factalism. But regardless of whether factalism is true, Turner argues, the book has much to teach us about ontology: the reductions provided by Tractarian geometry tell us something about the nature of ontological structure. Indeed, the fact that the problems for factalism were solved by using hypersurfaces and quality spaces suggests, in his view, that any satisfactory theory of the ultimate constituents of reality will need to postulate at least *proxies* for objects and qualities.

As Turner explicitly says in the Introduction, the book aims to be as ecumenical as possible: many theoretical options are explored, typically to show the machinery developed to be applicable to combinations of factalism with a variety of other philosophical positions. All the same, certain important assumptions and moves are made along the way. For instance, the fact that, as we have seen, Turner takes the language of appearances to be the 'first-order fragment of English' raises the issue of how exactly English sentences are to be formalized. Turner says that this is a problem for everybody, but this appears to neglect the option of thinking that there is no privileged way of formalizing natural language sentences independently of our aims and interests, which will contextually vary. Or to give another example, there is no extensive discussion of theory choice in metaphysics, despite the fact that a number of theories are rejected on the basis of how well they fare with respect to certain theoretical virtues. This, however, does not detract from the many merits of the book, which is carefully executed and makes very clear exactly what moves and at which points the factalist is required to make if her view is to survive a number of classical and novel objections. It will be of interest to anybody working on facts, factalism and the nature of ontology more generally.

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Causation and Free Will

BY CAROLINA SARTORIO

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Before Frankfurt cases nearly every philosopher assumed moral responsibility involved *leeway freedom*, that if an action is inevitable, the agent can't be responsible. Here's a typical Frankfurt case. Jones has good reasons to shoot Smith. Black, a

nefarious neuroscientist, secretly installs a device in Jones's brain that, if triggered, causes Jones to decide to shoot, for Black wants to be sure Jones shoots; if Jones wavers, Black will trigger the device. But when the time comes, Jones does not waver and shoots. What explains Jones's action? Not Black; he didn't trigger the device. It was Jones, even though, in the circumstances, his action was inevitable. Responsibility then does not seem to involve leeway freedom. If so, what kind of freedom does responsibility involve?

One popular approach is that responsibility involves the agent's *basis* for doing what she did – the *actual history* or *actual sequence* (ACS) leading up to her action.

Carolina Sartorio's *Causation and Free Will* advances an importantly original version of the ACS approach. For Sartorio, freedom is grounded in aspects of ACSs *and nothing other*. Which aspects? *Causal* aspects. In slogan form, 'there is no difference in freedom without a difference in (the relevant elements of) the *causal* sequence'. Jones is responsible for killing Smith because of the actual *causal* history leading up to his pulling the trigger, and nothing else. Nothing, for example, having to do with counterfactuals or the modal profile of the agent's ability to make decisions. Causal history and *causal history alone* does the trick. Hence the title of her book.

Sartorio makes two major moves, each designed to overcome a significant intuitive challenge. We think conveying those two moves best reveals the appeal of her book.

Here is the first. Just as Frankfurt cases support an ACS view, other cases speak against it. Consider:

> **Phones**: I witness a man being beaten, and consider calling the police. I could easily pick up the phone and call, but I decide not to, out of fear and laziness.

> **No Phones**: Everything is the same as in Phones, except that, unbeknownst to me, I couldn't have called because the lines were down at the time.

Intuitively, I'm responsible for failing to call the police in **Phones**, but not in **No Phones**. Why? Sartorio's opponent says it's because I could have done otherwise in **Phones** but not in **No Phones** (dialing would have made no difference). But the actual causal sequences are the same (I see the man, consider calling, but out of fear and laziness decide not to). We here have a difference in freedom but identity in actual historical causal sequence. Sartorio can't be right.

Not so fast, Sartorio argues. There's a *causal* difference between the cases. In both, the states of the agent are the same (I see the man, consider calling, but out of fear and laziness decide not to), but the *causal explanation* for the failure to call the police differs. In **Phones**, the reason the police don't receive a call is *because I don't pick up the phone*. In **Phones**, not calling *made all the difference*. But in **No Phones**, the reason why the police don't receive a call is *because the lines are down*. My failure to pick up the phone *made no difference*. Sartorio uses a clever analogy to buttress this last point. If your child tries to reach the sky by jumping, he is sure to fail. Then imagine out of fear and laziness he doesn't even try. Does his fear and laziness causally explain why he doesn't reach the sky? Surely not. Sartorio points to the 'extrinsicness' of causation as the general feature of causation lying behind the difference in the cases.

Here is the second major move. Just as Frankfurt cases support an ACS view, they can undermine them. Here's why.

When deciding to shoot Smith, Jones is responsive to reasons for *and against*. For example, if Smith's child were present, Jones would not have decided to shoot

(to spare the child from having to watch her father die). But wait! What about Black? With Black in the background, Black will intervene and trigger the device; Jones will shoot nonetheless. But then how can Jones, in such a situation, count as reasons-responsive? And if reasons-responsiveness is required for freedom and responsibility – as ACS views assert – how could an agent be free and responsible in a Frankfurt case? Doesn't the very motivation for an ACS view undermine its very plausibility?

The best-known ACS theory is from Fischer and Ravizza. Sure, they concede, the *agent* is not reasons-responsive in a Frankfurt case. Nevertheless, the *mechanism* by which the agent decides *is* reasons-responsive, for we evaluate the reasons-responsivity of the mechanism not in the actual world (where nefarious Black lurks) but in another possible world (where Black is not to be found). Since Jones's mechanism is reasons-responsive, Jones acts freely in the actual world. Or so they argue.

Sartorio does not accept this move, for then freedom supervenes not on the actual causal history of the action, but rather facts about the performance of the mechanism *in other possible worlds*. For Sartorio, the *agent* must be *causally* responding to reasons *in the ACS*. How does she pull that off?

Sartorio's 'radically different' idea is that *absent reasons* can be causes too. To motivate this possibility, Sartorio appeals to Arpaly and Schroeder's *In Praise of Desire* (Oxford, 2014). Imagine a driver who, out of blind habit, turns left at a familiar intersection. Intuitively one part of the complete causation explanation of the driver's turn is the *absence* of a sufficient reason not to turn left: the absence of an oncoming fire engine. It then looks like absent reasons are parts of causal explanations. And 'if there is *some* absence causation, then there is a *lot* of it'. For example, that aliens didn't invade the Earth is one small piece of the complete causal explanation for why I went to work today. Once admitted, they 'explode' (absent reasons, that is, not the aliens.) And once admitted absent reasons can do the work Sartorio's account requires.

How? On Sartorio's conception, Jones, when shooting Smith, is causally sensitive not only to the presence of reasons to shoot Smith (the desire for revenge) but also to the absence of sufficient reasons (the presence of a child) to refrain from shooting. The complete causal explanation for Jones's decision to shoot then involves the fact that no child is present on the scene, part of the causal explanation involves the absence of a reason not to shoot. Jones is then reasons-responsive *despite the presence of Black*. The *agent* is reasons-sensitive in just the right way: the responsiveness to the absent reason lies in the actual causal explanation of the decision. Problem solved.

There is much to say about these moves and other big ideas in Sartorio's book. The opening chapters carefully frame her view in terms of supervenience and grounding, and the closing chapter provides interesting and worthwhile replies to source incompatibilist arguments. Even so, the major appeal of her book resides, we believe, in the ways it advances the idea that freedom and responsibility lie in the actual causal sequence of the agent's action.

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