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HOW DO YOU MAKE YOURSELF A BODY WITHOUT ORGANS? USING KNAUSGÅRD'S *MY STRUGGLE* AS AN ETHICAL CASE

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Abstract: The concept of “the body without organs” takes up a great part of the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari. Yet, it is difficult to answer their question—“How do you make yourself a body without organs?”—or to understand their answer. In this paper I propose that the body without organs is an ethical concept. To support this assertion, I relate, especially, Deleuze’s thought on the Norwegian author Karl Ove Knausgård’s autofictive project, *My Struggle*, suggesting that *My Struggle* can be read as a body without organs. By doing so, I aim at two things: first, to illustrate a possible application of Deleuze’s ethic, and second, to show how such an ethic may guide us regarding what we ought to do.

Keywords: *body without organs, ethics, affirmative, Knausgård, Deleuze*

INTRODUCTION

The title of this paper – “How do you make a body without organs?” – refers to one of the plateau’s in Deleuze and Guattari’s book, *A Thousand Plateaus*. I wish to use this strange concept, the “body without organs,” or “BwO,” as my starting point while trying to demonstrate how it opens up the possibility of an alternative ethical practice.

The BwO was adopted from the French writer Antonin Artaud and first appeared in Deleuze’s *Logic of Sense*, then in *Anti-Oedipus* (written with Guattari), *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, and *A Thousand Plateaus* (written with Guattari).¹ Each variation makes the concept more ethical; referring to Spinoza’s *Ethics*, Deleuze and Guattari write, “Is not *Ethics* the greatest book of the Body without Organs?” (Deleuze and Guattari quoted from Shaw 2016, 162).

Next I wish to ask, in what way is the BwO ethical?

“Ethics,” according to Deleuze, “either makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: *not to be unworthy of what happens to us*” (Deleuze 2014, 169, italics added).

Unlike morality, which refers to a set of transcendent values or norms, ethics is understood here as an immanent practice or style of life characterized by an ongoing exploration of what might be possible (Deleuze 2002; Smith 2011). Thus, the term “not to be unworthy of what happens to us” is related to accepting or meeting what affects us and how we might incorporate it in a beneficial way, in which beneficial does not refer to any pre-existing transcendent moral categories.

I would argue that such an ethic has affinities with creative writing, which means that it has a lot to do with how the writer is receptive and absorbs what happens to him or her. To qualify this idea, I relate the concept of BwO to the Norwegian writer Karl Ove Knausgård’s six-volume auto-fictional project entitled *My Struggle*. In that immense literary project, he struggles to accept that he has the beliefs, feelings, and thoughts that he deserves given his way of being (Deleuze 2002, 1). Knausgård writes to overcome a way of being that he finds morally re-

¹ Smith (2012, 320) draws a map of the development of and changes in the BwO. I regard all the definitions as part of the same, that is, a “model for the unconscious itself,” yet not as something we should or ought to become conscious of, but rather as a way of living in this schizophrenic or pre-personal state of trying to be worthy of what happens.

stricted, controlled, and too rationalized by science (Knausgård 2011). To liberate himself, Knausgård creates a fictional room where he can experiment with a possible version of himself, becomes many – receive and absorb – by allowing his memories to diverge from any fixed moral standard as well as questions the certainty of his memories. For example, he stresses: “Happiness is not my objective” (Knausgård 2011); rather, his objective is to examine a life in all its complexity. This approach, I argue, resembles the concept of BwO.

For example, in *Anti-Oedipus* (2000b, 21), the BwO is described as “an egg,” which illustrates a state in between being and non-being. An egg is a potential still to be actualized; it is in a constant process of becoming. Equally, Knausgård is both being constituted by reality and constituting it.

There is a radical openness in the BwO. It emphasizes that we do not know what it will turn into, what it will be capable of, if anything. Also, it – at least I read it this way – refers to Deleuze’s often repeated Spinozean claim: We do not know what the body is capable of doing. The question “How do you make yourself a body without organs?” is, therefore, an ethical question. That is to say, how can we freely become whatever, instead of imprisoning ourselves by following predefined norms of how we should, ought, or must live (or remember our past)?

The BwO is a way of truly exploring what we are capable of. The BwO is a body full of uncertainty, a what if concept.

Thus, I propose that the BwO is ethical qua experimental: “The creation of this body without organs is a process that one cannot ever be completely ‘done with’” (Murphy 2016, 141).² The experimental process consists of two elements that work alongside one another: (1) the constitution of experience and (2) the constitution of reality.

I will briefly relate these two steps to Knausgård’s six-volume auto-fictional project, *My Struggle*. In other words, I refer to Knausgård for one reason only: as an example of how one can become a BwO.

² Similarly, Knausgård claimed that after finishing *My Struggle*, he would stop writing. Nevertheless, he continued, emphasizing that everything in life is a work in progress.

THE BWO

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari write:

We come to the gradual realization that the BwO is not at all the opposite of the organs. The organs are not the enemy. The enemy is the organism. The BwO is opposed not to the organs but to that organization of the organs called organism (2000a, 158).

With that quote, they deny the idea of following a purpose, an objective, or a master plan. Our body language and posture are often socialized by the norms and conventions of society. As an alternative, the BwO puts an end to such ultimate objectives that represent an already ordered map (i.e., a metaphysics of being). Contrary to this, Deleuze and Guattari assert that the “BwO is what remains when you take everything away ... populated only by intensities” (2000a, 151, 153).

The BwO confronts us with a problem of organization, that is, how we should, ought to, or must organize our lives, without reducing everything to the same organism.

To organize is to make things fit, even things that cannot fit. Organization functions like a funnel; diverging ideas are gradually managed as though being squeezed through the same hole, pointed toward the same objectives or fantasies. For example, in much management and organizational literature, the starting point is to create a clear objective or vision, then you organize your resources with reference to these. The BwO, on the other hand, is a multiplicity. It is something that takes place, any place, potentially pointing in all directions. There is, apparently, no clear entrance and exit; rather, there are different moments where life intersects with various intensity.

In his work on Francis Bacon, Deleuze writes:

Sensation is vibration. We know that the egg reveals just this state of the body “before” organic representation: axes and vectors, gradients, zones, cinematic movements, and dynamic tendencies, in relation to which forms are contingent or accessory. “No mouth. No tongue. No teeth. No larynx. No esophagus. No belly. No anus.” It is a whole nonorganic life, for the organism is not life, it is what imprisons life (2003, 44-47).

The organs are not the problem; the only problem is how the majority tends to organize them to perform or function in a specific way (e.g., managing by objectives).

In today's achievement society, we tend to focus on objectives, which far too easily can make any kind of organization moralizing (i.e., individual or societal), telling the organs how they ought to, should, or have to work, instead of suggesting how they might organize themselves (Janning 2015).

"The word experimental is apt, providing it is not understood as descriptive of an act to be later judged in terms of success and failure, but simply as of an act the outcome of which is unknown" (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 371; Shaw 2016, 172).

Thus, to become a BwO is to trust or have faith in each organ's capability of being flexible enough to find its, or their, own way, when needed. This point is perhaps best illustrated by referring to Artaud's use of the concept, without suggesting that Deleuze and Guattari's reading or use agrees. In 1947, Artaud wrote, "When you have given him a body without organs, then you will have delivered him from all his automatisms and restored him his true liberty" (Artaud quoted from Shaw 2016, 177).

Although a moral baseline of right and wrong in a society helps us understand and see how life typically works, the exact same baseline may also hinder us from seeing the free flow of information and knowledge that passes through as intensities. We become less open. Our vision becomes automatized. We keep certain forces or alternative life forms imprisoned due to our blindness or our unwillingness to make room for something new, or simply by deliberately referring to how things normally function, following the habit of following habits. Seen in this light, the BwO is also a critique of what Moore (1903, 10) called the "naturalistic fallacy" as an attempt to deduce norms from facts, for example that drug users tend to live shorter lives with a higher risk of becoming criminals, etc. Such deductions are not wrong per se; rather, the point is that Deleuze and Guattari do not commit themselves to such deductions. Instead, they evaluate a life as a singularity. It is in that sense that we speak about an immanent ethics, or that we do not see the unconscious as something dangerous qua unknown but rather as a potential, an egg.

The BwO, therefore, is a free organization of a life *with* life. And, as it is free, it can, at least potentially, become whatever. Hereby, we move away from morality to ethics.

BELIEVE IN THIS WORLD

Ethics is to be worthy of what happens, Deleuze wrote in *The Logic of Sense*. Ethics is a way of life worthy of accepting what life has to offer, not worthy in the sense that you should live up to certain ideals or norms but rather that you are capable of embracing what actually comes to occur. Regardless of what happens, you should still believe in this world. There is no other world.

The modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world. We do not even believe in the events which happen to us, love, death, as if they only half concerned us ... We need an ethic or a faith, which makes fools laugh; it is not a need to believe in something else, but a need to believe in this world, of which fools are a part (Deleuze 2000, 171, 173).

The task is to establish or reestablish a belief, but “not in a different world, but in the link between man and the world, in love or life, to believe in this as in the impossible, the unthinkable, which none the less cannot but be thought: ‘something possible, otherwise I will suffocate’ ” (Deleuze 2000, 170).

In order not to suffocate, you must breathe. “A mastery of the breath ... leads to mastery over the body,” suggests Artaud (Shaw 2016, 162). To breathe may not establish a belief in this world, but it is vital. It keeps you in this world as well as it shows how an immanent ethical practice is finite: “For the heart life is simple: It beats for as long as it can. Then it stops” (Knausgård 2011).

To believe, therefore, is to sense the vibrations of life equally, to become with them, move alongside the vibrations. In *My Struggle*, Knausgård pays attention to all aspects of life in the same neutral way: A quarrel with his wife is described as carefully as putting gas in his car or cleaning the house (Knausgård 2013).³ Hereby, the Norwegian writer exhibits how a belief in this world requires attention and awareness to the extent that the person observing becomes completely one with or indistinguishable from what is happening, that is, what is being observed. He *becomes*, which is an ethical practice. Becoming *with* touches upon “the ethical

³ Similarly, the primatologist Frans de Waal (2009, 211) does not link empathy with morality; instead, he writes, “taking another’s perspective is a neutral capacity. It can serve both constructive and destructive ends.”

imperative to engage with the present and be 'worthy' of it" (Braidotti 2011, 16).

The question of interest is how to make yourself a BwO.

THE SELFLESSNESS OF KNAUSGÅRD

Knausgård's idea of writing is as a way of *becoming worthy of what has happened and happens* to him. To become *with* is an engaged practiced, a willed practiced that is initiated by life itself. To become with is not to become somebody specific, that is, not to adopt a certain identity or moral profile. Knausgård (2011) writes, "... by writing I wanted to open the world for myself" – to be affected by the world.

In an exchange with James Woods, Knausgård describes the writing process as a filtering process that brings him closer to reality:

Now, I don't really pay much attention to the world. I'm not very present. I'm detached from almost everything. I'm very occupied with myself and my own mind. I'm not in connection with the world – *but in writing, I can be. That's a way for me to open a world up* (Knausgård 2013. My italics).

Through the process of writing, the author is able to turn his sensation from merely inward looking to outward looking. It is in the process of writing itself, which helps him to open or unfold the world as a way of actualizing what is there as a potential. The criterion is not whether the writing is good or relevant; rather, it is to allow the writing and the world to merge. The link between life and writing is a question of credibility.

Knausgård's *My Struggle* consists of six volumes. Each volume concerns a different part of the author's life, spanning from early childhood in volume three to the young man becoming a writer in volume four to more present-day issues that also include other people looking at him. He accepts the chaos and insecurity regarding who he is and was as being part of a life. Contrary to contemporary identity politics, he establishes a room in which different experiences – his own and others – can be expressed.

At first it seems a project to get over the death of his father and how Knausgård resembles his father. In an interview (Andrew O'Hagan, 2014), Knausgård said (referring to his father), "I had to get rid of him. That has been my project – to get rid of his presence inside me." Yet, as he also men-

tions in the first part of the work, it is an existential project. It is about a man struggling with becoming something other than what he is. For example, in volume one, he mentions that although he is married and has children and was already quite successful as a writer, he is not happy. The whole project is a way a getting rid of everything, mainly because everything seems to annoy him, except writing. For example, Knausgård (2011) notes how scientific explanations have killed the mystery of life. The result is a tiny claustrophobic world that he wishes to open. Writing, equally, requires that he is open, receptive, and ‘formable’. For him, to write, at least as he does in this project, is to make a BwO.

Knausgård wants to escape, leave behind, get rid of, but unlike a post-modern writer such as Paul Auster, who plays with identities in order to become another person in particular, Knausgård tries – without knowing this, I assume – to become a BwO. That is free. He wants to move beyond the limited space (i.e., his memories and life conditions, etc.). He wants to write another, more liberating, story about himself, not necessarily a prettier one. For example, in volume two, Knausgård discusses his debut novel, *Out of This World*, with a good friend called Geir. The novel is about a teacher who is having an affair with a young girl of only 13 years of age. Now, in volume two, Geir tells Knausgård that he (Knausgård) had told him (Geir) about the affair long before the publication of the novel. “It felt like a hand squeezed around my heart. How was it possible that he could say this? Could I have repressed such a huge incident? Just hidden it away and forgotten all about it, and then written it down without a moment of consideration whether it was correct? No. No, no, no. It was unthinkable” (Knausgård 2012). He then denies it, claiming that such an important thing cannot be repressed, and adds: “At the same time, I had big gaps in my memory, back then I had drunk quite a lot ... all these holes, all this unconscious darkness during so many years ... and now when Geir told me that I had told him that I have had a relationship with a thirteen year old in Northern Norway, I could not with my hand on my heart say no, I did not, because there was doubt” (Knausgård 2012).

Knausgård might be an unreliable historian, yet what he is writing is a fictional project. Fiction becomes a tool with which to make various versions of something true. It illustrates what Bergson pointed out regarding recollection and memory, that our memory is not something static hidden away in a drawer, but something created. Just as moral norms are social artefacts that change over time, Knausgård as a writer is uncertain about his own past. As Butler writes: “I am always recuperating, recon-

structing, and I am left to fictionalize and fabulate origins I cannot know” (2005, 39). Instead of reducing a life’s complexity in order to give it one solid identity (and eliminate unattractive possibilities), Knausgård shares his doubt and uncertainty, whereby he – quite paradoxically – ends up saying something more significant about a life, something that I would argue is part of any practical ethic: how vulnerable life is.

In the interview with Andrew O’Hagan (2014), Knausgård is asked whether writing *My Struggle* had been “therapeutic,” whether it had helped him “conquer the fear” of his father. Knausgård said no. He went on to say, “It’s nothing like that to write, I think. To write is much more about becoming free of everything, becoming free of what you know.”

My Struggle is about freedom, similar to the BwO. He no longer wants to do what he can. He aims at becoming another. He has to let go. It is in the process of writing that the autobiographical becomes fictional. Becoming a BwO is about having the courage to take a step into the unknown. It is a way of enlarging, expanding, exploring everything as it was, is, and is going to be, to make room for it all.

That is an ethical practice because it debates not only what to know and not know but also with what certainty, if any, and whether any experience may or may not be defensible depending on one’s criteria.

In the fifth volume, he writes:

I was onto something important, all I had to do was stretch out for it. This was a vague feeling, nothing on which you could build, but all the same I knew I had something there. In the mist, in the darkness of the forest, in the dew drops on the spruce needles. In the whales that swam in the sea, in the heart beating in my breast. Mist, heart, blood, trees. Why were they so appealing? What was it that enticed me with such power? That filled me with such enormous desire? Mist, heart, blood, trees. Oh, if only I could write about *them*, no, not write about *them* but make my writing *be* them, then I would be happy. Then I would have peace of mind (Knausgård 2013).

Make my writing *be* them. To write in order to be or become with the world, not to do anything specific, not to organize; rather, leave your organs and planning behind. Therefore, to be is to be *with*. That is to become.

For Deleuze, becoming is freedom. It has no end goal. Such freedom is not deep but expansive. It is not personal but impersonal. To become a BwO is to acknowledge that self-knowledge is integrated in the world.

You deceive yourself by not knowing the world around you. Or, if you do not know the world, you will never know yourself. And yet, the conclusion is even more radical. If the world and you resonate and become united, it is also because you are nothing other than what you become.

Knausgård gets to know himself as many things: son, father, friend, writer, lover, husband, failure, success, etc. However, the roles are never fixed or static. They change. He comes to accept that his struggle is two-fold: First, he has to accept that he is all of them (the son, the father, the drunk, a potential criminal, etc.); second, as a consequence thereof, that he is selfless. He is no further away from Hitler (volume six) than he is from being a caring father. To both accept this and affirm it is how to make a BwO.

This creative approach does not remove our responsibility per se. After all, we are still accountable for how we relate to life. However, if to become worthy of what is happening to us marks an ethical approach to life, then responsibility should not be seen as how well we follow a set of moral categories; rather, it is determined by how we respond to or carry with us the wounds we encounter in life. “Lives are by definition precarious: they can be expunged at will or by accident” (Butler 2009, 25). Knausgård, for example, acknowledges that a life embodies a potential for both creation and destruction. He decides which potential to actualize, which story to tell. His self is not an essence but is constantly becoming something else. I am always another, as Rimbaud famously said. “What something is, is given through the activity of differentiation” (Colebrook 2000, 87).

Thus, what is affirmed is the difference that makes everything else possible. To make yourself a BwO is to invent the conditions for non-stop experimentation, for example, by writing quickly without editing as Knausgård wrote *My Struggle* but also through reading. Both practices can resemble a spiritual or religious experience of *selflessness*: “The main thing about religious ecstasy is a feeling of selflessness – that you yourself disappear. I feel that when I read Dostoyevsky. I can have that feeling. I can just disappear” (Knausgård 2014).

In discussing *My Struggle* by Knausgård, I have briefly illustrated how elements of Deleuze’s philosophy can be practiced, lived out, not by all of us becoming writers but by incorporating this particular *approach* to life-ethics as an ongoing experiment. It is a way of paying attention neutrally or without judging beforehand in order to affirm what brings life. In this affirmative practice, an ethical life also becomes more artistic or poetic.

DISCUSSION

Deleuze and the narration in Knausgård's *My Struggle* share the same underlying metaphysic. On a basic level, they both accept that everything is constantly changing (i.e., the metaphysics of becoming). The process of making sense is a creative or inventive practice.

The awareness of the living, present moment is not anchored in the questions 'What is?' or 'What does it mean?' but in 'How does it work?' and 'What is also possible?' (Deleuze and Guattari 2000b, 102). Elsewhere, Deleuze says, "The ultimate aim of literature is to set free, in the delirium, this creation of a health or this invention of a people, that is, a possibility of life," thereby, he emphasizes, to "write for this people who are missing ... ('for' means less 'in the place of' than 'for the benefit of')" (Deleuze 1998, 4). The obligation is to make ourselves available to life in order to follow that which brings joy, clarity, and peace.⁴ Toward the end of the project, Knausgård finds peace of mind as he realizes that he consists of the others, of the world.

Philosophy is a way of being alert – that is, constantly being aware, always being on the lookout, questioning our habits as well as all the conventional norms and ideas that guide our lives. A philosopher exposes himself or herself to contact with life, not some predefined idea or knowledge of life:

Belief is no longer addressed to a different or transformed world. Man is in the world as if in a pure optical and sound situation. The reaction to which man has been disposed can be replaced only by belief. Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what he sees and hears (Deleuze 2000, 172).

Elsewhere, Deleuze writes:

A wave with a variable amplitude flows through the body without organs; it traces zones and levels on this body according to the variations of its amplitude. When the wave encounters external forces at a particular level, a sensation appears. An organ will be determined by this encounter, but it is a provisional

⁴ The concept of joy can be found in Spinoza, just as concepts such as clarity and peace can be found in Wittgenstein. Deleuze, on the other hand, does not have any explicit philosophical objective; his immanent ethic is related to an ongoing process of becoming other. Still, joy, clarity, and peace appear to qualify as states to affirm in life.

organ that endures only as long as the passage of the wave and the action of the force, and which will be displaced in order to be posited elsewhere. No organ is constant as regards either function or position... (Deleuze 2002, 44-47).

The process of becoming a BwO consists of the same two steps that make Deleuze's philosophy affirmative. First, we need to establish a belief in this world – what I have referred to as paying attention neutrally – then we may notice how we are affected and, therefore, changed as a result of what we encounter. The second part is one of problematization or examination of what is happening, as well as how it is happening and why.

Deleuze is a philosopher who is more concerned with living (all forms of life) than with knowledge *about* living (the good life). That is also expressed in the BwO and in Knausgård's project. For example, the organs, if understood morally (e.g., this is how this thing should be done), can prevent the body from re-organizing itself again and again; that inhibition can imprison life. The BwO is, on the contrary, constantly on the move. "Multiplicity, ritornello, sensation, etc., are all developed into pure concepts, but strictly speaking, they are inseparable from the passage from one concept to another" (Deleuze 2006, 363).

The "passage" that Deleuze speaks of is from unconsciousness to consciousness. You are constantly located between those two states, since there is no true or natural order of things. To relate to what is in the midst of becoming, you need to be alert, to pay attention (to the conditions of experience) and experiment with how things could be organized (i.e., the conditions of reality). "Nietzsche succeeded in making us understand, thought is creation, not will to truth" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 64).

For instance, I suggest that Knausgård's literary project is fueled not by a will to truth but by a will to create. It is that creative will that makes room for the truths to emerge. What makes *My Struggle* ethical is how the writer makes himself available to life: memories, reading, present occurrences, trends.

If Knausgård's project can help us familiarize ourselves with Deleuze's ethics, it is because *My Struggle* may be seen as a process of becoming *with* reality. It can help us see and experience what actually happens—to us, that is how we might be affected. Auto-fiction, as presented by Knausgård, is a form of negativity that breaks with the dominating urge to perform in a particular and measurable way so common in today's society. It is those so-called ideals or norms that Knausgård experiments with.

My Struggle is a kind of non-doing that seeks nothingness or emptiness as a form of liberation from all those performance demands and ideals, all the things that make him struggle because of the claustrophobia the strict norms of society creates. Non-doing is becoming with whatever happens, allowing your body and mind to be filled by life, not something useful or good according to certain ideals. For instance, the body takes up a lot of space in Knausgård's work. He cuts himself, he feels fat, he swims. He illustrates what Colebrook refers to when she describes the body as "a relation to what is not itself, a movement or an activity from a point of difference to other points of difference" (2000, 87). Unfortunately, the body has been moralized into acting in a conventional manner. "Almost everyone had the same body language ... The effort to maintain normality shone out of them" (Knausgård 2011, 204). The socialized or moralized body tries to behave correctly; it is an obeyed body. Conversely, a body without organs (or your constant striving to become a BwO) is constantly becoming a body capable of incorporating more. Becoming, then, is a radical process of depersonalization. One becomes by one's capacity to incorporate others or the world. It is no longer a matter of his, Knausgård's, life, but life as such. This is, I believe, what Knausgård refers to as selflessness and what Deleuze and Guattari call a BwO.

Selflessness is intimately tied with freedom, freedom as becoming. Here, you let go of all previous norms or ideals, but you do not let go of what happens. Freedom, therefore, is both resistance and creation, for example, creating a plane in which something that today is ignored can be expressed, actualized, etc. Or it is resistance to what keeps it imprisoned, that is, hindering it from expressing itself freely. Thus, freedom is not just a choice between two already given possibilities; rather it is a choice about which potentials or virtualities to actualize. It consists of two steps. The first is to let go of what makes us sad and drags us down by, alternatively, trying to affirm that which brings life and joy. That is the constitution of experience. The second step is to eliminate the possibility of something potentially destructive coming into being or actualizing what is in the midst of becoming a joyous experience. The constitution of reality.

Therefore, to make a BwO is not only to be open to changes but also to facilitate those changes, to manifest Nietzsche's "will to power" as a "will to create" (Deleuze 2002). The BwO is "a leap forward," as Braidotti says, "toward a creative reinvention of life conditions, affectivity, and figurations for the new kind of subjects we have already become" (2011, 53).

The term “already become” emphasizes the capacity to say “this will be” by actualizing this particular life condition here and now. The term “already become” also illustrates the imaginative and creative power (i.e., the potential) to affirm.

CONCLUSION

The BwO is organized like a selflessness machine that creates a new reality, actualizing new ways of being. If everything is a machine, everything is also in the midst of becoming something else due to its connections or *relationality*.

Still, the BwO is not about feeling connected to something particular, as if such a connection would give your life purpose. Rather, you relate to life neutrally and explore what new forms of life it may open the way for. It is a test as well as a development of your capacity to relate with life as such, to absorb it – here, Knausgård serves as an example.

Thus, the way to make yourself a BwO is to relate to life as such *and then* affirm what brings more life to life, that is, making our experiences more real, more directly connected with life without the filter of morality. Philosophy, in that sense, is risky business. To believe is to relate in an experimental and curious way (i.e., what is also possible?).

The BwO is a body not being subjected to internal or external evaluation according to predefined standards or objectives. Becoming is an ongoing movement that constantly questions what interrupts, breaks, or destroys the process of becoming. To make a body without organs is to be engaged in the present, ‘in order to affect qualitative changes’ (Braidotti 2011, 19), and it is in that way that auto-fiction can help us overcome our “selves.” In the end, *My Struggle* is a work of fiction.

Philosophy is an ongoing ethical struggle with life, that is, to be worthy of what happens to us as well as trying to pass on what you can never really have: life.

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