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**THE EMBODIED MIND OF GOD**

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**Abstract.** In this article, I propose a new concept: The Embodied Mind of God. I also point out the benefits that can flow from using it. This concept is a combination of two concepts broadly discussed in contemporary philosophy: 'The Mind of God' and 'The Embodied Mind'. In my opinion this new concept can be very useful in the area of Philosophical Christology, because one of the most important questions in that area concerns the mind of Jesus Christ — Incarnate Son of God. I present my own model of Christ's mind that is able to avoid at least some of the problems faced by Christology and sheds the new light on some of epistemological issues.

Do not blame matter, for it is not dishonourable.  
Nothing is dishonourable which was brought into being by God.

*John of Damascus*

This article is a kind of Christological consideration, Christological meditation, applicable to philosophy. So this is a proposal from the philosophical Christology point of view. Philosophical Christology, in consideration of the person of Jesus, who is regarded by Christians as the Incarnate Son of God, sees an opportunity to deepen and better understand our philosophical categories.

**I. JESUS' MIND AS 'POSSIBLE MIND'**

Christological considerations make sense and are useful even when one does not believe in Jesus as the Son of God. Looking at him from an epistemological point of view, one has the right to treat him as at most a 'possible mind'. Just as in metaphysics we use the concept of 'possible worlds' the 'examination' of which, or rather the associated 'thought experiments', give us a better insight into the intrinsic features of our world, so in epistemology we can use the concept of 'possible minds'. A 'possible world' is one that is somewhat similar to ours, but differs from it, sometimes quite significantly. Similarly, a 'possible mind' is one that to some extent is similar to the human mind, however, contains something that makes it different. For example, models of the human mind mapped in silicon-based material or in biological neural networks can be regarded as 'possible minds'. In these cases however 'minimum conditions' were sought that would allow us to think about the similarity of these artificial creations to the human mind.

In this article I want to suggest the study of the 'possible mind' in its 'maximum' version — directly united with the divine. Even if we do not accept the doctrinal texts of Christianity, we know that in the history of human thought there appeared the idea of the divine-human unity, in which, as the Council of Chalcedon taught, what is divine and what is human, is not divided, but at the same time not mixed.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The problem of Christ's knowledge was one of the chalcedonian controversies, see e.g. Imil M. Ishaq, *Christology and the Council of Chalcedon* (Outskirts Press, 2013), 347–71.

Whether such a mind actually existed is another question, but at least it is a ‘possible mind’. So it seems that, viewed from a philosophical point of view, this attempt is justified.

I think that from the Christological point of view the meaning of such a study can also be defended. The problem of Jesus Christ is one of the two most important Christian issues (the other is the problem of the Holy Trinity). Based on the biblical data, the Fathers of the Church and Christian thinkers during 2000 years of existence of this faith have tried to find the answer to the question, how to express and to describe Jesus, whom they believe in. Faith comes first, but faith is still looking to understand and try to express this understanding by means of philosophical categories. Theology, however, does not feel too confident about the problem of the mind of Christ. This is probably because theologians lack precise enough philosophical concepts to express what is contained in the dogmas of faith. They have limited themselves to the area of knowledge of Christ.<sup>2</sup> Philosophical Christology, through the study of the mind of Christ, can give theology a huge favour. It must be however remembered that Philosophical Christology can only mark the dead ends and prepare the way to solve the problem of Jesus’ mind.

## **II. THE HARD PROBLEM OF JESUS’ MIND**

In the past, it was mainly the knowledge of Jesus that was considered. Theologians asked, for example, whether Jesus knew that he was God. They also asked how many parts his knowledge must ‘consist of’, so that one could explain on the one hand his sense of unity with the Father, his prophetic speech, and on the other hand his ignorance and the fact that he grew in wisdom and that he learned as every other human being. When one tracks the medieval discussions on this subject, a variety of theories can be found. The most extreme of them, presented by Alexander of Hales, stated that Jesus had up to 6 types of knowledge. The most popular theory assumed that Jesus had 3 kinds of knowledge: the beatific vision enjoyed by the saints in heaven (and by which he learned all things in God); infused knowledge, which is the expression of his being particularly chosen by the Father (this kind of knowledge allowed him to know things in themselves); acquired knowledge, which was developed.<sup>3</sup> However it was very difficult for theologians to explain, what Jesus needed the acquired knowledge for, if he knew all things in God and in themselves.<sup>4</sup> Interestingly enough, Thomas Aquinas, in his philosophical development, modified his line in this case. He also accepted three types of knowledge, but with time he admitted the increasing importance of acquired knowledge. For him also problematic issue was how Jesus learned from people, since he was filled with the knowledge in all possible ways.<sup>5</sup> The importance of ‘acquired knowledge’ was increasing, because theologians realized that the denial of this dimension of knowledge was a threat to the understanding of the humanity of Jesus.

The problem of the knowledge of Jesus is undoubtedly important and interesting. Equally or perhaps even more important seem to be the ontological issues. However, these are issues that are much more

2 Psychological problems of ‘Hypostatic Union’ in Jesus Christ seem also to be easier than ontological problems, see Roch A. Kereszty, *Jesus Christ: Fundamentals of Christology* (St. Pauls, 2011), 305–12.

3 See B. De Margerie, *The Human Knowledge of Christ* (St. Paul, 1977), also: M. McCord Adams, *What Sort of Human Nature? Medieval Philosophy and the Systematics of Christology* (Marquette Univ. Press, 1999), 32–57.

4 Some authors also ascribe to Jesus knowledge of mystical kind. See Randall S. Rosenberg, ‘Christ’s Human Knowledge: A Conversation with Lonergan and Balthasar’, *Theological Studies* 71, no. 4 (2010): 817–45.

5 See Simon Francis Gaine OP, ‘Christ’s Acquired Knowledge According to Thomas Aquinas: How Aquinas’s Philosophy Helped and Hindered his Account’, *New Blackfriars* 96, no. 1063 (2015): 255–68.

complicated. It is no coincidence that theologians gave the ontological issues a wide berth; it is difficult to find adequate ideas with which one can grasp these issues. However, if we want to benefit from deliberations in the area of philosophical Christology and if we make christological considerations not only as intellectual play, we must dare to take on such ‘difficult’ philosophical topics. The problem of knowledge can be described as an ‘easy’ version of the problem of the mind of Jesus. The ontology of the mind of Jesus can be considered as the ‘difficult’ version of the same issue.

Christological models proposed in the past were built from top to bottom (it was a descending Christology). Today models are rather based on ascending Christology (they are built from the bottom to the top). This is because of a particularly strong emphasis on the humanity of Jesus in modern theology. Contemporary authors writing about this topic are happy to use the concepts and schemes coming from current philosophy and psychology. Although their considerations mainly refer to the knowledge of Jesus, there appear to be Christological models that try to show how it is possible to link the divine and the human mind of Jesus. The most interesting among them are models referring to psychoanalysis, which place the divine mind of Jesus below or above the threshold of normal, everyday consciousness. The first model, proposed by T. Morris, called the ‘Two Minds Solution’, is the suggestion that the divine mind of Jesus is a kind of ‘subconsciousness’. Christ’s human mind, acting as consciousness, to which we have normal access and the subconscious mind of the divine nature, there is a relationship. However reciprocal access to the content of the various layers of the mind is asymmetric. The divine mind has free access to the human mind. The human mind, however, receives only glimpses of what is happening in the other, deeper level. Jesus has complete divine knowledge, but He does not have access to it.<sup>6</sup>

This model does not seem to be satisfactory. Complete human consciousness, the ‘fullness’ of humanity, when seen from the epistemological point of view, also requires the existence of ‘human’ subconsciousness. When we realize how strongly the conscious dimension of our existence is determined by the unconscious dimension, we are not willing to get rid of this dimension so easily. The mind that contains the divine subconsciousness rather than the human one, does not seem to be the human mind any more. Jesus is not so fully human. Therefore, we fall into the trap of docetism — a position that says that the humanity of Jesus is merely apparent.<sup>7</sup>

A slightly different, but similar model was proposed by J. Maritain. Instead of ‘subconsciousness’ he talks about the ‘supraconsciousness’. By this term he suggested that the divine in Jesus does not belong to the ‘dark’ realm of the mind, which may be associated with something ‘subhuman’. The divine is the realm of light and closeness to God, the realm of contemplation and ‘higher thinking’. ‘Supraconsciousness’ in Maritain’s model is similar to the ‘active intellect’ known from Aristotle’s conception.<sup>8</sup> However, if the ‘supra-consciousness’, as suggested by Maritain, is a ‘normal’ part of the equipment of the human mind, then we have exactly the same problem as in the previous case. To say that supra-

<sup>6</sup> See Thomas V. Morris, ‘The Metaphysics of God Incarnate’, in *Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology*, ed. Michael C. Rea (OUP, 2009), 221–24. See also his *The Logic of God Incarnate* (Wipf and Stock, 2001), 104–7.

<sup>7</sup> John Sweet, “Docetism: Is Jesus Really Human or Did He Appear to Be So?”, in *Heresies and How to Avoid Them: Why It Matters What Christians Believe*, ed. Ben Quash and Michael Ward (Baker Academic, 2007).

<sup>8</sup> See: Jacques Maritain, *On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus*, ed. Joseph W. Evans (Desclee de Brouwer, 1969, 47–93).

consciousness is a more noble sphere does not change the fact that the human mind of Jesus is not ‘purely human’. His humanity again is missing something.<sup>9</sup>

The tendency to use models that relate to the contemporary debate in the area of philosophy and psychology, however, is justified. I also find such a reference in the model proposed by myself. Each age has in itself ‘its own’ Jesus Christ and is trying to understand him using ‘his own’ categories.<sup>10</sup> I want to propose a model that does not refer only to the types of knowledge that can be distinguished in Christ. My proposal is an attempt to construct an ontology of the mind of Christ. I will use two concepts, which are discussed today. The first is the concept of ‘The Mind of God’, and the second one is concept of ‘The Embodied Mind’. I think that the mind of Jesus Christ can be understood as ‘The Embodied Mind of God’.

### **III. 'THE MIND OF GOD'**

The term ‘The Mind of God’ is most often associated with S. Hawking. In the words of ‘A Brief History of Time’ Hawking wrote: ‘However, if we discover a complete theory, it should in time be understandable by everyone, not just by a few scientists. Then we shall all, philosophers, scientists and just ordinary people, be able to take part in the discussion of the question of why it is that we and the universe exist. If we find the answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason — for then we should know the mind of God.’<sup>11</sup> Though Hawking has claimed that His words do not show that he is a theist, and that the term ‘mind of God’ is used metaphorically, you can hear in his words the echo of the great desire that stands at the basis of human knowledge — the desire to know the world as God knows it, to look at the world through the eyes of God, to know God’s thoughts.

A similar desire guides theology. If the most appropriate description of theological aims can be considered in what St. Paul writes, then in theology, the point is to know the ‘*Nous kyriou*’ (Romans 11:34; 1 Corinthians 2.16). (The English translation of word ‘nous’ is ‘mind’.) I think that the word ‘*nous*’ is here understood not only in purely psychological terms. *Nous* is not also the set of logical propositions. *Nous* is not something that stands in front of God. It is rather a ‘part’ of God. God creating the world and giving Himself to the world, not only expresses His thoughts, but expresses Himself. The mind of God is of the same nature as God. In the case of man we can talk about the mind, which ‘creates’ thoughts and talk about thoughts that are ‘products’ of the mind. In God there is an identity between one and the other. Therefore by recognizing the ways in which God expresses Himself, we get to know His nature.

K. Rahner recognizes this matter as being particularly interesting. According to him, the self-giving of God to the world (*Selbstmitteilung Gottes*) is one complex process, one internally complex act. However, it contains four parts inextricably linked to each other and relating to each other. The first of these parts is creation; the second: incarnation, the third: the life of grace, and the fourth: the final transfor-

9 Different models of Christ’s consciousness are presented and analyzed in Andrew Loke, ‘The Incarnation and Jesus’ Apparent Limitation in Knowledge’, *New Blackfriars* 94, no. 1053 (2013): 583–602.

10 As Macquarrie reminds us: „[...] Christ-event of almost two thousand years ago is still making its impact felt, and those who are aware of this are still compelled to ask the question about the person who was at the centre of the event. But they can ask the question and likewise formulate any answers to the question only in the language and conceptuality of today”. John Macquarrie, *Jesus Christ in Modern Thought* (Continuum, 1992), 340.

11 Stephen W. Hawking, *A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes* (Bantam Books, 1990), 193.

mation of the world. So if we want to know God, we must take into account all these parts.<sup>12</sup> Following Rahner, we can say that there is one mind of God. It is, however, intrinsically complex. The various ‘parts’ of the mind of God can be known in the world in four ways, respectively by: the law governing the world (creation), unique events deriving from freedom (incarnation), communication between persons (the life of grace), strengthening the structures in which people and the things of this world are connected (final transformation).

The concept of the ‘mind of God’ gives us new insights into the inner unity of the different ways in which God gives Himself to the world. The most important is that the concept of ‘the mind of God’ enables us to understand that this part of Mind, which is expressed in the Incarnation, is not separated from the other parts. I think that most Christological problems originate from the fact that the incarnation was treated as an extreme. Theologians portrayed them as a violation of the unity prevailing in the life of the Trinity. This would suggest that the Son of God enters into a world that is alien to God, detached from Him. It seems that these are the remains of a gnostic way of seeing the world. In gnostic conceptions, the world was affected by an incurable evil. Therefore, to save the perfection of God, you have to isolate Him from the world. According to theologians, Jesus, the Incarnate Son of God, was supposed to have been mostly separated from the world. In the light of Christian revelation we must say that the Son of God does not incorporate in the world in which there is no God. He incorporates in the world in which God expresses Himself in various ways. By becoming a man, the Son of God is not against God. The only thing that changes is the form of unity. Hence the ‘mind of God’ in the Incarnation also does not connect with the mind, which bears purely ‘earthly’ dimensions. Following Maritain one can say that Jesus is the ‘*verus homo*’ but is not ‘*purus homo*’. In Rahner’s concept, even being ‘*purus homo*’ is not without its reference to God, who expresses Himself in various ways in the world.

Someone may ask: does this entail pantheism? On the basis of Christian theology on the one hand you should avoid identifying the created world with God and on the other hand thinking about the world as completely devoid of relationship with God. I believe that thinking using terms of transcendental presence of God in the world (Rahner proposes this kind of thinking) is the most accurate depiction. Undoubtedly, it has a negative connotation in the sense, that using this term we cannot deliver a fully accurate or complete explanation of God’s presence and activity, but we can only indicate that God is really present and that he acts in the world. But we must remember that theological claims, not to mention dogmatic statements, are often negative („apophtic”).

#### **IV. ‘THE EMBODIED MIND’**

Another interesting concept is the thought of ‘The Embodied Mind’.<sup>13</sup> This concept is characteristic to the second phase of cognitive sciences or otherwise, of the ‘second generation cognitivism’. In the first stage of cognitive sciences there was a belief that manipulation of symbols is the essence of intelligence. Therefore, attempts were made to shape computer-aided psychological processes. The brain

12 Theology of God’s activity in the world based on Rahner’s thinking is presented in Denis Edwards, *How God Acts: Creation, Redemption, and Special Divine Action* (Fortress Press, 2010).

13 Today we can use neuroscientific concepts to understand the problem of Christ’s self, see Oliver Davies, ‘Neuroscience, Self, and Jesus Christ’, in *Questioning the Human: Toward a Theological Anthropology for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Lieven Boeve, Yves de Maeseneer and Ellen van Stichel (OUP, 2014).

was treated as a system relatively isolated from the environment. Dissatisfaction with the solutions proposed in this approach led to the paradigm of ‘the embodied mind’.

It had several sources. The first was philosophical. In the texts of the so-called ‘late’ Husserl we can find fragments in which he reflects on the significance of the body in cognitive processes. Husserl writes about ‘kinesthetic experience’, and also notes that cognition implies a special kind of bodily self-sensation. The body is found in cognitive processes in a double role. As the object of cognition it is constituted by an entity that already exist physically. Getting to know our bodies that ‘we have’, we use the body that ‘we are’. Husserl also puts the problem that in earlier phases of his philosophy would not be possible to present: namely, the problem of the birth and death of the ‘transcendental subject’.<sup>14</sup>

Among philosophers, the question of ‘embodied mind’ is most commonly associated with M. Merleau-Ponty, who is in this respect a faithful disciple of Heidegger.<sup>15</sup> According to Merleau-Ponty the nature of the body is ambiguous and ‘carnal existence’ is the third category that goes beyond the physiological and psychological. In his concept, a living body is neither spirit or nature, nor soul, nor body, nor the interior or the exterior, nor an object or a person. These opposing categories are derived from something more basic. The body is not an ordinary subject in the world. Merleau-Ponty wants to show how the experience of the world, oneself and others is shaped and defined by embodiment. According to him, the body is not a curtain located between the mind and the world but it rather shapes the original way of being-in-the-world.<sup>16</sup>

The second source of ‘the embodied mind’ paradigm is the appearance of cognitive linguistics. Supporters of this stream break with Chomsky’s generativism and propose an alternative model of creating language meanings. According to Lakoff and Johnson the original structure arises from our experience and interaction with the outside world. Then, on their basis, the mind generates more complicated language meanings. Insight into the processes of creation is possible through metaphors.<sup>17</sup>

The third phase of the development of this paradigm is the biological phase. Particularly important were here: the discovery of mirror neurons (Rizzolatti et al.) and of multimodality, and research on ‘embodied simulation’. They show that cognitive processes are closely related to the motor system of human beings and other organisms. Subsequently, embodied social cognition was also studied. This cognition is purely intentional. Its aim is to guess beliefs, feelings, desires and intentions of other individuals. The conclusion to be drawn from these studies is that the understanding of the human mind is only possible through the integration of neurobiological research and physical research, social and cultural relationship, which concerns organisms.<sup>18</sup>

The second generation cognitivism is the most interesting for my purposes here. It also reached philosophical conclusions. We were able to see a revival of interest in phenomenal consciousness. We have

<sup>14</sup> See David W. Smith, ‘Mind and Body’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, ed. Barry Smith and David W. Smith (CUP, 1995).

<sup>15</sup> See Hubert Dreyfus, ‘Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty*, ed. Taylor Carman and Mark B. N. Hansen (CUP, 2005).

<sup>16</sup> Additional information in Shaun Gallagher, ‘Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition’, in *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*, ed. P. Robbins and M. Aydede (CUP, 2009).

<sup>17</sup> The beginning of this paradigm was the famous book George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980).

<sup>18</sup> Good examples of thinking in this paradigm are contained in Paco Calvo and Toni Gomila, *Handbook of Cognitive Science: An Embodied Approach* (Elsevier, 2008).

witnessed a discussion on the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ (Chalmers) and ‘embodied cognition’ (F. Varela, E. Thompson, E. Rosch, A. Damasio, A. Clark). There appeared to be a proposal to combine philosophical theses, derived from cognitive science, with phenomenological research (this postulate was reported by Gallagher and Zahavi in the well-known book *The Phenomenological Mind*). The problem of the interpretation of test results and their philosophical ‘force’ remained.

The paradigm ‘of the embodied mind’ was introduced as an antidote to Cartesian dualism, considered to be too difficult to accept, especially in the context of modern science. Cartesian dualism contains an image, suggesting the existence of mind situated ‘opposite’ to the world. From this image arose many consequences, including consequences of a theological (Christological) sort. The image, according to which the mind is something transcendent to the world, does not satisfactorily allow one to explain how it is possible to build a ‘bridge’ between the mind and the world. It is also difficult to indicate the role of the body in cognitive processes. Showing the weakness of the criticized solutions, Lakoff and Johnson wrote:

‘Mainstream Western philosophy adds to this picture certain claims that we will argue are false. Not trivially false, but so false as to drastically distort our understanding of what human beings are, what the mind and reason are, what causation and morality are, and what our place is in the universe. Here are those claims: [...]’

4. Human reason is the capacity of the human mind to use transcendent reason, or at least a portion of it. Human reason may be performed by the human brain, but the structure of human reason is defined by transcendent reason, independent of human bodies or brains. Thus, the structure of human reason is disembodied.

5. Human concepts are the concepts of transcendent reason. They are therefore defined independent of human brains or bodies, and so they too are disembodied. [...]

9. Since reason is disembodied, what makes us essentially human is not our relation to the material world. [...]’<sup>19</sup>

The thesis about the ‘embodied mind’ is interpreted broadly in two ways: epistemic and ontic. As M. Rowlands writes epistemic interpretation assumes that ‘it is impossible to understand the nature of cognitive processes without understanding the wider bodily structures in which these processes are situated’. As for the ontic interpretation, there are two possible versions of it. The first is a ‘dependence thesis’. Again Rowlands states: ‘According to the second interpretation, the embodied mind thesis is a thesis of the dependence of cognitive processes on wider bodily structures. The idea is that cognitive processes are dependent on wider bodily structures in the sense that these processes have been designed to function only in conjunction, or in tandem with these structures.’<sup>20</sup> The second ontic interpretation can be called a ‘constitution thesis’. Rowlands writes: ‘The third — the strongest and most interesting, therefore — interpretation of the embodied mind thesis is also ontic, but is based on the idea of constitution or composition rather than dependence. According to this third interpretation, cognitive processes are not restricted to structures and operations instantiated in the brain, but incorporate wider bodily structures and processes. These wider bodily structures and processes in part constitute — are constituents of — cognitive processes.’<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its challenge to Western Thought* (Basic Books, 1999), 20.

<sup>20</sup> Mark Rowlands, *The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology* (MIT Press, 2010), 55.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 57.

I think that for our needs in the field of Christology we can take even the third, the most extreme interpretation. It seems that the first interpretation is quite trivial, while the second does not bring anything new to the existing concepts. The mind is shown here only as embedded in the structures of the world. But it does not mean that it is embodied completely. I have to agree that the third interpretation is naturalistic. But this is not however reductionism aiming to get rid of the category of the mind. It is merely a more precise placement of the mind in the structures of the world. This is a ‘non-dualistic’ theory at least if the type of Cartesian dualism is taken into account. But this is probably not a monistic theory. The man in this concept is not merely a matter, but rather embodied spirit or spiritualized body.<sup>22</sup> Gallagher and Zahavi remind us:

It is not as if the phenomenological way to “overcome” dualism is by retaining the distinction between mind and body, and then simply getting rid of the mind. Rather, the notion of embodiment, the notion of an embodied mind or a minded body, is meant to replace the ordinary notions of mind and body, both of which are derivations and abstractions.<sup>23</sup>

## V. JESUS' MIND AS 'THE EMBODIED MIND OF GOD'

I would like to say that the previously presented way of showing the ‘component parts’ of man, the third interpretation, is the safest for Christology. As noted by O. Crisp, in Platonic dualism (so I guess also in Cartesian one) the soul is separated from the body, and only contingently related to the matter of the body (in this way, we fall into another error with Christology, namely *nestorianism*, which assumes internal breakdown in Jesus),<sup>24</sup> in hylemorphic dualism (though it is questionable whether it is really dualism) the situation is somewhat better — though the soul does not need to be united to the specific body, this relationship is more intimate, because the matter involves organizing body by the soul. The paradigm of ‘the embodied mind’ gives us insight into the necessary connection of the mind with the specific body.<sup>25</sup> Necessary to such an extent that it is precisely this particular one and no other body. And this specific body constitutes the mental experience of the man — Jesus — and constitutes his mind. In light of this conception, Jesus does not need to have ‘an additional’ mind. His mind does not have to be built of layers. There is no need to place a ‘divine part’ of the mind under or above the conscious mind.

Jesus remains in relationship with other persons of the Trinity. He does not fulfil this unity by being partly ‘outside the world’. The unity is realized through the world, in which the self-giving of God takes place in different ways. However, since the incarnation is one part of the process of self-giving, and *ipso facto* the Mind of God has an incarnational part, relationship with other parts is much deeper than any other human person is able to fulfil.

<sup>22</sup> Christological discussions shed light on anthropological problems. See Marc Cortez, *Embodied Souls, Ensouled Bodies: An Exercise in Christological Anthropology and Its Significance for the Mind/Body Debate* (A&C Black, 2008).

<sup>23</sup> Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, *The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science* (Routledge, 2008), 135.

<sup>24</sup> See Oliver Crisp, *Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered* (CUP, 2007), 66–67, and compare A. N. Williams, ‘Nestorianism: Is Jesus Christ one person or does he have a split identity, with his divine nature separate and divided from his human nature?’, in *Heresies and How to Avoid Them*, ed. Ben Quash and Michael Ward (Baker Academic, 2007).

<sup>25</sup> Irrelevance of bodily differences is often pointed out as the reason for scepticism about Cartesian epistemology. The paradigm of ‘The embodied mind’ is sensitive for differences of this kind, see Louise M. Antony, in *The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology*, ed. Paul K. Moser (OUP, 2002), 465–69.

The mind of Jesus is not the least, but the most embodied mind this world has ever known. It also means that Jesus is not the furthest, but the closest to ‘matter’. No other man has in himself the divine principle of the unity of these parts of God’s self-giving to the world. In any other man can be seen an internal ‘break’. So no other humans experience or can understand how parts of the Mind of God can remain together in harmony. That is why we cannot understand how it is possible to reconcile the existing laws of nature with the experience of freedom or to reconcile what is individual with what is common. Jesus, because it is in perfect unity with the other persons of the Trinity, remains in harmony, without the slightest separation, with all parts of process of self-giving. He is well incorporated, perfectly embodied into the structures of the world, which contain the elements of the divine and in which God expresses Himself.

But how to defend the unity of the person in Jesus referred to by the dogma of Chalcedon? How can we say that in Jesus there are two natures: divine and human without separation and without confusion? Is it necessary to maintain the duality and parallelism of the two natures? And whether any dualism (or parallelism) of natures entails dualism (or parallelism) of minds? Historically, dualism was considered necessary to defend the human freedom of Jesus. But it is possible to say that the adoption of the human will to the will of God does not break with human freedom, but only triggers true freedom. Similarly, we can think on the two types of minds. Jesus does not need to have two separate minds. The divine mind does not have to also occupy some part of the mind of Jesus. It is enough that Jesus has a human, ‘embodied mind’.

The answer to the question, how can one explain the possibility of concluding in the mind of Jesus, both of the human and the divine, is extremely difficult. It requires accurate answers to other questions. The answer to the question what might be contained in the divine mind, and a question of what is constitutive of the human mind and how the mind and body connect, is possible. Meanwhile, still we are looking for the answers to these questions. And we are not closer than answers about man than to the question of God. T. Morris writes:

What essentially constitutes a human body and a human mind wait upon a perfect science or a more complete revelation to say. We have neither a very full-blown nor a very fine-grained understanding of either at this point [...] For God the Son to become human, he thus had to take on a human body and a human mind, with all that entails. [...] He just had to take it and created, contingent body and the mind of the right sort.<sup>26</sup>

So we are looking for models that will allow us to bring the answers to these questions. On the one hand we take the concept of ‘the mind of God’, which is useful in the area of philosophy inspired by science, and in the area of theology. On the other hand we take, discussed by cognitive scientists and phenomenologists, the concept of ‘the embodied mind’. It seems that the christological model based on these concepts is able to avoid at least part of the problems faced by Christology. What else can fit within the limits of Christian orthodoxy? The proposal I have just presented is only a draft and needs further development. It seems to me promising. Surely it keeps up with the times. The task of good theology, including natural theology, is teaching the mysteries of faith in a way characteristic for contemporary times. This is already a sufficient reason to make such attempts and therefore to discuss the issue of ‘the embodied mind of God’.

26 Morris, “The Metaphysics of God Incarnate”, 217.

Finally, paraphrasing the words of John of Damascus quoted at the beginning: ‘Do not blame matter, for it is not dishonourable. Nothing is dishonourable which was brought into being by God’, I would like to add: nothing is dishonourable, which is filled by God’s presence.

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