

FULL TITLE: Durand of St.-Pourçain's Theory of Modes

RH: Durand's Theory of Modes

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ABSTRACT: Early modern philosophers, such as Descartes and Spinoza, appeal to a theory of modes in their metaphysics. Recent commentators have argued that such a theory of modes has as its primary source Francesco Suárez. In this paper, I explore one explicit source for Suárez's view: Durand of St.-Pourçain, an early 14th-century philosopher. My aim will be mainly expository: I will put forward Durand's theory of modes, thus correcting the persistent belief that there was no well-defined theory of modes prior to Suárez. First, I will sketch out the historical and theological context in which Durand developed his theory, briefly canvassing some of the items that he treats as modes as well. Second, I will go over the distinctive features that Durand thinks modes have. Finally, I will close with some reflection on why we should countenance modes in our ontology. Along the way, I will correct a few misconceptions about Durand's theory of modes.

KEYWORDS: Durand of St.Pourçain, Modes, Francisco Suárez, Ontology, Inherence

In a recent study on Francesco Suárez's modal distinction and its influence on Descartes and Spinoza, Tad Schmaltz argues that Suárez adopts the distinction from his older contemporary Pedro da Fonseca, himself somehow inspired by the early 14th-century philosopher John Duns Scotus; even so, Suárez "fundamentally reconfigures the distinction" (*The Metaphysics of the Material World*, 42) and so "introduces a novel sort of intermediate distinction between a mode and the *res* it modifies" (28).<sup>1</sup> Robert Pasnau concurs. He writes that "talk of modes does not take on the technical precision of a theory until the late sixteenth century" (*Metaphysical Themes*, 247).<sup>2</sup> Be what may about Suárez's adoption of the distinction from Fonseca, or the source of Fonseca's view, the modal distinction and with it a notion of modes was already well-established by the time Durand of St.-Pourçain took it up and discussed its possible application to the problem

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<sup>1</sup>See also ch. 2, sec. 2.2.2 ("A New Modal Distinction"), 41–47; "Suárez and Descartes on the Substantial Mode(s) of Union," 471–75; and "The Metaphysics of Surfaces in Suárez and Descartes," 6–9. On Suárez's influence, see Karin Hartbecke, "Zur Geschichte des Modusbegriffs."

<sup>2</sup>Later, Pasnau qualifies this historical claim somewhat (251): "Inasmuch, then, as none of the writings considered in this section were widely known, the theory of modes lacked a visible champion until Suárez, in the late sixteenth century." Stephen Menn ("Suárez, Nominalism, and Modes," 238) offers a more conservative appraisal: "It is impossible to say who invented the Scholastic doctrine of modes." Even so, Menn argues, "Suárez goes beyond Fonseca, and far beyond earlier thinkers, in the way he develops the theory of modes. Suárez is unique, in particular, in taking the modal account of relations of union as a model for solving many of the difficulties of the realist theory of the categories." As I'll show below, Durand too uses his theory of modes to solve the same difficulties, both about union and about the ontological status of the various categories.

of the Trinity at the turn of the 14th century, where he repeatedly characterizes it as the view of “others” (see below footnote 7). It would be far outside the scope of this paper to trace the roots of Durand’s theory of modes, its troubled association with Scotus, or its actual influence on Fonseca or Suárez.<sup>3</sup> Suffice it to say, throughout his career Durand favored the theory and with it the modal distinction, calling it a ‘useful distinction’ (*distinctio utilis*) in *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 47 and *Sent. C* 1.33.1, n. 15. Indeed, he was its most well-known defender, both among contemporaries<sup>4</sup> and later generations,<sup>5</sup> well into the early modern period, where he is cited by none other than Francisco Suárez as a source for his theory, among others.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Two early proponents stand out if only because Durand quotes from them directly: Giles of Rome (d. 1316) and Henry of Ghent (d. 1293). Henry’s influence on Durand is well-documented by Isabel Iribarren in *Durandus*, e.g. 108, 121, and “Henry of Ghent’s Teaching on Modes,” 123–29. On Henry’s theory, see also *Durandus*, ch. 3.2. Henry’s theory itself resembles Bonaventure’s earlier theory of modes (see *Durandus*, 121, 130). On Bonaventure’s theory, see *Durandus*, ch. 3.1. On Giles’s theory of modes, see Cross, “*Pro Insipiente*”; “Theology,” 48–61; *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation*, 91–104, 264–69; Pickavé, “Metaphysics,” 125–29; and Trapp, “Aegidii Romani de doctrina modorum.” Other authors adopted a theory of modes before Durand too, e.g. James of Metz (see Iribarren, *Durandus*, 121; “Henry of Ghent’s Teaching on Modes,” 123) and Peter John Olivi (see Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 247), among others. One important conduit here is Durand’s nemesis, Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323), who presents and rejects a theory of modes in *Sent.* 1.29.1 and 1.31.1 (1301/2 or 1302/3), as well as *Quodl.* 10.1 (perhaps contemporaneous), *Quodl.* 7.15 (date unknown), and especially *Quodl.* 1.9 (1307/8), the latter of which Durand cites verbatim and at length in *Quodl. Par.* 1.1. According to Iribarren (*Durandus*, 146) the proponent of the modal theory in Hervaeus’s *Quodl.* 1.9 is “most probably” Bonaventure. (In what follows, *Sentences* will be cited by Book, Distinction, and Question, followed by the paragraph numbers in the relevant edition, and *Quodlibeta* by Quodlibet and Question, followed by the page numbers in the relevant edition.)

<sup>4</sup>Durand’s adoption of the modal distinction to explain the Trinity received censure (twice) from his order in 1314 and 1316 (*Articuli 1314* and *Articuli 1316* respectively). As a result, his view repeatedly appears in *quaestiones* dealing with the issue produced by those Dominicans associated with the censure, e.g. John of Naples, Peter of Palude, and especially Hervaeus. For discussion and references, see Iribarren, “Some Points of Contention.”

<sup>5</sup>William J. Courtenay (*Schools and Scholars*, 182) claims that Durand was “one of the most frequently cited Dominicans of the century,” and Leen Spruit (*Species Intelligibilis*, 281) notes that Durand held “a surprisingly high position in the philosophical firmament of those days.” Indeed, on April 29, 1400, Jean Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris, wrote a letter recommending Durand’s *Sentences* alongside Bonaventure’s and Aquinas’s to be included in the syllabus (*Oeuvres complètes*, 30–35). Durand’s modal theory shows up in, e.g. Peter Auriol, *Sent.* 1.33.1 (1320s); Thomas of Strasbourg (Argentina), *Sent.* 1.33.1, 3.5.1, and 3.23.1 (1330s); and the influential John Capreolus, *Def.* 1.33.1 and 3.23.1 (15th century), among others. In the mid-14th century, a group of authors around Buridan (e.g. John of Mirecourt, Marsilius of Inghen, Albert of Saxony, and Nicholas Oresme) also discussed a theory of modes; however, to my knowledge there is no close connection with Durand’s theory here. For discussion, see Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 249–252, especially 249n6, and the references therein. On Buridan in particular, see also Normore, “Buridan’s Ontology” and Jack Zupko, “Acts and Dispositions in John Buridan’s Faculty Psychology.” As well, Durand’s modal theory of habits (*habitus*) makes a brief cameo in William Ockham (*Rep.*, Book 3, Question 7); for discussion, see Hartman, “Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits.” Another author worth mentioning here is Francis of Meyronnes, who, in the 1320s, explicitly developed Scotus’ modal distinction into a theory of ‘intrinsic’ modes (*Sent.* 1.42.4 and 1.8.5).

<sup>6</sup>In *DM* 7.1, n. 19, Suárez tells us explicitly that Durand holds the view, citing Durand precisely: “Denique hos modos videtur agnovisse Durand., in 1, dist. 30, quaest. 2, num. 15 [i.e. *Sent. C* 1.30.2, n. 15], ubi loquens de esse in seu inhaerentia accidentis dicit esse respectum

In what follows, my aim will be mainly expository: I want to put forward Durand’s theory of modes, thus correcting the persistent belief that there was no well-defined theory of modes prior to Suárez. First, I will sketch out the historical and theological context in which Durand developed his theory, briefly canvassing some of the items that he treats as modes as well. Second, I will go over the distinctive features that Durand thinks modes have. Finally, I will close with some reflection on why we should countenance modes in our ontology. Along the way, I will correct a few misconceptions about Durand’s theory of modes.

## 1. The Historical and Theological Context

Durand primarily develops his theory of modes in the context of the theological debate about the best way to characterize the relationship between the divine essence and its various internal relations, such as Fatherhood, etc. According to one view on the matter—associated with Gilbert of Poitiers—the internal divine relations are ‘modes’ of the divine essence. While Durand’s presentation of this view received censure from his order (twice), it is worth noting that Durand never fully and explicitly endorses it over a standard alternative.<sup>7</sup> However, it was in

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qui analogice dicitur res vel ens, quia non est res sed modus essendi neque est entitas habens modum sed modus tantum entitatis; et num. 16, idem dicit de dependentia et de omni eo quod est solus modus essendi.” (Here and in what follows, *DM* is cited by Disputation and section, followed by paragraph number.) Suárez also cites Diego de Astudillo, *In De gen. et corr.*, Book 1, Question 5; Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de compositione angelorum*, Question 5; and Fonseca, *In Met.*, Book 5, Ch. 6, Question 6, as sources in the same place. See also Suárez’s discussion of relations in *DM* 47.2, n. 4: “De prioribus autem respectibus ait [sc. Durandus] distingui realiter a suis fundamentis, in quo convenit cum praecedentibus opinionibus, et eodem utitur fundamento, scilicet, illo signo separabilitatis fundamenti a tali respectu. De quo signo iam dictum est ad summum posse ostendere distinctionem modalem. Neque Durandus amplius intendit, ut legenti facile patebit; solumque differt in usu vocis, appellans eam ‘realem’, quia in rebus ipsis invenitur.” Durand’s final redaction (C) of his *Sentences* circulated widely during the 16th century: there were at least fifteen printings between 1508 and 1594 alone. Durand’s views were especially common currency at Salamanca where there was a chair of Durandian studies alongside the Thomist chair there, and Durand is, predictably, cited and discussed regularly by, e.g. Cajetan, Toletus, Soto, Fonseca, Suárez, etc. On Durand’s legacy in the early modern period, see Müller, “Die Lehre vom *verbum mentis*.”

<sup>7</sup>In his early *Sent.* B 1.33.1, Durand attributes both the modal theory of divine relations and the more general theory of modes to “others” (f. 36rb; see also *Articuli 1314*, art. 13: “Haec autem omnia attribuit non sibi sed aliis in loco isto.”), and in later texts, while he drops any such qualification about the general theory of modes, he continues to treat the modal theory of divine relations as the view of “others” (e.g. *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 27, 36, 44; *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 53; *Sent.* C 1.33.1, n. 27). Indeed, in his most mature treatment of the matter (*Sent.* C 1.33.1), Durand decides that the modal theory of the divine relations and two alternative popular theories at the time—Hervaeus Natalis’s non-convertible identity theory and a version of Scotus’ formal distinction theory—equally safeguard what needs to be safeguarded, that is, they both can avoid the Scylla of Sabellianism, which posits too weak of a distinction between the divine essence and its internal relations, on the one hand, and the Charybdis of Gilbert of Poitiers’ view, which posits too strong of a distinction between them, on the other. Durand’s opponents, however, felt that he did not sufficiently respond to objections he had put to the non-convertible identity theory, and that the structure of his *quaestio*—listing the modal theory last—suggested his implicit endorsement of it. For a detailed discussion of the theological debate as a whole, see Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought*. For Hervaeus’s non-convertible identity theory, see *Quodl.* 1.9; *Sent.* 1.25.1; 1.31.1; and 1.32.1; for discussion,

this context that he developed his more general theory of modes, according to which mind-independent *created* reality at least can be divided into two basic sorts of entities: absolute things, such as substances and separable qualities and quantities, on the one hand, and modes of those absolute things, such as inherence, subsistence, and various real relations like contact, on the other.

Durand treated on this topic multiple times throughout his career. His first extant treatment (before 1308/9) is contained in the manuscripts that witness to an early version of his *Sentences*, notably, Book 1, Distinction 33, Question 1 (“Utrum proprietates relativa sit idem realiter cum essentia”).<sup>8</sup> In 1312 (likely Easter), as a freshly-minted regent master in Paris, Durand had the opportunity to refine his position in his first quodlibetal disputation there (*Quodl. Par.* 1.1: “Utrum omnia illa quae differunt realiter in eodem supposito faciant compositionem”). Around the same time, he also appears to have drafted up a (now lost) *carta confessionis* defending his view on the subject which he distributed to his colleague Guy Terrena at least.<sup>9</sup> Durand’s tenure at Paris was

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see Iribarren, *Durandus*, ch. 4. For Scotus, see Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*.

<sup>8</sup>The critical edition of the early version(s) of Book 1 is incomplete (to date it only covers Distinctions 4 through 17). For this and other unedited questions from Book 1, I have consulted Paris, *Bibliothèque nationale* lat. 14554; Paris, *Bibliothèque nationale* lat. 12220; and Auxerre, *Bibliothèque municipale* 26, with folios keyed to the latter. (For edited questions, I have relied upon the text found in the critical edition.) Following the editors, I will call the version of the text found in these manuscripts *Sent.* B, i.e. the second redaction (with the exception of *Sent.* 1.8.6, found only in the Auxerre manuscript, and so considered to belong to the first redaction, i.e. *Sent.* A). Although we do not find a distinction between an *old* (i.e. A) and a *new* (i.e. B) version of Book 1 in the list of censured articles (as we do with, e.g. Book 2), nevertheless there appears to have been at least three versions of this particular *quaestio* (*Sent.* 1.33.1) in circulation (in addition to the final [C] redaction): (1) the one found in the manuscripts listed above; (2) another that Hervaeus Natalis presents in *Quodl.* 2.7 (1308/9); (3) and a third still found in Palude’s *Sent.* 1.33.1 (1310/11). The differences are minor, especially when compared to the final redaction (*Sent.* C 1.33.1). I suspect that both Palude and Hervaeus used different versions of the A redaction. (Something similar occurs with *Sent.* 1.30.2, 1.34.1, and likely other questions.) Note that when the text of various redactions is verbatim the same, I have either signified this with, e.g. *Sent.* B/C (i.e. *Sent.* B and *Sent.* C), or, in cases where all extant versions are the same, as simply *Sent.*, reporting the paragraph numbers from *Sent.* C.

<sup>9</sup>See Guy Terrena, *Quodl.* 1.10. For discussion, see Iribarren, *Durandus*, ch. 7.2. *Quodl. Par.* 1.1 comes down to us in two versions or recensions, and there appears to be some confusion in the secondary literature about them. The first recension is contained in Vatican, lat. 1076 and the second is contained in three other manuscripts. The texts are largely the same. However, the second recension includes an interesting addition discussing Scotus’ *ex natura rei* distinction in some considerable detail (pages 43–56 in Takada’s edition). According to Josef Koch (*Durandus*, 109–116) the second recension was edited by Durand at some point after 1317. Isabel Iribarren (*Durandus*, 163) and Russell Friedman (“Dominican Quodlibetal Literature,” 450) agree. This date is based on the fact that in Vatican, lat. 1075 it is called the fourth *Quodlibet* and located after the three Avignon *Quodlibets* (f. 31va, f. 39ra-b). However, as far as I can tell, there is nothing intrinsic to the content of the second recension to suggest that it must be dated after 1317, and moreover there is some evidence that it should be dated earlier: Guy Terrena’s *Quodl.* 1.10 (which can be solidly dated to 1313) appears to draw not just from the (lost) *carta confessionis* but also from the additional material unique to the second recension—*pace* Koch, Iribarren, and Friedman who argue that he relied upon the first recension. Hence, it is plausible that the first recension is an early draft (perhaps a *reportatio*) whereas the second recension is a slightly later *ordinatio*, both of which Durand would have produced while in Paris in 1313.

short: he was promoted to lecturer at Avignon for the next three years (1313–16). During his first quodlibetal debate there (likely Christmas 1314) he once more had the chance to refine his views (*Quodl. Av.* 1.1: “Utrum divina essentia et relatio differant aliquo modo realiter”). As well, Durand’s view came to be censured twice by his order (1314 and 1316), and as a result of the first censure (July 3rd, 1314), Durand produced a (now lost) *Excusationes* (Autumn 1314), which can be somewhat reconstructed in light of Hervaeus Natalis’s *Reprobationes* and *De articulis* (likely Winter 1314).<sup>10</sup> Finally, at some point after 1317 (with a terminus *ad quem* of his death in 1334) he set down his considered view on the matter in the final redaction of his *Sentences*, the so-called C version.<sup>11</sup> In this version, he carefully separates his discussion of divine relations (*Sent.* C 1.33.1: “Utrum in divinis essentia et relatio differant aliquo modo realiter”) from non-divine relations and modes (*Sent.* C 1.30.2: “Utrum in creaturis relatio differt realiter a suo fundamento”).<sup>12</sup>

While most of Durand’s technical discussion of modes occurs in the context, then, of theological debates about the Trinity, he also applies the theory to a variety of other problems, both theological, for example, the Eucharist (*Sent.* 4.12.1) and the Incarnation (*Sent.* 3.1–6), where he decides that inherence and subsistence are modes, as well as philosophical, for example, the ontological status of various categories, among other issues. As we’ll see in the last section, Durand holds that some quantities (numbers) and some qualities (habits and shapes) are modes, as well as some relations, namely, certain categorical relations (second- and third-species relations of power and measure but not first-species relations of equality and similarity) and certain relations in the last six categories (position, when, where, having, but not action and passion).<sup>13</sup> There are, then, quite a few modes in Durand’s ontology. At one point in his early career, he issued this ringing declaration:

<sup>10</sup>See here especially Iribarren, *Durandus*, ch. 9.

<sup>11</sup>Perhaps in 1325, while briefly unemployed (Iribarren, *Durandus*, 7–8). On the dating of Durand’s various redactions, see Schabel et al., “Peter of Palude,” supplemented with two more recent studies: Friedman and Jeschke, “Michael of Massa” and Courtenay, “Durand in His Educational and Intellectual Context.”

<sup>12</sup>*Sent.* C 1.33.1 is lifted from *Quodl. Av.* 1.1 practically verbatim, and *Sent.* C 1.30.2 is more or less verbatim lifted from *Quodl. Par.* 1.1. The separation, in fact, occurs earlier. In *Sent.* B 1.33.1, Durand runs the two discussions together, but by the next year, in *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, he cleanly separates them, dividing that *quaestio* into three articles, one dealing with non-divine relations and another dealing with divine relations. In addition to Book 1, Distinctions 30 and 33, another important place where Durand discusses the theory of modes occurs in Book 1, Distinctions 7, 12, and 13.

<sup>13</sup>On habits, see *Sent.* A/B 3.23.1 and *Tractatus de habitibus*, Question 5 (incomplete). For discussion, see Hartman, “Are Cognitive Habits in the Intellect?” and “Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits.” On shapes and numbers, see *Sent.* B 1.17.3, n. 33; *Sent.* A/B 3.23.1, n. 21; *Sent.* C 1.43.2, n. 27; *Sent.* C 1.44.2, n. 20; *Sent.* C 4.12.1, n. 7; *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 42–43; and *Quodl. Par.* 1.5 (contained in Vatican, lat. 1076, f. 17rb-va, and dealing precisely with the ontological status of numbers). On categorical relations and relations in the last six categories, see especially *Quodl. Par.* 1.1–2; *Sent.* B 1.30.2 (especially the version [A?] contained in Palude’s *Sent.* 1.30.3 and Hervaeus Natalis, *De relatione contra Durandum*); and *Sent.* C 1.30.3, as well as the references in the last section of this paper.

One should not take on the view that a habit is not a quality just because it is a mode of a thing [*modus rei*] and not properly [*proprie*] a thing, for not only do [some categorical] relations and [some items in] the last six categories name modes of things [*modos rerum*], but also, in fact, one can find within Quality and Quantity certain items that are not properly [*proprie*] things but instead real modes [*modos reales*]. For instance, number within Quantity is not properly [*proprie*] some thing over and above things numbered but instead it is a real mode of them [*modus realis circa eas*]. Likewise, shape, considered the fourth species of Quality, is a mode of termination of quantity [*modus terminationis quantitatis*] and not some thing in itself [*secundum se*]. So too with a habit and a dispositional state [*dispositione*], considered the first species of Quality... (*Sent.* A/B 3.23.1, n. 21)<sup>14</sup>

Noteworthy, as well, are contexts where Durand rejects various modal solutions on offer, for example, on the distinction between a supposit and a nature (*Sent.* 1.34.1), where he explicitly rejects two versions of Giles of Rome's view that a supposit involves a mode added to the nature; on the distinction between essence and existence (*Sent.* A 1.8.6; *Sent.* C 1.8.2), where he doesn't even consider a popular 'modal' middle way between the hard-nosed realist Aegidian position that existence is a thing and the nominalist Godfridian view that existence is a concept;<sup>15</sup> on the 'modes' of intension and remission, where he rejects the idea that the degrees of intensity of a quality are modally distinct (*Sent.* 1.17);<sup>16</sup> and on the ontological status of a composite, where he rejects the idea that a composite is a mode in addition to its parts as united (*Sent.* 3.1.1; 3.2.2).<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup>All translations are my own. Note that Durand does not mean to claim that a mode is not some sort of thing *tout court*; his point is that it is not a thing 'properly', that is, it is not an *absolute thing*, a point I'll return to in a moment. Note as well, as we'll see in the last section, in his later works Durand appears to walk back some of the items on this list, e.g. first-species categorical relations of similarity and equality, as well as actions and passions, which he decides are mere concepts and not modes. It is also worth noting that the list here is incomplete. Not included are the various transcategorical modes of inherence and subsistence, as well as more peculiar modes such as *insitio*, i.e. the mode of quasi-inherence that Christ's human nature has in the divine (see footnote 32), and 'substanding' (*esse in quo aliud*), i.e. the mode that a substance or matter has with respect to a form inhering in it (see footnotes 17 and 44). Durand also argues that transcendental multitudes (*Sent.* C 4.12.1, n. 7) and changes (*Sent.* C 4.12.1, n. 7; *Sent.* 2.15.3, nn. 7–8) are modes.

<sup>15</sup>Durand pops for Godfrey's view at the end of the day. On the 'modal' middle way, see, e.g. Peter Palude, *Sent.* 1.34.2. Note that Durand here seems to *deny* that subsistence is a mode, whereas elsewhere (notably in *Sent.* 1.33.1) he maintains that it is a mode, a tension that does not go fully unnoticed by Palude.

<sup>16</sup>For discussion, see Solère and Céleyrette, "Jacques de Lausanne." It is interesting that one area where Scotus establishes his modal distinction (against the formal distinction) is in this context, although he appears to have drawn his claim back elsewhere. See King, "Scotus on Metaphysics," 25–26, 31–33.

<sup>17</sup>Durand became somewhat (in)famous as a reductionist about the composite to later authors, e.g. Capreolus, *Def.* 3.2.1, art. 2, sec. 2, n. 1, 5:16a; Cajetan, *ST* 3.6.5, n. 6; and following them Suárez, *DM* 36.3 (who neatly summarizes the debate). However, there is some confusion about Durand's view here. He maintains that *strictly* a composite is nothing over and above its parts *as united*, but its parts *as united* are its parts together with two modes: one of inherence and one of substanding. This is the sort of non-reductive view of the composite that Suárez, in fact, defends. However, whereas Suárez maintains that a composite is its parts

## 2. What Would It Be Like to Be a Mode?

Having looked, then, at the context in which Durand develops his theory of modes, as well as some of the items Durand thinks of as modes, in this section I want to now ask a more fundamental question: What is a mode? Durand is committed, I submit, to the following three core theses about modes: (1) a mode is a real, mind-independent thing, albeit of a peculiar sort (*the reality thesis*); (2) a mode is really distinct from the thing of which it is a mode (*the real distinction thesis*); and (3) a mode and the thing of which it is a mode do not constitute a composite with each other (*the non-compositionality thesis*). Let me go over each of these three theses seriatim.

### 2.1. The Reality Thesis

The reality thesis can be divided into two related claims: the reality thesis and the qualified reality thesis. The reality thesis states that modes are mind-independent things; the qualified reality thesis qualifies what sort of thing modes are. According to Durand, mind-independent (created) reality is divided into two basic sorts of things (*res*): absolute things (*res absolutae*), such as substances or separable qualities and quantities, on the one hand, and real modes of those absolute things (*reales modi rerum*), such as inherence, subsistence, certain kinds of real relations, like contact, etc., on the other. Both absolute things and modes have real essences of some sort, and, along with it, real existence of some sort, and neither are mere constructs of the mind.<sup>18</sup> It is worth emphasizing this claim. Durand, like Suárez, but unlike Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome, and for that matter Fonseca, is not offering us a deflationary account of modes<sup>19</sup>—*pace* Pasnau (*Metaphysical Themes*, 201n2, 245n2) who

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together with one mode of union, Durand maintains that a composite is its parts together with two modes (inherence and standing; see below footnote 44). Durand, then, would side with early modern modal theorists like Peter Hurtado who maintain that compositionality consists in two modes not one. See Anfray, “A Jesuit Debate” and Schmaltz, *The Metaphysics of the Material World*, 53–60.

<sup>18</sup>See, e.g. *Sent.* C 1.33.1, n. 15 = *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 49: “Sed essentia vel quidditas seu entitas horum modorum tota consistit in hoc quod est esse huius.” *Sent.* 4.12.1, n. 4, where Durand characterizes a mode as “illud cuius essentia est ad aliud habitudo et esse [eius est] ad aliud se habere.” See also *Sent.* 4.12.1, n. 11; *Sent.* A(?) 1.30.2, art. 1 (only found in Palude, *Sent.* 1.30.3); *Sent.* C 1.25.1, n. 6; *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 21, 36–37; *Sent.* C 1.30.2, nn. 13, 16 = *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 14–15, 18–19; *Sent.* C 1.33.1, nn. 20, 22; *Sent.* C 1.33.1, n. 27 = *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 53, as well as the references below in footnotes 25 and 26.

<sup>19</sup>In Suárez, see *DM* 7.1, n. 30 and *DM* 47.2, n. 8; in Fonseca, see *In Met.*, Book 5, Chs. 6 and 15. For discussion, see Schmaltz, *The Metaphysics of the Material World*, 42–43. On both Giles and Henry, see above footnote 3. Henry was somewhat unclear on whether modes have a positive ontological standing, although he does seem to have maintained a kind of deflationary view. See here especially *Quodl.* 9.3, 56: “... relatio realitatem suam contrahit a suo fundamento, et quod ex se non est nisi habitudo nuda, quae non est nisi modus quidam rem habendi ad aliud, et ita non res quantum est ex se, sed solummodo modus rei nisi extendendo ‘rem’ ut etiam modus rei dicatur ‘res’...” Durand does just that. Perhaps with Henry’s text in mind, in *Sent.* B 1.12.1, n. 15, he writes: “... licet fundamentum et respectus [i.e., a mode] non sint duae naturae facientes compositionem, sunt tamen duae res extendendo nomen ‘rei’ ut est commune ad absolutum et ad relatum.” Durand rejects Giles’s modal theory of subsistence (as filtered through Godfrey’s *Quodl.* 7.5) on the grounds that it, too, does not treat a mode as a

argues that Durand’s account of modes is deflationary.<sup>20</sup> Both modes and absolute things are mind-independent things with equal claim to some sort of positive ontological status in Durand’s metaphysics.<sup>21</sup>

However, modes are things with a certain qualification, for a mode is a dependent thing whereas an absolute thing is an independent thing. Durand explains this qualification by appeal to the technical apparatus of analogy. The term ‘thing’ (*res*), he tells us, is an analogical term:<sup>22</sup> it is a kind of equivocal term whose various equivocal meanings bear some sort of connection to each other, just as ‘healthy’ said of urine samples, salads, and Socrates is an analogical term.<sup>23</sup> In one sense—its primary sense—a thing is an absolute thing; but in another

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thing (*res*). See *Sent.* 1.34.1, n. 9.

<sup>20</sup>It seems to me that Pasnau is using the term ‘deflationary’ in two senses. In his discussion of real accidents and inherence (chs. 10–11), he uses the label to characterize theories which maintain a deflationary account of so-called ‘real accidents’ according to which, in Durand’s language, an accident is not an absolute thing. Durand’s account of at least separable qualities and quantities is definitely not deflationary in this sense: separable accidents are just as much absolute things as substances are. See especially *Quodl. Av.* 3.1, art. 3 and the discussion below. However, in ch. 13, Pasnau seems to use the term in a slightly different sense when distinguishing between two different theories of modes. A deflationary account of modes is one that maintains that modes “lack any existence of their own” whereas an anti-deflationary account of modes maintains that modes “exist in their own right, but cannot exist apart from their subjects,” that is, modes depend upon something else (246). In this sense, Durand is clearly a proponent of the anti-deflationary account, although with the proviso that modes neither subsist nor inhere but instead have their own sort of existence: *esse ad aliud* or *esse huius* (see footnotes 18, 25, 26).

<sup>21</sup>Durand’s commitment to an anti-deflationary view is also clear if we focus on his attempt at applying the theory of modes to explain the internal divine relations, e.g., Fatherhood, etc. This view came under considerable criticism because it treated the internal divine relations, conceived of as modes of the divine essence, as *too* thing-like, and so came too close to Gilbert of Poitiers’ view for comfort (see footnote 7). As Hervaeus, *De articulis*, art. 12, f. 120va-b, correctly points out, in his early texts Durand maintains that the divine essence and the internal divine relations equally “count as things” (*ponerent in numerum rerum*) and so they are “four things” (*quattuor res*). He quotes verbatim from Durand’s *Sent.* B 1.13.1, n. 26 and *Sent.* B 1.34.1, f. 85ra. See also *Reprobationes*, f. 113rb; *Correctiones*, 294; *Articuli 1314*, arts. 6, 13; and *Articuli 1316*, arts. 14, 36–38, 48. Cf., however, Durand, *Sent.* C 1.13.1, n. 26 and *Sent.* C 1.34.2, n. 4, where Durand softens his tone to a more conciliatory one. For Durand’s take on Gilbert of Poitiers’ view, see especially *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 59–61 and *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 58–60.

<sup>22</sup>Durand also maintains that the word ‘thing’ (*res*) and the word ‘entity’ (*ens*) are completely synonymous or equivalent with each other, and so his claim that ‘thing’ is an analogical term applies with equal measure to the term ‘entity’. See *Quodl. Par.* 1.4, 96–97: “... aliquid potest converti cum ente dupliciter: uno modo essentialiter, alio modo denominative. Primo modo res convertitur cum ente, quia omnis entitas extra animam est essentialiter realitas, et e converso.” *Quodl. Par.* 1.4, 101–102: “Res et ens extra animam ... convertuntur essentialiter; ideo omnis realitas est entitas et omnis entitas est realitas adaequate; nec differunt aliqua reali ratione, sed sunt nomina penitus synonyma.” See also *Sent.* C 1.25.2, n. 5.

<sup>23</sup>Durand maintains the “common” view on analogy (*Quodl. Av.* 3.1, 238). On analogical terms in scholastic debates, see Ashworth, *Les théories de l’analogie du XIIe au XVIe siècle*. While Durand does not articulate the distinction very clearly, it would seem that his view here is close to what Suárez later calls ‘intrinsic’ analogy as opposed to ‘extrinsic’ analogy. At least as Schmalz ( *The Metaphysics of the Material World*, 31–32) understands it, the difference is that the connection between the analogues in the former is one of dependence, which is precisely Durand’s view.



sense—its secondary sense—a thing is a real mode. Absolute things, on the one hand, and real modes, on the other, bear some connection to each other: the latter are dependent upon the former. It is in this sense that the term ‘thing’ is an analogical term and not a purely equivocal term: modes have a connection to absolute things, namely, dependence.<sup>24</sup>

The claim that a mode is a dependent thing whereas an absolute thing is an independent thing requires a good deal of nuance. To appreciate it, I want to draw a distinction between three senses of dependence: *essential dependence* (which a mode has upon an absolute thing), *existential dependence* (which an absolute thing has upon a mode), and *natural dependence* (which some absolute things have upon other absolute things).

Existential dependence first. According to Durand, an absolute thing that exists either subsists on its own or inheres in something else: these are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive modes of existence for absolute things. Hence, an absolute thing that exists has either a mode of inherence or a mode of subsistence. Complete substances have the latter and separable accidents have the former, in the normal run of things. It follows from this that there is a sense in which an absolute thing depends upon a mode, for an absolute thing cannot exist without having either a mode of inherence or a mode of subsistence. Call this existential dependence.<sup>25</sup> (Christ’s human nature is a peculiar exception here, for during the Incarnation it neither subsists on its own nor, strictly speaking, inheres in the divine nature, but rather it quasi-inheres in it; in what follows

<sup>24</sup>Durand’s theory of the analogical concept of thing is presented in two closely related passages. (1) *Sent.* C 1.30.2, n. 15 = *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 17–18 = *Sent.* B 1.33.1, f. 36rb = *Quodl. Av.* 2.1, 174 (differences or additions [*add.*] in parentheses): “‘Res’ dicitur analogice de re absoluta (re absoluta] absoluto *Sent.*) et de respectu (relativo *Sent.* seu de quocumque reali modo essendi *add. Quodl. Av.* 2.1) sed per prius et simpliciter de re absoluta, per posterius et secundum quid de respectu (relativo vel magis de relatione *Sent.* et de quocumque reali modo essendi *add. Quodl. Av.* 2.1), qui non est res nisi quia est realis modus essendi (ad aliam rem *add. Sent.*)” (2) *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 47–48 = *Sent.* C 1.33.1, n. 15: “‘Res’ autem non dicitur univoce de omnibus de quibus dicitur, sed aequivoce vel analogice, hoc est, secundum plures rationes quarum una attributionem habet ad alteram. Cum enim rerum quaedam sint absolutae et quaedam sint puri respectus, ‘res’ dicitur per prius et simpliciter de re absoluta, de qua dicitur formaliter praedicatione dicente hoc est hoc, sicut dicimus quod albedo vel quantitas est res et fortiori ratione substantia est res vel ens reale. Per posterius autem et secundum quid solum dicitur de respectu, qui non est res vel ens reale nisi quia est rei tamquam modus essendi eius; et idem est de omni modo essendi, puta de modo subsistendi per se et de modo essendi in alio et de eo quod est tangere vel tangi in corporibus.” See also *Sent.* C 1.33.1, n. 19 = *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 50; *Quodl. Av.* 2.3, 184; *Quodl. Av.* 3.1, 246; and *Sent.* C 1.25.1, n. 6.

<sup>25</sup>A mode, by contrast, cannot have a mode, as we will see when we discuss the non-compositionality thesis, and so it can neither inhere nor subsist; the sort of existence that it has is what Durand calls relative existence (*esse huius* or *esse ad aliud*), which is, so to speak, built into its essence and not owing to a mode added to it. See especially *Sent.* B 1.13.1, n. 24: “Ergo dices tu: relationes inhaerent, et ita erit compositio in divinis. Dico quod non sequitur, quia subsistere et inhaerere solum absolutis conveniunt, relatio enim quae est modus essendi ad aliud, et quicumque modus essendi, sive in se sive in alio, non subsistit per se nec inhaeret fundamento suo eo quod non est res absoluta a suo fundamento distincta.” See also *Sent.* C 1.30.2, n. 10 = *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 9–10; *Sent.* C 1.33.1, nn. 20, 22; and the references in the footnote 18 above as well as the next footnote below.

I'll avoid this complication and treat quasi-inherence as a kind of inherence. On Christ's quasi-inherence, see below footnote 32.)

The sense of dependence that a mode has upon an absolute thing is a different kind of dependence, which I call, following Durand, essential dependence, for it turns on the question of whether or not a thing *in its very essence* depends upon something else. The very essence of a mode, Durand writes, is relative: it always makes reference to something else; it is always *of* something else. A mode can neither be conceived of nor be without something else. A mode of contact, for instance, can neither be conceived of nor be without something else, namely, a body.<sup>26</sup> Durand will often talk of a mode as being 'founded upon' (*fundatur*) some absolute thing (its 'foundation' [*fundamentum*]) to capture this notion of dependence. An absolute thing, by contrast, is essentially independent: its essence is not relative but rather absolute. A complete substance or a separable accident can be conceived of without any other created thing, and it also can be without any other created thing (with the proviso, of course, that if it exists on its own then it must subsist, and so have a mode of subsistence). For instance, the brownness that now inheres in the wafer can be conceived of without the wafer, and it also can subsist on its own without the wafer or any other created thing (other than, of course, the mode of subsistence it would take on in such a supernatural circumstance).<sup>27</sup>

Finally, essential dependence should not be confused with another kind of dependence, which Durand calls 'concomitative' dependence, and which I will call natural dependence. This is the sort of dependence that a separable accident (normally) has upon the substance in which it inheres, according to the common course of nature. In a Christian world, such dependence is contingent: God could make it that a separable accident does not inhere in its substance (as in the case of the Eucharist). A separable accident has a natural dependence but not an essential dependence upon a substance.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>26</sup>See, for example, *Sent.* C 1.33.1, n. 15 = *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 48: "Quia nihil talium est entitas secundum se nisi quia formaliter est modus entitatis, et totus conceptus essentialis et formalis talium est esse alterius." *Sent.* C 1.33.1, n. 15 = *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 49 (additions [*add.*] in parentheses): "Et totus conceptus eius (quidditativus et formalis *add. Sent.*) est concipi—non ut hoc vel quid sed huius; et [ille] qui aliter concipit [eum], non concipit modum essendi, sed rem cuius est modum denominative." See also the references in footnote 18 above.

<sup>27</sup>Of course, Durand would admit that *all* created things are dependent upon God, the Creator, such that they cannot be without the Creator. However, this is a different kind of dependence than essential dependence, for things do not make reference to God in their essences. See here especially *Sent.* C 1.33.1, n. 22.

<sup>28</sup>See especially *Sent.* C 1.33.1, n. 15 = *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 48–49 (differences, omissions [*om.*], and additions [*add.*] in parentheses): "Nam quamvis omne accidens sit 'ens quia entis', ut dicitur quarto Metaphysicae [4.2 1003b5–10; see also 7.1 1028a18], tamen aliter et aliter convenit hoc absolutis et respectivis, et universaliter omnibus modis essendi, quia absoluta sunt 'entia quia entis' non quidem essentialiter et formaliter, sed solum concomitative, quia non essent naturaliter nisi essent in alio, scilicet in substantia; tamen sua quidditas non est esse in alio—immo praeter hoc habent suam formalem entitatem et quidditatem, sicut quantitas in sacramento altaris habet suam formalem (formam *Sent.*) entitatem (et quidditatem *add. Sent.*) absque hoc quod sit in alio vel sit alterius ut subiecti; et idem est de albedine et huiusmodi. Respectus autem et universaliter omnes modi essendi sunt 'entia quia entis' non

In sum, then, when Durand claims that modes are dependent things whereas absolute things are independent things, what he means is this. A mode is *essentially* dependent upon an absolute thing, whereas an absolute thing is not essentially dependent upon any other created thing. However, *some* absolute things are naturally dependent upon other absolute things (e.g. separable accidents upon substances) and *all* absolute things are *existentially* dependent upon either a mode of subsistence or a mode of inherence.

It is worth highlighting one historical upshot here. What I have been calling ‘essential dependence’ can be characterized in other terms as non-mutual separability: whereas an absolute thing can be without its mode, its mode cannot be without the absolute thing of which it is a mode. Pierre Bayle in his dictionary entry on Spinoza emphasizes the importance of the connection between a mode and non-mutual separability or essential dependence—a notion Spinoza, we are told, took from Descartes. According to Schmaltz, it is Suárez who is “the primary source” of “the notion of a mode that is tied to the condition of non-mutual separability” (*The Metaphysics of the Material World*, 46). However, as we can now see, the notion goes further back than that.

## 2.2. *The Real Distinction Thesis*

Like the reality thesis we can divide the real distinction thesis into two theses, namely, the real distinction thesis (a mode and the absolute thing upon which it is founded are really distinct somehow), and the qualified real distinction thesis. Here, however, the qualification turns not on what sort of real distinction is involved, but on what sort of relata are involved: If the relata are both absolute things, then the distinction is a primary real distinction; but if at least one of the relata is a mode, then the distinction is a secondary real distinction (or modal distinction). As Durand puts it:

Since real identity and distinction arise from mind-independent reality [*ex natura rei*], therefore those items are said to be really distinct primarily and without qualification [*primo et simpliciter*] which are distinct things such that [either] each subsists with its own distinct subsistence, such as two created supposita [e.g. two complete substances], or one of them subsists and the other inheres in it, such as a body and its whiteness, for such things are said to be primarily and without qualification [*per prius et simpliciter*] things or real entities [i.e. absolute things]. However, those items which are not distinct things in this way, but instead one of them is an absolute thing, in the way discussed, whereas the other is a mode of being (or each is a mode of being and not the thing having a

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solum concomitative, sed etiam quidditative et formaliter, quia (qui *Quodl. Av.*) nullam entitatem habent nisi hanc quae est esse (*om. Quodl. Av.*) huius. Unde albedo, quae est (esse *add. Sent.*) huius ut subiecti, puta cigni, est aliquid essentialiter praeter esse huius, quia esse huius non est eius essentia (sed modus *add. Sent.*). Sed iste modus essendi, qui (quia *Quodl. Av.*) est esse huius, non est quidditative et formaliter aliqua natura vel entitas nisi esse huius; et totus conceptus eius (quidditativus et formalis *add. Sent.*) est concipi—non ut hoc vel quid sed huius; et [ille] qui aliter concipit [eum], non concipit modum essendi, sed rem cuius est modum denominative.” See also footnote 45 below.

mode), are only said to be really distinct secondarily and with qualification [*per posterius et secundum quid*]. (*Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 50–51 = *Quodl. Av.* 2.3, 184)<sup>29</sup>

Durand maintains that mutual separability is not required for a real distinction: non-mutual separability is sufficient.<sup>30</sup> Hence, his general argument for the real distinction thesis is straightforward. If X and Y are both things of some sort, and at least one of them can continue to exist ‘intact’ without the other, then X and Y are (somehow) really distinct; but an absolute thing can continue to exist ‘intact’ without its mode (with the proviso, again, that it still must have some mode or other). As he puts it:

If two items are things [of some sort], then if they, once united, can be separated such that [at least] one of them continues to exist intact [*in integritate naturae suae*] without the other, then these two things are really distinct [somehow]. But subsistence [*esse in se vel per se*] and inherence [*esse in alio*] and the [absolute] things upon which they are founded are like this. . . . Therefore, such modes of being [*modi essendi*] are really distinct from the [absolute] things upon which they are founded. (*Sent.* B 1.33.1, f. 36ra-b = *Sent.* C 1.30.2, n. 14 = *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 16–17)

Consider, for instance, the Eucharist. A few moments before the sacrament at the altar, the wafer’s brownness (an absolute thing) inheres in the wafer. On Durand’s analysis, the wafer’s brownness has a mode of inherence founded upon it. However, as everyone admits, during the Eucharist brownness no longer inheres in the wafer, even though that brownness (a separable quality) continues to exist ‘intact’. (According to Durand, it no longer inheres but rather subsists.)<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup>Non-trivial differences, omissions (*om.*), and additions (*add.*) are noted in parentheses: “Et quia realis identitas et differentia ex natura rei consurgit (ut dictum est prius *add.* *Quodl. Av.* 1.1), ideo illa dicuntur differre realiter primo et simpliciter quae sic sunt diversae res quod utraque est per se subsistens, propria et distincta subsistentia, ut duo supposita in creaturis, vel una est per se subsistens et altera ei inhaerens, sicut corpus et albedo eius, quia tales res per prius et simpliciter dicuntur res et entia realia (quia ... realia] *om.* *Quodl. Av.* 2.3). Illa autem quae non sunt sic diversae res sed unum eorum est res absoluta, eo modo quo dictum est, aliud vero est modus essendi, vel utrumque est modus essendi (vel . . . essendi] *om.* *Quodl. Av.* 1.1) solum et non res habens modum (essendi *add.* *Quodl. Av.* 1.1), non dicuntur differre realiter nisi per posterius et secundum quid.” Note that Stella (wrongly) omits “*vel utrumque est modus essendi*” in his edition of *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, even though (1) it is present in three of the five manuscripts as well as the parallel text in *Quodl. Av.* 2.3, and (2) Durand goes on, in the continuation of the above passage, to argue that there is a third kind of real distinction, a subset of the secondary (modal) real distinction, wherein both of the relata are modes: “Et in istis adhuc est gradus, quia sint modi essendi impossibiles in eodem supposito (in eodem supposito *om.* *Quodl. Av.* 2.3), tunc magis dicuntur differre (realiter *add.* *Quodl. Av.* 2.3) quam si sint (modi essendi *add.* *Quodl. Av.* 2.3) compossibiles.” Durand gives a fuller treatment of the real distinction between two modes in *Sent.* B 1.13.1, nn. 30–32 = *Sent.* C 1.13.2, nn. 32–34 and *Quodl. Av.* 2.3, 185.

<sup>30</sup>On this, Durand is much like Suárez, for whom mutual separability is a mere “mark” (*signum*) of a real distinction (*DM* 7.1, n. 19). For discussion, see Schmaltz, *The Metaphysics of the Material World*, 36–40, 44–45; Rozemond, *Descartes’ Dualism*, 5–6; Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 258, 263; and Menn, “Suárez, Nominalism, and Modes,” 241.

<sup>31</sup>Or, at the very least, the quantity of the wafer in which the various qualities inhere, depending on what your theory is here. See Adams, *Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist*. For his part, Durand does not decide one way or another. See, for instance, *Sent.*

Hence, brownness (an absolute thing) and its inherence (a mode) are (somehow) really distinct. The same sort of thing can be said about subsistence and a complete substance due to the Incarnation,<sup>32</sup> and generally, Durand argues, about any real relation or mode and its foundation, for example, contact and a body, etc.

In sum, then, a modal distinction—which Durand at one point calls a real minor distinction—is a variant of a real distinction; and what distinguishes a real major distinction from a real minor (modal) distinction is the sort of relata involved.<sup>33</sup> Hence, unlike some early modern modal theories, for example, Fonseca’s, but not Suárez’s, on Durand’s view a modal distinction is a variant of a real distinction and not a ‘middle’ distinction between a conceptual and a real distinction, such as the formal distinction.<sup>34</sup>

### 2.3. *The Non-compositionality Thesis*

The final feature that a mode has is that it does not constitute a composite with its foundation when it is added to it, a thesis I have dubbed the non-compositionality thesis. Briefly, the thesis is this. According to Aristotelian metaphysics, as most scholastics understood it, there are two basic kinds of hylemorphic composites: *per se* composites, such as the composite of substantial form and matter, and *per accidens* composites, such as the composite of accidental form and substance. (There are, of course, other sorts of composites in Aristotle’s metaphysics, for example, quantitative composites, but Durand rules these out as candidates for the sort of compositionality that obtains between a mode and

C 1.33.1, n. 15 = *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 48; *Quodl. Av.* 3.1; and *Sent.* 4.10–12.

<sup>32</sup>According to Durand, during the Incarnation Christ’s human nature quasi-inheres in the divine nature in the sense that it is ‘grafted onto’ (*inseratur*) the divine nature much as a branch might be grafted onto a tree (*Sent.* 3.6.4, n. 7). However, God could, if he wanted, separate Christ’s human nature from the divine person, and so Christ’s human nature would continue to exist ‘intact’ without its mode of being (quasi-inhering) in the divine; instead, it would take on a fresh mode of subsistence. See *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 50 = *Sent.* C 1.33.1, n. 18 (differences in parentheses): “... si humanitas Christi divideretur (dimitteretur *Sent.*) a divino supposito et per se subsisteret, ipsa quidem haberet alium modum realem essendi quam prius...” This goes to show that, in general, any given complete substance (e.g. Socrates’ human nature), which in the ordinary run of things has a mode of subsistence, could, by divine power, come to lose that mode of subsistence and still continue to exist ‘intact’ (albeit it would have to inhere, or, if fortunate enough, quasi-inhere, in something else).

<sup>33</sup>*Quodl. Av.* 2.3, 185: “... quae differentia tamen est *minor* et secundum quid respectu differentiae duarum rerum quarum quaelibet est per se subsistens vel una alteri inhaerens.” Durand never calls the distinction in question a *modal* distinction, but as Suárez makes clear when commenting on Durand’s *Sent.* C 1.30.2 in *DM* 47.2, n. 4 (quoted above in footnote 6), Durand is clearly committed to what Suárez would call a modal distinction. In fact, Durand only uses the adjective ‘modal’ once in his *Sentences* (*Sent.* 1.34.1, nn. 12 and 14). As Durand’s text there indicates, he is not overly concerned with the terms we use as long as we track the things involved clearly (n. 14): *dato enim quod supposita creata dicerentur ‘modalia’ non esset multum curandum dummodo constaret de re.*

<sup>34</sup>On Fonseca’s conception of the modal distinction as a middle distinction, see *In Met.*, Book 5, Ch. 6, Questions 6–7 and Ch. 15, Question 2. Durand thoroughly rejects any such middle distinction between a real and a conceptual distinction, such as Scotus’ formal distinction. See especially *Sent.* 1.2.2; *Sent.* 1.34.1; and *Sent.* C 1.33.1, n. 13. In Suárez, see *DM* 7.1, n. 13 and *DM* 7.1, n. 16.

its foundation; henceforth, when I use the term ‘composite’ I will have in mind *hylemorphic* composites.)<sup>35</sup> When an accidental form such as whiteness inheres in a substance such as Socrates, we would say that whiteness “constitutes a composite” with Socrates; likewise, when a substantial form such as human nature informs prime matter, we would say that human nature “constitutes a composite” with prime matter. Does a mode, then, when it is added to its absolute foundation likewise constitute a composite with it? For instance, when one adds the mode of inherence to brownness (e.g. before or after the Eucharist), or when one adds the mode of contact to a ball (e.g. when the ball is in contact with the wall), does a composite come about made up of the mode (inherence, contact) and its absolute foundation (brownness, the ball)? Durand’s answer is ‘no’.

What motivates this thesis? Durand clearly states at least one motivation dealing with the Trinity: if a divine internal relation—conceived of as a kind of mode—were to constitute a composite with the divine essence—conceived of as its absolute foundation—then divine simplicity would be placed in danger.<sup>36</sup> However, I submit, for Durand there is also an important metaphysical reason to endorse non-compositionality: if we did not maintain the non-compositionality of modes, then we would be faced with a sort of bedrock infinite regress. To see this, it’ll be useful to go over his defense of the thesis itself. Durand, in fact, offers two defenses: an early one and a later one, and, as I’ll argue, the later defense is better than the early defense, for the early defense fails to generalize to all modes. But since the early defense is somewhat more straightforward, I will go over it first.

In his early *Sent.* B 1.33.1, Durand offers us a kind of master argument, which can be reconstructed as follows.

- (1) If one sort of mode does not constitute a (hylemorphic) composite with its foundation, then no mode constitutes a composite with its foundation.
- (2) But inherence does not constitute a composite with its foundation.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>35</sup>See, for example, *Sent.* C 1.30.2, n. 15 = *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 17 (differences in parentheses): “... omne quod componitur ex aliquibus componentibus (permanentibus *Quodl. Par.*) se habet ad illa sicut totum ad partes. Partium autem quaedam sunt quantitativae, quarum una non est in alia sed iuxta aliam positione differens; aliae vero se habent ut materia et forma substantialis vel ut subiectum et forma accidentalis. Constat autem quod esse in alio et accidens absolutum in quo fundatur, puta qualitas vel quantitas, non faciunt unum compositum tamquam partes quantitativae positione differentes.”

<sup>36</sup>See, for instance, *Sent.* B 1.33.1, f. 35vb: “Tertia quia si in creaturis respectus facit realem compositionem cum fundamento, videtur quod similiter faciat in divinis, cum utrobique ponamus realem respectum et reale fundamentum.” See also *Sent.* B 1.13.1, n. 24; *Sent.* C 1.33.1, n. 37 = *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 60; and *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 25–26, 39–43.

<sup>37</sup>*Sent.* B 1.33.1, f. 36ra-b = *Sent.* C 1.30.2, n. 15 = *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 17: “Secundum probatur scilicet quod relatio non facit realem compositionem cum suo fundamento, et hoc simili modo ut prius, quia sicut se habet esse in alio ad illud in quo fundatur, sic se habet esse ad aliud ad illud in quo fundatur; sed esse in alio non facit compositionem cum eo in quo fundatur; ergo nec esse ad aliud.” Note that in Palude’s otherwise verbatim presentation of this argument in his *Sent.* 1.33.1, f. 137rb, he includes both subsistence and inherence in the minor premise: “Sed *esse per se et in se et esse in alio non facit compositionem cum eo in*

I'll return to the generalization represented by (1) below. Why does inherence not constitute a composite with its foundation? Durand's answer, in short, is that otherwise an infinite regress would obtain. A (hylemorphic) composite is made up of two parts such that one of them inheres in the other, for example, an accidental form inheres in substance, or a substantial form in prime matter, and thus constitutes a (*per accidens* or *per se*) composite with it (see footnote 44 for the relevant texts). Hence, if inherence (a mode) were to constitute a composite with its foundation, then inherence would have to *inhere* in that foundation, and so inherence would then be the foundation for some further mode of inherence, which would inhere in it, and so on *per aspera ad infinita*. Durand writes:

If inherence [*esse in alio*] were to constitute a composite with an accident, for example, with whiteness to which it is added and upon which it is founded, then inherence would be [the kind of] thing which could have its own inherence really distinct from it, just as whiteness is [the kind of] thing which can have its own inherence really distinct from it. This is because <sup>38</sup> inherence would only constitute a composite with whiteness if one of them inheres in the other, just as whiteness only constitutes a composite with its subject when one of them inheres in the other. However, the initial inherence [of whiteness in its subject] cannot have some further really distinct inherence [added to it], for then there would be an infinite regress: this second inherence would have to have a third, the third a fourth, and so on *ad infinitum*, which is problematic. Hence, inherence does not constitute a composite with its foundation. (*Sent.* B 1.33.1, f. 36rb; see also *Quodl. Av.* 2.1, 174–175; *Sent.* C 1.30.2, n. 15 = *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 17–18; and *Sent.* C 1.33.1, nn. 15–18 = *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 49–50)

This is what metaphysicians nowadays would call a bedrock regress. <sup>39</sup>

In sum, then, one motivation Durand has for introducing the non-compositionality thesis is to avoid such a regress. In a Christian Aristotelian world (that is, a world wherein there are hylemorphic composites and wherein the Eucharist is true) at least one of the parts of a composite can continue to exist 'intact' without the other. Hence, we must be prepared to commit ourselves to some sort of entity that glues the parts together, namely, a mode of inherence, founded upon one part. The job of this mode is to explain the fact that the one part constitutes a composite with the other part. However, this mode cannot itself constitute a composite with the part to which it is added, for otherwise an infinite regress would, indeed, follow.

But what of our generalization (1) above? Does a regress loom large with other sorts of modes, such as subsistence and contact? Durand's defense of the

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quo fundatur." See below footnote 40 for independent arguments that subsistence does not constitute a composite with its foundation.

<sup>38</sup>The version of this argument presented in Palude, *Sent.* 1.33.1 includes an interesting addition here (f. 137rb): "This is both because it cannot subsist and also because..." (*tum quia non [potest] esse per se; tum quia. . .*). I return to this below in footnote 46.

<sup>39</sup>See, for example, Simons, "Lowe, the Primacy of Metaphysics, and the Basis of Categorical Distinctions."

generalization here is minimal: he declares it to be self-evident (*patet de se*). But, at least it seems to me, it is not at all self-evident.

Consider the real relation of contact, which Durand treats as a paradigmatic mode alongside inherence. A white ball that is in contact with the wall has a mode of contact founded upon it. But why can't the ball's contact inhere in the ball, and thus constitute a composite with it, much as an absolute accident such as its whiteness inheres in it, and thus constitutes a composite with it? There appears to be no danger of a regress. So too with the mode of subsistence and other modes *mutatis mutandis*.<sup>40</sup> (This might explain Durand's reservations about the non-compositionality thesis in his early *Sent.* B 1.33.1, f. 36rb, where he ends on the closing note that the modal theory of divine relations would "avoid many difficulties concerning the distinction of the [divine] persons; however one of its explicit claims, namely, that distinct things do not [always] constitute a composite, is not altogether effectively proven.")<sup>41</sup>

However, in his later works Durand offers us an alternative (and better) regress argument, one that, I submit, generalizes to all modes. In *Sent.* C 1.33.1 and *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, after defining a mode (in general) as something essentially dependent upon but really distinct from its foundation, as discussed above, Durand writes:

Two things follow from this. The first is that (3) subsisting or inhering is true of no mode of being, since (1) every such item [that is, whatever subsists or inheres] is a thing having a mode of being that is denominatively true of it; (2) but nothing that is a pure mode of being has a mode of being that is denominatively true of it, for then this [added] mode would have some other mode [added to it] and so on *ad infinitum*. (3) Hence, what is a pure mode of being is not something subsisting or inhering, but rather it essentially is the very mode of subsistence or inherence that other [things] have of which these [modes] are denominatively true. The second entailment is that (5) a mode of being does not constitute a composite with the thing of which it is denominatively true... This is because (4) any such composition is in virtue of the fact that one thing inheres in another; (3) but a mode of being neither subsists nor inheres, as was just proven. (*Sent.* C 1.33.1, nn. 16–17 = *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 49–50)<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>Elsewhere, Durand does give us two independent arguments for why subsistence cannot inhere in a complete substance (and thus cannot constitute a composite with it). First, in *Sent.* C 1.33.1, n. 22, he argues that were subsistence to inhere in a complete substance, then that substance would not be said to "formally" subsist (*non diceretur formaliter per se subsistens*). Second, in *Sent.* 1.34.1, n. 7, he argues that if subsistence were an absolute thing that inheres in a complete substance, then a substance would not be a *per se* unity (*nec esset unum per se nec ens per se*). By contrast, a mode added to a complete substance would avoid this problem (n. 14). However, Durand seems to have changed his mind on this: In *Sent.* C 1.34.1, n. 14, he appends the note that even a non-inhering mode of subsistence would not guarantee the *per se* unity of a complete substance.

<sup>41</sup>"Ista opinio si esset vera evitaret multas difficultates circa distinctionem personarum; nihilominus tamen illud quod est manifestum in ea, scilicet quod diversae res non faciunt compositionem, non omnino videtur efficaciter probatum." Curiously, this sentence is omitted in the otherwise verbatim version of the text we find in Palude, *Sent.* 1.33.1.

<sup>42</sup>Differences, omissions (*om.*), and additions (*add.*) in parentheses: "Ex hoc sequuntur duo.



Structured a little more straight-forwardly:

- (1) Whatever subsists or inheres is a thing that has a mode of subsistence or inherence, that is, a mode is denominatively true of it.<sup>43</sup>
- (2) A mode cannot have a mode of subsistence or inherence.
- (3) Therefore, a mode can neither subsist nor inhere. [1,2]
- (4) A (hylomorphic) composite is made up of two parts such that one of them inheres in the other. (As before, Durand has in view hylomorphic composites here.)
- (5) Therefore, a mode cannot constitute a composite with that of which it is a mode. [3,4]

The first thing to notice about this version of the argument is that (5) the non-compositionality thesis—the second entailment—falls out of the claim (3) that *a mode can neither subsist nor inhere*—the first entailment. A mode cannot constitute a composite with the thing of which it is a mode (its foundation), because (4) a composite is made up of two parts such that one of the parts inheres in the other and (3) a mode cannot inhere.<sup>44</sup> This argument is also, if sound, perfectly general: *no mode whatsoever* can constitute a composite with its foundation since *no mode whatsoever* can inhere in its foundation.

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Unum est [3] quod nulli modo essendi competit per se esse subsistens vel esse alteri inhaerens, quia [1] omne tale est res habens modum essendi competentem ei denominative; sed [2] nihil quod sit purus modus essendi habet modum essendi competentem ei denominative, quia tunc huius (unius *Sent.*) modi esset alius modus, et sic in infinitum. Ergo [3] quod est (quod est) nihil quod sit *Sent.*) purus modus essendi non (*om. Sent.*) est per se subsistens vel inhaerens, sed est (*om. Sent.*) essentialiter ipse modus essendi per se [subsistendi] vel inhaerendi aliorum quibus haec denominative competunt. Secundum est [5] quod (quia *Sent.*) nullus modus essendi facit compositionem cum re cui convenit denominative... Cuius ratio est, quia [4] omnis talis compositio est per hoc quod una res inhaeret alteri; [3] modus autem essendi nec per se subsistit nec (per se *add. Quodl. Av.\**) inhaeret, ut statim probatum est; quare etc.” On the phrase “*competere ei denominative*” see the next footnote. Note that Durand usually speaks of subsistence (somewhat redundantly) as *per se subsistere / modus essendi per se subsistendi*. Hence, I translate the first statement of (3) such that ‘*per se*’ qualifies ‘*subsistens*’ and not ‘*competit*’. Also note that the last ‘*per se*’ (added in *Quodl. Av.* and marked with an asterisk) occurs in only one of the five manuscripts Stella used in his edition; it should have been omitted, as *Sent. C* does.

<sup>43</sup>The phrase “*competere denominative*”, which I have translated as “denominatively true of” captures a more complicated (but commonplace) view about paronymous (or ‘denominative’) terms as discussed in Aristotle’s *Categories*. For instance, if Socrates has (the form of) whiteness (*albedo*), then Socrates is denominatively called ‘white’ (*album*), and vice versa; likewise, if X has (the mode of) subsistence, then X is denominatively said to subsist, and vice versa.

<sup>44</sup>One might argue that the absolute foundation is what inheres in the mode and not the other way around. As Durand points out, this gets us no further, since, as we saw above (footnote 17), Durand maintains that a composite is made up of two absolute things together with two modes: one of inherence, founded upon what inheres, and one of standing, founded upon that in which it inheres. Hence, we could run the same sort of argument for the mode of standing as we would for the mode of inherence. On the mode of standing and composition, see *Sent. C* 1.33.1, nn. 15, 18 = *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, 49, 50; *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 17–18 = *Sent. C* 1.30.2, n. 15; *Quodl. Av.* 2.1, 174–175; and *Sent. C* 1.23.2, n. 5.

So the question before us is this: Why can't a mode inhere? Let's look at the argument for this claim, (3), then, in more detail. The first premise (1) is pretty straightforward: If we say that X subsists or inheres, what we mean is that X has a mode of subsistence or inherence, and vice versa (see footnote 43). The crucial premise, then, is (2): a mode cannot have a mode of inherence or subsistence. Why not? Durand appeals here to a kind of infinite regress: "since, then, this [added] mode would have some other mode [added to it], and so on *ad infinitum*." How is this regress supposed to work? After all, we saw above that contact and subsistence (both modes) might well have a mode of inherence added to them, yet this would not seem to entail that this added mode must itself have "some other mode" added to it. (That is, we would agree that a mode of inherence cannot inhere in its foundation at pain of regress, as argued earlier, but other modes *can* inhere in their foundations without threat of regress.)

Here is what, I submit, Durand has in mind. A mode, as we have seen, is really distinct from its foundation. One thing this means is that a mode is extrinsic and incidental to the essence of its foundation. But if X is extrinsic and incidental to the essence of Y, then Y might not have had X (at least by divine power): brownness might not have had its mode of inherence; the ball its mode of contact; etc. Hence, if a mode were to *have* a mode, then it might not have had it.<sup>45</sup> A mode is also, as we have seen, essentially dependent upon its foundation: it can neither be conceived of nor be without its foundation, even by divine power.

Now, two things follow from this. First, a mode cannot have a mode of subsistence

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<sup>45</sup>Durand will often capture this feature (a mode's extrinsicity to its foundation) using the adverbial phrase '*concomitative*' which we are told is opposed to '*essentialiter*': if X is or has Y *concomitative*, then X is not or does not have Y *essentialiter*. (See our discussion of natural and essential dependence above.) See especially a passage a few paragraphs above this one in our texts quoted in footnote 28, as well as *Sent.* 3.1.1, n. 9: "... omnis natura actualis et absoluta ... potest sine contradictione existere sine omni eo quod *non est intrinsece de ratione sua sed solum extrinsece et concomitative*... Esse autem in alio [i.e., inherence] *non est intrinsece de ratione accidentis sed extrinsece solum et concomitative*, quia secundum cursum naturae accidens non esset nisi inesset. Similiter *esse per se* [i.e., subsistence] *non est intrinsece de ratione substantiae*, sicut expresse ponit Avicenna, sed est realis proprietas vel modus substantiae, quia substantia completa sibi derelicta proprium suppositum constituit. Propter quod absque contradictione potest substantia privari proprio modo existendi per se et accidens modo existendi in alio." Note that Durand's claim here—that a mode is incidental and extrinsic to its foundation—which seems to follow from the real distinction thesis, appears dangerous when applied to the divine, for neither subsistence nor the internal divine relations, e.g. Fatherhood, etc., seem 'incidental' to the divine essence, a point that his opponents stressed (see footnotes 4, 7, 21). While Durand does deny that the subsistence of the divine essence is a mode really distinct from the divine essence (*Sent.* 3.1.2, n. 7), he still holds that there is an important sense in which the divine internal relations are incidental to the divine essence—after all, the divine relations (at least) *are* really distinct from the divine essence, for otherwise one's view would collapse into Sabellianism, at least according to Durand; hence, there must be *something else* that prevents God from preserving the divine essence in existence, so to say, without the internal divine relations. Or he could abandon the extrinsically thesis when it comes to the divine: Durand's procedure in these texts, after all, is to *explain* divine relations as modes *through* a general theory of (created) modes; hence, in *Quodl. Av.* 1.1, *Sent.* C 1.33.1, and *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, Durand first sets out a general theory of created modes and then asks whether this theory could explain divine relations. Thanks to Stephen Menn for pressing me on this point.

at pain of contradiction, for then it would not be an essentially *dependent* thing but an essentially *independent* thing.<sup>46</sup> Second, and crucially, a mode cannot have a mode of inherence at pain of regress. Suppose the opponent’s view: a mode, A, depends upon its foundation, F, in virtue of a mode of inherence, B, added to A (e.g. contact depends upon the ball in virtue of inherence added to contact). Since mode B is extrinsic and incidental to mode A (that is, B’s foundation), it follows that A might not have had B; but then A’s *essential dependence* upon its foundation, F, would not be explained by B added to A (or A’s having B). Contact’s *essential dependence* upon the ball, for instance, would not be explained by its mode of inherence in the ball, for contact might not have had that mode of inherence. Hence, we must add some further mode, C, to mode B (inherence) in the (vain) hope that C might glue B onto A such that A’s *essential* dependence upon its foundation, F, might be secured, that is, such that A could never be without F, even by divine power. For instance, we must add some further mode to contact’s inherence that glues contact’s inherence onto contact so that even God could not unstick contact from the ball. But this added mode, C, will be extrinsic and incidental to B (inherence), and so B might not have had C (by divine power); and so we must add some further mode, D, to C, and so on *ad infinitum*.<sup>47</sup>

Hence, no mode whatsoever can have a mode of inherence, and so there is, I submit, a very fundamental and plausible metaphysical reason to endorse the claim that a mode does not constitute a composite with what has it.<sup>48</sup>

### 3. What Is the Criterion for Ontological Commitment?

Having canvassed the general features that all modes must have—dependent reality, real distinction, and non-compositionality—I want to close with a more basic question: Why modes? Why not have an ontology of just things instead of an ontology of things and modes? The short answer, of course, is simply this: when an absolute thing is too much but nothing at all is too little, then we should countenance a mode. But the long answer is more complicated.

While the terms might not be completely rigid, if we view Durand’s ontological program through the lens of the contrast between medieval nominalism and realism, Durand certainly comes off as having certain nominalist tendencies. He,

<sup>46</sup>Hence, Palude’s version of the original argument, which includes this entailment (“because it cannot subsist”), is superior to the original argument. See above footnote 38.

<sup>47</sup>One might object that contact’s essential dependence upon the ball is one thing (and intrinsic or essential to it) whereas its inherence in the ball is another (and extrinsic to it), and so there is no danger of a regress, since its essential dependence is not an *explanandum* to which its mode of inherence is the *explanans*. But then what would be the point of saying that contact inheres in the ball? Moreover, to say that X inheres in Y is to say that X is *naturally* (but not *essentially*) dependent upon Y, and so contact would be both essentially dependent upon the ball and not essentially (naturally) dependent upon the ball at the same time. (See our discussion of natural and essential dependence above.)

<sup>48</sup>Giles of Rome and Suárez also make the non-compositionality thesis a hallmark of their theories of modes. On Giles, see Cross, “*Pro Insipiente*”; “Theology,” 50–51; and *Quodl.* 5.14, 307b. On Suárez, see Schmaltz, *The Metaphysics of the Material World*, 43, 60–63 and *DM* 7.2, n. 6.

for instance, denies even moderate realist views about universals, such as those on offer by, for instance, John Duns Scotus and Hervaeus Natalis, which suppose that a universal has as its basis a (non-numerical or numerical, respectively) real unity outside the mind over and above the individual members of that universal (e.g. the individual human beings in the case of the specific concept Human Being, etc.) Quite the contrary, for Durand a universal has as its sufficient basis the multiple individual things that fall under a universal that exist outside the mind, for example, the multiple individual human beings. (In the technical language he develops elsewhere a universal is a ‘mere intrinsic relative denomination’ like similarity.) He also thinks that this is Aristotle’s considered opinion on the issue (*Quodl. Av.* 3.1).

Durand also exhibits nominalist tendencies when he addresses Aristotle’s ten categories: he thinks (and he thinks Aristotle too thinks) that these are merely ten ways of talking about the world (‘modes of predication’) and not necessarily indicative of ten ways that things are. As Durand puts it:

Being outside the soul is not divided into the ten categories [*praedicamenta*] in accord with the formal concepts [*formales rationes*] in virtue of which these categories are constituted [in themselves] and distinguished [from each other], but rather being outside the soul is divided into the ten categories in connection with the things that furnish the sufficient basis for the ten modes of predication so that there is real predication and not fake predication [*quoad res quae praestant sufficiens fundamentum ex modis praedicandi ut sit realis praedicatio et non ficta*]. Hence, since a thing taken on its own, on the one hand, and taken together with something else, on the other, vary the figure of predication in multiple ways, therefore it is not always the case that things outside the soul are multiplied according to the multiplication of the categories or modes of predication. (*Sent. C* 1.30.2, n. 20 = *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 24; see also *Sent. A/B* 3.23.1, n. 21; *Sent. C* 1.33.1, n. 21; and *Quodl. Av.* 3.1, 244–245, 256)

That said, it sure does look as if Durand is less of a nominalist than, say, Ockham, who does not countenance modes in his ontology (with some qualification).<sup>49</sup> Why should we be committed to so many different sorts of modes? Indeed, as we saw above (footnote 13), Durand thinks that only things in the category of substance and some quantities and qualities are absolute things. Shapes and habits (both kinds of quality) and number (a kind of quantity) are modes. In the category of relation, first-species relations are mere concepts but second- and third-species relations are modes; and in the last six categories, action and passion are mere concepts, whereas all the rest are modes. So, what is Durand’s criterion for ontological commitment?

To be sure, Durand is committed to something like a truth-maker principle: we

<sup>49</sup>On medieval and late scholastic nominalism generally, see Menn, “Suárez, Nominalism, and Modes.” On Ockham’s nominalism and ontology, see Adams, *William Ockham* and Pelletier, *William Ockham on Metaphysics*. The qualification involves the *triduum mortis* and the (possible) need for a special mode of union. For discussion, see Roques, “Must the Relation of Substantial Composition Be a Mode?”

should countenance something (either an absolute thing or a real mode) and not nothing in cases where a proposition needs something and not nothing to make it true.<sup>50</sup> Consider, again, the Eucharist. Granted the truth of the Eucharist, we have to admit that the proposition, “Brownness inheres in the wafer,” is made true by more than just the absolute relata on their own. But granted the infinite-regress argument, what must be added to make this proposition true cannot be a further absolute thing (which would constitute a composite with its foundation) but instead it must be a mere mode. Hence, inherence is a mode. So too, in general, with all *external* relations, for example, “The ball is in contact with the wall”: whenever the absolute relata of a relative proposition are insufficient for making that proposition true, then we must posit a real mode over and above those relata. Thus, Durand argues that external relations in the categories of when, where, position, and having are modes (*Quodl. Par.* 1.2).

With *internal* relations—usually defined nowadays as relations wherein the relata *are* sufficient to make the relative proposition true—such as similarity, our answer will be somewhat more complicated. Briefly, Durand decides that some internal relations can be completely eliminated from the ontology (these are conceptual relations or ‘mere intrinsic relative denominations’) whereas others cannot (these are *real* relations or intrinsic respects [*respectus intrinsecus*]). On his view, a relative proposition that characterizes an internal relation is ontologically committing (that is, commits us to a mode over and above the absolute relata) when the subject in virtue of its having the foundation of that relation necessarily depends upon something on the side of the term of that proposition.<sup>51</sup>

For instance, consider the proposition, “Fire is able to heat up water.” According to Aristotle, such a relation is a second-species relation of active power. Such a proposition seems to characterize an internal relation because fire and water on their own seem sufficient for making it true. (Strictly, fire together with some quality, an active power, e.g. heat, and water together with some corresponding quality, a passive power, are what seem sufficient for making it true: to say that fire can heat things up is to say that fire has the active power to heat things up and that there are things with a passive power to be heated up.) However, according to Aristotle’s famous definition in *Metaphysics*, an active power necessarily requires the existence of a corresponding passive power (and vice versa). Hence, even though the subject and the foundation in the subject

<sup>50</sup>For a discussion of the truth-maker principle in late scholasticism, see Embry, “Truth and Truthmakers in Early Modern Scholasticism.” Strictly speaking, the truth-maker principle demands only that we posit some *thing* to make a proposition true; whether this thing is a mode or an absolute thing will turn on considerations about whether or not it is essentially dependent.

<sup>51</sup>*Sent.* B 1.30.2, f. 34vb: “. . . relatio realis [i.e. an internal relation] habet quod sit realis a suo fundamento totaliter et praecise. Voco autem ‘reale’ fundamentum in unoquoque relativo quando relativum ex natura alicuius rei existentis in ipso coexistit aliud ad quod dicitur.” *Sent.* C 1.30.3, n. 10: “. . . realitas talis respectus [i.e. an internal relation] est totaliter et praecise a realitate fundamenti seu a causa fundamenti. Vocatur autem hic fundamentum ‘reale’ quando relativum ex natura alicuius existentis in ipso coexistit aliud.” See also the version of the text (A?) found in Hervaeus, *De relatione contra Durandum*, 14.

(fire and its hot quality, that is, the active power), on the one hand, and the term (water with some corresponding passive power in it) seem sufficient for making this proposition true, nevertheless since fire in virtue of its having this active power necessarily depends upon something on the side of the term (sc. the corresponding passive power in water) we must posit something (a mode) in addition to the absolute relata (namely, a mode of ‘calectivity’ founded upon fire’s active power).<sup>52</sup> So too, *mutatis mutandis*, with the corresponding second-species relation of passive power (e.g. “Water is able to be made hot by fire”), as well as third-species (non-mutual) relations of measure (e.g. “Socrates knows Felix”).<sup>53</sup>

By contrast, first-species relations (e.g. of similarity and equality) and, curiously enough, actions and passions, are internal relations that do not require us to posit anything over and above the absolute relata. (The relata are truly sufficient on their own.) For instance, the relative proposition, “The white ball is similar to the white chair,” is, according to Durand, a ‘mere intrinsic relative denomination’: the internal relation it characterizes (a first-species relation of similarity, according to Aristotle) is a mere conceptual relation, that is, such a proposition does not commit us to anything (mode or otherwise) over and above the relata. This is because the subject of such a proposition in virtue of its having the foundation does *not* necessarily depend upon something on the side of the term of that relative proposition: the white ball in virtue of its having whiteness (the foundation of similarity) does not necessarily depend upon anything on the side of the white chair (*Sent.* B 1.30.2, f. 34vb). As Hervaeus Natalis puts it, presenting Durand’s view:

Similarity does not necessarily follow upon its foundation ... since, once a white thing has been posited, similarity is not necessarily posited, since some other white thing is not necessarily posited, which is necessarily required for similarity. (*De relatione contra Durandum*, 21–22)

The same could be said for quantitative equalities (*Sent.* B 1.30.2, f. 34vb),<sup>54</sup> as well as actions and passions, which Durand conceives of as kinds of internal relations between an agent or patient and a produced or received effect (*Quodl.*

<sup>52</sup>See especially *Sent.* B 1.30.2, f. 35ra: “Quae autem fundantur super potentiam activam et passivam sunt reales utrobique, quia una coexigit aliam et e converso. Unde in definitione unius ponitur altera et e converso. Est enim potentia activa principium transmutandi alterum, scilicet habens potentiam passivam, et potentia passiva est principium transmutandi ab altero in quantum alterum, scilicet ab habente potentiam activam.”

<sup>53</sup>See especially *Sent.* B 1.30.2, f. 35ra: “Relationes vero mensurae ad mensurabile, ut scientiae ad scibile vel scibilis ad scientiam, sunt partim reales, partim vero secundum rationem, quia ex una parte est coexigentia, ex alia parte vero non.” See also f. 34vb: “Scientia enim secundum illud quod est quaedam res coexigit rem scitam; sed res scita secundum illud quod est lapis vel homo non coexigit scientiam sed solum prout sumitur sub respectu scibilis vel sciti, quia in relativo secundum rem, ut est scientia, est coexigentia ratione fundamenti; sed in relativo secundum rationem est solum coexigentia ratione respectus, ut dictum est de scibili. Sic igitur patet quod illud quod facit relationem esse realem est natura fundamenti talis quod per eam unum correlativum coexigit aliud.”

<sup>54</sup>Durand became somewhat famous as a ‘conceptualist’ about first-species relations, alongside Auriol. See Capreolus, *Def.* 1.31.1 for a good survey of this debate.

*Par.* 1.2; *Sent.* B 1.30.2, ff. 34vb-35ra [especially the version found in Hervaeus, *De relatione contra Durandum* and Palude, *Sent.* 1.30.3]; *Sent.* C 1.30.3, nn. 12 and 15; and *Quodl. Par.* 1.1, 20–22), in notable contrast with Suárez.<sup>55</sup>

To sum up: a true relative proposition implies a mode if and only if (1) the relation it characterizes is external, that is, the relata are insufficient in making it true (and so inherence, contact, etc., are modes), or (2) the relation it characterizes is internal *and* the foundation in the subject necessarily depends upon something on the side of the term (and so categorical relations of power and measure are modes).

What of the peculiar mode of subsistence? As it turns out—a complication I’ve avoided so far—subsistence is special insofar as it is what later scholastics called an ‘absolute mode’ (*modus absolutus*) as opposed to a ‘relative mode’ (*modus relativus*): whereas relative modes (e.g. contact, inherence, etc.) explain a relational aspect of what has them, subsistence does not, for its job, after all, is to explain the fact that its foundation exists on its own (that is, its *in/per se* existence).<sup>56</sup> Even so, the truth-maker principle applies straightforwardly here. Granted the truth of the Incarnation, the proposition, “Socrates’ human nature subsists,” is made true by something more than Socrates’ human nature on its own, since it might be the case that Socrates’ human nature quasi-inheres in the divine nature (as Christ’s does). Hence, we must posit something over and above Socrates’ human nature that makes this proposition true, namely, subsistence, and this must be a mode and not an absolute thing for it is an essentially dependent thing not an essentially independent thing.

#### 4. Conclusion.

Perhaps we can quibble with certain cases, for instance, Durand’s commitment to spatio-temporal relations as real, or his view that actions are conceptual internal relations; perhaps we do not live in a universe where the Eucharist and the Incarnation are compulsive. But this does no damage to the *general theory of modes*. What Durand has done is thought through the concept of mode—an essentially dependent thing really distinct from that upon which it depends (its foundation) but such that it does not enter into composition with its foundation—and he offers us, as a result, a highly sophisticated theory of modes, one which a Suárez or a Descartes would have recognized and put to use

<sup>55</sup>On Suárez’s conception of action as a mode, see Tuttle, “Suárez’s Non-Reductive Theory of Efficient Causation” and “Suárez on Creation and Intrinsic Change” and the references therein.

<sup>56</sup>On the distinction between relative and absolute modes, see especially Thomas of Strasbourg (Argentina) *Sent.* 1.8.1 and 3.23.1; Auriol, *Rep.*, Book 3, Questions 37–38, ff. 24va-25vb; and Palude, *Sent.* 3.23.1. To my knowledge, Durand draws the distinction only once, namely, in the title to the incomplete *Tractatus de habitibus*, Question 5, which asks whether a habit is an absolute thing, a relative mode, or an absolute mode. While this text is incomplete, it seems to me that Durand might have argued that habits (as well as shapes [or ‘modes of termination’] and numbers) are also absolute and not relative modes (see especially *Sent.* A/B 3.23.1, n. 21). Indeed, both Thomas (*Sent.* 3.23.1) and Palude (*Sent.* 3.23.1) take Durand to mean that habits are absolute modes. On Durand’s views about habits, shapes, and numbers, see above footnote 13.

to solve their various problems, in ontologies that are similar or different from Durand's own. <sup>57</sup>

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