



## ANU Centre for European Studies

### *Working Paper Series*

Vol. 1 No. 1 (May 2010)

### **What Soul for Europe? Unity, Diversity & Identity in the EU**

Pablo Jiménez

*Political integration has been part of the European project from its very beginnings. As far back as the early seventies there was concern in Brussels that an ingredient was missing in the political integration process. ‘Output legitimacy’ – the permissive consensus citizens grant to a government that is ‘delivering’, even if they do not participate in setting its goals – could not sustain unification indefinitely. Such a lacking ingredient – or ‘soul’ – has been labelled ‘European identity’ (EI) in an abundant and growing academic literature. According to Aristotle, ‘polity’ is a specific ‘constitution’ (regime or politeia) of a ‘city’ (or polis): a (‘political’) community composed of ‘citizens’ (politai). No polis can exist unless the politai come together to form it and sustain it. But what will gather and keep them united? Citizens can be very diverse regarding their language, history, religion or economic activity. In absence of a motivation, diversity of itself will make each member of a community go their own way. What kind of bond is required among very diverse European citizens to keep their polis (the EU) – their political community – together? In this paper I analyse several responses – culture, deliberation, welfare, power, multiplicity. Then I*

*attempt a synthesis suggesting that the answers might be referring to different aspects of a single notion – rather than exhaustive explanations of it. Finally I mention three issues regarding the concept of EI that require further study.*

Political integration<sup>1</sup> has always been part of the European project from its very beginnings (Weiler 2002:4) to the moment when the ‘Community’ became ‘Union’ (Treaty of Maastricht). ‘For four decades’ – Weiler points out –

‘European politicians were spoiled by a political class which was mostly supportive and by a general population which was conveniently indifferent. That “moment” has had a transformative impact: public opinion in all member states is no longer willing to accept the orthodoxies of European integration, in particular *the seemingly overriding political imperative* which demanded acceptance, come what may, of the dynamics of Union evolution’ (ibid)<sup>2</sup>.

As far back as the early seventies there was already a preoccupation in Brussels about a missing ingredient that could make political integration advance. ‘Output legitimacy’ – the permissive consensus citizens grant to a government that is ‘delivering’, even if they do not participate in setting the polity’s goals – could not sustain the political unification process indefinitely. Romano Prodi, a former Italian Prime Minister and President of the European Commission, spoke of a search for Europe’s soul (Prodi 2000:40-49). Such ‘soul’ – the lacking ingredient – has been sought after in the abundant (and growing) academic literature about ‘European identity’ (EI). That the term has not only been studied widely by

academics, but also used profusely by politicians may be indicative of its vagueness and the difficulty in defining it satisfactorily.

The concept of EI has been approached from different perspectives. The one that I am interested in is the consideration of EI as a collective bond that allows a political community to exist and subsist. According to Aristotle (2009:84-87) polity is a specific 'constitution' (regime or *politeia*) of a 'city' (or *polis*): a ('political') community composed by 'citizens' (members of the community or *politai*). Under that perspective we could think of the *polis* as the EU, the body of legal treaties as its *politeia*, and the European citizens as the *politai*. It is clear that an 'arrangement of the city' only makes sense provided there is a city to arrange. And there is no city without 'citizens'. No *polis* can come to exist – even less last – unless the *politai* come together to form it and stay united in it. But what will give the political community cohesion?<sup>3</sup> Presumably, something they all have in common – strong enough to maintain them together.

Now citizens can be very diverse from each other. In the case of the EU they speak different languages, like different food, hold different cultural traditions, have different historical backgrounds, profess different religions and occupy themselves in different economic activities. Diversity is an undeniable fact. Pure diversity will make members of the community go each their own way. What kind of bond is required to avoid that they all

disperse?

That is the quest for EI. In this paper I analyse several responses to it. According to them, EI would reside in culture, deliberation, welfare, power or multiplicity. Another possible answer is: 'nothing'. In that case speaking about political integration is senseless. It is a perfectly valid option. Yet *there is already* a polity of sorts – the EU. Even though imperfect and incomplete, struggling to become more democratic and legitimate, the EU presents already a degree of political integration. The 'problem' of EI is usually discussed not in the complete absence of a polity, but in the presence of an existing one – though shaky and ameliorable.

Heiko Walkenhorst, from documents handed to the 'Convention on the Future of Europe' in 2002-2003, detected five main positions or 'models' of EI which he called: 'historical-cultural', 'political-legal', 'social', 'international' and 'post-identity commonness' (2009:4-8). His work is not the only one trying to classify convincingly the immense amount of literature referring to EI (see for example Hurrelmann 2005, Delanty 2002, Bellamy 2008). He does present, however, a clear overview that is useful as a departing point to approach the subject. I use that classification to discuss EI on this paper.

For reasons of space I will speak only about one author representative of each position. Since they have written

about the subject under different circumstances, at different times, from different disciplinary perspectives and often meaning different things, I will try to describe what they say in their own terms<sup>4</sup>. Then I will attempt a synthesis, suggesting that their positions might be depicting different aspects of a single notion – rather than different notions. Finally I shall mention three issues regarding the concept of EI that require further study.

### *'Cultural' EI*

Through a historical survey, Ratzinger attempts 'to discover the deeper, more interior identity of Europe' (2007:20). He sees in Herodotus in the V century BC the first to conceive of Europe as a geographical concept (2007:11-17). With the Hellenistic states and the Roman Empire a continent is formed that becomes 'the basis for later Europe' around the Mediterranean. The triumphant advance of Islam in the VII and VIII century cuts boundaries and separates Europe from Asia and Africa. 'Europe' grows northward to Gaul, Germany, Britain and even Scandinavia, but keeping conceptual continuity with the preceding 'Mediterranean continent' (ibid). Theologically interpreted 'in connection with the Book of Daniel, the Roman Empire – renewed and transformed by the Christian faith – was considered to be the final and permanent kingdom in the history of the world', the '*Sacrum Imperium Romanum*' (ibid). This process of cultural and historical definition – the basis upon which it is possible to speak about the concept of Europe for

Ratzinger – comes to completion under Charlemagne (Ratzinger 2007:14). ‘The establishment of the kingdom of the Franks, as the Roman Empire...now reborn’, thinks Ratzinger, ‘signifies... a decisive step forward toward what we mean today when we speak of Europe’ (ibid). After the Carolingian rule the concept of Europe almost disappears and will not come back until the XVIII century, as a means of self-identification before the Turkish ‘threat’ (ibid).

Another, non-Western root of Europe is that of the Byzantine Roman Empire. Byzantium always understood itself as the true Rome. It also extended to the north, reaching the Slavic areas and creating its own Greco-Roman world. Notwithstanding the differences in main language (Greek v Latin) liturgy, ecclesiastical constitution and alphabet, Ratzinger claims that there were ‘sufficient unifying elements to make one continent out of these two worlds’: the common heritage of the Bible and the early Church, the origins of the religion in Palestine, the same idea of empire, the basic understanding of the Church ‘and hence the common fund of ideas concerning law and legal instruments’ (ibid) and finally monasticism, which remained an essential guarantor not only of cultural continuity but of ‘fundamental religious and moral values, of man’s awareness of his ultimate destiny...and as a force prior and superior to political authority’ (ibid). With the fall of Constantinople in 1453, conquered by the Turks, ‘the Greco- Christian, *European* culture of Byzantium came to an end’ (Ratzinger 2007:18). One of ‘the two

wings of Europe' (the other was the Carolingian Empire) was in danger of disappearing. Yet Moscow came into the scene and declared itself the 'Third Rome'. Now 'the boundaries of the continent began to move extensively toward the east, all the way to Siberia – 'neither Asia nor Europe' – which became 'a sort of preliminary colonial structure' (ibid).

Meanwhile Western Europe splits further, when a large part of the Germanic world with a new, *enlightened* form of Christianity, separated from Rome. To the expansion of Europe towards the east (extension of Russia into Asia) corresponds a 'transplanting of Europe', in both its Western forms (Germanic-Protestant and Latin-Catholic) beyond its geographical boundaries to America, which becomes a colony like Siberia – at least until the beginning of the XIX century (Ratzinger 2007:19), when the 'New World' receives the impact of another turning point in Europe's history: the French Revolution. With it, the spiritual framework 'without which Europe could not have been formed' falls to pieces (Ratzinger 2007:20). As a consequence, 'in the realm of ideas...the sacred foundation for history and for the existence of the State was rejected; history was no longer gauged on the basis of an idea of a pre-existent God who shaped it...for the very first time in history, a purely secular state arose', considering the divine guarantee and ordering of the political sector 'a mythological world view'. God himself was declared 'a private affair that did not play a role in public life'. Popular will was seen solely as 'a matter of reason, by which God did not appear to be clearly

knowable; religion and faith in God belonged to the realm of feelings and not to that of reason'. 'A new type of schism arose which ran through the Latin nations as a deep breach'. Meanwhile, the Protestant realm allowed within itself room 'for liberal and Enlightenment ideas, without that necessarily destroying the framework of a broad, basic Christian consensus' in their polities. The former idea of power (divinely inspired) disappeared, yielding to a new one in which nations and states, identifiable through uniform linguistic regions, appeared as the unique and true subjects of history. Each European nation considered itself unique and entrusted with a universal mission, with the resulting deadly great wars of the XX century (Ratzinger 2007:20-22).

Ratzinger perceives a deep crisis in today's Europe as closely connected with identity. With the triumph of the post-European technological-secular world, with the globalisation of its way of life and its manner of thinking, 'one gets the impression...that the very world of European values – the things upon which Europe bases its identity, its culture and its faith – has arrived at its end and has actually already left the scene...' (Ratzinger 2007:23). Hence EI for him means 'values', and these closely related to history, culture and Christianity. Europe, in its hour of greatest success in terms of peace and prosperity, appears to be in a crisis that 'endangers its life' and which is dealt with cultural transplants (especially from Islam and Buddhism), not only in terms of values but even in the most basic biological sense as well: 'there is a strange lack



of will for the future. Children, who are the future, are seen as a threat to the present...This invites a comparison with the decline of the Roman Empire: it was still functioning as a great historical context, but in practice it was already living off of those who would eventually break it up, because it no longer had any vital energy of its own' (Ratzinger 2007:24). He compares the view of Oswald Spengler with that of Arnold Toynbee: for the former Europe – a 'cultural continent' as Ratzinger calls it – has arrived at its final epoch and runs inexorably towards death or the handing on of its gifts to a new, emerging culture (with a different identity); under the perspective of the latter, Europe is in the midst of a crisis because it has fallen from religion to the worship of technology, the nation and militarism – secularism – but it can revert the tendency by reintroducing the religious heritage, especially Christianity (2007:24-25).

Ratzinger does not seem to be arguing only for a remembrance of the past in a romantic fashion. He sees the question of EI as a guarantee for the future. He wonders to this respect: 'What is there, today and tomorrow, that promises human dignity and a life in conformity with it?' (2007:26). He conceives EI in terms of culture, with religion and history as components.

After the French Revolution, two models of intercourse between religion and secularism were taking shape in Europe: a laicist<sup>5</sup> model in the Catholic, Latin (derived language) nations, with strict confinement of religion outside the public life, and a secular model in the

Protestant, Germanic (derived language) nations, where an enlightened Christian religion, 'essentially understood as morality...assured a moral consensus and a broad religious foundation to which the faiths other than the State religion had to conform. Laicist models 'proved to be fragile and have fallen victims to dictatorships'. They only survive 'because parts of the old moral consciousness continue to exist...making possible a basic moral consensus' (ibid). The secular model with a state church suffer today from attrition: 'religious bodies derived from the State no longer provide any moral force, whereas the State itself cannot create [it]' (Ratzinger 2007:27).

To the laicist and secular models<sup>6</sup> Ratzinger adds two more: the social- democrat, which served as a counterbalance to the two existing models in both, 'Latin' and 'Germanic' countries, and the totalitarian (communist) associated with a rigidly materialistic and atheistic philosophy of history, in which 'religion becomes a superfluous relic from the past'. Communism's scientific appearance conceals an intolerant dogmatism: spirit is the product of matter, morals are the product of circumstances and must be defined...according to the goals of society...there are no longer any values apart from the goals of progress. 'At a given moment everything can be permitted' and become "'moral" in a new sense of the word. Even man can become an instrument...' (Ratzinger 2007:29). The communist systems, points out Ratzinger, have foundered, 'above all because of their false economic dogmatism. But too often people ignore the fact that the

more fundamental reason for their shipwreck was their contempt for human rights, their subjection to morality to the demands of the system and to their promises for the future'. The real catastrophe they left behind is not economic. It 'consists, rather, in the drying up of souls, in the destruction of moral conscience'. For him, the former communists have quickly become liberals in terms of economic doctrine, yet the moral and religious problem has not been solved: 'the loss of man's primordial certainties about God, about himself, and about the universe – the loss of awareness of intangible moral values – is still our problem, especially today, and it can lead to the self-destruction of the European consciousness' (ibid).

Ratzinger wonders: 'In the violent upheavals of our time, is there a European identity that has a future and to which we can commit ourselves with all our might?' Then he enunciates 'the foundational moral elements' that in his opinion should not be missing from EI. The first one is the unconditional character of human dignity and human rights, values which are prior to any governmental jurisdiction. These values are not created by the legislator but exist in their own right and must be respected by him as values of a higher order. These values are ultimately derived from God who has made man to his image, and are therefore inviolable<sup>7</sup>. The fact that they cannot be manipulated by anyone is the real guarantee of human's liberty and greatness. Ratzinger claims that the human dignity, equality, solidarity, democracy and rule of

law present in the European treaties, imply an image of man, a moral option, and a concept of law that are 'by no means obvious out that are actually fundamental values in the identity of Europe' – he is referring here to their grounding in the Judeo-Christian tradition. 'These constitutive elements, along with their concrete consequences, ought to be guaranteed in the future European Constitution; certainly they can be defended only if a corresponding moral consciousness is continually formed anew' (Ratzinger 2007:30-31).

A second element related to EI is marriage and (family). Monogamous marriage, 'modelled in the basis of biblical faith', open to children, is a fundamental structure of the relation between man and woman. It is also the basic cell in the formation of a larger community. In Ratzinger's opinion this gave Europe (in the East and in the West) 'its particular face and its particular humanity'. Marriage and family were founded on 'patterns of fidelity and self-denial'. Europe, he says, 'would not be Europe if this fundamental cell of its social edifice were to disappear or if its nature were to be changed (2007:31-32).

The third foundational moral element of EI for Ratzinger is respect for what is sacred to someone else and especially for God, even from those who do not believe in him. 'Where this respect is violated, something essential in a society is lost' (2007:32-33). Then he notices a phenomenon of 'self-hatred in the Western world that is strange and that can be considered pathological'. He is

referring mainly to Europe, but not only. The West is making a 'praiseworthy attempt' to open up to 'foreign values' and understand them. But 'it no longer loves itself; from now on it sees in its own history only what is blameworthy and destructive, whereas it is no longer capable of perceiving what is great and pure. In order to survive, Europe needs a new – and certainly a critical and humble – acceptance of itself'. Then he adds 'that is, if it *wants* to survive' (ibid).

He sees in multiculturalism – 'continually and passionately encouraged' in Europe – sometimes little more than the abandonment and denial of its own (cultural) heritage. Denying its own identity Europe would be depriving others of a service to which they have a right. Multiculturalism itself calls Europeans to come to their senses and look deep within themselves again, because the 'absolute secularity that has been taking shape in the West is something profoundly foreign'. He concludes hoping that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU be 'a first step, a sign that Europe is consciously looking again for its soul', and that believing Christians see themselves as a creative minority that contributes to Europe's recovery of 'the best of its heritage and thus to the service of all mankind' (Ratzinger 2007:34).

From the preceding paragraphs it seems that for Ratzinger 'culture' has as some of its components history and religion. Along his writing he does not appear to be mainly concerned for the survival of Christianity in

Europe, trying to keep its 'market-share' as it were, in a scenario of rival and competing religions. Of course Christianity is having a tough time in Europe today. But, after all, it did not start in Europe and has today its most significant growth in other continents, especially Africa and Asia (Vatican Information Service 2010). What he appears to be implying is that in denying its 'Christian heritage' Europe will not be losing part of its history but an essential component of its own identity, what Europeans have in common with each other and what distinguishes them from others. Clearly Christianity is one element, yet Ratzinger places it as crucial when it comes to appreciating the moral foundations of achievements deeply ingrained in how Europeans see themselves such as human dignity, democracy and the rule of law.

His position says very little about concrete policy and even about a comprehensive account of EI. He clearly does not pretend that Christianity exhausts the meaning of EI, but is arguing that it has an indispensable place in it. Certainly, apart from pointing to the biological fact that native Europeans – Norwegians, Italians, Dutch or Germans in their traditional traits of, say, the last thousand years – seem to be disappearing as peoples<sup>8</sup> because of below-replacement level birth-rates, his position is not 'ethnic'. It is important to notice this since often the adjective 'ethnic' is sometimes attached to 'culture' in discussions about EI<sup>9</sup>. Identity set on ethnic grounds, with all the charge of racism and xenophobia that this implies, is of course unacceptable. And though

there might be thinkers who pose cultural identity in ethnic terms<sup>10</sup>, Ratzinger's position about EI is set rather in cultural terms, whereby 'Europe is a cultural (and historical) concept' (2007:11).

### *'Deliberative' EI*

In what could be called a 'manifesto on EI' written on February 15 2003 from 'the core of Europe' with the assent of Jacques Derrida, Habermas (2003), tried to depict those aspects that unite Europeans and differentiate them from 'others', especially from USA. For Habermas (2003:291) the 15 of February 2003 may be seen retrospectively in history as the birth of the European public sphere. At the international level and in the framework of the UN, Europe had to 'throw its weight on the scale to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States' (Habermas 2003:293). He hints to 'a feeling of common political belonging' (ibid), the subjective part of EI. The European population must add to their national identities – which engender an already abstract, 'civic solidarity' – a European dimension.

EI in this context seems to be also 'the consciousness of a shared political fate and the prospect of a common future'. EI must make citizens of one (European) nation regard the citizens of another (European) nation 'as fundamentally "one of us"' (ibid). So becoming solidary to other European citizens and considering them as 'one of us', are verbs, actions, rather than nouns. Those actions

are not exactly part of the concept of EI but they certainly derive from it as a consequence.

EI may already be existing or not, but it can certainly be created by participation of the citizens in the public sphere. The 'present moment' (Iraq War) might be a great opportunity to generate EI, given 'the difficulties of a situation into which we Europeans had been cast' (ibid). Then he outlined what we could call the objective part of EI: the description of that 'Europe' which the citizens are invited to identify with. That Europe was 'peaceful, cooperative..., open toward other cultures and capable of dialogue...', and had come up with solutions to nationalism – by creating the EU, a form of 'governance beyond the nation-state' – and to the injustices of capitalism – through the social welfare system. The challenge for Europe now was to 'defend and promote a cosmopolitan order on the basis of international law against competing visions' (Habermas 2003:293-4).

But what is distinctive about Europe? Some of its originally characteristic traits have been so successful that other regions have adopted them, basically all of the 'West': 'Christianity and capitalism, natural science and technology, Roman law and the Code Napoleon, the bourgeois-urban form of life, democracy and human rights, secularisation of the state and society...' (ibid). He enunciates what he believes to be the uniqueness of Europe (its identity), its 'face': the overcoming of the destructive power of nationalism; an 'incomparably' rich



cultural diversity; the acquired knowledge on how differences can be communicated, contradictions institutionalised, tensions stabilised, 'otherness' recognised; part of this EI is also the pacification of class conflict within the welfare state; the self-limitation of state sovereignty within the framework of the EU; features of a 'common political mentality' which include suspicion when the border between politics and religion is transgressed, a 'relatively large amount of trust' in the organisational and steering capacities of the state, scepticism towards the achievements of the markets, moderated optimism regarding technical progress, keen sense of the 'dialectic of enlightenment', a preference for the welfare state's guarantees of social security and for regulations on the basis of solidarity; the desire for a multilateral and legally regulated international order and the hope for an effective global domestic policy within the framework of a reformed United Nations (Habermas 2003:294-5).

Habermas wonders whether this 'mentality' that forms part of EI is superficial or has deeper historical experiences and traditions. He sees EI not as natural, but rather as an artificial construction that must happen 'in the daylight of the public sphere'. A European-wide public sphere needs to be embedded 'in a political culture shared by all' (Habermas 2001:19). This 'political culture' seems to be part of EI for Habermas. The new awareness of what Europeans have in common is expressed 'admirably' in the EU Charter of Basic Rights. The Charter

articulates 'a social vision of the European project' and shows what links Europeans together from the normative point of view (Habermas 2001:21).

For him, the emergence of national consciousness involved a 'painful process of abstraction' from local and dynastic identities to national and democratic ones (Habermas 2001:16). 'Why', he asks, 'should the generation of a highly artificial kind' of solidarity 'among strangers' – not go beyond the national level, to a European level? (ibid) But though arbitrarily invented, EI does not have to rely on an arbitrary political-ethical will for its formation or hermeneutics of processes of self-understanding (therefore EI is also a 'self-understanding'). Since EI can be constructed, Europeans – through discussion in the public sphere – can decide which historical experiences they want to be included in their identity. Habermas proposes some 'candidates' for the historical grounding of EI.

The first possibility that he mentions – just to discard it as non-appropriate – is religion. Second, the European preference for politics over market and thence their trust in the civilising power of the state and its capacity to correct market failures. Third, the party system that 'only in Europe' serves an ideological competition that subjects 'the socio-pathological results of capitalist modernisation to an ongoing political evaluation'. Fourth, an anti-individualistic ethics of solidarity with the goal of equal provision for all. Fifth, a heightened sensitivity to personal and bodily integrity, after the experiences of

totalitarianism. Sixth, the domestication of state power through mutual limitation of sovereignty – both at the national and international level. And seventh, the assumption by Europeans of a reflexive distance from themselves to account for their former violence in colonising and bringing about modernisation to other parts of the world (Habermas 2003:295-7).

Habermas' notion of EI – from the subjective point of view – means 'feeling of common political belonging' and of the other citizens as being part of the same community ('one of us'). Elsewhere he speaks of 'an interest in and affective attachment to a particular ethos: in other words, the attraction of a specific way of life (Habermas 2001:8). EI engenders an abstract, civic solidarity among strangers, the citizens. From the objective point of view 'Europe' asserts itself in the face of its 'Other' today, the USA. In contrast<sup>11</sup>, Europe is peace-seeking, power-moderated, colonially reflective, market-controlling, religion-suspecting, and so on. Since EI is an artefact, it must be built with the participation of all citizens in the public sphere, and it must contain those historical aspects that they want to choose as 'common memory' (history), which seems to be another important element of EI. Habermas notion of EI is difficult to encapsulate in only one of the sections in this review, it could go in the social welfare, the political legal or even the post-modern or the historical, depending on the accent. I name it 'deliberative' because the centre of EI is in Habermas' view deliberation of civil society in the public sphere.

### *'Social' EI*

For Anthony Giddens the core of EI is the 'European Social Model'. EI must be a feeling of belonging to a community (Giddens 2007:277). On the objective side, he sees the EU as a community that is cosmopolitan, open. The members of this community share certain values and a purpose, a goal. Intra-European education and travel are important ways to promote this identity. The European community must have clear borders, ways to say which territories belong to Europe and which ones do not. There must be criteria to include some and exclude others from Europe, which does not mean that good relations should not be cultivated with all neighbours. He points out to the easiness with which nobody thinks of possible membership for countries in North-America with clear European links and background. In the same way, nobody doubts that Norway or Iceland could belong to the EU or question their being located in Europe. When it comes to defining those boundaries (in terms of possible members of the EU) Giddens recurs mainly to reasons of practicality and economic costs (2007:275-281).

He sees the rejection of the European Constitution by Dutch and French in social and economical causes: the EU is not growing as fast as the USA (even less when compared to China or India) and there is need for a European debate in order to strive for the combination of economic growth with high levels of social welfare after the example of the Nordic countries (Giddens 2007:294).

Again, the face of Europe, the object of identification, the source of legitimacy is an EU that achieves and offers the social model for its citizens (Giddens 2007:288).

Other aspects (but not as important as that one) are the fact that the EU is a new form of polity with trans-national governance (Giddens 2007:284); that the EU is not United States, Europeanness is not 'Americanness' (Giddens 2007:276); the EU as an association or community of semi-sovereign nations but is not 'post-national' as Habermas argues (Giddens 2007:272); he coincides with Weiler in considering the EU a construction that promotes virtues like tolerance and humanity (Giddens 2007:269). He sees EI emerging as a product from the Cold War in the contrast with, on the one hand, American liberalism, and on the other, Soviet communism (Giddens 2007:255). For him, the real problem with EI arose after 1989, with the expansion of the European Community eastward (ibid).

In Giddens's eyes the EU is a powerful source of democratising influence that promotes the rule of law and market economy; a protection for its citizens in the face of global threats; a way for collective (European) defence and reaction for conflicts elsewhere in the world; a leader in climate change policy; a more egalitarian balance of power between the member states (Giddens 2007:258). Purposes for the existence of the EU are: the (European) social model; the conservation within and promotion without of a zone of peace and European values

such as democracy, unity in diversity and solidarity (Giddens 2007:264). Again, it is difficult to reduce Giddens (or any other author) and his position to a defined label. Yet it is clear that for him subjective EI equates – as in the case of other authors – to a feeling of belonging. The object of EI, though, is strongly centred on what he understands as ‘the social model’.

### *‘International’ EI*

It may be difficult to find what a Czech and a Spaniard have in common. But it might be easier to say why the polity of sorts which they both belong to is distinct from the Republic of Zambia, the Central American Integration Region (SICA) or the Russian Federation. Ian Manners (2008) has coined a term to describe an (objective) identity for the European polity: the EU is ‘a normative power’ which promotes a series of substantive normative principles such as: ‘peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance’. The way in which the EU promotes those principles is by being ‘a living example’ – in virtue-ethics terms), ‘reasonable’ – in deontological terms and by ‘doing less harm’ – in consequentialist terms (Manners 2008:66). Thus he depicts a polity which is arguably attractive as an object of identification. That is how Europeans (would like to) see themselves and to be seen by others in the world stage.

The EU would be an example of ‘sustainable peace’

(Manners 2008:68-69) following the founders' inspiration to make war not only unthinkable, but 'materially impossible'. The EU promotes this not only by encouraging dialog as a path for conflict resolution but also by devoting military capacities to strengthen peace in close accordance with the United Nations (UN) Charter.

Its second principle is social freedom in a particular legal context, with the 'five freedoms' (Manners 2008:69-70) being those of persons, goods, services, capital and establishment. Through the Charter of Fundamental Rights and its accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the EU promotes freedom of thought, expression, assembly and association.

The EU is an example and promoter of 'consensual democracy' (Manners 2008:70) through proportional representation in the member states, and in the EU itself by power-sharing in the European Parliament. The EU has helped spread consensual democracy in Central and Eastern Europe as part of the transition and accession processes. 'The trinity of democracy, human rights and the rule of law' is to be consolidated and supported in the EU's external action (ibid).

The fourth principle is associative (individual and collective) human rights (Manners 2008:71). They are associative 'because they emphasize the interdependence between individual rights - for instance freedom of

expression – and group rights – such as freedom of religion or belief’. These associative human rights are indivisible from consensual democracy, supranational rule of law and social solidarity.

The ‘supranational rule of law’ principle (Manners 2008:71-72) is understood in three steps: intra-communitarian – through the *acquis* – international law – above and beyond the EU – and cosmopolitan – advancing the development and participation of the EU and its member states in humanitarian laws and rights applicable to individuals.

The seventh principle of ‘inclusive equality’ (Manners 2008:72-73) forbids ‘any discrimination based on any ground’. The principle of social solidarity seeks to foster a ‘balanced economic growth, social market economy, full employment, social inclusion, social justice and protection, intergenerational solidarity and social solidarity among and between member states and outside the Union contributing to solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade and the eradication of poverty’.

The eight principle – ‘sustainable development’ (Manners 2008:73-74) – seeks a balance between ‘uninhibited economic growth and biocentric ecological crisis’ in the environment, inside and outside the EU. Finally the last principle, ‘good governance’ (Manners 2008:74-75), emphasises ‘quality, representation, participation, social



partnership, transparency and accountability in the democratic life of the Union'. The two distinctive features of the EU's good governance are the participation of civil society and multilateral cooperation.

The EU is a normative power. Unlike 'the Axis of Ego' – United States, Russia and China – (Manners 2008:80), it possesses the ability to establish normative principles and apply them to different realities. It represents in foreign policy a step beyond the sole play of national or regional interests and anchored instead in ethics and universally accepted values and principles (ibid).

An identity based on the international image of the EU is certainly attractive as an impulse for unity. The principles Manners appeals to are ideals that few citizens and countries would oppose. It is in the details – cynics would point out – where the problems begin. The EU had a dubious role during the nineties in the Balkan wars. The 2003 Iraq war itself, taken sometimes as the icon distinguishing the US and the EU, is difficult to understand under a simplistic view. Not exactly all member states of the EU disagreed with United States. Several of them actually participated in the invasion (UK, Spain, Poland, Denmark...). The 'soft power' of Europe represented by French President Sarkozy, trying to set a fair agreement between Russia and Georgia in the aftermath of their war in 2008, achieved only modest results. Even after the creation of the position 'High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy' joint action remains difficult and

slow.

At any rate, this is another way to visualise EI. As in other cases, Manner's vision does not necessarily exclude others.

### *'Post-modern' EI*

Gerard Delanty has long been advocating for what he calls 'cosmopolitan identity' of Europe (see for example 1995). He defines EI against either a 'national Europe' or a 'global (i.e. international) Europe', as a 'cosmopolitan identity based on a cultural logic of self-transformation' rather than as a supranational identity (Delanty 2005:405). For him Europeanisation is not an exclusively institutional EU-led project, which produces a supranational identity in detriment of national identity. It is rather about bringing a transformation of statehood in Europe (2005:407). The EU is not a version of the nation-state writ large. Europeanisation is not a response to globalisation but its expression (2005:408). EI is a social reality, not an institutional construct or a legal-constitutional framework. Europe actually does have a 'cultural existence', though very weak in comparison to that of national identities. The nature of EI, argues Delanty, 'is one that in embracing diversity it cannot be a foundation for a cultural identity in the conventional sense of the term' (2005:409). Culture is viewed by him as 'a dynamic and creative process of imaginary signification' (ibid). Against Habermas' position (which in

this paper I have called 'deliberative'), Delanty argues that there is little evidence that people identify strongly with constitutional principles', that constitutional patriotism might be more German than European and that Habermas' vision of a post-national Europe is limited: too European (2005:412). Finally, for Delanty Habermas sees values in too minimal a sense, and signals to Weiler's claim for the recognition of the Judeo-Christian values as part of EI, as 'paradoxically' more tolerant than Habermas' option for pure secularism (Delanty 2005:413).

In his opinion modern cosmopolitanism (based on Kant), 'generally lacked a political dimension and in fact is indistinguishable from internationalism' (Delanty 2005:415). Instead he advocates for a cosmopolitanism beyond the nationalism v internationalism dichotomy, to a political project aimed at the transformation of loyalties and identities in a world of multiple modernities (2005:416). Cosmopolitanism is not a clearly defined but a contradictory, ambivalent and paradoxical project. For cosmopolitanism democracy loses priority to give way to a 'new notion of integration' within the European nations and also outside Europe. Cosmopolitanism is about 'the transformation of cultural and political subjectivities in the context of the encounter of the local or national with the global'. Europeanisation has more in common with cosmopolitanism than with 'something specific as a European People, a European society, a European Superstate, or a European heritage (Delanty 2005:417)<sup>12</sup>.

Finally, EI is 'a form of post-national self-understanding that expresses itself within, as much as beyond, national identities...The local-global nexus is often the site of major social transformation' (ibid). His cosmopolitan perspective 'entails a recognition of the transformative dimension of societal encounters'. Europeanisation is producing greater convergence 'but it is also consistent with plurality', because 'the integration of societies entails differentiation'. Yet greater convergence does not translate into more overall cohesion and for this reason 'Europeanisation is difficult to democratize' (Delanty 2005:418). In an apparent recognition of a post-modern atmosphere in Europe he explains that 'the loss of markers of certainty' has led to a 'more communicative logic' underpinned by 'new discursive spaces' (ibid). His idea of EI is that of a 'self-understanding' not rooted 'in a community of fate' or in the state or territory, but 'in a mode of recognition and discursive rationality that is decentred' and 'not uniquely European' (ibid). So an EI that is neither 'identity' nor 'European'.

In sum, the republican tradition based on the idea of civil society and democratic governance is 'limited when it comes to a movement such as Europeanization which is not based on a concrete people as such' (Delanty 2005:19). Because Europe lacks its 'People', democratisation is not the key to EI, which can be better described in terms of 'self-transformation rather than self-governance' (ibid). Cosmopolitanism would be more central to EI than republicanism, which as a political

philosophy 'assumes a certain unity to political community', whereas cosmopolitanism operates under the assumption of 'unity in terms of diversity' (ibid).

With these ideas Delanty tries to distance himself both from the cultural and deliberative perspectives. He also partially ignores the social and international ones.

### *Official use of EI in politics*

It can be useful to consider at least one of the official positions that the EU (when it was still the 'European Community')<sup>13</sup> has taken in the past. Attending to the way in which EI is used by politicians can give light as to the implicit meaning they are assuming. The 'Document on EI' was published by the foreign ministers of the then nine member states in December 1973), with the goal is to better define the relations of the members (of the 'European Communities') with 'other countries' and on the world stage. Even though nearly forty years have passed since, the document shows traits that would continue to appear whenever the topic of identity was addressed in the *acquis communautaire* – the 'mobile constitution' of the EU formed by its many treaties.

The Nine<sup>14</sup> had overcome 'their past enmities' and decided that unity was 'a basic European necessity', to ensure 'the survival of the civilization' they had 'in common' (Document on EI 1973: 1). They wished to ensure respect for the 'cherished values' of their legal, political and moral

orders while preserving 'the rich variety of their national cultures' (ibid). Fundamental elements of EI ('shared attitudes of life) were the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice (which was 'the ultimate goal of economic progress') and respect for human rights. Those principles corresponded to 'the deepest aspirations' of Europeans (from those nine nations at least) who should participate in their realisation especially 'through their elected representatives' (ibid).

The Nine reaffirmed their 'political will' to succeed in the construction of a united Europe and to transform their communities 'into a European Union' (Document on EI 1973: 2). EI's originality and dynamism come from the diversity of cultures 'within the framework of a common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe' (Document on EI 1973: 3).

In the international scene 'a very small number' of increasing powerful countries motivated 'Europe' to unite and speak increasingly 'with one voice' if it wanted to make itself heard and play its proper role in the world' (Document on EI 1973: 6). Likewise, Europe would never succeed in the essential aim to maintain peace if it neglected 'its own security'. Therefore the Nine agreed on accepting the presence of USA's nuclear weapons in the

continent since ‘in the presence circumstances there is no alternative’ (Document on EI 1973: 8) – a clear option for one of the two contending powers during the Cold War. The Document quickly clarifies that ‘European unification is not directed against anyone, nor inspired by a desire for power’, but rather to become ‘an element of equilibrium and a basis for cooperation with all countries ‘whatever their size, culture or social system’ (Document on EI 1973: 9)<sup>15</sup>, in accordance with ‘the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter’ (ibid). The Nine’s foreign policy would pursue that international relations have a more just basis, the independence and equality of States is better preserved, prosperity is more equitably shared and security of each country is more effectively guaranteed (ibid).

Interestingly, the Nine consider they share with the US ‘values and aspirations based on a common heritage’ and wish to maintain their constructive dialogue and continue their cooperation ‘in a spirit of friendship’ (Document on EI 1973: 14). In general all of the second part (‘European identity in relation to the world’) defines the future EU as a global actor and in its relations with USA, URSS, China, the Mediterranean, Latin America, Asia and the rest of Europe (Document on EI 1973: 9-21). There is therefore a strong charge of the international meaning of EI.

Finally, the Nine foresee that EI ‘will evolve in function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe’. By

undertaking the definition of their own identity in contrast to other countries or groups of countries, 'they will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy' (Document on EI 1973: 22).

### *Toward a concept of EI*

From the preceding analysis a few elements emerge which could get us closer to a synthetic notion of EI. It is clear, first of all, that EI can be approached from the perspective of the subject who experiences or possesses it, or from that of the object of that experience. *Subjective* EI is usually called 'identification', 'commonality', 'Europeanness', 'feeling of belonging'. The 'subject' is the collectivity of European citizens (or sometimes of member states). The subjective side of EI is therefore identification of the Europeans with Europe, but not at the individual level, rather at the collective level. Therefore subjective identity refers to a common denominator arguably present in all members of the collectivity, not the identity (or identities) of individuals. This is the subjective aspect of EI.

The *objective* aspect, the centre of identification, is the European polity. It has to do with what the EU is, or what image it projects, or what it is not. This aspect of EI will often translate into discussions about the future of European project, or its past, or its achievements, or the kind of polity the EU is, or its place in the world stage.



EI speaks of identification of subjects ('Europeans') with an object ('Europe'): but what kind of 'object'? Is it 'Europe' considered as society, culture, economy, art, landscape or polity? The list can be longer. The concept of EI does not necessarily have to be political. My research is about EI considered *only* from the political point of view: that is, *Europe the polity* as the object of identification. Even when I study culture, history, religion, international affairs, social way of life or any other aspect to explain EI, I take them exclusively inasmuch as they seem to matter so that Europeans will identify with Europe as a polity.

Another element that comes up from the analysis is that, however light, inclusive and 'politically correct' the definition, as long as we speak of 'European' identity something and someone will be in, something and someone will stay out of the concept. EI implies delimitation, definition. It does not imply extermination, discrimination or oppression of anyone not included in the concept of 'Europe' or 'European'. It is perfectly possible to establish a very close, inclusive and cordial relation with non-Europeans<sup>16</sup>. Otherwise everyone and anyone could be a 'European' – a sure way to rendering the term altogether meaningless. There is a definitory and intrinsic characteristic in EI, a limit that any identity implies. Only taking this into account Europeans can say what they are as a community, and therefore who is in or out. Definition does not have to mean essentialism either. This takes me to the next distinction.

EI has two chronological aspects: what has already passed, and the future, still to happen. The part of EI that looks back is Europe's collective memory, its history. The part that looks forward is the project, its future. Some argue for one view *in detriment* of the other. But that does not have to be that way. Past and future can well be part of EI. And so it could be with elements of other definitions.

It seems to me that the discussion about EI could be caricatured as a polemic about what makes a good dinner. One party might argue that what sets the tone to it are the appetizers: they define your whole attitude and experience from the start. A second party might say that the key is a savoury salad, because of its content and colours. A third party might passionately defend the place of the main course, which justly is called 'main' and at the end stands for what you really had for dinner – inside this position you might have a bitter dispute between sea-food, meat and poultry advocates. A fourth school might revive the element that has been omitted in every other study: the importance of desert. Still a fifth one might discard the first four as irrelevant and bring to attention the incomparable role of drinks in their different kinds either at the beginning, during or at the end of the meal.. A final group might argue for a less restrictive, non-judgemental (why speak about 'good' dinner?), non-exclusivist, less table-centred, post-culinary concept of dinner as a space of encounter of different opinions, attitudes and experiences regarding food, drinks and tastes... But, could

not it be that a good dinner depended on the combination of several of those elements, keeping a certain balance that has into account the importance and place of each and every (or nearly every) one of them?

From the positions analysed in the paper, I do not see why culture and democratic deliberation – Christianity and Enlightenment – could not both be part of EI. In the same way a ‘welfare polity’ can without conflict be also at a ‘soft (or normative) power’ in the world scene. Could not the uniqueness of Europe, its distinctive identity, reside on being a polity grounded on the inspiration of the rich (spiritual and ethical) values of the Biblical tradition, built with the participation of civil society (deliberation and democracy), maintaining a mixture and justice or ‘social-market economy’ for its society, playing a pacifying and civilising role in the international stage, and open up to a certain extent to multiplicity and difference?

### *What soul for Europe?*

In this last part I would like to submit the idea that EI has several elements if analysed from the perspectives suggested in the precedent section. Attending to its history, there is no doubt that both the Biblical tradition and the Enlightenment have a place in it and form part of its *culture*.

As a political *project* EI has a strong republican orientation which co-exists with the ‘market-only’ –

‘no-polity’ – position and still today continues to push in the direction of making the EU a democratic, representative, legitimate and participative polity.

Looking inwards, the polity EU may show that EI is strongly related today with the social aspect: prosperity and justice walking along together. Widespread economic improvement has always been a hallmark of the EU.

Looking outwards, EI has to do with how others perceive the EU or at least – and more important for our study – how Europeans would like to be perceived abroad. The ‘soft’ or ‘normative’ power comes into place here, a force for peace and prosperity in the world, a bulwark of international law and civilised coexistence; often loudly ‘a non-USA’, almost imperceptibly as well a ‘non-Russia’ and ‘non-China’. No matter how it is defined, Europeans know they are (or would like to see themselves as being) different in comparison with other countries and regions of the world.

The final element, that of openness to multiplicity, is also part of EI, but in my opinion it has limits. Its cosmopolitanism goes well with the times of globalisation, yet its consideration of democracy as secondary deserves at least careful examination – the alternative to democracy is elitism. What is more important, neither of the thinkers here analysed is suggesting, when advancing their proposals for EI, that the EU should not be open and diverse. Setting contours of a polity in order to define

it is actually not a hindrance for constructive, friendly and peaceful engagement with non-European citizens or non-EU countries and regions: rather, it is a prerequisite. Openness to multiplicity has to be nuanced. 'Europe' is not an equivalent of Planet Earth. Accordingly, its identity has to be much more modest and contain a degree of particularity (which, as we have seen above, has nothing to do with contempt for non-Europeans). An exercise of definition that blasts all the boundaries cannot be a 'de-finition' – etymologically 'a setting of limits').

Jewish Professor JHH Weiler makes a point to this respect regarding one of the elements of EI analysed here which could be deemed more polemic and exclusivist – that of the Christian past. His argument applies all the more to the rest of the elements. During the debate about the mention of God and or Christianity in the Preamble of the Constitutional Treaty, Weiler wonders if that could not compromise Europe's self-understanding as a society and polity built on tolerance and multiculturalism. Then he advances a concept of tolerance that could go well with our notion of EI:

What of our Muslim citizens? What of our Jewish citizens? Would they not feel excluded? (...) True tolerance – as that discipline of the soul which resists the tendency to coerce the other – can only exist against a basic affirmation or certain truths. And there is a contempt for the other, not respect, in an 'everything goes attitude'. How can I respect the identity of the other if I do not respect my own identity? And why would a Muslim or a Jew, as religious minorities, feel safe in a society which excludes from its identitarian icons recognition of its very religious identity? (...) People come to these

countries partly because of their tradition of tolerance; because in spite of their own traditions they can warmly welcome somebody who does not share in them. (Weiler 2006:8).

EI has given elements that should not be ignored. They allow the EU to set terms of the encounter and integration of its new immigrants and the states applying for membership. At the same time, EI will be as dynamic and changing as the citizens of Europe<sup>17</sup>. Stating clearly what defines Europeans today does not mean that such should be their configuration as a political community in the future. But ignoring fundamental traits of their identity will be of no help to Europeans themselves, immigrants or non-Europeans, as Weiler points out.

Before concluding I would like to bring to attention three ideas that need further research. First, in the discussion about EI I have *assumed* – not demonstrated – that a certain kind of cohesion<sup>18</sup> is required among the members of a polity in order to keep it together. There is debate as to *what* the source of cohesion can or should be, but not regarding the *need* for cohesion – something that appears for many as self-evident.

Second, the concept of EI seems to have room for several of the positions analysed. I have introduced those positions and hinted to the idea that they might be stressing different aspects of a wider common notion. I do not think it is difficult to *show* this but I have not done it here due to constraints of space. The ‘models’ or ‘positions’ on EI might be rather ‘aspects’ of it – at least up to a certain extent. The cultural aspect leaves the

question of how to organise the polity open, and therefore does not clash with the deliberative aspect, as long as the cultural aspect is not completely ignored or denied. What the international aspect sells to the world is its culture, its deliberative organisation and its successful combination of 'progress & justice'. The deliberative aspect cannot help relying on common memories, a shared 'political culture' and mention of 'the Axis of Ego' or alternative 'Others' in order to define EI. The 'post-modern' aspect, while privileging multiplicity, still advances the idea of a 'cultural heritage' for Europe.

Third and last, the concept of EI is definable and also evolving, given and dynamic. After all the collective EU – the *polis* – is composed of its citizens

– the *politai* – who themselves have a given past, preferences and allegiances, but also an open future towards which they evolve in varied ways. This dynamism is stressed in the 'post-modern' aspect of EI, and rightly so, as long as it does not override completely the given aspect. In this paper I have not expounded on 'the right balance', which I think could be developed departing from Beuchot's concept of 'analogical hermeneutics' (2004:33-44)<sup>19</sup>. A purely essentialist account of EI will be similar to an inert statue. But so will be an exaggerated emphasis on multiplicity: a post-identity, post-European conception of 'European identity' will advance little as a contribution to our quest.

In this paper I have tried to inquire about the factors that

keep a polity together despite the diversity of its members. With that purpose I have explained five positions on EI. Then I have proposed a synthesis and suggested that the five positions to a certain extent present aspects – not necessarily in contradiction with the rest – of the same concept. Finally I have outlined three issues about EI that due to constraints of space have been only indicated but require further research.

## References

- 'Declaration on European Identity' (1973) *Bulletin of the European Communities* No 12, December 1973:118-122. Viewed 30 April 2010: [http://www.ena.lu/declaration\\_european\\_identity\\_copenhague\\_14\\_décembre\\_1973-2-6180](http://www.ena.lu/declaration_european_identity_copenhague_14_décembre_1973-2-6180)
- Antonsich, Marco. "The Narration of Europe in 'National' and 'Post-national' Terms: Gauging the Gap between Normative Discourses and People's Views." *European Journal of Social Theory* 2008; 11 (4): 505-522
- Aristotle (2009) *Politics* (translation by Ernest Barker) Oxford University Press. Reissued from the 1995 version
- Bellamy, Richard (2006) 'The Challenge of European Union', in John Dryzek, Anne Phillips and Bonnie Honig (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*, OUP, pp. 245-61
- Bellamy, Richard (2008) 'The Challenge of European Union', in John Dryzek, Anne Phillips and Bonnie Honig (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*, OUP, pp. 245-61
- Beuchot, Mauricio (2004) *Hermenéutica, analogía y símbolo* Herder, México
- Beuchot, Mauricio (2005) *Interculturalidad y derechos humanos* Siglo XXI, México
- Delanty, Gerard (1995) 'The limits and possibilities of a European identity: A critique of cultural essentialism' *Philosophy Social Criticism* 1995; 21; 15



- Delanty, Gerard (2002) "Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism". *Perspectives on European Policies and Society*. 3 (3) 2002: 345-359.
- Delanty, Gerard (2005) 'The Idea of a Cosmopolitan Europe: on the Cultural Significance of Europeanization' *International Review of Sociology - Revue Internationale de Sociologie* Vol. 15, No. 3, November 2005:405-421
- Delanty, Gerard (2010) 'The European Heritage from a Critical Cosmopolitan Perspective, LSE "Europe in Question" Discussion Paper Series No. 19.
- Giddens, Anthony. "Europa en la era global". (Translated from English into Spanish by Albino Santos Mosquera.) Paidós, Barcelona 2007.
- Habermas, J & Derrida, J (2003) 'February 15, or what binds Europeans together: a plea for a common foreign policy, beginning in the core of Europe' *Constellations* Vol. 10, No. 3
- Habermas, Jürgen (2001) 'Why Europe Needs a Constitution' *New Left Review* 11, Sep-Oct 2001:5-26
- Habermas, Jürgen (2006) 'Religion in the Public Sphere' *European Journal of Philosophy*' Vol. 14, Issue 1, pp. 1-25
- Hurrelmann, Achim (2005) 'Political Globalization, Social Integration, and Four Models of Supranational Political Community' Paper Prepared for the Conference *Supranational Political Community: Substance? Conditions? Pitfalls?* University of Victoria, 30 September - 2 October
- Jenkins, Philip (2006) 'Demographics, Religion, and the Future of Europe', *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer 2006) Manners, Ian (2008) 'The Normative Ethics of the European Union' *International Affairs* 84: I (2008) 65-80
- Clare Murphy (2006) 'The EU's baby blues. Birth rates in the European Union are falling fast.' BBC News (Europe Section). Monday 27 March, 6:44 UK time. Accessed April 2010:  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4768644.stm>
- Prodi, Romano (2000) *Europe as I see it* (Translated by Allan Cameron) Polity Press
- Ratzinger, J & Pera, M (2006) *Without Roots: The West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam* (Translated from the

Italian by Michael F Moore) Basic Books, New York  
Ratzinger, Joseph (2005) 'Europe's Crisis of Cultures',  
Translation of the lecture given in Italian by  
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, now Benedict XVI, in the  
convent of Saint Scholastica in Subiaco, Italy, on 2  
April 2005. Accessed 30 April 2010:

<http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/politics/pg0143.html>  
Ratzinger, Joseph (2007) *Europe Today and Tomorrow. Addressing the Fundamental Issues*. Ignatius Press, San Francisco

Vatican Information Service (2010) 'New Edition of the Statistical Yearbook of the Church', *Latest 5 news*, 27 April, viewed 29 April,  
<http://visnews-en.blogspot.com/2010/04/new-edition-of-statistical-yearbook-of-27.html>

Walkenhorst, Heiko (2009) 'The Conceptual Spectrum of European Identity

– from Missing Link to Unnecessary Evil' *Limerick Papers in Politics and Public Administration* 2009, No. 3, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Limerick, Ireland

Weiler, JHH (2002) *The Constitution of Europe. "Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?" and Other Essays on European Integration*. Cambridge University Press 1999, second reprint.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> I wholeheartedly thank very good observations, advices, discussions and/or constructive disagreements from colleagues and friends, especially John Besemeres, Marilu Costa, Christian Wicke, Nina Markovic, Conny Heidt, Guy Emerson, Saskia Hufnagel, Simon Bronitt, Julie Thorpe, Karis Müller, Ben Wellings, Klaus Klaiber, Dora Horvath, Bruce Kent, Ivana Damjanović and Matthew Zagor. Still, any shortcomings in this article are only mine.

<sup>2</sup> Emphasis added.

<sup>3</sup> Obviously, in the absence of a coercive force.

<sup>4</sup> This will show that authors are not easily classifiable in theoretical shelves: they all could be in several categories, though fall mainly into one of them.

<sup>5</sup> The wording is mine to distinguish a moderate kind of secularism (which I call simply 'secularism') from a militant version – typical of some 'Latin' countries with France as the prototype – which becomes an equivalent to fundamentalism in religion. 'Laicism' refers in this paper to the second kind. Prominent secularists and atheists such as Jürgen Habermas (see Habermas 2006) or Marcello Pera (see

Ratzinger & Pera 2006), for instance, do not belong to this kind. As a curiosity, in 'transplanted Europe' beyond the Atlantic (America) two neighbours exemplify either kind of secularism: mostly moderate in the US, mostly laicist in Mexico.

<sup>6</sup> Of intercourse between religion and secularism.

<sup>7</sup> Elsewhere (Ratzinger 2005) he points out to the Decalogue in the Bible as the origin of those values. 'The Muslims', he says, 'who in this respect are often and willingly brought in' (the discussion about mentioning God in the European Constitution) 'do not feel threatened by our Christian moral foundations, but by the cynicism of a secularized culture that denies its own foundations. Neither are our Jewish fellow citizens offended by the reference to the Christian roots of Europe, in as much as these roots go back to Mount Sinai: They bear the sign of the voice that made itself heard on the mountain of God and unite with us in the great fundamental orientations that the Decalogue has given humanity'.

<sup>8</sup> See Murphy (2006) for insights on the phenomenon of fast-falling birth rates in Europe. The population replacement level is 2.1 children per woman. The countries mentioned above have rates lower than that.

<sup>9</sup> See for instance Tomlinson & Maclennan (cited by Walkenhorst 2009:11), or Delanty (2002:348)

<sup>10</sup> I myself have not found one in recent (say XXI Century) peer-reviewed academic literature

<sup>11</sup> Much easier to make during the Bush than during the Obama years

<sup>12</sup> However he will speak elsewhere (Delanty 2010:15) about a 'cosmopolitan cultural heritage'.

<sup>13</sup> Or rather 'communities': the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom).

<sup>14</sup> France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, UK

<sup>15</sup> This element presupposes a very interesting possibility: that of having an identity as a European polity, without by that implying exclusion in an absolute way with all countries and regions of the world, something that has become a reality as the EU has undertaken joint projects of cooperation in practically every continent.

<sup>16</sup> Could there be a better relation than the one Europeans have with (just to give a few examples) Canadians, Americans, Australians or Argentinians? None of them expects to be called 'European' or feels discriminated against if s/he is not.

<sup>17</sup> An EI that will keep the European polity together today is different to the one in 2100, for example, when according to Professor Philip Jenkins (2006:533) Europe could have 'a Muslim population of around 25 percent'.

<sup>18</sup> Which I have equated with 'identity'.

<sup>19</sup> Which could also bring light on how to achieve social integration of culturally-different immigrants in Europe through his idea of 'interculturality', which is an application of the same notion – analogical hermeneutics – to the problem of cultural diversity in a polity (Beuchot 2005:33-44).