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Anais da V Conferência da Sociedade Brasileira de Filosofia Analítica

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Apoio:



lança mão da distinção entre conhecimento e opinião, acreditando que tudo o que podemos dizer sobre as coisas das quais ele fala terá sempre o aspecto incerto de uma opinião ou de uma conjectura. Não seria vedado ao ser humano um conhecimento de cada coisa em particular, mas acerca dos assuntos por ele tratados: os deuses e o todo. Não obstante o que é dito nesse fragmento, Xenófanes supõe noutra momento, em B18, que, com o tempo, pela investigação, descobre-se melhor, ou seja, que é possível conhecer. Embora B18 e B34 pareçam contraditórios, podemos associar essas passagens consistentemente, interpretando-o como um crítico dos limites da metafísica. Esta comunicação pretende apresentar os problemas das interpretações que atribuem a Xenófanes um pensamento puramente cético ou um puramente otimista epistemológico, a fim de apresentar razões para aceitarmos a interpretação alternativa apresentada.

A Defense of Belief-Credence Dualism

Elizabeth Jackson

In this paper, I defend Belief-Credence Dualism, the view that we have both beliefs and credences and both attitudes are equally fundamental. First, I explain belief, credence, and three views on their relationship. Belief is a coarse grained propositional attitude when we take p to be the case or regard p as true; credence is a more fine-grained attitude, similar to confidence, that is often represented on the $[0,1]$ interval. There are three main views on the way that beliefs and credences relate to each other: Belief-First, which maintains that credences reduce to beliefs, and Credence-First, which maintains that beliefs reduce to credences, and Dualism.

Then, I argue for Dualism. I do so first by painting a picture of the mind on which belief and credence are two cognitive tools that we use for different purposes. The basic idea is that each attitude has their unique role: beliefs simply our reasoning, enabling cognitive efficiency, and credences precisify our reasoning, which is especially important when the stakes are high and accuracy is crucial. I give arguments for this model from both philosophy and psychology, and discuss how it is supported by several models in psychology, including the adaptive

toolbox model and the two systems model.

Then, I argue that Dualism can explain this picture of the mind better than both Belief-First and Credence-First. On a Credence-First model, belief just is a credence above some threshold. It's unclear how, given Credence-First, beliefs can play a simplifying role in our reasoning. While a Belief-Firster can maintain that we may believe different contents in order to either pursue accuracy or efficiency, it is unclear how belief and credence are two cognitive tools on this picture. We may form beliefs with different contents depending on our situation, but this is a very different picture of the mind than the one above. Thus, Belief-First and Credence-First cannot explain this intuitively plausible and empirically supported picture of the mind.

Finally, I respond to two objections to Dualism. The first is that Dualism is a much more complicated picture than Belief-First and Credence-First; the fact that it is much less parsimonious gives us a *prima facie* reason to prefer one of the other two views. In response, I argue that it is unclear why principles of parsimony should apply to questions about the configuration of the mind; it is doubtful that our cognitive structures would be as simple as our data can explain. In fact, even if Belief-First or Credence-First could explain the data equally as well as Dualism, it's not clear we should prefer one of the former views to the latter. Second, I respond to the following worry: can positing two cognitive tools really simplify our reasoning? I argue via analogy that it surely can.

I conclude that Dualism is a promising view, and one that both epistemologists and philosophers of mind should take seriously.

Por uma visão estrutural da informação

Francisco Dário de Andrade Bandeira

Como observou Gareth Evans (1996), as pessoas são dentre outras coisas, “coletores, transmissores e armazenadores de informações.” Também não seria exagero dizer que em nossos dias a “informação” constitui um dos mais importantes