Emotional Speech Acts and the Educational Perlocutions of Speech

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Over the past decades, there has been an ongoing debate about whether education should aim at the cultivation of emotional wellbeing of self-esteeming personalities or whether it should prioritise literacy and the cognitive development of students. However, it might be the case that the two are not easily distinguished in educational contexts. In this paper I use J.L. Austin's original work on speech acts to (a) emphasise the interconnection between the cognitive and emotional aspects of our utterances, and (b) illustrate how emotional force affects communication in the classroom.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decades, there has been an ongoing debate on whether education should prioritise students emotional flourishing or whether it should only aim at their cognitive development.[1] However, the cognitive and the emotional aspects of educational practice cannot be easily distinguished. In fact many philosophers have underlined such a connection.[2] Here I will hopefully make a distinctive contribution to the discussion showing how *speech act theory* allows emotions to come into all of our utterances and influence their content. I will use J.L. Austin's original work on speech acts (Austin, 1962) and claim that the emotional character of our utterances influences the information we convey in the classroom.

First, I will offer a succinct reading of Austin's speech act theory. Austin proposes that, when we *say something about the world*, we also *do something in the world*. He uses the term *locution* to refer to the descriptive function of language and the term *illocution* to refer to the performative element of our utterances. This performative function of language entails that our utterances have certain effects on our audience. Austin calls this dimension of speech *perlocution*.

I will suggest further that, whereas *locutions* give us information, within *illocutionary force* lies the emotional character of our utterances. In *every* utterance or judgement there is an emotional weight and it influences the information relayed. Austin completely overlooks the emotional elements of the illocutions, although these may affect perlocutions. I will try to show

this is an important feature of illocutions and that it should be embraced in a new version of speech act theory.

In the last part of the paper, I turn to the *perlocutionary effects* of our utterances in real classroom situations. I will consider the case of *self-esteem*, which is often suggested as a primary good that education should produce. Perlocutionary effects such as self-esteem depend both and equally on the cognitive and emotional aspects of our utterances. I suggest however, that the emotional force influences even factual information when we convey it in the classroom. Speech act theory can help us realise how.

J.L. AUSTIN ON SPEECH ACTS

J.L. Austin in *How to Do Things with Words* (Austin, 1962) proposes that when we speak we are not merely describing the world truthfully or falsely; we rather *do* things in the world. We *make promises* or *give commands*; we *accuse* or *defend* someone etc. Austin begins his lectures trying to distinguish between two kinds of utterances: *constatives* and *performatives*. The former provide descriptions, the latter help perform certain acts. He soon undermines the distinction and places a *performative force* within every utterance. Every time we say something we make three different acts:

- *A locutionary act* or *locution*: to make a long story short, this is the act of pronouncing sounds that make sense in the language spoken, the act of communicating some kind of information (Austin, 1962, pp. 92–98).
- *An illocutionary act* or *illocution:* this is clearly the part of the act that interests Austin. It has to do with what I do *in* uttering this sentence under the specific circumstances of the utterance (Austin, 1962, pp. 98–101). This act is performed at the time of the utterance.
- *A perlocutionary act* or *perlocution:* this has to do with the consequences of my utterance (Austin, 1962, p. 101). It is the act(s) that I do *by* uttering this sentence under the specific circumstances of the utterance.

Austin gives an example to illustrate this distinction (Austin, 1962, pp. 101–102):

- Act (A) or Locution:
    - He said to me 'Shoot her!' meaning by 'shoot' shoot and referring by 'her' to *her*.

- Act (B) or Illocution:
    - He urged (or advised, ordered, &c.) me to shoot her.

- Act (C. a) or Perlocution:
    - He persuaded me to shoot her.
- [or] Act (C. b)
    - He got me to (or made me, &c.) shoot her.

In Austin's example then, my utterance had a serious effect: she got shot. Perlocutions refer to the effect my utterance has to the audience. Their effect depends on whether the audience recognises my intentions and my authority to perform the illocution, and on the conventions that have to do with the overall circumstances.

After making this distinction Austin focuses on the illocutionary act. Again, the following of certain *conventions* depending on the context, the *speaker's intentions* and *their authority* to utter the locution are necessary for the smooth or *happy* functioning of a performative. For example, if a say 'I do', I will manage to get married only if I am in an actual wedding ceremony and I am the groom or the bride.

Every utterance has an illocutionary *force* (it is a *warning* or a *promise*, a *description*, a *suggestion* or a *command* etc.). It is when we grasp the illocutionary force that we understand what the speaker wants to convey. Austin puts a performative force within every utterance and makes illocutions crucial for the understanding of the sentence.

Speech act theory is a model, which explains *the things we do with language*. It illustrates how verbal communication affects even non-verbal events in the world. Austin's philosophy of language has been the subject of long debates.[3] Here, I am not going to evaluate it against all other perspectives, but rather to revise it and use it to show how it can help us understand the interconnection between cognitive and emotional aspects of communication in educational contexts.

Needless to say, Austin's distinctions are far from clear-cut. Indeed, the illocution is not easily distinguished either from the locution or—and especially—from the perlocution.[4] Austin himself points out again and again that the three are, actually, indistinguishable. In fact, we need to grasp 'the total speech act in the total speech situation' in order to be fully aware of what has been said (Austin, 1962, p. 147).

SPEECH ACTS REVISED

Over the past decades there has been an ongoing discussion about the relationship between *reason* or *cognition* and *emotion*. It seems to me that speech act theory can provide us with a tool to explore this interconnection in general. Terms such as *reason* or *cognition* and *emotion* are ambiguous and their distinction is very vague too, as many have argued.[5] Here I use the term *cognition* mostly to refer to the *processing of information*. As to *emotion*, I am inclined to agree with Rorty (2004) that *emotion* is not easily distinguished from propositional attitudes, moods etc. I will thus use the term in the most ordinary sense possible and I will try not to commit myself to any strong thesis about the ontology of emotions.

When Austin gave his lectures on *How to Do Things with Words*, the discussion of emotions was not as philosophically or educationally fashionable as it is today. It is still surprising that he talks at such length, and in all of his work, about ordinary language usage and about all the things we do with words, without at all taking a perspective on emotions. Language is a very powerful tool for the expression and the manipulation of emotion.

We reveal our emotions through language. Emotional force is not always explicit. Often it is implied by gestures, tone, pauses etc. However, there is *always* some explicit or implicit emotional force when we speak. In order to fully understand what has been said, we need to grasp the emotions revealed as well. Part of what the speaker appreciates when grasping *the total speech act in the total speech situation* is the emotional force conveyed.

The emotional force of the utterance lies within the *illocutionary act*. Many have suspected some relationship between the illocution and the emotions. Butler (1997) talks about *excitable* speech or more recently Cavell (2006) writes about 'Performative and *Passionate* Utterance'. However Cavell proposes a distinction between performative and passionate utterances.[6] I, on the other hand, would like to suggest that every utterance has an emotional force and is thus performative. *Fully understanding the illocution, depends on whether one grasps the emotions expressed or implied by the speaker in the specific context.* There is more to *illocution* than mere emotion (the speaker's intentions for instance); however the emotion behind the utterance often gives us the clue as to whether it is meant as an *insult* or a *proposal*, for example.

Austin is right when he says that the full meaning of an utterance depends on the illocution. Only if one understands what the speaker *wants to do* in saying what she says, does one fully understand her. However, illocutionary force partly relies on emotion: she *commands* you to open the window when she is angry, she is *begging* you when she is frightened, etc. The illocution is indeed the key for fully understanding an utterance; and the emotions behind it are the key to fully understanding the illocution.

Emotions then are a crucial part of the illocution:

(i)   They depend on the speaker's intentions, desires and feelings, however conscious or not. I may say 'this is what Austin meant!' in a classroom. Perhaps I am angry with a student who disputes with me and I want to intimidate them. Or it could be that I am full of enthusiasm for offering some alternative interpretation to my students and I want to persuade them. Or it could be that a student of mine just came up with a great idea and I am excited and proud—or envious. The illocution depends on the emotion behind it. Emotions may not be completely transparent to me or to the class. However, they affect the way the utterance comes out. In a way they are not completely unclear either. The context allows a reading, even though it may not be 100% accurate.

(ii) The illocution reveals our feelings, intentions or moods about the kind of information the locution transmits and about the overall situation.

(iii) The manifestation of the illocution, including the emotion behind it, has to do with the community's conventions. Austin emphasises the importance of conventions for the successful performance of a speech act. The speaker should be authorised and the circumstances should be appropriate. Austin uses mostly examples of ritual or ceremonial acts (weddings, christenings etc.) to

underline the conventional nature of the speech act, but we do not have to limit illocutions to such rituals. *Giving a promise* or *buying a sweater, calling someone a name and insulting them, showing one's appreciation* or *contempt,* all those acts rely on conventions, as do the emotions related to them.

Emotions are anyway tied to all of a community's activities. Even those thinkers who describe emotions as strictly hardwired, completely physical or inner cannot deny the community's significance when mastering them. Paul Ekman introduces the term *display rules* in order to explain the vast variety of emotional reactions in different cultures (Ekman and Friesen, 1975). De Sousa (1987) talks about the *paradigm scenarios* in which one learns which emotional behaviours are appropriate in a given situation. We learn even what emotions *to feel* depending on the context. Illocutionary force, including its emotional ingredients, strongly relies on a community's habits and conventions.

(iv) Both the illocution and the emotion behind it are political in the sense that they consist of strategies and/or immediate evaluative reactions. They are thus performative in a very strong sense: they *change* the world.[7] I get angry whenever I interpret what you say as insulting. My anger is an immediate evaluation of your behaviour. It changes my perception of the situation. It is also a strategy.[8] I might try to hide my anger or I might express it. Either way my strategy is conveyed through my illocutions, which in turn depend on my emotions.

(v) Our illocutions have certain perlocutionary effects. Since illocutions are strategic they can either achieve or fail to achieve their goal. However, their strength to affect the audience comes from their emotional force. I will return to this point.

Thus, within speech-act theory, the *locutionary act* is the part mostly connected with cognition. The pure physical act of producing noise is here combined with the mental act of speaking a language. Here one can raise questions about whether what we say is grammatically or syntactically correct, accurate, true or false etc. One can assess whether the speaker follows grammatical, syntactical or pronunciation rules and/or whether the information conveyed is true.

The *illocutionary act* is the space of *conventions, intentions, desires* and *emotions*. The information conveyed can hardly be understood if we do not grasp the illocution. Take the sentence 'I told him you are not that young'. Even though I know what it says, I cannot fully understand it unless I grasp what the speaker wants to do with it. Is it meant as an *insult* or a *vote of confidence*, for example? To fully understand it, I need to know the context, just as Austin suggests. However the context is important partly because it will help me grasp the emotions of the speaker. Unfortunately, Austin completely overlooked the importance of emotions in *How to Do Things with Words*.

The distinction between the locutionary and the illocutionary act is indeed schematic. They both rely on communal conventions. They both depend on the following of some rules. They are both partly mental acts and partly physical acts.[9] They are simultaneous acts and one cannot exist without the other.

So far, there is a certain key element of speech act theory missing. In the next part of the paper I will turn to the *perlocutionary act* and use it to show the significance of speech acts theory for education.

PERLOCUTIONARY EFFECTS IN THE CLASSROOM

The *perlocution* is part of the speech act. Austin's original theory suggests that we perform all three acts in every utterance: everything we say in real life circumstances conveys some information (locutionary act or *locution*), implies certain meaning depending on our intentions and the overall conventions of the circumstance (illocutionary act or *illocution*), and has some effects on the audience (perlocutionary act or *perlocution*).

Conventions, *intentions* and *authority* are the keywords on which Austin relies for a happy performance of *the total speech act in the total speech situation*. I have added *emotion* to the mix. In any case, speech act theory can be an elicit model to analyse student–teacher communication in the classroom, since the conventions are clear, teachers' authority is strong, and their intentions and emotions can have a very powerful effect on the students. All the key ingredients for the happy performance of our speech acts are already there, waiting for us *to do things with words*.

Education is a conventional process *per se*; educators are authorised speakers by definition and can thus perform all kinds of speech acts. Whenever we stand before our audience, we perform all three acts: (a) we relay pieces of information (*locution*), (b) depending on the context, our mood and the overall circumstances, we try to do things in communicating this information (*illocution*), (c) and our ways of speaking have certain effects on our students (*perlocution*). We do all three acts simultaneously.

Speaking in a classroom I might *intimidate, inspire, bore, insult* etc. Butler (1997) is right to say that it is not clear how these perlocutions are distinguished from the illocutions that produce them. Austin's original idea was that the perlocutions of speech have to do with the *future consequences of a speech act to the audience*. He did not sufficiently elaborate this insight. In fact, he struggles with the distinction in chapters IX and X of *How to Do Things with Words* and he finally refuses to make a sharp division. Some examples, though, can show us approximately what he had in mind: *if I accuse you in court, you may go to jail; if I bequeath you this watch, you will own it after I die,* etc. Perlocutions have to do with future effects of our utterances.

Perlocutionary effects are strong in educational contexts, given the teacher's authority and the conventional nature of schooling. We should therefore retain the distinction between illocutions and perlocutions at least when talking about educational processes; perlocutions can be taken to refer to the *future* and *more permanent results* of our speech acts to our students.

Lets explore an example. What would be a perlocution worth performing for our students?

Self-esteem has been proposed as one of the goals that education should pursue.[10] There have been numerous attempts to defend, analyse, refute and even empirically measure self-esteem and its relevance to education over the past decades. More than 15,000 journal articles have been published over the last 30 years on self-esteem (Baumeister *et al.*, 2003) and the topic is still under discussion, especially when related to education (Crocker and Park, 2004; Neff, 2011). For example, Smith (2002, 2006) argues that encouraging self-esteem has a serious downside endorsing narcissistic characteristics and Neff (2011), in the same spirit, proposes we substitute it with self-compassion; Emler (2001) tries to show empirically that self-esteem is irrelevant to a person's education,[11] while others insist that self-esteeming personalities have better academic achievements and/or vice-versa that academic achievement increases one's sense of self-esteem (Goetz *et al.*, 2010; Guay *et al.*, 2010; Huang, 2011; Ireson and Hallam, 2009; Ross and Beckett, 2000).

One can find most of the relevant literature discussed from the perspective of philosophy of education in Ruth Cigman's work. Cigman (2001, 2004) discusses several objections to the educational ideal of self-esteem; she explores different notions of self-esteem and manages to distinguish it from psychological frauds, such as narcissism. She also responds to recent studies that completely alienate self-esteem from social factors, such as gender, race, education, etc. (Cigman, 2004), and moreover argues against the idea that one could (or should) measure self-esteem. Finally, she forcefully claims that teachers should promote *healthy* (Cigman, 2004) or *basic* (Cigman, 2001) self-esteem: *a feeling of self-worth and competence that can enable children to pursue their full potential.*

The vivacity of today's discussions of self-esteem shows that education is one of self-esteem's *homes*. Even Smith (2002), who warns for precaution when promoting self-esteem, agrees that this should be one of education's aims. It is hard to prevent education theory from discussing students' self-esteem. I am not going to get into all these discussions here, not even defend self-esteem as an educational goal. I will just use self-esteem as an example of how a revised version of speech act theory can be useful in educational contexts. I will thus, analyse self-esteem as a possible desirable *perlocutionary* effect of our utterances in the classroom. To see self-esteem as a perlocutionary effect of our communication with our students can benefit us in two ways. First, speech act theory revised can help us combine different views about the construction of self-esteem and get a fuller understanding of its prerequisites. Also, speech act theory underlines the fact that self-esteem is not an abstract goal we can theoretically propose. It is the outcome of our everyday educational practices in real-classroom situations.

So, if we do take up the task of promoting *healthy self-esteem*, how can we do it? Three competing views have been proposed.

John Rawls includes *self-esteem* with the *primary goods*, which a good educational system (or rather a good society) should produce for all citizens. *Primary goods* (Rawls, 1971, p. 62) refer to things that have a use whatever

a person's rational plan of life is. Goldman (1999, p. 353) uses the term to talk about *'fundamental knowledge', defined as knowledge that is likely to be useful whatever other types of knowledge a person wishes to acquire*. Primary goods are related to *information and skill* that might be useful to the young.

Self-esteem then, arises from individual achievement (Griffiths, 1995, pp. 109–130; Nozick, 1974; Rawls, 1971) and is related to the information and the skills one can acquire from education. A good educational system promotes self-esteem if it can offer opportunities for cognitive growth. I shall call this the *cognitive view* of self-esteem.

On the opposite side, is what I shall call the *emotive view*, originally supported by Rogers (Rogers, 1983; Rogers *et al.*, 2013). According to this view, self-esteem emerges from *unconditional positive regard*. If adults, teachers and parents, are supportive and kind to the young, if they are affectionate and loving, children will create self-esteeming personalities and feel safe to reach their full potential. Achievement then arises from self-esteem and not the other way around.

There is also a third alternative. I will call it the *political view* and use Griffiths (1995) as its advocate. Griffiths argues that self-esteem is related to the construction of personal identity and the social constraints that affect such a construction. Coherent self-identities tend to have higher self-esteem. Institutional discrimination between gender, races, social classes etc. affects the way we perceive ourselves. Most of us have to struggle with acknowledged and unacknowledged aspirations depending on our gender, race or social background. Those aspirations are often in conflict: my *racial* background might be very supportive of the idea of me becoming a young mother and much less supportive of me becoming an academic. However, my *social* background might see my aspiration to be an academic more favourably that my wish to become a young mother and so on. Our identity is then built on a constant negotiation over belonging and not belonging in categories like the ones cited above (Griffiths, 1995, pp. 109–130). In this light, there is hardly any *unconditional regard* for most of us. There are many conditional regards, some overlapping and some that we feel are mutually exclusive. So, we assemble our identities bargaining and compromising over which to choose, which to combine and which to abandon. Depending on how smoothly the negotiation process progresses, self-esteem adjusts. A sense of a coherent self is the root of self-esteem. This explains why women, for example, usually have lower self-esteem than men or why they need to work much harder to gain it: they have to work against all kinds of stereotypes in order to assemble a coherent self-identity.

There are many versions of the *political view*. Cigman, for example, argues against the view that self-esteem is a social phenomenon or a direct consequence of belonging to a stigmatised group; she ascribes such a view to Chetcuti and Griffiths (2002) and she considers it simplistic (Cigman, 2004). She counter-suggests a *situated* concept of self-esteem: the esteem of an *embodied and social* self. I believe, however, that she is much closer to Chetcuti and Griffiths than she realises. For it seems to me that Chetcuti and Griffiths do not suggest that self-esteem is a direct consequence of belonging

to a stigmatised group. Rather they suggest that it is a consequence of a *coherent* self. Coherence has to do with the aspirations we allow ourselves and those aspirations depend largely on our social background and our embodied selves. Problems arise when such aspirations conflict with one another. Take a young middle-class boy, star of the school football team, who wants to become a kindergarten teacher. If his ambitions are treated as incompatible, that might hurt his self-esteem. Low self-esteem then, is not a consequence of his cultural background *per se;* it rather comes from his effort to combine conflicting sets of expectations. I think this is the point that Chetcuti and Griffiths (2002) and Griffiths (1995) make. And Cigman's notion of *situated self-esteem* can support such a view too. At some point then, our *basic* feeling of self-worth has to do with assembling a coherent corpus of aspirations that arise from our embodied and social selves.

The emotive view is very close to the political one. Thus, Griffiths is very sympathetic to Rogers (Griffiths, 1995, pp. 109–130). Both the emotive and the political view of self-esteem highlight society's attitude towards the young. If students are handled with respect, tolerance and affection they are more likely to build self-esteeming personalities. The political view though, calls for an attitude-changing strategy.

Those three views suggest different ways of cultivating self-esteem. Now let's bring speech act theory back to the discussion. Speech act theory, revised so as to include the emotional aspects of language, can help bring together all three of these views. The cognitive (locution), the emotive and the political aspects of language (illocutions) come together in our every utterance. And they affect the audience and its own emotions (perlocution). The case of self-esteem shows how language expresses speakers' intentions and emotions but also influences the emotions of the audience.

The emotions of the teacher come out in their utterances. The teacher needs to be affectionate and kind, just as Rogers and the emotive view suggests, in order to do the ground-work for constructing self-esteeming personalities. But since education is hardly a one-to-one relationship these days, our attitude takes a political stance to build a trusting environment that includes all students.

However, even in the era of political correctness, stereotypes still survive as emotions, moods and ultimately illocutions. The politics of speech lie within its emotive force. The more the teacher conforms to gender, racial or cultural stereotypes, the more sexist, racist or culturally biased their utterances will be, consciously or unconsciously. And given the fact that educators have certain authority, this will in the long run influence the identities of their students and their self-esteem. The political component also lies within the illocution. Illocutions (intentions, attitudes, emotions) are strategies to promote certain ideals or to disregard others.

Nevertheless, the locutions of speech are significant too. The cognitive element also relates to the construction of self-esteeming personalities. A mathematics teacher is supposed to teach students some mathematics; a philosophy teacher is supposed to teach students some philosophy. We need to convey correct and useful information and encourage useful skills.

If we neglect the cognitive side of our utterances, and just concentrate on the emotional enhancement of our students, we end up with people who again miss *primary goods*, in the sense Goldman uses the term: they miss pieces of knowledge that would be useful in their future. One cannot have self-esteem, unless one is able to pursue one's interests. And in order to enable children to pursue their full potential, we need to help them grasp pieces of knowledge that are likely to be useful, whatever other types of knowledge they wish to acquire.

Perlocutionary effects, such as self-esteem, depend on the locutions and the illocutions of speech or, to use a more ordinary terminology, both and equally on the cognitive, the emotive (and the political) aspects of our utterances. Speech act theory brings those features together.

Moreover, speech act theory proposes that *the way the information comes out is crucial for the grasping of this information.* It even explains whether I will take in certain pieces of information as relevant *to myself.* Imagine a male mathematics teacher, for example, who never asks a girl to the blackboard to solve an exercise, whereas he asks boys all the time. Now there is clearly some implicit emotional burden involved here. It might not be clear to him or his students exactly what kind of emotions are in play. In fact he (or many of his students) may fail to appreciate that he has never asked a girl to the blackboard. However, consciously or unconsciously, such illocutions clearly come across as sexist. A girl in that classroom might not relate to this subject at all. Her life, her carrier choice and her self-esteem might be influenced not because she was not offered certain pieces of knowledge, but because the information was distorted from emotions and attitudes that made it less probable for her to relate to the knowledge. Information is taken in by the light of illocutions. Emotions hide in illocutionary acts; they influence the meaning of our utterances and affect the future of our students.

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have tried to use speech acts theory in order to show that there is always an emotional force in our utterances. This emotional force influences the factual information we communicate in the classroom and subsequently the lives of our students. Speech act theory, slightly modified, is an elegant tool that can help analyse the interconnection between cognitive and emotional aspects of our utterances. This is especially important for education. We need to be aware that the information we deliver is constructed in the light of our attitudes towards it, as conveyed within our every utterance.

Speech act theory can also help bring the discussion of our educational aims down to earth. Self-esteem, as well as any perlocutionary effect we wish to provide for our students, is not an abstract goal that we will achieve at the end of our educational practice. Nor does it necessarily depend on the explicit priorities that educational policy imposes. The perlocutionary effects of educations are being built day-by-day, utterance-by-utterance, speech act by speech act.

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NOTES

1. For instances of this on-going dialogue, see Boler, 1999; Brackett and Rivers 2014; Cigman 2001, 2004; Dunlap, 2012; Ecclestone and Hayes, 2008; Goldman, 1999; Griffin, 2012; Griffiths, 1984; Hargreaves, 2005; Kristjansson, 2007; Liston and Garrison, 2004; Morgan, 2015; Pekrun and Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2014; Roberts, 2013; Scheffler, 2010; Schutz and Pekrun, 2007; Smeyers *et al.*, 2007; Smith, 2002; Suissa, 2008; Zembylas and Fendler, 2007.
2. See, for example, Damasio, 1994; De Sousa, 1987; Griffiths, 1984, 1995; Solomon, 1993.
3. There has been a long debate regarding Austin's philosophy of language over the years from different perspectives. See, for example, Alexander and Weinberg, 2007; Dummett, 1978; Fodor and Katz, 1963; Gasparatou, 2008, 2009, 2010ba, 2010b, 2010c, 2013; Hanfling, 2000; Katz and Fodor, 1962; Searle, 1969; Strawson, 1969.
4. Black, 1969, Forguson, 1969, Furberg, 1969 and Graham, 1977 (pp. 53–85), among others, criticise Austin's inability to sharply distinguish the three different acts. I believe however that Austin's point is that they are in fact indistinguishable (Gasparatou, 2005).
5. Many discuss the fragility of the *reason/cognition–emotion* distinction, from very different perspectives. Just for a quick overview, see Damazio, 1994; De Sousa, 1987; Griffiths, 1984, 1995; and Solomon, 1993.
6. Cavell draws a distinction between performatives and passionate utterances on the basis that 'A performative utterance is an offer of participation in the order of law. And perhaps we can say: A passionate utterance is an invitation to improvisation in the disorders of desire' (Cavell, 2006, p. 19). He thus uses the term 'passionate utterance' to talk about certain perlocutionary (rather than illocutionary) effects, which, according to him, Austin neglected (Cavell, 2006, pp. 155–192).
7. According to Solomon, 1993 (pp. 135–136) emotions are the 'preverbal analogues of what Austin called "performatives"—[they] do something in the world rather than simply describe ... a state of affairs'.
8. See also Solomon, 1993 (pp. 226–229).
9. See also Butler's, 1997 and Felman's, 1983 comments on the *speaking body*.
10. See for example: Cigman, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2009; Fulmer *et al.*, 2010; Goetz *et al.*, 2010; Guay, 2010; Ireson and Hallam, 2009; Ross and Beckett, 2000. For a review of the current debate see Crocker and Park, 2004.
11. See also Van Laar, 2000 who tries to interpret the paradox of low academic achievement but high self-esteem in African American students.

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