Abstract
Following John Rawls, nonideal theory is typically divided into: (1) “partial-compliance theory” and (2) “transitional theory." The former is concerned with those circumstances in which individuals and political regimes do not fully comply with the requirements of justice, such as when people break the law or some individuals do not do their fair share within a distributive scheme. The latter is concerned with circumstances in which background institutions may be unjust or may not exist at all. This paper focuses on issues arising in transitional theory. In particular, I am concerned with what Rawls’ has called “burdened societies," that is, those societies that find themselves in unfavorable conditions, such that their historical, social or economic circumstances make it difficult to establish just institutions. The paper investigates exactly how such burdened societies should proceed towards a more just condition in an acceptable fashion. Rawls himself tells us very little, except to suggest that societies in this condition should look for policies and courses of action that are morally permissible, politically possible and likely to be effective. In this paper I first try to anticipate what a Rawlsian might say about the best way for burdened societies to handle transitional problems and so move towards the ideal of justice. Next, I construct a model of transitional justice for burdened societies. Ultimately, I argue for a model of transitional justice that makes use of a nonideal version of Rawls’ notion of the worst-off representative person.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Rawls, LP, p. 5. I leave aside cases of total impossibility, since if there are no possible reforms that a burdened society could implement that would lead to a more just condition, then I have nothing to discuss. However, given the ability of societies to change, especially with the input and assistance of other societies, it seems likely that these cases will be very few.
The grievousness of an injustice is said to be a matter of the extent to which a given institution deviates from perfect justice. It is conceivable that a given reform my make a society more just right now, but will not be consistent with perfect justice-or may even impede its realization. Rawls, TOJ, p. 216.
Therefore, questions of retributive and restorative justice that are appropriate to this different notion will not be considered here.
See Farrelly (2007), p. 850, and also Sreenivasan (forthcoming).
In this version of the original position, “rational representatives” of peoples are “guided by appropriate reasons,” “situated symmetrically,” and do not know “the size of the territory, or the population, or the relative strength of the people … who they represent… the extent of their natural resources, or the level of their economic development.” Rawls, LP, pp. 32–33.
Technically not all liberal societies must endorse justice as fairness, and not all decent peoples will necessarily be decent consultation hierarchies. On Rawls’ account, these are each merely one of the possibilities within each category. (I thank Jon Mandle for bringing this point to my attention).
Rawls, LP, p. 111. Also note that the use of force as part of an effort to assist burdened societies is ruled out since the societies providing aid are well-ordered and so do not act aggressively towards other societies.
The World Bank estimates that 2,561.5 million people lived below the $2 a day poverty line in 2005; As such, it is not an unreasonable assumption that most burdened societies would have a substantial percentage of people living at or below this line. See World Bank, “Prospects for the Global Economy” (2009) at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2009/Resources/10363_WebPDF-01Chapter1-w47.pdf .
I do not mean to suggest that these questions are ones Rawls either did, or should have, addressed. They are not his questions, since he was mainly concerned with outlining a duty of assistance on the part of well-ordered societies. However, note that the answers to these questions must be part of a complete transitional theory, especially given that the duty of assistance is meant to be non-paternalistic and so its content must be in large part concretely determined by burdened societies themselves. (Many thanks to Steve Vanderheiden for this last observation).
Of course, transitions from a less-just to a more-just condition will be necessary for societies that are not “burdened” but are still unjust. Whether a society is burdened or not depends on the extent of the unfavorable circumstances in which it finds itself, particularly economically. Societies that are not burdened, but still have some injustices to correct, should be understood to be unjust societies in favorable conditions.
Rawls, TOJ, p. 266. The basic liberties Rawls lists as “important” are the right to vote and hold office, freedom of speech and assembly, the right to bodily integrity and freedom from psychological oppression, freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure, freedom of conscience and thought, and the right to hold personal property. Rawls, TOJ, p. 53.
By lexically ordering the principles, Rawls establishes that violations of the first principle are more grievous than violations of fair equality of opportunity or the difference principle, since the priority is based on the importance of liberties to deliberators in the original position.
To be fair, Rawls allows that “the first principle covering the equal basic rights and liberties may easily be preceded by a lexically prior principle requiring that citizens’ basic needs be met, at least insofar as their being met is necessary for citizens to understand and to be able to fruitfully exercise those rights” (Rawls (1996), p. 7). Rawls is not here recommending that people prioritize the protection of civil liberties over their very survival.
In his classic book Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (1980) Henry Shue argues persuasively that the distinction between negative and positive rights is neither sharp nor significant.
Clearly there are vectors other than these. Also, “vector” is my terminology. Farmer prefers the term “axis”. He also cites some material from liberation theology in this connection, but it should be understood that I am not invoking that tradition here. See Farmer (2010), pp. 337–341.
Many of the global poor rank ending police brutality and harassment very highly on a list of improvements they would like to see in their lives. See Narayan et al. (2000), pp. 35–36 and 27.
Shue also notes that the “mixture of the analytic and the empirical in an element like standard threats is obviously difficult to characterize with any precision. …But which threats are pervasive, which are serious, and which can feasibly be resisted must be discovered from particular situations,” (Shue 1980 Note 22, p. 184).
References
Farmer P (2010) On suffering and structural violence: social and economic rights in the global era. In: Saussy H (ed) Partner to the poor: a Paul Farmer reader. University of California Press, Berkeley, pp 328–349
Farrelly C (2007) Justice in ideal theory: a refutation. Polit Stud 55:844–864
Gilabert P (2008) Global justice and poverty relief in nonideal circumstances. Soc Theor Pract 34:411–438
McKerlie D (1994) Equality and priority. Utilitas 6:25–42
Moellendorf D (1996) Constructing the law of peoples. Pac Phil Q 77:132–154
Narayan D et al (2000) Voices of the poor: crying out for change. Oxford University Press for The World Bank, New York
Phillips M (1985) Reflections on the transition from ideal to non-ideal theory. Noûs 19:551–570
Rawls J (1996) Political liberalism. Columbia University Press, New York
Rawls J (1999a) Theory of justice, Revised Edition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Rawls J (1999b) Law of peoples. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Robeyns I (2008) Ideal theory in theory and practice. Soc Theor Pract 34:341–362
Sen A (2009) The idea of justice. Belknap, Cambridge
Shue H (1980) Basic rights: subsistence, affluence and US foreign policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Simmons AJ (2010) Ideal and nonideal theory. Phil Pub Affairs 38:5–36
Sreenivasan G (2007) Health and justice in our nonideal world. Polit Philos Econ 6:218–236
Sreenivasan G (forthcoming) What is non-ideal theory? In: Williams M, Elster J (eds) Transitional justice. New York University Press, New York.
Tasioulas J (2005) Global justice without end? Metaphilosophy 36:3–29
Valentini L (2009) On the apparent paradox of ideal theory. J Polit Philos 17:332–355
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to audiences at both the North American Society for Social Philosophy Conference (July 2010) and the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (August 2010) for their excellent feedback. I would also like to thank Steve Vanderheiden, Helga Varden and Jon Mandle for their detailed and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Fuller, L.L. Burdened Societies and Transitional Justice. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 15, 369–386 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9300-0
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9300-0