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Methodology of Narrative Structural Analysis*

Present-day analysts of narrative structure, working in the tradition of Propp and other formalists, have succeeded in effecting many improvements in the concepts and techniques of their predecessors. However, in one respect at least, they have not advanced beyond the work of Propp in that they continue to by-pass what may be termed the 'textual surface' of narratives, i. e. the constituent sentences of the narrative text as it is presented to the reader (hearer).[1] One manifestation of this neglect is that analysts take as their point of departure, not the text itself of a given narrative, but rather a synopsis of the text. For instance, Tzvetan Todorov, in his recently published study of the *Decameron* (1969: 16), explicitly states that he deals more with synopses of the stories than with the stories themselves.[2]

This practice can be justified in that it reflects the correct intuition that narrative structure is, in a sense, 'independent' of the linguistic means by which it is manifested. More exactly stated, there are a number of respects in which the underlying narrative structure differs from the textual surface. Perhaps the most important difference is in the disparity between

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[1] Propp (1968: 113) considered choice of linguistic means one of the areas in which the storyteller is free to create, and thus "not subject to the morphologist's study". Lévi-Strauss has asserted (1955: 431) that "Myth is the part of language where the formula *traduttore, traditore* reaches its lowest truth value ... Its [myth's] substance does not lie in its style, its original music or its syntax, but in the STORY which it tells."

[2] That this is also a common practice of Lévi-Strauss has been noted by several commentators, e.g. Hendricks (1967: 42-43), and Maybury-Lewis (1969: 117).

units of narrative structure and syntactic units. One plot event may be manifested by a few sentences, while another, of equal structural import, may be manifested by several long paragraphs. This is to say that the sentence (a constituent of the textual surface) is not a unit of narrative structure. The structural representation thus contains terms or elements not explicitly present on the textual surface. Another major difference is the greater 'objectivity' of the underlying representation with respect to the textual surface. The underlying structure is abstracted from narrative point of view (or rather, this is 'unmarked'), which is a matter of the means employed by the narrator to make us perceive the story events in a particular way. Deictic and phatic elements, which introduce subjectivity into the narrative, are also lacking, as are all individuating aspects of language use that collectively constitute what is commonly referred to as literary style. Nothing characteristic of, say, Faulkner's style would exist in the representation of the narrative structure of a Faulkner story. A final major difference results from the fact that a given narrative text rarely consists of pure narration; more typically an admixture of features of other discourse types, e.g. description, drama, etc., is present.

By first (intuitively) synopsizing a narrative, the analyst in effect neutralizes variable aspects of the text that are, for his immediate purposes, irrelevant — and, in fact, a source of 'noise' which obstructs his perception of the underlying narrative organization.[3] One might compare his initial operation with the anatomist's cutting away of all non-bony parts of the body so as to reveal the skeleton. Nevertheless, this practice, although justifiable on some grounds, creates a gap between concrete text and abstract structure, and this has certain negative consequences. The one we will be concerned with for the balance of this paper involves its implications for the development of a precise methodology for the structural analysis of narratives. By a 'precise methodology' is meant one "that states explicitly the criteria by means of which the analyst recognizes the manifestations of the concepts that are part of his theoretical frame of reference ..." (Mathiot, 1970).

Despite the fact that some analysts can be said to give attention to techniques of analysis, their discussions do not constitute a precise methodology in the above sense.[4] For instance, Lévi-Strauss (1955) has

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[3] This is not to deny, of course, that 'textural' features may occasionally foreground relevant aspects of the structural organization.

[4] Notable exceptions to this statement are the work of Greimas (1966: 141-70) and of Mathiot (ms). The methodology proposed here was developed independently of these sources; cf. Hendricks (1965).

(partially) illustrated his techniques with a brief analysis of the Oedipus myth. However, his point of departure is a synopsis of the myth, whereas it is obvious that a precise methodology must have the constituent sentences of the text as its point of departure. How one might first obtain a synopsis is passed over in one sentence by Lévi-Strauss: "The technique ... consists in analyzing each myth individually, breaking down its story into the shortest possible sentences ..." (1955: 432). The synopsizing operation may tend to be ignored because of its 'transparency'; Fischer (1963: 249) has noted that segments of a tale larger than a sentence "generally can be condensed into single sentences by intelligent native informants when they give a quick summary of a tale". The ability to synopsize seems to be part of one's 'narrative competence' and thus a relevant subject for explication.

Lack of explicitness in the matter of synopsizing a narrative is of no minor consequence, for this represents approximately half the analytic work involved in obtaining a structural analysis of a narrative. The representation of underlying structure is close (but NOT identical) to a synopsis of the narrative. The primary difference between a preliminary synopsis and the resultant structural analysis is that the former is an inventory of elements ('extracted' from the text) that are merely juxta-posed, whereas the latter results from a 'structuration' of this inventory; this operation involves uncovering relational principles, as well as inferring terms not explicitly present in the synopsis (or original text), and results in a condensation of the extracted elements. Note that in the dis-cussion to follow, the synopsizing operation will be referred to as NORMALIZATION and the structurizing operation, as SUMMARIZATION.

In this paper greater attention will be given to normalization than to summarization. This imbalance of treatment reflects the fact that the former operation can be discussed with greater explicitness. Subjectivity and the necessity of an appeal to intuition increase the further one gets from the textual surface. Nevertheless, our ultimate goal is the develop-ment of a unified set of procedures for going from the concrete text to the abstract structure. We want to bridge what some see as an absolute chasm (see the discussion of this issue in Hendricks, 1967: 34ff.).

At this point it is perhaps worth making explicit the ways in which this goal does not represent a reversion to the neo-Bloomfieldian attempt to develop a set of discovery procedures. Harris (1952), for instance, conceived of a discovery procedure as one which results in a compact one-one representation of the corpus; each category X in terms of which the corpus is described is identified with some phonic features of the data,

and these features are associated only with the category X. None of the operations of linguistic analysis destroy this one-one association.

In the case of narrative analysis, we have already pointed out that there is no simple correspondence between units of the underlying structure and features of the textual surface. What this means is that any adequate representation of narrative structure must utilize theoretical terms that have no direct relation to the textual surface. These theoretical terms are not automatically discovered in the data by the application of procedures — they must be provided by a theory of narrative discourse. Recall that the earlier characterization of 'precise methodology' referred to a pre-existent theoretical frame of reference. Therefore, what we have initially is not just a narrative text and a set of procedures, but also a system of theoretical terms.[5]

Our goal can be more accurately compared to the logician's task of converting everyday language into logical formulas. (This analogy is particularly apropos because, as will be seen, use is made of some notational conventions of symbolic logic for representing narrative structure.) There is no simple relationship between logical symbols and elements of sentence surface structure. But as Janet Dean Fodor (1970: 207) has pointed out, although no explicit translation rules relating sentences of a natural language to logical formulas have ever been formulated, generations of students in introductory logic courses have picked up the art of translation. Such a fact suggests, she notes, that it would be possible to formulate explicit translation rules.

In keeping with our disavowal of a concern for discovery procedures, we will sketch the nature of the underlying structure before turning to a consideration of methodology per se. It is postulated that the underlying structure of all narratives consists of two sub-structures, which will be referred to here as the SYNTAGMATIC and the PARADIGMATIC. The former relates to plot, the latter to character (and theme). Paradigmatic structure consists of two elements in opposition, the opposition being specifiable by a matrix of binary features. The two elements constitute, in effect, sets or groupings of all the *dramatis personae* that appear in the narrative (with the possible exception of certain 'mediating' characters who belong to neither set). That is to say, it is assumed that the characters appearing in a narrative are polarized, and this polarization is the means whereby the thematic significance of the narrative is signalled or conveyed. Each

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[5]   Our approach, concerning itself with the description of individual texts, may still seem neo-Bloomfieldian because of its emphasis on finite corpora rather than generative rules. To adequately answer this possible criticism will require a separate article.

character set (element of the paradigmatic structure) can be given a thematic label, which is the polar opposite of the label given the other set. Possible labels include Life-Death, Nature-Culture, Past-Present, etc. The implication is that thematic statement cannot be directly made by the author, but only through the use of foils (cf. de Saussure's notion of opposition and his example [1922: 122] that "ce n'est pas *Gäste* qui exprime le pluriel, mais l'opposition *Gast:Gäste*").

Plot is the dynamic aspect of narration, as contrasted to the static nature of character opposition. The fundamental purpose of plot is to interrelate characters — especially to bring protagonist and antagonist together in situations where they each have an interest. Plot is dynamic in that it involves a 'stretching out' or temporalization of the spatial (paradigmatic) conflict so that there is movement toward a high point of conflictful interaction, then away, ending in a change of configuration of the characters — more exactly, an inversion of the initial situation. This terminology is more or less traditional, but it can be made more precise by utilizing some elementary notions associated with the study of the Klein group in mathematics (see Barbut, 1970) and the notion of 'narrative transformation' as developed by Greimas (1966: 211).

Of immediate relevance in the present context is the matter of how narrative structure, in both its paradigmatic and syntagmatic aspects, is represented. It is proposed here that use be made of n-placed logical predicates ($0 < n \leqslant 2$), and a set of arguments. The arguments are variables — they do not denote specific individuals *(dramatis personae)*, but rather, the character sets (and their thematic labels) of the paradigmatic structure. They may be referred to, in thematically neutral terms, as protagonist and antagonist.

One-place predicates are used exclusively to represent the bundle of 'features' into which each element of the paradigmatic structure can be analyzed. Two-place predicates are used exclusively to represent syntagmatic (plot) structure. If we regard plot as the passage from one situation to another, where by 'situation' is meant the interrelationship of characters at any given moment, then a situation as so defined is equivalent to a logical predicate with two arguments. A representation such as $x(Y,Z)$, consisting of the two-place predicate x and the arguments Y and Z, is to be read 'Protagonist Y is in the relation x to Antagonist Z'.[6]

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[6] The predicate relations are irreflexive so that all two-place predicates have both arguments, protagonist and antagonist. However, the protagonist argument is not necessarily always in the first position; one could say that the arguments are 'noncommutative'. The predicates used to represent a story should be small in number,

Such a representation of narrative structure in terms of logical proposi-
tions is independent of any given language and in fact of any system of
grammatical parts of speech. In terms of English, at least, arguments
correspond to proper nouns (or, occasionally, group nouns such as
committee, delegation, etc.) with the feature [+Human].[7] One-place
predicates correspond to either nouns or adjectives (in their predicative
function only — in a grammatical sense). Two-place predicates correspond
to transitive verbs. Thus, a unit of plot structure would assume the
grammatical form $N_{pr} + V_{pr} + N_{pr}$ (*pr* = 'proper'; *tr* = 'transitive').
It is extremely important to stress that this grammatical representation
is not a linguistic surface form. That is, a constituent sentence of the
text as it is presented to the reader is typically not in this form. Such
constructions constitute representation of underlying narrative structure
and will be referred to here as idealized sentences.[8]

Thus only two (idealized) sentence types occur in the underlying
representation: transitive sentences with human agent and patient; and
attributive (predicative) sentences, with a human noun as 'patient'.
Obviously a much greater diversity of sentence types is to be found on
the textual surface. In developing a methodology our central task there-
fore will be one of describing the pertinent surface grammatical charac-
teristics of narrative discourse. The differences between the idealized
sentences and the sentences found on the textual surface are not due
mainly to factors of individual style; rather, they are a reflex of various
techniques of narration. Therefore our task, more specifically, is one

related by operations of inversion: $x, \bar{x}, x^{-1}$, etc. For more discussion, and an analysis
of a short story using these notational conventions, see Hendricks (ms).

[7]   Cf. Bremond's (1966: 62) definition of narration, as opposed to other discourse
genres: if there is no implication of human interest — i.e. if the narrated events are
neither produced by anthropomorphic agents nor undergone by anthropomorphic
patients — then there is no narrative, for it is only in relation to a human project that
events become meaningful.

[8]   The nature of the relation between representation in terms of predicates and argu-
ments, on the one hand, and in terms of grammatical categories, on the other, is very
much an open question which can be settled only by extensive work in basic theory.
Since our concern here is methodological, not theoretical, two possible relations may
merely be sketched. One possibility is to consider the representations as belonging to
two different levels; representation in terms of logical propositions could be regarded
as being at the level of 'narrative deep structure', and representation in terms of gram-
matical categories, at the level of 'narrative surface structure' — which is not to be
identified with linguistic surface structure (or even with linguistic deep structure).
Another possibility is simply to regard the two representations as notational variants of
the same structural level. From a practical viewpoint, the logical notation lends itself
more readily to analytic manipulation; also, it is convenient to have a distinction
between particular proper nouns and variable arguments.

of establishing correlations between various narrative techniques and devices, on the one hand, and the grammatical resources of the given language, on the other. One implication of this is that we cannot make do with the grammar of the language as it exists since it does not discriminate between those linguistic features that have literary relevance — i.e. serve to manifest critical concepts — and those that do not. Thus certain extensions or modifications of the grammar are necessary in order to properly describe the language of narrative texts.

It is not the case, however, that *ad hoc* categories, with no relation to the grammar of the language as a whole, are set up to describe the language of particular narrative texts. Rather, what is involved is the establishment of new groupings of already existent grammatical categories or constructions. These new groupings result from giving primacy to functional components within a narrative for which traditional literary terms exist and then seeking to establish the various linguistic means which manifest or serve this function. Typically there will be a one-many relation between the literary function (device) and the linguistic manifestation. (Some examples will be provided below. For more detailed discussion, see Hendricks, 1967: 33ff.) It should be stressed here that certain sentence constructions occur on the textual surface that have absolutely no relation to the underlying representation. The reason for this is that texts which are considered to belong to the genre narration rarely consist of pure narration; most contain some aspects of other discourse types, e.g. description. There is no representation in the underlying structure of narrative setting, etc.

It goes without saying that the grouping of the diverse sentence constructions found on the textual surface into a small number of sets (types) does, in itself, nothing to eliminate the disparity between the idealized forms and the surface forms. The disparity has certain methodological consequences, and the groupings facilitate the formulation of operations that have to be performed in going from the textual surface to the underlying representation. The major methodological implication of this disparity, particularly that resulting from genre admixture, is that the narrative text must undergo extensive 'normalization' before one can undertake an analysis of narrative structure proper (i.e. perform the operations of 'summarization').[9] As a matter of fact, the plot synopsis

[9]   It should be noted that Harris (1952, 1963) has given extensive attention to discourse normalizing operations. However, he conceives of discourse analysis as an extension of structural linguistics, which means that he lacks a conception of discourse structure not in a simple one-one relation to the text itself. Nevertheless, Harris' work provides numerous ideas which we have found fruitful, and his influence will be apparent.

most analysts take as a point of departure is in effect a sort of normalized form of the text.

Let us turn now to a consideration of those sentence types on the textual surface that are of immediate value in the preliminary operations of normalization. All of the different sentence structures that occur on the textual surface can be grouped into two broad classes or types. These will be referred to as the ACTION ASSERTION and the DESCRIPTION ASSERTION. The grammatical characterization of these two types is based on Harris' (1962) string analysis of sentence structure. In general terms, the description assertion is a grouping of all sentence patterns in which the verb takes a subjective complement; e.g. *be, seem, appear, look*, etc. Following Harris' classification, the 'object' (Ω) of these verbs — Harris assumes a tripartite division for all sentences — may be either: N; *Adj*; *Prep* + N (e.g. *He is in class*); *Adj* + *Prep* + N (e.g. *They are fresh from the field*); *Adj* + *to* + V + Ω (e.g. *We are ready to go*); and so on. Included among the copula-type verbs are those such as *shine* and *loom* that can take predicate adjectives (e.g. *The moon shone bright*). Also regarded as description assertions are sentences in which *have* occurs in the sense of 'to possess, hold, or contain as a part, characteristic, attribute, or associated feature'.

All sentences not classified as description assertions will be regarded as belonging to the group labeled 'action assertion'. A characterization of the action assertion as the complement of the description assertion is in the interests of economy, for it covers a more diverse range of sentence constructions than does the description assertion. If those varieties listed above in connection with the description assertion are omitted, then the classification of Ω's in Harris, 1962, can be applied to the characterization of the action assertion. It should be noted that the word *action* in the expression 'action assertion' is not to be taken to imply that all the sentence patterns so classified involve action in the usual sense of the term; that is, all the patterns do not have a constant semantic import. In fact, some may seem intuitively to be descriptive, e.g. *Mary resembles Sue*; this matter will be briefly discussed later. However, it should be emphasized here that the division into two main assertion types is for purposes of facilitating a very early normalization operation, and it is desirable that this operation be as mechanical as possible, with a minimum appeal to the analyst's judgment. Necessary refinements can occur later in the analysis.

Each assertion type has several sub-types. Before these can be discussed, it will be necessary to take up some of the early normalizing

operations. The reason for this is that the sub-types are established, not on the basis of grammatical characteristics of the constituent sentences of the narrative, but rather with respect to these sentences after they have undergone certain normalizing operations (the effect of which, however, is relatively minimal).

The very first normalizing operation entails replacing all anaphoric expressions by their referents. It is assumed here that this can be intuitively done with a minimum amount of difficulty; for a discussion of the possibilities for formalizing this procedure, see Hiż (1969). Although the idealized sentences representing the underlying structure contain only (human) proper nouns (plus occasional group nouns), in any narrative as it is presented to the reader these will be replaced under certain circumstances by various substitute forms. Not all alternate realizations of names will necessarily involve pronouns; sometimes the substitutes will be noun phrases of variable internal constituency, ranging from *article* + *N* to nouns with various preposed or postposed modifying elements, e.g. *the young man, the girl with an umbrella*, etc. If such expressions are anaphoric substitutes, the adjectives serve an identifying function, not a descriptive (predicative) one. The phrases function like names to denote individuals, differing from names only in having an internal structure (on this matter see Bellert, 1970; Gleason, 1968; Palek, 1968).

The next normalizing operation involves the excision of all description assertions from the text, leaving only action assertions. Its purpose is to make more perceptible the development of plot and the corresponding interrelationships of characters. This operation is guided by the grammatical characterization of these two types, given earlier.[10] It has proved to be the case that description assertions can be (more or less) mechanically separated from a narrative, leaving a coherent sequence of plot events; in other words, performing this operation does not result in a disintegration of the story. This may seem to run counter to the notion of organic unity, but it can be argued that this result is not counter to Aristotle's doctrine of unity, as presented in the *Poetics*; cf. Lord (1964).

All subsequent analytic operations deal exclusively with the action assertion (and its sub-types) since the description assertion has no relation to the underlying narrative structure. That is, it is not the manifestation,

[10] This operation must follow, and not precede, the replacement of all anaphoric expressions by their antecedents since it is not always immediately obvious which descriptive material serves more to identify than to describe.

on the textual surface, of the one-place predicate propositional form. Action assertions are the manifestation of both one-place and two-place predicate propositional forms. This follows from the nature of narrative fiction, in which character (and theme) is 'rendered' through action, and not stated directly by the author. That is to say, character traits and themes have to be inferred from plot action. (Admittedly not all narrative fiction is consistently of this nature; however, to account precisely for the whole narrative spectrum would only entail amending the model proposed here so as to allow one-place predicate forms to be occasionally manifested by description assertions on the textual surface.) The description assertions found on the textual surface of a narrative serve to indicate physical setting and to delineate physical attributes of *dramatis personae* since these, unlike psychological traits, cannot generally be implied through action (but see below for a qualification). Another possible function for description assertions is that of marking boundaries between major segments of the plot.

The extraction of action assertions from the text may be said to be analogous to the extraction of sentence 'centers' from sentences, as in Harris (1962); for example, the center of the sentence *Today, automatic trucks from the factory which we just visited carry coal up the sharp incline* would be *Trucks carry coal*. The other elements are (left and right) adjuncts. In the case of narratives, description assertions may be thought of as 'adjuncts' to the action assertions.

In fact, the appeal to string analysis in the extraction of action assertions is not merely analogical, for not all descriptive material occurs as separate sentences with the grammatical form definitive of description assertions; that is, an action assertion may itself have descriptive adjuncts, e.g. *The courteous young man helped the feeble old lady*. From the viewpoint of transformational grammar, the adjectives *courteous*, *old*, etc. are in effect embedded sentences (of the grammatical form identified with description assertions), such as *The man is young*, *The lady is old*, etc. However, there is no need to apply transformational analysis so as to obtain, in their 'pure' form, the underlying description assertions. Rather, the descriptive adjuncts may be excised as in string analysis, leaving the center *the man helped the lady*.

One complicating factor lies in the fact that Harris' notion of adjunct does not differentiate between what are in effect embedded description assertions and embedded action assertions. Consider the sentence *Entering the house, John was stopped by the neighbors*. If this is analyzed in terms of string analysis, *entering the house* and *by the neighbors* would

both be excised as adjuncts, leaving the center *John was stopped*. This analysis is inadequate for our purposes, since, to give one reason, the adjunct *entering the house* is an 'action', part of the sequence of events constituting the plot. In transformational terms, there is an embedded simple sentence *John entered the house*, which would be classified as an action assertion. Harris' string analysis therefore cannot be consistently followed in excising descriptive material from the text. It will suffice, however, if care is taken to regard as adjuncts only those sentence segments that are in effect embedded description assertions.[11]

Although the extraction of action assertions (alternatively, the excision of description assertions) is perhaps the most objective of the various analytic operations, it is by no means a wholly mechanizable task; the necessity of *ad hoc* decisions cannot wholly be eliminated. Just a few of the problems can be cursorily indicated by examining the following excerpt from Faulkner's short story "A Rose for Emily".

... They were admitted by the old Negro into a dim hall from which a stairway mounted into still more shadow. It smelled of dust and disuse — a close, dank smell. The Negro led them into the parlor. It was furnished in heavy, leather-covered furniture. When the Negro opened the blinds of one window, they could see that the leather was cracked; and when they sat down, a faint dust rose sluggishly about their thighs, spinning with slow motes in the single sun-ray. On a tarnished gilt easel before the fireplace stood a crayon portrait of Miss Emily's father.

They rose when she entered — a small, fat woman in black, with a thin gold chain descending to her waist and vanishing into her belt, leaning on an ebony cane with a tarnished gold head. Her skeleton was small and spare; perhaps that was why what would have been merely plumpness in another was obesity in her. She looked bloated, like a body long submerged in motionless water, and of that pallid hue. Her eyes, lost in the fatty ridges of her face, looked like two small pieces of coal pressed into a lump of dough as they moved from one face to another while the visitors stated their errand.

She did not ask them to sit...

After the excision of descriptive material (and the replacement of anaphoric elements), the passage would have the following form.

The deputation was admitted by the Negro into a hall. The Negro led the deputation into the parlor. The deputation sat down. The deputation rose when Emily entered, leaning on a cane. Emily's eyes moved from one face to another while the deputation stated their errand. Emily did not ask the deputation to sit.

[11] One could alternatively propose a through-going reduction of all sentences to kernels, and then there would be no exceptions involved in extracting the action assertions. However, for practical purposes this is unwieldy, and besides, consistent reduction to kernel form is not necessarily in the interest of the later analytic stages.

Among the observations that may be made about the passage from
"A Rose for Emily" and its partial normalization are the following. One
cannot always make a clear-cut separation of action assertion from
descriptive material — minor adjustments of sentences may be necessary
if they are to be well-formed. Second, description assertions occurring
as objects of verbs such as *believe, think, see,* etc. pose a special problem,
e.g. *When the Negro opened the blinds of one window, they could see that
the leather was cracked.* The description assertion *The leather was
cracked,* in the form of a subordinate clause, occurs as the object of *see,*
but sentences of the general form NP_1 *see* NP_2 would, according to our
criteria, be classified as an action assertion. This particular example is
further complicated by co-occurring with the clause *When the Negro
opened the blinds of one window*; this is an action, but it only serves to
make the observation of a descriptive detail possible. Further, consider
a clause such as *a faint dust rose sluggishly* ... This, again, is an action
assertion in terms of the criteria proposed earlier, but intuitively it may
seem to be descriptive. (It may be noted that the subject of the verb is
inanimate; the descriptive value of such constructions will be discussed
below.)

The above problems are not intended to denigrate the value of
recognizing a distinction between description assertion and action
assertion. They do show that separation of description from narration
is a more complex matter than these types and their grammatical charac-
terization suggest. However, it should be emphasized that these types
remain valuable for preliminary analysis, and that the above 'normalized'
version of the passage resulted from a collapsing of several distinct
stages of normalization.

The next stage of normalization, after extraction of action assertions,
aims at transforming these assertions, now the sole constituents of the
text, so that they are maximally similar in grammatical form. An im-
portant aspect of this involves breaking down complex action assertions
— i.e. those with embedded action assertions — into simpler ones.
Use is made of Harris' (1957) work in transformational analysis since
for our purposes it is an advantage that transformational relations, for
Harris, exist between actually occurring sentences and do not, as in
Chomsky's approach, serve to map deep (hypothetical) structures onto
surface ones. Consistent reduction to kernels is not necessarily a desider-
atum. Perhaps the most general guideline to follow is that the end
result should facilitate the later stages of analysis, e.g. by making it
easier to register parallelisms in content, etc. (cf. Hill's [1959] discussion

of semantic parallels; while Hill speaks of external parallels, our concern is with those internal to the given narrative).

Another aspect of this stage of normalization deals with direct quotations, a component of narrative that makes it akin to the drama. For example, *Miss Emily said, "I have no taxes in Jefferson"* would be transformed into *Miss Emily said that she had no taxes in Jefferson*. This rephrasing requires a minimal amount of judgment (on some of the grammatical shifts involved in this operation, see Hendricks, 1967: 39). A more interpretative paraphrase is possible, such as *Miss Emily denied having taxes*. The ultimate goal of analysis, in fact, is to attain such a paraphrase, but this is not a matter of normalization but of summarization.

To discuss the remaining normalizing operations, we must first establish sub-types of the action assertion. The preceding normalizing operations assure uniform results in the recognition of these sub-types, for the basic classificatory criterion is the number of proper nouns *(dramatis personae)* explicitly present in the sentence. Based on this criterion, we can establish three sub-types of the action assertion, designated Types 0, I, and II. In Type 0 assertions, no *dramatis persona* (N_{pr}) is present; e.g. *The sun rose*; *The wind rustled the leaves*. In Type I assertions, one N_{pr} is present; e.g. *Emily hardly ever went out*; *John answered the telephone*, etc. Type II assertions have two N_{pr} explicitly present; e.g. *The sheriff sent a note to Emily*.[12]

Both Types 0 and I, in turn, each have two sub-types, implicative and non-implicative. An implicative assertion is one in which there is a grammatical (rather than semantic) basis for inferring the existence of a *dramatis persona* (i.e. adding a N_{pr} to the assertion) that is not explicitly present. Consider the following Type I action assertions.

(i) *John was shoved*
(ii) *Emily returned the tax notice*
(iii) *Mary destroyed the letter*
(iv) *Emily no longer went out*

The passive form of (i) provides a basis for saying that a second person is

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[12] It might seem necessary to recognize a Type III action assertion, e.g. *David introduced John to Mary*. However, such sentences are not frequently encountered (after normalization), and so far no need to recognize such a sub-type has arisen. It may be noted, however, that instances of so-called 'mental process' clauses pose a special problem for narrative analysis, e.g. *John noticed David kissing Mary*, etc.

implied — the subject of the corresponding active sentence, which has been optionally deleted from the passive *(John was shoved by NP)*. Example (ii) is also implicative in that *return* may be said to be a verb which inherently has two *dramatis personae* associated with it (sender and receiver), though both are not necessarily expressed. Cf. Halliday's (1970) notion of what he calls 'inherent functions'. He cites as an example the sentence *Roderick pelted the crocodile. Pelt* is said to be a verb that inherently has an instrumental 'role' associated with it, though, as in the above sentence, it is not always expressed. In example (iii), however, there is no grammatical implication of a second person.[13] Any intuitive implicative force probably is a matter of the semantic structure of the word *letter*. Finally, in the case of (iv), there seems to no basis, either semantic or grammatical, for saying that a second person is implied. It is therefore classified as a Type I non-implicative action assertion, as is (iii). Let us now briefly consider the implicative/non-implicative distinction as it applies to Type 0 assertions.

  (i) *The tax notice was returned*
 (ii) *The door bell rang*
(iii) *The sun rose*

Example (i) requires no discussion; it combines passive voice with an omitted inherent *dramatis persona* of the verb *return*. Assertion (ii) is an example of the so-called 'ergative' construction: the subject of the intransitive verb can also occur as direct object, with the subject of the sentence being the causer of the action. Thus in the case of (ii) there is a grammatical basis for inferring a *dramatis persona*. No such inference can be drawn from (iii); it is therefore classified as Type 0 non-implicative.

The fundamental purpose of the preceding classification of assertion types is to facilitate the process of going from the constituent sentences of a text to its underlying structure. Since the representation of plot structure involves the use of propositional forms which correspond to Type II action assertions, the value of recognizing Type I implicative assertions in the text is obvious. They signal the necessity for certain normalizing operations, by means of which the text can be brought closer to the form of the underlying representations. In one sense, a Type I implicative assertion is 'really' Type II, and it can be put in that form by an objective grammatical operation. Of course the identification of the proper

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[13] Such an assertion might be said to be 'implicative', but in a sense different from the use here, if the direct object *letter* is what we will later call a 'mediator'.

dramatis persona to be supplied cannot be determined from the assertion alone; it is necessary to appeal to the immediate context. In this respect the normalizing operation is somewhat comparable to that dealing with anaphoric elements. In fact, the implicative forms might be seen as a form of zero anaphora. Both operations — that dealing with anaphora and that with implication — form an important part of the general normalizing operation that aims to make the text as complete and explicit as possible. The necessity for such a preliminary step in narrative analysis has been recognized by other analysts, e.g. Mathiot (ms), but they have not made clear all that this entails. (Needless to say, much work remains to be done in formalizing the identification of implied *dramatis personae*.)

At this point we can use the above examples of sub-types of the action assertion to clarify, at least partially, the earlier discussion of functional groupings of diverse sentence structures and constructions. It is obvious that each of the types and sub-types set up here is grammatically heterogeneous; the warrant for grouping these disparate structures together is, as indicated in the earlier discussion, their similarity of function within the narrative. For instance, the function of Type I non-implicative action assertions is to 'render' character through action, rather than to advance the action of the narrative (i.e. to contribute to the gross plot structure). From the assertion *Emily no longer went out*, and similar ones in the Faulkner story "A Rose for Emily", we can infer that the *dramatis persona* Emily was (or, rather, became) reclusive — although this word never explicitly occurs in the text.

More exactly, the function of rendering character belongs primarily to those Type I non-implicative assertions that contain intransitive verbs. Those with transitive verbs, e.g. *Mary destroyed the letter*, may or may not advance the plot (in addition to rendering character), depending on whether the inanimate direct object (e.g. *letter*) is what will later be called a 'mediator'. The other action assertion types (Type II, Type I implicative) serve primarily to advance the plot — though they may secondarily serve to render character since the intermingling of functions on the textual surface is a common characteristic of narratives.

Just as psychological traits of *dramatis personae* can be 'rendered' through the use of action assertions, so, in a sense, can some aspects of their physical description. Consider the following two assertions.

(i) *John was grimy*
(ii) *Grime covered John*

It seems intuitively clear that (ii) is a more vivid and 'dramatic' way of asserting (i).[14] Assertion (ii) is an action assertion with an inanimate noun as subject instead of a proper noun. There is a sense in which it could be said that Type 0 action assertions, such as *The sun rose*, etc., likewise function to 'render' physical setting rather than to advance the plot. More exactly, this is true only of Type 0 non-implicative assertions, since an implicative one such as *The door bell rang* will serve to advance the plot.

Although Type 0 and Type I non-implicative action assertions may seem in one sense to 'describe', this does not indicate that our original division into action and description assertions needs to be modified. If it were, we would no longer be able to account for at least one aspect of the distinction critics draw between 'rendering' and 'telling'.

All normalizing operations have been set forth, and we can turn now to a brief consideration of the summarization operations. First it should be underscored that normalization is only a preliminary — albeit extremely important — step in the analysis of narrative structure. We cannot possibly hope to achieve the idealized forms of the underlying structure solely through normalization; the further operations of summarization are required. Summarization is a more powerful operation than normalization, but it is also more subjective in that it is not closely tied to grammatical form. However, as we will see, at least one important aspect of the summarization operation can be discussed in grammatical terms. While complete objectivity in narrative analysis is perhaps in principle unattainable, it would be premature to draw the line as to where elimination of subjectivity is an *a priori* impossibility.

The summarization operation has two main sub-stages, corresponding to the two aspects of narrative structure. Paradigmatic summarization entails grouping characters into opposing sets which are given thematic labels. Since the procedures followed here — derived from those used by Lévi-Strauss (1955) in his illustrative analysis of the Oedipus myth — have been rather fully discussed elsewhere (Hendricks, 1970), nothing further will be said about paradigmatic summarization.

Syntagmatic summarization yields a representation of plot structure. A preliminary step involves excision of all action assertions that are 'non-functional', in the approximate sense of Propp (1968). Such assertions, in part, are the manifestation of such literary notions as

[14]   Note that less of an inferential leap is involved in inferring (i) from (ii) than in inferring that Emily was 'reclusive' from *Emily no longer went out*. The former case involves only adjectivization of the noun.

foreshadowing, recapitulation, etc. Consider, for example, the first paragraph of "A Rose for Emily":

> When Miss Emily Grierson died, our whole town went to her funeral: the men through a sort of respectful affection for a fallen monument, the women mostly out of curiosity to see the inside of her house, which no one save an old man-servant — a combined gardener and cook — had seen in at least ten years.

Since Emily is the main character of the story, this is by no means a simple exposition from which the main action moves forward. In fact, the story ends with the death of Emily and its immediate aftermath; these events are treated in some detail by Faulkner in the last few pages of the story. We may omit this expository passage since it is already in effect summary and thus not raw material for further analysis. Such material constitutes a type of 'meta-narration'; cf. Harris' (1963: 40) notion of 'meta-discourse'. As 'meta-narration', such story components may provide valuable clues about the organization and thematic significance of the story, but they are no substitute for a narrative analysis since they do not run together into a connected text about the text (cf. Harris, 1963: 50).

Not all action assertions not contributing to the gross plot structure are instances of meta-narration. Some function merely to set the scene for a direct confrontation between main characters. These assertions typically are Type II, though one of the *dramatis personae* is a 'mediating' character, i.e. one not belonging to either of the two opposing character sets. An example would be the passage from "A Rose for Emily" quoted earlier in which Emily's servant shows the deputation into the parlor.[15]

Whereas the preceding stage of syntagmatic summarization primarily involved the excision of material, the next (and final) stage is a matter of recasting the remaining material into a higher level of generality; in literary terminology, this is a matter of going from scenic to panoramic narration. One aspect of this operation can be discussed in grammatical terms and will entail a sub-classification of the Type II action assertion.

Although the forms used to represent syntagmatic structure correspond more or less to Type II assertions, they are nevertheless not of exactly the same grammatical form. Assertions on the textual surface that have two *dramatis personae* explicitly present do not necessarily have them both in the subject and direct object positions, respectively. Certain common

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[15] This sequence has functions other than that of putting the deputation 'on the scene', making direct interaction with Emily possible. One of these is to provide a framework for description assertions about Emily's house, which, incidentally, is a metonym for Emily.

(inanimate) nouns may occupy the direct object position. If this is the case, one of the names would occur either as indirect object (e.g. *They mailed Emily a tax notice*) or possessive modifier (e.g. *Sartoris remitted Emily's taxes*), and so on. All such sentence types will be grouped together and referred to as Type II mediate action assertions. Those in which the two proper nouns are subject and object, with no other nouns present, will be referred to as Type II immediate action assertions. Thus the underlying forms in the representation of syntagmatic structure are all (equivalent to) Type II immediate assertions.[16]

The inanimate nouns that are the direct objects in Type II mediate assertions will be referred to as 'mediators' — they mediate the relation between various *dramatis personae*. Consider the following sequence of mediate assertions.

(i)   *Sartoris remitted Emily's taxes*
(ii) *The next generation mailed Emily a tax notice*
(iii) *Emily returned the notice* (Type I implicative)

The tax notice (or taxes) is a mediator — it mediates the relation between Emily and Sartoris and between Emily and the next generation. The task confronting the analyst is to arrive at immediate assertions — ones which directly relate the two *dramatis personae*. To accomplish this, it is necessary to attend to the context and to determine the intention and motivation of the *dramatis personae*. In the context of "A Rose for Emily" it is apparent that the sentence *The next generation mailed Emily a tax notice* is equivalent to saying that *The next generation did not support Emily*, or something similar.

The Type II immediate assertion makes no reference to the mediator. This is to be expected of a summary statement, for in any summarization certain information, typically of a concrete, particularistic sort, is inevitably lost. Mediators probably are one of the linguistic means for 'rendering' rather than 'telling' a story. By the former literary critics usually mean that the plot events (as well as characterization, etc.) arise out of a concrete situation and are not expressed in abstract terms. Almost exclusive use of Type II immediate assertions would

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[16]   With regard to the question of whether Type II immediate assertions ever occur on the textual surface, it is postulated here that such forms most likely are manifestations of what was earlier referred to as 'meta-narration'; e.g. in "A Rose for Emily" there occurs the sentence *So she* [Emily] *vanquished them* [the deputation]... This is a recapitulation, placed at the beginning of a new section of the story, of what occurred during the preceding section.

result in 'abstract' — relatively less specific — discourse. Verbs that directly relate two *dramatis personae* (e.g. *love, hate, support,* etc.) restrict the specificity with which a story can be told. Type II mediate assertions allow more specificity in that verbs which can take indirect objects and other complements (e.g. *give, take, send,* etc.), while having less semantic specificity in themselves, can be used in innumerable situations with a variety of complements (mediators) that provide specificity. The difference between mediate and immediate Type II assertions is probably one factor in the explanation of how diverse stories can have the same underlying structure.

   The above summarizing operation basically involves going from one assertion to another one at a higher level of generality. Another aspect of syntagmatic summarization involves going from several action assertions to a single one. In other words, a 'hypotaxic' level of narration is replaced by a 'hyperotaxic' level (cf. Greimas, 1966: 162-64). To properly accomplish this, the hypotaxic sequence of action assertions cannot be considered in isolation from preceding and following sequences.[17] Since the goal is to uncover the 'functional' elements of plot structure (in a Proppian sense), one must of necessity take into account the fact that a given action sequence is in response to (the outcome of) a preceding sequence and that it, in turn, opens the way for another sequence. Consider the following sequence from "A Rose for Emily".

   So the next night, after midnight, four men crossed Miss Emily's lawn and slunk about the house like burglars, sniffing along the base of the brickwork and at the cellar openings while one of them performed a regular sowing motion with his hand out of a sack slung from his shoulder. They broke open the cellar door and sprinkled lime there, and in all the outbuildings ... They crept quietly across the lawn and into the shadow of the locusts that lined the street.

One possible (informal) summarization of the above sequence would be the single sentence *The greybeards sprinkled lime about Emily's house.* This hyperotaxic sentence is a Type II mediate assertion, and it might seem that the next step would involve making it a Type II immediate one which would directly relate Emily to the 'greybeards'. However, in terms of what precedes the passage, it is evident that Emily herself is not directly involved at this stage of the plot. The above sequence dramatically portrays the outcome of a meeting of the town aldermen called to discuss

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[17]   A related problem here, of course, is in the proper segmentation of the stream of behavior (narrated events); see the criteria proposed by Armstrong (1959: 163ff.).

Story

→ Normalization: 1st Stage

(String Analysis) Anaphoric elements replaced by their antecedents. Description assertions excised.

Story constituted solely of action assertions

→ Normalization: 2nd Stage

(Transformational Analysis) Complex action assertions simplified. Direct quotes recast as indirect

Transformed Action Assertions

Normalization: Final Stage

Implied *dramatis personae* identified for implicative assertions. Type O non-implicative assertions excised.

Story constituted solely of Type II (& normalized Types O & I impl.) action assertions, plus Type I non-implicative

→ Summarization: Spatial Aspect

Story with Type I non-impl. assertions eliminated

Summarization: Temporal Aspect (Prelim. Stage)

Components not contributing to gross plot structure (e.g. meta-narration, scene-narration, scene--setting assertions, etc.) are excised

Story constituted solely of action assertions contributing to gross plot structure

→ Summarization: Temporal Aspect (Final Stage)

Higher level of generality achieved

From Type II mediate to Type II immed. action assertions

From a hypotaxic to a hyperotaxic level

FINAL OUTPUT: Sequence of propositional forms (2-place predicates)

Fig. 1

neighbors' complaints about a smell emanating from Emily's house. During that meeting a conflict arose between 'three greybeards' and a young member of 'the rising generation' over the proper course of action to take. The young man wanted to directly confront Emily with an ultimatum to clean her place up. Thus, in summarizing the above sequence and representing it in terms of a logical proposition, one should make explicit that it constitutes a resolution of the conflict in favor of the greybeards. One possible representation would be: v(PS, PR), in which *PS* and *PR* stand for 'Past' and 'Present', respectively — thematic labels for the character sets resulting from a paradigmatic analysis of "A Rose for Emily" (cf. Hendricks, 1970) — and *v* denotes 'vanquish'. This concludes our discussion of techniques of narrative analysis. The whole range of procedural steps may be conveniently recapitulated by means of a sort of 'flow chart'; see Fig. 1. It goes without saying that the procedures discussed here still rely heavily on the analyst's intuition, but at least they represent a point of departure for further investigation.

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