

Reviews of *Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity*, Sacha Golob (Cambridge University Press)

- Crowell (Rice), *Philosophy in Review*, pages 2-7.
- Cregan (Oxford), *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, pages 8-13.
- Campbell (Nazareth College of Rochester), *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, pages 14-18.
- Keiling (Freiburg), *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, pages 19-21.

Sacha Golob. *Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom, and Normativity*. Cambridge University Press 2014. 282 pp. \$95.00 USD (Hardcover ISBN 9781107031708).

Sacha Golob's carefully argued, clearly written, and philosophically engaging book is a welcome addition to the growing literature that brings Heidegger's sprawling and apparently idiosyncratic thought into dialogue with philosophical approaches that are temperamentally very different from it—above all, analytic philosophy. As this book amply demonstrates, the rewards are many, both for understanding Heidegger and for fostering insight into philosophical issues. Here the issue is *intentionality*, the 'property, typically attributed to mental states, whereby those states are directed toward or about something' (6). Golob is well-versed in the analytic literature on intentionality and is careful to define his terms in ways that do not prejudice the many contested matters found there, but a direct confrontation with analytic philosophy is not his primary goal. That goal is, rather, to offer an alternative to what he calls the 'dominant approach' (5) to *Heidegger's* account of intentionality. In doing so he carves out for Heidegger a position in dialectical space that might seem paradoxical: the 'explanatorily primary' form of intentionality is non-propositional but nevertheless *conceptual*.

The dominant approach is represented by a set of authors whose work has been informed by Hubert Dreyfus's influential reading of Heidegger. Thus the book engages in detail with arguments advanced by Taylor Carman, Mark Wrathall, William Blattner, Mark Okrent, Cristina Lafont, and Dreyfus himself, among others. The dominant approach is 'dominant' not because it is shared by most Heidegger scholars, but because it is practically the only one to treat Heidegger as an interlocutor in contemporary philosophical debates about intentionality, language, truth, and meaning. Golob's treatment of it, then—certainly the most comprehensive and critical one to date—should be required reading for anyone interested in those issues. Here I can only sketch that treatment, but the real value of the book lies in its detailed analyses.

§Chapter One lays out the terms, beginning with two claims drawn from Heidegger: first, that 'assertion' reduces entities to presence-at-hand; and second, that assertion derives from a more primordial engagement with things. Golob argues that Heidegger's notion of assertion is not limited to a certain speech act but includes all 'propositional intentionality', i.e., all propositional attitudes (15). The dominant approach holds that propositional intentionality derives from an intentionality that is not only non-propositional, but also (supposedly for that reason) non-conceptual. Golob's strategy in this chapter is to undermine the claim that there is a necessary connection between propositional intentionality and the ontology of the present-at-hand, thereby undermining the dominant approach's way of establishing that 'propositional intentionality is explanatorily derivative on some irreducibly non-propositional mode of intentionality' (18). In Chapter Two, Golob follows with his own view of the relation between assertion and the present-at-hand in *Being and Time*, on the basis of which, in Chapter Three, he offers a novel account of Heidegger's claim that propositional intentionality is derivative. Identifying problems with this view as well, Golob devotes two final chapters to exploring (what he takes to be) an alternative account drawn from Heidegger's post-*Being and Time* reflections on the connection between freedom and normativity.

According to Golob's Heidegger, 'conceptual' content must satisfy four conditions: it must be universal; it must support inferential relations; it must not be something that is too 'fine grained' to be expressed in propositions; and it must be unavailable to non-human animals (10). Content

exhibiting these features is conceptual even if, as with perception, it is not exhausted by them. Golob then identifies three ‘logically independent’ meanings of ‘presence-at-hand’ in Heidegger’s text and defines the thesis to be denied as a disjunction of these senses. In none of them is there a necessary connection between propositional intentionality and the present-at-hand, though there *is* a connection if we add a condition that Golob discusses in Chapter Two.

What is the basic objection to the dominant approach? Roughly, it explains the connection between propositional intentionality and the present-at-hand by arguing that the former derives from an intentionality which resides in embodied skills and abilities that elude capture in the conceptual form of assertions. But (among other things) the argument is exegetically suspect because it attributes to Heidegger a theory of ‘sensorimotor’ intentionality drawn from Merleau-Ponty, whereas ‘Heidegger shows little or no interest in developing the apparatus necessary to defend that kind of theory’ (45). Perhaps he *should* have, but the dominant approach should not be accepted as *Heidegger’s* until it is shown that no exegetically more satisfying account of the derivative character of propositional intentionality is possible.

In Chapter Two, Golob provides his own account of how propositional intentionality reduces being to presence-at-hand. Such a reduction obtains only if the disjunction earlier introduced is conjoined with a certain *philosophical analysis* of assertion, which Heidegger calls ‘logic’. By focusing exclusively on *predication* in abstraction from the assertion’s existential context, logic ‘dims down’ the full content of propositional intentionality (50-2) and yields an ontology of the present-at-hand. Propositions themselves are not the culprit—after all, Heidegger’s text is full of them (64)—and there is scant evidence that Heidegger embraces an explanatorily basic level of intentionality that eludes propositional formulation. But then how do we explain Heidegger’s claim that propositional intentionality is derivative of a more primordial non-propositional form of intentionality?

Taking his cue from Heidegger’s call to ‘liberate grammar from logic’ (68), Golob addresses this question in Chapter Three, the most ambitious and complicated in the book. He proposes that the two levels of intentionality do not differ in regard to concept-involvement, as the dominant approach has it; rather, they differ in ‘grammar’: there are *two* ‘vehicles’ for conceptual content, the propositional and the ‘pre-propositional’ (68). The grammar of propositional content involves the ‘is’ (a is b); the grammar of conceptual but pre-propositional content involves the ‘as’ (a as b). Propositional content is derivative because, as Heidegger puts it in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1929/30): ‘The proposition “a is b” would not be possible with respect to what it means, and the way in which it means what it does, if it could not emerge from an underlying experience of “a as b” (72). The challenge for Golob, then, is to show why the ‘a as b’ is neither non-conceptual nor just an inchoate form of propositional content.

His argument is governed by two principles, ‘Context’ and ‘Apriori’. Context says that what is explanatorily basic in Heidegger’s account of intentionality is locating entities (the ‘a-variable’) within a relational/teleological context or ‘world’. And Apriori says that in order to locate entities in such a context I must have prior familiarity with it. According to Golob, Heidegger establishes Apriori through what Quassim Cassam calls a ‘self-directed transcendental argument’: given that I am capable of a certain kind of experience—in this case, the ability to locate entities in a context—the argument provides a ‘non-empirical analysis’ (hence Apriori) of the ‘intentional capacities I must possess in order to intend objects in this way’ (86-7). Further, on pain of infinite regress, Apriori entails the ontological difference: the intentional capacity I must possess is an ‘understanding of being’, where being is not itself an entity (88).

In turning to the a-variable, these two principles help explain Heidegger's stance toward representationalism. Heidegger clearly rejects 'mediational' representationalism, the view that the a-variable is some sort of mental entity that determines reference to an entity in the world (91-6). Heidegger's target here is 'Husserl'—that is, Husserl's doctrine of the noema as interpreted by Dagfinn Føllesdal (and embraced by the dominant approach), which holds the noema to be a Fregean *Sinn*. In contrast, Golob argues that Heidegger's account of the a-variable is 'Russellian'—that is, the a-variable is the entity itself. As he shows in a later chapter, this is compatible with a 'minimal' representationalism in which our experience of the entity in the a-as-b structure is not 'brute' but has 'accuracy conditions' (183). Golob's Russellian interpretation of the explanatorily basic form of intentionality highlights Heidegger's proximity to an alternative interpretation of Husserl, according to which the distinction between noema and object is not an ontological but a *methodological* one. On that reading, the noema 'comes very close to Heidegger's conception of "phenomena": the a-variable as manifest within a context (96-7). On the Russellian interpretation, further, intentionality turns out to be relational, and Golob devotes some acute paragraphs to showing how Heidegger's 'externalism' might address standard problems associated with the relational view, such as objectless presentations, illusions, and hallucinations (100-1). It is Golob's discussion of the b-variable that forms the most original part of the book, however, and it exposes a tension that undermines the schema of *Being and Time*. Golob argues that Heidegger came to adopt a new approach to intentionality in the years immediately following its publication, but paradoxically his account of the b-variable, or 'context', in *Being and Time* itself exploits the notion of 'prototype' (*Vorbild*) not found before the texts from 1928/29.

Golob associates the context—what I am already familiar with whenever I am intentionally directed toward an entity, my *Vorgriff*—with Heidegger's notion of discourse (*Rede, logos*), but he rejects Cristina Lafont's contention that context is identical to language. At the same time, he rejects the dominant approach's claim that it is a non-conceptual framework of skills, practices, and gestures. Context, on Golob's view, is both non-linguistic and conceptual, a 'new vehicle for conceptuality' (103). Heidegger has no name for this new vehicle in *Being and Time*, however, so Golob imports the Platonistic term '*Vorbild*' from *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (1929) to unpack an implicit 'prototype theory' of concepts in *Being and Time*. A prototype is an exemplar that adumbrates a context or world (129). When I encounter the blackboard as badly positioned, for instance, it is because I am oriented by a prototype that adumbrates what I am trying to be (a teacher), which 'forms' (*bildet*) the normative order of the classroom-context in which blackboards can show up in appropriate or inappropriate ways. Such prototypes satisfy the four criteria for conceptual content introduced earlier (148-51), but being oriented by a prototype does not have a propositional structure.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger is especially concerned with the prototype for understanding beings *as beings*—and Golob devotes some careful pages to showing how Heidegger's discussion of Kant's schematism in the *Kantbuch* suggests that the prototype theory already governs *Being and Time*'s pursuit of time as the ultimate context for understanding being. However, the prototype theory involves a certain tension between Kantian and Platonic motives in Heidegger's thinking, one that contributes to the failure of *Being and Time*.

On the one hand, the prototype theory represents Heidegger's attempt to free Platonism from the logical prejudice of the 'theory of ideas' (124); on the other, Heidegger's 'insertion of a prototype account of intentionality into the Critical framework' (114), through his identification of time as *the* horizon for an understanding of being, ends in failure. In Chapters Five and Six, then, Golob argues that after *Being and Time* Heidegger's

dissatisfaction with the Kantian architectonic led him to *freedom* as the explanatorily basic form of intentionality. Though these explorations, too, are carried out as a dialogue between Kant and Plato, it is the Platonic motif (I would argue) that contains the productive kernel of the prototype approach. I would go further: the ‘failure’ of *Being and Time* does not stem from the prototype theory itself but from the unmotivated idea that there must be one ‘ultimate’ prototype, one meaning of being.

Before getting to that, however, Chapter Four applies the prototype theory to ‘metaphysical’ questions (155) that have exercised readers of *Being and Time* for decades. John Searle, for example, dismisses Heideggerian phenomenology because it treats the ready-to-hand as basic when it is obviously grounded in nature. In answer, Golob distinguishes between a narrow sense of the ready-to-hand, confined to tools, and a broad sense that covers *all* entities, including natural things, that have attained ‘world-entry’ and so can be intended (158). While the former are constituted by ‘mind-dependent’ properties (and so cannot exist without Dasein), the latter include entities whose properties are ‘prima facie mind-independent’ (167). When Heidegger says that reality depends on Dasein, ‘reality’ is the prototype according to which we can intend real things as real. But this does not turn their mind-independent properties into mind-dependent ones; hence on Golob’s definition of ‘idealism’, Heidegger is not an idealist (174).

Nevertheless, Heidegger refuses the naturalistic ontological approach recommended by Searle: start with an account of mind-independent nature and arrive at the ‘narrow’ ready-to-hand by adding certain teleological and social capacities. Why this refusal? Golob argues that Heidegger has no adequate answer to this question; rather, the refusal stems from his general project of providing ‘a non-naturalistic, non-reductive account of the nature of Dasein’s intentionality’, a project committed to the idea that normativity cannot be naturalized (161). At bottom, Golob argues, *Being and Time* has ‘no real story about, or interest in, the question of how Dasein relates to the present-at-hand insofar as the latter is considered *outside the scope of intentionality*’, and this deficiency (if it *is* one, I would add), is made good ‘in name only when Heidegger later appeals to ‘metontology’’ (162). On Searle’s definition of idealism as any theory that makes irreducibly *de re* reference to entities impossible, then, Heidegger’s realism may well count as idealism (176).

Regarding truth, Golob takes up Tugendhat’s influential claim that Heidegger’s explanatorily basic form of intentionality is non-normative, hence not a mode of truth at all. Golob denies that Russellian ‘acquaintance’ can be understood as some direct intuition (*noein*) of an entity prior to the a-as-b structure. Further, while acquaintance does not have a propositional structure, it is normatively assessable (hence relevantly truth-like) because it involves non-binary ‘accuracy conditions’ (183). The explanatorily basic level thus avoids Tugendhat’s criticism and can be used to address Cristina Lafont’s charge that Heidegger’s theory makes all empirical revision and learning impossible (185).

In the book’s final two chapters, then, normativity takes center stage. On Golob’s view, Heidegger turns to freedom—‘the capacity to recognize and commit oneself to norms’ (195)—to overcome the impasse of his account of temporality in *Being and Time* and *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Hence freedom—central to what Heidegger calls Dasein’s ‘transcendence’—is the explanatorily basic form of intentionality that accounts for the irreducibly normative aspect of the a-as-b structure.

Chapter Five develops this point by interpreting transcendence as Dasein’s ability to act ‘for the sake of’ something that it is trying to be. To act for the sake of being a teacher, for instance, is to commit oneself to the norms that govern success or failure in teaching. Doing so does not require that such norms be formulated as rules; and indeed on the prototype theory the *Vorbild* of teaching will not be a thematic object but something ‘understood’, a way of being that makes me beholden to entities in certain specific ways. Golob pursues this

issue through a comparison with ‘Kant’s “practical” account of freedom’ which, like Heidegger’s, ‘turns on a distinctive relation between selfhood, normativity, and the first-person perspective’ (198). For Heidegger, as for Kant, ‘my being and behavior is *mine* because it is at issue for me’, that is, because its success or failure is normatively at stake (200). Such a conception of selfhood—in which the capacity to ‘take on, respond to and assess normative commitments’ is basic (202)—is conceptually (though perhaps not metaphysically) incompatible with my being a locus of external causal forces. I act in *light* of norms and not merely *in accord* with them. As Golob points out in his response to various Kantian and Hegelian objections to Heidegger’s concept of freedom, Heidegger is trying to address what Robert Pippin calls ‘the difficult to describe [...] character of the conceptual activity at work’ in the explanatorily basic form of intentionality (205).

Despite this Kantian analogue, Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s transcendence cannot appeal to any pre-given nature (e.g., ‘rational being’) as the normative prototype for such selfhood. In Chapter Six, Golob will suggest that ‘authenticity’ plays something like this role, but here it seems to me there is a missed opportunity. Heidegger himself identifies what replaces Kant’s ‘form of law’, namely, the Platonic *agathon as epekeina tes ousias*. Though Golob does not investigate this connection, it forms the heart of prototype theory: the ultimate context (measure, norm) for my being a self is not some particular exemplary ‘for the sake of’ or practical identity, nor is it some specific concept, like ‘time’; rather, it is the normative *distinction* between better and worse. To be a self is to act in light of ‘what is best’.

Golob’s account of authenticity, which includes consideration of the ‘factic’ character of the ‘normative terrain within which Dasein operates’ (213)—its ‘finitude’ and its dependence on *das Man*—turns on an interpretation of the *breakdown* of all Dasein’s particular ‘for the sake of’s’ or normative commitments. In *Angst*, death, and conscience Dasein *experiences* the ‘true facts about itself’, above all, a ‘set of limitations’ on its responsibility: that ‘nothing will ever provide the foundational ground’, or ultimate normative justification for what it does, ‘which was promised by theories such as the categorical imperative’ (235-6). On his reading, *Angst* teaches that there are ‘no norms, no possibilities, which are binding on Dasein simply in virtue of its being Dasein’ (230). And death, in turn, as Dasein’s ‘ownmost possibility’, shows that to be a self is to ‘confront’ the ‘absence of such a norm’ (233). Finally, conscience calls me to the kind of responsibility possible in such a situation: not to be responsible for the norms according to which I act (which derive from the social whole, *das Man*), but rather for their normative *force*. To be authentic, or ‘resolute’, is to act with a ‘transparent’ understanding of this existential relation to the space of reasons (218).

Here Golob poses two questions: Why should we accept Heidegger’s account of the self and its characterization of the normative ground of intentionality? And why should we care about authenticity? Thanks to the ‘scope of [Heidegger’s] ambition’, answering the first question is hard; it would, for instance, require us to ‘rule out alternatives’, such as normative realism, which Heidegger ‘barely considers’ (237). Golob answers the second question by appeal to what he calls Heidegger’s ‘methodological perfectionism’ (240). This yields, first, a *hypothetical* reason to care about authenticity: if Dasein ‘fully realizes its own essence’ in authenticity, and if such realization is ‘a necessary condition on good philosophy’, then insofar as I am engaged in the project of philosophy I will have a reason to care about authenticity (240). Because Heidegger holds that philosophy requires a special sort of first-person commitment that ‘guarantees that we are “coining the appropriate existential concepts”’ (225) rather than merely taking over traditional tropes, authenticity would be something like an obligation for the philosopher. But Golob goes further: on the basis of the exegetical fact that Heidegger often describes existence itself as a kind of ‘philosophizing’

(241), it seems that a concern for authenticity is a desideratum for *all* acting for the sake of something. Though this does not amount to an ‘obligation’ to be authentic (244), authenticity allows us to ‘better navigate among the irreducibly finite’ demands that confront us in *das Man* (243), because only as authentic are we ‘genuine loci of responsibility’ (248). Having presented his interpretation of Heidegger, Golob concludes his book with some contrarian reflections. First, his dismissal of the dominant approach’s emphasis on the phenomenological difference between ‘sensorimotor’ intentionality and reflective deliberation is generalized to the claim that ‘Heideggerian phenomenology places no special weight on conscious experience’ (254). I think this conclusion is hasty. It is true that ‘insofar as Heidegger’s phenomenology can be said to have a single guiding light, it is [...] normativity’ (254), but it seems to me that neither the prototype theory nor the account of finitude are intelligible apart from a phenomenology that refers at every point—if only tacitly—to the descriptive features of first-person experience. First, Heidegger’s understanding of concepts (or prototypes) as ‘formal indications’—a notion that Golob mentions but does not develop—is predicated on the very kind of experiential ‘authenticity’ Golob himself emphasizes: insight into the ‘evidence situation’ in which we *try* to ‘coin the appropriate existential concepts’. Second, the sort of self-directed transcendental argument that does the heavy lifting in Chapter Three requires that the descriptive features of our experience be fixed, and there is no way to do that except through reflection on first-person experience. Finally, the accuracy conditions that Golob attributes to the *a*-variable cannot really be characterized without engaging in the kind of phenomenological reflections that Merleau-Ponty (and his dominant approach followers, among others) pursue. Somewhat surprisingly, Golob concludes by calling into question the whole project of looking for an intentionality that is more primordial than propositional intentionality. Here the paradox of interpreting *Being and Time* through the later notion of prototype becomes acute. For Golob seems to think that the failure of the prototype theory *as such* is demonstrated by *Being and Time*’s failure to establish time as the prototype for all understanding of being. Thus he suggests that we drop the prototype theory and think of Heidegger’s subsequent turn to freedom and normativity not as unearthing a more primordial mode of intentionality but as a way of ‘unpacking the explanatory structure of propositional intentionality’ (255). The result would be that ‘there would be no mode of intentionality that was not propositional’ (256).

I am not convinced that this is anything more than a terminological matter. When in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* Heidegger calls Dasein’s transcendence a kind of ‘primordial intentionality’, he distinguishes it clearly enough from act-intentionality, and not much seems to hang on whether one calls it an ‘explanatory condition’ of propositional intentionality rather than a mode of intentionality itself. And while Golob thinks that the claims about freedom and normativity he developed in Chapters Five and Six are ‘compatible’ with the prototype theory but ‘logically separable from it’ (255), I’m not so sure. I agree that the prototype theory is at work in *Being and Time*, though it is not named there; but I would argue that the normative concept of freedom, also not named, is at work there as well. And I have already suggested that the failure of *Being and Time* stems not from the prototype theory itself but from an unmotivated commitment to the idea that there must be a single exemplary meaning of being. If, further, one attends to the role of the *agathon* in Heidegger’s actual development of the prototype theory—as the formally-indicating concept which adumbrates the context of my responsibility for going on in light of what I hold to be ‘best’—then separating freedom from *Vorbild* does not seem to be an option. The claim that the relation between freedom and normativity is the explanatory ground of propositional intentionality stands or falls with conceiving of conceptual normativity as context-adumbrating exemplarity to which I am committed in my practice and whose meaning is

always at issue in that practice. Whether this remains a kind of ‘conceptualism’ in Sacha Golob’s specific sense can remain open for now. His wonderful book will be indispensable for any future discussion of Heidegger and intentionality.

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Cregan, International Journal of Philosophical Studies.

Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity

By Sacha Golob

Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. xvii + 270. ISBN 978 - 1- 107- 03170 - 8. £60.00/\$95.00) (hbk).

The aim of Sacha Golob's recent book *Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity* is to offer up a fundamentally new account of the arguments and concepts which define Heidegger's early philosophy. For all intents and purposes the text delivers exactly that. The acuity with which Golob handles his presentation of Heidegger's position, as well as the overall rigour, strength and originality of the claims advanced mark this book out as a timely and substantial contribution to the field. The approach is patient, but not laboured; detailed, technical and at times dense; but above all readable and highly rewarding. While its thesis may not entirely resonate with the diversity of approaches to Heidegger's philosophy the book should, nonetheless, be of real benefit to all those with a strong interest in Heidegger's thought; it will also appeal to anyone with an interest in the historical context to which such texts as *Sein und Zeit* belong. Those conversant in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and philosophy of perception will similarly find much of value in the account which Golob presents. Here, however, I focus on only a general presentation of what I consider to be the book's most important claims.

To a large degree the arguments put forward hinge on a distinction drawn between propositional intentionality and conceptual content, resulting in the novel, and to some perhaps paradoxical claim that propositional intentionality is derivative for Heidegger on a 'mode of experience that is conceptual and yet nonpropositional' (p. 3). As Chapter 3 fleshes out in detail, the derivative nature of propositional content is best grasped in terms of the '*a* as *b* variable' (broadly understood along the lines of the conjunction of what the author calls *Context, A Priori* and *Ontological Knowledge*). Later chapters, although in part logically independent, explore the implications of this reading with particular regard to the role of normativity.

The early discussion centres around two preliminary considerations: first, can a viable reading be found for *Derivative*, i.e., the claim that 'propositional intentionality is explanatory derivative on some irreducibly nonpropositional mode of intentionality' (p. 25); and second, can it be shown with sufficient philosophical and exegetical clarity that propositional intentionality is something which Heidegger indexes to an times multiply ambiguous *present-at-hand* ontology (glossed in the existing literature, and defined in this case as *Present-at-hand**) (p. 19). According to the 'dominant account' (in its most sophisticated form attributed to Carman and Wrathall) propositional intentionality as Heidegger conceives of it is unable to capture the richer aspects of experience; this entails the claim that Dasein's basic form of intentionality is instead nonpropositional and nonconceptual. This view is seemingly mistaken: 'the primary level of Dasein's intentionality is not nonconceptual and nonpropositional; Heidegger does not hold that propositions necessarily distort our basic forms of our experience' (p. 28). In short, Golob at first seems to be claiming that Dasein's basic mode of intentionality does not appeal to some nebulous, nonpropositional *x* which is supposed to be constitutive of 'world' as Heidegger understands it. This claim, however problematic it may appear to some (particularly in the context of *SZ*),

is well argued. The dominant approach is treated fairly, seriously and with balance, though the conclusion holds that none of the existing proposals (e.g., defining the constitutive x in terms of the practical) are ‘ultimately satisfactory’ (p. 40). As is suggested, we therefore ‘need to abandon the dominant reading of Heidegger on intentionality’ (p. 46).

What immediately follows is largely couched in terms of *Present-at-hand*[#], a nuanced reinterpretation of Heidegger’s thesis. On Golob’s reading of the issue *present-at-hand* entities are not only represented by propositions but those propositions must, in turn, ‘be subject to a certain type of philosophical analysis’ (p. 49). He subsequently holds that this new reading severs the widely held link between *Present-at-hand* and *Derivative*. This, we’re similarly told, is an acceptance of the view that all intentionality is propositional but not of the view that all propositions are mere ‘assertions’ as subject to ‘logical’ analysis. Declarative statements of the kind found in *SZ* need not therefore result in distortion: this ‘is something done *to*, not *by*, propositional content’ (p. 54). The problem for Heidegger would then appear to lie not in propositions per se, but in the kind of philosophical method (a logical, theoretical or meta-linguistic approach, for example) to which our propositions are unsatisfactorily subject. Accordingly, Heidegger is ‘trying to free linguistic practice from a particular methodological framework’ (p. 63); to instead look at propositional intentionality through an analysis of *Dasein* and the assertions which belong to *Dasein* within its social context. Similar claims appear in McManus’s insightful *Heidegger and the Measure of Truth* (OUP, 2012), but the thesis is certainly in marked opposition to the Carman-Wrathall model as outlined; it also rejects Dahlstrom’s paradox of thematization as well as Blattner’s problem of self-reference. Of course, we’re still left with a problem here. If propositional content (cleansed or purified in some way) can capture the constitutive x noted above how might the *Derivative* thesis be explained? Why, in other words, would we be inclined to accept the view that there’s also a mode of intentionality prior to and separate from that which is intended propositionally?

The solution (offered in Chapter 3) is simple according to Golob: Heidegger adopts two modes of intentionality, based not on differing content but on different *grammars*, i.e., ‘irreducibly different mechanisms for delivering that content’ (p. 68). So, the mistake as Heidegger sees it lies not in any reliance on propositional intentionality (commonly seen to entail merely some species of the *present-at-hand*) but stems from the way in which propositional intentionality has been analysed by the tradition. This claim is certainly novel. If correct, however, then how one wonders is this commonality (content) and distinction (grammar) to hold?

The potential fix on offer is grounded in the claim that *Dasein*’s primary level of intentionality is now conceptual yet nonpropositional. Golob qualifies his stance on *Conceptualism* by claiming that conceptual content is basic but that *Dasein*’s primary level of intentionality does not contain conceptual elements only. This, in what seems like an Allisonian-Kantian register, therefore implies ‘*two very different vehicles*’ (p. 71) for conceptual intentionality, one of which is propositional, the other nonpropositional. The difference thus is not quantitative but qualitative. The difference lies in the mode of articulation itself directed by one or other of these two vehicles; according to Golob, Heidegger (albeit after much internal conflict) prioritizes the latter.

The book similarly draws on a great deal within contemporary analytic philosophy of mind here. Representationalist theories of intentionality are discussed; Husserl and analytic neo-Husserlians are also employed. Steering clear of any representational account for the time being, however (*SZ*, it’s suggested, avoids both meditational and indirect representationalism, for example), the argument is made that Heidegger’s stance is best characterized by a certain context-creating ability; it is ‘the capacity to intend entities as standing in various relations’ (p. 82) which is not, it must be emphasized, a capacity to intend

relations between entities in terms of a capacity to endorse propositions. This, I think, is persuasive and well supported textually. It similarly gets to the heart of the ‘*a* as *b* structure’ or ‘context model’ upon which Golob’s Heidegger relies. A lot here will similarly pivot around Heidegger’s Kantian heritage and the transcendental arguments which Golob takes him to advance. These transcendental arguments are not seen to be directed at entities (‘if they were they would merely be ontic’: p. 89) but are rather directed at an ontological context and our ability to intend entities within a meaningful relation. This context (roughly the *b* variable) is not to be construed along the lines of Fregean sense or Husserlian noema, however. The *b* variable may be explanatorily basic but it is not metaphysically independent of the entity to which it relates. Yet this seems to make intentionality sound like something relational nonetheless. Golob endeavours to head this worry off (and here the hope is to incorporate the arguments of Zahavi and Crowell) by claiming that intentionality cannot be reduced to some kind of interaction between the physical and psychical, say. This, it is claimed (though the success seems debatable), stems in part from the fact that Heidegger avoids the use of basic metaphysical vocabulary in the same way as other authors.

Golob next tackles the ‘prototype’ in terms of which *b* variable might make sense. ‘In Heideggerian terminology, what we need to explain is the nature of ontological knowledge, of our familiarity with something other than an entity which serves as the basis for Dasein’s engagement with entities’ (p. 112). Naturally enough the answer will be time: ‘time ... is the relevant prototype for world’ (p. 112). Hence time is the conceptual, nonpropositional, non-entity like prototype in terms of which entities are made manifest. Golob elaborates on these themes by way of an understandable reference to Heidegger’s ‘repetition’ of Kant (transformed again by way of a prototype account of intentionality in relation to time) and Plato (underpinned by the claim that Heidegger finds here further justification for his reliance on a foundational prototype). Needless to say these sections, though brief, progress with the same fine-grained, sophisticated and careful level of analysis indicative of the text as a whole. I suspect, however, that some will take issue with Golob’s account of the latter. Personally I’m sympathetic to the approach taken. There are indeed compelling reasons for thinking that Heidegger assigns to philosophy a comparable task to that of Plato. Where in the *Phaedrus* one encounters a call for the soul to recover its wings, for example, the fundamental ontology of *SZ* arguably seeks to ‘awaken’ the memory of being in order to access the originary (though temporal) essence – the *a priori* essence – which is anterior to all entities. Other remarks (e.g., the claim in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* that philosophy ‘begins in a *fundamental event*’) might support this view, but such a reading (not least given the possible threat of *onto-theology*) will not be universally embraced.

In Chapter 4 Golob uses the arguments offered thus far as a springboard into an analysis of ‘what one might loosely call metaphysics’ (p. 155), whereby being, truth and realism are analysed in the context of the ready-to-hand. Although this chapter stands alone in certain respects (thereby fostering only a vague sense of unevenness to the progression) it is used to support the book’s overall thrust. The argument in this case revolves around the following: ‘Heidegger’s primary aim is to give a non-naturalistic, non-reductive account of the nature of Dasein’s intentionality’ (p. 161); the result of this being that Heidegger cannot be read (*contra* Searle, say) as trying to privilege the ready-to-hand over the present-at-hand for merely the ‘absurd’ reason that we somehow see things in terms of the former first of all. The priority of the ready-to-hand instead finds a more sophisticated, explanatory and methodological justification. Perhaps the most interesting work in this chapter revolves around Golob’s confrontation with Heidegger’s idealism (at least the suspicion thereof) and the counter claim that ‘Heidegger is a realist whose overriding concern is with the conditions on intentionality’ (p. 174). Much of the relevant Anglo-American literature is expertly and again charitably surveyed but the point of disagreement remains: in spite of Heidegger’s

occasional carelessness, 'intentionality is possible only through a familiarity with, a disclosure of, being which serves to create a clearing' (p. 178). The implications for truth are also explicitly cashed out in these terms. Where representational models were previously rejected, 'minimal representationalism' emerges as an alternative: entities conform to the attendant truth which transcendental, ontological knowledge entails. What this then means is that at least some form of synthesis and 'thus an accuracy condition' (p. 183) is implied. Again, this is carefully argued even if it doesn't quite steer us away from the problematic nature of Heidegger's claim. How, for example, might we progress to the 'primordial unity' (SZ 232; 327) wherein the entity is seemingly indistinguishable from the background context in terms of which its phenomenal character makes sense? Can 'togetherness [*Beisammen*]' (SZ 33) be characterized differently or, better yet, can it be neatly dovetailed with the account of *Prototype* given?

To some extent Chapters 5 and 6 offer a response to this kind of worry. Here a shift towards freedom (in accordance with Crowell freedom is understood as 'the capacity to recognize and commit oneself to norms, and to act on the basis of them': p. 195) comes centre stage. In this instance 'mineness' as specifically linked to Kantian practical freedom is the key (in so far as both are located within a normative framework, that is). Certainly by the mid to late 1930s Heidegger credits Schelling's own appropriation and revision of Kant with uncovering the necessity of freedom *viz.* the constitutive ground of Dasein. A confrontation with that assessment would have been interesting to see here but Golob nonetheless states the position (that freedom, contiguous with the distinctive ontology of Dasein, has an intended explanatorily priority) well.

This account is further fleshed out towards the end of the book. The 'radical and complex limitations' (p. 213) to which Dasein's freedom is subject (e.g., death) receive helpful treatment, as does the state of one's denial of this normative finitude, namely inauthenticity. While for Golob 'thrownness' implies an undifferentiated position initially compatible with both authentic and inauthentic understanding, the latter (at least its possibility) is unpacked by way of a reference to the phenomena of anxiety, death and guilt. All three of these issues are considered in relation to finitude, normativity and Dasein and all three phenomena, when approached in the appropriate phenomenological manner, it's suggested, contribute something worthwhile: they act as paths to lead us towards an understanding of '*Dasein itself*', an understanding in which 'no normative considerations have any force *for us*' (p. 231). Hegel is discussed in this instance and although by name the account of *Moralität* which he offers (as a kind of private, detached normative basis) is not, one can sense the qualified similarities. Yet there is it would seem a kind of intrinsic value nonetheless, though not some special 'set of principles' (p. 243) to which Dasein is beholden. The final sections of the text thereby confront Dasein's 'obligation' (for Golob ultimately a misleading term) to be authentic. The answer here comes in the form of Heidegger's 'methodological perfectionism' (§6.3), again a way of owning up to the mineness (analogous to Kant's use of 'I') of Dasein's answerability. This claim has the considerable benefit of embracing the temporal structure of human agency whereby propositional intentionality now needs to be understood in terms of *being-in-the-world*.

My overview inevitably passes over many of the subtleties in Golob's account. Suffice to say, I consider his book to be carefully argued and persuasive, showing above all how sympathetic attention to Heidegger's philosophy can still yield exciting results. I suspect that in time his book will become an important reference point for the debate and themes with which he helpfully and meticulously engages.

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Campbell, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.

In this engaging and tightly argued book, Sacha Golob defends a unique thesis about Heideggerian intentionality. In doing so, he situates Heidegger's early work (1919-1935) in a dialogue with Husserlian readings of Heidegger's philosophy as well as with contemporary analytic thinkers. The book takes up important philosophical questions about meaning, freedom, and authenticity that will be of interest to anyone inclined toward philosophy.

The book has six chapters. The first three advance Golob's new way of thinking about intentionality. He concludes that the project outlined in *Being and Time* ultimately fails because Heidegger does not provide an account of temporality that is nuanced or differentiated enough to describe the contexts of meaning that we use to understand objects. The last three chapters aim to explain Heidegger's thinking after *Being and Time* in light of that failure, but then they also return to themes from that text. In these chapters, Golob takes up the notions of freedom and normativity, which leads him to analyze a panoply of important Heideggerian notions, such as truth, authenticity, anxiety, and death. A close reading of this book will be richly rewarded, but for the sake of simplicity, let me paint with a broad brush. I take Golob to be proposing three main theses. The first is that Heidegger's idea of intentionality is conceptualist and yet non-propositional. By intentionality, Golob simply means, "a property, typically attributed to mental states, whereby those states are directed toward or about something" (6). Against many other commentators on Heidegger, this book argues that the basic level of experience for Heidegger, what Golob calls throughout the book "the explanatorily primary level of Heideggerian intentionality," contains conceptual content. In making this claim, Golob is distancing himself from those who equate conceptual and propositional intentionality (104), which then allows him to advance his next thesis. He writes, "I am going to claim that the core of Heidegger's account of nonpropositional, conceptual intentionality rests on the idea of a prototype" (109). Thus, Golob's second main thesis is that - against Kant's critical framework but consistent with Plato's theory of forms - Heidegger's intentionality employs a basic prototype approach. In *Being and Time*, that prototype is time. These two theses are fleshed out in the first three chapters, which constitute, in my judgment, the heart of the book. The fourth chapter uses the prototype approach to explain Heidegger's theory of truth, but the next thesis emerges in Chapters five and six, where Golob claims that, "freedom is the capacity to commit oneself to norms" (195). By looking at Dasein's freedom in normative terms, that is, by saying that Dasein operates "within a normative terrain" (213), Golob can then recast authenticity and inauthenticity in those terms. As such, and this I take to be the third main thesis of the book, authenticity is a matter of understanding the normative terrain in which Dasein operates, in other words, authentic Dasein, "accurately understands its own nature: i.e. it makes sense of itself . . . in a way that reflects the facts about Dasein that texts such as [*Being and Time*] have supposedly identified" (214).

As one who has now traveled along the paths beaten by this engaging and provocative book, I do want to provide something of a guidepost. The Introduction claims that the author will show that while "Dasein's primary intentionality is conceptual, it is nevertheless nonpropositional" (2). But then roughly the first seventy pages, encompassing Chapters one and two, make the case that "there is no class of content such that it cannot be captured by propositions" (67). Golob goes to great lengths to show that for Heidegger the explanatorily basic level of experience has conceptual content and can be rendered in propositions, even scientific propositions (64), that do not distort that experience. We find him asserting in Chapter one, for example, that "the primary level of Dasein's intentionality is not

nonconceptual and nonpropositional" (28), and we even find him defending "the view that all intentionality is propositional" (34). In light of his contention in the Introduction, this was confusing, at least until Chapter three, where we learn that Heideggerian intentionality is conceptual but can be nonpropositional.

Nonetheless, Golob is raising a fascinating and important multifaceted question here, which I might synthesize in the following way: do concepts, propositions, and assertions in some way distort or diminish our basic way of experiencing the world? Golob writes, "One of the classic arguments for nonconceptual content is that certain experiences, in particular perception, are somehow so rich or diffuse or fine-grained that they cannot be captured in language" (10). This is an important expression, which surfaces numerous times throughout the text. Golob catalogs an array of positions by thinkers who claim that for Heidegger, language fails to do justice to the richness of human experience. The conceptualist reading of Heidegger advanced by Golob depends on how we understand what Heidegger says in *Being and Time* about present-at-hand entities and about the notion of assertion. Golob carefully dissects various ways of conceiving what is meant by the present-at-hand, but the gist of his argument is that concepts, assertions, and propositions do not necessarily cut an entity off from the context of meaningful relations in which it is embedded and so do not necessarily render the entity present-at-hand.

To take just a few examples, he argues that assertions might preserve an entity's relationship to its context (20); that the conceptual is not necessarily a "detached or deliberate or explicit or self-conscious experience" (30); that skills or *savoir faire*, which Hubert Dreyfus says are nonpropositional, "need only be cashed as the capacity to apply one proposition rather than another" (34) (meaning that "the skill is not a mode of intentionality" 34n84); and that cognition is not simply a matter of staring at entities but is rather an "active process" that does not involve "a suspension of practical concerns" (38-39). But the most important ideas relate to what Golob, referring to Taylor Carman and Mark Wrathall, has termed the Carman-Wrathall model, which argues that for practical, normative, and perceptual reasons, "propositions are unable to capture the distinctive content present at the primary level of experience" (40). On Golob's reading, they say this because, first, our primary comportments and behaviors are practically and not conceptually oriented (43-44), second, our basic, fundamental level of experience cannot be either true or false (44), and, third, the primary level of intentionality involves a kind of perceptual, sensory-motor experience that is either too vague or too rich to be grasped in propositions.

Interestingly, Golob's responses to these claims chiefly take the form of questions: "what sense of 'practical' is in play here such that it is opposed to 'conceptual or logical'?" (43-44); "why . . . can't the instrumental chains beloved by Heidegger be captured in propositional terms?" (44); "why could this pursuit of ends and competence not be analysed *in terms of*, rather than opposed to, my possession of the relevant concepts?" (44); "why can I not simply assert propositions such as 'these entities stand in a normative relation other than truth'?" (45). In other words, in this key section of the text, Golob does not so much argue as implore his interlocutors to see something that seems quite clear to him. Why is it that Golob views things so differently than Carman, Wrathall, Dreyfus, and others? It may have something to do with what they are looking for. Golob says that the "Carman-Wrathall model aims to identify some feature *x* which both explains why the explanatory primary form of Dasein's intentionality is nonpropositional and why such intentionality cannot be captured by a proposition" (43). Is Heidegger looking for an explicit *x*?

Consider what he says in "The Origin of the Work of Art" about color. He writes, "Color shines and wants only to shine. When we analyze it in rational terms by measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and

unexplained."^[1] The same can be said about experience, even in the early Heidegger, where he was concerned about the ways that language, including discussion, distorts experience. Golob insists that when Heidegger says that propositions diminish our experiences, he has in mind "*a particular philosophical approach*" (53-54). That approach, he says, is when an assertion is "subject to 'logical' analysis" (54). But when we look back at Heidegger's early lecture courses, we see that he was very much concerned about the ways in which ordinary language, even just recounting what happened to you during the day, modifies and even distorts the original experience.^[2] Thus the issue is not with whether certain experiences cannot be captured by concepts and propositions. All experiences are subject to linguistic articulation, but when we do so, something is lost. The original experience is modified, distorted or leveled down in some way. Here is an example that may resonate with anyone reading this review. The conceptual apparatus used in teaching evaluations may tell us something about what happened in a classroom, but they will never grasp the experience that students had taking the class. One can argue, and Golob does (64), that in using propositions and assertions in his own work, Heidegger (on the dominant view that Golob is criticizing) is engaging in the very objectification, distortion, and leveling down that he opposes, resulting in a paradox or contradiction. But this passes over his endless attempts at developing neologisms and inventive linguistic innovations, which were designed to resist the conceptual leveling down that he thought plagued language itself.

In Chapter three, which is the longest and most complicated, Golob builds upon his claim that the primary level of Heideggerian intentionality necessarily, though not exclusively, contains conceptual content. The two nonconceptual elements of that intentionality are objects and moods. This is a remarkable chapter, providing an in-depth analysis of the basic contextual structure of intentionality in *Being and Time*, carefully explaining what it means for Heidegger to make the hermeneutic claim that we understand "a as b," that is, that we understand an entity "a" in terms of its context "b." For Heidegger, we must have some familiarity with that context in terms of which we understand entities. Golob argues that that context cannot itself be an entity, or else we would need some other context in order to understand it. To avoid this infinite regress, we must have some *apriori* familiarity with that context. Golob does not mention the hermeneutic circle here, which might solve the problem of infinite regress. Nonetheless, Golob's account here is highly innovative. He discerns in Heidegger a prepropositional and yet conceptual level of meaning, which he calls "a new depth grammar." It is a grammar because the prepropositional content may be expressed in propositions without any loss of meaning, as both contain identical conceptual content. This innovation is the prototype model.

For Golob we are able to locate entities within a relational context, that is, we are able to locate the "a" variable within the "b" variable, because of "a prior familiarity with a prototype that exemplifies the relations that define those contexts" (109). Golob uses the example of a hat to introduce the way in which one's nonpropositional exposure to the hat can familiarize one with the different relations according to which we make sense of similar entities (109). He then argues that the prototype in *Being and Time* is time. Importantly, the prototype cannot be an entity, due to the infinite regress mentioned above. It must be ontological and thus not a being.

In my judgment, this prototype approach has remarkable potential to explain Heidegger's thinking, especially his use of examples, which are often the most illuminating and instructive aspects of his thought. But how can time be a prototype? A prototype, such as the hat, is particular, an example serving as a model, and it is an entity. I do not see how a prototype can be general and not an entity, which is why I also do not see the links between the prototype model and the Platonic forms (123-135). I wish that Golob had not used the term "prototype" in his definition of prototype (109). In the discussion of Plato, he talks about

the Platonic "ideas as prototypes" (133), but, again, this does not fit with Golob's example of the hat. Copies of the hat must look exactly like the prototypical hat. For Plato, however, hats can come in many different shapes, sizes, and colors, and yet still participate in the form or idea of hat. Ultimately, I do not see how time or even modes of time like *Temporalität* and *Zeitlichkeit* can serve as prototypes because they are general. Golob might have gone in a different direction here, using the prototype approach to explain how Heidegger uses specific examples, such as the bridge that extends over the Neckar River in Heidelberg in "Building Dwelling Thinking," to show how phenomenological descriptions of specific things can familiarize us with meaningful contexts, opening up space and a world in which to dwell.

Golob's understanding of what Heidegger means by Being is different from what many scholars of Heidegger take it to mean, and I think he knows this. The book is meant to offer a new, and controversial, way of thinking about Heidegger's work. So, when Golob talks about truth, he deviates from the more common understanding of truth in Heidegger as unconcealment prior to correctness and incorrectness by saying that Heidegger is a minimal representationalist whose notion of truth must contain "accuracy conditions" (180). Golob argues that for Heidegger, truth involves meaning, and thus understanding, and something can always be understood either correctly or incorrectly (183). As such, to understand Being involves the correct or incorrect understanding of the properties of a thing, which constitute its essence (184). For Golob, an entity cannot simply be disclosed or given. It must be contextualised, the "a" variable must be located within the "b" variable, and with the "a as b" structure an accuracy condition is operative (183).

A Heideggerian response to this would be to say that the properties of a thing do not constitute its Being. Properties are beings, entities, and so are ontic on Heidegger's terms, not ontological. But Golob's approach to Heidegger is conceptual through and through. Even moods are conceptual: "their role is to articulate essentially conceptual structures" (207). When he talks about authenticity and freedom, he sees these as involving self-understanding within a normative terrain and thus within the "space of reasons" (220). Golob surely is right when he says that one can be authentic against the backdrop of a social world dominated by "the one" (217-218). But then he views anxiety as a "conceptual state" wherein one is disconnected or separated from a "web of interrelated tools and tasks" (227) that is still there but no longer has "normative force" for you (233). Authenticity then "requires a full understanding of Dasein, and by extension of the basic contours of the space of reasons" (218), and the "demand" to be authentic becomes "a necessary precondition on philosophy" (241). Concluding, Golob views Heidegger as saying that authenticity is important because it is essential for doing good philosophy. But Heidegger is not trying to say that "all activity is philosophy, and all value is philosophical value" (242). He was not trying to make human existence more philosophical, he was trying to connect philosophy to human existence. My worry is that Golob's understanding of Heidegger is too theoretical, too conceptualist, which is why he claims that authenticity in "Heidegger's perspective is profoundly theoretical" (242) and why he makes the practical awareness of *savoir faire* or know-how into a knowledge affair: "it is the *know* . . . that makes possible the how" (140, emphasis in original).

Whether you agree with the arguments in this book or not may depend on how you understand concepts. My sense is that the Carman-Wrathall model thinks of a concept as "an explicit or thematic or systematic understanding" of something, which is how Golob says we should not think about the concept, mainly because if we did, then Kant's categories would not be concepts (9). But even Kant says that the categories are special concepts. Golob

appeals to Kant's notion of concept, but then in his definition, Golob employs the very language that he argues against. He says that the content of a concept "is not qualitatively rich or diffuse or fine-grained in a way that prohibits its expression in any declarative sentence" (10). I think this begs the question, since Golob's point is that there is no content so "rich or diffuse or fine-grained" that it cannot be stated in concepts. But maybe this does not matter. At the heart of this book is a question with a long philosophical history: do concepts (or assertions, or propositions), as James might say, still the stream of experience? Golob's engaging and thought-provoking answer makes an important contribution to a new chapter in the history of that question, one from which both analytic and continental thinkers will profit greatly.

[1] Heidegger, Martin. "The Origin of the Work of Art," translated by Albert Hofstadter in *Basic Writings*, edited by David Farrell Krell (Harper Collins, 1977, 1993).

[2] See GA 58 *Basic Problems of Phenomenology: Winter Semester 1919/1920*, tr. Scott M. Campbell (Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 90-91.

Keiling, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung.

Sacha Golob: *Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity*, 270 S., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014.

Sacha Golob entwickelt mit wünschenswerter Klarheit eine normativitätstheoretische Interpretation von Heideggers Intentionalitätsverständnis. Deren systematische Pointe besteht darin, dass Heidegger *nicht-propositionale* Intentionalität beschreibt, die dennoch immer auch sprachliche oder begriffliche Gehalte umfasst und deshalb in einem schwachen Sinne durchaus *begrifflich* ist. Wenn diese Theorie kohärent ist, würde Heidegger in ein bisher kaum erschlossenes, wenn nicht ganz neues Gebiet der Intentionalitätstheorie gehören.

Die ersten beiden Kapitel haben das Ziel, die herrschende Deutung von *Sein und Zeit* (SZ) zu widerlegen, durch welche diese Pointe gerade ausgeschlossen wird: Folgt man der von Hubert Dreyfus entwickelten und gegenwärtig von Taylor Carman, Mark Wrathall und insbesondere Sean Kelly vertretenen Lesart, ist für Heidegger eine nicht-begriffliche Form von Intentionalität fundamental. Durch eine solche Auslegung seiner These, dass das Seinsverständnis der Vorhandenheit in der Zuhandenheit fundiert ist, wird Heidegger in Vorwegnahme Merleau-Pontys zum Theoretiker eines *mindless coping* und verkörperter Motorintentionalität. Nach einer vorbildlichen Klärung seiner Begriffe diskutiert Golob insgesamt zehn verschiedene Argumente und Varianten dieser Deutung, die er aus exegetischen und/ oder konzeptionellen Gründen verwirft (28 – 47).

Seine eigene Lesart entwickelt Golob dann ab dem dritten Kapitel durch eine Diskussion des „hermeneutischen Als“. Intentionalität definiert sich demnach am Modell ‚*a-als-b*‘: *etwas* (a) wird *als etwas* (b) intendiert, wobei Golob dies als den *Kontext* näher bestimmt, in dem a intendiert wird. Das erlaubt es ihm, Vorhandenheit und Zuhandenheit schlicht als verschiedene Varianten der b-Variablen, als verschiedene „Grammatiken“ (71) zu rekonstruieren, wie a intentional erfasst werden kann. Entscheidend ist nun Golobs These, dass die b-Variable nicht *propositional*, aber *begrifflich* gefüllt werden muss: a wird im Hinblick auf einen Kontext intendiert, der eine logische Struktur hat und damit zum Raum der Gründe gehört. Die logische Struktur von b erläutert Golob, indem er Heidegger die *Prototypen*-These (109) zuschreibt, der zufolge jede intentionale Erfassung eines jeweiligen a eine *allgemeinere* Form von Intentionalität (einen Prototyp), welche die b-Variable repräsentiert, beinhaltet. Die Prototypen-These führt Golob deshalb dazu, Heidegger einen *schwachen Konzeptualismus* zuzuschreiben, den er durch vier Merkmale erläutert (10): Intentionale Zustände beinhalten immer auch ein Moment generischer Allgemeinheit (i) und schließen deshalb normative oder inferentielle Relationen mit ein (ii). Außerdem verfügen weder Tiere über begriffliche Intentionalität in diesem Sinne (iii), noch gibt es für Heidegger intentionale Gehalte, die zu fein wären, um nicht begrifflich erfasst werden zu können (iv). Paradigmatische Fälle für solche Prototypen sind die sogenannten „horizontalen Schemata“ der Temporalität, deren ontologisches Wissen nicht-propositional, aber eben begrifflich ist, weil diese Schemata Grundformen von Intentionalität umschreiben, innerhalb derer sich alle Intentionalität bewegen muss.

In exegetischer Hinsicht erlaubt es die Prototypen-These Golob nicht nur, Heideggers Projekt von den Frühschriften über SZ bis zu den *Grundproblemen der Phänomenologie* (GA 24) mit Hilfe aktueller Begrifflichkeit aus den Debatten um den Intentionalitätsbegriff nachzuzeichnen. Auch die Kritik an Husserls Repräsentationalismus der Noemata ebenso wie seine Auseinandersetzung mit Kant und Platon kann Golob schlüssig erläutern: Immer

handelt es sich um Versuche, das in intentionalen Zuständen vorausgesetzte begriffliche, aber nicht propositionale Wissen zu erläutern. Im vierten Kapitel erläutert Golob von dieser Beobachtung ausgehend Heideggers Metaphysik und Wahrheitstheorie aus dem so entwickelten Intentionalitätsverständnis. Dabei erweist sich Heidegger als Realist in einem spezifischen Sinne: Gegen die These eines „temporalen Idealismus“ (William Blattner) wendet Golob die Überlegung, dass Heidegger ontologisches Wissen zwar als Bedingung dafür versteht, dass sich Menschen auf etwas (a) beziehen können. Aber Zeit ist nicht für die Individuation von a's verantwortlich (177).

Die letzten beiden Kapitel stellen Heideggers Intentionalitätsverständnis dann in einen neuen, normativitätstheoretischen Zusammenhang: Golob versteht Heideggers Beschäftigung mit Freiheit als Alternative zum mit SZ scheiternden Versuch, Temporalität als Bedingung und Grundform von Intentionalität zu erläutern. Beide Formen der Beschreibung der Möglichkeit von Intentionalität seien logisch unabhängig. Obwohl Golob hier viel von anderen normativitätstheoretischen Interpretationen übernimmt, die insbesondere John Haugeland seit den 1980er Jahren entwickelt hat, weicht er damit in einem entscheidenden Punkt doch von diesen ab: Golob trennt die Freiheit, sich in der Alternative von Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit zu normativen Ansprüchen Anderer (des „Man“) zu verhalten, von jeder Form eines primären Weltverstehens. Während etwa Steven Crowell zu zeigen versucht hat, dass Heidegger an einer Vorstellung des Guten als Grund und Maßstab von Intentionalität *epekeina tes ousias* festhält, so dass das Gute jene Stelle besetzt, die für Kant das moralische Gesetz hatte, fehlt in Golobs Rekonstruktion jede Form einer solchen (transzendenten) Bindung. Anstatt also die Prototypen-These normativitätstheoretisch zu reformulieren geht Golob lediglich davon aus, dass Eigentlichkeit als formalisierte Variante einer normativen Bestimmung des Menschseins zu verstehen ist. Für Heidegger sei es weiterhin typisch, in einer Art *methodologischem Perfektionismus* (240) eigentliche Existenz und den ‚richtigen‘ Vollzug von Philosophie zu identifizieren. Dadurch folgt in Golobs Interpretation aus dem Scheitern von Heideggers fundamentalontologischem Projekt ein Bild von Normativität als Zusammenspiel sich zwar womöglich authentisch aber zuletzt immer beliebig selbst verpflichtender Individuen. Von der Endlichkeit des Daseins ist auch die Philosophie nicht ausgenommen, auch sie untersteht zuerst dem Ideal der Eigentlichkeit und ist erst dann der Wahrheit verpflichtet.

Ob Golob damit der radikalen, sogar revolutionären Funktion gerecht wird, die Heidegger der Philosophie zuschreibt, ist jedoch zu bezweifeln. Zwar scheitert Heidegger sicherlich daran, Temporalität als jenen *absoluten* Kontext zu beschreiben, in dem sich alle Intentionalität hält, und es ist zumindest fraglich, ob das Gute für Heidegger tatsächlich als Bedingung normativer Orientierung fungiert, wie Crowell meint. Aber das Scheitern der fundamentalontologischen Spekulation bedeutet zumindest für Heidegger noch nicht, dass die Seinsfrage verschwindet oder die Frage nach dem Guten an ihre Stelle tritt. Auch werkgeschichtlich beschäftigt sich Heidegger zwar immer weniger mit dem Sein, dafür umso mehr mit dem Erscheinen der Welt als „Geviert“. Hier wäre genauer zu untersuchen, inwiefern es sich nicht gerade bei diesem Begriff um eine erneute Variante der Prototypen-These handelt—allerdings dadurch abgewandelt, dass Heidegger an die Stelle des Vorrangs der Zeit vier gleichursprüngliche Strukturmomente setzt.

Golob beschließt sein Buch mit dem Vorschlag, die Suche nach einer vorpropositionalen Form von Intentionalität einzustellen und Heideggers Normativitätstheorie vielmehr als Angebot zu verstehen, die Tiefenstruktur propositionaler Intentionalität zu begreifen (255). Wie diese Alternative näher zu verstehen ist, führt Golob nicht weiter aus, macht aber darauf aufmerksam, dass sich von seiner Interpretation Linien ins Spätwerk ziehen lassen müssten. Das ist in der Tat eine vielversprechende Perspektive: Bedenkt man etwa die Rolle des „Worts“ in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, dann ließe sich auch dem späten

Heidegger ein schwacher Konzeptualismus zuschreiben, der jedoch von der propositionalen Struktur von Sprache nicht zu trennen ist, ganz so wie Golob es annimmt. Im Ergebnis bringt Golobs Buch so nicht nur die bislang erbittert, aber ergebnislos geführten Diskussionen um Heideggers Beschreibung nicht-propositionaler Intentionalität wesentlich voran, sondern stellt zuletzt die Trennung zwischen einer nicht-propositionalen und einer abgeleiteten propositionalen Intentionalitätsform grundsätzlich in Frage. Damit läuft sie auf eine nur angedeutete hermeneutische Lesart zu, in der Heideggers Sprachphilosophie zentral werden müsste. Integriert man diese jedoch als Variante eines späten Konzeptualismus Heideggers in die von Golob rekonstruierte Normativitätstheorie, dann dürfte sich diese in einer Weise anreichern, wie es weder der temporalen Ontologie noch Heideggers Andeutungen zur Rolle des Guten gelingt.

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