

Tal Meir Giladi

**Jerusalem Divided:
The Hebrew University's Philosophy Department
Between Rotenstreich and Bar-Hillel**

(Draft: published in *Philosophia* 51 (4): 1949–1976)

Please cite the published version

Students who looked at the announcements posted in the hallways of the Hebrew University's Givat Ram campus in 1959/60 may have noticed posters inviting them to lectures on philosophical themes. There were two main types of such lectures. At meetings organized by the Philosophical Society, talks were delivered on oriental philosophy and the West (E.W. Tomlin), the philosophy of literature and the image of man (Maurice Feldman), a new book by Nathan Rotenstreich, *Spirit and Man* (Rotenstreich and Eugène Jacob Fleischmann), and Plato's *Timaeus* (Joseph Liebes).¹ At meetings of the Israel Society for Logic and the Philosophy of Science, there were talks on finite automata (Michael Rabin), the mechanization of mathematical thought (Abraham Robinson), innovations in combinatorial grammar (Yehoshua Bar-Hillel) and using the WEIZAC computer for statistical sampling (Raphael Bar-On).²

From these examples, it is apparent that the lecture-going public and philosophy students at the Hebrew University were implicitly being called upon to deliberate the merits of, or choose between, two distinct philosophical paths of demarcating the realm of philosophy. Schematically speaking, they were presented with a choice between philosophy conceived as a discipline contiguous with the disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, and philosophy conceived

¹ Publications of the Philosophical Society, January 6, June 8, and November 30, 1960, Central Archive of the Hebrew University (henceforth CAHU), file 2230.

² Reports of the Israel Society for Logic and the Philosophy of Science, October 10, 1959 and June 2, 1960, CAHU file 2230.

as adjacent to the exact and natural sciences. Alternatively, the choice was between philosophy that is deeply engaged with the history of philosophy, and philosophy reputed for taking this history to be a tedious and superfluous burden. These dichotomies were also reflected in the two core courses required for the BA degree in philosophy at the time, courses whose formative impact was particularly pronounced. One was Introduction to the History of Greek Philosophy, taught by the head of the department, Nathan Rotenstreich, who for several years also served as Dean of the Faculty of Humanities, and Rector. The other course, Introduction to Logic, was taught by Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, who also taught in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science in the Faculty of Science.

This divide, which was manifest in the curriculum, was by no means unique to the Hebrew University, but reflected the broader bifurcation between two schools of Western philosophy in the twentieth century. In English-speaking countries, it is generally referred to as the divide between analytic and continental philosophy. What was special about the situation at the Hebrew University, however, was that the split manifested itself in a rather small department, being embodied, basically, in one prominent representative of each school – Rotenstreich and Bar-Hillel – as well as the fact that over many years of working together, the irreconcilability of the views in question remained largely unspoken. Rotenstreich and Bar-Hillel were good friends and avoided doctrinal confrontations. Rather, they taught the disparate philosophical approaches in parallel, leaving it to the students to juxtapose the opposed views, and perhaps choose between them.

This bifurcation, and the two personalities involved, does not fully capture the story of the Philosophy Department's formative years in the Givat Ram campus. Scholars such as Shlomo Pines, Edward Poznanski, Eugène Jacob Fleischmann, Pepita Haezrachi, and Yeshayahu Leibowitz, among others, also taught in the department, presenting students with a variety of emphases and approaches. Nevertheless, in light of their outsize influence on the department's subsequent development, it seems instructive to study this period in the department's history through the lens of the contrasting philosophical outlooks of Rotenstreich and Bar-Hillel. Adding poignancy to the divergence is the fact that both men began their philosophical journeys at the Hebrew University as students of Samuel Hugo Bergmann, but continued his work in different ways. Hence the story of their divergence is to a great extent the story of the second generation of the Hebrew University's Philosophy Department.

This article will focus on some key aspects of the lives and thought of Rotenstreich and Bar-Hillel. It will address their philosophical maturation as Bergmann's students, their views on the goals of twentieth-century philosophy, on the philosopher's role in public life, and the circumstances under which they started teaching in Jerusalem right after the founding of the State of Israel.

1. Two of Bergmann's students

Even during the period of its founders, Leon Roth and Samuel Hugo Bergmann,³ the Philosophy Department placed considerable emphasis on logic and the philosophy of science. It was Bergmann who cultivated these areas, whereas Roth focused chiefly on ethics and political philosophy. From the outset of his philosophical career, Bergmann had taken an interest in, and written on, Bernard Bolzano's logical and mathematical theories (Bergmann 1909). Bolzano, departing from the received view at the time, had sought to develop a logic that was independent of any element of human cognition. To put it differently, Bolzano took logic to be a science that, like mathematics, deals with propositions, without necessarily addressing the ways in which humans think about the world. But Bergmann, who had received a central-European philosophical education, was equally interested in the psychology and epistemology of Franz Brentano, the teacher of Anton Marty, Bergmann's own teacher, at the University of Prague.⁴ In contrast to Bolzano, Brentano devoted most of his research to studying cognition, and sought to provide a first-person description of the workings of human consciousness.

The fact that both these philosophers later became key sources of inspiration for some of the foremost representatives of analytic philosophy, on the one hand, and for Husserl's phenomenology, on the other, did not induce Bergmann to conclude that there was any tension between their views, let alone that they were incompatible. Nor did he see any incongruity between his interest in contemporary developments in physics, and his engagement with Kant's philosophy and late-nineteenth-century neo-Kantianism, or his deepening involvement in Zionist circles. On the contrary, in his books and classes, Bergmann endeavored, as did other philosophers of that

³ On the Philosophy Department in the Roth-Bergmann era, see Gordon, Motzkin 2003.

⁴ Bergmann later published his correspondence with Brentano, see Bergmann 1946.

generation, to bridge the gaps between various worldviews, gaps that some advocates of those views were actively seeking to widen.⁵ Bergmann's eclectic or bridge-building outlook can also be understood as an expression of his commitment to creating a Hebrew-language philosophical canon, viz., translations of, and commentaries on, the masterpieces of philosophy of every stripe, to make them accessible to new generations of Hebrew-speaking readers.

Throughout the 1930s, Roth and Bergmann successfully headed an eclectic philosophy department characterized by a balance between the classic areas with which philosophy has been preoccupied from time immemorial, such as ethics and ontology, and questions arising from new scientific developments. This balance is attested to, for instance, by an examination paper for a study prize in philosophy in the 1935/36 academic year. Alongside questions about ethics ("Is the good good because it is desirable, or is it desirable because it is good?") and the history of philosophy ("Describe the development of the term "idea" in the philosophical literature"), it also has questions about the interface between philosophy and the sciences ("In your opinion, what should the sciences learn from philosophy, and what should philosophy learn from the sciences?"), and questions about eminent twentieth-century philosophers such as Ernst Mach, Henri Poincaré, Émile Meyerson, and Bertrand Russell.⁶ The winner of the study prize that year was Yehoshua Bar-Hillel. He was a first-year student.

A year earlier, Bar-Hillel had left Kibbutz Tirat Zvi, where he had been living since arriving in Mandatory Palestine from Berlin in 1933 in the framework of the Bnei Akiva youth movement, and registered for BA studies at the Hebrew University. Initially he studied chemistry, but upon discovering that he could not tolerate the laboratory odors, he switched to philosophy and mathematics. Even before classes began, he had already encountered the first three volumes of the journal *Erkenntnis* – the organ of logical empiricism – edited by Carnap and Reichenbach. For Bar-Hillel, it was a "revelation" (Bar-Hillel 1964, 1).

Never before had I come across such an unrelenting stride toward clarity and testability in matters philosophical as in the articles of Carnap in these volumes; never before did I see such

⁵ In the mid 1970s, Yirmiyahu Yovel suggested that "If Israel, today, does not suffer from unilateral provincialism, but evinces representation of and familiarity (if not sufficient dialogue) with most philosophical approaches, this is not just due to the land's small dimensions and affinity with various wellsprings of culture, but is to a large extent also due to the actions and attitude of Professor Bergmann" (Yovel 1975).

⁶ Philosophy study prize examination paper, 1935, CAHU, file 227.

a powerful denunciation of metaphysical obscurantism combined with a thorough understanding and analysis of its seductive appeal and with the techniques of combatting this appeal as in the contributions of Carnap, Neurath, Schlick and Reichenbach published there. My future was clear (Bar-Hillel 1964, 7).

In the course of his studies, Bar-Hillel found, in both the philosophy and the mathematics departments, mentors who shared his passion. Foremost among them was Abraham Fraenkel, from the Mathematics Department. In Bar-Hillel's second year, 1936/37, he participated in Fraenkel's seminar on Carnap's *Logical Syntax of Language*.⁷ Retrospectively, he described the seminar as the crucial experience of his student years (Bar-Hillel, 1970, 11). The second key mentor was Bergmann who guided his path – so Bar-Hillel wrote – “like a kind of heavenly providence” (Bar-Hillel, 1970, 11). Bergmann supervised Bar-Hillel's MA thesis on logical antinomies, and later his PhD dissertation, entitled “Theory of Syntactic Categories.” Bar-Hillel started to write his dissertation when he enlisted in the British Army's Palestinian Regiment in 1942. Only after the end of WWII was he able to finish writing it, before once again enlisting, in 1948, this time in the Israeli Army. During the 1948 War, he led an infantry unit in battles for the Katamon and German Colony neighborhoods. While serving as an officer in the Mekor Haim neighborhood, he lost one eye in a grenade explosion.

Despite the good relations between Bar-Hillel and Bergmann, it seems that of the two protégés, it was Rotenstreich who was closest to Bergmann. There was a definite political affinity between Bergmann, who was affiliated with the left-wing Zionist party “Hapoel Hatzair,” and Rotenstreich, who had immigrated to Palestine from Poland with the left-wing Zionist youth movement “Gordonia”. They first met in 1932 when Rotenstreich, at Haim Arlosoroff's suggestion, came to meet Bergmann and discuss the thought of the Zionist spiritual leader A. D. Gordon. The discussion made a profound impression on Rotenstreich (Yovel et al, 1975, 63). That same year Rotenstreich began studying at the Hebrew University. In addition to philosophy, he did minors in Hebrew Literature and Kabbalah. Rotenstreich wrote his PhD dissertation, “The Problem of Substance in Philosophy from Kant to Hegel,” under Bergmann's supervision, receiving his doctorate in 1938. A year later, the dissertation was published.

⁷ Carnap's *Logische Syntax der Sprache* was published in English as *Logical Syntax of Language* (1937).

In what was surely their most significant scholarly collaboration, Bergmann and Rotenstreich worked together, beginning in the early 1940s, on Hebrew translations of the classic philosophical canon. Among these works were Salomon Maimon's *Essay on Transcendental Philosophy* (published in 1941) and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (published in 1954). Rotenstreich drafted the translations, which were then edited and annotated by Rotenstreich and Bergmann jointly (Yovel et al, 1975, 65). This collaborative effort ultimately yielded, among other works, translations of all Kant's major writings. Alongside Joseph Liebes's translations of Plato's works, it constituted the period's most valuable contribution to the creation of a Hebrew-language philosophical style and vocabulary, a considerable feat given that there had been little linguistic innovation in this realm since the Middle Ages.⁸

Their joint project strengthened the bonds between Bergmann and Rotenstreich. In 1944, Rotenstreich, together with Martin Buber, edited a festschrift honoring his teacher on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. Three years later, together with Hans Jonas, Rotenstreich took over Bergmann's duties temporarily when Bergmann was abroad.⁹ The esteem was mutual. In 1944, in recommending to the university's Rector, Leo Mayer, that Rotenstreich, who was in the midst of writing *Jewish Thought in the Modern Era*, be awarded a scholarship, Bergmann had asserted: "Of all our graduate students in philosophy, he is thus far the only one who received his doctoral degree and immediately afterwards continued on to new scholarly work, and who devotes all his free time to scholarly work." Bergmann's recommendation ended with the following comment: "I would be happy were I to know that Dr. Rotenstreich would find his place within the university and someday take my place."¹⁰

2. On the Mission of Philosophy

A fruitful way to pinpoint the differences between the philosophical outlooks of Bar-Hillel and Rotenstreich is to examine their respective views on the question of the tasks facing twentieth-century philosophy. Granted, their views did not remain static. However, comparison of the two thinkers' early writings on this matter reveals several salient differences between their respective approaches. Whereas initially, Bar-Hillel took philosophy to be ancillary to the sciences,

⁸ On the translation project, compare Chowers 2017.

⁹ Bergmann to Dean of Humanities, June 1, 1947, CAHU, file 2279.

¹⁰ Bergmann to Rector Mayer, July 19, 1944, CAHU, personal file, Rotenstreich.

Rotenstreich saw it as a national-educational project. In his 1939 article “Logical Empiricism,” Bar-Hillel explained that the mission of philosophy was to construct, with purely logical-mathematical syntax, a language that could meet the needs of the experimental sciences. In *Jewish Thought in the Modern Era* (1945-1950), Rotenstreich discussed the role played by philosophy in exploring the connection between present and past, and in particular, in investigating the connection between modern Jewish existence and the history of Jewish thought.

2.1. Bar-Hillel’s thought as articulated in his article “Logical Empiricism”

Bar-Hillel’s scholarly contributions were not limited to philosophy. He also published widely in mathematics, linguistics, and computer science, his greatest contribution to the latter being in the realm of machine translation. His 1959 claim that computers would be unable to generate high-quality translations, and to do so would always require human assistance, is still acknowledged as one of the realm’s foundational principles.¹¹ Despite his insistence that he had never strayed too far from philosophy – as, for example, when he asserted that he took his work on machine translation to be a test case of computers’ ability to execute a complete formalization of natural languages (Bar-Hillel 1964, 7) – the lion’s share of his academic achievements were in fields other than philosophy. In philosophy itself, he took positions that were connected, in principle, to his early adoption of the tenets of logical empiricism, especially the theses put forward by Carnap, and to his gradual disenchantment with them as time wore on.

Despite having been written just a year after he completed his MA studies, Bar-Hillel’s article “New Philosophy,” (Bar Hillel, 1970)¹² published in 1939 in the literary journal *Moznaim*, offers a strikingly accessible presentation of the goals of the school of thought that had captured his philosophical interest. Of Bar-Hillel’s many writings, this article most clearly articulates his basic stance on philosophy’s bifurcation into two schools. It also presents an explicit definition of what he took to be philosophy’s mission. The fact that in 1970, the article was reprinted, under the title “Logical Empiricism,” as a chapter of his book *Logic, Language and Method*, attests that although his views shifted after 1939, Bar-Hillel nonetheless saw this article as an important element of his

¹¹ Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, *Report on the State of Machine Translation in the United States and Great Britain*, Technical report no. 1, 15 February 1959 (Jerusalem). Prepared for the U.S. Office of Naval Research, Information Systems Branch, under contract No. NONR-2578(00). N.R. 049-130. Compare: Hutchins 2000.

¹² Originally: Bar-Hillel 1940. Reprinted in Bar-Hillel 1970.

thought. Indeed, the changes his views underwent can be more readily understood against the backdrop of this seminal article.

The article's main thrust is a survey and critique of the development of logical empiricism, which was an important stratum in the first generation of analytic philosophy. It discusses the various attempts by proponents of logical empiricism to use mathematical logic to solve problems in the empirical sciences. From the perspective of logical empiricism's main proponents, mathematical logic was the appropriate foundation for the construction of a new language, a scientific language characterized by logical-mathematical syntax. In contrast to natural languages, whose syntax permits self-contradictory sentences and sentences that lack meaning and content (the square is round, the soul is a prime number, etc.), the new language would make it possible to formulate scientific propositions clearly, precisely, and unambiguously.

The title – “Logical Empiricism” – merits scrutiny. Empiricism is the philosophical approach whose basic premise is that the senses are the source of knowledge about reality. By contrast, logic is the science that examines and evaluates arguments and conclusions, without connection to their truth-values. Bar-Hillel, who was unapologetic about taking only limited interest in the history of philosophy, nonetheless opens the article with a description of the historical tension between empiricism and logic: “The history of philosophy after the Middle Ages – and maybe before as well – is the history of a stubborn and many-faceted war between advocates of dogma and reason (*ratio*), on the one hand, and advocates of experience and doubt, on the other” (Bar Hillel, 1970, 197). This description is intended to remind readers that throughout history, logicians – say, Leibniz – have often examined and evaluated arguments and conclusions, within frameworks Bar-Hillel refers to as “dogmatic,” for example, those intended to solve metaphysical problems regarding God and the soul. By contrast, the empiricists' commitment to knowledge arrived at through the senses, steered them away from involvement with supernatural matters, and toward the advancement of science.

But Bar-Hillel did not mandate choosing between abstract logic and empirical science. His objective was to emphasize how, in calling for the development of a logic that would meet the needs of the empirical sciences, logical empiricism constituted an integration of the two rival trends. Bar-Hillel compared this integration to the fulfilment of Descartes' and Leibniz' rationalist dreams of a “logical calculus” that would make it possible to solve every philosophical problem. Notwithstanding the seventeenth century philosophers' dreams, the logical empiricists did not see

the “logical calculus” as a means of solving problems in the metaphysical realm, such as problems regarding God and the soul, but rather problems in the empirical realm, such as problems in physics and chemistry.

Construction of a new language for science had an additional objective. From the perspective of the logical empiricists, the new language was also intended to be a means of eliminating metaphysics, which would be unable to formulate its claims in the new language. The new language would thus be a touchstone of truth, helping to spot invalid arguments and making internal contradictions explicit. Bar-Hillel joined the pursuit of this objective and became active in the logical empiricist project’s critical and polemical endeavors. This is particularly salient in his discussion of Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology, which Bar-Hillel viewed as “altogether vacuous verbiage.”

This comment echoes Carnap’s harsh critique of Heidegger. In “The Elimination of Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language,” published in *Erkenntnis* in 1931, Carnap claimed that putting Heidegger’s sentences to the logical-syntactical test would lead to the conclusion that they were meaningless. As an example, Carnap analyzed Heidegger’s claim that “the Nothing nothings,” a claim made in “What is Philosophy?” (Heidegger, 1956). I cannot go into the substance of Heidegger’s article, which discusses the feelings of anxiety that arise when we think about “the Nothing,” and will only note that Heidegger put forward his claim that “the Nothing itself nihilates” in this context, connecting it to another claim, namely, his claim that our discovery of the Nothing is a terrifying event. Carnap too was uninterested in trying to understand Heidegger’s words, but simply asserted that they were totally meaningless. Apropos Heidegger’s claim that “the Nothing nothings,” for instance, Carnap stated that it was meaningless simply because the word “nothing” is not a noun, and therefore cannot serve as a sentence’s subject.

As is evident from his discussion of Heidegger, Bar-Hillel shared Carnap’s critique of Heidegger’s problematic formulations, yet at the same time, it should be noted that when Bar-Hillel wrote his article in 1939, the logical empiricists, and among them, Bar-Hillel, had already retreated from these strong claims about meaninglessness. The thesis that there is a single foundational syntax, any deviation from which renders an expression meaningless, did not withstand criticism for long. According to Bar-Hillel, it was Carnap’s own theory of conventionalism, introduced in *The Logical Syntax of Language*, that dealt a death blow to the grandiosity of claims that the impossibility of metaphysics could be proven. According to Carnap’s

theory, in every realm of knowledge, questions about meaning can only be decided within a linguistic framework that has been agreed upon beforehand, but there is no external basis for preferring one framework to another. Hence the Heideggerian propositions in question are meaningful, though their meanings exist only within the framework of Heidegger's discussion. Bar-Hillel contends that the relativism inherent in this position suffices to undermine most of the metaphysical systems that aspire to absolute truth, but admits that the hope of eliminating metaphysics once and for all by way of a direct proof had been thwarted. In Bar-Hillel's words, the goal to which philosophy aspires is the following:

The more modest goal of constructing a language of science has thus taken the place of the elimination of metaphysics. In working toward the ideal language, the empiricist has learned to formulate his demands of future languages more precisely, and to more fully process the syntactic rules of these languages, which will enable him to draw nearer to the problem that should be the center of his attention. After having purified the foundations of the sciences of any prejudice, any inheritance from the speculative past, the problem of *the unification of the sciences* comes into view (Bar Hillel, 1970, 212).

In hindsight, years later, Bar-Hillel acknowledged his overblown evaluation of mathematical logic's potential for solving philosophical problems, and even retracted his claim that metaphysical problems were pseudo-problems. In 1964, he preferred to put the matter differently: "Most of these problems are bogus and deceptive formulations of serious – even extremely serious – problems" (Bar Hillel, 1970, 9). In fact, Bar-Hillel, on whom Chomsky's linguistic theories had made a profound impression, now began to critique Carnap for restricting his analysis, from the start, to the language of science, and thereby in effect forgoing examination of the validity of inferences in ordinary language. Bar-Hillel would dub this disregarding of natural language the "logicians' betrayal," and would compare the insistence on working solely on mathematical languages to the proverbial drunkard looking for his lost housekeys under the nearby streetlight (Bar Hillel, 1970, 112).¹³

At the same time, Bar-Hillel's iconoclastic approach and ongoing attacks on traditional philosophizing did not wane even much later on in his intellectual evolution (Margalit, 1990). At

¹³ Originally: Bar-Hillel 1963/64. Reprinted in Bar-Hillel 1970.

some points it even seemed as if his involvement in this conflict was accompanied by a deep contempt for his adversaries. For instance, Bar-Hillel refused to engage in direct dialogue with Meshulam Groll, one of Rotenstreich's students, who in an article published in *Iyyun* had declared that "traditional logic cannot define Hegelian logic" (Groll 1961). Bar-Hillel explained this stance in a brief response to the article: "Groll's article does not satisfy what I deem to be the preconditions for rational debate" (Bar-Hillel 1962). Bar-Hillel's conduct thus clearly diverged from the accepted norms of academic discussion. In essence, Bar-Hillel was not claiming that he disagreed with the views held by colleagues such as Groll, but rather that what they were teaching was utterly meaningless.

2.2. Rotenstreich's thought as articulated in his book *Jewish Thought in the Modern Era*

The breadth of Rotenstreich's writing was immense. His publications in Hebrew include no fewer than forty-four books and booklets, and over a thousand scholarly and newspaper articles. His publications in other languages, primarily English, include forty books and some 250 articles.¹⁴ Rotenstreich wrote – and typically, dictated – confidently and with ease. This enabled him, in addition to writing ongoing newspaper pieces on matters of concrete political import, to address an extremely broad range of subjects, including virtually every sphere of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics, from the philosophy of history to psychology. At the same time, it might be claimed that this prolificacy sometimes had an adverse effect on the cogency of his arguments. Furthermore, Rotenstreich rarely discussed methodology – specifically, how he arrived at his conclusions – a practice that often made his works, especially those on epistemology, very hard to decipher.

Rotenstreich's two-volume *Jewish Thought in the Modern Era* (1945, 1950), written early in his career, contains a clear articulation of several key principles of his approach. The work, undertaken with Bergmann's encouragement, as well as that of senior figures in the Zionist leadership, such as Berl Katznelson, presents comprehensive studies of Jewish philosophers, mostly German, from Moses Mendelsohn to Hermann Cohen and Franz Rosenzweig. Analysis of the thought of A.D. Gordon, to whom Rotenstreich had been drawn from an early age, also receives attention. In fact, despite declaring, when he finished the project, that he was leaving Jewish thought in order to devote himself to general philosophy, his initial conclusions reappear, and are

¹⁴ For Rotenstreich's full bibliography: Galron-Goldschlager 2010.

further developed, in a number of his later books, including *Between Past and Present: an Essay on History* (1958), and *On Jewish Existence in the Present* (1972). Chief among these conclusions is the idea that to understand contemporary Jewish existence, the present generation must be well-versed in the past, in the philosophy and traditions of Judaism, but need not necessarily live in accordance with them. Here we see Rotenstreich's more general idea that the present has interpretive dominion over the past.

At the beginning of *Jewish Thought in the Modern Era*, Rotenstreich describes the historical situation Jewish philosophy finds itself in. Jewish philosophy, the traditional framework for which was the Jewish religion, has in modernity become a means of understanding the Jewish nation. Rotenstreich argues that in the modern era, Jews could no longer make do with "naïve tradition" vis-à-vis their understanding of Judaism. Their very existence in the modern world obliged them to acknowledge various truths that were incompatible with the principles of their faith. Jews were therefore compelled to recognize that their religion was not the sole true religion, but rather one religious phenomenon among many that had developed, and sometimes died out, over the course of history. They were also compelled to recognize that religions are human creations – to be exact, national creations – or, as Rotenstreich put it, borrowing a Hegelian trope, creations of the "spirit of the nation" (*Volkgeist*). As a result, Jews began to evaluate their religion in accordance with non-traditional criteria, specifically, philosophical criteria. Ultimately, the secular-philosophical study of Judaism became, Rotenstreich claims, the principal route taken by Jews seeking to understand their spiritual world and national identity.

In the framework of this study, modern Jews found much that was relevant to them in historical Jewish thought. They found, for instance, that it embodied moral imperatives that were part of what Rotenstreich would later term the Jewish "spirit," (Rotenstreich 1963) spirit being a community's set of norms, or what could be regarded as its culture. Rotenstreich demonstrated the power of such secular-philosophical study of Jewish thought mainly in the second volume of *Jewish Thought*, most of which highlighted Jewish thought as a source of ethics in the writings of Samuel David Luzzatto, Hermann Cohen, and A.D. Gordon. The following passage, composed of quotations from A.D. Gordon that Rotenstreich selected and threaded together, aptly illustrates Rotenstreich's approach:

Our religion is not, like the religion of the European peoples, of alien origin, but is the creation of our national spirit. Our religion permeates our national spirit, and our national spirit is to be found in every part of our religion. To such a point is this true that it is perhaps not too much to say that our religion is our national spirit itself, only in a form that has come down to us from primeval times [...] “You shall be holy, for I, the Lord your God, am holy” is not a new worldview but a new relation of man to himself [...] If we look at Judaism, we must note one thing – all morality, all of religion, all of man’s world, is based on man as the image of God within man (Rotenstreich 1950, 281).¹⁵

Yet upon reading *Jewish Thought*, we see that beyond the comprehensive studies of Jewish thinkers that comprise its content, the theoretical study of Jewish philosophy also has a practical purpose. First of all, according to Rotenstreich, the book has the potential to make us aware of real-life questions, to demonstrate their significance, and to provide the impetus for resolving them (Rotenstreich 1950, 6). In addressing the objectives of studying Jewish thought, at the end of the book, which was completed shortly after the end of the 1948 War, Rotenstreich acknowledges that the Jewish philosophical tradition did not give Jews – and could not have given them – tools to cope with the disasters and historical challenges they faced in the twentieth century, especially during the 1940s, when the book was written. From his perspective, the purpose of Jewish philosophy is not to provide the Jewish people with practical principles, religious or other. Rather, it is to provide a body of historical thought from which they can draw meaning and inspiration, or in other words, to provide material from which a shared national-secular identity can be forged. That is, the contemporary Jew’s connection to Judaism no longer need be based on upholding commandments, but can be based on indirect inspiration from the philosophical reflections of Jewish thinkers throughout the ages, which, indeed, also animates what Rotenstreich takes to be the Jewish people’s contemporary project – Zionism.

We have been allowed to feel that Jewish history itself, human reality itself, the events and the terror of looming dangers, are together part of the secret of the Jew. And if we need the metaphysics of Jewish history, what is needed is not a metaphysics that will survey the overall

¹⁵ Gordon’s quotations are from Eges’s edition of *Gordon’s Writings* (1939, 125, 1940, 124, 1941, 200).

temporal duration of the events, including both high points and low, but a metaphysics that will be attuned to the rhythm of actions and happenings (Rotenstreich 1950, 295).

In attending to Rotenstreich's formulations, it becomes apparent that his understanding of the relation here termed "inspiration," and elsewhere termed "affinity," "hold upon," and so forth, is not unequivocal. But his metaphorical phrasing, according to which Jewish philosophy is only "attuned to" the enterprise of Jewish national revival, but does not speak, enables us to understand the relation Rotenstreich demarcates between past and present. As Rotenstreich sees this relation, even though the past imparts meaning to the present, that meaning is determined by the individuals taking action in the present.¹⁶

Indeed, Rotenstreich was a prominent ideologue of left-wing secular Zionism that sought, like other modern nationalist movements, to anchor its contemporary existence in national history and thought, without commitment to any religious dictates. At the same time, it should be noted that Rotenstreich's views, which were perceived in Israel as left-wing, could, in the context of general political philosophy, be categorized as conservative. First, given the importance Rotenstreich accords to "the spirit of the nation" in human history, his views could be classed as falling under right-wing Hegelianism. Secondly, they could be classed as in line with the broader conservative worldview, which regards tradition as the indispensable foundation for existence in the present. A pre-eminent representative of this approach is Michael Oakeshott, whose works Rotenstreich taught and quoted frequently.

Before summarizing this section, it will be helpful to add a few words about Eugène Jacob Fleischmann, who taught in Jerusalem alongside Rotenstreich in the 1950s, but focused on very different aspects of the philosophy that was prevalent in Europe at that time. Fleischmann, who had also studied under Bergmann, completed his doctoral studies in 1951 with a dissertation on "The Problem of Christianity in Nineteenth-Century Jewish Philosophy." But it was not due to his scholarly work on this subject that Fleischmann occupied a special place in the world of Israeli philosophy. Rather, it was because Fleischmann became the first philosopher to lecture on French existentialism in Jerusalem. Early in 1949, Fleischmann gave a talk on the thought of Jean Paul Sartre, who was much acclaimed at the time, at a Philosophical Society meeting. The audience

¹⁶ Compare to Bareli, Gorny 2007.

responded enthusiastically.¹⁷ Like Bar-Hillel, and unlike Rotenstreich, Fleischmann took an up-to-date approach to philosophy, an approach that was attuned, in real time, to developments in the major hubs of world philosophy. Consequently, throughout the 1950s, Fleischmann was very popular with students who took an interest in twentieth-century French philosophy, and set their sights on Paris, considering it – especially in light of the Nazis’ atrocities and the spiritual and physical destruction of Germany – the center of world philosophy. In 1958 Fleischmann became a Research Fellow at the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), where he worked chiefly on Hegel’s philosophy.¹⁸ He left the Hebrew University officially at the end of 1962. Fleischmann returned to Israel in 1967, and accepted a position at Tel-Aviv University. Until his retirement, he divided his time between Paris and Tel-Aviv.

In Tel-Aviv, Fleischmann, who had moved away from existentialism, did not enjoy the same popularity with his students that he had when teaching in Jerusalem. It seems reasonable to conjecture that had he remained at the Hebrew University, Fleischmann could have continued to mediate between Paris and Jerusalem. There were several reasons such mediation was needed. For one thing, Rotenstreich and Bar-Hillel were both originally students of German philosophy, and furthermore, most of their scholarly connections were with universities in Britain and the United States. For another, in contrast to the preceding generation, in the 1950s and 1960s, the second language of most students in the Philosophy Department was English. Given this simple fact, over the years a significant advantage accrued to Bar-Hillel and representatives of Anglo-American philosophy. With a small number of exceptions, notably Rotenstreich’s student Yirmiyahu Yovel, the Jerusalemites did not pay much attention to the momentous philosophical work being done in France during this period.

2.3. Interim Summary

There is a close link between Bar-Hillel’s and Rotenstreich’s conceptions of philosophy’s mission, and their attitudes to the history of philosophy. Bar-Hillel rejects any philosophical approach that does not satisfy the criteria of the modern scientific outlook; this attitude is particularly pronounced in his early thought. Rotenstreich’s attitude to previous philosophical approaches is more accepting, acknowledging the value of things that no longer have direct relevance to contemporary

¹⁷ The lecture was later published: Fleischmann 1949.

¹⁸ Fleischmann’s French book on Hegel’s political philosophy remains popular: Fleischmann 1992.

life. We also saw that due to its robust connection to science, Bar-Hillel's philosophy is characterized by universality; nationality and religion have no place in it. In this regard, Rotenstreich's attitude is more complex: universal philosophy is valuable in itself, but also serves as a tool for clarifying national philosophy and history, and what our relation to them should be. As will soon be evident, these attitudes proved to be relevant to the two thinkers' respective stances on the question of the philosopher's role in public life.

3. Changing of the Guard at the Philosophy Department

The philosophical coming-of-age of Bar-Hillel and Rotenstreich took place against the background of considerable change at the Hebrew University. After the 1948 War, the university's status shifted: from a small academic institution serving the Jewish community of Mandatory Palestine, it became the only general university in the independent State of Israel, whose population was growing rapidly. Though forced to leave its campus on Mt. Scopus and move into buildings scattered around the western half of the city, the Hebrew University's enrollment had increased dramatically. Between the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1960s, the student population grew more than eight-fold. The Faculty of Humanities experienced a similar burgeoning.¹⁹

Given the expansion that followed the end of the 1948 War, as well as the mass immigration from Europe and the Middle East, it became imperative to recruit lecturers to meet the university's growing needs. This was the case in all the institutes and faculties, but the challenge was especially acute in the Philosophy Department, where, due to a unique confluence of events, the task of recruiting faculty involved finding replacements for all the department's professors. In 1950, the Hebrew University's Executive Committee had approved a third professorial position for the Philosophy Department, in addition to the existing positions of the department's founders, Leon Roth and S.H. Bergmann.²⁰ As Roth would leave the university in 1953, and Bergmann was expected to retire in 1955, the appointees of the early 1950s would determine the department's composition and character until the end of the 1960s. The first generation of the Philosophy

¹⁹ Compare: Cohen, 2006, 195-196.

²⁰ Executive Committee meeting, September 9, 1950, CAHU, file 2279.

Department, the generation of the founders, was about to step down, and among its remaining tasks was the recruitment of suitable successors.

From the perspective of the body responsible for the appointments – namely, the Philosophy Committee, whose dominant figures were Bergmann and Poznanski,²¹ though there were frequent changes in the makeup of the committee – the priority was recruitment of lecturers from abroad. Most of the names suggested during the committee’s meetings were promising Jewish philosophers from universities in Europe and the United States. Several among them, such as Hans Jonas,²² Isaiah Berlin,²³ Erich Weil,²⁴ Emmanuel Levinas,²⁵ and Leo Strauss,²⁶ were to become influential philosophers. The committee members hoped that the trips abroad undertaken by Bergmann, Poznanski, and Gershom Scholem to feel out and win over the potential candidates would bear fruit, and at least one of the candidates would agree to make Israel his home, as Roth and Bergmann had – even if only out of sympathy for the Zionist project. But most of the candidates declined to come to Jerusalem. Jonas and Strauss, who did come, and even began teaching, did so only for brief periods, and soon went back to positions at universities in the United States.²⁷ A few years later, Edward Poznanski offered the following explanation for the failure of these recruitment efforts.

Suffice it to say that the salaries paid here [in the US] to faculty are at least four or five times higher than those paid in Israel, and here it is claimed that these salaries are low [. . .] If we add to this the difficult conditions for conducting scientific research, Israel’s distance from the world’s scientific centers, and the large sums that must be spent to travel abroad, it is clear that a scholar of high standing (and that’s primarily who we’re talking about) would have to be very enamored of Israel to abandon his prestigious position and immigrate to Israel in order to take up the life of a pioneer. We can preach Zionism, but it won’t help.²⁸

²¹ The Philosophy Committee was the body authorized to recommend, subject to the university’s approval, curricular changes and new appointments within the Philosophy Department.

²² Philosophy Committee meeting, September 24, 1950, CAHU, file 2279.

²³ Philosophy Committee meeting, May 26, 1952, CAHU, file 2279.

²⁴ Philosophy Committee meeting, December 4, 1952, CAHU, file 2279.

²⁵ Philosophy Committee meeting, December 9, 1954, CAHU, file 2279.

²⁶ Strauss to Aviram, 1953 (date unspecified), CAHU, file 2279.

²⁷ Jonas’s departure, which he ascribed to the terrible economic situation in Israel at the time, was perceived by his friend Gershom Scholem as a betrayal of Zionism. See Wiese 2007, 53-55.

²⁸ Poznanski to Dean Polotsky, February 9, 1955, CAHU, file 2279.

Bergmann came to a similar conclusion: “I don’t think there’s any chance that teachers who currently hold positions at universities abroad will come here. I’m of the opinion that we’ll have to find the requisite faculty ourselves.”²⁹ In fact, the external circumstances were in line with Bergmann’s intentions. The Philosophy Department had, up to that point, conferred doctoral degrees on just four students. Only two of the four remained in touch with the department upon completion of their studies – Rotenstreich and Bar-Hillel. The two young PhD’s were both Bergmann’s students. As already mentioned, Leon Roth, the Philosophy Department’s founder, left Israel in 1953.³⁰ But even before leaving, Roth had stopped attending meetings of the university’s Philosophy Committee. Roth’s gradual withdrawal from active participation in the activities of the Philosophy Department put Bergmann in a position of significant influence vis-à-vis anything connected to the appointment of his successors.

Bergmann’s intent, in this regard, had been evident in a 1944 letter, quoted above, to the university’s rector, in which he expressed the hope that Rotenstreich would one day inherit his position. Moreover, by the early 1950s Rotenstreich was a prolific philosopher, and had begun to involve himself in university affairs. Indeed, he had already, in the late 1940s, published a number of articles that directly addressed university affairs. In these articles, he alternates between defending the university’s independence against attempts by other national institutions to exercise control over it (Rotenstreich 1946), and exhorting its intellectuals to play a more active role in the governance and guidance of the budding State (Rotenstreich 1948, 1949).³¹ The articles were perceived, on the one hand, as defending Bergmann and Bergmann’s friends in the far left “Brit Shalom” (and later, “Ichud”) organizations from attempts to silence them, and on the other hand, as critical of their dissenting stance.³² Rotenstreich’s ambivalent approach, which straddled defense and critique, rendered him representative of the upcoming generation of intellectuals, whose position was more nationalistic than that of the preceding generation, but remained faithful to the principle of the university’s independence.

²⁹ Bergmann to Dean Polotsky, December 39, 1954, CAHU, file 2279.

³⁰ Roth preferred not to spell out his reasons for leaving the university and the country. In his eulogy for Roth, Bergmann suggested that Roth had left the country in the wake of the shock of the Dir Yassin massacre, adding that “Zionism has lost a loyal son, who, out of loyalty to his idea of Judaism, and the searing pain that ensued because Zionism as actualized in the State did not accord with the image he bore in his heart, left Israel and became a *yored* [an emigrant from Israel], and in truth became, after having agonizingly uprooted his soul from the soil of the homeland, a wandering Jew” (Bergmann 1963).

³¹ Compare to the comprehensive discussion in Cohen 2006, 184-193.

³² Few developments in the histories of Israel’s universities have interested scholars as much as the activities of the “Brit Shalom” and “Ichud” movements, the literature on which is extensive. Worthy of note here is Ben-Israel 2009.

In addition to participating in this debate, Rotenstreich was involved in activities promoting the interests of the university. For instance, when he was invited to be a research fellow at the University of Chicago in 1949, he contacted the Chicago chapter of the Friends of the Hebrew University, as well as Werner Senator, the Hebrew University's Vice-President, and offered to help organize a summer seminar at the Hebrew University for American scholars. He also relayed names of individuals, families, and communities that might potentially donate to the university or assist in its development efforts.³³ For all these reasons, Rotenstreich was a leading candidate to inherit Bergmann's position. His candidacy gained the support of members of the Philosophy Committee, and in 1951 he was appointed a Lecturer in the Philosophy Department. When Bergmann retired in 1955, Rotenstreich became one of the first graduates of the Hebrew University to be appointed a full professor. At the same time, he also took on the role of Head of the Philosophy Department.

During this period, Bar-Hillel's academic career was unfolding quite differently. He too had received a research fellowship at the University of Chicago, but in contrast to Rotenstreich, Bar-Hillel had fully integrated into the American academic research scene. In the autumn of 1950, he met Carnap, the philosopher he most admired, for the first time, and began working closely with him. Initially, their joint work focused on information theory.³⁴ In the spring of 1951, he was offered a research position at the Research Laboratory of Electronics at MIT and ended up staying there for over two years. While at MIT, Bar-Hillel set aside his philosophical pursuits and began working on machine translation, or to put it differently, on the nexus between computer science and linguistics. As pointed out above, Bar-Hillel did some of the earliest and most important research in the field of machine translation, which was growing rapidly at the time due to the enormous budgets allocated for its development by the US Department of Defense with a view to facilitating military intelligence efforts in the Cold War context. Bar-Hillel described his MIT years as the most stimulating and creative times he had experienced up to that point (Bar-Hillel 1964, 6).³⁵

³³ Rotenstreich to Senator, May 7, 1949, CAHU, personal file, Rotenstreich.

³⁴ This work came to fruition in Rudolf Carnap and Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, *An Outline of the Theory of Semantic Information*, Technical Report no. 247, Research Laboratory of Electronics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1952.

³⁵ Compare: Hutchins, 2000.

During his time at MIT, Bar-Hillel corresponded with Bergmann and Poznanski about their proposal that he return to the Hebrew University. Bar-Hillel, who was quite content in the United States, accepted the proposal, but also stipulated various conditions. These conditions are referred to in a letter Bar-Hillel wrote to Poznanski in January 1952, in which he listed the courses he was willing to teach, emphasized that he intended to organize them in accordance with the format used at Yale and Harvard universities, and added that “if this isn’t enough for one position out of the three to four positions that we’ll have, and for the 3,000 students we’ll have in 1953/1954 – *it’s just too bad.*” In the continuation of the letter, Bar-Hillel explained his reluctance to lengthen his publications list in order to get the position. “I am hereby declaring explicitly that I will not write a book solely in order to get a position. 95% of philosophy books are such that it would have been better had they not been written, and I have no intention of adding to them. I’ll write a book when I think that I’ve completed a research project, to the extent that apprising the public of its findings and methodologies would be worthwhile.”³⁶

A year after this correspondence, the Philosophy Committee, with Bergmann’s encouragement, recommended Bar-Hillel’s appointment as a Lecturer, despite Scholem’s concerns that Bar-Hillel represented “a one-sided approach to the problems of philosophy” and “it would be undesirable for that particular approach to gain dominance over the discipline.”³⁷ Bar-Hillel’s appointment was approved in February 1953. He began teaching in the department as a Lecturer in 1953, and was appointed a Professor in 1955. Along with the latter appointment, the university administration also accepted Bergmann’s recommendation that a new academic unit devoted to the philosophy of science be established for Bar-Hillel within the Faculty of Science.³⁸ Headed by Bar-Hillel, the Department of the History and Philosophy of Science was inaugurated in 1957.

The unfolding of these events attests that considerable resolve on the part of the main players, as well as a certain amount of luck, had in fact come together to bring about an outcome that might

³⁶ Bar-Hillel to Poznanski, January 13, 1952, CAHU, personal file, Bar-Hillel.

³⁷ Senate meeting minutes, session 4, January 14, 1953, CAHU, file 2279. Paul Weiss, a Yale University philosopher who often served as an external referee for the Philosophy Department regarding academic appointments, expressed the following concerns about Bar-Hillel’s appointment: “Bar-Hillel raises a problem confronting philosophy departments throughout the world. He belongs to the technically trained, skeptically minded, precise and well-ordered but quite ignorant philosophers who have made a speciality of logic, linguistics, scientific method, and mathematics, but know little and care less about anything else normally associated with the idea of philosophy” (Weiss to Dean Polotsky, January 7, 1955, CAHU, file 2279).

³⁸ Philosophy Committee meeting, February 21, 1955, CAHU, file 2279.

appear to have been inevitable, namely, that the split that emerged in twentieth-century philosophy was also manifested in Jerusalem.

Once the transition to the new generation was complete – Bergmann having retired, and Rotenstreich and Bar-Hillel having been appointed in his place – it became evident that whereas one of Bergmann’s philosophical goals had been to bridge the gap between the two schools of thought, his successors positioned themselves squarely on opposite sides of the divide, and felt no need to bridge the gap. A good illustration of the situation is provided by Bar-Hillel’s critical review of Bergmann’s 1953 *Introduction to Logic*, which appeared in *Iyyun* right before Bergmann’s retirement.

One of the principal tasks that Professor Bergmann sought to accomplish in the book before us was to mend the tear that has in recent years arisen between two streams in logical theory, viz., the “philosophical” stream and the “mathematical-symbolic” stream. There is no doubt that the author is more qualified to undertake this than many others. Nevertheless, it seems to me that he has not succeeded in bringing adequate proof of his thesis that “formal” logic requires supplementation by “content-based” (or “transcendental”) logic (Bar-Hillel 1955, 25).

The opening of the Department of the History and Philosophy of Science in 1957 can also be understood from this perspective. In addition to implementing Bergmann’s proposal from 1955, the new department served to resolve the substantive scholarly differences that had begun to break out between Rotenstreich and Bar-Hillel. In a short exchange of letters from 1954, Bar-Hillel had suggested allowing students majoring in mathematics or science and minoring in philosophy to be tested on philosophy of science rather than ethics and political philosophy.³⁹ Rotenstreich opposed this and compared forgoing the study of ethics to “forgoing [observance of the Jewish precept of] tallit and tefillin.”⁴⁰ As to Bar-Hillel’s suggestion that MA students be allowed to focus on philosophy of language, Rotenstreich replied: “I fear that what Yehoshua is suggesting is that a

³⁹ Bar-Hillel to Philosophy Department teaching staff, June 23, 1954, CAHU, file 2279.

⁴⁰ Rotenstreich to Philosophy Department teaching staff, June 29, 1954, CAHU, file 2279.

certain school of thought be taught, and it is uncertain whether it should be seen as philosophy or linguistics.”⁴¹

Bar-Hillel’s suggestions were rejected. Yet opening the Department of the History and Philosophy of Science, where students could focus exclusively on these areas, succeeded, on the one hand, in facilitating a philosophical-scientific orientation, and preventing disputes among the Philosophy Department’s teaching staff, and on the other, in strengthening the eclectic profile of philosophical engagement in Jerusalem.⁴² Students who studied in the department during the 1950s thus necessarily took courses on both the history of philosophy and the new philosophy of science. The undergraduate curriculum required courses on the history of ancient philosophy and the history of modern philosophy, in one of which they had to take an exam, and so too it required passing an exam in three of the following four courses: logic, epistemology, methodology of science, and ethics and political philosophy. Beyond that, students were offered a broad range of courses and seminars. Examples include: “Problems in the Philosophy of History” and “Kant” (Rotenstreich); “Mathematical Logic” and “Philosophy of Language” (Bar-Hillel); “Reading *The Guide for the Perplexed*” and “Philosophy after Aristotle” (Pines); “Aesthetics” and “Readings in Greek Philosophy” (Haezrachi); “Reading Carnap’s *Logical Syntax of Language*” and “Introduction to the Philosophy of Science” (Poznanski); “Twentieth-Century Philosophy” and “Sartre” (Fleischmann); “Philosophical Problems in the Natural Sciences” and “Mind and Body” (Leibowitz); “Dialogic Philosophy from Kierkegaard to Buber” and “Hegel’s *Logic*” (Bergmann). Noteworthy courses were also given by professors from other departments, such as “Discussions on Taoist Texts” (Buber) and “Fundamental Problems in Lurianic Kabbalah” (Scholem); and by visiting professors: “Introduction to the Philosophy of Politics” (Erich Weil) and “Political Philosophy” (Leo Strauss).⁴³

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² In a 1983 interview, Rotenstreich mentioned these considerations: “What is happening today in the department is indeed appropriate to the fact that there are different approaches, different systemic orientations. And as to the curriculum, there’s a core curriculum, such as Greek philosophy, modern philosophy, logic, and epistemology, and beyond that there’s branching off into a variety of [sub-]disciplines, and dispersal into orientations as required, according to what the student chooses. And I see this curriculum and this structure as desirable. I said this, I stressed this when I returned from the United States in 1949. I said to Bergmann that if we become a department with one school of thought, very soon we’ll be provincial. Very soon that school of thought will wane, and we’ll be stuck with it. (Rotenstreich, interview with Geoffrey Wigoder, CAHU, Oral History Division (henceforth OHD, November 2, 1983).

⁴³ These examples are taken from various Philosophy Department course lists from the 1950s (CAHU).

4. The Philosopher's Role in Public Life

Along with their disparate outlooks on the mission of philosophy, Rotenstreich and Bar-Hillel also differed on the question of the philosopher's role in public life. Should philosophy professors play a special role in society? Are they supposed to be authorities on matters of conscience and morality? To put it differently, are philosophers also supposed to provide moral edification, and if so, to whom? Or does their role amount to no more than having expertise in their field, as professors of physics and professors of pharmacology do?

Here too Bergmann, who took his function as a philosopher in Jerusalem to be that of a moral educator and societal critic, was a role model. Bergmann, who was viewed by Bar-Hillel, despite the differences of opinion between them, as "the generation's pre-eminent teacher and conscience," (Bar-Hillel 1970, 6) sought to nurture, among his students, the next generation's spiritual guides (Bergmann 1939/40). This aspiration can be seen as rooted in the traditional philosophical ethos that, throughout the ages, has commended the efforts of philosophers to influence public life. From Bergmann's perspective, this aspiration is linked, first and foremost, to fulfilment of Ahad Ha'am's vision of establishing, in the land of Israel, a spiritual center for the Jewish people. This center, according to Bergmann, was the Hebrew University. The mission of shaping, within the university's walls, the contours of a humanistic Jewish identity that could be accepted by the entire Jewish people, in Israel and in the Diaspora, was far more important to Bergmann, in many respects, than professional training (i.e., preparation for the struggles of life, where the ideal is "sharpening one's nails and teeth" [Bergmann 1920]), and sometimes even took precedence over scientific research.

This concern about the Jewish people's spiritual profile, and determination to voice political critique beyond the strong criticism of Zionist policies that Bergmann expressed along with other members of the left faction of the "Brit Shalom" movement, merits illustration. A good example can be found in a lecture, entitled "On the Spiritual Face of the Nation in Our State," which he delivered at the Authors' Forum that was convened, with Ben-Gurion's participation, at the Kirya (the compound housing the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv) when the 1948 War ended. In the lecture, Bergmann articulates, in just a few words, what he takes to be the role of intellectuals in Israel: "We must find the path to Jewish humanism" (Bergmann 1949).⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Bergmann's talk was translated into German and printed in the newsletter of the Association of Central-European Immigrants, and thus preserved.

4.1. Rotenstreich: Philosopher and Public Intellectual

Rotenstreich was, like Bergmann, a philosopher immersed in public life. One of the foremost and best-known intellectuals of his generation, he frequently weighed in on issues of the day, and expressed his opinions in op-eds in the daily press. But as noted, in contrast to Bergmann's dissenting stances, Rotenstreich was a senior member of the ruling Mapai party who acted, in the framework of his position in the party, to promote cooperation between the academic establishment in Jerusalem and the young State of Israel. In his view, the role of Israeli intellectuals was not to engage in 'external' critique, but rather, to actively participate in building the State.⁴⁵ Rotenstreich was, as Bareli and Gorny aptly put it, an "intellectual from within" (2007). But over the years, and with Rotenstreich's rising status – from Head of the Philosophy Department (1955) to Dean of the Faculty of Humanities (1957), Israel Prize Laureate (1963), and ultimately, Rector of the Hebrew University (1965-1969) – Rotenstreich put increasing emphasis on his differences of opinion with the State's leaders.

In the post-1948 period, it seemed as if the Philosophy Department was too small an arena for Rotenstreich, who sought to influence much broader circles. His public polemic with Ben-Gurion (1957), which, against the background of the Lavon affair (1960-61), evolved into political conflict during the "professors' protest" and led to the founding of an opposition movement, "Min Hayesod" ("Back to Basics") within Mapai (1962), was the highpoint of Rotenstreich's demi-oppositionalism, which lasted many years, and included, among other things, criticism of Israeli militarism (e.g., criticism of the enlistment slogan "*Hatovim Latayis*" [The best become pilots] [Rotenstreich 1961]) and criticism of academic collaboration with Germany.⁴⁶ Unlike Bergmann, most of whose efforts were devoted to critique of the relation between Jews and Arabs in Mandatory Palestine, and after 1948, between Israel and its Arab population, Rotenstreich's critique was principally directed inward, generally toward cultural issues.

Of the various instances in which Rotenstreich adopted an oppositionalist stand, I focus on the controversy between Ben-Gurion and Rotenstreich over "secular messianism." It took place in the form of an exchange of letters that began not long after the 1956 Sinai campaign, continued

⁴⁵ Philosophy Committee meeting, December 4, 1952, CAHU, file 2279.

⁴⁶ Compare: Livne, Morris-Reich 2017.

from January to April of 1957, and was published in the summer 1957 issue of the journal *Hazut*.⁴⁷ I focus on this controversy because it touches upon the question of the status of philosophy within the Israeli ethos. The context within which the controversy is usually considered is that of the discussion of “messianism” in the worldview of Israel’s first Prime Minister, that is, Ben-Gurion’s invocation of terms such as “messianic era” and “redemption” to harness the enthusiasm of the Israeli public and shape its perception of Israel’s founding. From Rotenstreich’s perspective, the main problem is not the use of religious terminology, but rather, Ben-Gurion’s efforts to forge an Israeli ethos that skips over entire periods of Jewish history.

According to Ben-Gurion, the Zionist project owed its success to the “messianic impulse,” that is, to the “the ancient attachment to the expectation of redemption, the biblical homeland, the vision of the Prophets.” For Ben-Gurion, a corollary of this outlook, which was driven primarily by pragmatic considerations, was that upon Israel’s establishment, Zionist thought, expressed in works such as Pinsker’s *Auto-Emancipation* and Herzl’s *The Jewish State*, lost its relevance and significance for the younger generation (Ohana 2003, 313).

Zionist youth excel vis-à-vis a specific trait that is, in my opinion, positive, although many see it as a kind of ‘cynicism’: it does not tolerate stale rhetoric that has no substance [...] a sense of the homeland is very important to Israel’s youth, but they find that awareness, not in the works of Pinsker and Herzl, but in the Bible. They find that awareness in hiking the land. You [Rotenstreich] claim that there are no leaps in history. There most certainly are. The founding of the Jewish State was a leap over hundreds of years, and in the War of Independence we approached the days of Joshua, insofar as the stories about Joshua became, for the young, more accessible and understandable than all the speeches of the Zionist Congresses. To our great chagrin, the ‘recent past’ does not exist, because the Judaism of the ‘recent past’ was decimated (Ohana 2003, 307).

It is by no means surprising that the author of *Jewish Thought in the Modern Era* did not look favorably on the historical leaps Ben-Gurion was referring to. In Israel at the end of the 1950s, the biblical-military ethos’s primacy over Jewish philosophy, and even over Zionist thought, was already a *fait accompli*. Furthermore, it was also a *fait accompli* at the Hebrew University. The

⁴⁷ References to the exchange in the present article are to the version published in Ohana 2003.

university's archaeological excavations at Hatzor, led by Professor – and General – Yigal Yadin, began in 1955. They were accorded the status of a national project and attracted prodigious amounts of attention and support from the public, the press, the university administration, national institutions and the country's leaders. At the "Bible Conference" held in Jerusalem in 1956, Yadin remarked: "With lecturers telling them that King David's army was organized on the lines of the IDF, it is doubtful even one of the 1,400 in the audience could have nodded off."⁴⁸ As Uri Cohen put it, these scholars became cultural heroes – "the nation's new priesthood" – and the military-biblical ethos became entrenched as the primary historical anchor of the emerging Israeli culture (Cohen 2006). Though they were given a platform and their contribution was recognized, philosophers such as Rotenstreich were less successful at rendering the questions they studied part of general Israeli cultural literacy. It thus appears that in his correspondence with Rotenstreich, Ben-Gurion touched a sore spot. In speaking of the "leap" over thousands of years of Jewish life in the Diaspora, Ben-Gurion sought to undermine Rotenstreich's national-philosophical project, and to thwart his efforts to instate secularized Jewish philosophy as an essential source of Israeli culture. Accordingly, Rotenstreich's responses sought to defend his field, and uphold the value of Jewish philosophy.

I fully agree with you that there are leaps in history, and that there have been leaps in our own history. The very fact of the State's existence is an instance of a leap in history. [...] But as in every rebirth, the revival is occurring in the place and the historical era where we are actually situated. We revive the biblical story as former inhabitants of the Diaspora, not as those for whom the Diaspora is a passive background that left no lasting impression, as though we were still basically infused with the place and time that we were now seeking to revive. Here there cannot be leaps, and if there were a leap, it would create a Karaitism in consciousness, on the one hand, and sever us from the shared Jewish fate in the present day, on the other. [...] In keeping with a medieval principle I would say: Chasms should not be excavated beyond what is required; the existing chasms are sufficient in any event (Ohana 2003. 211).⁴⁹

⁴⁸ "The Lectures at the Bible Conference in Jerusalem," *Haaretz*, March 21, 1956 [Hebrew].

⁴⁹ Here Rotenstreich has in mind the Scholastic principle known as 'Ockham's Razor.'

The maxim “Chasms should not be excavated beyond what is required” exposes the personal facet of Rotenstreich’s dispute with Ben-Gurion. Much has been written about the political conflict between the two that would break out several years later in the wake of the Lavon affair and the founding of the *Min Hayesod* faction. On the received interpretation, the professors’ protest Rotenstreich led was a fight to defend the norms of democratic political conduct.⁵⁰ However, it may well be that behind the scenes, the conflict over the status of Jewish philosophy and Zionist thought played a role in Rotenstreich’s growing opposition to Ben-Gurion. This suggestion cannot be elaborated on here. What should be noted in the context of this article, though, is that within the Philosophy Department, the widely-discussed controversy with Ben-Gurion raised Rotenstreich’s standing as a public intellectual. Even though philosophy never achieved the status of the Bible in the emerging Israeli ethos, in the 1960s, the public profile of Rotenstreich himself made the Hebrew University’s Philosophy Department, and in particular Rotenstreich’s classes, one of the places where Israel’s cultural elite was educated. Many of his students, among them Yirmiyahu Yovel, Eddy Zemach, Menachem Brinker, Amihud Gilad and David Heyd, went on to serve in key leadership roles throughout the Israeli academic world.⁵¹ In addition, those who took his courses included senior IDF officers, e.g., Israel Tal, writers, e.g., Amos Oz and Yehoshua Kenaz and poets, e.g., Aharon Shabtai.

4.2. Bar-Hillel: Scientist and Critic

In contrast to Rotenstreich, whose lectures filled halls, Bar-Hillel was not particularly popular with students. Nor was he a well-known public figure. But his students – e.g., Israel Prize laureates Avishai Margalit, Asa Kasher and Itzhak Schlesinger – felt that they belonged to an elite, albeit a small one, at the forefront of science, a feeling engendered in part by Bar-Hillel’s august status in the international scientific community. On the question of the philosopher’s role, Bar-Hillel’s position seems to be closer to the view that prevailed in faculties of science worldwide, which put the emphasis on professors’ expertise in their fields. The idea that a professor’s role was also to impart broader values to his or her students was perceived as outdated and pretentious. Over the

⁵⁰ In his book, Uri Cohen suggests, contra the received view, that the protest was a deliberately-created ‘crisis’ intended to make an impression on the political establishment in order to buttress the status of the Jerusalem professorate, which felt threatened by the founding of a competing university in Tel-Aviv; see Cohen 2003, 230-254.

⁵¹ In a 1990 interview, Rotenstreich listed those he considered his most eminent students (Rotenstreich, interview with Shlomo Sneh, OHD, May 16, 1990).

years, with the strengthening of professionalism and liberal values such as individualism, this approach, which Bar-Hillel had embraced, became the dominant one in Israel's academia, including the humanities. But Bar-Hillel had already voiced it with great clarity in a discussion of the university's role published in a special issue of *HaUniversita*. To Bergmann's contention that the university's role is, among other things, to educate students to be disseminators of culture, and that it is desirable for a philosophy lecturer to be a spiritual authority, just as the rabbi had been in the shtetl in generations past, Bar-Hillel responded unequivocally as follows:

I totally and unreservedly disagree with every last word my esteemed teacher spoke, from beginning to end. I already said this before, in an interim comment, and I'll say it again: We are fortunate that we haven't engaged in edifying and educating. In his remarks upon laying the cornerstone of the university in 1918, Weizmann expressed the hope that prophetic power would also be renewed in Jerusalem. Let us leave prophetic wisdom to "Al-Azhar" and other universities of that sort.⁵²

Bar-Hillel's categorical remarks should not, however, be interpreted as a rejection of every form of "edifying and educating." A rare interview he gave to the Passover supplement of the *LaMerhav* newspaper a little over a month before the 1967 War provides a complementary perspective on this issue. When asked: "Which truths that you uphold would you like to inculcate in the public?", Bar-Hillel replied:

Ordinarily it isn't my practice to inculcate truths in my students, and in the framework of my formal lectures at the university, I certainly don't. [...] But indirectly, as a result of the philosophical discussions, my students will learn – by example, not preaching – about a critical attitude to all life's phenomena. And they may well, and are permitted to, redirect the critical outlook they're acquiring toward phenomena that are outside the subjects that I address directly. Among philosophers of science, or logicians, in the new sense this discipline has acquired recently, not a single one is to be found who influenced life directly; the influence was solely indirect (Bar-Hillel 1967).

⁵² "On the Past and Present Role and Vocation of the University," *HaUniversita: Journal of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem* (1964), special issue, 27-43 [Hebrew]. See too Cohen 2003, 184-193.

Bar-Hillel did not give many interviews, but in this interview he articulated the critical relation he sought to impart to his students indirectly. Bar-Hillel voiced harsh critique regarding a number of issues on the public agenda: religious coercion (“I would not want to see actions based on faith in supernatural forces made compulsory in the State of Israel, since such coercion seems to me impossible to defend on any rational grounds”); encouraging Jews to immigrate to Israel (“I know ‘Zionists’ who are willing to welcome the possibility, and are not shocked at the idea, that the situation of a Diaspora Jewish community could become so precarious that its members would be compelled to come to Israel, and who would be sorry if the antisemitism in the United States were to fade away completely”); and Israel’s relation to the Palestinians refugees. The latter critique included explicit support for the refugees’ right to return to Israel (“The refugees have, in my opinion, a moral right [...] to return to Israel to the same degree that Russian Jews have a right to immigrate to Israel”) (Bar-Hillel 1967).

Support for the right of return, which was also voiced, in the early 1950s, by Bergmann, became rarer in the 1960s. Bar-Hillel was a liberal whose position on this issue was close to that of the Communists, whom he did not hesitate to criticize about other matters (“I would like to see less historical arrogance in my students. Less certainty that they have understood the spirit of history – and one of my biggest grievances against my Marxist friends is that they purport to know the spirit of history and which way the winds of history are blowing” [Bar-Hillel 1967, 16]). The major Israeli military victory in the 1967 War kept Bar-Hillel’s criticism out of the public eye. His liberal opinions, which diverged markedly from the public consensus, were, during that period, generally voiced privately, in discussions and other activities in the framework of small circles of the dovish left. In 1976, a year after Bar-Hillel’s death, the poet Yebi (Yona Ben-Yehuda) dedicated a poem to him, entitled “The June 1967 War: Mother of All Evil. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1915-1975).” The poem describes the impression made on the poet by Bar-Hillel’s public activism after the war: “When you searched in the storm that at times / darkened eyes but did not hoarsen voices / the encouraging word and in the morning / the lucid sobriety, you found them / in the figure of Yehoshua Bar-Hillel. / His good will and engagement did not / tire of just protest / for which he enlisted / and gave of his soul and pocket. / He knew the essence of the human imperative. / Preserve his memory” (Ben Yehuda 1976).

5. An Tense Exchange between Rotenstreich and Bar-Hillel

There is no explicit reference to Rotenstreich in any of Bar-Hillel's works. In Rotenstreich's, Bar-Hillel is spoken of only once – in an obituary for Bar-Hillel upon his passing (Rotenstreich 1975). Yet the two were close friends, and their families were on friendly terms.⁵³ The letters they exchanged have little philosophical content, but many indications of friendship. It would seem that their philosophical orientations were too disparate for them to be able to engage in dialogue or even debate, or at any rate, to be able to do so and remain on good terms. In light of this, a tense exchange of letters between them, from late 1968, on political and administrative matters, is particularly interesting.

The office of Abraham Harman, President of the Hebrew University, received a letter from Israel's ambassador to Germany, Asher Ben-Natan, voicing criticism of remarks Bar-Hillel had made at a scientific conference in Germany.⁵⁴ According to someone who had been present, who informed the ambassador, the substance of Bar-Hillel's remarks at the conference was "almost anti-Israel." The report claimed that Bar-Hillel had told the attendees that the Hebrew University imposes certain restrictions on Arab students, that these restrictions adversely affect the Arab students' ability to write doctoral dissertations and to be employed by the university as instructors, and that these restrictions are imposed on the Arab students in order to maintain the university's Jewish character. In the report sent to Ben-Natan, the sender wondered whether it was appropriate for a Hebrew University professor to raise such matters in Germany, of all places, and in front of an audience of non-Jews.⁵⁵

The complaint was passed on to Rotenstreich, who was the Hebrew University's Rector at the time, and he wrote to Bar-Hillel asking for clarification.⁵⁶ In his response, Bar-Hillel claimed that the information that had been reported was highly inaccurate, and that he hadn't said anything at all about constraints imposed on Arab students. He had only presented to those in attendance "factual information about the percentage of Arab students (and Jewish students of Middle Eastern origin), about their percentage among the university's junior and senior faculty (the latter percentage being zero), about the causes of this situation, and about the approaches adopted by the

⁵³ "He [Bar-Hillel] was a close friend of mine, even though our orientations were different," Nathan Rotenstreich, OHD, interview with Shlomo Sneh, May 16, 1990.

⁵⁴ Ambassador Ben-Natan to President Harman, September 27, 1968, CAHU, personal file, Bar-Hillel.

⁵⁵ Y. Ronen to Ambassador Ben-Natan, September 27, 1968, CAHU, personal file, Bar-Hillel.

⁵⁶ Rotenstreich to Bar-Hillel, October 21, 1968, CAHU, personal file, Bar-Hillel.

university and the country to develop this under-utilized potential. I took the opportunity to point out that when the time would come and an Arab teaching assistant would reach a level from which he could be promoted to a senior position, there would no doubt be debate about the matter.” Bar-Hillel ends his response with the comment: “The fact that the manner in which I spoke wasn’t fully in harmony with the official propaganda of Israel’s ‘representatives’ in the Diaspora did make an impression, but not necessarily a bad one.”⁵⁷ In a subsequent letter, Bar-Hillel continued: “I said that there were views in the Faculty, that is, among the lecturers, which held that the Hebrew University must be Hebrew in terms of the makeup of its teaching staff, and I’m sure that you know of such sentiments as well as I do.”⁵⁸

Rotenstreich responded angrily, informing Bar-Hillel that his remarks were very worrisome to him. Rotenstreich assured him that, as a participant in the deliberations of the academic appointments and advancement committees, he was convinced that “were we to have occasion to consider an Arab candidate with scientific qualifications, we would make a special effort to hire him.”⁵⁹ He went on to write, in another letter: “I can’t understand where you got the idea that I know as well as you do about such sentiments. I’m sorry to say it, but this entire episode is quite superfluous. There is no basis whatsoever for the claim that there are national or religious barriers at the Hebrew University.” Rotenstreich ends his letter as follows: “ I regret that we have been encumbered by this matter, which displeases me, as you yourself can understand, and which has arisen from unsubstantiated claims.”⁶⁰ With that, the exchange ended.

6. Conclusion

The years following Israel’s founding were formative ones for the development of philosophy as an academic discipline in Israel. During this period, the distinction between philosophy seen as contiguous with the humanities and social sciences, and philosophy seen as adjacent to the natural and exact sciences – a distinction that had emerged previously in Europe and the United States and was the starting point for what would later be called the split between analytic philosophy and continental philosophy – began to make its presence felt in Jerusalem. Going forward, the

⁵⁷ Bar-Hillel to Rotenstreich, October 22, 1968, CAHU, personal file, Bar-Hillel.

⁵⁸ Bar-Hillel to Rotenstreich, October 31, 1968, CAHU, personal file, Bar-Hillel.

⁵⁹ Rotenstreich to Bar-Hillel, October 29, 1968, CAHU, personal file, Bar-Hillel.

⁶⁰ Rotenstreich to Bar-Hillel, November 6, 1968, CAHU, personal file, Bar-Hillel.

distinction would, implicitly or explicitly, be a factor in determining how Israeli philosophers understood their field's paths and possibilities, and the nature of their work within it.

In every case of cultural influence, there are, among the influenced, local figures who represent paths and possibilities originating outside. These figures shape the manner in which those paths and possibilities are perceived, at least initially. This was the role played by Nathan Rotenstreich and Yehoshua Bar-Hillel in the philosophical world of Israel's founding generation. Over the years, the two came to be identified with the schools they were aligned with, even though they did not intend to represent them, nor could they represent them. Conceivably, other philosophers of that period might have been able to play this role successfully, and in so doing, might have imbued the distinction between the schools with different – perhaps radically different – content. Later on, when Rotenstreich had stepped down from his position as Head of the Philosophy Department in 1974, and after Bar-Hillel's untimely death in 1975, it was time for the next generation to take on leadership of the discipline, and determine how Israeli philosophy would develop in the coming decades.

As we saw, Bergmann's two proteges who continued the philosophical enterprise he had nurtured had proceeded along very disparate paths, so much so that the gap between their approaches was too wide for them to discuss, let alone try to bridge. The task of juxtaposing the opposed approaches directly, in order to gauge their strengths and weaknesses, or even indirectly, thus awaited their students. Some of Bar-Hillel's students perceived philosophy as practiced by Rotenstreich to be no more than an overblown exposition of the Zionist ideology familiar to them from their youth movement years. Some of Rotenstreich's students, on the other hand, believed that Bar-Hillel's work couldn't even be considered philosophy, or in any event, philosophy that had a connection to human lives. In the provocative words of Israeli writer Yoel Hoffman: "The University was divided (like Jerusalem itself) between the disciples of Rotenstreich and those of Bar-Hillel. The latter spoke truths that had no value, while the former spoke nonsense that filled the heart with joy" (Hoffman 2007, § 29). During the 1970s and 1980s, the gap between the camps widened. But today, now that the revolutionary zeal has cooled off, and even those who sought to cast off the history of philosophy have been absorbed into it, it is possible to rise above the division into schools of thought, and offer a sober assessment of what Israeli philosophy gained, and what it lost, in those years of bifurcation. This question can, and should, be the starting point for further research.

References

- Bareli, A., Gorny, Y. (2007). An 'Inside Intellectual': Remarks on the Public Thought of Nathan Rotenstreich. In N. Rotenstreich, *Zionism: Past and Present* (pp. 1–47). SUNY.
- Bar-Hillel, Y. (1940). New Philosophy. *Moznaim* 11, 82–94 (Hebrew).
- Bar-Hillel, Y. (1955). Some Objections to 'An Introduction to Logic' by S.H. Bergmann. *Iyyun* 6(1), 25 (Hebrew).
- Bar-Hillel, Y. (1963/64). The Betrayal of the Logicians. *Iyyun* 14/15, 120–125 (Hebrew).
- Bar-Hillel, Y. (1964). *Language and Information*. Addison-Wesley.
- Bar-Hillel, Y. (1970). *Logic, Language and Method*, Sifriat Poalim (Hebrew).
- Bar-Hillel, Y. (1962). On a Comparison of Mathematical and Dialectical Logic. *Iyyun* 13(1): 36–38 (Hebrew).
- Bar-Hillel, Y. (1967). On Some Accepted Lies *LaMerhav*, April 24 (Hebrew).
- Ben-Israel, H. (2009). Politics on Mt. Scopus in the Mandatory Period. In H. Lavsky (Ed.), *History of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem* (pp. 3–86). Magnes (Hebrew).
- Ben-Yehuda, Y. (1976), *Dreams, People, Hopes*. Ratzon Tov (Hebrew).
- Bergmann, S.H. (1909). *Das philosophische Werk Bernard Bolzanos*. Niemeyer.
- Bergmann, S.H. (1920). The Goals of Education. *Hapoel Hatzair*, July 2 (Hebrew).
- Bergmann, S.H. (1939/40). On the Political Education of Our Students. *Niv Hastudent* 4 (Hebrew).
- Bergmann, S.H. (1946). Briefe Franz Brentanos an Hugo Bergmann. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 7(1), 83–158.
- Bergmann, S.H. (1949). Das Geistige Gesicht des Volkes in unserem Staat. *Mitteilungsblatt des Irgun Olej Merkas Europa*, May 6.
- Bergmann, S.H. (1963). A Profile of Prof. Leon Roth. *Haaretz*, April 11 (Hebrew).
- Carnap, R. (1937) *Logical Syntax of Language*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co.
- Chowers, E. (2017). Violence and the Hebrew Language: Jewish Nationalism and the University. *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies* 16(3), 358–376.
- Cohen, U. (2006). *The Mountain and the Hill: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Pre-Independence Period and Early Years of the State of Israel*. Am Oved (Hebrew).
- Eges, Y. (ed.) (1939, 1940, 1941). *Gordon's Writings*. Zionist Library (Hebrew).
- Fleischmann, J.E. (1949) The Existentialism of J.P. Sartre. *Iyyun* 1(4), 273–285 (Hebrew).
- Fleischmann, J.E. (1992). *La philosophie politique de Hegel*. Gallimard.
- Galron-Goldschlager, J. (2010). *A Bibliography of Nathan Rotenstreich's Works*. Bialik Institute (Hebrew).
- Gordon, N., Motzkin, G. (2003). Between Universalism and Particularism: The Origins of the Philosophy Department at Hebrew University and the Zionist Project. *Jewish Social Studies* 9(2), 99–122.
- Groll, M (1961). The Self-Movement of the Notion in Hegel's Philosophy. *Iyyun* 12(2), 83–116 (Hebrew).
- Heidegger, M. (1956) *What Is Philosophy?* College & University Press.
- Hoffman, Y. (2007). *Curriculum Vitae*. Keter (Hebrew).
- Hutchins, J. (2000). Yehoshua Bar-Hillel: A Philosopher's Contribution to Machine Translation. In J. Hutchins (ed.), *Early Years in Machine Translation* (pp. 299–312). John Benjamins.
- Ohana D. (2003). *Messianism and Mamlachtiut: Ben-Gurion and the Intellectuals Between Political Vision and Political Theology*. Ben Gurion University Press (Hebrew).

- Livne, S., Morris-Reich, A. (2017). Fundraising and Collaboration: The Hebrew University and the German Question, 1959–1965. *Naharaim* 11(1-2).
- Loewe, R. (ed.). (1966). *Studies in Rationalism, Judaism and Universalism in Memory of Leon Roth*. Routledge.
- Margalit, A. (1990). Bar-Hillel: The Man and his Philosophy of Mathematics. *Iyyun* 39, 7–12.
- Rotenstreich, N. (1945). *Jewish Thought in the Modern Era: History and Reality*. Am Oved (Hebrew).
- Rotenstreich, N. (1946). Ownership of the University. *Haaretz*, June 29 (Hebrew).
- Rotenstreich, N. (1948). In View of the Change. *Haaretz*, October 8 (Hebrew)
- Rotenstreich, N. (1949). The Power of Spirit. *Haaretz*, May 4 (Hebrew).
- Rotenstreich, N. (1950). *Jewish Thought in the Modern Era: Of the Secret of Judaism*. Am Oved (Hebrew).
- Rotenstreich, N. (1958). *Between Past and Present: an Essay on History*. Yale University Press.
- Rotenstreich, N. (1961). *Hatovim LaTayis*. *Davar*, February 27 (Hebrew).
- Rotenstreich, N. (1963). *Spirit and Man: An Essay on Being and Value*. Martinus Nijhoff.
- Rotenstreich, N. (1972). *On Jewish Existence in the Present*. Sifriat Poalim (Hebrew).
- Rotenstreich, N. (1975). Man of Language and Logic. *Yediot Aharonot*, October 3 (Hebrew).
- Wiese, C. (2007). *The Life and Thought of Hans Jonas*. Brandeis University Press.
- Yovel, Y. (1975). Thinker and Believer. *Iyyun* 26, 7–29 (Hebrew).
- Yovel, Y. et al. (1975). Memorial Remarks on the Yahrzeit of S.H. Bergmann. *Iyyun* 26 51–80 (Hebrew)