CONSEQUENTIALISM AND VIRTUE

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Abstract: We examine the following consequentialist view of virtue: a trait is a virtue if and only if it has good consequences in some relevant way. We highlight some motivations for this basic account, and offer twelve choice points for filling it out. Next, we explicate Julia Driver's consequentialist view of virtue in reference to these choice points, and we canvass its merits and demerits. Subsequently, we consider three suggestions that aim to increase the plausibility of her position, and critically analyze them. We conclude that one of those proposed revisions would improve her account.

Keywords: Consequentialism; Virtue; Character; Luck; Julia Driver

Many philosophers would agree that a tenable comprehensive ethical theory must provide an account of virtue and vice that is consistent with the theory's broader commitments (cf. Hursthouse 1999: 1-5), because ethics is not only about what we should do but who we should be. Consequentialism is no exception.[1] Consequentialist moral theories are those that make ethical properties such as right action and virtue depend entirely on consequences (Sinnott-Armstrong 2015). Consider the *Basic Consequentialist View* of virtue (BCV): a trait is a *virtue* if and only if it has good consequences in some relevant way; a trait is a *vice* if and only if it has bad consequences in some relevant way. These definitions are basic because they are underspecified. A fully worked out account must provide answers to at least the following questions: what is good? How should we understand a trait's 'having' a consequence? What kinds of traits can be virtues? Are expected or actual consequences the relevant ones? How good must the consequences be for a trait to be a virtue? What is virtue's role in moral theory? Our aim is to

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[1] Some consequentialists may opt for eliminativism about virtue. After all, Jeremy Bentham (1843), a prominent consequentialist, eliminates "natural rights" from his broader moral theory calling them "nonsense upon stilts" precisely because his moral theory does not offer a good account of them. Why not think the same about virtue? We thank Folke Tersman for this question. In our view, there is a theoretical cost for consequentialists who eliminate virtue, because they ignore a central part of our moral experience.

analyze a prominent consequentialist's answer to more detailed versions of these questions,[2] and then point to a more plausible consequentialist account of virtue.

We proceed as follows. First, we highlight some plausible features of the BCV, and then provide twelve questions to which a fully developed consequentialist account of virtue must provide answers. Second, we unpack Julia Driver's (2001; 2004; 2006; 2016) consequentialist account of virtue in terms of those questions, because it is the most comprehensive and essentially consequentialist account of virtue on offer.[3] We also point out how her development of the BCV makes it more attractive and then briefly explicate some objections to her view. Third, we consider and evaluate three modifications of Driver's account suggested by Ben Bradley (2005; 2017; 2018), and, in so doing, we point to a more plausible consequentialist account of virtue.

1. Motivations for the BCV and The Twelve Questions

An attractive feature of the BCV of virtue is a feature that makes consequentialism in general attractive—namely, that moral properties are about promoting good. Another attractive feature of the BCV is that traits are virtues only if they promote good in the relevant way, which fits with Linda Zagzebski's (1996: 136) assertion that virtue is a "success term." Recently, experimental philosophers Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely (2013) have established that at least for people not trained in philosophy, whether a trait produces good is more important for its being a virtue than internal features of the trait such as its giving rise to pretheoretical good

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[2] Philosophers in the consequentialist tradition including Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, Henry Sidgwick, and G. E. Moore have embraced ideas that resemble the BCV to varying degrees. Those interested in this tradition should see the chapters on Hutcheson, Hume, and Mill in this volume; also see Bradley (2017) for a nice discussion of Moore's account of virtue.

[3] Thomas Hurka's (2001: 3-4) account of virtue as an intrinsically good attitude toward an intrinsic good is not essentially consequentialist: "It [this account of virtue] can be accommodated within … consequentialism. The account … can be extended in a deontological setting." Furthermore, Driver's view is purely consequentialist in a way that others are not. For example, Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) and Linda Zagzebski (1996) offer views of virtue that have a consequentialist necessary condition alongside at least one non-consequentialist necessary condition.

intentions or motivations. Insofar as these studies provide evidence for philosophical theories supported by such intuitions, this is good news for the BCV, because Feltz and Cokely highlight that producing good consequences is the more salient feature of a virtue for many people. This study, then, provides an opportunity for consequentialists to explain away the idea that a trait is a moral virtue only if it gives rise to pretheoretical good intentions and motivations, because it is the less salient feature of virtue. As we fill out various parts of the BCV, more attractive features come into view. For now, we turn to consider twelve questions that a fully specified consequentialist account of virtue must answer.

The Good Question: What makes a good consequence? That is, what is the intrinsic good(s) that virtue promotes?

The Relation Question: What is the 'having' relation between the trait relatum and the good consequence relatum? Is it a causal or non-causal relation?

The Trait Nature Question: Must a virtue be a character trait—that is, a broad psychological disposition to feel, think, and act in certain ways in particular kinds of circumstances? Or can it be a psychologically thinner item such as a motive (Adams 1976) or attitude (Hurka 2001), or perhaps even a non-psychological trait such as eye color?[4]

The Trait Psychology Question: If virtues must be psychological in character, do they require any particular psychology? Must, for example, a virtue be a "corrective" to natural selfishness (Foot 1978: 8)? Or, must a virtue be a character trait to form pretheoretical good intentions or motivations (Hursthouse 1999: 121-160; Zagzebski 1996: 77-136)?

The Trait Scope Question: Is it only the consequences of an individual's trait that counts toward that trait's virtue status? Or do the consequences of all traits of the same type count toward the virtue status of all such traits?

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[4] See Halbig's contribution in this volume.

The Internalist/Externalist Consequence Question: Are the consequences that determine virtue status objective and external to agency, or are they subjective, expected consequences?

The Consequence Scope Question: Do both long- and short-term consequences count toward the virtue status of a trait, or only short-term consequences? Are the consequences that count limited to the actual world, or do consequences in nearby possible worlds count too?

The Maximizing Question: Must a virtue's consequences be maximally good or merely surpass some non-maximal threshold? The exact nature of this threshold depends on the answer to the next question.

The Contrast Question: Does the threshold specify a certain quantity of good that must be surpassed for a trait to be a virtue (for example, a virtue on balance produces more good than not)? Or does the threshold essentially involve a contrast to the good produced by other traits (for example, a virtue produces more good than other relevant traits)?

The Overall/Average Question: Does the threshold specify the balance of good consequences as a sum total (overall) or as the mean of the sum total (average)?

The Scalar Question: Are some virtues more morally valuable than others (for example, the better virtues produce more good)? Or are all virtues equally morally valuable?

The Role Question: What role does virtue play in consequentialist moral theory with respect to right action? There are two options for the BCV. The indirect option is to understand right action by way of virtue; the right action to perform is the one that the relevant virtue prescribes. The direct option makes the rightness status of an action depend on the consequences of the action, and the virtue status of a trait depend on the consequences of the trait.

These twelve questions are choice points for building a consequentialist account of virtue and for situating at least part of its role within a broader consequentialist moral theory. We turn our attention now to Driver's consequentialist account of virtue.

2. Driver's Account of Virtue

Driver (2001: 82) defines a *virtue* as a "character trait that produces more good (in the actual world) than not systematically." Driver (2001: 38-39, 104) defines *moral virtue* as a trait that produces good for others primarily, and a *prudential virtue* as a trait that produces good for its possessor. She (2001: 106), however, regards this distinction as "largely semantic": "these traits [moral and prudential virtues] are all good-producing traits, and as such can be described as moral virtues." Let us unpack her definition of virtue by using our twelve questions, and, in some cases, explore her rationale for making the choices that she makes.

The Good Question: Driver (2001: 91-106) understands the good in terms of "social flourishing" that includes subjective and objective features, but she does not provide a full account. We read Driver's claim about good consequences to include also the prevention of factors that thwart social flourishing. She (2001: 84-85) claims, for example, that at an earlier time, chastity was a virtue precisely because it prevented the occurrence of disastrous consequences. Symmetrically, then, bad consequences are those that bring about social languishing, and that prevent social flourishing.

The Relation Question: Driver (2001: 82) often uses the language of a trait's "producing" consequences. But in response to Onora O'Neill's (2004: 8) objection that traits at least typically do not cause behaviour, Driver (2004: 35-36) revises her account by opting for the weaker 'make a difference' relation between a trait and its consequences. For simplicity, we retain the causal language with the caveat that she is committed only to difference making.

The Trait Nature Question: Driver's (2001: 68, 106-108) view is that only character traits can be virtues, and thus non-psychological traits such as eye color cannot be virtues.[5] Although

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[5] If the claims made by some social psychologists and philosophers that character traits do not exist ("We need to abandon all talk of virtue and character, not find a way to save it by reinterpreting it" (Harman 2000: 224)) or that external circumstances wholly swallow the influence of character traits are true claims, then there would be no virtues or vices on Driver's view. We, however, are skeptical about the truth of those claims; and most social psychologists and philosophers are skeptical about them too (see Miller 2014: 199-200). In fact, most acknowledge

most philosophers hold that virtues are necessarily character traits (see, for example, Aristotle 2002, Calder 2007, Hursthouse 1999, Kant 1996, Miller 2014), it seems open for consequentialists who locate moral value wholly in external consequences to think that non-psychological traits such as hair color can be virtues. Since Driver locates moral value entirely in external consequences, why does she go the standard way? Here is her explanation: "To hold that a virtue is a character trait is to recognize that virtue is something possessed only by creatures who have minds and characters" (2001: 108). But this rationale does not justify her position; it is compatible with people's good producing non-psychological traits being virtues. In contrast to her stated motivation, we find it plausible that Driver embraces the character trait requirement to accommodate pretheoretical intuitions about virtue.

The Trait Psychology Question: Driver's view is that nothing beyond a trait's being a psychological disposition is required for it to be a moral virtue, at least with respect to the intrinsic nature of the trait (Driver 2001: 42-61; 2016). Thus, virtues need not be correctives to natural selfishness or be disposed to give rise to pretheoretical good intentions. Of course, a trait's giving rise to pretheoretical good intentions is still an important part of its being a virtue precisely because good intentions reliably bring about good consequences.

The Trait Scope Question: Consequences relevant for determining whether an individual's character trait is a virtue are not limited to the consequences produced by that particular trait. Rather, the consequences of all people's type-identical traits count toward their virtue statuses. We, however, qualify this answer in response to an upcoming question.

The Internalist/Externalist Consequence Question: The consequences relevant to making a trait a virtue are objective consequences that are external to agency, not subjective, expected consequences. Driver (2001: 68-78) opts for external consequences to preserve the relation

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that we at least have local character traits that make a difference to behavior (Doris 2002: 64); more recently, Gilbert Harman (2003: 92) has agreed: "people may differ in certain relatively narrow traits".

between virtue and the world. If her account were recast with expected good consequences, it would have the advantage of protecting a trait's virtue status from luck, because modally fragile factors outside of the agent's control could not influence the action's consequences and thereby affect the trait's virtue status. Driver's response to the problem of luck, generated by her commitment to external consequences, is twofold. First, a trait must systematically produce good consequences to be a virtue, which typically precludes a trait from being a virtue on the basis of a mere fluky consequence (2001: 82). We return shortly to the nature of 'systematicity'. Second, she views luck as a "fact of life" in a way that includes the moral life (2001: 83).[6]

The Consequence Scope Question: Long-term consequences count toward a trait's being a virtue (2001: 84), and the actual world is the limit for consequences that count (2001: 82). Thus, consequences produced in close possible worlds do not count. According to Driver (2001: 82), what happens in close possible worlds has very little practical significance, and "moral evaluation serves a practical function."[7] Within this actual world limit, however, Driver (2001: xvii, 85) introduces further contextually determined boundaries for what consequences count toward a trait's virtue status. As a result, a trait might be a virtue relative to one actual context, but not relative to another. For example, aggression might have been a virtue in ancient times, but it is no longer so. "What determines the relevant context will … be factors that make focusing on one context rather than another useful" (2001: 85). Presumably, the idea is that contextual boundaries are drawn when different environments provide a good explanation for why the same type of trait gives rise to consequences with very different moral valences, which is what makes it so useful to distinguish the contexts.

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[6] Driver (2012) does not think that luck can affect *every* aspect of the moral life; for example, she argues that even the consequentialist can consistently hold the view that two identical reckless drivers are equally blameworthy even though one of them kills a pedestrian. The idea is that the killer driver's wrongdoing is more serious than the merely reckless driver's wrongdoing, but they deserve the same degree of blame. For an introduction to the problem of moral luck and various attempts to solve it, see Hartman (2017: ch 1).

[7] For an argument that counterfactual consequences are practically significant, see Hartman (2015: 89-92).

The Maximizing Question: A virtue need not maximize good consequences (2001: 73-74), because such a standard is too demanding. Rather, a trait is a virtue just in case it systematically produces more good than not.

The Contrast Question: Driver's threshold specifies a relative amount of good that a virtue produces (more good than not), and it makes no essential contrastive reference to the good produced by other traits.

The Scalar Question: Some virtues are morally superior to others. The better ones are those that systematically produce better consequences (2001: 74).

The Overall/Average Question: Driver does not address this question. In our view, the most plausible position for her to take is that a virtue produces more good than not on average. To see why, suppose for reductio that a virtue is a trait that produces more good than not overall and that wit happens to produce more good overall than justice simply because its more common and more commonly enacted. It follows that wit is a better virtue than justice, which is counterintuitive (Bradley 2005: 296). Plausibly, it is not a trait's ubiquity or activation frequency that determines how good of a virtue it is, but rather how much good it produces on average each time it is enacted. It is noteworthy, however, that the average answer does not entirely solve this problem. Suppose, for example, that wit is activated only once with very good consequences; it may turn out that the average good produced by wit is greater than the average good produced by justice, and so wit is the better virtue in that world.[8] The modification that we recommend at the end of this chapter mitigates this problem by widening the scope of consequences that count toward a trait's being a virtue to nearby possible worlds, because it is plausible that wit would not also have such good consequences in nearby possible worlds. As a result, we think that the

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[8] We thank Erik Carlson for pressing this point.

average answer is more plausible, and that Driver has this in mind for her undefined 'systematicity' requirement.[9]

The Role Question: Virtue plays a direct role in moral theory, as does right action (Driver 2001: 71-73; cf. Driver 2006). Thus, the moral quality of character traits and actions are determined by their own consequences; if virtue and right action statuses are determined by sets of consequences that are different enough, a virtue may occasionally produce a wrong action and a vice may sometimes produce a right action (cf. Adams 1976: 471).

Here, then, is Driver's account of virtue: a certain kind of character trait is a virtue relative to a context in a possible world if and only if character traits of that kind make a difference to producing more social flourishing than not on average in that context in that possible world. This view of virtue inherits the two plausible features of the BCV mentioned above. Consider four more potential benefits of Driver's view.

First, Driver's (2001: 72) account can offer a partial explanation of ambivalence about hard cases for an act consequentialist. Act consequentialism is the view that an action is obligatory if and only if it produces more good than the other action options. A standard problem for this theory is that it sometimes prescribes intuitively unjust actions. For example, a sheriff must choose either to give up an innocent vagrant to a violent mob or stand by while the mob takes "justice" into its own hands. Stipulate the details of this case such that the action of giving up the vagrant produces the most good. But then, act consequentialism implies that it is obligatory for the sheriff to give up the vagrant, which is morally untoward. Driver's account of virtue can help to explain what is morally untoward about it. It seems plausible that the sheriff with the virtues relevant to this decision (acting in character) would not have given up the innocent vagrant. That is, only a person with the vices relevant to this decision (acting in

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[9] At one point, Driver (2001: 95) equates "systematically" with "overall," which we do not think is representative of her position on this issue.

character) would have given up the vagrant, because the dispositions involved in giving up an innocent person to an angry mob do not generally make for social flourishing. Thus, Driver's account of virtue may provide the act consequentialist with a mitigating rejoinder to this kind of evaluational ambivalence.

Second, Driver's context sensitive account allows for character traits to change their moral status over time. One example that Driver (2001: 84-85) provides is that chastity used to be a virtue, because disastrous consequences lay in store for women who were not chaste. As birth control and paternity tests became available, however, those bad consequences were often averted. Driver concludes that chastity is no longer a virtue, because being unchaste no longer has bad consequences on balance. Driver's consequentialist account, then, can explain changing societal attitudes toward chastity in terms of its changing virtue status. (For various criticisms of this motivation, see Adams 2006; Calder 2007; Hartman 2015).

Third, Driver's (2001: 53; 2016) account is more egalitarian than other prominent accounts of virtue, because Aristotle, Kant, and their followers put various knowledge and motivational requirements on virtue (see Aristotle 2002; Hursthouse 1999; Kant 1996; McDowell 1979; Zagzebski 1996). Driver, however, does not make such requirements necessary, and so imperfect people with various kinds of moral ignorance and bad motivations can still be counted as having virtues. For example, Huck Finn believes that he ought to turn in the runaway slave Jim, but his sympathy precludes his doing so. Huck's sympathy is a virtue, and his action is certainly the right one, even though he believes he is doing wrong and feels crushing guilt for running away with what he thinks is Miss Watson's property. Driver believes that this judgment about Huck's having the virtue of sympathy is exactly right. Still, one might wonder why egalitarianism is a merit for an account of virtue. For example, it is not a merit of an account of excellent health that it is less demanding and more people are thereby counted as healthy. (For more criticisms, see Adams 2006; Hartman 2015; Russell 2007; Slote 2004).

Fourth, Driver's account gives an intuitive verdict on the virtue status of certain character traits involving ignorance. Driver contends that the character traits of modesty, blind charity, trust, forgiveness, and impulsive courage necessarily involve certain kinds of ignorance. For example, the modest person is ignorant (but not badly ignorant) of her own self-worth (2001: 19); the blindly charitable person is ignorant of various defects of others and focuses on their good qualities (2001: 28); the forgiving person forgets certain kinds of wrongs done to her and others (2001: 32). She also contends that these traits are intuitively virtues and that her account is well-suited to accommodate this contention, whereas other accounts are not due to their knowledge restrictions. Some evidence that she offers for their virtue status is that these traits are "valued … as traits that morally improve the character" of the individuals who possess them (2001: 36); of course, the decisive factor for her is that they systematically produce good in the relevant way. (For experimental philosophical support of their status as virtues, see Feltz and Cokely 2012. For several different criticisms, see Adams 2006; Flanagan 1990; Sandler 2005; Slote 2004; Winter 2012).

Driver's account of virtue, then, is attractive, because it focuses on social flourishing, preserves a necessary connection between virtue and the world, partially explains a certain kind of evaluational ambivalence, explains shifting virtue evaluations, is egalitarian, and counts modesty, blind charity, trust, forgiveness, and impulsive courage as virtues.

Nevertheless, her account has been charged as having various counterintuitive implications. For example, a trait with pretheoretical bad psychology such as a disposition to enjoy hurting an innocent person is possibly a virtue if it happens to give rise to good consequences in the relevant way (Hartman 2015: 80-82; Slote 2004: 29-30; but see Driver 2001: 56-62 for a response). Someone also can become a better or worse person by inadvertently traveling into another context, because changes in context can change the virtue status of her character traits and the virtue status of her character traits determine the degree to which she is a

good or bad person (Hartman 2015: 84-87). Furthermore, Driver's account has been charged with theoretical problems. For example, it provides no common intrinsic structure to virtues and vices (Calder 2007: 209-213).[10] Driver's account also places no restrictions on how a person becomes virtuous, and it seems plausible that a person is not praiseworthy for a non-voluntarily acquired virtue. But virtue is necessarily a property for which its possessor is praiseworthy (Zagzebski 1996: 101; but see Driver 2001: 10 for a response.) Finally, Driver collapses an intuitive distinction between a trait's being good and its being a virtue. Intuitively, not all good producing traits are virtues; virtues are supposed to be excellences, not meager good producing traits.[11] Indeed, Driver's view seems to imply that almost all character traits are either virtues or vices! But instead of considering how Driver attempts or might attempt to explain away these counterintuitive implications and theoretical problems, we turn to consider three revisions of Driver's account of virtue proposed by Bradley (2005; 2017; 2018) and evaluate whether someone sympathetic to Driver's account should adopt them.

3. The Pluralist Suggestion

Driver answers The Trait Scope Question by making the consequences produced by all character traits of the same type count toward the virtue status of all those character traits.[12]

Although Bradley thinks that Driver's answer is correct, he also thinks it is odd in this way: "it may seem odd to say that whether it is a virtue for one person to have a character trait depends at all on the consequences of some *other* person or people having it" (2018: 401-402;

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[10] Hurka's (2001) theory of virtue and vice is compatible with act consequentialism, and it makes virtue and vice intrinsically good and bad in ways that avoid the two counterintuitive implications and this theoretical objection.

[11] There is an analogous objection in the moral responsibility literature to views that collapse the intuitive distinction between being bad and being blameworthy (see Hartman 2020: 109).

[12] Driver's view functionally collapses into the view that only the consequences produced by a particular trait count toward its virtue status if there is only one instance of each type of trait instantiated in an actual context. This collapse may be the case given the complex nature of our character traits if traits are individuated in very fine-grained ways (see Miller 2014).

italics in original). For example, suppose that honesty has good consequences for the general population but bad consequences for a diplomat in her capacity as a diplomat. Bradley thinks that there is a sense in which the diplomat's honesty is not a virtue, even though there is another sense in which it is. He adopts a virtue pluralism such that the diplomat's honesty is a virtue qua the consequences produced by all traits of this type and is a vice qua its own consequences.

Bradley's pluralism, however, strikes us as unattractive. The pretheoretical idea of virtue does not include a trait's being a virtue or a vice strictly due to its own consequences (in addition to being a virtue or a vice due to the consequences of all the other instances of the same kind of trait), which is a mark against the pluralism. Why should someone sympathetic to Driver's account care about the pretheoretical idea of virtue? Driver's (2001: 62; 2004: 33) ambition is to provide an account of virtue that is better than its Aristotelian and Kantian rivals. And one criterion for measuring the plausibility of various conceptions of virtue against one another is to measure how well each conception accounts for the pretheoretical idea (Hartman 2015: 81). Thus, if a proposed revision of Driver's account is at odds with the pretheoretical idea of virtue, we have a reason to reject the revision. Furthermore, adopting the pluralistic suggestion seems unnecessary, because two responses are open to Driver. First, although honesty gives rise to bad consequences in a person's capacity as a diplomat, the trait could still be a virtue if it gives rise to enough good consequences in the broader population such that the bad consequences of the diplomat's honesty are swamped. Second, if the diplomat's context is different enough from the everyday context, perhaps it is fitting to say that honesty is a virtue relative to our everyday context but not the diplomat's context. Either way, we do not recommend adopting the pluralistic suggestion.

4. The Contrastivist Suggestion

Driver answers The Contrast Question by asserting that there is a relative quantitative standard with respect to whether a character trait is a virtue—namely, it must produce more good than not on average.

Bradley (2005; 2017; 2018) argues that Driver's account faces a difficulty based on this answer. Consider the following scenario:

> In Horribleland, resources are very scarce. Earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and volcano eruptions cause nearly constant suffering for the inhabitants. Furthermore there are dangerous monsters everywhere that attack and kill people. Even the best possible character trait fails to bring about positive value overall; the best one can do is mitigate people's suffering. … everyone in Horribleland is vicious. If someone in Horribleland devotes her life to preventing suffering and succeeds in preventing a lot of suffering (even if only a very tiny portion of the enormous suffering in that world), it would be very implausible to deny that she is virtuous even if she fails thereby to produce anything of positive intrinsic value (2017: 82).

The problem is that Driver's threshold simply cannot be reached in this kind of radical circumstance. As a result, a character trait such as compassion that strikes many people as a virtue would turn out to be a vice; in fact, the property of virtue is not even instantiated in Horribleland.

Bradley contends that the consequentialist should jettison Driver's threshold, because it gives the wrong verdict for compassion in Horribleland. He proposes a different answer to The Contrast Question: a character trait is a virtue if and only if it produces better consequences than alternative character traits in the relevant contrast class (2005: 286). This answer to The Contrast Question gets the right verdict in Horribleland, since it is not the case that compassion must produce more good than not on average to be a virtue; rather, compassion must merely produce more good on average than indifference, spite, cruelty, etc.

Although we agree that the contrastivist suggestion would fix the problem, we think that the alleged problem disappears depending on how we understand Horribleland. On the one

hand, suppose that we understand Horribleland such that a person with compassion produces consequences that prevent more suffering than not on average, even though it does not produce positive consequences on average. As Driver (2001: 82) abstractly formulates her view, it appears that compassion would not be a virtue, because she asserts that a virtue must produce more good than not. Nevertheless, we think Driver is best read as holding the view that good consequences include not only positive consequences but also the prevention of negative consequences. After all, chastity was supposed to be a virtue by Driver's lights precisely because it prevented bad consequences. But then, it is plausible to think that compassion is a virtue even in Horribleland, which is the desired result.[13]

On the other hand, suppose that we simply stipulate the details of Horribleland such that all character traits including compassion produce bad consequences on average even when we allow consequences that prevent suffering to count as good. In that case, Horribleland is such an extreme circumstance that it is plausible that there are no virtues in Horribleland, because it is common to think that having a virtue requires cooperation from the world. Neo-Aristotelians such as Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) and Linda Zagzebski (1996), for example, would not think that virtue is to be found in Horribleland, because they think that virtue requires not only good internal psychology but also the production of good consequences. Even Aristotle (*NE* 1179b23-31) held that certain external requirements were necessary to becoming virtuous such as being habituated by the right kind of family in the right kind of society (cf. Nussbaum 2001: chs. 11-12). Thus, it is not surprising that there are no virtues in Horribleland. The upshot is that the move to contrastivism is unmotivated by the considerations to which Bradley appeals.[14]

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[13] This move is not available to consequentialists who specify the good in a way that precludes the prevention of suffering from being good. We thank Vuko Andrić for this point.

[14] We can, however, see other motivations for contrastivism. For example, one might adopt it to circumvent our objection that Driver's account cannot make the intuitive distinction between a meager good producing trait and a virtue. One might also adopt it to circumvent an objection raised in conversation by Krister Bykvist: if someone's being a good or bad person is determined by their virtues and vices, then everyone in Horribleland is a bad person, which is a counterintuitive result.

5. The Counterfactual Suggestion

Driver's answer to The Consequence Scope Question is that the consequences that count toward a trait's actually being a virtue are limited to those that occur in the actual world, and so consequences in nearby possible worlds are irrelevant to its virtue status.

This feature of Driver's account has provoked various objections about how luck affects the virtue status of character traits (see, for example, Calder 2007: 204-208; Hartman 2015: 84; Slote 2004: 30). Bradley (2005: 292-294) nicely highlights three ways in which this is so. First, suppose that Lucky is malicious and that he is the only person in the world (or his context) with that disposition. He sneezes when he attempts to insult others, plump birds block his bullets, and his internet trolling is always received ironically. Since Lucky's malice never has bad consequences, it is not a vice, which is counterintuitive. Second, suppose that there is a world in which no one is in need, and so the instantiated trait helpfulness is never enacted. In such a world, helpfulness produces no good states of affairs, and so it is not a virtue, which is also counterintuitive. Third, suppose that super-benevolence is an uninstantiated property. Because super-benevolence does not actually produce good, it is not a virtue, which is again counterintuitive. These examples illustrate general ways in which Driver's account of virtue is counterintuitively subject to luck.

The consequentialist can respond to the luck argument in various ways. One could answer The Internalist/Externalist Consequence Question differently by asserting that it is only *expected* consequences that count. Because it is plausible for Lucky to expect his malice to have bad consequences, this revised version of Driver's account appears to avoid the luck problem. In fact, however, this proposed revision may not avoid the luck problem, because consequence-less helpfulness and uninstantiated super-benevolence may not be traits that people actually expect to have good consequences.

A more promising way to mitigate the impact of luck is to provide a different answer to The Consequence Scope Question. Instead of limiting the consequences that count to those that occur in the actual world, broaden the scope of consequences that count to include those that are produced in nearby possible worlds (Bradley 2005; Hartman 2015). So, even if Lucky's malice produces no actual harm, he plausibly succeeds in harming his targets in nearby worlds. Thus, Lucky's malice would be a vice on the more permissive limit on consequences, which accords with our intuitions. Additionally, even if there is no opportunity to be helpful in the actual world, there could be such opportunities in nearby possible worlds, and if so, helpfulness would be a virtue. Lastly, even if super-benevolence is not actually instantiated, it could be instantiated in nearby possible worlds, and if it is instantiated, super-benevolence would be a virtue. Thus, broadening the consequences that count to nearby possible worlds mitigates the influence of luck on the virtue status of traits.

One might object that if we take the intuitions seriously that luck should not determine whether a trait is a virtue or vice in these cases (and so, malice should be a vice, helpfulness a virtue, and super-benevolence a virtue), then we should take seriously the anti-luck intuition that compassion is a virtue in Horribleland. Our response differs depending on how we understand Horribleland. First, if we understand Horribleland such that compassion produces consequences that prevent more suffering than not on average, compassion would be a virtue, and the objection is avoided. Second, if we just stipulate that compassion produces bad consequences on average in Horribleland, compassion is a vice due to bad circumstantial luck. We, however, contend that compassion's failing to be a virtue is not lucky (Hartman 2015: 86-89). After all, it is common to hold that an actual occurring event is lucky *only if* it fails to occur in a broad range of nearby possible worlds in which the relevant initial conditions are the same (see Levy 2011; Peels 2019; Pritchard 2019).[15] Plausibly, the circumstances of Horribleland are modally stable such that

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[15] For explication of various conceptions of luck, see Church and Hartman (2019).

compassion also fails to produce good on average in at least most nearby possible worlds, and thus compassion's failure to be a virtue is not lucky. If, however, those horrible circumstances are not modally stable and compassion produces on average good consequences in a broad range of nearby possible worlds, then it would turn out to be a virtue even in Horribleland, and so there is no inconsistency in our treatment of anti-luck intuitions.

6. Conclusion

We offered twelve salient questions that must be answered to provide a full consequentialist account of virtue and its role in moral theory. Subsequently, we explicated Driver's account and highlighted various advantages and criticisms. Finally, we considered pluralist, contrastivist, and counterfactualist revisions of her account, and argued that the best version of her view is revised in such a way as to allow consequences in nearby possible worlds to count toward the virtue status of actual character traits.[16]

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