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EMPEDOCLES DEMOCRATICUS: HELLENISTIC BIOGRAPHY AT THE INTERSECTION OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS*

Introduction

A tantalizing fragment of Aristotle, probably from his lost *On Poets*,[1] appears at first glance to characterize Empedocles of Agrigentum as an advocate for democracy:

> Aristotle too says that he [sc. Empedocles] was a free man, and estranged from every sort of rule, if indeed it is true that he declined the kingship when it was offered to him, as Xanthus claims in his account of him [sc. Empedocles] – obviously because he was more content with a life of simplicity. Timaeus also said these things, at the same time adding the reason for his [sc. Empedocles'] being a man of the people.[2]

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[1] So Janko 2010, who notes that it is 'hard to be sure' whether the fragment comes from the lost *On Poets* or *Sophist*. Rose, followed by Gigon (F 865), speculated that it came from Aristotle's lost *Sophist*, probably because Diogenes knows the *Sophist* to be the text of Aristotle that speaks about Empedocles (F 65 Rose = Diog. Laert. 8.57 and 9.25). For reasons that will become clear, i.e. that I believe that Aristotle was evaluating Empedocles' character by way of exegesis of his poems, I opt for *On Poets*.

[2] So I translate δημοτικὸς ἀνήρ. In the fourth century BCE, this phrase is explained exegetically as a 'champion for the majority' (περὶ τὸ πλῆθος ... σπουδάζων) at Demosthenes 24.134. Alternatively, Aeschines (3.169-70) provides an expanded definition of the essential qualities of a δημοτικὸς ἀνήρ that corresponds well to Timaeus' account of Empedocles: first, he must be a free-born citizen (ἐλεύθερος) from both sides of his parentage; second, he must have as a legacy from his ancestors service done for democracy; third he must be temperate and self-restrained in daily life (σώφρονα καὶ μέτριον χρὴ πεφυκέναι ... πρὸς τὴν καθ' ἡμέραν δίαιταν); fourth, he should be rational and a capable

φησὶ δ'αὐτὸν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐλεύθερον γεγονέναι καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς ἀλλότριον, εἴ γε τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτῷ διδομένην παρῃτήσατο, καθάπερ Ξάνθος ἐν τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγει, τὴν λιτότητα δηλονότι πλέον ἀγαπήσας. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ Τίμαιος εἴρηκε, τὴν αἰτίαν ἅμα παρατιθέμενος τοῦ δημοτικὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα. (Aristot. *De poetis* F *71 Janko = Tim., *FGrHist* 566 F 134 = Diog. Laert. 8.63)

The external cover-text[3] here, Diogenes Laertius' *Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers*, couches this account of Empedocles' democratic inclinations between two passages from an internal cover-text, which may have been written by the late fourth century historian Timaeus of Tauromenium, who wrote extensively about the political activities of philosophers, including Pythagoras and other 'Pythagoreans', in his *Sicilian and Italian Histories*.[4] The testimony of Aristotle's discussion of Empedocles has received some discussion, and some attention has also been paid to Xanthus, probably to be identified as Xanthus of Lydia (*fl.* 450 BCE), a historian and rough contemporary of Empedocles.[5] Arnaldo Momigliano was struck by this passage, since he believed that it offered some of the earliest possible evidence for biography in

rhetorician; and finally, he should be courageous. As we will see later, Timaeus seems to adapt some version of the first, third, and fourth qualities in his presentation of Empedocles. One might also wish to compare this term with the term δημοκρατικός and cognates, which have been discussed extensively by Ober 2008.

[3] I adapt and extend the historiographical terminology used by Guido Schepens 1997, 166-67 n. 66 to refer to the various textual levels within Diogenes Laertius' *Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers*, one of the most palimpsestic texts in the history of ancient philosophy. I consider the 'external' cover-text to indicate the textual level at which Diogenes Laertius is ostensibly the narrator; I consider an 'internal' cover-text to indicate the textual level at which Diogenes' source for his material is explicitly or implicitly differentiated from the external cover-text and, importantly, at the same time is also acting as a 'cover' text for another work. When, for example, Diogenes quotes Timaeus, but Timaeus is not acting as a cover-text for any other source, Diogenes is the 'external' cover-text, and Timaeus the 'source' text; but when Diogenes quotes Timaeus, and Timaeus is actually 'covering' Aristotle, Diogenes is the 'external' cover-text, Timaeus is the 'internal cover-text', and Aristotle is the 'source' text.

[4] Several lines (8.63, lines 131-33 ed. Dorandi) derived from Favorinus' *Memorabilia* (F 57 Amato) interrupt what appears to be a coherent narrative, possibly derived from Timaeus or Neanthes (see below), about Empedocles' criticisms of the luxuriousness of the Agrigentines. The manuscripts are consistent, however, in preserving Favorinus' note about Cleomenes the rhapsode's performance of the *Purifications* of Empedocles at the Olympic Games.

[5] Momigliano 1993, 30-32, followed by Kingsley 1995, 185ff. and Janko 2010, 535. For a balanced account of the historiographical and textual problems here, see Schepens & Theys' entry at *FGrHist* 1001 F 1.

the ancient world.[6] He was particularly interested to see whether Aristotle himself was quoting from an earlier work of Xanthus called *On Empedocles*, which would thereby constitute one of the earliest treatises devoted to the life of a philosopher-poet.[7] Given the presence of other evidence of poetic exegesis in this period, so Momigliano thought, we might have evidence of one of the earliest works of biography devoted to a contemporary.[8]

Still, Momigliano and those who have followed him have not seriously attempted to resolve the obvious problem of sifting through the several historiographical layers (i.e. the several cover-texts) that condition the narrative concerning the political life of Empedocles. Attention to the fragment of Aristotle, buttressed by the optimistic hope that Xanthus had really written a treatise on Empedocles, has had the effect of diverting our attention from the more general presentation of chapters 63-66 of the eighth book of Diogenes Laertius' *Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers*, which narrate the remarkable story of the origins of the political life of Empedocles, fashioned here, perhaps surprisingly, ὁ δημοτικός. What, if anything, do the accounts of Aristotle and Xanthus contribute to the discussion here, that Empedocles was considered a 'democratic' philosopher? In order to advance upon this question, we investigate why Timaeus of Tauromenium, author of the internal cover-text which, as I will try to argue, originally preserved the accounts of Aristotle and Xanthus, has retained their presence.[9] That is, a sufficient critical response to the problem of Empedocles the democrat requires much more extensive analysis of Timaeus' project of construct-

[6] Momigliano 1993, 30-38.

[7] Momigliano 1993, 31.

[8] Stesimbrotus of Thasus, like Anaximander of Miletus after him, is said to have explained Homer's poems for a fee (Xen. *Smp*. 3.6 = *FGrHist* 9 T 3 = *FGrHist* 1002 T 4), and he also seems to have written a pamphlet on the lives and political policies of Themistocles, Thucydides son of Melesias, and Pericles (*FGrHist* 1002 F 1-11); Plato characterizes the ideal rhapsode as one who can interpret the intention of Homer (*Ion* 503c1-6); Theagenes of Rhegium (DK 8 F 1-2) developed allegorical readings of Homer's gods roughly in an Ionian tenor. The *Suda* (ζ 77, s.v. Ζήνων Τελευταγόρου) attributes to Zeno of Elea a work entitled *Explanation of the Verses of Empedocles* (Ἐξήγησις τῶν Ἐμπεδοκλέους).

[9] Jacoby, correctly in my opinion, establishes the context for Timaeus' Fragment 134 with the reference to Aristotle. Schepens & Theys (*FGrHist* 1001 F 1) suggest that, if there was an intermediary source, he can 'only be identified speculatively', and they list Hermippus (*FGrHist* 1026) and Hippobotus (*FGrHist* 1039) as possibilities. As Baron 2013, 106 n. 75 notes, Aristotle is cited alongside Timaeus by Diogenes no less than four times (F 51, 79, 134, and 143a).

ing Empedocles' democratic character by way of reference to Aristotle and Xanthus. Our investigation must begin not from the ungrounded assumptions of scholars such as Ava Chitwood, whose generalizations concerning the biographical tradition of Timaeus have the two-pronged effect of both unfairly damaging the historian's credibility and oversimplifying what is a far more complex, and intriguing, case of historiographical presentation.[10] We should rather begin from a position which seeks to elucidate the many complicated lines of engagement found in Diogenes Laertius 8.63-66 and in its broader context, with the goal not of discovering whether the historical Empedocles of the early fifth century BCE truly was a democrat, but rather *why* Timaeus, if he really is the main authority behind Diogenes' presentation of Empedocles' political life, might be invested in particular in advancing this historiographical construction. For in the latter project we can obtain a richer sense of Timaeus' engagement with philosophical and political thought of the fourth century BCE, as well as his methods of critical engagement and even appropriation of his predecessors' work.

Empedocles the Anarchist: Aristotle's Account

Let's begin, then, with Aristotle's alleged take on Empedocles' political orientation. The external cover-text of Diogenes states that, according to Aristotle, Empedocles 'was a free man, and estranged from every sort of rule' (ἐλεύθερον γεγονέναι καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς ἀλλότριον).[11] Diogenes

[10] Chitwood 2004, 30 says of Timaeus' story of Empedocles' democratic inclinations: 'The anecdote comes to us from Timaeus, a historian and compiler generally hostile to philosophers (as this anecdote might suggest) and therefore generally unreliable. That such a man is one of the very few named sources for Empedocles' political career does little to strengthen the credibility of the tradition. The anecdote is especially inauspicious for one whose moral code prohibits bloodshed, especially when it stems from Empedocles having to wait for wine or being threatened with having it poured on his head. The anecdote seems to be nothing more than a comic invention [...]'. The logic and rhetoric employed in this 'evaluation' are highly questionable. I will present an alternative account.

[11] It is difficult to know precisely how to translate πάσης ἀρχῆς ἀλλότριον here. Kingsley 1995, 185 alternatively opts for 'who had nothing to do with official positions of any kind', which is a possibility (although ἀρχαί in the plural is Aristotle's preferred way of referring to magistracies). In a similar passage from the *Politics* (2.5 p. 1267a41), the phrase ἀλλότριον τῆς πολιτείας highlights that one does not have a share in it (μετέχον). I prefer 'estranged from every sort of rule' for reasons that will become clear below.

quotes or (less likely) paraphrases[12] Aristotle here in order to show agreement (καί) with the source for the information in chapter 63, who is unknown, but possible candidates include Neanthes of Cyzicus and Timaeus of Tauromenium.[13] Hicks thought the latter to be the source for the information found in the preceding part of chapter 63, in which Empedocles' speech to the Agrigentines and criticism of their proclivity to luxury (τρυφή) is apparently quoted.[14] There is, of course, no reason for us to associate the criticisms of Agrigentine luxury in chapter 63 with Aristotle's evaluation of Empedocles' political character, especially since luxury was not a *topos* for Aristotle in his historical studies. Instead, we would do better to seek, by reference to Aristotle's own philosophical writings, a more nuanced sense of what he may have meant when referring to Empedocles as 'free' and 'estranged from every sort of rule'.

As Mogens Herman Hansen has convincingly argued, the standard meaning of the word ἐλεύθερος in Greek prior to Plato and Aristotle is simply 'free', as opposed to 'slave'.[15] There is no specific implication of political liberty in the writings of Homer, but sometime in the fifth century BCE, at the latest, ἐλεύθερος and its abstract cognate ἐλευθερία began to take on political valences, and to be associated specifically (in various ways) with democracy.[16] Hansen associates this change with the se-

[12] As Stefan Schorn points out to me, it is also possible that Diogenes is responsible for the term 'free man' (ἐλεύθερος) in paraphrasing Aristotle's thought. This would be plausible if it were a *topos* to refer to philosophers as 'free men' in Diogenes' work, but the only example I can find of Diogenes celebrating a philosopher for being 'free' is his doxographical summary of Stoic ethics (7.121 = *SVF* 3.355), in which Diogenes differentiates the Stoic wise man from inferiors, on the grounds that freedom is 'the capacity for independent action, whereas slavery is the privation of independent action'. Initially, then, this formulation isn't far from what we hear about Empedocles. Importantly, however, Diogenes goes on (7.122 = *SVF* 3.617) to cite Chrysippus' treatise on Zeno's proper use of terminology, elaborating on what he has earlier said about the free man by claiming that 'the wise are not only free, but also kings, since kingship is rule without censure, which none but the wise can maintain'. Obviously, however, this Stoic notion of the sage as the king is at odds with what Aristotle is saying: Empedocles proves that he is a free man by *rejecting* the kingship, not by embracing it (whether at a metaphorical or literal level). Perhaps Diogenes thought it worth preserving this anecdote because of its divergence from the Stoic maxim?

[13] The passage given, lines 126-30 in Dorandi's edition, is not included in Jacoby's fragments, and it is corrupt; but Battier's 1705 edition emended the text to include Timaeus' name, on the assumption that there is a lacuna. It is also possible that Neanthes is the source here, given the fact that Neanthes is later cited for evidence of Empedocles' speech on equality (Diog. Laert. 8.72 = *FGrHist* 84 F 28), as I will discuss below.

[14] Hicks 1925, II 377.

[15] Hansen 2010, 2-3.

[16] Also see Raaflaub 2004, 225-30.

mantic expansion of these words to include more 'metaphorical' aspects, which leads to the association of freedom with citizenship, and, in the context of debates concerning the best form of rule, with the democratic ideal.[17] This can also imply the right to participate in decision-making within the polis, or the right to live as one pleases, as opposed to being ruled by someone else, e.g. by a tyrant or an oligarchic group.[18] As Hansen convincingly shows, all of these senses are apparent in Aristotle's use of the terms, which is primarily relegated to his *Politics* and, perhaps surprisingly, not to his *Eudemian* or *Nicomachean Ethics*: in the first two books of the *Politics*, we see Aristotle use the term ἐλεύθερος conventionally, by reference to the opposition between 'free' and 'slave', and of citizens; but in books 3-6 of the *Politics*, 'the opposition between free and slaves disappears from the discussion', and these terms univocally refer to adult male citizens of the polis and their possession of political rights.[19] It is entirely possible that Aristotle was referring in such a way to Empedocles, but this would not account for the information that glosses the word ἐλεύθερος, namely, that Empedocles was 'estranged from every sort of rule'. *A priori*, we would assume that Aristotle is referring not specifically to tyrannical or oligarchic rule, but rather more generally to 'every kind of rule' (πάσης ἀρχῆς), which would render Empedocles some sort of *anarchist*.

In Book 6 of the *Politics*, we see Aristotle develop his own peculiar approach to anarchists. In seeking to describe ἐλευθερία as the 'principle' (ὑπόθεσις) of democracy, by which he seems to mean something like its final cause,[20] he differentiates two indicators[21] of ἐλευθερία that can be discerned from what the proponents of democracy themselves say:

> Well, then, a principle of the democratic constitution is freedom. For this is customarily asserted, on the grounds that people have a share of freedom only under this sort of constitution, since, as they say, every sort of democracy aims at this. One indicator of freedom is to be ruled and to rule by turns [...] Another indicator, however, is to live as one

[17] Or, as Raaflaub 2004, 190 hypothesizes, the elements that informed the concept of what he calls 'absolute freedom' represented 'a nexus of political arguments that assumed great importance in Athens in the late 430s'.

[18] Hansen 2010, 9.

[19] Hansen 2010, 10.

[20] Aristot. *Rh*. 3.2 p. 1404b15-16.

[21] He refers to them as σημεῖα.

> likes. For this, they say, is the function[22] of freedom, insofar as to live not as one likes is (the function) of someone who has been enslaved. So, then, this is the second definition of democracy. From it has come *[the claim of] not being ruled, preferably not by anyone*, or, failing that, (being ruled) by turns; and, in this way, one engages in freedom in accordance with equality. (Aristot. *Pol.* 6.1 p. 1317a40-b17)

Aristotle introduces the two 'indicators' of freedom in order to expound two diverging definitions of democracy, both of which link freedom essentially to democracy. But two modalities of freedom are distinguished: one in which people rule and are ruled by turns, also said to be 'in accordance with equality' (κατὰ τὸ ἴσον),[23] and one in which there are no stated contingencies. It thus becomes possible that, by elaborating on Empedocles' status as a free person that he was 'estranged from every sort of rule', Aristotle was really describing Empedocles as a sort of extreme anarchic democrat, one who simply believed that he ought to do whatever he wishes, at any given time.

If this is the case, then the description of Empedocles as an anarchic democrat would not be considered praiseworthy by Aristotle. He discusses anarchic democracy in several passages. In the context of describing the sort of extreme democracy that is opposite to what is expedient, i.e. a democracy which lacks majority rule, he says:

> Freedom appears to be doing precisely what one wants; so that everyone who lives in these sorts of democracies lives as he wants – 'as he fancies', as Euripides says. But this is bad; for living in conformity with a constitution should not be considered slavery, but preservation. (Aristot. *Pol.* 5.7 p. 1310a31-36)

Aristotle's commitment to political participation reveals a fundamental criticism of this sort of anarchic democracy, that living autonomously is dangerous and does not guarantee personal safety.[24] This claim is

[22] The manuscripts, followed by Ross, have ἔργον, but Richards postulated ὅρον, which would render 'definition'.

[23] If, that is, we admit the phrase καὶ συμβάλλεται ταύτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἴσον, which Bonitz thought was interpolated. There are two sorts of equality named in the portion I have excised, namely 'according to number' (sc. arithmetical) and 'according to value'. The anarchic aspect of freedom evidently shares in neither. On arithmetical equality and equality according to value, see Hansen 2010, 14-15.

[24] It is true, as Raaflaub 2004: 185-86 has argued, that self-sufficiency is an ideal for the *polis* in Aristotle's political thought; but we have to be careful not to confuse the polis with the individual.

bound up in Aristotle's commitment to the notion that human beings as individuals are naturally disposed to political participation, on the grounds that self-preservation is a function of all nature.[25] In fact, this claim takes us back to a fundamental proposition of Aristotle's *Politics*, as adumbrated in the first book:

> From these things, then, it is clear that the city-state is one of the things that exists by nature, and that the human being is by nature a political animal, and that anyone who is by nature, and not simply by chance, citiless, is either less, or greater, than a human being. (Aristot. *Pol.* 1.1 p. 1253a1-4)

If a human being does not participate in a city-state, then, he is assumed to be either less, or more, than human. Aristotle goes on to explain what he means a few passages later: anyone who does not participate in the city-state, either because of incapacity to do so, or because of self-sufficiency, is respectively either a beast, or a god.[26] A human being who refuses to, or cannot, participate in political life simply *isn't by nature a human at all*.

This information, I think, is key to understanding Aristotle's description of Empedocles as 'a free man, and estranged from every sort of rule', and it forces us to reconsider whether Aristotle was referring to Empedocles as an anarchist of a democratic sort, or as a different sort of anarchist altogether. While it must remain a possibility, as I considered above, that Aristotle sees Empedocles as an extreme democrat who simply does what he wishes, I submit instead that Aristotle is more likely to be criticizing Empedocles for being a sort of anarchist *who does not participate in society at all*, and who consequently fails to obtain the conditions of being a political animal whatsoever. David Keyt has sought to associate the implicit criticism of the apolitical proto-anarchist in *Politics* 1.1-2 with Diogenes the Cynic;[27] but the case for Empedocles is no less, and possibly more, convincing, especially given Aristotle's extensive analysis of Empedocles' poems and their underlying meaning throughout his corpus.[28]

[25] On self-preservation in Aristotelian teleology, see Leunissen 2010, 93-95.

[26] Aristot. *Pol.* 1.1 p. 1253a25-29.

[27] Keyt 1993, 135-36.

[28] A simple glance at Bonitz' listing for Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος in the *Index Aristotelicus*, which comprises in total almost two whole columns, reveals Aristotle's deep and continued engagement with Empedocles throughout his works. By contrast,

Why might Aristotle think this way? We cannot know for sure, but a plausible rationale arises when we consider the actual fragments of Empedocles, including one of the most famous fragments (both in antiquity[29] and today), which just happens to be quoted by Diogenes just before the discussion of Empedocles' rejection of Agrigentine luxury at Diogenes Laertius 8.63 (the relevant lines are in **bold**):

> O friends, who dwell in the great city of the yellow Acragas,
> Up in the high parts of the city, concerned with good deeds,
> [Respectful harbours for strangers, untried by evil,][30]
> **Hail! I, in your eyes a deathless god, no longer mortal,**
> **Go among all, honoured, just as I seem:**
> Wreathed with ribbons and festive garlands.
> As soon as I arrive in flourishing cities I am revered
> By all, men and women. And they follow at once,
> In their ten thousands, asking where is the path to gain,
> Some in need of divinations, others in all sorts of diseases
> Sought to hear a healing oracle [...] (Diog. Laert. 8.62 = DK 31 B 112; Translation by Inwood)

In this fragment, Empedocles adapts the language of political participation to new ends, rejecting the political force of the first words ('O friends') and replacing them with a statement of his own divinity and charismatic attraction. One would be hard pressed to see in B 112 any appeal to political participation, much less to the sorts of watchwords and concepts associated with participatory democracy in the fifth or fourth Centuries BCE. Yet, if we are to believe the later sources (including Aristotle), there is a peculiar logic of freedom and equality at play here: the friends whom Empedocles addresses are friends by virtue of the fact that they could be similar to one another, at least potentially.[31]

Diogenes receives only one mention (*Rh*. 3.10 p. 1311a24-25). It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate Aristotle's reception of Empedocles' poem.

[29] These lines are amply cited in antiquity, with portions appearing in the *Anthologia Graeca*, Sextus Empiricus, Plotinus, Tzetzes, Philostratus, Lucian, the *Suda*. See Wright 1981, *ad loc*., for the evidence.

[30] It is difficult to know whether to include this line here, as Inwood and Wright do, but I suspect it belongs elsewhere in Empedocles' poem. I discuss it below.

[31] That seems to be what Sextus Empiricus (*Math*. 1.302-03) takes to be the force of the lines, as well as those found in B 113, which he quotes within vicinity of one another. Sextus explicitly criticizes those who would think the philosopher would say these things 'out of boastfulness and contempt for the rest of mankind' (κατ' ἀλαζονείαν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλληλους ἀνθρώπους ὑπεροψίαν). The grammarian and layman, he says, do not

All human beings are united in their shared capacity for divine realization, but the implied connections between them are extra-political, and extend beyond the political community of Agrigentum itself.[32]

The irony of this particular interpretation of Aristotle's anarchic Empedocles is that it is possible that Timaeus of Tauromenium may have been attacking Aristotle's treatment of Empedocles' B 112, which he may have found upon consultation of Aristotle's works during his long sojourn in Athens. In the passage from Diogenes' text that precedes Aristotle's evaluation of Empedocles' apolitical character, a portion of Empedocles' speech to the Agrigentines, which is likely to derive from Timaeus' or Neanthes of Cyzicus' works, is extant.[33] Just before this passage, in fact, B 112 is quoted at length in the context of a summary of Heraclides of Pontus' *On the Woman Who Stopped Breathing* (8.60-62 = Heraclid. Pont. F 87 Schütrumpf), a dialogue which Timaeus is evidenced to have attacked elsewhere.[34] And at the end of the external cover-text's narrative of Empedocles' democratic activities (Diog. Laert. 8.66), we see quoted, once again, the crucial lines from Fragment B 112 which could have presented Aristotle with evidence of Empedocles' false claims to divinity. Although it must remain speculation, it is possible that Timaeus constituted the internal cover-text for the entire narrative of Empedocles' political life from 8.60-66 (excepting three interruptions by Diogenes: a gloss from Aristippus and Satyrus;[35] another gloss from Favorinus,[36] and an addition to the historical narrative – not a gloss – from an unidentified source, possibly Neanthes of Cyzicus[37]) who has preserved information from the lives of Empedocles known to

understand like-to-like principles, which philosophers of old operated upon. Instead, Sextus suggests that Empedocles 'called himself a god because he alone kept his mind free from evil and unmuddied and by means of the god within him apprehended the god without' (trans. Bury).

32 It is suggested that Empedocles may not be the only person who is superior to mortals by the rhetorical question given in B 113. Perhaps Empedocles shifts in B 115 to addressing a smaller group of people, including Pausanias, a likely addressee for much of the poem (on which, see Trépanier 2004, 51-52 and 80-82).

33 On the relationship between Timaeus' and Neanthes' accounts of Empedocles' democratic activities, see below in Section IV.

34 Cf. Pearson 1987, 126. On this dialogue, see Gottschalk 1980, 13-36.

35 Diog. Laert. 8.60-61, lines 103-11 Dorandi = Satyr. F 14 Schorn = [Aristipp.] F 8 Dorandi.

36 Diog. Laert. 8.63, lines 131-33 Dorandi = Favorin. F 57 Amato.

37 Diog. Laert. 8.65, lines 150-59 Dorandi. Cf. Schorn 2007, 128 n. 79. It is possible that Neanthes is responsible for the information given at 8.63, lines 126-30 Dorandi, but this information could also be derived from Timaeus' account.

him, those given in the writings of Heraclides of Pontus, Aristotle, and Xanthus of Lydia.[38] Between the accounts of Heraclides and Aristotle, Timaeus would have quoted B 112 as evidence to ground his overall claim that Empedocles was a δημοτικὸς ἀνήρ.[39] How this scenario might work gets played out later on in the narrative, and I will discuss this in Section IV. For the moment, though, we might want to consider whence Timaeus could have obtained these lines of Empedocles' poem.[40] One possibility is that Timaeus knew Empedocles' works from his local experiences in Sicily, and although this cannot be disproven, there is no hard evidence outside these passages to confirm it either. Another possibility is that Timaeus found B 112 in Heraclides' *On the Woman Who Stopped Breathing*. But this hypothesis becomes more problematic when we note the fact that, perhaps surprisingly, Heraclides of Pontus nowhere else evidences any *specific* or *detailed* knowledge of the poem of Empedocles.[41]

Another hypothetical scenario worth considering is that Timaeus of Tauromenium, as the internal cover-text for large strands of Diogenes Laertius 8.60-66, read Empedocles' B 112 (or at least portions of it) in

[38] Although where to fit in Hippobotus and Hermippus, if at all, is difficult to know. They are often cited alongside one another and in close proximity to Timaeus (e.g. at Diog. Laert. 8.51 and 8.69). One possibility (which doesn't invalidate my supposition that Timaeus was attacking Aristotle) is that Diogenes Laertius had an intermediary doxographical text which preserved portions of Timaeus' criticisms of Aristotle. Hermippus of Smyrna wrote a work *On Aristotle* (*FGrHist* 1026 F 28-33), but he does not seem to know Timaeus' work.

[39] Another possibility is that Diogenes Laertius, in the external cover-text, was himself quoting Empedocles B 112 independently of Timaeus' or Heraclides' account, perhaps through an intermediary like Satyrus, who was interested in Empedocles' verses provided evidence for his character. Note that at Diog. Laert. 8.59, Satyrus (F 13 Schorn) is the source for Gorgias of Leontini's alleged claim that Empedocles announces his power of sorcery and more in his verses, evidence for which Satyrus cites B 111 as evidence.

[40] The third line of B 112 was quoted by Diodorus Siculus (13.83 = *FGrHist* 566 F 26a), in the context of discussing Timaeus' treatment of Agrigentine life, ethics (by specific appeal to τρυφή), and political activities. If, however, Timaeus was the source that Diogenes used for quoting B 112, then we would want to agree with Zuntz and transfer this line somewhere else in the poem. On B 112 and its sources, see Wright 1981, 264-66.

[41] It is not obvious who the subject of the verb εἶπεν in line 114 of Dorandi's text is. It would be a bit unusual for Diogenes to present Heraclides as speaking in the present tense (φησί) and then retain the same subject in the past (εἶπεν). But even if we accept that Heraclides is the understood subject of the verb εἶπεν, it is still unlikely that the internal cover-text's argument that Heraclides 'derived [the titles of doctor and diviner] from these lines' faithfully reflects Heraclides' *own text* – it is difficult to imagine the character Empedocles *quoting his own poems* in Heraclides' dialogue in order to demonstrate to his interlocutor that he was a doctor and diviner. Rather, this would appear to be the conjecture of the author of the internal cover-text.

Aristotle's *On Poets*, and appropriated Aristotle's interpretation of them to fit his own arguments concerning luxury and politics in Agrigentum. This scenario corresponds to the fact that Timaeus had access to the writings of Aristotle and, in using what he found there, established a polemic against the philosopher on factual and methodological grounds.[42] Moreover, there is excellent evidence that Aristotle knew and read the poem of Empedocles, which he quotes often, and whose lines he elsewhere analyzes for his own purposes, usually philosophically.[43] On this hypothesis, Aristotle's description of Empedocles as 'a free man, and estranged from every sort of rule' would constitute Aristotle's own interpretation of B 112, the first lines of which were probably placed at the head of Empedocles' poem and were, as we mentioned earlier, comparably well known in antiquity. This hypothetical scenario, then, would have Aristotle, an avid reader of Empedocles' work, inferring from the first lines of Empedocles' poem the character of its speaker, exemplifying Aristotle's own assumption that poetic expression reflects moral character.[44] If this is right, Aristotle's discussion of Empedocles will have provided a model for later Peripatetics to support their biographical claims with evidence from the works of the poets themselves, and the so-called 'method of Chamaeleon' will have had its roots in Aristotle's own writings.[45]

[42] The best evidence of this regards Timaeus' and Aristotle's versions of the founding of the colony of Epizephyrian Locri, which I have discussed elsewhere (Horky 2013, 106-07 with n. 70). Also cf. Meister 1975, 13-19 and Pearson 1987, 98-108.

[43] He quotes lines of Empedocles at *Metaph*. 3.4 p. 1000a29-32 (B 36), 3.4 p. 1000b6-9 (B 30), 4.5 p. 1009b18-19 (B 106) and 4.5 p. 1009b20-21 (B 108); *Ph*. 2.4 p. 196a22-23 (B 53); *GC* 2.6 p. 333b1-2 (B 37) and 2.6 p. 334a5 (DK 54); *Cael*. 2.13 p. 294a26-28 (DK 39); *Mete*. 2.2 p. 357a25 (DK 55), 4.4 p. 381b31 (B 34), and 4.9 p. 387b5-6 (B 82); *GA* 4.1 p. 764b18 (B 63), 1.18 p. 723a25-26 (B 65), 4.8 p. 777a10 (B 68), and 1.23 p. 731a5 (B 79); *De an*. 1.2 p. 404b13-15 (B 109); *Sens*. 2 p. 437b26-438a3 (B 84); *Resp*. 13 p. 473b9-474a6 (B 100); *Rh*. 1.13 p. 1373b16-17 (B 135); and *Po*. 21 p. 1457b13-14 (B 138).

[44] Generally, for on the derivation of character from poetic lines in lives of poets in Aristotle (especially by reference to Solon), see Arrighetti 1987, 170-76. For a good general study of the aims of literary biography, see Graziosi 2006. Aristotle's associates the author's character with the ethical value of the actions represented in the poem (*Po*. 4 p. 1448b25-27), and claims (*Po*. 15 p. 1454a17-19) that 'character appears whenever speech or action makes clear the moral choice' of the speaker (ἔξει δὲ ἦθος ... ἐὰν ... ποιῇ φανερὸν ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις προαίρεσιν). Also compare Aristotle's argument, in the *Rhetoric* (1.2 p. 1356a1-13), that orator's *speech itself*, and not some preconceived notion, is what produces the trust which allows the listeners to discern the character of the orator.

[45] On the 'method of Chamaeleon', see most recently Schorn 2012, 426-31.

Xanthus' Account and the Transition to Empedocles the Democrat

Now that we have dealt with Aristotle's representation of Empedocles as an anarchist, it is worth devoting some space to the account attributed to Xanthus.[46] As a further explanation of Aristotle's description of Empedocles as 'a free man, and estranged from every sort of rule', Diogenes says:

> [...] if indeed it is true that he declined the kingship when it was offered to him, as Xanthus claims in his account of him [sc. Empedocles] – obviously because he was more content with a life of simplicity.
>
> εἴ γε τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτῷ διδομένην παρητήσατο, καθάπερ Ξάνθος ἐν τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγει, τὴν λιτότητα δηλονότι πλέον ἀγαπήσας. (Aristot. *De poetis* F *71 Janko = Tim., *FGrHist* 566 F 134 = Xanth., *FGrHist* 1001 F 1 = Diog. Laert. 8.63)

Is this Xanthus to be identified with the fifth century BCE historian Xanthus of Lydia, as the consensus now holds?[47] We have already mentioned in the introduction that this information was derived from a work attributed to Xanthus, either an independent treatise called *On Empedocles* or, more likely, an account of Empedocles derived from a larger work.[48] We know titles of two other works ascribed to Xanthus of Lydia in antiquity: a 4-book history of Lydia, probably called *Lydiaca*, which survives in no less than 30 fragments; and a work entitled *Magica*, for which two interesting, but problematic, fragments survive.[49] Peter Kingsley has argued that the latter fragments probably were excerpted from the former work, although conclusive proof is very difficult to obtain.[50] As Kingsley has also argued extensively, Empedocles' iatromantic exploits were well-known in antiquity. So perhaps we might think that Xanthus' discussion

[46] The fullest and most reasonable discussion remains Schepens & Theys' entry for *FGrHist* 1001.

[47] For a useful bibliographic discussion of this issue, see Schepens & Theys' discussion in footnote 2 *ap. FGrHist* 1001 F 1.

[48] As Stefan Schorn suggests to me (*per litt.*): 'I think we have to supplement something [to ἐν τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ] like λόγοις which means that it refers to an account of Empedocles'.

[49] *FGrHist* 765. Fragments 1-30 are assumed to come out of the *Lydiaca*, whereas Fragments 31-32 are associated with the *Magica*.

[50] Kingsley 1995, 184-85.

of Empedocles is to be associated with the *Magica*. Connecting 'magism' (in the double sense of 'magic' and of 'relating to Persian *magoi*')[51] to Empedocles would not, in the light of Empedocles' fragments and testimonia, be a major stretch: not only would semantic slippage that attended that term in the Greek world admit of such a possibility, but this possibility also accommodates the evidence given by Aristotle in his *On Poets* (the same work from which the Xanthus-fragment has probably been excerpted) that Empedocles composed a poem, now lost, on the theme of Xerxes' crossing of the Hellespont.[52] On this hypothesis, then, Xanthus of Lydia's work on Empedocles would be the earliest attested biographical study of a philosopher, and it would have discussed both his life and (possibly) his charismatic exploits. But the case is not so clear-cut, since the historical information given by this Xanthus, that Empedocles rejected the offer of becoming king of the Agrigentines, appears to be a trope in Hellenistic biographical writings: a late third century BCE historian of philosophy, Antisthenes of Rhodes, claims that Heraclitus was offered the kingship, which he declined and yielded to his brother.[53] Even so, when we consider the evidence that Xanthus is apparently being quoted by Aristotle, we must admit the possibility that Xanthus innovated in developing this *topos*, which was then employed by later biographers.

The passage associated with Xanthus aims to elucidate further Aristotle's claim that Empedocles was a 'free man', and it does so by portraying Empedocles as someone who, when the kingship was offered to him, rejected it, 'obviously because he would have been more content with simplicity' (τὴν λιτότητα δηλονότι πλέον ἀγαπήσας). The content, and origin, of this latter epexegetical statement are worth examining more closely. One might speculate that the information derives from Aristotle, but there are two problems with this interpretation, one terminological, and the other philosophical: first, Aristotle never uses the crucial term λιτότης in reference to the ethical standing of other ascetics (e.g. Cynics, Pythagoreans) nor in reference to 'free persons' – the term itself, and the moral concept of 'simplicity' that attends it, never occurs in Aristotle's corpus; and second, our previous discussion showed that such a conclusion would not follow from Aristotle's treatment of Empe-

[51] On the changing valences of the term *magos* and its meaning to Greek philosophers, see Horky 2009.

[52] Kingsley 1995, 189-90. Cf. Diog. Laert. 8.57 = F 73 Janko.

[53] Diog. Laert. 9.6 = *FGrHist* 508 F 10. It is not known whether this Antisthenes is the same person as 'Antisthenes the Peripatetic' (*FGrHist* 508 F 1-2).

docles as an anarchist.[54] As we argued, Aristotle's pure anarchists are not bucolic simpletons who pursue a life of non-interference from the taxing responsibilities of participating in the city-state; they are, quite simply, not human. On the other hand, the adverbial δηλονότι might be thought to imply that Diogenes Laertius is himself inserting a comment in the external cover-text. This must remain a possibility, although it must be noted that Diogenes does not elsewhere associate λιτότης with Empedocles, nor with the Pythagoreans nor any other ascetics; that term is only expressly associated with Zeno of Citium by Diogenes himself (Diog. Laert. 7.26), although it appears to have had Epicurean resonances as well (e.g. Diog. Laert. 10.11).[55]

One alternative, I suggest, is to see the appeal to λιτότης in the context of other Hellenistic accounts of Pythagorean ethics, which might imply the hand of Timaeus of Tauromenium here.[56] An unfortunately fragmentary extract from Book 10 of Diodorus Siculus' *Library of History* (F 3-26 Cohen-Skalli)[57] preserves excerpts from one of the most extensive but, until recently, little studied[58] Hellenistic accounts of Pythagorean

[54] Also see Schepens & Theys' worries, given in footnote 6 of their commentary on *FGrHist* 1001.

[55] Also see Diog. Laert. 8.13, where Diogenes himself claims that Pythagoras eschewed the eating of animals in order to train people for 'contentedness of life' (εἰς εὐκολίαν βίου). At Diog. Laert. 6.21, speaking of the Cynic Diogenes of Sinope, Diogenes Laertius calls him 'mean' (εὐτελής), after the fashion of Antisthenes.

[56] A possible worry with this hypothesis rests on the language Diodorus uses here: we will recall that the text that follows says: 'Timaeus also said these things (τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ Τίμαιος εἴρηκε), at the same time adding the reason (αἰτία) for his being a man of the people'. This formulation (τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ... εἴρηκε) implies that it was Diogenes himself, or his immediate source, who was comparing the accounts of Timaeus with what he found attributed to Aristotle and Xanthus. But it is also possible that Diogenes, or his source, was *paraphrasing* Timaeus' own discussion of Aristotle and Xanthus, especially since, as I have argued above, Timaeus is known to have criticized Aristotle elsewhere.

[57] I use Cohen-Skalli's (2012) enumeration of the fragments, in her new edition published by Les Belles Lettres.

[58] Generally, see the exhaustive historiographical analysis of Schorn 2013, who critiques the position of Cohen-Skalli and concludes that 'Neben Aristoxenos als Hauptquelle für die Biographie des Pythagoras und das Leben der Pythagoreer und dem Tripartitum als Hauptquelle für die Ethik verwendet er mindestens eine, vielleicht mehrere Nebenquellen für ergänzendes Material' (77). Burkert 1972, 104 n. 36 is inconclusive about Book 10's source/s, but does argue some information found in Diodorus' account and the fragments of Aristoxenus (F 31 Wehrli) suggests that the 'highly rhetorical, moralizing source' had access to Aristoxenus' writings, but probably wasn't Aristoxenus himself. Neither Kahn's (2001: chapter 6) nor Riedweg's (2005, 119-27) accounts of Pythagoreanism in the Hellenistic age discusses it.

ethics. One fragment, in particular, illustrates Pythagoras' celebration of a life of simplicity (λιτότης) with regard both to eating and politics:

> Pythagoras urged his followers to cultivate the simple life (παρεκάλει τὴν λιτότητα ζηλοῦν), since extravagance (πολυτέλεια), he maintained, ruins not only the fortunes of men but their bodies as well. For most diseases, he held, come from indigestion, and indigestion, in turn, from extravagance. Many men were also persuaded by him to eat uncooked food and to drink only water all their life long, in order to pursue what is in truth the good (ἕνεκεν τοῦ τἀγαθὰ[59] θηρᾶσθαι τὰ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν). And yet, as for the men of our day, were one to suggest that they refrain for but a few days from one or two of the things which men consider to be pleasant, they would renounce philosophy, asserting that it would be silly, while seeking for the good which is unseen (τἀφανὲς ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖν), to let go of that which is seen (ἀφέντα τὸ φανερόν). And whenever it becomes necessary to court the mob or to meddle in affairs which are none of their business (δημοκοπεῖν ἢ πολυπραγμονεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων), they have the time for it and will let nothing stand in their way; whereas, whenever it becomes necessary to bestir themselves about education and the repairing of character (περὶ παιδείαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἠθῶν ἐπισκευήν), they reply that the matter is not opportune for them, the result of it all being that they busy themselves when they have no business and show no concern when they are concerned. (Diod. 10 F 12 Cohen-Skalli = Const. Porph. *Exc. de sent*. 78; translated by Oldfather)

Diodorus Siculus' text here has been excerpted and preserved in the tenth century CE *De Sententiis* of Constantinus VII Porphyrogenitus, and it appears to be a close, if not direct, quotation of Diodorus' original text.[60] What is notable in this discussion of the Pythagorean life and education is the opposition of the life of simplicity (λιτότης) with the life of extravagance (πολυτέλεια). Similarly, Diodorus, in his initial presentation of Pythagoras' followers (10 F 3 = *Exc. de virt. et vit.* 60), had described Pythagoras' followers as 'convert[ed] from the life of extravagance and luxury' (ἀπέτρεπεν ἀπὸ τῆς πολυτελείας καὶ τρυφῆς) through association with the sage.[61] The emphasis here on Pythagorean education (παιδεία)

[59] This is Dindorf's conjecture for the manuscripts' ταῦτα.

[60] On the state of the account, see Schorn 2013, 7-16.

[61] And, indeed, later on (10 F 26) we hear that Epaminondas of Thebes, because he was incited to a life of perseverance and simplicity (τῆς τε καρτερίας καὶ λιτότητος) through his Pythagorean learning under Lysis, became the foremost citizen of Thebes 'and of all people in his time'. Neanthes (*FGrHist* 84 F 30 = Porph. *VP* 55) also knew the tradition in which Epaminondas was the student of Lysis.

in Pythagoras' encouragements (παρεκάλει) recalls Pythagoras' speeches to the men, women, and youth of Croton in Iamblichus' account, which have been thought to have originated in the works of Timaeus, although this cannot be proven.[62] Still, we see a similar constellation of the rejection of extravagance and luxury in Empedocles' criticisms of the citizens of Agrigentum, cited in a long passage attributed to the fifteenth book of Timaeus' work by Diodorus Siculus, for which there is a good deal of comparative evidence (from Diog. Laert. 8.51 and Ael. *VH* 12.29, both of whom refer explicitly to Timaeus)[63] to authenticate the passage as genuinely Timaean:

> And witness to the luxury (τρυφή) of the inhabitants [of Agrigentum] is also the extravagance (πολυτέλεια) of the monuments which they erected, some adorned with sculptured race-horses and others with the pet birds kept by girls and boys in their homes, monuments which Timaeus says he had seen extant in his own lifetime[64] [...] Speaking generally, [the citizens of Agrigentum] led from youth onward a manner of life which was luxurious (καθόλου ... τὰς ἀγωγὰς ... τρυφερᾶς), wearing as they did exceedingly delicate clothing and gold ornaments and, besides, using strigils and oil-flasks made of silver and even of gold.[65] (Diod. 13.82.6 = Tim., *FGrHist* 566 F 26a; translated after Oldfather)

Interestingly, immediately after this passage Diodorus Siculus quotes one line of Empedocles' poem, in which he speaks metaphorically of the Agrigentines as 'respectful harbors for strangers, untried by evil' (ξείνων αἰδοῖοι λιμένες, κακότητος ἄπειροι), a line which, as we mentioned before, has been thought to have fallen somewhere in Empedocles' appeal to his fellow-citizens at the beginning of his poem. And Diodorus' description of the excesses of the Agrigentines functions, within his own historical narrative, to anticipate the imminent collapse of Agirigentine prosperity, in the wake of Hamilcar's invasion in

[62] The initial verb (παρεκάλει) is the same in Iamblichus (*VP* 37), and the celebration of education comes at *VP* 42-43. See Schorn's comments on this passage (2013, 64-66).

[63] On this see Jacoby's comparative paradigms with 26b and 26c *ad loc*.

[64] Baron 2013, 83 recognizes this passage as key to understanding Timaeus' historical methodology, viz. his employing of 'arguments from silence' based on monuments and physical remains he encountered.

[65] That the details of this particular sentence, regarding the evidence of the luxury of the Agrigentine people, is original to Timaeus is confirmed by Aelian (*VH* 12.29), who attributes them specifically to him.

406 BCE, when the great general sacked the city and transferred the most lavish booty (τὰ πολυτελέστατα τῶν ἔργων) to Carthage.[66] Among this booty is the so-called Bull of Phalaris, whose existence, attested by earlier historians, Timaeus is said to have categorically denied.[67] Through these many historiographical twists and turns, it seems, the invisible hand of Timaeus of Tauromenium can be detected.[68] Given the probability that Timaeus contrasted simplicity, especially with regard to the way of living, against extravagance, which is emblematic of luxury, we might be inclined to see the phrase, 'obviously because he would have been more content with simplicity' (τὴν λιτότητα δηλονότι πλέον ἀγαπήσας), as a report of Timaeus' explanation of the information given by Xanthus.[69] Indeed, we will not be surprised to see the line that follows upon this epexegetical statement: 'Timaeus also said these things [sc. the things Aristotle and Xanthus had said], at the same time adding the reason for his being 'a man of the people' (τὴν αἰτίαν ἅμα παρατιθέμενος τοῦ δημοτικὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα).[70] On this interpretation, then, Empedocles' rejection of the crown would be grounded in his adoption of the Pythagorean way of life, which was marked by simplicity and a rejection of extravagance.[71]

[66] Diod. 13.90.4.

[67] Diod. 13.90.5 = *FGrHist* 566 F 28. Similar information is associated with Timaeus by Polybius (12.25) and the Scholiast to Pindar (*Sch. Pind. P.* 1.185). The matter is very difficult to grasp, however, since the accounts seem to contradict one another. On this problem, see generally Dudziński 2013 and Baron 2013, 83 with n. 119.

[68] Schorn 2013, 60 follows Delatte in claiming that this passage 'von dem [Bild] der Pythagoristen des 4. Jh.s. beeinflußt zu sein scheint' and doubts that Aristoxenus is Diodorus' source for 10 F 12.

[69] It is true that the fragments of Timaeus collected in *FGrHist* do not speak of λιτότης specifically, but the editor has not considered the evidence from Diodorus Siculus 10 F 12, which appears to have Timaean provenance on other grounds.

[70] It is possible, of course, that Timaeus only claimed that Empedocles denied the kingship, but there is no reason he couldn't have mentioned Aristotle's claim that Empedocles was a 'free man' – especially since what follows elaborates what it means to be a 'free man' in a democratic sense that is peculiar to Timaeus, and starkly differentiated from that of Aristotle.

[71] Timaeus (*FGrHist* 566 F 14) and Neanthes (*FGrHist* 84 F 26) both attest to the notion that Empedocles was eventually prevented from participating in the discussions of the Pythagoreans because, as Neanthes says, Empedocles publicized (ἐδημοσίωσεν) the Pythagorean teachings in his poetry. For the democratization of Pythagorean esoteric knowledge of the mathematical Pythagorean tradition, see Horky 2013, 116-18 and Schorn 2014, 304-05.

Empedocles the Democrat: the Accounts of Timaeus and Neanthes

Obtaining a nuanced grasp of Timaeus' representation of Empedocles the democrat is, in many ways, an even more complicated endeavor than what we have previously attempted with Aristotle and Xanthus (difficult though that has been), although we can for the moment dispense with some of the earlier problems regarding multiple cover-texts. While Diogenes Laertius threads his biography of Empedocles' political life (from chapters 63-66) with passages from Timaeus' history, often directing our attention towards him, he seldom clarifies what material, specifically, he is taking from the Sicilian historian. It is an added headache that, as Stefan Schorn has shown, the material culled for the specific account of Empedocles the democrat originates in the writings of two historians, Timaeus and Neanthes of Cyzicus, whose apparently symbiotic relationship makes it very difficult to extract what portions of the story come from each historian.[72] I shall have something to say about both of these interesting figures, who preserve similar versions of a story involving Empedocles' political activities in Agrigentum. The first version is clearly associated with Timaeus:

> Timaeus also said these things [sc. the things Aristotle and Xanthus had said], at the same time adding the reason for his being a man of the people (αἰτίαν ... τοῦ δημοτικὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα).[73] For he says that he [Empedocles], having been invited by one of the magistrates, as the dinner was going forward and no drink had been brought out, even though the other guests kept quiet, became indignant (μισοπονήρως διατεθείς) and ordered them to bring it out. The host said that they were waiting for the officer of the council [to arrive]. Once he arrived, [the officer] was made symposiarch, obviously (δηλονότι)[74] because it was arranged by the host, whose designs to tyrannical rule could be traced (ὑπεγράφετο τυραννίδος ἀρχήν). For he [the host] ordered the guests either to drink the wine or to have their heads doused in it. So, for a time, Empedocles kept quiet; and on the following day, after bringing a prosecution

[72] Schorn 2007, 128-29 with n. 79. For a more detailed account of the relationship between Timaeus and Neanthes, see Schorn 2014, 309-10.

[73] Timaeus seems to differentiate Empedocles here from his grandfather (also named Empedocles), who is elsewhere (Diog. Laert. 8.51 = FGrHist 566 F 26b) referred to as a 'man of distinction' (ἐπίσημον ἀνήρ). On the term δημοτικὸς ἀνήρ, see above n. 3.

[74] Note the stylistic consistency here in the Timaeus passage with the previous passage in 8.64 involving the explanation of the information given by Xanthus, which I suspect to derive from Timaeus.

> against them in the court – both the host and the symposiarch – he secured their condemnation and execution. This, then, was the beginning of his life in politics (ἀρχὴ ... αὐτῷ τῆς πολιτείας ἥδε). (Tim., *FGrHist* 566 F 134 = Diog. Laert. 8.64)

Timaeus is the stated source for all of this information, but Neanthes also seems to know another version of the same story: Diogenes later cites him (8.72 = *FGrHist* 84 F 28), by reference to a discussion of the Pythagoreans,[75] as saying that 'after the death of Meton,[76] a tyrannical rule began to rise up. Thereupon Empedocles persuaded the Agrigentines (apparently in a speech) to put an end to their in-fighting and to cultivate political equality' (ἰσότητα ... πολιτικὴν ἀσκεῖν).[77] As is clear from his other fragments, Neanthes celebrated the Pythagorean virtue of 'temperance' (σωφροσύνη) as over and against 'monarchical and lawless behavior' (μοναρχικὸν ... καὶ παράνομον) of tyrants such as Dionysius II of Syracuse.[78] It is not clear, however, whether Neanthes has derived his account of Empedocles the anti-tyrant from Timaeus' original or from a common source – the account here is too vague to be sure about exactly what Neanthes was describing, but given his tendencies, we should opt for the former.[79] It is a tantalizing possibility that the portion which anticipates Aristotle's fragment, in which one sentence from a speech of Empedocles is described, may have originated in Neanthes' (or Timaeus') account:

> Hence, he says that because they were living luxuriously (τρυφώντων αὐτῶν), Empedocles said to them: 'The Agrigentines live luxuriously

[75] Is this a work *On the Pythagoreans* (Περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν), as Diogenes seems to imply? It is difficult to know, since Neanthes is said to have treated Pythagoras in the fifth Book of the *Mythica* (*FGrHist* 84 F 29). It is possible that Neanthes gave the same information in multiple works (cf. Schorn 2007, 132).

[76] This Meton is probably the father of Empedocles, mentioned by Timaeus in (apparently) the fifteenth book of his work (Diog. Laert. 8.51 = *FGrHist* 566 F 26b).

[77] Neanthes' version says nothing of Empedocles bringing the would-be tyrants to court, and the reference to his 'persuading' of the Agrigentine people might suggest that he was attempting to sway the assembly of Agrigentum. Iamblichus claims of Pythagoras that he sought to abolish stasis within the city-states of Sicily and Italy (*VP* 33-34), a passage that might be thought to arise out of Timaeus' histories (also see Porph. *VP* 21-22 and des Places' note *ad loc.*).

[78] Iambl. *VP* 189 = *FGrHist* 84 F 31b.

[79] We have to be careful not to assume that Neanthes simply agreed with/transferred Timaeus' information. As Schorn 2014, 309 has noted, Neanthes often quotes, corrects, and adds to the reports of Timaeus.

(τρυφῶσι) as if they would die tomorrow, but they construct their homes as if they were going to live forever'. (Diog. Laert. 8.63)

On the one hand, the obvious criticism of Agrigentine luxury, as instantiated in the extravagance of their homes, parallels Timaeus' own moralizing discourse concerning the luxurious monuments of Agrigentum, as found in Fragment 26a and discussed above.[80] On the other hand, Neanthes probably recounted the speech on equality that was directed towards the Agrigentines, and it is not outside the realm of possibility that his appeal for political equality would have also criticized their proclivity for luxurious living, a mark of decadence and social inequality.

Let us return to the account of the origins of Empedocles' political career: we see that Timaeus' account is framed by what appears to be technical terminology for causation, both in philosophical and in historiographical contexts. He presents the story involving the dinner party as the explanatory 'reason' (αἰτία) for Empedocles' being a 'man of the people', and then frames the narrative by saying that the story provides the historical 'beginning' (ἀρχή) of his political life. The association of the explanatory 'reason' and 'beginning' is traditional and can be found both in earlier Greek historiography, philosophy, and medicine.[81] But in the wake of the philosophy of Aristotle and the other Peripatetics, the modalities of association between these concepts changed dramatically. Aristotle, for his part, speaks of 'beginnings' and 'reasons/causes' in the same breath in his endoxastic account of the opinions of the Presocratics in *Metaphysics* A, but he lays some grounds for differentiation in Δ, at least with regard to application in his own philosophical project.[82]

[80] It is true, as Gorman & Gorman 2007 have observed, that later authors who preserve Timaeus, such as Athenaeus, overstated, perhaps playfully, the significance of τρυφή. Yet we should not be so hasty to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Gorman & Gorman do not take account of the possible evidence from Diogenes Laertius and dismiss other crucial evidence from Diodorus Siculus (13.81.6 = *FGrHist* 566 F 26a; 5.10 and 5.19 = *FGrHist* 566 F 164, not discussed) without substantial argument (2007, 59 n. 81). Nor is it compelling, in the light of Timaeus' well-documented critiques of Aristotle's appeal to probabilistic historical explanation (see Horky 2013, 109), that he would accept Aristotle's argument that Sybaris fell because of the mythological co-colonization by Acheaeans and Troezenians and subsequent expulsion of the Troezenians (*Pol*. 5.3 p. 1303a24-33, cited by Gorman & Gorman 2007, 59 n. 82).

[81] Cf. Huffman 1993, 78-84.

[82] Aristotle explicitly associates Empedocles' 'reason/cause' with 'source/beginning' at *Metaph*. 1.4 p. 985a29-33, on which see Betegh 2012, 135-36. In *Metaphysics* Δ, Aristotle seeks to lay out the *endoxa* regarding the meanings of both the terms ἀρχή (5.1 p. 1312b34-1313a24) and especially αἴτιον (5.2 p. 1013a24-1014a25). Discussing

Aristotle would probably refer to this alternation in the life of Empedocles as an efficient cause, a cause whose links to its 'source' are particularly strong within Aristotle's metaphysics, physics, and biology.[83] This is not simply an arbitrary comparison: the passage makes it clear that Timaeus was interested in tracing scientifically the 'origins' of and 'reasons' for various historical possibilities and realities, including not only the alteration in Empedocles' life (from apolitical to political), but also the possible tyrannical uprising that Empedocles is understood to have snuffed out through his advanced interpretive skills. If this interpretation is right, it confirms our speculation that in engaging critically with Aristotle's account of Empedocles in *On Poetry*, Timaeus was developing his own position on explanation, which was the cornerstone of Aristotle's philosophy.

Superior intuition is not the only aspect of Empedocles' personality that is being emphasized by Timaeus. Indeed, Empedocles' character is explicitly differentiated from the other symposiasts through his actions. Empedocles appears to grasp the proper sense of comport within the economy of the symposium, exhibiting irritation at the improper procedure of eating without wine, whilst the others keep quiet. Such protesting exhibits Empedocles' 'liberal' character, in a Peripatetic sense, by contrast to those who sheepishly keep silent at the obvious rudeness of the host.[84] Conversely, once he has correctly inferred the plot against the city-state from the hybristic[85] activities of the host and symposiarch[86] and realized the danger for the city, Empedocles adopts the pose of the others by keeping quiet, so as not to cause alarm. He is thus both perceptive and pragmatic. And Empedocles' actions on the following day

the relationship between these concepts further would require a study far beyond the scope of this paper.

[83] For an excellent, concise discussion of Aristotelian causation across the sciences, see Barnes 2000, 83-91.

[84] Such indignation at impropriety (μισοπονηρία) is associated by the author of the Pseudo-Aristotelian *On Virtues and Vices* (5 p. 1250b23-27) with justice and appears just before the discussion of liberality.

[85] One wonders if these activities would have constituted the crime of committing *hybris*.

[86] It may be relevant to consider the case of Demosthenes' speech against Conon (Dem. *Or*. 54.3-4), in which he slanders the character of Conon's sons by describing how they, in a drunken throng, poured the contents of chamber-pots over the heads of Demosthenes' slaves. At a metaphorical level, Demosthenes, in *On the Crown* (*Or*. 18.50), also claims that Aeschines 'is guilty, as though having poured down some dregs of his own wickedness and offenses onto me'. On the significance of this event in the context of Demosthenes' rhetorical tactics, see Cirillo 2009, 8-9.

signify his democratic character, in a sense especially prevalent in the speeches of Isocrates (*Or.* 20.10), Demosthenes (*Or.* 9.36-40 and 10.4), and Lysias (*Or.* 26.2): he is a citizen who demonstrates his ideological commitment to democracy by publicly identifying as traitors those who seek to betray the polis and overthrow the democratic regime.[87] In this way, we can see that Timaeus takes Empedocles' democratic character to be exemplified both in his mode of comport and in his political action.[88] Whereas Aristotle makes Empedocles into a kind of anarchist who shares of no sorts of rule – who is neither beholden to authority nor participates in it – Timaeus associates Empedocles with the liberal character of a staunch defender of democracy, a sort of Demosthenic philosopher[89] who recognizes the importance of proper procedure and respects the civic institutions of the government as it stands.

It is all the more surprising, then, to see what Diogenes Laertius' external cover text presents next (8.65) in the narrative of the life of Empedocles. Apparently taking his cue from Timaeus' description of the 'beginning' of Empedocles' political career, Diogenes illustrates a similar situation (πάλιν δέ) in which Empedocles performed a public speech on equality (περὶ ἰσότητος) as against a doctor named Acron of Agrigentum, who allegedly sought special privileges from the Agrigentine council for a private tomb.[90] It is unclear where Diogenes is obtaining this information, but I suspect Jacoby has correctly assumed (through non-inclusion in F 134) that it comes from a source other than Timaeus; if it is any indication, Diogenes presents two versions of an epigram written to slander Acron, wavering on whether Empedocles or Simonides is responsible for the second line in the distich.[91] Be that as it may, the passage that follows upon this one is included by Jacoby as evidence for Timaeus' account of Empedocles' democratic political activities:

[87] See Hansen's third type of democratic freedom (2010, 3-4).

[88] We might wish to recall the fourth attribute of Aeschines' δημοτικὸς ἀνήρ (*Or.* 3.170), discussed above in n. 3: he should be ἐυγνώμων and δυνατὸς εἰπεῖν, the former of which Aeschines glosses as τὴν διάνοιαν προαιρεῖσθαι τὰ βέλτιστα.

[89] When Aeschines attacks Demosthenes in *Against Ctesiphon*, he asks whether Demosthenes is to be considered a δημοτικὸς ἀνήρ, which might suggest that this is precisely what Demosthenes' advocates were calling him. Obviously, Aeschines concludes negatively (3.175-76).

[90] On Acron's life, see Plin. *NH* 29.1.3-5, *Suda* α 1026 s.v. Ἄκρων, and Plu. *Is et Os.* 79 p. 383d.

[91] My best guess would be that this passage comes from Neanthes' account of Empedocles' appeal to 'cultivate equality in politics' (ἰσότητα … πολιτικὴν ἀσκεῖν), which Diogenes refers to several chapters later (Diog. Laert. 8.72 = *FGrHist* 84 F 28).

> Later on,[92] Empedocles also effected the dissolution of the gathering of the Thousand (τὸ τῶν χιλίων ἄθροισμα κατέλυσε), three years after it had been established, with the result (ὥστε) not only that he may be counted among the wealthy, but also among those who were advocates for democracy. Certainly (γέ τοι),[93] Timaeus, in his first and second books – for he often makes mention of him – says that Empedocles held opposite views (φησὶν ἐναντίαν ἐσχηκέναι γνώμην) in public life <and in his poetry>. (Tim., *FGrHist* 566 F 2 = Diog. Laert. 8.66)

Textually, the corruption makes it difficult to know precisely what Timaeus said about the differences between Empedocles' views on public life and his poetic output. And the location of the comments – 'first and second book' of Timaeus' work – has been questioned by successive editors as well.[94] At any rate, it is clear that what Timaeus said about his public persona was contrary to what is found in Empedocles' poems.

We should inquire whether the first sentence, involving the famously problematic Agrigentine 'gathering of the thousand' (τὸ τῶν χιλίων ἄθροισμα), is original with Timaeus. Evidence against this hypothesis might come from the citation of Timaeus in the second sentence, separated from the information in the first by the phrase γέ τοι. In this circumstance, it makes the most sense to see γέ τοι as referring back not to the entire preceding sentence, but specifically to the inferences drawn in the ὥστε clause, which might indicate the opinions of the external cover-text of Diogenes, or might derive from another intermediary (such as, perhaps, Hippobotus).[95] Be that as it may, it still remains to explain the troublesome reference to τὸ τῶν χιλίων ἄθροισμα, a specific designation that is not attested anywhere else in the ancient world, despite the fact

[92] The words ὕστερον δὲ seem to indicate Diogenes' external cover-text, rather than the internal cover-text's temporal marker; see, for example, the beginning of the next section (8.67), where Diogenes posits the same temporal marker (ὕστερον μέντοι) while using evidence from a different source.

[93] So I translate the difficult γέ τοι here. Denniston ²1954, 550-51 says of this combination that 'τοι retains its vividness [...] [but] at the same time, the τοι usually strengthens, and coheres with, the (limitative) γε, so that γέ τοι is practically a livelier form of the much commoner γοῦν, "at any rate"'.

[94] See the various readings in the *apparatus criticus* of Dorandi's text.

[95] It is interesting that this phrase only occurs two other times in Diogenes' work, in both cases by reference to the biography of Pythagoras (8.42 and 8.43). In the former case, Diogenes is quoting directly from the *Letter of Lysis*; in the latter, he is contrasting the account involving Telauges (from Timaeus?) with that of Hippobotus, concerning the relationship between Telauges and Empedocles. On the *Letter of Lysis*, see below.

that councils of the 'Thousand' are documented for this period.[96] The term ἄθροισμα refers to a 'gathering' of natural elements or stuffs in natural philosophy, and it is commonly employed this way, for example, in Epicurean physics.[97] This might be thought to indicate an error in the external cover-text, especially given Diogenes' well-known appreciation of Epicureanism. But political meanings are also attested in antiquity. For example, the grammarian Aelius Herodianus defines ἑταιρία specifically as a 'gathering of friends' (τὸ τῶν φίλων ἄθροισμα),[98] and Cassius Dio associates it with the Roman Senate in the time of Servius Tullius (mid-sixth century BCE).[99] The *Suda*, too, knows it to be a synonym for ὅμιλος, or a collected body of adherents.[100] More relevant to our analysis, it is used at the beginning of the Doric *Letter of Lysis*, a popular pseudepigraphical document within the Pythagorean tradition that has been thought to have been written in the mid-third century BCE, and that some scholars have thought to be associated with Timaeus:[101]

> After Pythagoras' departure from the company of men, I never would have imagined that the gathering of his disciples (τὸ τῶν ὁμιλητᾶν ἄθροισμα) could be dispersed. But even if we have been scattered unexpectedly, separated and carried apart from one another just as if in a shipwreck over the barren sea, it remains pious even for me to recall the divine and holy doctrines of that man, and not to render the goods of wisdom the common property of those who have not even been purified in their souls in a dream. (*Epist. Lysidis ad Hipparchum* [vel *Hippasum*][102] p. 111.16-112.1 Thesleff)

[96] On the 'Thousand' at Agrigentum, Ghinatti 1996, 28-29 says, 'L'assemblea dei "mille" appare come il consesso dei rappresentanti delle gradi famiglie ricche dei possidenti agrari, di tipo censitario, derivato da quella primaria della fondazione, di origine rodia, costituita dopo Falaride, sciolta sotto i tiranni e ricostituita alla caduta di Trasideo; è del tipo "numero chiuso", fermi restando a quell' epoca, del numero limitato, sia la composizione all'interno di essa a gruppi di rappresentati a seconda delle famiglie più o meno potenti come era nel periodo arcaico'. He then goes on to suggest (133) that this body, like other 'Thousands' at Croton, Locri, and Rhegium, started as a 'primary assembly' that, gradually through the fifth century BCE, was transformed into a 'secondary assembly', associated with the ἀλία in later inscriptions.

[97] e.g. in the *Letter to Herodotus*, preserved at Diog. Laert. 10.63-65.

[98] Ael. Herod. *Part*. p. 37.9 Boissonade.

[99] Cass. D. 2.11.4

[100] *Suda* o 257, s.v. ὅμιλος.

[101] e.g. Delatte 1915, 85-87. Zhmud 2012, 171 and 189 n. 79 thinks that it is to be dated to the first century BCE, and not earlier.

[102] On the conflation of these names in the tradition, see Burkert 1961, 17 n. 4.

It is quite doubtful that the ἄθροισμα of Pythagoras' disciples, clearly something closer to a ἑταιρία of the sort described by Aelius Herodianus, is the same thing as the Agrigentine 'gathering of the thousand' (τὸ τῶν χιλίων ἄθροισμα), which must be understood as some sort of civic assembly.[103] But the important point here is terminological compatibility within the traditions of Pythagorean historiography: digging deeper into the semantics might provide an alternative to unnecessary skepticism concerning the historical plausibility of the Agrigentine institution.

In fact, we see that historical passages originating in Timaeus' history elsewhere refer rather commonly to advisory political bodies called 'the Thousand' in Magna Graecia during the fifth century BCE.[104] In a long passage extracted from a certain 'Apollonius' (Iamb. *VP* 254-64), which seems to have originated somewhere in Timaeus' history,[105] a democratic revolution is described in Croton (which probably took place in the mid-450s BCE), in which the pro-democracy Pythagoreans Hippasus, Diodorus, and Theages (probably all assumed here to be Crotonian citizens), who are members of the 'Thousand', promote democratic changes to the ancestral constitution of Croton:

> And when, from the council of the Thousand (ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν χιλίων), Hippasus, Diodorus, and Theages spoke on behalf of all citizens having a share in the political offices and the assembly, and of having public officials give accounts of their conduct to those who had been elected by lot from all citizens, the Pythagoreans Alcimachus, Deinarchus, Meton, and Democedes opposed this proposal and sought to prevent the ancestral constitution from being abolished (διακωλυόντων τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν μὴ καταλύειν). Those who were champions of the common people prevailed (ἐκράτησαν οἱ τῷ πλήθει συνηγοροῦντες). Thereupon, when the people assembled, the politicians Cylon and Ninon, apportioning between themselves the thrust of their speeches, launched an attack on [the Pythagoreans Alcimachus, Deinarchus, Meton, and Democedes]. (Apollon., *FGrHist* 1064 F 2 = Iamb. *VP* 257-58; translated after Dillon & Hershbell)

[103] On Pythagorean ἑταιρείαι, see Horky 2013, 97-101. For a thorough discussion of Agrigentine political bodies, see Ghinatti 1996, 27-39.

[104] Cf. Ghinatti 1996, 133.

[105] For one defense of this attribution, see Horky 2013, 111-14. Staab 2007 compellingly argues that the 'Apollonius' who, as an intermediary, preserves parts of Timaeus' history, is Apollonius Molon.

As I have argued elsewhere, the democratic revolt in Croton comes on the back of waves of other democratic revolutions in Magna Graecia in the first half of the fifth century BCE, including Tarentum (probably 473 BCE), Agrigentum and Himera (472 BCE), Syracuse (466/465 BCE), and Naxos, Catania, and Rhegium (461/460 BCE).[106] Of these, evidence for a council of the 'Thousand' exists not only at Agrigentum and Croton, as discussed above, but also at Rhegium.[107] The description of the Rhegine 'Thousand' is particularly important here, since it has been excerpted from Aristotle's *Constitutions*, which Timaeus knew:

> They [sc. the Chalcidians] called the place where they founded the city Rhegium, after some native hero. They established an aristocratic constitution (πολιτείαν ... κατεστήσαντο ἀριστοκρατικήν), for one thousand men were selected according to the value of their property to administer everything (χίλιοι γὰρ πάντα διοικοῦσιν αἱρετοὶ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων). They employed the laws of Charondas of Catania. Anaxilaus of Messina was their tyrant. (Her. Lemb. *Breviar. Aristot. const.* 55 Dilts; translation after Dilts)

In Book 4 of the *Politics*, Aristotle describes Charondas as among those who put forward laws that fall under the 'constitutional government' (πολιτεία), and which might be thought to accord with the ideals of one type of 'aristocratic' constitution, which Aristotle identifies as the 'best regime' (ἀρίστη πολιτεία).[108] The original Chalcidian constitution of Rhegium resembles most closely the sort of 'aristocratic' constitution associated with Carthage, whereby wealth and virtue are in the interests of the polity.[109] It was apparently annulled in the wake of the arrival of the tyrant Anaxilaus from Messina in the 490s, as Aristotle attests.[110] In the context of the first three decades of the fifth century BCE, the action of causing the dissolution of the characteristic aristocratic/oligarchic civic body in Magna Graecia could have solicited comparisons with Anaxilaus, whose tyrannical character, while not proverbial, was at least famous enough to have been preserved in Aristotle's *Constitutions*, more than a century-and-a-half after his death. And since there is evidence that

[106] Horky 2013, 119-20 with n. 119.

[107] For the 'Thousand' at Rhegium, see Ghinatti 1996, 109-11.

[108] See Aristot. *Pol.* 4.11 p. 1295a25-35. On 'best regime', see Cherry 2009.

[109] Aristotle elsewhere associates the constitution of Rhegium as an oligarchy (*Pol.* 5.12 p. 1316a35-39).

[110] *Ibid.*

Timaeus himself consulted Aristotle's *Constitutions* on his long sojourn to Athens, it is likely that he would have been aware of the repercussions of composing a story in which one charismatic man is responsible for effecting the dissolution of the council in an 'aristocratic' city-state.[111] In this way, Timaeus provides ample evidence – and perhaps, we might imagine, overstates the case – that Empedocles, like his other democratic heroes Hippasus, Diodorus, and Theages of Croton, had democratic, rather than tyrannical, designs in mind, when he resolved to overthrow the institution of the Agrigentine 'Thousand'.[112]

In fact, Diogenes' external cover text goes on to attribute to Timaeus the justification for why we should not assume that Empedocles had tyrannical designs:

> [Timaeus] says that Empedocles held opposite views in public life <and in his poetry. For> he appeared to be <prudent and a supporter of democracy[113] in his public life,> whereas he was outspoken and self-serving in his poetry. At any rate, he says:
>
> 'Hail! I, in your eyes a deathless god, no longer mortal,
> Go among all'
>
> *Et cetera*. At the time when he came to stay in Olympia, he was considered worthy of such excessive attention, that no one was ever mentioned in the companies of fellows more than Empedocles. (Tim., *FGrHist* 566 F 2 = Diog. Laert. 8.66)

The closing section of Diogenes' account of Empedocles' political life thus continues to operate in the context of Timaeus' biography. Timaeus asserts a divergence between Empedocles' political ideology, which is

[111] Cf. Horky 2013, 109.

[112] If this is right, then Timaeus would have been participating in a debate that was more widespread in the fifth century BCE, namely whether Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans were tyrannical or not. On this topic, see Schorn 2014, 303-05.

[113] The manuscripts BP, which preserve αὐτὸν τῇ τε πολιτείᾳ φαίνεσθαι, are obviously corrupt, and Reiske noted a lacuna following πολιτείᾳ. Diels, followed by Jacoby, inserted αὐτὸν <ἔν> τε τῇ πολιτείᾳ <καὶ ἐν τῇ προήσει· ὅπου μὲν γὰρ μέτριον καὶ ἐπιεικῆ> and marked as spurious {ἐν τῇ ποιήσει} after φίλαυτον. Nevertheless, I prefer the supplement of Bignone (<καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ· ὃ μὲν γὰρ σεμνὸν καὶ φιλοδημοτικὸν>), which more closely traces the antonyms of the stated terms ἀλαζόνα καὶ φίλαυτον, although the fact that φιλοδημοτικός is generally unattested should compel us to supplement with the more common φιλόδημος, a word used by Pheidippides in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (1187) to refer to Solon.

fundamentally democratic, and his poetry, which evinces the qualities of an egotistical braggart (ἀλαζὼν καὶ φίλαυτος).[114] Did he gather this characterization from Aristotle's *On Poets*? It is impossible to know for sure, and it is true that Timaeus may not have needed Aristotle when the characterization follows directly from Empedocles' poem. But Aristotle as local interlocutor for Timaeus makes a good amount of sense here too.[115] The former trait is defined by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (2.7 p. 1108a21-22) as 'pretense in the form of exaggeration' (προσποίησις ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον), and the person who possesses it (4.7 p. 1108a22-23) is someone who 'pretends to reputable opinions that he does not possess' (προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων ... καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων);[116] and the latter quality of being φίλαυτος, a philosophical term which is first attested in surviving Greek literature in the writings of Aristotle, is considered worthy of censure in the *Politics* (2.2 p. 1263b1-5), where it is differentiated from 'being in the state of friendship with one's self' (φιλεῖν ἑαυτόν) on the grounds that the φίλαυτος is friend to himself 'more than is appropriate' (μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν).[117] In this way, then, Timaeus seeks explicitly to differentiate the democratic political character of Empedocles from the self-promoting content of his poetry. It seems that when Timaeus quotes the two lines of Empedocles' poem that he had (so I suspect) found quoted in Aristotle's own *On Poets*, he bring evidence of the sage's political life to bear on Aristotle's description of Empedocles as an anarchist, which arose out of Aristotle's own reading of Empedocles' poem.[118] If this interpretation is right, then Timaeus' approach to Aristotle's account of Empedocles would feature two critical movements: first, he would have taken Aristotle's own description of Empedocles as a 'free man and estranged from every sort of rule' (ἐλεύθερον γεγονέναι καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς ἀλλότριον) out of context and used it as evidence that Aris-

[114] This tension is noted by Schorn 2014, 304.

[115] We might recall Sextus Empiricus' complaint (*Math*. 1.302) about those who criticize Empedocles' claim to divinity because they believe it was done 'out of boastfulness and contempt for the rest of mankind' (κατ' ἀλαζονείαν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλληλους ἀνθρώπους ὑπεροψίαν).

[116] On the use of the verb προσποιέω by Isocrates to refer to pretenders to Pythagoreanism, see Horky 2013, 90-91.

[117] It is also the case, however, that Aristotle (*EN* 9.8 p. 1169a12-13) considers being φίλαυτος a sufficient condition for being a 'good man' (ἀγαθός), but that a 'wicked man' (μοχθηρός) should not possess this quality, because he will commit injury to his friends or himself.

[118] It is worth noting that in *On Poets*, Aristotle mentioned the political speeches of Empedocles (F 73 Janko), but we cannot be sure what he knew of them.

totle was in agreement with him about Empedocles' democratic inclinations; he also would have argued, against Aristotle, that *a poet's character is to be grasped (chiefly) from his actions*, *not simply inferred from his poetic voice*. Aristotle had stated directly in the *Poetics* and apparently also in *On Poets* that the character of a poet matches the speech that the poet employs characteristically.[119] Indeed, this interpretation is consonant with the analysis of Riccardo Vattuone, who has shown that Timaeus used Aristotle's approaches to discerning the character of authors from the subject matter of their writings precisely to show how unreliable a method of inference it really was.[120] What better way to do this than to subject the philosopher himself to his own medicine. On the account of Polybius (12.24.1-3 = Tim., *FGrHist* 566 F 152a), Timaeus is said to have claimed that

> poets and authors show their real natures in their writings by dwelling excessively on certain matters (διὰ τῶν ὑπεράνω πλεονασμῶν … διαφαίνειν τὰς ἑαυτῶν φύσεις), maintaining on the one hand that the poet [sc. Homer] is constantly feasting his heroes, suggesting gluttony; and on the other that Aristotle often gives recipes in his writings, suggesting an epicure and a gourmand.[121]

Timaeus thus exposes the dubiousness of the philosopher's own methods of inferring character from writing – by turning them against Aristotle himself.[122]

What Timaeus may have said about the function of Empedocles' poetic egoism, which he admitted, is unfortunately unclear from the surviving context in Diogenes Laertius: the information that follows may be thought to emphasize Empedocles' desire to be famous, a charge that had been leveled against Pythagoras and other Pythagoreans in the Athenian imaginary from the end of the fifth century BCE.[123]

[119] As mentioned above (see n. 45), Aristotle took *both* speech and actions (and not action alone) as indicators of moral character in poetic and rhetorical performances. Aristotle may have been attacked by Philodemus (Aristot. *De poetis* *F 2 Janko = Phld. *Po*. 4, col. 104.13-21) as well for this assumption (cf. Janko 2010, 219).

[120] Vattuone 1991, 37-39, followed by Baron 2012, 119.

[121] Translated after Champion.

[122] Cf. Baron 2012, 119.

[123] Cf. Horky 2013, 88-93 and 98-99. Note that being 'famous' in these circumstances isn't simply about popularity, in the modern sense of this term; it aims at the successful development of a philosophical community (ἑταιρία) that will carry the sage's wisdom forward.

Conclusions

If this interpretation and critical reconstruction is right, then the external cover-text of Diogenes Laertius has preserved something quite special, and quite unique among the surviving evidence from antiquity, in his short account of Empedocles' democratic character and actions. He has not simply relayed an anecdotal account that seeks – wholly unreliably, as some have thought – to fictionalize Empedocles' political activities for the mere purpose of entertaining the audience. Rather, Diogenes Laertius has preserved an important internal cover-text which presents the early Hellenistic historian Timaeus of Tauromenium's dialectical appropriation and criticism of Aristotle's description of Empedocles' character in his lost *On Poets*. In the midst of doing so, Diogenes seems to have retained not only Aristotle's characterization of Empedocles, as an anarchist whose poems exhibit the qualities of a self-centered braggart, but also further evidence – sadly lacking due to the near total loss of *On Poets* – of how Aristotle associated the character of poets with the poems that they composed. In this way, we have a new piece of concrete evidence for Aristotelian virtue ethics, especially with regard to how Aristotle thought artistic expression shapes authorial character. Additionally, Diogenes has preserved indications of Timaeus' own method of historical explanation, also desperately desired, due to the near-total loss of the treatises of the Hellenistic historiographers, including most of Timaeus' own work. The evidence presented above suggests too that Timaeus was, in fact, well aware of Peripatetic historiographical and even philosophical tendencies, and that he chose to adapt them to suit his own purposes in the composition of his histories, even if it meant parodying them. Moreover, what is surprising and extremely interesting here is the way in which Timaeus appears to respond to Aristotle's depiction of Empedocles' character, given the fact that we have little evidence of other historiographers in the Hellenistic age critically evaluating or using Aristotle's methodology outside the Peripatos[124] until the histories of Polybius, in the middle of the second century BCE.[125] Finally, Timaeus nods towards a representation of Empedocles that makes him into an advocate for democracy and democratic values, a δημοτικὸς ἀνήρ,

[124] Obviously, two figures from within the Peripatos who adapted Aristotle's historical methodology to the composition of biographies were Aristoxenus and Chamaeleon. For the former, see Schorn 2011; for the latter, see Schorn 2012.

[125] On criticisms of Peripatetic philosophy by historiographers after the death of Aristotle, now see Baron 2013, ch. 6.

that would have resonated with anyone who had read or heard the orators Aeschines or Demosthenes in Athens. Empedocles, on Timaeus' account, emerges as a Demosthenic philosopher, a man who ethically rejected the excesses of kingship and protected the rights of the Agrigentine people against the threats of tyranny and oligarchy. What we cannot say with absolute confidence, however, is whether the narrative of Empedocles' political activities in Diogenes Laertius' *Life and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers* presents a historically reliable account of Empedocles' participation in the founding of a new democracy in Agrigentum in the 470s-460s BCE. To be sure, the story of Empedocles *democraticus* has much more to tell us about the legacy of Aristotle's history of philosophy, as well as his philosophy of history, in biographical writings of the Hellenistic age and beyond.

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