**Meaning and Use, Once Again**

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**A Critical Notice by Sybren Heyndels of: Pragmatist Semantics**, by José Zalabardo, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023, xvi + 233 pp., $80.00/£60.00 (hardcover), ISBN 9780192874757

The general aim of Zalabardo’s new book *Pragmatist Semantics* (2023) is to provide an analysis of propositional representation.[[1]](#endnote-1) More specifically, Zalabardo aims to identify the facts by virtue of which sentences, which purport to represent the world, obtain their meaning. He calls these facts *meaning grounds*. *Representationalism* is the position that a sentence’s meaning grounds consists in language-world relations (i.e. relations between the sentence and items or facts in the world that the sentence represents).[[2]](#endnote-2) *Pragmatism* is the position that a sentence’s meaning ground consists of features concerning the way in which the sentence is used. As the title of the book already suggests, Zalabardo defends a kind of pragmatism.

More specifically, Zalabardo’s aim is to reject the following claim, which he refers to as the ‘RR assumption’:

(RR) A sentence that performs the function of representing things as being a certain way must have a representationalist meaning ground (8).

In a slogan, (RR) amounts to the idea that representation demands representationalism. Zalabardo argues, against (RR), that certain representational vocabularies should be given pragmatist meaning grounds. His strategy is to look at four types of discourse – *moral* discourses of what is morally right and what he calls *semantic* discourses involving *truth*, *propositional attitudes* and *meaning* ascriptions – and to argue that representationalist meaning grounds cannot be given for these types of discourse. This is done in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 4 considers those approaches that reject the idea that these discourses have a representational function at all. In chapters 5 up until 9, Zalabardo develops a positive account that holds onto the idea that these four types of discourses have a representational function, but which rejects the claim that these discourses must have representationalist meaning grounds. Zalabardo, in other words, aims to specify the pragmatist meaning grounds for these four types of discourses’ (alleged) representational function.

Zalabardo’s book is ambitious and covers a wide range of philosophical problems. This diverse range of topics, together with a writing style which is very dense, makes it a challenging read. In what follows, I will raise problems about specific steps of Zalabardo’s arguments and I will criticize important aspects of his positive account.

1. **Moral predicates and metalinguistic negotiations**

In chapter 2, Zalabardo argues that representationalism about sentences involving moral predicates cannot be true. His argument is a revised version of the oft discussed ‘open-question argument’ in metaethics. Zalabardo’s argument focuses on the predicate ‘is morally right’ and the property of maximizing overall utility, but he takes his argument to be generalizable to both other moral predicates and to other ‘natural properties’ that might serve as potential referents for these predicates. Zalabardo only gives a very rough characterization of ‘natural properties’: they are ‘properties whose instantiation by an action can be ascertained by standard empirical means’ (14). The aim, then, is to undermine ‘any view according to which ‘is morally right’ refers to a natural property’ (14).

The argument contains four premises (15-16). Zalabardo’s argument features a ‘we’-perspective and a perspective of someone who rejects utilitarianism. Given that some of Zalabardo’s formulations of his argument are unnecessarily complicated, I have taken the liberty of reformulating the argument in a more accessible way. I will present the argument against the background of a disagreement between U (a utilitarian) and D (a deontologist). The utilitarian holds that an action is morally right if and only if the action maximizes overall utility. In other words, she holds that the satisfaction conditions of ‘is morally right’ are utilitarian. The deontologist rejects that an action is morally right if and only if the action maximizes overall utility. Therefore, she denies that the satisfaction conditions of ‘is morally right’ are utilitarian. Here is my reformulation of Zalabardo’s main argument (the original formulations can be found in the endnotes for comparison):

[P1] Sameness of meaning of ‘is morally right’ is compatible with different satisfaction conditions for ‘is morally right’ as used by U, a utilitarian who thinks that killing one to save five is morally right, and D, a deontologist who rejects that killing one to save five is morally right;[[3]](#endnote-3)

[P2] If ‘is morally right’ has different satisfaction conditions for U and for D, then the predicates cannot have the same referent as understood by U and D;[[4]](#endnote-4)

[P3] Sameness of meaning of ‘is morally right’ is compatible with ‘is morally right’ not referring to the property of maximizing overall utility;[[5]](#endnote-5)

[P4] Sameness of meaning demands co-reference;[[6]](#endnote-6)

[C] ‘is morally right’ does not refer to the property of maximizing overall utility.[[7]](#endnote-7)

[P3] follows from both [P1] and [P2]. [P4] is stipulated. Zalabardo claims that [P1] ‘rests on firm ground’ (16). [P2] is controversial, given that there is a well-known naturalist rebuttal thereof in the literature. Therefore, Zalabardo spends a great deal of his time defending [P2]. I will remind the reader once again of the fact that Zalabardo takes his argument not only to count against the view that ‘is morally right’ does not refer to the property of maximizing overall utility, but also any kind of natural property that could be said to be the referent of ‘is morally right.’

Even though Zalabardo focuses much attention on [P2], my main problem is with [P1]. First of all, the claim that sameness of meaning *is compatible with* different satisfaction conditions for ‘is morally right’ is too weak. If this is merely a matter of compatibility, then different satisfaction conditions for ‘is morally right’ might also be compatible with *difference of meaning*. However, if this is allowed for, then the conclusion no longer follows. If difference of meaning is compatible with different satisfaction conditions for ‘is morally right,’ and if it is agreed that the predicates used by U and D cannot have the same referents (this is [P2]), then ‘is morally right’ can certainly still refer to the property of maximizing overall utility; for example, such as in cases where it is used by U, the utilitarian. If this is indeed the case, then Zalabardo has also failed to undermine ‘any view according to which ‘is morally right’ refers to a natural property’ (15).

What is needed for the argument is not just that sameness of meaning be compatible with different satisfaction conditions for ‘is morally right,’ but the stronger claim that sameness of meaning is the best explanation of what is going on in a disagreement between the utilitarian, who endorses that an action is morally right, and the deontologist, who rejects that the same action is morally right. There is of course a whole tradition in metaethics in which this exact thing is assumed (Hare 1991; Horgan & Timmons 1993; Smith 1994, 35; see Plunkett & Sundell 2013, 5-8 for an overview). The argument is the one from (1) the intuition that there is a genuine disagreement between, for example, a utilitarian’s claim that ‘killing one to save five is morally right’ and a deontologist’s claim that ‘killing one to save five is not morally right’, to the (2) claim that ‘is morally right’ must mean the same thing for both the utilitarian and the deontologist. In other words, the assumption is that genuine disagreement requires sameness of meaning.

However, this inference has been prominently disputed in the recent literature. In their classic article, Plunkett & Sundell (2013) argue that there are cases of *metalinguistic negotiation*, where speakers use terms with a different meaning but which can still be said to have a genuine disagreement. These are cases in which the disagreement specifically concerns the meaning – either the *character* (i.e. the contextually invariant meaning of a term) or the *content* (i.e. what is picked out relative to a specific context) of the terms that we use. These disagreements matter because what our terms mean sometimes plays an important role in our lives: we care a great deal about the meaning of ‘torture’, ‘racism’, ‘man’, and ‘woman’ because whether or not these terms apply in particular cases plays an important role in our lives and reflects our ideas of what constitutes the good. This certainly applies to the predicate ‘is morally right’ as well: moral disagreements between a utilitarian and deontologist can be interpreted as having genuine disagreement about the meaning of our terms. When the deontologist denies the utilitarian’s claim that ‘killing one to save five is morally right,’ she can also be interpreted as being involved in a metalinguistic negotiation about the meaning of ‘is morally right.’

Zalabardo does not spend too much time justifying [P1], but it is clear that he implicitly endorses the inference from (i) the intuition that there is genuine disagreement between two speakers to (ii) sameness of meaning of the terms used by the two speakers. In chapter 4 of his book, Zalabardo rejects a contextualist approach to moral predicates, according to which ‘is morally right’ means something like ‘being approved by me (or the community),’ arguing that ‘[a]ll apparent cases of moral disagreement would have to be taken instead as cases in which we talk at cross purposes’ (61). However, as Plunkett & Sundell (2013, 4) argue, moral contextualists can hold on to the claim that two speakers are involved in a genuine disagreement by interpreting the disagreement as a metalinguistic negotiation, even though the meaning of ‘is morally right’ differs when it is used by either speaker.

To sum up my argument, as it stands the literal formulation [P1] is too weak. If sameness of meaning is merely *compatible* with different satisfaction conditions, then difference of meaning could be compatible with different satisfaction conditions as well and, in that case, the conclusion does not follow. However, if [P1] is strengthened by arguing that sameness of meaning is the best explanation of genuine moral disagreement, then Zalabardo has failed to give sufficient evidence to rule out another potential explanation of the relevant disagreement, namely that the two speakers are involved in a metalinguistic negotiation.

1. **Is truth a property?**

Zalabardo applies the same argumentative strategy when arguing against the idea that truth ascriptions, propositional attitude ascriptions and meaning ascriptions can be said to refer to properties. In this section, I will focus on his argument against the idea that ‘is true’ refers to a property. In Zalabardo’s words, he will consider ‘a general line of reasoning against the possibility of treating *any* property as the referent of ‘is true’’ (37). Paradigmatic examples of properties that ‘is true’ can be said to refer to include the property of corresponding to facts, the property of being a member of a maximally coherent system of sentences, or the property of being accepted at the end of inquiry (37). Zalabardo’s argument focuses on the property of being accepted at the end of inquiry but is targeted at *any* proposal for a property to which ‘is true’ can be said to refer.[[8]](#endnote-8)

I will carry out a similar reformulation of the argument for the same reason given in the previous section (the original formulations can be found in the endnotes):

[P1] Sameness of meaning of ‘is true’ is compatible with different satisfaction conditions for ‘is true’ as used by C, a correspondence theorist, and by P, a pragmatist theorist who holds that something is true if and only if it is accepted at the end of inquiry;[[9]](#endnote-9)

[P2] If ‘is true’ has different satisfaction conditions for C and P, then the predicates cannot have the same referent as understood by C and P;[[10]](#endnote-10)

[P3] Sameness of meaning is compatible with ‘is true’ not referring to the property of being accepted at the end of inquiry (or the property of corresponding to reality);[[11]](#endnote-11)

[P4] Sameness of meaning demands co-reference;[[12]](#endnote-12)

[C] ‘is true’ does not refer to the property of being accepted at the end of inquiry (or the property of corresponding to reality).[[13]](#endnote-13)

The argument against [P1] presented earlier in the case of ‘is morally right’ also applies here. What Zalabardo is claiming is something stronger than mere compatibility. He needs to say that sameness of meaning is the best explanation of genuine disagreement about the nature of truth. However, genuine disagreement about truth can also be expressed through metalinguistic negotiations. There might even be cases where the best explanation of disagreement between speakers who defend different satisfaction conditions (correspondence, being accepted at the end of enquiry, coherence etc.) for ‘is true’ is that they are negotiating the meaning of ‘is true’. Some philosophers seem to think of their own work on truth in exactly this manner. Kevin Scharp (2013) for example argues that the concept of truth is inconsistent and needs to be replaced by successor concepts.

I will now focus on [P2]. Prior to doing so, however, it is important to begin with a general remark about the role that Zalabardo’s argument plays in his overall philosophical project. As he makes clear in the beginning of his book, Zalabardo’s aim is to claim that moral and semantic discourses (i) genuinely *have* a representationalist function but that they (ii) do not have representationalist meaning grounds. Instead, he argues, they have pragmatist meaning grounds. However, if this is his aim, it is unclear why there is a need for an argument which aims to reject *any* account that specifies a property as a referent for these predicates. After all, the relevant question is not whether these predicates refer to properties or not, but whether or not they refer to any *substantial* properties that play an important role in *explaining* the meaning of the relevant predicates. As he makes clear in the opening chapter of his book, he wishes to deny that the relevant types of discourses have representationalist meaning *grounds*.

In fact, this difference between truth as a property and truth as a substantial (explanatory) property connects to the way in which the debate on truth has evolved in recent decades. The view that truth is not a property at all has certainly been defended in the past. In his 1949 essay ‘Truth’, P.F. Strawson develops a kind of deflationary position according to which the predicate ‘is true’ does not add any assertive content to the statement, but adds that the occasions in which we appropriately say that a statement *is true* are often different from the circumstances in which we make the statement itself. The predicate ‘is true,’ Strawson argues, has a typical *confirmatory* use. It is often used to underwrite a statement already made by another speaker in a conversation. While this seems to me to still be a good point, Strawson added to it the, now much more controversial, claim that ‘[t]he phrase ‘is true’ is not *applied to* sentences; for it is not *applied to* anything. Truth is not a property of symbols; for it is not a property’ (Strawson 1949, 84).

Strawson would later go on to repudiate this view (Strawson 1998, 402), and contemporary deflationists generally accept that there is an uncontroversial sense in which truth can be said to be a property. Horwich, for example, states ‘[t]hat [the claim that] truth is a property almost goes without saying. We do, after all, distinguish two classes of statement: those that are true and those that aren’t – so truth is what members of the first class have in common’ (Horwich 2004: 71). Similarly, Thomasson (2015) argues that easy inferences from ‘The table is red’ via the conceptual truth ‘If the table is red, then the table has the property of redness’ to ‘There is a property of redness’ establish the existence of properties in an innocent and ontologically lightweight manner. Similarly, easy inferences from ‘Her statement is true’ via the conceptual truth ‘If her statement is true, then her statement has the property of being true’ leads to the acceptance of truth properties.

I agree that there is no problem with taking truth to be a property in this minimal sense. The main dividing line between deflationists and the more ‘metaphysical’ (or ‘inflationist’) accounts of truth, however, concerns the question that has less to do with whether truth is a property (‘is true’ refers to a property) but whether it is a *substantial* property (‘is true’ refers to a substantial property). While there are different accounts of what it means for a property to be ‘substantial’ or not (Edwards 2013; 2018), the difference is generally made in terms of explanatory power: a property is substantial if it explains why particular members of a class are a member of that class.

Zalabardo is insufficiently clear about whether his arguments are supposed to target the claim that ‘is true’ (or ‘is morally right’) refers to any kind of property, or whether it refers to a substantial property. He clearly suggests the former when he writes that he will be considering ‘a general line of reasoning against the possibility of treating *any* property as the referent of ‘is true’’ (38). However, I take it that the proper aim of Zalabardo’s argument should be that it denies that ‘is true’ (‘is morally right’, ‘believes/desires that’, ‘means that’) refers to a substantial property with the relevant kind of explanatory power, given that it is Zalabardo’s aim to reject that four types of (moral and semantic) discourse have representationalist meaning *grounds*. This also resonates with his discussion of [P2] to which he devotes most of his time defending. As a reminder, here is [P2]:

[P2] If ‘is true’ has different satisfaction conditions for C and P, then the predicates cannot have the same referent as understood by C and P;

[P2] is only true if ‘is true’ does not follow a natural kind model to single out its referent. After all, in the case of natural kind terms, we could have been empirically ignorant of the underlying, substantial property that explains the surface qualities of the relevant natural kind. If this is so, then ‘is true’ can have different satisfaction conditions for two speakers even though the true referent is the same for both speakers.

While Zalabardo’s argument against the claim that ‘is true’ (or ‘is morally right’) is hard to follow, I do agree that there is a strong disanalogy between natural kind predicates (such as ‘is water’) and predicates (such as ‘is true’ or ‘is morally right’). One of the problems with Zalabardo’s argument, however, is that he is insufficiently clear as to what natural kind terms are supposed to be. In multiple instances, he talks about how a natural kind view of ‘is true’ would take this predicate to refer to a ‘unique property’ (39) which explains all (or sometimes Zalabardo talks about ‘most’) instances of truth. That such a unique property will not be discovered seems reasonable: the prospect of monist theories of truth according to which there is one substantial truth property (which explains for all the members of the class of truths *why* they are members of this class), does not look good. However, the failure of monist theories does not entail the failure of ‘inflationary’ theories of truth in general. Other philosophers have developed pluralist theories of truth, arguing that different truth properties (correspondence, coherence, superassertibility) can be discerned in different domains. Such properties, pluralists argue, are still substantial: they might not be able to explain *all* instances of truth, but these properties do have some explanatory role to play in the relevant domain, and together they might be able to explain why most members of the class of truths are members thereof. Even though I agree with Zalabardo that ‘is true’ is not a ‘strong’ natural kind term in the sense that there might be a unique,substantial property underlying all cases of truth, more could have been written about how to deal with pluralist theories of truth.

The same can be said about moral rightness. I would agree that it is implausible to expect that ‘is morally right’ refers to one substantial property that can be empirically discovered and would explain all instances of moral rightness. The fact that some philosophers in the past thought that such a property exists does not make this claim less implausible to me. However, from this it does not follow that pluralist theories of moral rightness cannot discern a variety of substantial properties of actions that explain why something is morally right. Such pluralist theories are exactly what one should expect, given the complexity of our moral lives. Furthermore, there is a role for empirical research here as well, as is evident in actual empirical studies concerning the different values that underlie moral judgements of people with different political beliefs or people with different cultural backgrounds (e.g. Graham et al. 2013).

1. **Pragmatist semantics**

Zalabardo aims to reject accounts that give representationalist meaning grounds for moral and semantic discourses. But he also wishes to hold on to the idea that these discourse do, in fact, have a representational function. In other words, his aim is to give non-representationalist (pragmatist) meaning grounds for the four types of (moral and semantic) discourses that he discusses. These types of discourse have a representational function according to Zalabardo. I have several problems with the positive account that he develops and with the reasons he gives in support of his position.

My first point is that Zalabardo’s justification for the claim that the relevant types of (moral and semantic) discourses have a representational function is rather weak. He regards the claim that these discourses have a representational function to be something intuitive and that, therefore, it is a ‘major disadvantage’ (77) of non-representationalist views (e.g., ethical non-cognitivism, deflationism about truth, instrumentalism about propositional attitudes etc.) to claim that these discourses have a non-representational function. Zalabardo adds that even though this intuition is neither ‘sacrosanct’ (77) nor ‘universally shared’ (78), he is ‘not going to try to defend the representational intuition against this line’ but ‘rather is going to treat it as an assumption’ (78).

Given that the rejection of the claim that moral and semantic discourses have a representational function is one of the cornerstones of the book, a much more elaborate defense of it would not just have been welcome; it is actually a necessity. First of all, the notion of a (non-representational) function is insufficiently clarified. This makes it hard to assess whether or not the claim that a type of discourse is representational is either intuitive or unintuitive. Secondly, when considering moral discourse, it is not hard to look for reasons why such discourses have some ‘non-representational’ tendencies. Questions about whether it is morally right to burn religious books, whether it is morally right to allow euthanasia, to use the national flag to clean the toilet or to have incestuous relationships do not seem to be the types of questions to which we will one day discover the right answer. Clearly, there might be people who think so, but many do not. And this is all that is needed to show that the idea that moral discourse has a representational function (at least in one sense) is not at all ‘intuitive.’ From this neither the view that there is no sense in speaking about the representational function of moral discourse at all, nor the view that there is no interesting sense in which we can carry out empirical research about the values that underlie our various moral judgements follows. However, it does show that simply ‘assuming’ that moral discourse has a representational function without clarifying the notion of a representational function is question-begging.

A second point concerns Zalabardo’s actual pragmatist account of the meaning grounds of moral and semantic discourses. Zalabardo eschews epistemic notions (such as those used by warranted assertibility accounts of meaning) and instead argues that the meaning of the relevant sentences derives from the conditions under which these sentences are actually accepted. Zalabardo opts for the mental notion of acceptance (and rejection), rather than the notion of assertion because he realizes that assertions can be insincere and he wants ‘to filter out these spurious assertions and focus on those that are accompanied by conviction’ (92). ‘Acceptance of a sentence,’ Zalabardo argues, ‘is a conscious, involuntary re-identifiable attitude towards the sentence consisting in the conviction that things are as the sentence represents them as being’ (92). He further emphasizes that acceptance ‘is simply an involuntary feeling provoked by some sentences, as we understand them’ (92). This leads him to state that the pragmatist meaning grounds of semantic and moral discourses should be understood in terms of the conditions under which the relevant sentence is actually accepted and rejected, or, as he sometimes puts it, in terms of the procedures that govern our actual acceptance and rejection.

There are several problems with this account. First, the pragmatist meaning grounds are supposed to play a role in explaining the representational content of semantic and moral discourses (assuming that they have such representational content). However, if these meaning grounds are facts about the actual acceptance of sentences, and if acceptance is defined in terms of our attitude ‘towards the sentence consisting in *the conviction that things are as the sentence represents them as being*’ (92 – my italics), then the *explanandum* is already presupposed in the *explanans*. The explanation is, in other words, circular.

Secondly, in the case of moral discourse, Zalabardo argues that the meaning of ‘is morally right’ is grounded in facts about ‘feelings of moral approval’ (94). However, it is implausible that these feelings are anything like the ‘conscious, involuntary re-identifiable’ (92) acceptance attitudes that Zalabardo describes. There is a whole wealth of literature on the social psychology of our moral intuitions that describes these intuitions as mostly *unconscious* intuitions that precede our post-hoc rationalizations thereof (see especially the social intuitionist model developed in Haidt 2001). While these intuitions are certainly commonly described as being involuntary to some degree, it would be too strong to claim that we never have *any* voluntary, rational control over our moral judgements (this is what rationalist critics of social intuitionism emphasize, see for example Sauer 2017). In other words, social intuitionists would deny that feelings of moral approval are conscious, and moral rationalists would deny that they are involuntary. Zalabardo’s positive account of pragmatist meaning grounds thus seems to be open to a whole line of criticism in this arena.

Thirdly, a last problem resides in the sense in which this amounts to a *pragmatist* proposal. Even though ‘pragmatism’ is a mansion with many rooms, one of the key things that most pragmatists share is a commitment to the priority of *practical doings* or *action* over *theoretical thinking* or *reflection*. By grounding the meaning of sentences in mental facts about conscious yet involuntary feelings, the order of explanation seems to be the opposite of the pragmatist’s preferred explanatory strategy. For the same reasons, I would add, the alleged affinity to the later Wittgenstein (88-90) seems to be wrong-headed as well.

1. **Conclusion**

In this paper, I have criticized certain steps in Zalabardo’s development of a pragmatist semantics. I have focused almost exclusively on points that I disagree with, or which I experienced as being insufficiently clarified. I should emphasize that the book has more to offer, and I recommend it to anyone with an interest in the subject.

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**Endnotes**

1. References to Zalabardo’s book will simply be by page number. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Zalabardo distinguishes between two kinds of representationalism. The first type of representationalism holds that the meaning ground of a declarative sentence is the relation between the sentence and a fact. This view was initially defended by Russell (1907), but it also gives rise to some serious difficulties. The most notable difficulty is that the position cannot explain the meaning of false sentences without postulating the existence of ‘non-facts,’ which is rather implausible. The second type of representationalism holds that the meaning ground of a declarative sentence results from the relations between the terms in the sentence and the worldly items (e.g., particulars and properties) that are represented by the sentence as being combined with one another in a certain way. This view is defended by Russell (1912) after he rejected his previous theory. The second kind of representationalism is meant more as a collection of theories, rather than as one specific theory. Subtypes of this kind of representationalism can defend different accounts of the referential links between terms and items in the world (e.g., mediated through concepts or senses, causal-historical links) or different accounts of the semantic values of terms (e.g., semantic values of a predicate can be sets of particulars, properties, or concepts). [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. ‘Someone can mean by ‘is morally right’ what we mean by it even though they take an action to satisfy ‘is morally right’ but believe that the action doesn’t maximize overall utility, or take an action not to satisfy ‘is morally right’ but believe that the action maximizes overall utility’ (15). To make the argument more accessible, I have changed the setting to a conflict between a utilitarian and a deontologist. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. ‘If someone takes an action to satisfy ‘is morally right’ but believes that the action doesn’t maximize overall utility, or takes an action not to satisfy ‘is morally right’ but believes that the action maximizes overall utility, then ‘is morally right’, as understood by this speaker, doesn’t refer to the property of maximizing overall utility’ (16). [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. ‘Someone can mean by ‘is morally right’ what we mean by it even though the predicate, as understood by them, doesn’t refer to the property of maximizing overall utility’ (16). [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. ‘Someone can’t mean by ‘is morally right’ what we mean by it if the predicate has different referents as understood by them and as understood by us’ (16). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. ‘‘is morally right’, as we understand it, doesn’t refer to the property of maximizing overall utility’ (16). [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Note that Zalabardo no longer writes about ‘natural properties,’ as he did in the discussion of moral predicates. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. ‘Someone can mean by ‘is true’ what we mean by it even though they take a sentence to satisfy ‘is true’ but believe that the sentence won’t be accepted at the end of enquiry, or take a sentence not to satisfy ‘is true’ but believe that the sentence will be accepted at the end of enquiry’ (39). [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. ‘If someone takes a sentence to satisfy ‘is true’ but believes that the sentence won’t be accepted at the end of enquiry, or takes a sentence not to satisfy ‘is true’ but believes that the sentence will be accepted at the end of enquiry, then ‘is true’, as understood by this speaker, doesn’t refer to the property of being accepted at the end of enquiry’ (39). [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. ‘Someone can mean by ‘is true’ what we mean by it even though the predicate, as understood by them, doesn’t refer to the property of being accepted at the end of enquiry’ (39). [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. ‘Someone can’t mean by ‘is true’ what we mean by it if the predicate has different referents as understood by them and as understood by us’ (39). [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. ‘‘is true’, as we understand it, doesn’t refer to the property of being accepted at the end of enquiry’ (39). [↑](#endnote-ref-13)