the pleasant sensation of Natasha's caress (D_1) to the desire for Natasha's caress (D_2) since D_2 may be satisfied while D_1 remains unsatisfied if Natasha's caress fails to result in Nathan's having a pleasant sensation. When Kenny claims that "to say that one went on the big dipper because one wanted a thrill, is not to say that there was some special sensation, called a thrill, which one wanted over and above wanting to travel fast at dangerous angles, to see the ground rushing up at one, to feel one's stomach leaping, etc.," (117) he is partly right and partly wrong. It is true that a thrill is not a special sensation. But it is not true (i.e., not necessarily true) that wanting a thrill is not to want something over and above wanting to travel fast at dangerous angles, etc. For I may want to travel fast at dangerous angles because I believe that doing this will be thrilling, where its being thrilling to travel fast, etc., is a satisfaction condition for my desire. It may turn out that my belief was mistaken, i.e., that traveling fast, etc., was not thrilling. But surely my

desire has been satisfied if I wanted nothing more than to travel fast, etc.; for ex hypothesis I succeeded in doing that. But surely as well my desire has not been satisfied if doing these things did not turn out to be thrilling; for by the previous hypothesis I did these things for the sake of being thrilled and was not. This is not to suggest that one accordingly wants two experiences, to wit, the experience of traveling fast, etc., and a thrill. Rather, one wants traveling fast, etc., to be a thrilling experience. Kenny has focused exclusively on the nominative forms of sensation and experience terms ('a thrill', 'a delight', 'comfort') thereby ignoring the largely modal (adverbial and adjectival) role of such terms. In saying that one wants a thrill, one is saying that one wants a thrilling experience, the experience consisting in doing or undergoing something. In effect, he has inherited the systematically misleading practice which Nowell-Smith exposes. The conceptually more primitive adverbial-adjectival modal structures ('N-ful sensation', where 'N' stands for a noun) have been ignored in favor of their syntactically elliptical surface (sentence) structures ([sensation of] 'N'). Although he has correctly argued that 'a thrill' does not signify some special and numerically distinct experience over and above doing or undergoing something, Kenny errs in altogether ruling sensation and experience terms of the 'thrill' and 'delight' variety out of the analysis of 'I want e' sentences, leaving only actions and benefactions in the analyzans. It is correct to drop the nominative 'a delight' in the analysis of 'I want a delight' but incorrect to ignore the modal 'delightful' which is constitutive of the desiderative object denoted by 'a delight' in the analyzandum. In analyzing a sentence like 'I want the pleasure of going',

employing the adjective 'pleasant' can be modally indispensable to giving a proper characterization of the desiderative object, and, therewith, of the satisfaction conditions for the desire. For I may not want to go simpliciter, but want to go only on the belief that going will be a pleasant experience. Although Kenny is correct in noting the justificatory function of terms like 'ecstasy' and 'joy', he fails in representing this as the end of the matter. Since, as Kenny maintains, all 'I want e' sentences are analyzable into 'I want to V' sentences, we must now make brief mention of Kenny's treatment of such sentences.

For such a sentence to be intelligibly employed the speaker must be able to say what counts as V-ing; but this is only to say that he must understand the words he uses. The significant point that Kenny defends goes as follows: "With these qualifications [viz, satisfaction of the necessary belief conditions], it is true that I can want to \emptyset [to V] only if I am not \emptyset -ing [V-ing]." (120) This non-obtainment condition (NOC₂) is an analogue of that which Kenny advances for tangible objects (NOC₁) and it is faulty for the same reasons. In view of this, and since treatment of NOC₁ has been postponed until a general treatment of the relation between wanting and lacking is made, treatment of NOC₂ will be postponed as well.

Before concluding our appraisal of Kenny's analysis of desiderabilia I care to consider two of his more interesting and critical arguments. The first concerns the relation between wanting to do something and the ability to do it, and some exposure of Myles Brand's position ("Causes of Actions", 1970) on this point will be given as well. The second concludes with a denial of "the possibility of wanting what is logically

impossible." (122) The arguments are significant as efforts to further clarify and characterize, respectively, the relation between desire and action and desire and object.

Kenny's brief argument concerning the relation between desire and ability sets forth a strong and obviously true negative thesis and a weak and disputable positive thesis:

There is clearly some connection between the ability to \emptyset and the ability to want to \emptyset . Beings which cannot drink cannot be thirsty, and beings who cannot speak cannot feel an urge to swear. Only a man who can play chess can want to castle, and a newborn baby cannot want to pray. On the other hand, we cannot say that a man can want to \emptyset only if he can \emptyset . We have to want to swim before we learn to swim, and one does not need wit to want to make others laugh. (121)

It seems clear that Kenny is not advancing a series of empirical claims about abilities to desire. Rather, to take the first example, the claim is that in all logically possible worlds it is not the case that beings which cannot drink could ever be thirsty. Predicating thirst of a being which cannot drink is logically ruled out by the sort of subject term which 'thirsty' qua predicate term requires. However, "beings which cannot drink cannot be thirsty" is logically true only if the first occurrence of 'cannot' applies to species (rather than accidental) inability, thereby functioning like the modal operator 'not logically possible that'. For although it would be a logically contingent matter that beings which cannot (species inability) drink exist, it would not be a contingent matter that, insofar as m is a member of that species, m could not drink. Further, 'being thirsty' does not necessarily mean 'wanting to drink' for reasons cited earlier (supra, p. 8). The imprecision evident in the formulation of the first example is evident as well in the subsequent examples.

The case of playing chess cannot be decided until some clear and restrictive definition for 'castling' is agreed upon. For if castling merely consists in moving two chess pieces (king and rook) in appropriate places when certain board conditions obtain (evacuation of relevant bishop and knight) then it is apparent that someone who does not play chess could want to move those pieces in that way, say, as a prank. Even further, it is not fully clear that we must adopt Kenny's language of 'is able to want'. Can we not, instead of saying 'only a man who can play chess can want to castle', rather say, correctly or not, 'necessarily, if a man wants to castle, then he can play chess'? Goldman has expressed some consternation about saying that a person is 'able' or 'unable' to want to do something, pointing out that "the notion of ability is not ordinarily applied to wants."⁵⁰ However, I am willing to say that, except by implication, S is unable to want to \emptyset unless S has a concept of \emptyset -ing. This is nothing more than another way of saying that having a concept of \emptyset -ing is (except where \emptyset -ing is desired by implication) a necessary condition for wanting to \emptyset . Kenny's concluding point, that "we cannot say that a man can want to \emptyset only if he can \emptyset ," is unexceptional.

What is perhaps Kenny's most ambitious and intriguing argument along these lines has as its conclusion the claim that a man cannot want what is logically impossible.

Can a man want what is logically impossible? It seems not, for the following reason. Wanting finds expression in two ways: verbally, and in behaviour. The verbal expression of wanting involves a description of the state of affairs wanted; but what is logically impossible is indescribable. The behavioural expression of wanting consists in steps taken towards a desired end; but there are no steps towards a logically impossible end. . . . Whenever we try to specify the object of his want, we are condemned to utter nonsense or to contradict ourselves. . . . What a man can neither describe nor try to do he cannot want to do. (121-123)

There are myriad difficulties with this argument, many of which appear to involve the precipitous move to a principle for the sake of rigor and elegance. Briefly to mention a few, the verbal expression of wanting is not confined to making descriptions of the state of affairs wanted; for surely exclamations and naming may be expressions of wanting. And if Kenny believes that naming is a descriptive act then considerably more argument is required. Secondly, what indeed does 'what' range over in "what is logically impossible is indescribable"? If 'what', taken as a variable, ranges over states of affairs (logically impossible ones) then describing them (e.g., as 'logically impossible') does not appear so difficult. If contradictory expressions cannot be descriptions, in that they cannot pick out any state of affairs, in what possible sense can 'what', taken as a variable, range over states of affairs? And if 'what' is not a variable ranging over states of affairs then how are we to construe "what is logically impossible is indescribable"? Kenny provides no clue. Thirdly, 'the behavioural expression of wanting' is a peculiar phrase. Virtually any behavior could be appropriate to some desire or other. And given any particular desire, all sorts of behavior are imaginable (given the circumstances, other desires, etc.), behavior which includes gesture and inaction as well as practical procedure vis-á-vis an end. But to attend to the substance of Kenny's argument, although I am unable to say just how it is an unsound argument, I am nevertheless convinced that it is unsound in view of the following counterexample.

Suppose the following: (1) S is working with some axiomatic system K; (2) $\frac{\quad}{k} B$ and no one knows that $\frac{\quad}{k} B$; (3) S knows that no one knows that $\frac{\quad}{k} B$ and suspects that $\frac{\quad}{k} B$; (4) S realizes that proving $\frac{\quad}{k} B$

would be a logically significant accomplishment; (5) Q is working with K and knows that neither $\frac{|}{k} B$ nor $\frac{|\cancel{}}{k} B$ is known to be the case. Surely, if S tells Q that he suspects that the significant result $\frac{|}{k} B$ can be obtained, Q will not be hopelessly puzzled. And if S tells Q that he accordingly wants to prove $\frac{|}{k} B$, Q will not be hopelessly puzzled. They both agree that trying to prove $\frac{|}{k} B$ may be a fruitless exercise since $\frac{|\cancel{}}{k} B$ may, after all, be the case. But surely S can intelligibly say, "I want to prove $\frac{|}{k} B$." Suppose finally that S proves that $\frac{|}{k} B$. S can then say that his desire to prove $\frac{|}{k} B$ has been satisfied.

Suppose however that $\frac{|\cancel{}}{k} B$ is the case, with all the other antecedent conditions being the same. Surely the conversation between S and Q would not be different because of this unknown fact; S could say, "I want to prove $\frac{|}{k} B$," and Q would not be puzzled. Sceptical perhaps, but not puzzled. Suppose further that S discovers that $\frac{|\cancel{}}{k} B$ is the case. We should say at this point that S now realizes that his desire to prove $\frac{|}{k} B$ is unsatisfiable. But Kenny would have us say that, since $\frac{|\cancel{}}{k} B$ is the case, S could not have wanted to prove $\frac{|}{k} B$, for a proof of $\frac{|}{k} B$ is, ex hypothesis, logically impossible. Kenny accordingly commits us to saying that none of the activity of S which resulted in his proof for $\frac{|\cancel{}}{k} B$ can be explained by citing a desire to prove $\frac{|}{k} B$. But indeed how else are we to explain that activity? Kenny's position further commits us to saying that either S had no desire at all, even though he sincerely said, "I want to prove $\frac{|}{k} B$," or he had some other desire. In either case, I find this consequence starkly implausible.

I am convinced, given a great deal of work, a theory of reference, some decision about what 'sorts of things' logically impossible 'states

of affairs' 'happen to be', etc., that the errors in Kenny's argument could be adequately exposed. However, it is only important that this inquiry set aside that argument with a satisfactory counterexample. On the other hand, I find it difficult to imagine someone rationally wanting 'something' which he knows to be logically impossible. And that is not the same as wishing that it were not logically impossible.

Lastly, and on this point Kenny is correct, it is clearly true that S can have incompatible desires (S both wants that p and wants that not-p), "for we cannot in general say that if A wants that p and A wants that q, then A wants that p and q." (122) For if such a move were allowed then every 'conflict of desires' which had the form 'wanting p and wanting not-p' would have the contradictory form 'wanting p and not-p'. If on the one hand I want to go to the theater this evening because I have never seen one of Albert Einstein's comic films, and on the other hand I want to remain at home because I have a great deal of writing to do, it surely does not follow that I want the conjunctive 'state of affairs' 'my going and staying' to obtain.

At this juncture in our treatment of desiderabilia we will suspend any further analysis of Kenny's claims until a discussion of the relation between wanting and lacking is undertaken. But several points require our attention before broaching that discussion, points which have been directly addressed by Myles Brand in "Causes of Actions" (1970). The remainder of this section will therefore be directed to Brand's various positions on the points in question.

Brand has postulated yet another link between desire (specifically, action-desire) and ability: "If S wants to a, then S believes that it is

within his power to a, [but] S need not believe that he can do a now or in the circumstances presently obtaining. If the paralytic wants to walk, then he believes that he can walk some time or other; he need not believe that he can walk here and now, nor that he can walk without medical treatment. [italics mine]"⁵¹ Shifting as he does, without interim clarification, between 'within one's power' and 'can', Brand's principle is formulated imprecisely. It will be my presumption however that neither of these terms designates logical possibility and that each comprehends the 'can of ability' (under normal circumstances).⁵² This point aside, it does appear indisputable that the conditional form of Brand's principle is neither that of material implication nor that of empirical generalization. The principle is presented as being quite unexceptional. Although Brand fails to specify the sort of implication he introduces here, the plausible candidate is entailment. Accordingly, I will take "If S wants to a, then S believes that it is within his power to a" to mean the same as: 'S wants to a' entails 'S believes that it is within his power to a'.

The principle is not unexceptional however. It is too strong and counterexamples do exist. It is not only conceivable but frequently true that someone S intelligibly claims to want to a while disavowing either a belief that it is within his power to a or a belief that it is not within his power to a. That is, formally speaking, ' $(W_{s/a}) \ \& \ (-B_{s/p[a]}) \ \& \ (-B_{s/-p[a]})$ ' is not logically false. S may say 'I want to a' but be unprepared to say either 'I can a' or 'I cannot a'. We surely often want to do things without being confident that the matter of its being within our power to do them is now or will be settled to the good. Suppose that

S says 'I want to try to score' where it is clear that S wants to score (for 'S wants to try to a' does not entail 'S wants to a'). By this, we would generally understand S to mean both that (1) he is not confident that it is (or will be) within his power to score, and (2) he is not confident that it is not (or will not be) within his power to score. Further, it would be a mistake to say that on occasions where ' $(-B_{s/p}[a])$ ' & ' $(-B_{s/-p}[a])$ ' is true that ' $(W_{s/a})$ ' could not be true since, at best, S might 'merely' wish to a. For wherever beliefs about ability and opportunity account for the existence of a wish, the subject in question either believes that it is not within his power to a or that it is decidedly unlikely that it is within his power to a. (This is not, however, to suggest anything like 'S wishes to a' entails, at the least, 'S believes that it is decidedly unlikely that it is within his power to a'; for the former does not entail the latter. This specific matter and matters generally concerning the relation between wanting and wishing will be taken up in the third section of this chapter.)

Accordingly, I am convinced that Brand's principle is false. 'S wants to a' does not entail 'S believes that it is within his power to a' since, for one reason, the term 'want' is frequently, intelligibly, and reasonably used where the desirer is not prepared to declare that it is within his power to do as he wants. Indeed, we often say 'I want to a' rather than 'I intend to a' when some measure of full confidence that one will indeed do a is lacking. Brand's principle is accordingly too restrictive insofar as it is intended to represent an ordinary rather than stipulative notion of wanting. However, without yet ruling on the question of whether wishing is a species of wanting, and where 'wanting' is

used where 'wishing' would not be (except colloquially and as a matter of courteous or deferential protocol), we may say the following:

If S wants to a, then it is not the case that S believes that it is not within his power to a.

That is, with the above conditions held forcefully in mind, 'S wants to a' entails 'It is not the case that S believes that it is not within his power to a'. For if S does believe that it is not within his power to a, we can always and significantly say that S wishes to a.

Before turning to a consideration of wanting and lacking, one other thesis advanced by Brand must be closely examined. Again, in his essay, "Causes of Actions", Brand states virtually without argument that every 'I want x' sentence (where 'x' ranges over physical objects) is necessarily analyzable into not merely an 'I want to V x' sentence, but more strongly, into an 'I want to a (to or with x)' sentence (where 'a' ranges over actions). This position is faulty as well and Kenny notably avoids assimilating all values of 'v' for 'V' in 'I want to V x' to verbs of action. This is a vital point to establish in this inquiry since it involves a putatively straightforward conceptual link between action and desire.

The claim that every desire for a physical object is an action-desire at base is a strong claim, and, I think, a quite ambitious claim. But it is a mistaken claim. It is important to show that this is indeed a mistaken claim since it figures prominently in the efforts of some philosophers to show that, in the end, we need only study action-desires since every desire is analyzable into an action-desire. It is further important to describe the confusions involved here since acceptance of these claims can systematically mislead philosophers into pointless

searches for the appropriate action that is desired in any given case of desire. Accordingly, I will present Brand's formulation of the claim that every 'I want x' sentence entails an 'I want to a' sentence, offer rebuttal, and subsequently move on to wanting and lacking. Brand's position:

If S wants x, and x is a physical object, then S wants to do something with or to x, even if it is only to keep x.⁵³

Suppose that a mechanic, S, while repairing an automobile engine, determines that he might later need a particular tool x if he is to complete his project. It is not now S's belief either that he now needs x or that he will later need x. Rather, it is S's belief that a good chance exists that he will need x. Further suppose that S accordingly wants x for the remainder of the project or until such time that a need for x is determined to not exist. Finally suppose that S is confident that he will get x (it is common practice for the chief mechanic to leave x in S's tool box) and that S has no reason to believe that, upon getting x, his having it for the duration of the project will be questioned, challenged, or jeopardized in any way. Since, ex hypothesis, S has not yet determined a use for x, it is not now true that S wants to now (or later) do anything with or to x qua tool. Rather, S wants to be able to do something with or to x qua tool just in case a need for x is eventually determined to exist. That is, S wants x to be available for use, to be within his power to use, just in case a need for its use is determined to exist. Accordingly, this example affords no straightforward satisfaction of the consequent of Brand's conditional. In what remaining sense can we say that in wanting x S wants to do something with or to x?

Brand's formulation of the matter suggests that if x does not fit into any specific plan of action then, at the least, S must, in wanting x, want to keep x, where keeping x consists in doing something with or to x. But this position is plainly false for a host of reasons. Surely it is not true of S that he wants to keep x in any strong sense of keeping, viz, wanting to make and maintain a general claim to x. At best, S wants to keep x in that S wants x to be within his power to use for the duration, etc. (And this is certainly an extended if not odd sense of 'keeping' vis-à-vis the customary force which that word is given.) But since, ex hypothesis, S has no reason to believe that he might lose x upon getting it, it is therefore not true that S wants to keep x for the duration in the sense that S wants to do things, upon getting x, which will guarantee or optimize his retention of x. Again, and at best, S wants to keep x in that (1) S is not disposed to part with x for the duration, and (2) S would likely be indisposed to part with x if, as a matter of fact, some unforeseen prospect of not having x arose. But surely, on this ground alone, we cannot say that in wanting x S wants to do something with or to x. We can only say that, in the extended sense in which x is being kept, (1) S does not want to part with x, and that (2) S would likely want to do something to insure or argue for the availability of x for use if a prospect of his not having x were to arise. Accordingly, we cannot grant Brand such a direct and logically strict link between thing-desire and action-desire. However, as a general observation, it is typically true that physical objects are desired as elements in plans of action and, therefore, that thing-desires are typically analyzable into action-desires.

In conclusion then, our analysis of desiderabilia has shown that not all desiderative statements which are significantly analyzable into 'I want to V (x)' sentences (since all are analyzable into 'I want \emptyset to V' sentences) are such that all values of 'v' for 'V' are verbs of action. Kenny admits this much in allowing that 'I want e' sentences are analyzable into desires to either do or undergo something. And most significantly, Brand's claim that all 'I want x' sentences are analyzable into 'I want to a(to or with x)' has been shown to be far too strict to be acceptable. Lastly, in assessing the general satisfaction conditions for desiderabilia, questions about our ability to desire in certain cases, and claims about certain alleged belief conditions for certain sorts of desires (Brand's belief condition for action-desires), we have prepared important ground for eventually presenting an integrated and systematic view of the relation between action and desire.

Wants and Lacks

What is wanted must not be already in the wanter's power, or at least must not be known by him to be so. Aquinas pointed out that it is as impossible to want what one already has as it is to remember what is now happening.⁵⁴

Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence, not absolutely, but considered as absent: just as the sensible, considered as past, is the object of memory. (Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, 30, 2 and 1)⁵⁵

As Gareth B. Matthews and S. Marc Cohen have observed,⁵⁶ Kenny's allowance that one may want that which one knows one already has, provided 'wants' means 'wants to keep', appears to vitiate the entire point that it is impossible (presumably, logically impossible) to want what one has and knows one has. But this point aside, which does not appear troublesome to Kenny, we are left with the alternative that there is at

least some sense of 'want' such that it is impossible to want what one has and knows one has. Surely Kenny does not simply mean that one cannot want to acquire what one has and knows one has. That claim, which is prima facie and trivially true, would not warrant the considerable argumentation which Kenny undertakes.

Matthews and Cohen argue that Kenny's claim, if non-trivial, is manifestly false. Their argument does have the virtue of showing that something is wrong with Kenny's position, although it does not allow for what is properly guided in taking that position. In rebuttal they offer the following counterexample. While attending a cocktail party, a wife asks of her husband (who has a martini), "Do you want your olive?", and he replies, "I'm afraid I do." Surely we can say of the husband that he wants the olive, though he has it and knows he has it. And we can say of the husband that he wants to keep the olive only if he exhibits olive-keeping behavior, like storing the olive in a bottle. But if he exhibits no such behavior, it is still true that he wants it, has it, and knows he has it. Consequently, Kenny's claim about the relation between wanting and lacking is clearly false. However, to this putative counterexample one might contest that Kenny's proviso comes into play, that what we really have here is a more subtle case of wanting to keep the olive. For it is ordinary enough to say that the husband wants to keep his olive vis-à-vis the prospect of not having it, a prospect which is introduced by his wife's query. But to alter the example, suppose both that no such query occurs and that the husband does not exhibit any olive-keeping behavior. Surely the husband could have the olive, know he has it, and not want it. But could it ever be that he has it, knows he has it, and yet wants it?

The appropriate response to this challenge is, I am certain, affirmative. Concurring, Colin Radford argues that a man can want what he has and knows (or believes) he has, although "we tend not to say of things we already have or of things which we believe we cannot have that we want them, not because we do not want these things but because the truth or truthfulness of a remark is nowhere near sufficient for its being made."⁵⁷ With this point Radford makes a significant observation. Conditions sufficient for saying 'S wants x' or 'I want x' are generally conditions which involve, in some respect, the having of x being at issue. Wanting often is linked to lacking or the prospect of lacking. But surely as well one can want what one knows one has. To deny this, as Radford states, would be to paradoxically hold that no one wants anything he has and that, upon getting something wanted, one no longer wants it.

Clearing the way even further, J.M. Hinton agrees that a man can want what he believes he has while holding that, equally, "there is no mistake in the other way of speaking, the one in which 'having' excludes 'wanting'." Very broadly speaking, there are two sorts of wanting: 'wanting' which includes 'having' and 'wanting' which excludes 'having'. The actual import of the Matthews-Cohen counterexample is that there are two such sorts of wanting, not that there is no logical link whatsoever between wanting and lacking. They fail to draw the proper conclusion from their evidence. 'Wanting' which includes 'having' consists in seeing what you have as an asset, a gain, a plus.⁵⁹ And, as Hinton argues, seeing what you have as an asset makes wanting what one knows (or believes) one has radically different from other kinds of wanting. The Radford-Matthews-Cohen contentions illuminate the fact that a man can 'be

of the same mind' (to wit, on our analysis, hold an attitude of endorsement) upon getting something which has been wanted. Of course one may want something one knows one has without having wanted to acquire it. And one may want to acquire something without, upon getting it, wanting it. And lastly, one may want something (count it as an asset) without wanting to keep it, for 'wanting to keep x' is generally a much stronger and more final form of wanting x where x is had and known (or believed) to be had.⁶⁰ Counting x as an asset, wanting to acquire x, and wanting to keep x⁶¹ are logically independent of each other; and it is not true, as Radford and Hinton agree, that all of the conceptual work can be accomplished by the latter two types of wanting. Although neither Hinton nor Radford comments in this regard, it might be thought that 'wanting' which includes 'having' has no satisfaction conditions and that, accordingly, there is a clear form of wanting which can be neither satisfied nor unsatisfied. But suppose that one does not have x, mistakenly believes that one has x, and that one wants x, i.e., counts having x a gain. Surely, insofar as I do not have that which I so want, my wanting it is in that sense unsatisfied. Although the desirer qua mistaken believer may be satisfied that he has x, insofar as he is mistaken we can say that his desire is not strictly satisfied even if the desirer is satisfied in this regard. Quite generally, a desire of any type is satisfied only if the state of affairs desired both obtains and is known to obtain by the desirer. It may at first glance appear odd that we should distinguish between (1) satisfying the desire and (2) satisfying the desirer. But this is possible just because the phrase 'satisfying a desire' does not simply mean 'its coming about that S believes that \emptyset qua

desired obtains'. If we deceive someone into thinking that he has what he wants we do not say that his desire has accordingly been satisfied. If Ashton wants a genuine Ming Dynasty vase, and I deceitfully persuade him to purchase a clever imitation, then, although Ashton may be satisfied that he has such a vase, there is a clear sense in which his desire for a Ming Dynasty vase has not been satisfied. We may say that his desire to acquire such a vase was fraudulently rather than actually satisfied. Although Ashton may now insist that his desire to acquire a Ming Dynasty vase has been satisfied, if he subsequently discovers the fraud he can himself intelligibly say "I don't want this; this is not what I wanted at all." where the first occurrence of 'want' means 'count as an asset' and the second means 'wanted to acquire'.

It is often conjectured that Kenny and Aquinas err by confusing wanting ($wanting_i$) with lacking ($wanting_p$) and so believe that someone's not having something is a logical condition of his wanting it.⁶² But this judgment presses them into a manifest mistake which, I should imagine, neither would agree to commit: to wit, we can never intelligibly say that a man wants what he already has, even if he believes that he does not have it, i.e., he cannot $want_i$ what he does not $want_p$. But rather than maintaining that $wanting_p$ is a logical condition of $wanting_i$, Kenny argues that not knowing that one has x is a logical condition of $wanting_i$ x. And Aquinas appears to argue that believing that \emptyset does not obtain is a logical condition for concupiscence when he adds the conceptual rider 'considered as absent' re the object of concupiscence. But these are epistemological conditions for $wanting_i$ and not mere empirical conditions. That is, the principle attributed to Kenny and Aquinas

states that if, as a matter of fact, S does not want_p x, then quite independently of any beliefs which S may or may not have, it is logically impossible for S to want_i x. And insofar as we limit 'want' in the claims of Kenny and Aquinas to 'want to acquire' then their claims are quite unexceptional.

It is worth noting that Aquinas' logical condition for wanting_i x is much stronger than Kenny's, for one can not know that one has x and yet not believe that one does not have x. And to some extent this is an advantage which Kenny's formulation enjoys since, as a matter of fact, one can want x while conjointly not believing that one has x and not believing that one does not have x. Suppose that Jones acquires an oddly-assorted box of tools from his aging uncle and that Jones and Johnson are working from the box while repairing a bureau. Johnson asks of Jones, "Do you have a countersink?", and Jones replies, "Well, I don't know; but whatever is the case, I definitely want one." We cannot say that 'want' in Jones' reply is, quite strictly, 'want to acquire' since Jones cannot say that he doesn't have a countersink. Jones wants to use a countersink and endorses having a countersink where 'having' cannot be simply assimilated to either 'acquiring' or 'having proximate power over'.

All these points taken together, and especially the conclusion that one can want (count as an asset) what one believes one has, it is once again clear that there is no strictly formal warrant for inferring either an action, an action tendency, or an action-desire from the formally simple proposition expressed by 'S wants x'. For, from the fact that S counts x as an asset nothing follows about S doing or tending to

do or wanting to do anything. And as we determined earlier, even if we take 'want' as 'want to acquire', we cannot infer an action-desire from 'S wants x'. For it is possible for someone to want to acquire something which he is confident he will get without doing anything to get it. The earlier example of the engine-mechanic provided the details of such a case.

Lastly, moving now from a consideration of the Kenny and Aquinas non-obtainment conditions for tangible objects (NOC₁, supra,91), we must redeem the promisory note to deal with Kenny's second such condition (NOC₂), that for actions. Analogizing NOC₁ and NOC₂, Kenny maintains that "just as one cannot want what one has already got, or what one always has, so one cannot want to do what one is already doing, or always does [although] one can, of course, want to go on doing what one is doing; and one can do what one wanted to do." (119-120) Strictly speaking, of course, this claim, like the earlier claim about tangible objects, is flatly false without the introduction of a belief condition for its formulation. And it is mistaken as well unless some distinction is drawn between 'wanting to bring it about that one is doing a', 'wanting to be doing what one believes oneself to be doing', and 'wanting to go on doing what one believes oneself to be doing'. Each of these distinctions is well-sanctioned by ordinary parlance. With respect to the second of these, it is the exception, not the rule, that an agent, upon beginning to do what he has wanted to do, has no desire to be doing what he takes himself to be doing. And it is no more necessary that, if one believes oneself to be doing a and wants to do a that one therefore wants to go on doing a, than it is necessary that, if one wants what one believes one has, then one wants to keep it. If one enjoys the scent of magnolias,

and lingers for a moment over a magnolia because one wants to be doing just that, as opposed to accidentally lingering over a magnolia, it surely need not be true that one wants to go on lingering in this way. Of course, insofar as S wants to be doing what he believes he is doing, the object of his desire has duration as part of its analysis since a doing requires time. But that is not at all the same as saying that S wants to go on doing a, unless, of course, we agree to trivialize the idea of 'going on' so that no distinction can be drawn between present and future activity.

Concerning inferences to actions or specific action-desires, whatever warrants might exist for them from sentences like 'S wants to a' will be treated in part in the following section of this chapter and at length in the third and concluding chapter of this inquiry. These questions define the central issues of the basic problem which has been broached herein. It should only be noted at this point that, from the fact that S wants to be doing a, which he believes himself to be doing, it does not follow that S is doing a. Only if 'knows' is substituted for 'believes' can we say that the latter follows from the former. But the more substantive matters, like whether we can say 'If S wants to bring it about that he is doing a, then, ceteris paribus, S will do a', will be dealt with briefly in what immediately follows and mainly as a final development of the argument of this inquiry.

Wants and Wishes

It is a familiar doctrine that no instance of really wanting or of straightforward wanting is ever an instance of wishing, that 'wanting' is a performance-linked concept whereas 'wishing' is in that respect its

contrary, and that 'wanting' suggests that something is considered to be the matter by the subject of whom it is predicated whereas 'wishing' suggests idleness and passive fancy.⁶³ We customarily find this characterization congealed in the phrase 'mere wishing'. 'Wishing' qua 'mere wishing' is accordingly exiled from any significant role in a theory of action. This position is an especially convenient one for philosophers who maintain that wanting to do and doing are non-contingently connected, i.e., that 'If S wants to a, then, ceteris paribus, S will a' is logically true.⁶⁴ For then we can say that the following is a reductio for 'S wishes to a': (1) 'S wants to a', (2) 'the appropriate conditions obtain', and (3) 'S does not a'. Less familiar is the doctrine that neither 'wanting' nor 'wishing' denotes a distinct concept, each rather defining nodes on a conceptual spectrum with a troublesomely amorphous middleground.⁶⁵ And thirdly we find the claim that wishing something is straightforwardly an instance of wanting something, but that wishing is a species of wanting where the differentiate embodies, typically, either a belief condition or a dispositional condition, or both.⁶⁶ None of these doctrines is fully adequate; but there is merit in each.

It should be clear by now that 'wanting' is not a strictly performance-linked concept; to insist that it is amounts either to stipulative definition or to apriorism. This point has been established both in rebuttal of Brand's assimilation of all desires for physical objects to action-desires and in defense of the position that one can desire that which one believes one has. And insofar as one can agree that wishing is a species of wanting, where wishing is seen as typically not resulting in action, then the claim that 'wanting' is not a strictly performance-linked concept is only strengthened. I propose to show that this view,

the 'species doctrine', is the most nearly correct view and that it can be accepted with minor refinement.

'Wanting' is a cluster-concept, as we should have imagined, under which stands a host of more delimited concepts (candidates for which are 'wishing', 'aspiring', 'hoping', and 'craving') many of which closely parallel items in the repertoire of classical psychologies (such as epithymia, eros, orexis, agape, conatus, concupiscence, passion, etc.).⁶⁷ In the company of specific supporting points, this point will be advanced with the intent of redeeming 'wishing' from its quick-handed detractors while vindicating that concept as an element in any theory of action which appeals to the desiderative states of an agent. The point then is to show what is wrong with a claim like G.E.M. Anscombe's that wishing is "not of any interest in a study of action and intention."⁶⁸

At the outset, it should be indisputable enough that not every case of wishing is a case of idly daydreaming or of making fanciful suppositions, i.e., not every wish is a mere velleity. For in a semantically significant (rather than protocol) sense of 'wishing', it makes sense to say that one fervently wishes that the President would desist from his current domestic policies. Secondly, it is not true, contra Radford, that 'Wishing is often and most itself when idle i.e. . . . when the object of the wish is somehow seen by the wisher as impossible of achievement."⁶⁹ radford's position commits us to saying that, from the wisher's point of view, his most genuine wishes are essentially pointless and trivial, little more than empty protests. As a provisional intuition, this position should at least appear somewhat suspect and as at best too strongly formulated. For example, in believing that a future state of

affairs is inexorably 'out of one's own hands' or 'not up to oneself' (i.e., impossible of first person achievement); one can nevertheless sensibly wish (in a quite strong sense of 'wish') that it come about without at all believing that its coming about is impossible or even quite remote. And it will not do to suggest, in an attempt to counter the above example, that every 'genuine' or 'paradigm' case of S wishing the state of affairs \emptyset to obtain is actually analyzable as a case of S wishing to bring about \emptyset , the suppressed 'impossibility' (as a belief element in 'wishes') thereby qualifying not 'the obtainment of \emptyset ' but 'my bringing about \emptyset '. For I can fervently wish⁷⁰ that the President desist from his policies without thereby wishing to be in one of the positions (e.g., advisor, lobbyist, legislator) necessary to singly influence or directly shape his policy; I may have duties which render such a consideration 'out of the question'. Hinton counters Radford's position by maintaining that wishing is "most itself when inactive" (rather than when it is pointless, i.e., 'idle' in Radford's technical sense) where, "for one reason or another, the subject has no real intention of 'doing anything about it', as we say."⁷¹ An example: my wish that someone would shut the door is not typically grounded in a belief that I cannot or that no one can; it is rather grounded in the fact that I cannot be bothered.

Both Radford and Hinton have attempted to circumscribe a paradigm or central case of wishing, the former in terms of a belief condition and the latter in terms of a disposition condition (to wit, an indisposition). And Hinton believes that many elements of Radford's set of paradigm wishes are elements as well of his set of paradigm wishes.

As an initial point, Hinton's claim that there is an intersection between the two sets is substantively faulty though, in a trivial sense, correct. Where S wishes that \emptyset and regards \emptyset as impossible of achievement and accordingly makes no effort to bring about \emptyset , it is not quite correct to say that S has no real intention of doing anything about it. It is not as though S fails to intend or withholds intending since intending is, as a matter of principle, not up for consideration. Where S believes that the obtainment of \emptyset is impossible of achievement, talk about S intending or not intending to bring about \emptyset is out of place. It is trivially true that S has no intention of bringing about \emptyset . But substantively speaking, given his beliefs, the matter of intention should not and generally would not arise. This argument, of course, rests on the principle that if S intends to a then it is not the case that S believes that it is impossible to a. And that principle, I am persuaded, is quite unexceptional. Secondly, we often claim to wish that something were not the case, thereby indicating (in some cases at least) reluctance to alter the status quo rather than a belief about the impossibility of doing so or a settled indisposition to alter the situation. One might say, 'I wish she weren't here,' only soon thereafter to say, 'I've had enough; I'll ask her to leave.' Thirdly, we must distinguish between having an idle wish and idly wishing, where the fact that a wish is idle (pointless) may not be evident to the wisher and where idly wishing is manifestly a velleity for the wisher, often characterized by a mere disposition to the linguistic performance 'Ah, if only . . . ' or 'I wish that . . . '.

All these points taken together, it is my judgment that 'wish' in 'I wish that \emptyset ' points toward either (1) the speaker's judgment that a

significant block exists with respect to 'doing anything about it', (2) that intending to do anything about it is out of place, (3) that the speaker is not disposed enough or at all to do anything about it, or (4) that the obtainment of \emptyset is considered a pleasant or appropriate prospect but only quaintly entertained. As far as a paradigmatic case of wishing is concerned, it might appear that a suitable method for deciding upon such a case would involve looking at sentences like 'S didn't really wish that \emptyset '. That is, it might be thought that we introduce the qualifiers 'really' and 'not really' because we judge that one specific case needs to be distinguished in some respect from a central or paradigmatic case. However, for the simple reason that it is philosophically difficult to ferret out an even plausible paradigm, I am unconvinced that we have a central case in mind when we say that someone didn't really wish for something. But this is not to say that no criteriological grounds exist for our saying such things. If Collins, in a moment of rage, shouts "I wish that he would die!", we might want to make allowances for the rage vis-à-vis other facts about Collins and say that he didn't really wish the death of his father. That is, given that Collins was considerably agitated, if not momentarily 'out of his mind', we might want to say that the matter of Collins' sincerity cannot arise. Or we can say that Collins doesn't really wish to be in Naples this winter if it appears that he has only quaintly entertained the idea (supra, #4). And this point leads nicely into another which is quite significant and frequently omitted in the literature.

Suppose that Collins is a shy fellow and says to Connors, "Ah, how I wish that I might spend an evening with Pearl." Further suppose that

Connors tells Collins that he knows Pearl and that everything could be easily arranged whereupon Collins is seized by anxiety and dismisses the idea. Connors would then be warranted in holding that Collins didn't really wish to be with Pearl since, given that he could, he didn't want to be with Pearl. In saying that he wished to be with Pearl, Collins likely used the grammatical accusative 'to spend an evening with Pearl' to denote what we might call a partitive intentional object. Collins, in imagining certain pleasant and exciting things about being with Pearl, said that he wished to be with her. But if Collins had adequately or authentically considered that prospect he would likely have anticipated (if not experienced) his anxiety and, if honest, not avowed a wish to see her. It is not a novel thesis that we are able, in imagination, to dissociate unpleasant elements from pleasant ones in entertaining a prospect and thereupon claim to wish that the state of affairs in question would obtain.⁷² I am willing to concede that our ability to imaginatively dissociate in this way is somewhat puzzling; but it is, nevertheless, I believe, a phenomenological datum of experience. In finalizing this extended argument then, although it is doubtful that either there is a paradigm for wishing or that we appeal to one in qualifying claims about someone's wishing something, it is nevertheless true that we have criteria for making such qualifications.

We are now in a position to consider the view that wishing is a species of wanting. In her discussion of intentional action Anscombe avoids the policy of radically distinguishing wishing and wanting while nevertheless attempting to preserve grounds for a reductio policy (supra, 110). She argues that while wishing, hoping, and 'pricks of desire' are

forms of wanting, the distinctive feature "present in" straightforward or full-blooded wanting is "some kind of action or movement which (the agent at least supposes) is of use towards something."⁷³ Various, she states that "the primitive sign of wanting is trying to get."⁷⁴

Although Anscombe's gloss of nuance in this argument is very cavalier, if we take 'wanting' restrictedly as 'wanting to acquire' it is correct to observe that the most rudimentary sign of wanting is 'trying to get'. But that is not the same as saying that all cases of full-blooded desires to acquire something are invariably so manifested. Indeed, we have already shown (supra, 100-101) that a man might want to acquire something quite intensely and yet not even tend to try to get it if he is confident that he will get it anyway, quite independently of acting. It is difficult to see just what Anscombe means when she claims that some action or movement is "present in" this sort of wanting. It appears that Anscombe believes that a sense of 'wanting' exists such that 'wanting \emptyset ' means in part 'acting to bring about \emptyset '. Setting aside the above reminder of an earlier point, and restricting our case even further, this condition is still too strong for many clear cases of 'full-blooded' wanting where countervailing factors obtain, and only an 'action-tendency' exists.⁷⁵ It furthermore reveals serious difficulties for the principle 'If S wants to a, then, ceteris paribus, S will a', difficulties which will be discussed at length in the concluding chapter. Secondly, Anscombe has given us neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for these action-oriented cases of wanting which are not cases of wishing, et. al. Once again, with respect to 'trying to get' as a necessary condition, it has already been shown (supra, 100-101) that one can clearly want a

tangible thing without doing or wanting to do anything to it, with it, or to get it. This point has been succinctly endorsed by Radford: "A man may do nothing to achieve some end because, though not certain, he is confident of getting what he wants without his doing anything; his failure to act is a measure of his confidence, it does not impugn the existence of his desire." [italics mine]⁷⁶ (Further, even where 'want' is not equivalent to 'wish', et. al., this renders a corrolary principle, 'If S wants x, then, ceteris paribus, S will try to get x', a highly suspect principle since it is difficult to speak of 'believing one will get x without trying' as a countervailing factor.) Lastly, Anscombe appears to provide no candidate for a sufficient condition here since she is surely aware that 'trying to get' can be satisfied without producing an instance of wanting. It can be true of Collins that he is exhibiting useful movement towards something of which he has the idea while not wanting the end in question. For Collins can be coerced or simply controlled to exhibit such movement. Or, if Roy Lawrence is right, Collins can intend to bring about \emptyset without wanting to bring about \emptyset .⁷⁷

That both Radford and Hinton adopt a species view of wishing is clear from the latter's characterizing most of wishing as 'inactive desire',⁷⁸ and from the former's remark that "a person who hopes or wishes that. . . , or to . . . , or for . . . eo ipso desires something."⁷⁹ With the exceptions that 'wish' can be used when our fourth characterization (supra, 113-14) is satisfied, as well as in contexts typified by the Collins-Connors-Pearl example, this view is correct. To wish that \emptyset is, typically, to hold an attitude of endorsement with respect to the obtainment of \emptyset . The philosophical predeliction to deny this appears to

devolve from an understandable but naive focus upon the whimsical usage of 'wish'. But in response to this denial, we need only notice that when one of our desires is overridden by another we often speak of the first as a wish, or that, having said 'I wish that \emptyset ' and subsequently learned that I can bring about \emptyset , that I may then undertake to bring about \emptyset . And we should note again, of course, and without philosophical moment except as clarification, that desires are frequently spoken of as wishes as a matter of courtesy and protocol.

Finally then, what can be said about the place of wishing in any theory of action which appeals to the desiderative states of an agent? In rebuttal to the alleged principle 'If S wants x , then, ceteris paribus, S will try to get x ', it might be argued that the principle is flawed by an oversight: there are gradients of desiderative intensity. Although S may want x , S just may not want x enough to 'do anything about it'. Although this deceptively simple response requires further attention, I find it essentially correct. Moreover, if one doesn't want x enough to do anything to get it, then one can sensibly say (#3, supra, 114) that one wishes one had it. Accordingly, the reductio policy of dismissing alleged counterexamples to the above principle as cases of mere wishing (as if wishing and wanting are quite unrelated) fails; for it is now clear that many cases of wishing are cases of wanting but not wanting enough to act appropriately. A second point. A man can want and try to do what he believes to be virtually impossible for him to do. Suppose that Tompkins is competing in a close and hotly contested billiard match. It is Tompkins' turn and he is faced with a difficult shot which he has never before been able to execute. If he scores, he wins the

match. Tompkins addresses himself to the cue ball saying, "How I wish that I might make this shot." In saying this Tompkins both attests to a strong desire to make the shot as well as to his strong belief in the unlikelihood of making it. Tompkins desires qua wishing to make the shot; and he tries to make the shot. It is accordingly possible to cite desire qua wish to explain an action. Even more strongly, Tompkins may be convinced that he hasn't the skill to execute the shot but try nevertheless on the outside chance that he will cue the ball correctly. Finally suppose that Tompkins loses the match and becomes short-tempered, brooding fitfully, wishing that he hadn't lost the match. We can cite this idle wish as an explanation (or partial explanation) for his agitated behavior. One other example: suppose that I fervently wish that the President would desist from his current domestic policies. At this time I may vote for the opposition candidate, citing the President's failure to pursue different policies as my reason for my vote. In this case, it is not as if I have quite suddenly acquired a reason for opposing the President. My previous and unconsummated wish is part of the history of my now having the reason I have.

In summary then, the concept of 'wishing' cannot be ignored in any adequate theory of action which appeals to the concept of 'desire'. Indeed, even fanciful wishing, insofar as that involves the play of imagination, can be a significant event in the emergence of projects, sensibilities, and qualities of mind.

Homo Distractus

Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, that to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, II, iii,3)

It has indeed been a common article of judgment, especially among philosophers, that the psyche is an embattled realm where reason and desire vie for hegemony. As early as the Theogony of Hesiod the claim is made that in every man and every god Eros (Desire) "softens the sinews and overpowers the prudent purpose of mind" (II, 116-120). Concurrence in this characterization has been manifold, especially where reason is depicted as the executor of prudence and virtue and desire is cast as a visionless perturbation. Kant contrasted moral rectitude with inclination, Freud introduced the scenario of a magisterial Ego-Superego complex set over against the Id, and Descartes alludes to the sovereign function of the cognitive (Les Passions de L'Ame, Second Partie, Article CXLII). Plato, although he did allow reason (logistikon) a desiderative ally (eros), schematized a tripartite soul in the Republic where the rational and the appetitive (epithymetikon) are mediated by a spirited element (thymoeides) which can ally with either. And of course Plato's graphic metaphors of the man (reason) within the man and of the charioteer, the white stallion, and the dark stallion are significant here.

Conceived in this way, man is essentially bifurcated by the intra-agential dialectic of reason and desire; homo qua homo distractus. Indeed, reason and desire tend to acquire the character of agents themselves, dramatis personae, and this accordingly introduces the ontological problem of what the individual man, the agent, may then be conceived

to be. And of course the bifurcation of mind (or soul) and body has been a frequent concomitant of the bifurcation of reason and desire.

But this general conception of man has not enjoyed the philosophical unanimity which we might suspect. The inveterate rationalist Spinoza allowed that desire is the actual essence of man (Ethics, III, I, Definitions of the Emotions), Hume that the 'conflict of reason and desire' is a popular confusion since reason consists in understanding the connections between ideas and neither motivates nor has a motive, and Nietzsche that the misunderstanding of passion and reason consists in regarding the latter as if it "were an independent entity and not rather a system of relations between various passions and desires; and as if every passion did not possess its quantum of reason" (The Will to Power, 387). Indeed, Walter Kaufman's characterization of Nietzsche's position suggests a striking parallel with Hegel's early claim that the dialectical emergence of reason is grounded in desire where "self-consciousness is Desire"⁸⁰: "The opposition to the popular dualism of reason and passion, and to any deprecation of either of these, is one of the leitmotifs of Nietzsche's thought. . . . The will to power is neither identical with reason nor opposed to it, but potentially rational."⁸¹

It occurs to me that there is something correct in each of these positions, but that, oddly enough, Hume and Nietzsche have been most nearly correct. So far as one is ready to talk about reason one is already at the threshold of both rarifying and reifying reason into a daimonic entity peculiarly stationed at the vortex of a desiderative maelstrom. This is clearly one of Nietzsche's points. And insofar as one is ready to talk about the combat of reason and desire one is committed to

attributing desiderative characteristics (motives) to reason. The 'combat of reason and desire' accordingly looks more like a scenario of the virtuous protagonist (reason) in his perennial conflict with the vulgar antagonist (desire) where the protagonist, though motivated to do good, never desires to do good, but only has reason to do good. All of desire becomes identified with its most dramatic and rudimentary instances; "and since these instances come most frequently under moral proscription, it is easy to suppose that reason and desire form a dichotomy"⁸² where reason is identified with the moral executor. This is one of Hume's points. And insofar as one assimilates desire to disquietudes and perturbations one ignores both the intentionality of desire as well as the setting of belief, judgment, and perception in which desires arise, persist, and decay. Again, this was Nietzsche's point. And lastly, so far as one insulates reason from desire, as opposed to considering reason as the system of relations between desires, where desire is potentially rational (Nietzsche), or desire as a necessary condition for the emergence and maturation of reason (Hegel), then the conflict model is something of an expectable consequence.

Properly conceived, I think, reason is the capacity to give reasons, acquire and generate concepts, develop principles, make categorial judgments, interrogate matters of cause, reason, and value, etc. And to say that a man is rational is to say that he typically exercises this capacity well in arriving at and maintaining the beliefs, desires, and principles in accordance with which he intends and acts. His beliefs and desires are typically acquired and ordered in such a way that they are more consistent than not, considered without special pleading, and open to

reconsideration. A man is more or less rational in proportion to his capacity to reason and the quality and frequency of his exercise of that capacity, especially with respect to his intentions and actions. Above all, this is not to suggest that rational thought and rational action are to be identified with approved thought and action. Just as well, if there indeed exist absolute moral truths, it is still possible to rationally dispute their truth and act contrariwise while being mistaken in doing so. Rationality is a quality of mind rather than any specific content of mind.

What then can be said about 'the conflict of reason and desire'? More correctly, to state that there is a 'conflict' of reason with desire in S is to indicate either (1) that desires which have been generated, cultivated, and ordered rationally in S coexist inconsistently with certain desires in S which have not been so ordered, (2) that desires to do what is deemed appropriate coexist inconsistently with desires to bring about what are deemed pleasant prospects, or (3) that S does not want to do what S realizes (judges, determines, etc.) that he ought (either morally or non-morally) to do (where 'what one judges one ought to do' is identical with 'what one judges, in a given circumstance, specifically satisfies a principle of action' (1) which one endorses, or (2) which has been uncritically assimilated and become habitually operational).⁸³ None of these cases consists in the combat of either entities, faculties, or agents. We rather have inconsistencies between desires, aversions, and principles of action. Willingness to talk about the psychodrama of reason and desire has largely devolved from an antecedent identification of rational action with morally responsible action and this, furthermore, with specific approved principles of conduct like altruism, humility,

and contrition. Action which does not exemplify such principles is thereupon very easily considered action which involves doing what one wants to do as opposed to doing what one ought to do. Acting on desire accordingly appears quite unlike acting on principle. When this much has been conceded it is very natural to talk about being 'overcome by desire' and of falling victim to an 'irresistible desire'. If this view is carried far enough, a man is an agent if and only if he is rational (exemplifies the correct principles) whereas one more properly only behaves on desire; desire overcomes reason and agency is abrogated. And no one is ever overcome by a desire to be charitable or to observe the canons of popular wisdom; there is no desire, but only reason to do good. Where the flesh is already denegated, desire is denegated as well when it is assimilated to the promptings and perturbations of the former.

Aside from the obvious error of assimilating 'desire' to 'uneasiness' and 'carnal appetite', this view misses the fact that acting on desire is largely a species of acting on principle. Cognitive and evaluative norms and procedures are in force when a state of affairs is apprehended or determined to be desirable.⁸⁴ To cite a fact or a predicted fact as a reason for desiring is to bring that fact or predicted fact under a principle of reason. Furthermore, when one acts on desire one typically exemplifies some principle of action (which the agent might not be aware of and might not admit to). The more general and comprehensive of our standing desires typically embody principles of conduct which are principles nonetheless if they are inconsistent with the popular moral wisdom. And insofar as desire is reclaimed from its ignominious exile to the spleen and the self-indulgent ego, it is possible to follow Goldman⁸⁵

(contra Kant) in collapsing the distinction between acting from a sense of duty and acting from desire. As Goldman maintains, this commitment multiplies modes of motivation beyond necessity. One need only say that acting from a sense of duty consists in acting on a desire to do what one believes one ought (morally) to do. I do not believe that such a move disguises some unwarranted and pernicious apriorism. More correctly, plausibility is decidedly on the side of this position; the insistence that 'duty-motivation' is different in kind inherits the burden of argument in this case.

Even more familiar than talk about 'the conflict of reason and desire' is talk about 'the conflict of desires'. Such talk can be and typically is systematically misleading. Desires conflict only insofar as they are mutually exclusive in some respect and not at all insofar as they are conceived as combatants. Equally familiar is talk about the 'intensity' of a desire which suggests all too readily (but need not; supra, 118) that desires are paramechanical thrusts which precipitate action, anxiety, etc. It has frequently been believed by philosophers as recent as Goldman⁸⁶ that every desire has an intensity which is in principle measurable and that, therefore, in accordance with certain models, the resolution of any particular conflict of desires is in principle predictable. All that is lacking is the practical technique.

There are myriad difficulties with this position. Without broaching the enormous freedom-determinism issue, it is certainly something of an arguable leap to hold, quite simply, that if desiderative intensities could be measured then conflict resolutions could be systematically predicted. Secondly, if measurement is to consist in monitoring

physiological changes it will not thereby consist in measurement of desiderative intensities unless it can be shown that a direct (presumably causal) link exists between instances of the latter and instances of the former. Thirdly, it is altogether unclear as to how a particular physiological state (S_1) could be identified as that state caused by or causing a given particular desire (D_1). Although D_1 would be distinguished from some D_2 by their respective objects, how could S (which does not have an object) be identified as the effect (cause) of D_1 or S_2 the effect (cause) of D_2 , especially where D_1 and D_2 exist occurrently and concurrently? Fourthly, what warrant is there for presupposing that the 'how much' in 'how much \emptyset is desired' refers to psychic intensity; i.e., doesn't this just as frequently indicate the degree to which the desirer values what is desired? Surely my valuing something greatly need not have high psychic intensity as an invariable conjunct. Moreover, if I want to do something because I consider it appropriate, i.e., the thing to do (e.g., keeping a promise), something which is not a pleasant prospect, and I want to do something because the prospect of it is pleasant to me (breaking that promise), then, a fortiori, in the sense in which I want to keep that promise I do not want to break it more (or less). How indeed could a prediction in terms of simple intensities be made of the resolution of this case? In this case, we have not merely a divergence (if any) between 'excitement profiles' but a divergence as well between the conditions for instantiating different principles of action (i.e., doing what is deemed appropriate and doing what is deemed pleasurable). The Intensity-Resolution Thesis (IRT), as it stands, harbors too many difficulties and open questions to be considered a credible, much

less cogent, characterization of preemption and dissonance-resolution among desires.

Typically implicit in this thesis, insofar as it attempts to depict resolutions in a strictly quantitative manner, is a commitment to the largely discredited thesis that the 'strongest motive invariably prevails' (SMT). The traditional assessment of the SMT has been that it is either false, uninformatively tautological, or, if true, certainly not known to be.⁸⁷ If by 'the strongest motive' we simply mean 'the motive which prevails', then the SMT is both uninformatively tautological and misleading insofar as it purports to be informative. If the formulation of SMT is non-trivial, then it is false, provided that our common experiences of 'doing a when one really and rather wants to do b' cannot be explained away. This objection to the SMT can be referred to as the 'Non-Redemption of Real Preference Thesis' (NRT). Lastly, if SMT is true, we do not know it to be true since knowing that requires knowing NRT to be false; and NRT is prima facie true.

But the NRT is not without its own problems. First, so far as the NRT represents certain cases of real preferences as cases of non-redeemed strongest motives, the NRT accordingly inherits all the problems which surround talk about the strengths or intensities of motives or desires; but those problems may be unavoidable. Secondly, the notion of 'real preference' as opposed to 'actual preference' presents us with the oddity of S in fact preferring a to b (insofar as S elects to do a rather than b) while really preferring doing b to doing a. Provided that S can make a genuine choice, and provided that S takes himself to have a genuine choice, how indeed could S ever not elect to do what he really

prefers to do? One attempt to handle this situation might involve an appeal to a sentence like "I really prefer going to staying, but all things considered I have decided to stay." That is, we might say that to remark that S really prefers b to a is to say that, considered in themselves simpliciter, S desires to do b more than a (if, indeed, a is desired intrinsically at all). Now the question is this: insofar as S rather elects to do a, are we committed to saying that S extrinsically ('all things considered') desires doing a more than he intrinsically desires doing b. That is, are we committed to saying that since S elects to do a it must therefore be true that the desire to do a is, in the end, stronger than the desire to do b? As it turns out, the attempt to elucidate the NRT in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic desires, rather than discrediting the SMT, raises the issues surrounding the latter once again. There is a certain attractiveness to saying that, in cases of genuine choice, whatever we elect to do must, in the end, carry 'the most weight', where a higher order desire may override an intrinsic preference. But again the question is: does one desire 'overriding' another, or 'carrying the most weight', or 'winning out' make that desire, invariably, the 'strongest'? One might say that insofar as S has and believes he has a genuine choice, then his preferences do not compel a particular choice; one can always choose to do something other than what is preferred. Preferences compel only insofar as choices are only apparent rather than genuine. But even given this consideration, it does remain difficult to understand how one could, on balance, choose to do other than as one prefers to do. However, as we move away from cases of genuine choice, considering cases where one does not believe that one is able to act as

one really prefers to act (lack of opportunity, lack of native ability, presence of coercive factors, etc.), it is easy to see that we often do not act on our 'strongest' desire. The NRT is further strengthened by a consideration of the phenomenon of guilt. If S, subsequent to doing a, experiences the guilt which he anticipated in electing not to exemplify a moral rule, it was not simply true that his desire to do a overrode or carried more weight than his desire to follow the rule in question. And if any form of determinism is true, it might be that it was not up to S to act on his real preference, if that preference consisted in exemplifying that rule. Further weakening the SMT, though not directly bearing on the NRT, is the fact that men must often act quickly and decisively, being forced to choose between lines of action with respect to which they could not avow an order of preferences. Given such situations, it becomes difficult to see what having acted on one's strongest motive or desire might mean. Holding out for that characterization of the situation would be suspiciously aprioristic.

With this then, the present subsection, the chapter, and the first part of our inquiry have been completed. The results of our analysis of the concepts and grammar of 'want' and 'desire' now allow us to credibly and resourcefully entertain the fundamental question at issue here.

WANTS AND ACTS

Having scouted and explored features of our talk about wanting and desiring which are important for understanding their relations to action and behavior, I now propose to consider those claims about these relations which have received most attention in the recent literature. Aside from independent conclusions already reached, the preceding two chapters have been conceived to produce premises for the argument which the present chapter in particular and this inquiry in general constitute. Specifically, I will now examine four alleged logical relations between wants and acts as well as the matter of whether instances of desire are ever causally related to instances of action. The alleged logical relations: (1) 'If S wants to a, then, ceteris paribus, S will a' (L₁); (2) 'Description acted under, the belief and desire content acted on, form a tri-partite logical web, only two links of which are necessary for explaining a given action' (L₂); (3) 'Doing a is a criterion for wanting to a' (L₃); and (4) 'If S does a because of desire d, then d is 'descriptively-dependent' upon a' (L₄). Each, in turn, will be examined; and it will be argued that no warrant exists for our accepting any one of them. The claim that wants and acts are sometimes causally related will be briefly reviewed and seriously disputed. Lastly, centered about the notion of 'material' connections between wants and acts, a number of suggestions will be advanced for a further, more comprehensive treatment of the place of desire in a theory of human action.

'If S wants to a, then, ceteris paribus, S will a' (L_1)

Although the following analysis of L_1 probably warrants the strong conclusion that L_1 is false, mine is the more limited purpose of drawing the weaker conclusion that no warrant exists for our believing L_1 to be true. Initially the procedure will be to cite the major sources of advocacy for L_1 . Subsequently, and at some length, point by point objections will be developed against L_1 .

Advocacy of L_1

It is obviously false that wanting to a entails doing a. But it has been strenuously argued recently that a weaker thesis (L_1) is obviously true, to wit, that 'wanting to a', 'ceteris paribus' entails 'doing a'. Indeed, if anything is obvious here, it is that the introduction of the 'ceteris paribus' clause into the antecedent as a 'logical stop-gap' bears considerable scrutiny. Representative of the advocacy of L_1 is an argument advanced by Raziel Abelson which, among other things, conflates intention and desire:

Assume that Jones wants, intends, desires, or in some sense has a motive to open the window. What does this entail about what he will do? Well, it entails that he will open the window, but it does not entail this tout court. It entails that he will open the window provided that no reason arises for his not doing so (e.g., a hurricane is not blowing outside) and provided nothing prevents him (e.g., he is not paralyzed, and the window isn't stuck). The provisos here constitute the contextual limitation I spoke of on the entailment between motive and act. To say "I want to open the window; nothing prevents me, and I have no reason or motive not to, not even the motive of laziness; but still, I won't open the window" is senseless. What on earth could I mean by "want"? In this contextually limited way, a motive is indeed logically connected to an action. . . .⁸⁸

Aside from more substantive objections to this argument, it is clear that the 'ceteris paribus' clause of 'contextual limitation' must further

include such conditions as 'S is able to a, has the opportunity to a, and believes that he is able and has the opportunity'. In a slightly different formulation of L_1 , William Alston has considered a more credible explication of the 'countervailing factor' or 'ceteris paribus' clause:

Whenever A wants to do x, doesn't want to do anything incompatible with doing x more than he wants to do x, believes that doing y will put him in the best position for doing x, has both the capacity and opportunity for doing y, doesn't feel obliged to do anything incompatible with doing x or y, has no scruples against doing x or y, hasn't forgotten about doing x, is not too emotionally upset to do x, then he will do y.⁸⁹

So formulated, with perhaps several additional conditions in the antecedent, L_1 appears to be a quite good candidate for a logical truth. The point then is to determine, under analysis, just how reliable that provisional intuition may be.

Objections to L_1

(1) Nominally, we may begin by observing that if L_1 or Alston's formulation of L_1 (L_1') is a logical truth, then the denial of either will be necessarily false. We may observe as well however that the denial of neither is manifestly false. It may be objected that such an 'observation' merely begs the question and cannot be cited as a reason for suspecting L_1 . Nonetheless, insofar as the 'ceteris paribus' clause stands unexplicated, or explicated in such a way that substantive objections may be advanced against it, the denial of L_1 will not be manifestly false of necessity, although it may indeed be false of necessity. Stripped of its rhetorical questions, Alston's 'argument' amounts to little more than a pronouncement of what he takes to be

incontrovertibly true. But that sort of advocacy clearly will not do. We require an analysis of 'desire' and 'action' which demonstrates the unintelligibility of denying L_1 or L_1' . Furthermore, any rejoinder which consists in appealing to the 'logical oddity' or 'deviancy' of denying L_1 or L_1' is surely no more compelling than the traditional ploy of saying that something is 'unimaginable'; for it is notoriously difficult to specify just why and in what respect a statement is logically odd. Indeed, the notion of 'logical oddity' is surely less rigorous than the claim (L_1) in support of which it might be advanced. Nevertheless, in view of such a consideration it becomes reasonable to suppose that there is something essentially right about L_1 which may not be purely logical in nature. L_1 , or some variety of L_1 , may represent some feature of our common-sense psychological scheme; perhaps an empirical generalization which is 'true for the most part'. Or it may even be a fundamental principle or postulate which is known neither a priori nor a posteriori but which we rather take to be true as a condition for making sense of our experience.

(2) It has already been argued (supra, Ch. 2, "Wants and Wishes") that L_1 is strongly suspect simply because one may want to do something, but simply not want to do it 'enough' to actually do anything about it. This point appears to be consistent enough with ordinary parlance. Subsequently however, serious vagaries and complexities were found to be embedded in that slice of our parlance, especially with respect to what we mean and whether we always mean the same thing by locutions like 'wanting \emptyset more than Ψ ', 'desiderative intensity/strength', qualitative distinctions between desires with respect to the principles of action

they embody, etc. This objection to L_1 is accordingly heir to those difficulties and may at best, consequently, be considered a tentative warrant for further suspecting the allegation that L_1 is obviously true.

(3) Less an objection to L_1 than an observation about what advocacy of L_1 involves, it is a matter of considerable dispute whether future-tensed statements are eligible for truth-value assignments. Gilbert Ryle and Charles Hartshorne have argued that such statements are never either true or false, Ryle maintaining that such statements are in fact predictions which never 'come true' but which turn out to have been good or bad. Now, L_1 is held to have the form of 'P and Q' entail 'R' where, if 'P and Q' is true then 'R' must be true. However, if 'R' ('S will do a') is a future-tensed statement (and surely one construal of 'will' in 'S will do a' is so tensed), then it is not entirely clear that 'P and Q' can entail 'R'. It appears clear enough that any defense of L_1 involves a commitment to the 'law of excluded middle' (i.e., to the position that future-tensed statements, if meaningful, are either true or false). But insofar as such a fundamental principle is credibly and resourcefully challenged by philosophers, the prima facie acceptability of the very logical form of L_1 is accordingly challenged. And insofar as one finds merit in that challenge, as I do, one is there with furnished another reason for finding L_1 less than obviously (in this case logically) true.

(4) A variety of L_1 which has some currency in the literature takes the following form: (L_1'') 'If S wants \emptyset , and believes that doing a is a means of bringing about \emptyset , then, ceteris paribus, S will do a'. Even if L_1 were logically true and known to be, L_1'' would be marked by

its own distinctive problems. We have shown (supra, Ch. 2, "Desiderabilia") that it is not the case that every desire is analyzable into an action-desire. L_1 " appears to implicitly declare that if S wants \emptyset (where ' \emptyset ' ranges over all possible desiderabilia), and believes that doing a is a means of bringing about \emptyset , then S wants to do a. And this internal principle is surely false. To consider a few circumstances, none of which can be considered a countervailing factor and each of which is sufficient for rendering the consequent ('S wants to a') false when the antecedent is true, (1) S may be confident that the obtainment of \emptyset is already guaranteed, quite independently of his doing anything, and therewith not desire to do any 'relevant' thing; (2) S may have scruples which he believes render all options for bringing about \emptyset out of the question (and this is not a matter of a desire to observe those scruples overriding a desire to do some relevant act; ex hypothesis, S has no desire of the latter sort); (3) S may want (qua wishing that) \emptyset and yet be simply unprepared to do anything about the matter (without thereby satisfying any denial of any conjunct in the 'ceteris paribus' clause); (4) S may not realize that he wants something \emptyset (supra, discussions of desire by implication, unconscious desire, referential transparency) and yet realize that doing a will bring about \emptyset without thereby counting this fact as a 'pro-point' for doing a. L_1 " is accordingly quite untenable.

(5) S may not realize that he wants to a (e.g., an unconscious desire) and yet realize that doing b will lead to or bring about his doing a without thereby counting this fact as a pro-point for doing b. This observation seriously weakens L_1 ' since the ceteris paribus clause must now rule out S not wanting to b. If an 'S must realize that he wants to

a' condition, is to be added, as well as conditions to cover #2 and #3 of objection 4, then we are well along in so truncating L_1 ' that deciding its truth or falsity is hardly to be a matter of philosophical moment.

(6) What, precisely, is to count as a countervailing factor— anything that would prevent S from doing a? Can a lack of realization by S that he unconsciously desires to a be intelligibly said to prevent S from doing b, where doing b is believed by S to be a means of bringing about his doing a? Similarly, can ignorance of an implied desiderative object or being unprepared to act on a desire count as a countervailing factor? Whether these cases may or may not be so characterized, the important point here is that advocates of L_1 must persuasively disambiguate 'prevent' as it occurs in the 'stop-gap' clause if L_1 is to have any force at all. And I should think that a successful characterization of these cases as countervailing factors would be very difficult indeed. Consider the earlier discussion of 'desire in escrow', i.e., of the essentially conditional nature of certain desires. Suppose that S desires to a and conditionally desires to b as a means of bringing about his doing a. Surely this feature of the desire to b does not count as a countervailing factor, i.e., as something which prevents S from doing b. S is rather and simply not prepared to b until he is satisfied that certain conditions have been met. Accordingly, S may not do b even though every condition in the antecedent of L_1 ' has been satisfied; for his desire to do b (if indeed he has such an extrinsic desire) is, in this case, held in escrow.

(7) The presumption that the provision "S does not want to do anything incompatible with doing a more than he wants to do a" will, ceteris

paribus, result in S acting to bring about his doing a is mistaken on the face of it. Suppose that S wants to a just as much as but no more than he wants to g, where doing a and doing g are incompatible. Surely, from this alone it would not follow that S will act to bring about his doing a. But this is precisely what we should think, given L_1 and L_1' , since the antecedent of L_1 (including the 'no more than' provision) is, ex hypothesis, satisfied.

To put the matter another way, suppose that S wanted to a, did not a, and that we have checked all of the conjuncts in the ceteris paribus clause of L_1 , except one, and found each to be true. Now, if L_1 is true, the remaining unchecked conjunct must be false; otherwise, we would have a true antecedent and a false consequent (assuming 'S will a' can be given a truth-value assignment). Further suppose that the unchecked conjunct is, precisely, "S does not want to do anything incompatible with doing a more than he wants to do a". Since this conjunct must be false if L_1 is true, the denial of this conjunct must be true, i.e., "S does (did) want to do [something] incompatible with doing a more that he wants (wanted) to do a" is true. But it is clear that S might have not done a, under the above conditions, without its being true that he wanted to do something incompatible with doing a more than he wanted to do a. For S may have wanted to do something incompatible with doing a just as much as and no more than he wanted to do a and simply (1) opted to do the first of these, or (2) been unable to opt between them. Even if in rejoinder one were to introduce into the antecedent of L_1 a further condition like "S does not want to do anything incompatible with doing a precisely as much as he wants to do a," serious difficulties would attach

to such conditions regardless of their number and exact form. This is so simply because the occurrences of the relational phrases 'more than' and 'as much as', far from being rigorous, are actually glosses over problems which attach to the very concept of desiderative strength (supra, Ch. 2, "Homo Distractus"). The view that desires are isolable paramechanical thrusts has been challenged along with the view that we can analogize the 'interplay of desires' with the model of force-vector resolution. And it has been argued as well that we can desire things in different senses such that a desire for \emptyset cannot in the same sense be stronger than a desire for ψ (supra, 126). Although I am not prepared to offer a comprehensive analysis of the relations in question, it is indisputable enough that advocacy of L_1 inherits that task, a task which, insofar as it is not satisfactorily undertaken, thereby places the acceptability of L_1 at a further remove.

Furthermore, advocacy of L_1 appears to involve a commitment to a variety of the previously discredited thesis that the strongest motive prevails (SMT). That is, the provision that S does not want to do anything incompatible with doing a more than he wants to a appears to be included to establish wanting to a as a stronger desire than any other desire to do something incompatible with doing a. But of course that provision, as it occurs in L_1 , does not establish this whatsoever; for S may want to a precisely as much as he wants to g (where a-ing and g-ing are incompatible). If we revise this provision it may appear that it is now quite unexceptional: "S does not want to do anything incompatible with doing a more than or precisely as much as he wants to a". With this adjusted provision, are we now warranted in saying that 'S

wants to a' and 'ceteris paribus' entail 'S will a' (or, 'S will b' in the case of L_1)? I think not. For S may not realize that wanting to a and wanting to g are incompatible and rather, for example, believe that doing g is a means for bringing it about that he does a. Accordingly, S may in fact do g and thereby preclude his doing a even though his desire to a is stronger than his desire to g. To consider an example, suppose that Andrews wants very much to launch a rocket and believes that any one of three buttons, A, B, and C, when pushed, will launch the rocket. Suppose further that only A and B will launch the rocket while C will detonate the rocket. Now although S wants very much to push an appropriate button, he doesn't especially want to push one rather than another. However, suppose he elects to push button C only because it is nearest. We cannot say that S wants to push button C as much as he wants to push an appropriate button or as much as he wants to launch the rocket. Moreover, his desire to launch a rocket is clearly incompatible with his desire to push button C. And if S in fact pushes button C, his action will preclude his launching the rocket.

In rejoinder, an advocate of L_1 might concede this point and then simply state that the provision in question must be recast with the following addendum: "For any action-desire which S has which is incompatible with doing a, S is aware of that incompatibility". However, such an addendum, far from strengthening L_1 , actually narrows the logical link between 'action' and 'desire' to such an extent that satisfaction of the antecedent becomes an improbability. Furthermore, the required awareness of relevant incompatibilities rules out the applicability of L_1 to unconscious action-desires of which the desirer is not

inferentially aware. Such action-desires, when and if any are incompatible with some other action-desire, will count as counterfactuals for the truth of the proposed addendum. Accordingly, that addendum is purchased with the costly narrowing of L_1 to a virtually incidental philosophical observation with hardly the force which an axiom of a theory of action ought to have.

(8) Objections such as those given in (1) - (7) have prompted advocates of L_1 to offer definitions of 'wanting' which would, presumably, defuse the opposition. As Alston has observed,⁹⁰ the "heroic course" would be to simply import all of the other components of the antecedent of L_1 into a dispositional definition of 'wanting'. Depending, of course, upon responses of advocates to challenges made against the ceteris paribus clause, a prototype definition (as implausible as it is) of this sort might take the following form:

D1 'S wants a' = df. ' If S does not want to do anything incompatible with doing a just as much as or more than he wants to a, believes that doing b will put him in the best position for doing a, has both the capacity and the opportunity for doing b and believes this to be the case, has no scruples against doing a or b, has not forgotten about doing a, and is not too emotionally upset to a, then he will b.'

Conspicuously, D1 is circular, not only introducing 'want' into the definiens but including reference in the definiens to the particular desire specified in the definiendum as well. More substantively however, we may observe that any reservations we may have about the logical truth of L_1 readily reapply to D1. Insofar as we can reasonably and resourcefully doubt that L_1 is logically true, we are hardly obliged to believe that D1 is an adequate characterization of just what we mean by 'want'. And of course, D1 hardly tells us just what we mean by 'wanting to a'.

Rather, it purports to tell us what sorts of conditions are sufficient for a-ing, provided S wants to a. And lastly, as Alston has incitefully observed, importing "all the factors which might conceivably prevent a want from issuing into action into a specification of the meaning of the word 'want' . . . would be a coherence theory of meaning with a vengeance."⁹¹

A less convoluted dispositional definition of 'wanting to a' which avoids the circularity of D1 characterizes action-desire in terms of (1) a belief about means and (2) an action probability.

D2 'S wants to a' = df.' If S believes that doing b will put him in a position to a, he will be more likely to b than he would have been without this belief.'

But D2 is scarcely an adequate definition of wanting to a. At best, it might be the case that the "definiendum" entails the "definiens"; but neither is this the case. First, although S may want to a and believe that doing b will put him in a position to a, S may have uncompromisable scruples against doing b (or b-sort acts) such that doing b is out of the question for S. The belief in question then hardly raises the probability of S doing b. (Further, if 'believe' is not taken occurrently, the required increase in probability is equally difficult to see.) Secondly, although in wanting to a S may want to b, doing b may be logically impossible, in which case believing that doing b will put him in position to a could not be said to increase the likelihood of S doing b; for that is fixed at "zero probability" (cf. Ch. 2, "Desiderabilia"). Additionally, if one were to accept the Kantian distinction between duty-motivation and inclination, a distinction which has not been accepted in this inquiry, then it could be argued that D2 fails to distinguish

between these two forms of motivation. Lastly, even if D2 were an adequate definition of 'wanting to a', the probabilistic nature of D2 would not appear to bulwark advocacy of L_1 or L_1' ; for advocacy of the latter consists in maintaining that S will a, ceteris paribus, if S wants to a, not just that it is quite likely that S will a.

An even more parsimonious definition, which amounts to a variant of the probabilistic characterization, is framed in terms of a tendency to a.

D3 'S wants to a' = df. 'S has some tendency to a'.

Unfortunately, S might have a tendency to a only because S is agitated in some relevant way or because doing a is a matter of thoughtless habit. Secondly, as Alston has noted (without satisfactory explanation), "it is possible for A to want very much to do x but to have no tendency at all to do x, at least in any ordinary sense of 'tendency'."⁹² In the service of this claim, which I take to be correct, the following cases may be cited as counterexamples to D3. Where S believes that there is no possibility of his succeeding in doing a, he may have no tendency to (try to) a. The 'a' in 'S wants to a' may denote a partitive intentional object where, all things considered, S has no tendency to a. Further, S's desire to a may be held in escrow, in which case whatever tendency exists for S to a is itself held in escrow—a manifestly peculiar notion. Lastly, considering the normative aspect of action, a similar implausibility is conceivable. Suppose that Smith is in Dhofar, wants to act politely, and doesn't know what acting politely in Dhofar consists in. But without such knowledge we could hardly say that Smith tends to in fact act politely. He may tend to do things which he supposes might count as instances of being polite. But that is quite different from

saying that he tends to act politely. We may generally observe that most of the objections advanced against L_1 are strong enough to equally disabuse us of probabilistic definitions of action-desire as well as of probabilistic recastings of L_1 . An example of the latter has been advanced by Johathan Cohen who claims analyticity for the proposition expressed by the following statement:

If an agent believes that y is contingent upon x , desire y , has no conflicting desires, and x is in his power, then he will probably do x .⁹³

Again, in rejoinder, we can cite the possibilities that (1) S may not realize that he desires y and (2) the desire for y may be held in escrow. Further, and importantly, S may desire qua wishing for y in some respect which renders S 's doing or trying to do x an improbability (cf., Ch. 2, "Wants and Wishes"). The virtue of this principle, however, rests with the " y is contingent upon x " clause which renders the L_1 ' counter-example of the mechanic (cf., "Desiderabilia") inapplicable.

In view of the manifold difficulties which advocacy of L_1 or L_1' inherits, and in basic concurrence with Cohen, Alston has admonished philosophers to consider a weaker probabilistic principle. To this end, Alston has submitted the following hypothetical as a good candidate for one that is true of a person S when and only when he has a desire for a state of affairs \emptyset .

If S believes that doing a either will be an attainment of \emptyset or has some considerable likelihood of leading to \emptyset , then if \emptyset is within his power, this belief will add to the probability of his trying to a .⁹⁴

Unfortunately, this principle, which Alston thinks may even be analytically true,⁹⁵ is similarly heir to objections 1 and 2 brought against Cohen's principle. Further, it lacks the aforementioned virtue of

Cohen's principle in that it is subject to the counterexample of the mechanic; i.e., S may be confident that the obtainment of \emptyset is guaranteed independently of his doing anything, etc. However, Alston's principle shares a virtue with Cohen's principle, to wit, each embodies the important realization that what we choose to do, decide to do, and do is quite fundamentally related to our beliefs about what we can and ought to do. It is systems of wants and beliefs which give rise to actions. Alston frames the matter differently, stating that "whatever else a want may be, it makes action tendencies susceptible to increase by beliefs" [*italics mine*].⁹⁶

This entire notion of an 'action-tendency' is somewhat puzzling however. The literature is virtually barren of any sustained explication of the notion; yet it is frequently appealed to as a sort of conceptual primitive in much of recent action-theory. First, the 'tendency-analysis' of action-desire seems equally likely to be based on a plausible empirical (synthetic) theory about desires as on the meanings of the terms involved. Secondly, lacking an analysis of 'S has a tendency to a' as we do, one thing is certain. We could hardly analyze the former as 'S would do a if conditions C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n were to obtain'. For then the 'tendency-analysis', as a putative revisionist move re L_1 , would actually collapse back into L_1 (or D3 back into D1). Thirdly, talk about 'probability increments' and 'action tendencies' is hardly any less diffuse or more intelligible than the analyzandum in the service of which they are cited.

Wants as Dispositions: L₁ Again

As we have earlier observed (supra, Ch. 1, "Transitivity, Inequivalence, and Intentionality"), to have an occurrent desire for \emptyset during a certain period of time is not necessarily to be aware of or have or be in a state of \emptyset -related phenomenal presentations or a state of thinking of \emptyset . To have an occurrent desire for \emptyset is to presently hold an attitude of endorsement re \emptyset where the concept ' \emptyset ' is a 'concept-in-force' (cf., Ch. 1, n. 1). If this is the case, then it may be that to desire \emptyset is to be liable or likely to be in certain mental states and behave in certain ways during that period, i.e., to desire \emptyset is to have certain dispositions re \emptyset . However, far from confining this reformulation to the observation that desiring something is typically characterized by saying, doing, experiencing, or thinking certain things, the dispositional analysis of desire is essentially reductive; to desire \emptyset just is to be disposed to find the prospect of \emptyset attractive (or appropriate) if \emptyset is brought to mind, to say x if C₁ obtains, to do y if C₂ obtains, to feel z if C₃ obtains, etc. Allowing d₁, d₂, d₃. . . d_n to designate certain dispositions, dispositionally analyzed 'S desires \emptyset ' (Q) is synonymous with '(If C₁ then d₁) and (If C₂ then d₂) and . . . (If C_n then d_n)' (Q'). Obviously, Q can be synonymous with Q' only if Q logically implies each of the conjuncts of Q'. For if Q did not imply one of them, then Q could be true and Q' false, in which case Q and Q' would not be synonymous. Various, the dispositional analysis (in this its strongest form) maintains that a number of statements of the form "If S desires \emptyset , then if S is aware of something associated with \emptyset , the thought of \emptyset is likely to be called up" are analytically true. But just which of these candidate conjuncts are

indeed true, and which are true as a matter of fact (if any), and which by virtue of the meanings of the terms involved, is an issue the resolution of which is bound to be a matter of dispute.

Aside from the indefinite complexity of this analysis, it should be noted that in most cases it cannot remain faithful to the basic imperative of its point of departure. Inspired by Gilbert Ryle, the dispositional method has largely been urged by behaviorists who would reductively construe 'mental-states' as dispositions to overt behavior when certain conditions (which are in principle publicly observable) are satisfied. The difficulty arises however when certain hypotheticals can be rendered putatively true only on the assumption of certain conditions which are not reductively analyzable into publicly observable facts, viz, beliefs, scruples, aversions, doubts, etc. That is, the behavioral disposition analysis will hold that (1) a given 'mental state' consists in a disposition to behave overtly in certain ways and (2) that, given this disposition, S will so behave provided certain publicly observable conditions obtain. Accordingly, 'S desires \emptyset ' is analyzable into 'If C_1 , C_2 , . . . C_n , then S will a'. However, certain of these conditions will have to make reference to the beliefs, scruples and other desires which S has at the time, i.e., reference to facts which do not appear to be publicly observable in principle. And if, indeed, every relevant fact is publicly observable in principle, then this approach is committed to providing a dispositional analysis of each such fact which is non-circular. And there is considerable reason to doubt that this can be done. Although Jones may have very good grounds for believing that Smith is thinking of Paris, and indeed may be said to know that Smith is

thinking of Paris, we would be generally disinclined to say that having those ground constitutes publicly observing Smith thinking of Paris.

Further, it should be noted that we have already shown that not every 'S desires ϕ ' statement is analyzable into an 'S wants to a' statement. Accordingly, the behavioral disposition analysis must be confined to saying that 'If C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n , then S will a' will be true when and only when S has some relevant action-desire. Such an analysis is consequently heir to all of the objections which have been brought against L_1 .

Additionally, any set of conditions which might be taken to logically guarantee a certain act when and only when a certain desire exists would have to include specifications of the relative 'strengths' of other desires. (It is clear that our desires do have 'strengths'; but it is also clear that just what we mean by this and just what an adequate analysis of this would look like is far more problematic than advocates of varieties of L_1 would appear to allow.) However, the necessity of making such specifications introduces an ineluctable difficulty: in the very reduction of a desire d_1 a reference is made back to d_1 (the analyzandum) as in 'S does not want to do anything incompatible with doing a more than he wants to a'. Further, every dispositional analyzans employs the basic term occurring in the analyzandum (viz, 'desires', 'wants'). It seems quite clear then that we can hold with Alston that this strong form of a dispositional analysis of desire "is infected with a vicious circularity."⁹⁷ One is hardly reconstruing desires as dispositions systematically if the terms 'desire' and 'want' occur in the analyzans.

Lastly, we should repeat an earlier point in noting Goldman's epistemological rejection of this analysis.

One salient failing of a purely dispositional approach is the difficulty it faces in accounting for knowledge of one's own occurrent wants. If a want consisted solely in a disposition to behave overtly in specifiable ways, then it would seem that the only way to tell you want x is to make inferences from your overt behavior. But clearly an agent does not need to infer his wants from this behavior in the way that a third person does. An agent has a sort of "privileged access" to his own (occurrent) wants; his reasons for acting are knowable to him in a way that they are not knowable to others. This fact is left unaccounted for by a purely dispositional analysis of wanting.⁹⁸

Although Alston eschews the dispositional analysis of wanting, he nonetheless endorses (for reasons which will soon become clear) the inference view which Goldman has challenged. Much as Goldman has, I have earlier argued against this view and in particular against Alston's affinity for that view (supra, Ch. 1, "Objects, Belief Conditions, and Avowals"). Accordingly, I concur with Goldman's objection to the dispositional analysis, and for just the reasons he cites. For it seems clear both that (1) this analysis must appeal to the inference view and (2) that the inference view is quite implausible.

Wants as Hypothetical Constructs

Unable to exonerate the dispositional analysis of desire, Alston has advanced a very fertile proposal. Consider the following two sorts of statements about desire:

- (A) When a person is frustrated in his attempts to satisfy a desire, he has a tendency to behave aggressively.
- (B) If S desires \emptyset , he is not indifferent to the matter of the obtainment of \emptyset .

Statement A is purely synthetic since it does not have the truth status it has because of the meanings of the terms involved. On the other hand, statement B is clearly analytic since we could not deny B

without recasting the meanings of some of the terms (viz, 'desires', 'indifferent') involved. Midway between A-type and B-type statements we have, according to Alston, statements like the hypotheticals of a dispositional analysis which are neither clearly analytic nor synthetic but which "do the most to bring out what it is to want something."⁹⁹ We shall call these C-type statements. Each makes explicit some "aspect" of the meanings of 'want' and 'desire', yet none is true in virtue of its logical form or analytic à la "Every Euclidean triangle is rectilinear." C-type statements may be said to be 'quasi-analytic', i.e., insofar as we both work within and out from the analytic — synthetic distinction. Candidate C-type statements include:

- (1) If \emptyset comes to mind, the thought of it will be pleasant.
- (2) If S is aware of something associated with \emptyset , the thought of \emptyset is likely to be "called up."
- (3) If \emptyset -related objects are present in the environment of S, they are more likely to be noticed than other objects.

Obviously, such candidates do not have precisely the same status, since statement 3 could be given up more easily than statement 2. Furthermore, statement 1 will often be false with respect to a given desire since not every desire has pleasure as an internal accusative (cf., Ch. 1, "Objects and Accusatives"); that is, we sometimes desire a prospect, even if it strikes us as unpleasant, because we deem its obtainment 'appropriate', 'the right thing', 'morally required', etc. Nevertheless, it is true that such statements do represent many of our beliefs about the typical (though not invariant) ways in which systems of wants and beliefs will be manifested in behavior, action, thought, and experience. And such beliefs are intimately connected with the usage we give 'want' and

'desire' in ordinary parlance. We have only nominal truths about these concepts (e.g., statement B) until we fully explicate those manifestations in a comprehensive general theory of desire.

Alston however makes the much stronger claim that the nature of desire can be made clear only by specifying how it "tends to manifest itself in behavior, thought, and experience."¹⁰⁰ At this point then he suggests that desires are actually hypothetical constructs, where a hypothetical construct is "something which lies behind manifestations and [is] specifiable only through them"¹⁰¹ [italics mine]. He does not maintain that we have a set of hypotheticals which constitute an explicitly developed theory of desire. But he does hold that the hypotheticals we do have and are wont to employ constitute a fragment of any such theory. Alston does not mean to imply by this that in using 'want' and 'desire' we commit ourselves to each such hypothetical being true. We rather commit ourselves to most of them without committing ourselves to any particular one of them.

The important point here is that Alston has opted for a Kantian-like distinction between noumena and phenomena in characterizing the nature of desire. When speaking of a desire we are confined to talking about its actual or probable manifestations, where the desire itself 'noumenally' lies behind them and is specifiable only through them. Obviously then, Alston is bound to accept the inference view of first-person knowledge mentioned earlier. And unfortunately, far from elucidating the nature of desire, Alston's view appears to be committed to the position that (1) desires exist, (2) the meaning of 'desire' is something like a construction over a set of hypotheticals, and (3) (insofar

as desire is specifiable only through its manifestations) we can only say of desire d that it is that 'whatever' which manifests or tends to manifest itself in more or less specifiable ways.

It is quite difficult to fathom just why Alston adopts this view. Generating a desiderative ontology on this model seems to be anything other than a perspicacious move. Alston has stated his belief that if we regard all of the hypotheticals as A-type statements (synthetic) we will then be quite unable to say what a desire is.¹⁰² But of course we can say that a desire consists in holding a distinctive sort of attitude, that, metaphorically speaking, it is more like a topological feature of consciousness than like any content of consciousness, etc. To use an earlier analogy, desiring is more like the dramatic setting of a play than any particular piece of action on the stage.

Now perhaps Alston has taken the 'actions on the stage' as the manifestations of desiring, where 'the dramatic setting' "lies behind" those 'actions' and is specifiable only through them. But as desirers we have a privileged access to our own conscious 'dramatic setting' such that we are often able, upon reflection, to take our desires as objects of consideration. So reflecting upon our desires is not a case of desires 'manifesting' themselves in the sense of 'manifestation' which Alston has in mind — to wit, behavioral symptoms (overt and private) of desiring. And in so reflecting we are indeed able to say quite a lot about our desires. In fact, as discussed earlier (supra, Ch. 1, "Objects, Belief conditions, and Avowals"), in reflecting we are often involved in quite consciously 'coming to desire' things not previously desired; and this is nothing like decoding symptoms in making an inference to a desire.

Specific ontological commitments to the side, Alston's observations are uncommonly suggestive. Challenging the analytic-synthetic dichotomy with his introduction of C-type statements, which I have called 'quasi-analytic', Alston has rightly and capably shown that the philosophically significant claims we can make about desire vis-á-vis experience, behavior, and action are not likely to be demonstrably logical truths. The meaning of 'want' and 'desire' is in many respects a construction over the epistemological warranting conditions for third-person attributions of a desire to some person S. We appeal to indications of the presence of a desire in another person, indications such as his patterns of discourse, his readiness to avow the desire, changes in his behavior upon the acquisition of a relevant belief, etc. No such indicator appears to be a logically necessary or sufficient condition for the existence of the desire in question and each indicator is logically independent of the others. Yet the usage given 'want' and 'desire' in ordinary parlance appears subject to an assumption, which is itself clearly synthetic: namely, that these indicators are highly intercorrelated. In accordance with this assumption, which (if the meaning of a word is its use) is ensconced in the meaning of 'want' and 'desire', we normally take one or several such indicators as adequate warrants for a third-person attribution.

Before concluding our treatment of L_1 and issues related to it we must consider one other hypothetical construct characterization of wants.

Wants as Theoretical Constructs

Considering it obvious that 'wanting' does not denote a psychological occurrence (i.e., an episode), Richard Brandt and Jaegwon Kim¹⁰³

propose the advantage of construing 'wanting' as a "theoretical construct", i.e., as a term the meaning of which is "anchored" in a common-sense scheme of psychological explanation which relevant hypotheticals in part constitute.

Although this approach is not framed as a behavioral reductive analysis, it nonetheless parallels the programs of recent phenomenism and logical behaviorism in characterizing statements containing terms which express a certain species of concept as constructions over a set of conditionally formulated test sentences. On this view, explanation of action or behavior by appeal to desire consists in setting that event in "a wider pattern of lawful regularities." ¹⁰⁴ Accordingly, in appealing to desire we implicitly introduce the applicability of certain lawful regularities which render the explanandum (an action or some behavior) intelligible. Recalling the above remarks concerning the inter-correlation of desire-indicators, I find the spirit of this assessment of the matter essentially well-guided. But we have objected that none of these test sentences or indicators provide logically necessary or sufficient conditions for wanting, where each such item is not analytically true. And further, whatever might be meant by "a lawful regularity", it surely cannot be "an invariant regularity". For if that were the case, 'S wants x' would very likely entail a statement expressing that regularity, that statement thereby being analytic of 'S wants x'.

This point aside, it certainly does not follow from such considerations that a desire is simply a theoretical construction over a set of lawful hypotheticals. Brandt and Kim do argue that there is good reason to construe the terms 'want' and 'desire' as theoretical

constructs; but they conspicuously do not concern themselves with the ontological status of desires. Indeed, an advocate of the theoretical construct view might even say that the consideration of such questions is a matter of misplaced concern. For presumably, on this view, to say that a desire exists is only to say that the antecedent of some hypothetical is satisfied. (E.g., 'If day dreaming about \emptyset is pleasant to S, then S wants \emptyset .') But of course, above all else, to say that someone wants something is to assert the existence of an attitude of endorsement re some state of affairs, an attitude which is a mode of comprehending self and world (especially futurity), a 'bearer' of values and the consequences of evaluative procedures, an instance of a fundamental category (viz, 'Desire') in any adequate ontology of man, etc. And that ontology could not end with the observation that each of us has this desire and that desire; it must observe as well that we comprehend ourselves as desiring beings and that this has everything to do with understanding human action (especially long-term projects) and experience.

The Tripartite Logical Web (L₂)

In his carefully executed article, "Some Remarks on Action and Desire" (1970), J.J. Valberg suggests that when philosophers speak of logical relations between action and desire they often appear to have some sort of act-desire-belief inference pattern in mind, albeit confusedly. The inference pattern which Valberg ferrets out of all this, and which he neither endorses nor dismisses, consists of a tri-partite web which allegedly allows one to infer from any two links to the third.

If an agent acts because of a certain desire, then, from the content of this desire (what he desires) and the content of the belief on which he acts, we can infer a description under

which he performed the action. For example, that Tom performed a because he wanted to be polite and on the belief that hat-tipping is a means of being polite, entails that he took a as an instance of hat-tipping. Moreover, from any two of this triad, the third proposition could be inferred. . . . Description acted under, the belief and desire content acted on, thus form a three-part logical web, only two links of which are necessary for explaining a given action.¹⁰⁵

Upon analysis however, we find that no such entailments exist. Consider the following three cases:

- (1) "Tom performed a because he wanted to be polite and on the belief that hat-tipping is a means of being polite" does not entail "Tom took a as an instance of hat-tipping". For Tom can fail to tip his hat and know that he has failed (a March wind sends his Stetson sailing). Tom will then take a as an instance of having tried and failed to tip his hat.
- (2) "Tom performed a because he wanted to be polite and took a as an instance of hat-tipping" does not entail "Tom performed a on the belief that hat-tipping is a means of being polite". For Tom could clearly perform a on the belief that hat-tipping might be a means of being polite. Further, if in Dhofar, Tom may have no beliefs about what counts as being polite in Dhofar. But he may tip his hat nevertheless, rather than do nothing, since he wants to be polite and hasn't any better option at hand. ('Might be' and such phrases constitute modal qualifications of the 'is' in "is a means of".)
- (3) A convincing defense of this 'leg' of the web would require a careful discussion of the crucial phrase, "the belief on which". For obviously, there is a good sense in which Tom may have tipped his hat on the belief that Samantha enjoys hat-tipping without its having been true that Tom wanted to please Samantha. Tom may have tipped his hat in spite of the likelihood of Samantha's delight or, even further, in order to privately insult her by appearing to be polite. What does seem to hold here however is that insofar as Tom acts on some 'appropriate' belief, and insofar as Tom's action is agent-attributable (i.e., not coerced or strictly controlled), then we will get an entailment to the desire on which he in fact acted. For example, if Tom took a to be an instance of hat-tipping, and performed a on the belief that hat-tipping is (under certain conditions) a means of insulting Samantha, then, perhaps, we can say that Tom performed a because he wanted to insult Samantha. But the only reason we can be confident about this is because we must

already know Tom's desire in order to cite the 'appropriate' belief on which he acted. The 'entailment' then is only apparent; if we are to know the explaining belief on which he acted we must first know the explaining desire on which he acted.

In view of cases (1) - (3), and surely other sorts of cases could be cited, I am unpersuaded that the alleged entailments hold. However, it would be quite wrong to summarily dismiss the thesis in question. An inference pattern, much like the one proposed by Valberg, indeed exists as a feature of our use of 'act', 'belief', and 'desire'.

Suppose I ask of Tom, "Why did you bat the ball into left field?," whereupon he replies, "Because I thought the sunlight would blind the left fielder." Here we have a description of Tom's act which he accepts as well as an avowal of the belief on which he acted. We take that avowal to mean that Tom believed he would have a quite good chance of getting to base if he were to bat the ball into left field. Tom's reply explains his action in a significant way, whereas a statement of the form, "Because I wanted to bat the ball into left field," would only serve to say that the action was not unintentional and would generally be construed as truculence. (The matter of "Because I want to" responses has been roundly debated; but treatment of that dispute would not be ancillary to the present inquiry.)¹⁰⁶ Further, if we are successful in our efforts, the desires and beliefs on which we act have everything to do with the descriptions which we will give of our own acts. And of course the practical syllogism, much discussed by Aristotle and more recently by Goldman (A Theory of Human Action), is of considerable importance here. There does exist an act-belief-desire web, but it is not a rigorously logical one. It consists of an 'explanational matrix' and an 'inference

pattern', i.e., a correlated set of warranting conditions for certain third-person ascriptions which functionally represents the systematic interconnectedness of wants, beliefs, and acts.

Acts as Criteria for Wants (L₃)

Since this proposal for a logical connection between wants and acts has enjoyed little advocacy and less attention, I will confine my criticism of L₃ to several remarks about its untenability and thereupon leave the matter at that. A defender of L₃, Richard Taylor affords us a succinct characterization:

Suppose, then, that someone moves his finger and we propose as a causal explanation for this that he wanted to move it. How shall we, or the agent himself, decide whether this was in fact the cause? . . . Our entire criterion for saying what he wanted . . . to do, is what he in fact did; we do not infer the former from the latter on the basis of what we have in fact found, but we regard the former as something entailed by what we now find, namely, just his moving his finger. [*italics mine*]¹⁰⁷

As Goldman has correctly observed,¹⁰⁸ it is simply wrong headed to suggest that S's doing a is our criterion for S's wanting to a. If 'S performed a' entailed 'S wanted to a' we would be forced to say that unintentional acts never occur. But surely they do occur, in which case the mere doing of a does not entail a desire to a; 'S did a unintentionally' does not entail 'S wanted to a'.

Further, taking 'criterion' as a logically sufficient warranting condition for the third-person ascription of wants, it is decidedly unlikely that we do have or ever might have such criteria, at least with respect to intrinsic wants. With respect to intrinsic wants, no piece of behavior or action is logically sufficient for ascribing some particular want d₁ to an agent since it is always possible in principle to

explain that behavior or action by postulating some other intrinsic want d_2 . Any number of intrinsic wants could plausibly account for a specific act or piece of behavior.

Taking 'criterion' more loosely, as an indicator of the sort mentioned earlier ("Wants as Hypothetical Constructs"), it is also not true that S's doing a is our entire criterion for saying that S wanted or wants to a. It constitutes part of our warrant for believing this, but it does not exhaust that warrant. We also consider (1) other desires which we take the agent S to have which may render it reasonable to suppose he has a given intrinsic desire, (2) the situation of S which may (by appeal to behavioral norms) be thought to induce S to have some desire, (3) the verbal avowals of S, and (4) the 'conversation of gestures'. Finally, as we have previously determined, with respect to conscious occurrent desires a subject is not confined to consulting his behavior to 'determine' whether he has some such desire.

Descriptive-Dependency (L_4) and Causation

Aside from the prima facie importance of deciding what logical relations might exist between wants and acts, the basic interest in this question has devolved from a larger interest in deciding whether wants and acts can be causally connected. With Goldman¹⁰⁹ as a notable exception, philosophers have generally accepted the following claim: 'If the connection between wants and acts is logical (i.e., non-contingent), then it cannot also be causal; and if the connection is causal, then it cannot also be logical'. One leg of this debate has been established, albeit falteringly, by A.I. Melden:

But as a desire, no account is intelligible that does not refer us to the thing desired. The supposition, then, that desiring or wanting is a Humean cause, some sort of internal tension or uneasiness, involves the following contradiction: As Humean cause or internal impression, it must be describable without reference to anything else — object desired, the action of getting or the action of trying to get the thing desired; but as desire this is impossible. Any description of the desire involves a logically necessary connection with the thing desired.¹¹⁰ [*italics mine*]

Quite aside from the fact that Melden assimilates the full range of possible causal characterizations of desire to that of Humean phenomenalism, and equally aside from his puzzling claim that causes (even Humean causes) must be describable without reference to anything else,¹¹¹ it is very difficult to make sense of the final statement in the above passage.

Surely he cannot mean by this that any intelligible designation of a desire must mention that which is desired. For one could individuatingly refer to a desire S has by saying "the desire you just spoke of" or "the desire which preoccupied you at time t." Secondly, in holding that a desire cannot be described without referring to "the thing" desired, is Melden speaking of 'actual things' like physical objects which exist or acts which have occurred, or is he speaking of intentional objects? If he is speaking of intentional objects, then there is no dispute here, for we can say, loosely, that the intentional object of a desire is logically connected with that desire; "The desire for \emptyset has \emptyset as an intentional object" is formally true. The intentional object of a desire makes it the desire that it is. And, of course, an intentional object is ontologically quite unlike some existent in the world (e.g., a physical thing). But if 'intentional object' is what Melden means by 'object' then his argument against desires being causes fails. For in saying that Humean causes must be describable without reference to

anything else, he claims that such a cause must be logically independent of other things (where 'thing' presumably ranges over events, physical objects, mental states, etc.). But we have shown that intentional objects aren't such things; they are 'concepts-in-force'. And from the fact that a desire is logically related to a concept of x it does not follow that it is related to x itself. Accordingly, we have no ground for saying that desires are descriptively-dependent upon physical objects, events, and the like. So the alleged fundamental difference between desires and causes, at least as Melden has described the latter, breaks down.

More specifically, with respect to wants and acts, Melden's principle takes the following form: 'If S does a because of desire d, d cannot be described without referring to a; d is descriptively-dependent on a' (L₄). However, S might have done a because of d₁ where d₁ is an intrinsic desire and d₂ an extrinsic desire vis-à-vis d₁; the object of d₂ might be 'doing a' whereas the object of d₁ might be 'being \emptyset '. Suppose S does a because he wants to be \emptyset ; 'being \emptyset ' need make no reference to the actual act-token a. So, a description of d₁ need make no such reference. Secondly, prior to in fact doing a we would have intelligibly described d₂ without referring to a (for no such reference could be made); 'a' in 'S wants to a' denotes an intentional object (S wants to instantiate a certain act-type a). Of course, where we say something like "S is doing a and wants to be doing a" we refer both to the act-type instantiation which S desideratively intends as well as to an actual act-token which counts as an instance of that act-type. But where we simply say "S wanted to a," even if S has done a on this desire, and

where the description 'a' does not report or imply that some act actually occurred, we are only denoting an intentional object (the instantiation of act-type a) by our use of 'a'. We do not say that we wanted to perform just the act-token we did perform, with all of its myriad incidental details and consequences. We rather say that what we did counted as a satisfaction instance of the act-type we wanted to instantiate. Accordingly, a desire to a is not descriptively-dependent upon the act-token a, where one in fact performs a because of a desire to a. The relation of performed a to desired a is, roughly, that of particular to genus or class; but this is not to suggest that one desires a genus or class of objects in desiring to do something. In concurrence, Donald Davidson has advanced the following argument in "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" (1963):

We may be taken in by the verbal parallel between 'I turned on the light' and 'I wanted to turn on the light'. The first clearly refers to a particular event, so we conclude that the second has this same event as its object. . . . [However] if the reference were the same in both cases, the second sentence would entail the first; but in fact the sentences are logically independent. What is less obvious, at least until we attend to it, is that the event whose occurrence makes 'I turned on the light' true cannot be called the object, however intensional, of 'I wanted to turn on the light'. If I turned on the light, then I must have done it at a precise moment, in a particular way — every detail is fixed. But it makes no sense to demand that my want be directed at an action performed at any one moment or done in some unique manner.¹¹²

As a candidate logical relation between wants and acts then, L_4 fails as did the three previously considered candidates. And with this failure one alleged blow to the view that wants and acts are sometimes causally related is therewith deflected. But of course this does not settle the causal question. A number of philosophers have held that wants and acts are non-contingently connected (advocates of L_1) and that

they could not therefore ever be causally connected.¹¹³ But I am unable to attach much weight to such arguments simply because the chief premise is anything but manifestly true. Indeed, in rejoinder to this position, Goldman has ingeniously turned their chief premise against them:

Similarly, I think, the concept of wanting is the concept of something that tends to have certain effects, viz. acts. In other words, it is a logical truth about poisons (or imbibing poisons) that they tend to cause death. Thus, there is a logical relationship between wants and acts. Far from precluding a causal relationship between them, however, this logical relationship ensures a causal relationship. . . . On my view, then, the concept of an occurrent want is the concept of a mental event [italics mine] that tends to result in behavior. It is, therefore, a logical truth that wants tend to cause action.¹¹⁴

On the face of it, of course, Goldman's claim is much too strong; for it is not the case that all occurrent wants tend to result in action. We have argued this point at length. Secondly, occurrent wants are not, contra Goldman, events qua mental episodes; they are datable in the biography of the subject but they are not episodes (supra, 19-21). Accordingly, I am unable to allow that wants can be causes of acts insofar as causes are events. Construed non-episodically we might loosely say that occurrently desiring constitutes an event: "All evening I have wanted to find you." And in this sense of 'being an event' one might still care to argue that wants can cause acts. One might appeal to counterfactual conditionals: (1) 'If c had not occurred, then e would not have occurred' implies 'c caused e', and (2), to say that desire d explains act a is to say that if d had not occurred then a would not have occurred. However, this response would be inadequate on at least two grounds. First, a might have occurred unintentionally without the occurrence of d. Or S might have performed a on some other desire. From the fact that d

explains a we cannot infer that d was a necessary condition for a. Secondly, as Kim has recently observed ("Causes and Counterfactuals," 1973), an analysis of causation by appeal to counterfactual conditionals does not appear to be adequate:

It seems, however, that the sort of dependency expressed by counterfactuals is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency and that causal dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships that can be expressed by counterfactuals.¹¹⁵

Kim considers the following counterfactual: "If I had not turned the knob, I would not have opened the window." Although it is true enough that my turning the knob caused the window's being open, it is not true that my turning the knob caused my opening the window. The force of this observation is, I submit, clear, to the point, and correct. Whatever way in which my turning the knob generates my opening the window, it is not a case of causal generation. Similarly, it may well be that however wants generate acts, it is not a case of causal generation. One might reply that my wants causally generate some of my acts although they do not causally generate my performing those acts. But such a move, I suspect, would consist in drawing a bogus distinction. For what distinction is there between my doings (my acts) and my performing my doings?

Further, we should briefly consider the matter of referential opacity and transparency once again. Given certain beliefs which Jocasta may be presumed to have held, her desire for the man who solved the riddle of the Sphinx explains many of her acts; her system of wants and beliefs constituted her reasons for doing what she did.¹¹⁶ But we should not say that her desire for Oedipus (transparent reference) was part of her reason for doing what she did. Jocasta was not then acquainted with that man under

the description (or disguised description) 'Oedipus'. However, if her desire caused her acts (given certain beliefs), then the desire that caused sleeping with her lover also caused an act of incest [if those acts are either identical or causally related]. But we could not say that her reason for sleeping with her lover was a reason for committing incest. Reasons certainly appear to be act-description relative, whereas causes do not. Accordingly, on this procedure of individuating acts, it seems that explanation by appeal to desire as a species of causal explanation and explanation by desire as a species of reason-giving explanation are incompatible. The entire matter here hinges on how we are going to individuate acts. And that is anything but a straightforward matter.¹¹⁷

Lastly, I should like to echo the sentiment of Brandt and Kim ("Wants as Explanations of Actions"). Until an adequate characterization of causation is given, and shown to be plausibly applicable to these issues, it will be difficult to attach much importance to the question of whether wants may ever be said to cause acts.

Action Theory and Ontology

The objectives detailed at the outset of this inquiry have now been accomplished. Of course a discussion of this sort is at most an extended preface to any comprehensive treatment of the relations between wants and acts. But this project has been conceived in just that way, viz, as a propaedeutic to any adequate inquiry into action and desire. Conspicuously, systematic analyses of intentions and reasons for acting have not been undertaken. This is so simply because a satisfactory response to the issues at hand can be managed without internal theses addressed to these topics. Nonetheless, any general theory of action and desire which

is of consequence must deal with such topics at length.

In the main, it has been argued that there exist a host of 'material connections' between wants and acts (some of them being quasi-analytic) which are both ontological (e.g., act-schematum/act-token) and epistemological (e.g., the warranting conditions for third-person ascriptions of intrinsic action-desires) in character. In making this general point it has been necessary to challenge both the episodic model of desiring (re: deciding the causal question) and the claim that entailments exist between certain existence statements about given wants and given acts. Any significant work which may be done on the relations between wants and acts will, I submit, focus upon those material connections. It has been the intent of this work to establish that point, albeit chiefly via negativa.

Furthermore, some effort has been made to systematically recast action theory on the ground that we cannot confine ourselves to talk about particular desires and beliefs; we must consider what it is to be a desiring being as well. It is not enough to treat warrants for ascriptions, lawful generalizations, or the forms of act generation. Action theory must undertake ontology; specifically, it must redeem the durable intuitions of thinkers like Plato, Spinoza and Hegel who placed the category of Desire squarely in the foreground of both (1) any adequate ontology of man and (2) any adequate account of praxis: homo qua homo desiderans. In recent contribution to this task, Richard J. Berstein (Praxis and Action) has provided an excellent critical history of action theory.¹¹⁸

To this end, some argument has been advanced for the position that in desiring we comprehend self and world in a distinctive way which stands, to speak metaphorically, on the cusp between contemplative *Nous* and unreflective *Praxis*. As cognitive beings we comprehend the world as a complex of facts and possibilities. As desiring beings we comprehend the world as a complex of facts and possibilities which 'make a difference'. Indeed, Hegel held that the emergence of self-consciousness and desire are collateral moments in the biography of conscious life. Far from being irreconcilable psychic antagonists, rationality and desire are 'of the same cloth'. To speak of the former is already to speak of the latter, and vice-versa; and to speak of action is to speak of both. Actions are system-dependent phenomena; and the cardinal elements of that system are wants and beliefs (as well as evaluative and analytical procedures), i.e., the desiderative and the cognitive.

It seems clear enough then, that decisive philosophical contributions to the issue of what it is to act, must, in the end, pose the fundamental question: 'What sort of being is man such that he acts and what is the place of desire in characterizing that being?'

NOTES

¹'Intentional object', as I shall use this term, is connected in important ways with the use given 'concept' by Alonzo Church as set out in his Introduction to Mathematical Logic (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956). The fundamental difference between 'concept' and 'intentional object' rests with the fact that one can have a concept of \emptyset without intending \emptyset (having \emptyset as an intentional object), i.e., 'having an intentional object' connotes an active or occurrent state of affairs (whether conscious or unconscious, thematic or non-thematic) whereas 'having a concept' need not. One can have₁ a concept (as a capacity to act in a certain rule-governed way, etc., depending on one's analysis of what a concept happens to be) in a latent or residual sense and one can have₂ a concept actively in the sense of its currently being an element in a plan of action, line of thought, etc. But one can only have₂ an intentional object. With that restriction at hand then, the following position taken by Church (P. 8, n. 20) is essentially the position being advanced with respect to intentional objects: "According to the Fregean theory of meaning which we are advocating, 'Schliemann sought the site of Troy' asserts a certain relation as holding, not between Schliemann and the site of Troy (for Schliemann might have sought the site of Troy though Troy had been a purely fabulous city and its site had not existed), but between Schliemann and a certain concept, namely that of the site of Troy." The point then is that in seeking the site of Troy a certain relation held between Schliemann and the concept of the site of Troy (for in deciding whether any x = the site of Troy, Schliemann must appeal to what he conceives Troy and the site of Troy to be) and that this relation was one (at least part of the time) of desideratively intending the site of Troy. An intentional object of Troy is not a manifest thing like Troy might be; it is a concept-in-force of what the manifest thing which 'Troy' might denote might be like. Lastly, it is recognized that 'the concept of \emptyset ' is typically spoken of as denoting the concept expressed by ' \emptyset ' (cf. Church, p. 8, n. 20). However, where ' \emptyset ' occurs as the direct object in intentional contexts we shall speak of ' \emptyset ' denoting an intentional object in addition to speaking of the concept expressed by ' \emptyset '. The reason for this is twofold: (1) an intentional object of \emptyset might significantly differ from what is, by some common agreement, regarded as the concept of \emptyset and so one cannot speak of the mere occurrence of ' \emptyset ' as expressing each such possible intentional object; (2) insofar as Schliemann had the site of Troy as an intentional object (where 'the site of Troy' need not denote any actual site locatable on the surface of the earth; cf. Church, p. 7) this 'having' consisted in an active rather than aptitudinal relation to the concept of the site

of Troy and this relation, being an event, is indicated or denoted by the appropriate occurrence of 'the site of Troy' in the above intentional context, i.e., something is picked out in this context and it is, precisely, an intentional object.

²For example, Charles Taylor has argued in The Explanation of Behaviour (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 60-61, that "the 'idea of X' must enter into our account of 'desiring X', even if this desire is unconscious and unacted upon. That is, X must have an intentional description for the agent."

³Alvin Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970), p. 110: "The intentional object of a desire, then, must be a concept or something like a concept, rather than an actual object or act." Also, cf. p. 13, this text.

⁴David A.J. Richards, A Theory of Reasons for Action (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 32.

⁵Several precedents exist for this position. First, Thomas Reid, in the third essay, "Of the Principles of Action," of his Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 119, takes the following position: "If we attend to the appetite of hunger, we shall find in it two ingredients, an uneasy sensation and a desire to eat. . . . In infants, for some time after they come into the world, the uneasy sensation of hunger is probably the whole. We cannot suppose in them, before experience, any conception of eating, nor, consequently, any desire of it. They are led by mere instinct to such when they feel the sensation of hunger. But when experience has connected, in their imagination, the uneasy sensation with the means of removing it, the desire of the last comes to be so associated with the first, that they remain through life inseparable: and we give the name of hunger to the principle that is made up of both." Secondly, P.H. Nowell-Smith, in his volume Ethics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 109, sets forth a virtually identical position: "And it is still more fatal to represent desires as sensations. The desires I am considering all involve sensations in so intimate a way that it is natural to try to identify the desire with the sensation involved. . . . 'I feel hungry' is a Janus-phrase that both refers to my sensations and also expresses a desire to eat. And it is used with this double force because it is an empirical fact that people who have the sensation referred to also want to eat." Lastly, and perhaps most decisively, Anthony Kenny in Action, Emotion and Will (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 111, argues against the empiricist's predilection (especially Hume's) for regarding desires as sensations: "The impossibility of treating desire as a sensation is best brought out by asking such questions as whether the same sensation occurs when one wants a golliwog as when one wants some chewing-gum. If so, then one wants to know why chewing-gum will not satisfy the desire for a golliwog, and vice versa; and in general, why any and every object of desire will not satisfy any and every desire. . . . For any sensation whatever may be characterized as appropriate to some want or other." Kenny concludes by stating that if 'wanting a' were the name of a sensation, then it could not be a value of the

function 'wanting \emptyset ' and, accordingly, understanding 'wanting a' would be no help toward understanding some 'wanting b' where $a \neq b$.

⁶This point is corroborated by Wallace L. Chafe, Meaning and the Structure of Language (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 144-45, where, in considering among other sentences the sentence 'Tom wanted a drink', he considers the matter of 'desire' as a transitive verb of action: Although Tom in each of these sentences looks as if it were an agent [qua acting] from the point of view of surface structure (cf. Tom cut the paper), there seems good reason to say that it is not an agent. Tom is not the instigator of an action, not someone who did something. Rather, he is one who was mentally disposed in some way, one with respect to whose mental experience a drink was wanted, an answer known, or the asparagus liked."

⁷cf. Goldman, pp. 86, 97, and 86 respectively, for a defense and more detailed treatment of this distinction, especially with respect to (1) the claim that 'a standing want, on the other hand, is a disposition or propensity to have an occurrent want, a disposition which lasts with the agent for a reasonable length of time,' (2) the claim that standing wants are "just dispositions, not events in consciousness," and (3) the claim that "an occurrent want is a mental event or mental process: it is a 'going on' or 'happening' in consciousness." (Moreover, it should be noted that Goldman as well endorses the position that desiring and wanting_i are not performances of a certain kind: "A second misconception to be dispelled is the notion that wants are a species of (inner) acts," p. 92; "wants simply are not acts, and hence there is no requirements that they be caused by further wants," p. 93.) At this point we must clarify any apparent inconsistency vis-à-vis standing desires with respect to the earlier claim (supra, 5 and 167, n.1) that forms of 'to desire' appear "clearly reserved for taking as their grammatical objects terms which denote an intentional object, i.e., an object in some sense predicable of a mind," and that "'having an intentional object' connotes an active or occurrent state of affairs." After all, if we say of Nathaniel that he wants to become president of the council, and we mean only to report that this is a standing desire and not to suggest in any way that Nathaniel is now intending that possible future state of affairs, how then can we continue to say that 'becoming president of the council' denotes an intentional object in 'Nathaniel wants to become president of the council'? Firstly, we should introduce a technical device to facilitate marking off sentences of the form 'S desires \emptyset ' which introduce standing desires from those which introduce occurrent desires. Let us indicate 'S has a standing desire for \emptyset ' by 'S desires_{st} \emptyset ' and 'S has an occurrent desire for \emptyset ' by 'S desires_{oc} \emptyset '. A standing desire for \emptyset , taken as a disposition to occurrently desire \emptyset , is, more precisely, a disposition to intend \emptyset desideratively. Accordingly, ' \emptyset ' in 'S desires_{st} \emptyset ' does not pick out an intentional object qua predicated of S at the time of the use of this sentence to make a statement about S. It rather picks out a state of affairs (whether 'actual' or manifest in part or not), a schema of which is given in the concept of \emptyset which S has, which S is disposed to intend desideratively. On the other hand, ' \emptyset ' in 'S desires_{oc} \emptyset ' obviously does pick out, among actual and possible

manifest states of affairs, a concept-in-force of those states of affairs, i.e., an intentional object. It is quite important to remember that an intentional object, although it may be accompanied by graphic imaginings and picture-like presentations, is not itself anything like a discrete phenomenal presentation. Lastly, although it is helpful in an inquiry of this sort to introduce the subscript device for marking off standing from occurrent desires, it should be noted that whatever sort of desire is being introduced by a statement is usually clarified by the context in which that statement occurs. When the statement is ambiguous in this respect, then clarification can be, and often is, called for.

⁸It is once again helpful to appeal to the example of Schliemann seeking the site of Troy as analyzed by Church, p. 8, n. 20: "This is, however, not to say that 'Schliemann sought the site of Troy' means the same as 'schliemann sought the concept of the site of Troy.' On the contrary, the first sentence asserts the holding of a certain relation between Schliemann and the concept of the site of Troy, and is true; but the second sentence asserts the holding of a like relation between Schliemann and the concept of the concept of the site of Troy, and is very likely false. The relation holding between Schliemann and the concept of the site of Troy is not quite that of having sought, or at least it is misleading to call it that - in view of the way in which the verb to seek is commonly used in English."

⁹A few minor and parasitic 'exceptions' to this general claim will be dealt with shortly. Until they are introduced however, I shall speak as if they do not exist since they relate in no substantive way to those issues which will be broached prior to their mention and treatment.

¹⁰cf. Goldman, pp. 101-102, who discusses this notion at some length.

¹¹cf. A.I. Melden, Free Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 114, and Robert G. Olson, "Ignorance, False Belief, and Unconscious Desire," Journal of Philosophy, LIV (July 18, 1957) 466-74.

¹²P.F. Strawson, Individuals (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1959), pp. 247-48.

¹³cf. Roderick M. Chisholm, "Intentionality," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, IV (1967), 201-04.

¹⁴This presupposition attaches as well to talk about particular desires which are, generally (though not necessarily, as in 'the desire from t_0 to t_n '), uniquely identified by reference to their objects.

¹⁵Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, ed. James Strachey and trans. Joan Riviere (London: The Hogarth Press, 1950), p. 10.

¹⁶Ilham Dilman, "Is the Unconscious a Theoretical Construct?," The Monist, LVI (July, 1972), 319.

¹⁷ Thomas W. Smythe, "Unconscious Desires and the Meaning of 'Desire'," The Monist, LVI (July, 1972), 413.

¹⁸ Goldman, p. 86.

¹⁹ Concurrence on this point is provided by Smythe, 419, who remarks that "a desire can be known and conscious even though it seldom occupies my attention."

²⁰ There is only one other exception to the otherwise unexceptional claim that any ' \emptyset ' in any 'S desires \emptyset ' denotes an occurrent intentional object or an intentional object which S is disposed to desideratively intend. The other involves a referentially transparent occurrence of 'desire' and 'want_i'. This will be treated in the final unit of this chapter. But it must be noted that each such strictly non-intentional occurrence is parasitic upon an intentional occurrence. This is clear with desire by implication and it will later be shown to hold for referentially transparent occurrences.

²¹ This usage of 'really wanting all along' should not be confused with cases where we use this phrase to point out that we have been mistaken about the satisfaction conditions for a particular desire (e.g., finally discovering that doing carpentry would satisfy one's desire to perform enjoyable manual labor), i.e., a case in which something has been desired strictly by implication, without our knowing for a moment, for example, that in desiring \emptyset (where r and s are instances of \emptyset) we were desiring either of two unimagined things. Rather, this usage comes closer to those cases where we have indeed had a determinate concept of a state of affairs and held either an occurrent or standing desire that it come about. However, the particular case in point here is something of a hybrid of these polar usages in that the cabinet maker, at one time, had a determinate concept of his object, subsequently forgot it but desired the state of affairs in question by implication from his meta-desire, only later to discover the forgotten concept. In cases however where a person has been totally ignorant of what his desire amounted to, it is only by appealing to this notion of strict implication, I submit, that enables us to make sense of his eventually saying, 'So, that's what I've wanted all along'. He did not want it all along in the same sense in which he may have, for an extended period of time, knowingly wanted something of which he had a determinate concept. In saying, 'That's what I've wanted all along', he is not suggesting (nor will we likely take him to mean) that he had whatever 'that' refers to as an intentional object.

²² Smythe, 422.

²³ J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 11-12. Although, in general, I agree with Austin on this point, it nevertheless appears that there exists a set of counterexamples which, although trivial, are counterexamples enough. That is, it is not true that no sentence exists "in the utterance of which" I take no chances at all. Presumably this is the same as saying that no

sentence expresses a proposition in the sincere assertion of which I take no chances at all. Now, to say that someone sincerely asserts a proposition is, in part at least, to say that he believes that proposition to be a true one. And to say that one might take no chances at all in asserting a proposition is to say that one could not believe falsely that the proposition is true, i.e., that one could not be mistaken. But surely there are such propositions, namely, all those which are logically true. It is not logically possible that one can mistakenly believe a logically true proposition. Accordingly, every sentence which expresses a logically true proposition is a sentence in the utterance of which one takes no chances at all. And there are an infinite number of these.

²⁴Austin, p. 113.

²⁵A.J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1956), pp. 65-66.

²⁶Ayer, pp. 67-68.

²⁷Goldman, p. 49.

²⁸William P. Alston, "Motives and Motivation," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, V (1967), 406. (Hereafter, refer to as "Motives".)

²⁹Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour, pp. 50-51.

³⁰It is important to be very careful about this point. I do not mean to suggest that a statement of the form 'I want \emptyset ' occurs quite invariably as a performative utterance. As Roderick M. Chisholm has noted in his Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 16, "an utterance beginning with 'I want' is not performative in this strict sense, for it cannot be said to be an 'act' of wanting." Surely, if we take a performative utterance in the strict sense to be an utterance which accomplishes the act signified by the verb in the utterance, then 'I want \emptyset ' is never strictly performative. Candidates for strict performatives include 'I promise', 'I order', 'I choose', and 'I guarantee'. Any performative occurrence of an 'I want' utterance would therefore be performative in an extended sense. The primary candidate for a performative occurrence of 'I want', as Chisholm sees the matter, involves the use of 'I want' as a substitute for the strict performative 'I request'. I shall claim that it can function as well as a performative substitute for 'I endorse'. (It would be a mistake of course to regard such 'substitution' as strict, for much is connoted by each term which is not typically connoted by the other.) However, the matter of the reportive or descriptive function of utterances beginning with 'I want' is the 'sticky wicket'. I believe that Chisholm has confused two issues in this regard. On the one hand, he sets out to show that J.L. Austin's position in his Philosophical Papers, ed. J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 44-84--that, when someone says 'I request', then his point is not to describe himself as requesting or to report on his dispositions--is a

mistaken position. But the position which Chisholm actually defends (Theory of Knowledge, p. 17) is that "an utterance of 'I want' may serve both to say something about me and to get you to do something." To say that an utterance may serve to describe me is not at all the same as saying that my point in making such an utterance is to describe myself. Finally, mention should be made of Gertrude Ezorsky's comment on this issue in her essay, "Wishing Won't—But Wanting Will," Dimensions of Mind, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: Collier Books, 1961), pp. 225-30. Ezorsky's central claim is (1) that 'I want \emptyset ' is a dispositional and not a performative expression since in making such an utterance "I may be lying, I may be asserting something which is either true or false which I believe to be false." (p. 226) That is, (2) performative and dispositional expressions "are of a logically different order" (p. 227), the latter having a truth-value and the former not. Further, Ezorsky claims that, (3) although 'I want x ' may "function like" a performative expression, (4) it is nevertheless true that every 'I want \emptyset ' statement "asserts [*italics mine*] a propensity to choose and in other ways secure" \emptyset (p. 227) It appears that 1 is correct insofar as it amounts to Chisholm's claim that 'I want \emptyset ' expressions are not, strictly speaking, performatives. And 3 is correct so far as it allows that 'I want \emptyset ' can function like a performative. But 4 is remarkably odd vis-à-vis 3. For how indeed can a single usage of 'I want \emptyset ' occur both as an assertion and like a performative? By Ezorsky's own observation (2) it appears that it cannot.

³¹ cf. B.F. McGuiness, "I Know What I Want," Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, LVII (1956-57), p. 305 and 316; Alasdair MacIntyre, The Unconscious (New York: Humanities Press, 1958), p. 44 and p. 48; R.S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation (New York: Humanities Press, 1960), p. 63. Also, and most importantly, cf. Goldman, p. 98 and p. 122.

³² Herbert Fingarette, The Self in Transformation (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), p. 33.

³³ Goldman, p. 98.

³⁴ Dilman, 318-19.

³⁵ Smythe, 418. Note that Dilman's truism (supra, 39-40) about not knowing our wishes insofar as they are unconscious is no longer truistic, given this criterion. We must rather say that, without evidentiary insight, it is a truism that our unconscious wishes are unknown to us. Given such insight we become conscious of the fact of the wish; but the wish itself is not thereby guaranteed of transformation from an unconscious state to a conscious one.

³⁶ cf. W.P. Alston, "The Varieties of Privileged Access," American Philosophical Quarterly, VIII (1971).

³⁷ Dilman, 325. Also, cf. Ezorsky, p. 230; "A man may be in a privileged position to know what is in a Latin text if he owns the only existing copy, but he cannot take advantage of his privileged position

unless he takes the trouble to learn how to read Latin. To know what my wishes are is not the same as to be in a privileged position to know what they are."

³⁸William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1905), I, p. 201; also, cf. Plato, Timaeus, 46 A; Aristotle, De Somniis, 462a; and Norman Malcolm, Dreaming (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), who disagrees.

³⁹cf. Goldman, pp. 122-123: "The relevant similarity [between conscious and unconscious wants] is the tendency for unconscious wants, like normal wants, to cause other wants by practical inference. An unconscious want is a state which is postulated as the cause of certain conscious wants, the presence of which would otherwise be surprising."

⁴⁰Goldman, p. 124.

⁴¹Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious," The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), XIV, p. 167.

⁴²Nowell-Smith, p. 136.

⁴³Roderick M. Chisholm, first appeared in Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 170-71, and later reprinted in An Introduction to Philosophical Inquiry, ed. Joseph Margolis (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1968), pp. 759-60.

⁴⁴W.V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970), p. 48.

⁴⁵Jerrold J. Katz, Semantic Theory (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), p. 261.

⁴⁶Katz, p. 262.

⁴⁷Although the following argument was developed independently, additional support for its conclusion can be found in Action, Emotion and Will (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 198, by Anthony Kenny who holds that simple cognitive sentences whose grammatical object is a substantival expression are not shown to be intentional by Chisholm's third criterion. I hold that such sentences remain intentional but that Kenny's argument has a point: namely that we must refine Chisholm's criterion by indexing contexts as referentially opaque or as referentially transparent. Additionally, and more perspicaciously, Ausonio Marras, "Intentionality and Cognitive Sentences," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXIX (December, 1968), p. 258, n. 5, has set forth a position which aligns very well with my own: "My own feeling is that substitution in intentional contexts is more complex than either Kenny or Cornman makes it appear. It certainly seems that a distinction between what Quine calls a 'notional' (opaque) and a 'relational' (transparent) sense of intentional verbs is necessary before we can decide whether certain

inferences are warranted or not. When the notional sense is used (which for certain intentional verbs is doubtless primary), substitution in intentional contexts seems to require a system of, and rules for, indexing singular terms relative to the 'speaker's language' and the 'subject's language', in a way analogous to that in which certain modal systems index singular terms relative to 'worlds.'

48

Hereafter, all references to Kenny's work which are made in this chapter will be references to this title; most references will be made by listing the appropriate page number in the text proper.

⁴⁹Nowell-Smith, p. 108.

⁵⁰Goldman, p. 198.

⁵¹Myles Brand, "Causes of Actions," Journal of Philosophy, LXVII (November 5, 1970), 945.

⁵²Bruce Aune, "Can," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, II (1967), 18-20.

⁵³Brand, 944.

⁵⁴Kenny, pp. 115-116.

⁵⁵St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947), I, p. 719.

⁵⁶Gareth B. Matthews and S. Marc Cohen, "Wants and Lacks," Journal of Philosophy, LXIV (July 20, 1967), 455.

⁵⁷Colin Radford, "Hoping and Wishing," The Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volume XLIV (1970), p. 53.

⁵⁸J.M. Hinton, "Hoping and Wishing," The Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volume XLIV (1970), p. 78.

⁵⁹'Counting it as a plus that p' is not equivalent however to 'being glad that p' since the latter, as Hinton argues (pp. 79-80), "seems difficult to confine to a pro tanto sense, difficult to detach from an all-in reckoning."

⁶⁰Although, in our previous example, it is permissible to say that the husband wants to keep his olive, not absolutely or unconditionally, but merely vis-à-vis the prospect of losing it.

⁶¹Overlooking this fact may have accounted for the form of Brand's faulty principle which analyzes every 'I want x' sentence into an 'I want to a (with or to x)' sentence (supra, 100-101).

⁶²Radford, p. 54.

⁶³ John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Random House, Inc., 1957), pp. 229-43.

⁶⁴ Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour, p. 49.

⁶⁵ G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 67.

⁶⁶ cf. Radford and Hinton.

⁶⁷ cf. J.C.B. Gosling, Pleasure and Desire: The Case for Hedonism Reviewed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969): "But 'want' is a very general word for commenting on behaviour . . . Only trouble can come from treating it as a simple straightforward term," pp. 110-111.

⁶⁸ Anscombe, p. 70.

⁶⁹ Radford, p. 55. Presumably here, 'impossible' in "impossible of achievement" ranges over both logical and circumstantial impossibility.

⁷⁰ Hinton, p. 71.

⁷¹ One would generally use 'wish' here rather than 'want' since the latter tends to suggest that one takes oneself to have some power over the party in question.

⁷² cf. Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics, Part III, Prop. XVII.

⁷³ Anscombe, p. 70.

⁷⁴ Anscombe, p. 68.

⁷⁵ cf. Brand, pp. 945-46 in concurrence with this objection to Anscombe's position. For additional advocacy of that position cf. Jon Wheatley, "Reasons for Acting," Dialogue, VII, 4 (March, 1969), 553-67. 67.

⁷⁶ Radford, p. 65.

⁷⁷ Roy Lawrence, Motive and Intention (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 87-88.

⁷⁸ Hinton, p. 72.

⁷⁹ Radford, p. 51.

⁸⁰ G.W.F. Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, (Hamburg: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1952), p. 139: "Und das Selbstbewusstsein hiemit seiner selbst mir nur gewiss durch das Aufheben dieses Andern, das sich ihm als selbständiges. Leben darstellt; es its Begierde."

⁸¹ Walter Kaufman, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1956), p. 203.

⁸² A.R. Louch, Explanation and Human Action (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), p. 68.

⁸³ Or variously, where 'what one judges one ought to do' satisfies a conditional principle of action of the form 'If one wants to a, then, in this case, one ought to b', and where one does not want to do b qua requirement for a. One can determine what is required and yet not want to satisfy that requirement, or not want to satisfy it enough to actually do so.

⁸⁴ cf. Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action: An Exploration in Definition and Classification," Toward A General Theory of Action, ed. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962), pp. 395-396.

⁸⁵ Goldman, pp. 53-54.

⁸⁶ Goldman, p. 73.

⁸⁷ Perhaps the most eloquent and closely reasoned objections to the SMT have been advanced by Thomas Reid in Essays on the Active Powers of the Mind, Essay IV, Chapter IV.

⁸⁸ Raziel Abelson, "Review of Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose," Journal of Philosophy, LXVI (March 27, 1969), 183-83. (Also, cf. Charles Taylor, p.33, and Goldman, pp. 111-12, Who considers L_1 quite plausible.)

⁸⁹ William P. Alston, "Wants, Actions, and Causal Explanations," Intentionality, Minds, and Perception, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1967), pp. 321-22. (Hereafter, refer to as "Wants".)

⁹⁰ Alston, "Wants," pp. 324-26.

⁹¹ Alston, "Wants," p. 325.

⁹² Alston, "wants," p. 326.

⁹³ Jonathan Cohen, "Teleological Explanation," Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, N.S. LI (1950-51), 264.

⁹⁴ Alston, "Motives," 404.

⁹⁵ Alston, "Motives," 405.

⁹⁶ Alston, "Motives," 404.

⁹⁷ Alston, "Motives," 404.

⁹⁸ Goldman, p. 98.

- ⁹⁹Alston, "Motives," 405.
- ¹⁰⁰Alston, "Motives," 405.
- ¹⁰¹Alston, "Motives," 406.
- ¹⁰²Alston, "Motives," 405.
- ¹⁰³Richard Brandt and Jaegwon Kim, "Wants as Explanations of Actions," Journal of Philosophy, LX (July 18, 1963), 427.
- ¹⁰⁴Brandt and Kim, 434.
- ¹⁰⁵J.J. Valberg, "Some Remarks on Action and Desire," Journal of Philosophy, LXVII (August 6, 1970), 505.
- ¹⁰⁶cf. Amelie Rorty, "Wants and Justifications," Journal of Philosophy, LXIII (December 22, 1966), 765-772, and Raziel Abelson's reply in "New Stops on the BIWT," Journal of Philosophy, LXIV (July 20, 1967), 453-54.
- ¹⁰⁷Richard Taylor, "I Can," The Philosophical Review, LXIX (January, 1960), 86.
- ¹⁰⁸Goldman, p. 111.
- ¹⁰⁹Goldman, p. 112. See also: Charles Taylor, p. 33 and pp. 49-50; Richard Taylor, "I Can," 87-88; and Bruce Goldberg, "Can a Desire be a Cause?," Analysis, 25 (January, 1965), 70-72.
- ¹¹⁰A.I. Melden, Free Action, p. 114
- ¹¹¹cf. Goldberg, 70-71.
- ¹¹²Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," Journal of Philosophy, LX (November 7, 1963) 687-88.
- ¹¹³Chief among these are Charles Taylor and Richard Taylor. A rejoinder to Charles Taylor has been advanced by D.C. Dennett, "Features of Intentional Actions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXIX (December, 1968), 241. However, Dennett appears to confuse de re and de dicto necessity here: "But by parity of reasoning conception cannot be the cause of pregnancy, since part of what we mean by conception is that ceteris paribus it brings on pregnancy. Since 'conception' is defined as the cause of pregnancy, our 'law' is a tautology, but that does not mean conception is not the cause of pregnancy. The point is that we can give other characterizations of the event we call conception, so that the contingency of our discovery is restored."
- ¹¹⁴Goldman, p. 112.

¹¹⁵ Jaegwon Kim, "Causes and Counterfactuals," Journal of Philosophy, LXX (October 11, 1973), 570.

¹¹⁶ Proponents of the position that reason-explanations (inclusive of desiderative explanations) are not a species of causal explanation include the following (to mention but several): Anscombe, Intention; William Dray, Laws and Explanation in History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957); D.W. Hamlyn, "Behavior," Philosophy, XXVIII (1953); Melden, Free Action; R.S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation; and Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour. Philosophers challenging this view include: Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes"; Goldman, A Theory of Human Action; and Jerome A. Shaffer, Philosophy of Mind (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1968).

¹¹⁷ cf. Joseph Margolis, "Puzzles Regarding Explanation by Reasons and Explanation by Causes," Journal of Philosophy, LXVII (April 9, 1970) 187-95.

¹¹⁸ Richard J. Berntein, Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).

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VITA

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