WHEN WISDOM CALLS

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Philosophical Protreptic in Antiquity

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BREPOLS

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IMPERIAL ROME

PROTREPTIC AND APOTREPTIC: ARISTOTLE'S DIALOGUE *PROTREPTICUS*

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This paper has three major aims. The first is to defend the hypothesis that Aristotle's lost work *Protrepticus* was a dialogue.[1] The second is to explore the genres of ancient apotreptics, speeches that argue against doing philosophy and show the need for protreptic responses; our exploration is guided by Aristotle's own analysis of apotreptics as well as protreptics in his *Rhetorica*. The third aim is to restore to the evidence base of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* an apotreptic speech that argues against doing Academic philosophy, evidence that was incorrectly excluded by Ingemar Düring in 1961.

In part 1, we briefly review some classic examples of apotreptic speeches against philosophy found in Plato, Isocrates, and other authors.

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[1]   We reject the commonly held assumption that the work was a monological 'oratorical letter', as it had been interpreted by Emil Heitz, *Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1865); Rudolf Hirzel, 'Über den *Protreptikos* des Aristoteles', *Hermes*, 10 (1876), 61–100; Werner Jaeger, *Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* (1st ed. Berlin 1923; 2nd ed. 1955; English translation: *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the history of his development* by R. Robinson. Oxford University Press, 1948, 2nd ed., 1961); and Ingemar Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction* (Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1961). Instead we return to the interpretation of Jacob Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältnis an seinen übrigen Werken* (Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1863), pp. 116–22. According to Bernays, the work was probably a dialogue containing adversarial speeches. This was also the view of Ingram Bywater, 'On a lost dialogue of Aristotle', *The Journal of Philology*, 2 (1869), 55–69; Hermann Usener, 'Vergessenes', *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, 28 (1873), 392–403; Hermann Diels, 'Zu Aristoteles' *Protreptikos* und Cicero's Hortensius', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1 (1888), 447–97. That the work was a dialogue is also presupposed in the fragment collections of Valentin Rose, *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1886); Richard Walzer, *Aristotelis dialogorum fragmenta* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1934); and William David Ross, *Select Fragments* = vol. xii of *The Works of Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952) and *Aristotelis fragmenta selecta* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955).

In part 2, we define the genres of protreptic and apotreptic speech according to the extensive account Aristotle gives in *Rhetorica* I. We also discuss some apotreptic arguments that appear in the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. In part 3, we discuss the reports by Alexander of Aphrodisias and other commentators about Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, and interpret them as indicating the presence of apotreptic argumentation as well as protreptic responses in that work. We find that the hypothesis that Aristotle's *Protrepticus* was a dialogue best accounts for this reported evidence. In part 4, we argue that the dialogue hypothesis also best accounts for some reported evidence about Cicero's *Hortensius*, a dialogue that definitely contained an apotreptic against philosophy (and its refutation) and that reportedly was modeled on Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. In part 5, we present an excerpt from an Isocratean apotreptic against Academic philosophy, an excerpt first attributed to Aristotle's *Protrepticus* in the late 19th century. We provide a range of arguments to authenticate the attribution of this material to the lost work of Aristotle and to identify the speaker as 'Isocrates', a character in Aristotle's dialogue. This apotreptic speech stimulated the other characters to offer a network of protreptic responses, of which we select two for particular study.

In our reconstruction, we identify several different adversarial speeches that were written so as to resemble the voices of at least three different characters who were also themselves authors:[2] Aristotle himself, and two of his literary rivals, Isocrates of Athens[3] and Heraclides of Pontus.[4] Aristotle innovated the dialogue genre by writing for himself

[2]   See D. S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson, '*Aristotle*, Protrepticus: *citations, fragments, paraphrases, and other evidence*' (unpublished manuscript 1; available for download at www.protrepticus.info). Our reconstruction proposes at least three characters, including Isocrates of Athens, Heraclides of Pontus, and Aristotle of Stagira, debating in front of an audience of youths.

[3]   We expand on the suggestion of Donald James Allan, according to which 'Aristotle may easily have supposed himself addressing the royal personage, to whom the work is inscribed, in rivalry with a representative of the Isocratean school, who would maintain that a mathematical and scientific training such as the Platonist's offer is useless for practical life' ('Fragmenta Aristotelica', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 3 (1953), 248–52, at 250). This is to us more plausible than Hermann Langerbeck's suggestion that the speakers were Plato and an Athenian politician, in his review of 'D. J. Allan, *The philosophy of Aristotle*', *Gnomon*, 26 (1954), 1–8, at 4; on the other hand, if the speakers were two Academic philosophers and a writer prominent in Athenian political affairs, Langerbeck's suggestion enjoyed some version of the truth.

[4]   This is not the best occasion to develop and defend our views about Heraclides of Pontus, but for the sake of completeness we give an outline account of our identification of this speaker. The arguments in favour of philosophy in *Protrepticus* VI–XII must be the work of two speakers, not just one, because one of the speakers reaches a final

the leading role in his *Protrepticus*, but he also incorporated into his rivals' speeches certain ideas and arguments congenial to his philosophy and to his overarching thesis: one should do philosophy. In this paper we study Isocrates' apotreptic and Aristotle's protreptic response to it.

Classical examples of apotreptic speeches against philosophy

An anonymous but hilarious apotreptic to philosophy has been partially preserved on Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 3659.

> But they don't agree at all on that; no, even silver – and yet what could be whiter than silver?! – no, despite this, Thrasyalkes says it's black! So then, when even the whiteness of silver is on the doubtful side, why be amazed if people who are deliberating have their disagreements over war and peace, over alliance and revenues and disbursements and the like? And what about the philosophers themselves? If you confined them together in the same house and an equal number of madmen in another house next door, you would get much, much greater howls from the philosophers than from the madmen! In fact, this one, this Antisthenes here, says he would rather feel madness than pleasure; but Aristippus…[5]

We do not know the author or work from which this tantalizing fragment derives. It is possible, perhaps likely, that it was originally imbedded in a protreptic dialogue, which naturally would have contained a refutation of the argument.[6] In any case, the speech presents an example of what we

rhetorical climax in ch. VIII and, as we demonstrated (D. S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson, « Authenticating Aristotle's *Protrepticus* », *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 29 (2005), 193–294), the citations made by Iamblichus mirror the order of those passages in the original; this second speaker is a Pythagorean thinker, to judge from many details in his ch. VIII speech; this Pythagorean philosopher is the contemporary author Heraclides of Pontus, whose story about Pythagoras calling himself a philosopher while conversing with Leon of Phlius, told in his dialogue *The Woman not Breathing*, is referred to and incorporated in the speech of Aristotle in ch. IX, as is seen both in the title of the chapter (Iambl., *Protr.*, 4,9–13) and in certain details of the speech itself (IX, 51,6–15).

5   *P.Oxy.* 3659, ed. Helen Cockle, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* LII, 59–62 (London: British Academy, 1984), column I, lines 3–13. All translations are ours, unless otherwise noted.

6   We collect this, together with other papyrus evidence, in our reconstruction of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, because its themes resonate in other fragments of the lost work; Lucian's 'howling philosopher' at *Hermot.* 11 (a work consisting of apotreptics to phi-

will call a general apotreptic against philosophy: the intent of the speaker seems to be to discourage everyone at all times from practicing philosophy in any way whatsoever. The reasons given are that philosophers always dispute everything and so can never reach agreement on anything; as a result they are worse than useless and actually harmful, since they prevent agreement from being reached on such pressing public and practical issues as war and peace, alliances, revenues and disbursements.

Another example of a general apotreptic against philosophy is again preserved only as a fragment; in this case a letter from Cornelius Nepos to his friend Cicero.

> I am so far from thinking philosophy the teacher of life and perfecter of bliss that I think no one needs teachers of living more than those who discuss the topic so busily. Of all those who give such shrewd advice in school on modesty and self-control I see the majority living on their passions, living in lust.[7]

Nepos' apotreptic expresses a second theme of classical apotreptic: the hypocrisy of philosophers, who follow none of their own teachings about how to live. The fragment is preserved in Book III of Lactantius *Divine Institutes*, a book entitled *False Wisdom*: this is the most complete and best preserved apotreptic against philosophy to survive from antiquity. Lactantius preserves several otherwise unattested fragments from Cicero's dialogue *Hortensius*, a work in which Cicero represented apotreptic arguments against philosophy in the voice of Hortensius, a leading orator. Cicero then refuted those arguments, either in the voice of Catulus, or in a character named after himself – Cicero. Lactantius naturally omitted these responses in compiling his general apotreptic to philosophy.

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losophy) seems to allude to this passage; the mention of the obscure Thrasyalkes of Thasos (otherwise unknown except as the proponent of a theory favoured by Aristotle of the flooding of the Nile) would otherwise be difficult to explain; and the ironic humour of the thought experiment (would philosophers or madmen make more noise, if the same number of them were confined to a house?) is typical of Aristotle's style as a comic writer. These considerations make its attribution attractive but not certain. At least one other fragment of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* has been preserved on papyrus: *P.Oxy.* 666 (= fragment 3 Ross, *Aristotelis fragmenta selecta*). The arguments of *P.Oxy.* 666 are fruitfully compared to Isocrates' views by Tarik Wareh, *The Theory and Practice of Life: Isocrates and the Philosophers* (Cambridge, Mass.–London: Harvard University Press, 2012), notes 86–88.

7   Cornelius Nepos in a letter to Cicero, *apud* Lactant., *Div. inst.* III.10 (= Cic. *Ep.* fr. 1, VIIB, p. 31 Weyssenhof), translated by Anthony Bowen and Peter Garnsey, Lactantius: *Divine Institutes* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003), p. 194.

Plato inventively incorporated both apotreptic and protreptic speeches in his own dialogues, such as *Protagoras*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, and *Republic*. In the Hellenistic age, the *Euthydemus* was subtitled *protreptic*, even though it explicitly embeds both apotreptic and protreptic speeches in its dialogue construction. The Platonic *Clitophon* is a pseudo-dialogue, designed to drive home the important philosophical point that mere protreptic speech is not enough.[8] Perhaps the best known apotreptic against philosophy is the speech of Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias* at 484c4–486d1. The speech is meant to serve as a major example of the power of rhetoric, and thus as a defense of its practice. Hence it is extremely polished, incorporates numerous maxims and quotations from poets, and employs very complex balanced clauses in an unmistakably ornate style meant to imitate the style of Gorgias himself. It begins as follows:

> Such then is the truth of the matter, and you will be convinced of it if at length you let go of your philosophy and pass on to higher things. For to be sure, Socrates, philosophy is a pretty thing enough, if only a man apply himself to it to a moderate extent at the proper age; but if he goes on spending his time upon it too long, it is the ruin of a man. For if he will be ever so clever and yet carries these studies far on into life he must turn out ignorant of everything that one who would be an accomplished and eminent citizen should be conversant with. For in fact people of this kind show themselves ignorant of the laws of their own cities, and of all that a human being ought to say in his ordinary dealings with the world, public or private, and of human pleasures and desires, and in short quite unacquainted with the varieties of human character. Accordingly when they come to undertake any private or public business they make themselves ridiculous – just as no doubt the politicians do when they take part in your occupations and discussions.[9]

We call this kind of apotreptic a specific apotreptic because, unlike the previous examples, the apotreptic of Callicles aims to discourage only a certain way of doing philosophy, and actually includes a protreptic encouragement to a different way of doing philosophy. Callicles argues that one should do philosophy, but only at a certain age and to a moderate extent. If it is pursued beyond moderation and into adulthood, it

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[8]   On the *Clitophon* and its place in 4th c. rhetoric, the indispensable resource is Simon Roelof Slings, *Clitophon* (Cambridge-New York-Melbourne *et alibi*: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[9]   Pl., *Grg.* 484c4-e3, translated by Edward Meredith Cope, *Plato's Gorgias: literally translated* (Cambridge: Deighton, Bell and Co., 1864).

trades off with the cultivation of more useful skills, like doing public or private business, the work of lawyers, orators, and politicians. This then introduces a third and a fourth great theme of apotreptics against philosophy: that philosophy is appropriate only for the training of the young, and doing philosophy later detracts from the cultivation of other important skills and activities. 'Philosophy it is well to cultivate just so far as it serves for education, and it is no disgrace for a lad to study it: but when a man already advanced in life still goes on with it, the thing, Socrates, becomes ridiculous,' says Callicles.[10] This remains an unfortunately familiar apotreptic trope, as when students are advised by their parents to take a philosophy course or two but to avoid majoring in philosophy and getting distracted from preparation for a 'real' profession.

The subsequent arguments in this apotreptic expand on these themes by applying them to the case of Socrates explicitly. Callicles threatens adult philosophers with punishment: 'one advanced in life still doing philosophy, and unable to set it aside … Socrates, seems to me to want flogging. For as I said just now a man like that, clever as he may be, cannot fail to become unmanly by avoiding the centers of the city and the market-places which, as the poet said, are the places where men acquire distinction; his fate is to skulk in a corner and pass the rest of his life whispering with three or four lads, and never give utterance to any free and liberal and great and generous statement'.[11] This seems addressed to Socrates, who brings it back to his mind at *Theaetetus* 172b–177b, in his speech he calls a 'digression'. We know that Socrates in fact did spend all his time in the centers of the city and the market-places, and that he furthermore gave utterance to the most free, liberal, great, and generous statements. (At least this is the image of Socrates that Plato presents us with.) On the other hand, Callicles ominously foreshadows Socrates' eventual fate and performance in court, and suggests that similar fates await those who get too deep into philosophy:

> Don't you think it a shame for a man to be in the condition, which I consider you to be in, together with all those who are constantly going deeper and deeper into philosophy? For as it is, if a man were to arrest you or any one else of those like you and drag you off to prison charging you with some crime of which you were entirely innocent, you know very well that you wouldn't know what to do with yourself, but there you would stand with your head swimming and your mouth open not

[10] Pl., *Grg.* 485a, tr. Cope.

[11] Pl., *Grg.* 485d-e, tr. Cope.

knowing what to say; and when you were brought up before the court, however contemptible and wretched your accuser might be, you would be condemned to die if he chose to lay the penalty at death.[12]

After these extremely personal applications of the general line of apotreptic argument, Callicles summarizes his position in the following imperative: "'cultivate the accomplishment" of business, and cultivate what will gain you the reputation of good sense; leave to others these overnice frivolities or nonsense or whatever else they should be called, "which will end in your dwelling in an empty and desolate house"; and emulate, not men who waste their time in trivial debates, but those whose portion is wealth and fame and many other good things'.[13]

Isocrates of Athens, who was a rival of Plato's, having set up a successful school advertising to teach philosophy long before the establishment of the Academy, seems to have alluded to and adapted Callicles' apotreptic to philosophy in his late work *Antidosis* (353/2 BCE), in which he stated and defended his own educational ideals.[14] Like Callicles' apotreptic, Isocrates presents a specific apotreptic, which also includes a protreptic to doing philosophy at a young age. But his target is quite different. He is attacking the theoretical and mathematical conception of philosophy that was being developed and pursued in the Academy: 'I think the leaders in the eristic speeches and those who teach astronomy, geometry, and other branches of mathematics do not harm but rather benefit their students, less than they promise but more than others think'.[15] In so doing, Isocrates mixes in a protreptic to doing mathematical philosophy at a young age with his apotreptic against doing theoretical philosophy later in life. He admits that his position seems 'somewhat contradictory', but he clarifies that this appearance is due to the fact that theoretical studies differ from other skills in being useful only in training the mind, but completely lacking in intrinsic value, and absolutely worthless later in life. For this reason, he actually refuses to call these subjects philosophy:

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[12] Pl., *Grg.* 486a-b, tr. Cope.

[13] Pl., *Grg.* 486c, tr. Cope.

[14] It is interesting to remark that one of Isocrates' earliest works (late 390s BCE), the advertisement for his new school of higher education called *Against the Sophists*, also has an apotreptic/protreptic structure; after criticizing the 'sophists' (by which Isocrates includes certain Socratic teachers) and repelling his readers from their education (1–13), he praises his own approach to attract them to his school (14–22).

[15] Isoc., *Antid.* 261, translated by Yun Lee Too in David C. Mirhady, and Yun Lee Too, *Isocrates* I (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000).

> I don't think we should call what does not at present benefit our ability to speak or act 'philosophy'. Instead, I call such activity a 'mental gymnastics' and a 'preparation for philosophy' – a more mature subject than what children learn in schools but for the most part similar. When children have worked hard at grammar, music, and the rest of education, they have not yet made progress in speaking better or in deliberating on public affairs, although they have become better prepared to learn the greater and more serious subjects.[16]

Here Isocrates expresses another great theme of apotreptic: the denial that certain parts of philosophy deserve to be called philosophy. And here again we find a depressingly familiar trope of apotreptic: the argument, still heard in the context of hiring deliberations, that some part or specialization of philosophy should not actually be considered philosophy; we have heard such arguments against history of philosophy, analytical philosophy, continental philosophy, non-western philosophy, etc. In his own context, Isocrates cleverly deploys the trope of the incoherence of philosophers: 'of whom one said the number of elements is infinite; Empedocles, that it is four, ... Ion, that it is not more than three; Alcmaeon, that it is only two; Parmenides and Melissus, that it is one; and Gorgias, that it is nothing at all. I think that such quibblings resemble wonder-workings, which provide no benefit but attract crowds of the ignorant. Those wishing to do something useful must rid all their activities of pointless discourse and irrelevant action'.[17] Thus Isocrates' speech contains almost all the classical tropes of apotreptic: the argument from incoherence, the argument from trading off with more important studies and activities, the specific apotreptic against immoderate philosophy done beyond a certain age, and the apotreptic against some specific kind of philosophy as not being real philosophy.

Aristotle's definition of apotreptic speech and examples of it in the *Corpus Aristotelicum*

Let us now turn to Aristotle. There seems to be a consensus that the *Protrepticus* was written in the late 350s, in Athens, as a direct reply to

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
[16] Isoc., *Antid.* 266–267, tr. Too.
[17] Isoc., *Antid.* 268–269, tr. Too.

Isocrates' *Antidosis*.[18] Isocrates had said that 'it is not about small things, either the argument or the judgment in which we are engaged, rather it is about the greatest things; for you are going to cast a vote not about me alone, but also about an occupation to which many of the younger men are applying their mind'.[19] Aristotle treated this as an attack on philosophy in general, and paraphrased the argument this way: 'You are going to judge not about Isocrates but about an occupation, whether one must do philosophy' (*Rhetorica* 1399b10–11). We contend that earlier scholars were correct in considering Aristotle's *Protrepticus* to be a dialogue, and specifically D. J. Allan was correct to assert that in the work Isocrates (or one of his students, he suggested) was portrayed as delivering an apotreptic against Academic mathematical and theoretical philosophy, so that it could in turn be refuted by one or more protreptics to Academic philosophy.[20]

But before presenting that apotreptic speech and Aristotle's protreptic responses to it, let us consider Aristotle's account of apotreptic speech in general. Although it is overlooked,[21] Aristotle provides a direct analy-

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[18]   The suggestion that the *Protrepticus* was written in response to Isocrates *Antidosis* was argued in 1923 by Jaeger, *Aristotle*, and then defended in 1936 by two scholars working independently, Ettore Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, 2 vols (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1936); and Benedict Einarson, 'Aristotle's *Protrepticus* and the structure of the *Epinomis*', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, 67 (1936), 261–85. According to *The Cambridge Ancient History*, 'Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, or *Exhortation to Philosophy*, may be read as a challenge' to Isocrates. It offers its readers 'a vision of *paideia* and the philosophical life different from that presented by Isocrates in his *Antidosis* of 353 by emphasizing the primacy of the "theoretical" over the "active" life, the possibility of precise knowledge about human values analogous to mathematical knowledge, and the pleasure of devoting one's energy and life to intellection (*phronesis*)' (M. Ostwald and John P. Lynch 'The Growth of Schools and the Advance of Knowledge' = Ch. 12a of *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume 6, The Fourth Century* BC. 2nd ed. D. M. Lewis, John Boardman, Simon Hornblower, M. Ostwald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 592–633, at 619). We have argued for this in detail on the basis of a comparison of several works of Isocrates with the fragments of the *Protrepticus* in our unpublished essay 'The *Antidosis* of Isocrates and Aristotle's *Proptepticus*' (available at www.protrepticus.info). See also Wareh, *The Theory and Practice of Life: Isocrates and the Philosophers*; and James Henderson Collins, *Exhortations to Philosophy: The Protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle* (Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[19]   Isoc., *Antid.* 173.

[20]   See footnote 3.

[21]   The significance of this extensive description of protreptic rhetoric has been neglected by most interpreters of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, who have tended to focus on the parallels (or apparent differences) with respect to doctrines expressed in the *Ethica* and *Politica* and *Metaphysica*. A refreshing exception is Sophie Van der Meeren, *Exhortation à la philosophie. Le dossier grec: Aristote* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2011), pp. 44–54. This neglect is unfortunate because there is good reason to believe that the part of the *Rhetoric* on protreptic and apotreptic was written relatively early, around the same period

sis of protreptic speech, and discusses the tropes that those authors who devise protreptic speeches should employ in *Rhetorica* I.4–7. He begins by defining both protreptic and apotreptic as species of deliberative speech. 'Deliberative speech concerns on the one hand *protreptic* and on the other hand *apotreptic*: for both those who give counsel in private and those who address assemblies in public always produce one or the other of these'.[22] In the paradigm case, a protreptic speech is addressed to members of a public deliberative assembly, addressing whether to pursue some course of action, for example going to war or not. Aristotle says that the 'most important subjects ... on which people give deliberative speeches are ... finances, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and the framing of laws'.[23]

Aristotle's *Protrepticus* was not directly focused on any of these geopolitical or economic issues, although the suggestion that philosophy can resolve such issues was made in response to the claim that philosophers contribute nothing to practical affairs.[24] But the fact that protreptic speech can be made on a more specific and individualized basis is made clear when Aristotle mentions 'those who give private counsel'.[25] Aristotle's *Protrepticus* was addressed to a certain individual named Themison, but at the same time was widely circulated as a public and published document – so widely in fact that it continued to be read aloud in public after the author's death, according to a selection cited in Stobaeus, a report that describes the Cynic Crates reading it to a shoe-

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as the *Protrepticus* (the mid 350s). According to George Alexander Kennedy, chapters 5–15 of Book I of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* form its 'early core', but were probably also revised later (*Aristotle, On Rhetoric: a theory of Civic Discourse*, second ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 56). Commentators on the *Rhetoric* (including Kennedy) have ignored the *Protrepticus*, focusing instead on the *Gryllus*, another lost exoteric work that apparently contained both a specimen of rhetoric and some rhetorical theory.

[22]   Arist., *Rh.* I.3.1358b8–10.

[23]   Arist., *Rh.* I.4.1359b18–23.

[24]   Aristotle, in passages from his *Protrepticus* cited in Iambl., *De communi mathematica Scientia* (abbreviated *DCMS*) XXII.69.4–22, edited by Nicola Festa, *Iamblichi de communi mathematica scienta liber ad fidem codicis florentini* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1891, revised by Ulrich Klein, Stuttgart: Teubner, 1975), and in Iambl., *Protr*. X.54.12–56.12, seems to answer this apotreptic against philosophy: rather than distracting us from more important issues like 'war and peace, etc.' (the objection found in *P.Oxy*. 3659), philosophical intelligence actually advances clear thinking about war and peace and public affairs generally.

[25]   Arist., *Rh.* I.3.1358b9.

maker in Athens.[26] So the *Protrepticus* itself can be interpreted both in its immediate context as a kind of private counsel, but also as a wider, more popular protreptic to philosophy. In any case, the guidelines for protreptic speech given in the *Rhetorica* apply to it.

The first guideline of the *Rhetorica* concerns the time frame with which deliberative speech is concerned: the future is what is of concern to the deliberative speaker: 'for it is concerning the things that will be that he offers counsel in offering either protreptic or apotreptic'.[27] The second guideline concerns the end of deliberative speech: 'it is the advantageous and disadvantageous. For the one offering *protreptic* offers counsel on the basis that a proposal is better, and the one offering *apotreptic* offers counsel on the basis that it is worse, but the other things (whether just or unjust; whether beautiful or shameful) are taken up as adjuncts in relation to this'.[28] The reason that Aristotle can offer a unified account of both protreptic and apotreptic rhetoric, whether for private or public settings, is that all deliberative speech ultimately aims at the exact same end: εὐδαιμονία.[29] Aristotle accordingly provides an analysis of the constituents of εὐδαιμονία, or rather of things that audiences may be expected to consider its constituents.[30] Aristotle does not in the *Rhetorica*, as he does in the *Ethica Nicomachea*, point out that philosophers

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[26]   Stobaeus excerpted the following passage from the *Epitome* of the Cynic Teles: 'Zeno said that Crates, while sitting in a shoemaker's workshop, read the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* which he wrote to Themison (the king of Cyprus), saying that no one has more good things going for him to help him do philosophy since, as he has great wealth, he can spend it on these things, and he has a reputation as well. He said that when Crates was reading, the shoemaker was paying attention while stitching, and Crates said, "I think I should write a *Protrepticus* to you, Philiscus, for I know you've got more going for you to help you do philosophy than the fellow Aristotle wrote to"' (*Flor.* IV.32.21 = 785.1–26 Hense).

[27]   Arist., *Rh.* I.3.1358b13–15.

[28]   Arist., *Rh.* I.3.1358b21–25.

[29]   'Roughly speaking, for each individual person and all in common there is a certain target at which they take aim in both choosing and avoiding. And this is, in summary, εὐδαιμονία and its constituents. Let us then, by way of illustration, say what is εὐδαιμονία is in absolute terms, and from what things the parts of it are produced. For all the protreptics and the apotreptics are concerned with this and with the things that contribute to it as well as their opposites. For the things that supply it or one of its parts, or produce more instead of less of it, one should do; but the things that destroy or impede it or produce its opposites, one should not do' (1360b4–14).

[30]   'Let εὐδαιμονία be defined as good action combined with virtue; or self-sufficiency in life; or the most pleasant life accompanied by security or abundance of possessions and bodies <e.g., animals and slaves>, with the ability to keep secure and use these things; for all people agree that success (εὐδαιμονία) is mostly one or more of these things' (1360b14–18).

differ from the majority about what constitutes εὐδαιμονία.[31] His purpose in the *Rhetorica* is not to define a normatively or even descriptively adequate definition of εὐδαιμονία, but rather to provide a rhetorical analysis of the term which will make it available for employment in speeches attempting to persuade people to take a certain course of action.

All of the apotreptics that we have thus far considered have argued that doing philosophy will ultimately undermine εὐδαιμονία, and their arguments aim to show that the philosopher can expect to enjoy less of the components of success. All of the components said to contribute to or constitute εὐδαιμονία – virtuous action, self-sufficiency, pleasure, and the use of wealth and possessions – were all major themes in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*; 'we take the position that success is either intelligence and a kind of wisdom, or virtue, or great enjoyment, or all these'.[32] Aristotle goes on in *Rhetoric* I.5 to give a laundry-list of the conventional constituents of εὐδαιμονία: good birth (i.e. nobility), numerous and worthy friendships, wealth, good and numerous children, good old age, health and other bodily virtues, reputation, honor, and even good luck. The rest of this chapter (1360b–1362a) is an elaboration of each of these conventionally accepted constituents of happiness. These are all discussed in the *Protrepticus*, including good friends,[33] good old age,[34] good reputation and honor,[35] good luck,[36] and wealth.[37]

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[31] Dispute about the proper understanding of εὐδαιμονία is mentioned at I.4.1095a12–30. For alternative definitions of εὐδαιμονία see I.8.1098b22–25, VII.13.1153b9–21 and X.6–8.1176a30–1179b23.

[32] Arist., *Protr.*, *apud* Iambl., *Protr.* XII.59.26–60.1.

[33] Aristotle argues that 'we call "friends" those with whom we are familiar, so we should be "friends" to intelligence and love wisdom, since it makes us familiar with so many things' (Arist., *Protr.*, *apud* Iambl., *Protr.* VIII.46.11–21).

[34] Aristotle says of wisdom that 'old age lays claim to this alone of good things; therefore some form of intelligence is by nature our end' (Arist., *Protr.*, *apud* Iambl., *Protr.* IX.51.24–52.4).

[35] Themison is said to have a 'reputation' (Stob., *Flor.* IV.32.21) and yet it is argued (by some character in the dialogue) that 'honors and reputations, objects of more striving than the rest, are full of indescribable nonsense … to those who behold anything eternal' (Arist., *Protr.*, *apud* Iambl., *Protr.* VIII 47.16–18).

[36] Aristotle argues that good luck can only bring about goods either intended by skill or generated by nature; and skill intends to bring about ends that are good by nature; but the ultimate end of nature for humans is intelligence and theoretical knowledge (Arist., *Protr.*, *apud* Iambl., *Protr.* IX, 49.3–52.8).

[37] Wealth is a common theme in protreptic works (and apotreptic speeches against philosophy), and Aristotle's *Protrepticus* was typical in this regard. Thus in the address, Themison is said to be able to contribute to philosophy because he 'has great wealth and a reputation' (Stob., *Flor.* IV.32.21), but it later argued that it is more important to have

But, as Aristotle points out, deliberative speech is not about the nature of the end – this is for the most part presupposed. Rather the deliberative orator concentrates on the means to an end, and thus is focused on the value and utility of certain courses of action.

> It is now plain what our aims, future or actual, should be in offering protreptic and apotreptic; the later being the opposite of the former. Now the deliberative orator's aim is utility: deliberation seeks to determine not ends but the means to ends, i.e. what it is most useful to do. Further, utility is a good thing. We ought therefore to assure ourselves of the main facts about goodness and utility in general.[38]

Thus Aristotle's account of deliberative rhetoric in *Rhetorica* I.5–7 mostly consists of an analysis of the notion of the good, of utility, and of comparative advantage. The storehouse of tropes that he discusses can in fact be found throughout protreptic and apotreptic rhetoric.

For illustration, consider the apotreptic argument against mathematics attributed to Aristippus in Aristotle's *Metaphysica*.

> Some of the sophists, e.g. Aristippus, used to ridicule mathematics; for in the other arts, even in the industrial arts, e.g. in carpentry and cobbling, the reason always given is that it is better, or worse, but the mathematical sciences take no account of things that are good and bad.[39]

Notice how this apotreptic resembles Isocrates' apotreptic to theoretical philosophy in general and mathematical theory in particular: the guiding trope is the uselessness of this kind of philosophy. The apotreptic thus conforms to Aristotle's guidelines in the *Rhetorica*: it is argued that mathematics does not usefully contribute to εὐδαιμονία; since it is completely devoid of any reference to the good, it cannot possibly contribute anything to the end on which all parties to the dispute are agreed.

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intelligence in order to *use* wealth well than it is to *possess* more of it, since it is harmful if used unintelligently (*P.Oxy.* 666; Arist., *Protr. apud* Iambl., *Protr.*, 45.18–20). This is in part a response to the Isocratean argument against the pursuit of theoretical science: 'we are not wealthy by knowing about wealth but by possessing a very substantial amount of it' (Arist., *Protr.*, *apud* Iambl., *DCMS* XXVI.79.20–22). This was not really the focus of Aristotle's thinking on wealth; in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle asserts that 'generally, being wealthy consists in use more than in possession. For the employment and use of such things is wealth' (I.5.1361a23–24).

38 Arist., *Rh.* I.6.1362a15–21.

39 Arist., *Metaph.* III.2.996a32-b1, translation adapted from William David Ross, *Aristotle, Metaphysica* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928).

Now consider the response which comes in a later passage in Aristotle's *Metaphysica*:

> Since the good and the beautiful are different (for the former always implies conduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless things), those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the good are in error. For these sciences say and prove a great deal about them; if they do not expressly mention them, but demonstrate attributes which are their results or their definitions, it is not true to say that they tell us nothing about them. The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. And since these (e.g. order and definiteness) are obviously causes of many things, evidently these sciences must treat this sort of causative principle, since the beautiful is in a sense a cause (ὡς τὸ καλὸν αἴτιον τρόπον τινά). But we shall speak more plainly elsewhere about these matters.[40]

Aristotle's answer to Aristippus' apotreptic against mathematics, which forms part of his own protreptic to mathematical and theoretical philosophy, involves demonstrating that mathematics does in fact contain – and in the highest and purest way – the beautiful (or rather τὸ καλὸν, which also means 'the noble'), which is a form of the good.[41] A very similar argument is made in Aristotle's protreptic to the life sciences in *De Partibus Animalium*, where Aristotle refutes an anonymous apotreptic to the study of animals. He hints at the position in saying that 'surely it would be unreasonable, even absurd, for us to enjoy studying likenesses of animals – on the ground that we are at the same time studying the art, such as painting or sculpture, that made them – while not prizing even more the study of things constituted by nature, at least when we can be-

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[40] Arist., *Metaph.* XIII.3.1078a31-b6, tr. Ross, adapted. In Ross' Oxford translation, a note hangs from the last sentence suggesting that this was 'apparently an unfulfilled promise'. It is surprising that Ross does not mention the possibility that the reference is to Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.

[41] Arguments about the presence of beauty in mathematics were apparently also offered in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, according to reports in Procl., *In primum Euclidis elementorum librum commentarii*, Prolog. I, 25,12–27,16. At this point, Proclus pauses to consider the views of certain 'contentious people' who argue against mathematics, either on the Isocratean ground that the applied sciences alone have utility, or on the Aristippean ground that mathematics does not deal with or contain beauty; Proclus opposes this 'by pointing out the beauty in mathematics by the ways in which Aristotle attempted to persuade us' (26,10–13), and giving an account that is compatible with, but not the same as, his account in *Metaphysics* XIII. In other nearby sections, Proclus has been paraphrasing Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, and this seems the most likely explanation of this reference as well.

hold their causes'.[42] Since anyone who would discourage the study of animals must admit that observing resemblances of 'animals disagreeable to perception' can be beautiful, for example in the form of painting or sculpture, he must admit that studying the causes of the animals themselves can be valuable, since these studies apprehend the same causes – namely the forms – of the animals that are represented. Beauty exists as a cause apprehended by this study so that, as in the case of mathematics, we should be encouraged to pursue it rather than discouraged.

> For this reason, we must not be childishly disgusted at the examination of the less valuable animals. For in all natural things there is something marvelous. […] one should approach research about each of the animals without disgust, since in every single one there is something natural and beautiful. For what is not haphazard but rather for the sake of something is in fact present most of all in the works of nature; the end for the sake of which each animal has been constituted or comes to be assumes the place of the beautiful (τὸ καλόν).[43]

Now when we turn from the refutation of the apotreptic, to the positive protreptic aspect of Aristotle's argument, we find him making direct use of a trope that he recommends in the *Rhetorica*: 'The objects of the more beautiful and valuable sciences are also more beautiful and valuable; for as the science is, so too is its corresponding truth. And each science commands its own objects. But the more valuable and beautiful the object of a science, the more valuable and beautiful the science itself is in due proportion'.[44] The same trope is also deployed in *De Partibus Animalium* in order to argue that the life sciences are not necessarily less valuable than the mathematical sciences.

> Among the substantial beings constituted by nature, some are ungenerated and imperishable throughout all eternity, while others partake of generation and perishing. Yet it has turned out that our studies of the former, though they are valuable and divine, are fewer (for as regards both those things on the basis of which one would examine them and those things about them which we long to know, the perceptual phenomena are altogether few). We are, however, much better provided in relation to knowledge about the perishable plants and animals, because we live among them.

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[42] Arist., *Part. an.* I.5.645a10–15, translation adapted from James G. Lennox, *Aristotle: On the Parts of Animals* (Oxford University Press, 2001).

[43] Arist., *Part. an.* I.5.645a15–23 (in part), tr. Lennox, adapted.

[44] Arist., *Rh.* I.7.1364b7–11. Cf. *Top.* III.1, 116a21–22.

> For anyone willing to labor sufficiently can grasp many things about each kind. Each study has its attractions. Even if our contact with eternal beings is slight, none the less because of its surpassing value this knowledge is a greater pleasure than seeing precisely many and greater things. Perishable things, however, take the prize in respect of understanding because we know more of them and we know them more fully. Further, because they are nearer to us and more of our own nature, they provide a certain compensation compared with the philosophy concerned with divine things.[45]

Notice that the apotreptic against study of the animals is presumed to be an example of a specific apotreptic: the assumption is that the interlocutor would agree mathematical science, and in particular astronomy, is worth doing (because the objects such sciences apprehend are eternal and contain τὸ καλὸν) but the study of the animals, since it focuses on mundane and seemingly trivial things, does not apprehend any such objects. The response is then made that, as we have seen, the causes of animals are also beautiful, and even if they are perishable, there is a compensating factor: their closeness and variety. The apotreptic is thereby answered and a protreptic to both astronomy and the study of animals is established on several levels.

In summary, if we take into consideration these most famous apotreptics against philosophy, including two reported in the Aristotle Corpus, we can distinguish between the following kinds of apotreptic arguments:

1. General apotreptics against philosophy (examples: Anonymous in *P.Oxy* 3659, Nepos in his letter to Cicero, Hortensius in Cicero's *Hortensius*, Lactantius in *False Wisdom*);

2. Specific apotreptics against majoring in philosophy (examples: Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias*, Isocrates in the *Antidosis*, parents objecting to undergraduates majoring in philosophy);

3. Specific apotreptics to some part or kind of philosophy (examples: Isocrates' apotreptic to theoretical-mathematical philosophy in *Antidosis*, Aristippus' apotreptic to mathematics, the anonymous apotreptic to life sciences in *De Partibus Animalium*, apotreptics to dubious areas of philosophy often made in the context of hiring decisions).

Corresponding to each of these kinds of apotreptic speeches, then, will be protreptic speeches. Thus, there will be arguments for doing philo-

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[45] Arist., *Part. an.* I.5.644a23–645a4, tr. Lennox, adapted.

sophy at every age.[46] And there will be protreptics to specific kinds or parts of philosophy (or other sciences or arts considered to be philosophy), thus protreptics to mathematics,[47] protreptics to astronomy,[48] protreptics to the life sciences, protreptics to medicine.[49] And at the root of it all there will be general protreptics to philosophy – given in response to the absolute apotreptics against philosophy. Cicero's *Hortensius* was such a work, even if it also served as a specific protreptic to Academic philosophy. But the classical model was Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. And so let us now turn to that work.

Reports about Aristotle's *Protrepticus* and the dialogue hypothesis

We will now try to show that Aristotle's *Protrepticus* contained – and not merely described – apotreptic speeches and arguments. The work consisted of apotreptic speeches and protreptic speeches responding to them. This is the main reason we think the work should be interpreted – and reconstructed – as a dialogue. In our view, it is likely that the work contained apotreptic speeches of all three kinds just mentioned – and, naturally, protreptic refutations of each of these as well. Eventually our focus will be on the specific apotreptic against theoretical and mathematical philosophy which is put in the voice of an Isocratean character. But first let us consider the evidence for the existence of a general

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[46] Examples of protreptics to doing philosophy at all ages include the opening of the *Letter to Menoeceus*, in which Epicurus encourages both the young and the old to do philosophy (*apud* Diog. Laert. X.122). Aristotle expresses a more nuanced position, encouraging the young to do mathematical and the old to do political science (*Eth. Eud.* V = *Eth. Nic.* VI.8.1142a15–16). The *Protrepticus* contains an extremely memorable proverb according to which 'old age lays claim to this alone among good things', stated in the context of a teleological argument that human animals are by nature continually transformed towards a natural end, namely wisdom and intelligence (*apud* Iambl., *Protr.* IX.53.24–52.3; cf. *Pol.* VII.9.1329a15–16; VII.15.1334b12–22). Cicero's *De senectute* also contains an extensive protreptic to philosophy aimed at the elderly.

[47] Iamblichus' *DCMS* is a vast sourcebook of these, perhaps comparable in value as a sourcebook for mathematical protreptic as his *Protrepticus epi philosophian* is for the genre of general protreptics to philosophy.

[48] For example, the opening pages of Ptolemy's *Almagest*, which starts with a brief protreptic to astronomy, with elements apparently borrowed from Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. See Jacqueline Feke, 'Ptolemy's defense of theoretical philosophy', *Apeiron*, 45 (2012), 61–90 at n. 9.

[49] For example, Galen's *Adhortatio ad artes addiscendas*.

apotreptic against philosophy in the work. The most important source of evidence is Alexander of Aphrodisias.

> But there are also cases in which, taking all the significations, it is possible to refute the thesis on the basis of them all; for example, if someone should argue that one should not do philosophy: since to do philosophy means both to investigate this same thing, whether one should do philosophy or not (as Aristotle says in the *Protrepticus*), but it also means to participate in philosophical theory, then each of these is shown to be appropriate to the person, entirely refuting his thesis.[50]

Alexander's description of Aristotle's argument, beginning with 'if someone should say that one should not do philosophy...', and ending with '...entirely refuting his thesis', seems to indicate that the argument was made in the context of a dialogue, one in which someone had been depicted as arguing that 'one should not do philosophy', and then it was pointed out that this person has refuted himself, because 'do philosophy' *means* not only 'to participate in philosophical theory', but also 'to investigate this very thing, whether one must do philosophy or not'. Thus for the person who makes the anti-philosophy argument, 'to do philosophy' is shown to be appropriate or proper. Hence that very person should do philosophy.

Several ancient commentators and scholars recount an argument to a similar conclusion, but report the details and even logical form of the argument quite differently. Perhaps the earliest reported version of such an argument comes from Clement of Alexandria.

> Indeed this argument seems to me to be well put: if one must do philosophy, <one must do philosophy,> for this is something which follows from the thing itself; but even if one must not to do philosophy, <one must do philosophy,> for one could not form a judgment opposed to anything without earlier having formed a judgment about this thing. Therefore, one must do philosophy.[51]

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[50] ἔστι δὲ ἐφ' ὧν καὶ πάντα τὰ σημαινόμενα λαμβάνοντας ἔστιν ἐπὶ πάντων αὐτῶν ἀνασκευάζειν τὸ κείμενον· οἷον εἰ λέγοι τις ὅτι μὴ χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐπεὶ φιλοσοφεῖν λέγεται καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, εἴτε χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν εἴτε καὶ μή, ὡς εἶπεν αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Προτρεπτικῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τὴν φιλόσοφον θεωρίαν μετιέναι, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν δείξαντες οἰκεῖον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πανταχόθεν ἀναιρήσομεν τὸ τιθέμενον. (*In Aristotelis topicorum libros octos commentaria* II.3.110a23 = *CIAG* II: 2.149.9–15, ed. Wallies = *testimonium* A2 in Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus*; cf. *Suidas* phi-414, Adler, *s.v.* φιλοσοφεῖν).

[51] καὶ γὰρ οὖν εὖ πως ἔχειν μοι φαίνεται ὁ λόγος ἐκεῖνος· εἰ φιλοσοφητέον, <φιλοσοφητέον>· αὐτὸ γάρ τι αὐτῷ ἀκολουθεῖ· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ μὴ φιλοσοφητέον· οὐ γάρ τις

Clement's version of the argument is extremely compressed, and the text must be supplemented in several ways in order to get an adequate construal. Furthermore, Clement does not attribute the argument to Aristotle at all, and the logical form of the argument does not appear to be Aristotelian. We might, however, relate it to Alexander's version as follows. If a person believes that he must not do philosophy, then he must have formed a negative judgment about philosophy, but this process of forming a judgment is doing philosophy, and so the person ends up showing that one must do philosophy after all. On this interpretation, we have to imagine a person formulating arguments against doing philosophy, that is, an apotreptic speech. And so again even this version of the argument suggests a dialogue (even if only some kind of interior dialogue), in which hypothetically formulated apotreptic arguments are refuted by someone who points out that anyone reaching the conclusion that one ought not do philosophy only reaches that conclusion by doing philosophy, and thus demonstrates the need for philosophy after all.

But this is not the only interpretation of the argument that is possible. It also seems possible to interpret it as a free-standing declarative argument, in the form of a dilemma with two conditional premises. Olympiodorus reports the argument in a similar way in his commentary on Plato's *Alcibiades*, and he explicitly attributes the argument to Aristotle.

> And Aristotle in his *Protrepticus* said that if one must do philosophy, then one must do philosophy; and if one must not do philosophy, then one must do philosophy; so absolutely one must do philosophy.[52]

We can represent this argument as follows, where 'p' stands for the proposition 'one must do philosophy':

1. if p, then p;
2. if not p, then p;
3. therefore, p.

As with Clement's version, this argument is technically imperfect insofar as it lacks the axiom 'p or not p'. A more satisfactory version in this

καταγνώῃ <ἄν> τινος μὴ τοῦτο πρότερον ἐγνωκώς. φιλοσοφητέον ἄρα. (Clem. Al., *Strom.* 6.18.5 = 515.31–516.3 Stählin).

[52] καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν ἐν τῷ Προτρεπτικῷ ἔλεγεν ὅτι 'εἴτε φιλοσοφητέον, φιλοσοφητέον· εἴτε μὴ φιλοσοφητέον, φιλοσοφητέον· πάντως δὲ φιλοσοφητέον'. (Olympiodorus, *In Alc.* 119a–120d = Westerink 144.15–17 = testimonium A4 in Düring, *Aristotle's* Protrepticus).

respect is however attributed to Aristotle by an anonymous scholar commenting on Ammonius' commentary on Aristotle's *Analytica Priora*. The topic is a kind of syllogism called 'subconditional' which, as the scholar explains, obtains when both the hypothesis and the minor premise contain the members of a contradiction but conclude one single thing:

> And also of this kind is Aristotle's argument in the *Protrepticus*: whether one should do philosophy or one should not do philosophy, one should do philosophy; but either one should do philosophy or one should not do philosophy; therefore absolutely one should do philosophy.[53]

And we can represent this argument as follows:

    1. if p or not-p, then p;
    2. p or not-p;
    3. therefore, p.

For clarity, the first premise can be analyzed into two separate propositions (as in Clement's and Olympiodorus' versions of the argument), resulting in the following argument.

    1. if p, then p;
    2. if not-p, then p;
    3. p or not-p;
    4. therefore, p.

Let us now discuss the arguments for attributing this argument to Aristotle. It does not look Aristotelian in form, since the premises do not consist of terms but of propositions ('one must do philosophy' and 'one must not do philosophy'). This version of the argument is Stoical in form, and in fact we do find later Stoics employing just such an argument.[54] It is not impossible that Aristotle produced the argument, but

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[53] τοιοῦτος δε καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλους λόγος ἐν τῷ Προτρεπτικῷ· εἴτε φιλοσοφητέον εἴτε μὴ φιλοσοφητέον, φιλοσοφητέον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ φιλοσοφητέον ἢ οὐ φιλοσοφητέον· πάντως ἄρα φιλοσοφητέον. (Anonymous scholion on Ammonius' *In Aristotelis analytica priora*, under the title Περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν πάντῶν τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, found in a manuscript in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris under the shelf mark Codex Parisinus Graecus 2064, folio 263a = Aristotle, *Protrepticus*, testimonium A3 in Düring, *Aristotle's* Protrepticus).

[54] See William Calvert Kneale, 'Aristotle and the *Consequentia Mirabilis*', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 77 (1957), 62–66; and Luca Castagnoli, *Ancient Self-Refutation: the logic and history of self-refutation from Democritus to Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 189 and 196.

the fact that it does not conform to his own logic, while it does perfectly conform to Stoic logic, must lead one to suspect that Olympiodorus and the Anonymous Scholar may have represented a later Stoic argument as being Aristotle's argument in the *Protrepticus*. Of course, that may easily be explained by assuming that the Stoic version of the argument was inspired by Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, a refined and perhaps improved version of it, but at any rate it was probably explicitly adapted to conform to Stoic method.

As for whether this adaptation has improved the argument, we may now get to the heart of the matter by reducing the argument and dropping the logical truisms 'if p, then p' and 'p or not p', resulting in the following so-called *consequentia mirabilis*: if not-p, then p. And at this point the mind can focus on the essential problems with this version of the argument. The first problem is that there seems to be no reason to accept the assertion that 'if one must not do philosophy, then one must do philosophy' (hence the consequence is *mirabilis*). One would have to assume that 'the propositional content that one must not philosophize is made the object of an activity that itself counts as an instance of philosophizing'.[55] But nothing in the pithy form of the argument that we are given in these sources lends any support to this supposition.

The second problem is that Aristotle holds that no proposition implies or is implied by its own negation (*Analytica priora* II.4, 57b3–14). Thus the version of the argument attributed to Aristotle in the *Protrepticus* is, by Aristotle's own estimation, invalid. This fact led Kneale to conclude that Aristotle had contradicted himself and argue that the source of Aristotle's error was the enunciation of a false principle in the *Analytica priora*.[56] After all, there is a category of truths that are implied both by themselves and by their negations, namely absolute truths. But it seems difficult, as Kneale realized, to treat the proposition 'one must do philosophy' as an absolute truth. For one thing, the assertion is rather easily falsified, by simple observation of the fact that many people in fact do not do philosophy, which is precisely why protreptic arguments in favor of doing philosophy need to be given by Aristotle. At any rate, the opponent of philosophy, who believes (but perhaps does not argue) that one should not do philosophy, and hence embodies the fact that one need not do philosophy, will never concede that the proposition 'one

55   Gabriel Nuchelmans, *Dilemmatic Arguments: towards a history of their logic and rhetoric* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1991), p. 14.

56   Kneale, *Consequentia mirabilis*, p. 66.

must do philosophy' is an absolute truth. Again, he may easily demonstrate this point performatively by simply refusing to take part in philosophy. In that case, nothing whatsoever compels him to accept *any* of the propositions described above, even the truisms. He may simply walk away and refuse to take part, and there will be no declarative argument which could possibly compel him to conclude that he should do philosophy. Thus the argument, at least as these sources recount it, utterly fails as a stand-alone declarative argument.

In order to avoid these problems, Luca Castagnoli has reconstructed the argument as follows.

> 1. If <your position is that> one must philosophize, then <you yourself admit that> one must philosophize;
> 2. If <your position is that> one must not philosophize, then <you must reflect on this choice and argue in its support, but by doing so you are already choosing to do philosophy, thereby admitting that> one must philosophize;
> 3. Either <your position is that> one must philosophize or <your position is that> one must not philosophize;
> 4. In any case, therefore <you must admit that> one must philosophize.[57]

Castagnoli supports his interpretation on the basis of some further testimony about the argument from Lactantius, Elias, and David that we will examine in due course, and that supports his interpretation of the crucial second proposition. His interpretation is certainly an advancement over Kneale in that it does not depend on the *consequentia mirabilis* and does not run afoul of Aristotle's prohibition on deriving a proposition from its own negation in the *Analytica Priora*. These are certainly advantages and Castagnoli's interpretation is the best one advanced so far. But difficulties remain, beginning with the fact that the argument is not Aristotelian but Stoical in form. Castagnoli complains that 'the later commentators did not serve Aristotle well by stripping his argument of its original dialectical clothing', but Castagnoli reassures us by speculating that 'even those who reshaped and simplified the form of the *Protrepticus* argument remained fully conscious of its actual logic, and used that dilemma as an elegant elliptical reminder of Aristotle's more complex and informal dialectical reasoning'.[58] The question remains whether or not we cannot get closer to 'its actual logic' and to 'Aristotle's more com-

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57   Castagnoli, *Self-refutation*, p. 193.
58   Castagnoli, *Self-refutation*, 194.

plex and informal dialectical reasoning' by comprehending the kind of dialectic clothing that has been stripped away – namely actual apotreptic arguments spoken in direct speech.

But another difficulty with Castagnoli's interpretation is that the argument seems on its own to fail at its purpose, to compel acceptance of the conclusion that 'one must do philosophy': 'if his point was only that whenever one rationally adopts, justifies and defends the option not to philosophize, either against a flesh and blood dialectical opponent or, Platonically, in a silent dialogue with oneself (a sort of "monologic dialectic"), one is thereby unconsciously and unwittingly admitting to the necessity of philosophy, the "mother of proofs", this does not amount to proof of the absolute truth of the maxim "one must philosophize", but is another instance of the now familiar *ad hominem* reversal'.[59] In the sequel, we will see that such an interpretation of the argument as a *valid ad hominem* argument can be better supported by recognizing the argument not as a stand-alone declarative argument, but rather in the context of a dialogue in which *homines* argued *ad homines*. For his part, Castagnoli offers to speculatively strengthen the argument by adding 'the extra assumption that any decision on what to do, or at least any decision of crucial significance for one's life, ought to be accompanied by that kind of reasoned assessment of its merits and drawbacks, then the absolute necessity of philosophy was proved'.[60] But as Castagnoli points out, 'it is difficult to decide what kind of necessity (psychological, moral, logical...) could have been established'.[61] Further, the extra assumption is question-begging about the necessity of doing philosophy by failing to take into consideration other possible sources of motivation, like habit, authority, or emotional drive. Furthermore, 'the whole argument is open to the retort that one can carefully decide with the aid of argument and philosophy that one ought not to philosophize and *then* abandon philosophy altogether'.[62] Choose your simile: philosophical apotreptic may be used either like purgative drugs, as the Pyrrhonians suggested, which eliminate both philosophy and the apotreptic arguments themselves or, as Wittgenstein suggested, apotreptic arguments may be like a ladder, which can be kicked away once one has transcended the need to do philosophy.

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[59] Castagnoli, *Self-refutation*, p. 194.
[60] Castagnoli, *Self-refutation*, p. 194.
[61] Castagnoli, *Self-refutation*, p. 194n32.
[62] Castagnoli, *Self-refutation*, p. 195.

As we have already suggested, a much better solution is available, one which avoids these problems and accounts for all of the available evidence better: the argument was not originally presented as a stand-alone declarative argument (and was probably never intended by Aristotle to be expressed as one), but rather was presented in the context of a philosophical dialogue. If we take seriously Alexander's version of the argument, which hangs from the clause 'if someone should argue that one should not do philosophy', then we can see that the argument was not originally presented in the form of a dilemma with two conditional premises, but was meant to show that the person delivering an apotreptic to philosophy does in fact show, through his own action, that one should do philosophy, because philosophy includes within itself the activity of arguing about whether or not one must do philosophy. This interpretation is considerably strengthened by the other testimonies about the argument from Elias and David.

> Indeed, as Aristotle says in his writing entitled *Protrepticus*, in which he exhorts the youth to do philosophy – he says this: if you should do philosophy, you should do philosophy, and if you should do philosophy, then you should do philosophy. Therefore in every case you should do philosophy. For if philosophy truly exists, then positively we are obliged to do philosophy, since it truly exists. But if it does not truly exist, even so we are obliged to investigate how it is that philosophy does not truly exist; but by investigating we would be doing philosophy, since to investigate is a responsibility of philosophy.[63]

> And Aristotle, in a certain written speech of his *Protrepticus*, in which he exhorts the youth to philosophy, says that: if you should do philosophy, then you should do philosophy, and if you should not do philosophy, then you should do philosophy. So in any case you should do philosophy. For example, if someone says that you should not be a philosopher, they have used a demonstration, by means of which they refute philosophy; but if they have used a demonstration, then it is clear that they do philosophy. For philosophy is the mother of demonstrations. And if someone says that you should be a philosopher, again they do philosophy. For they have used a demonstration, by means of which they demonstrate that philosophy truly exists. So in any case one does philosophy, both the one who refutes philosophy and the one who does not. For each of them has used a demonstration, by means of which the

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[63] Elias, *In Isag.* = *CIAG* XVIII:1, p. 3.17–23, ed. Busse = testimonium A5 in Düring, Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.

arguments are proven. But if one has used demonstrations, then it is clear that one does philosophy. For philosophy is the mother of demonstrations.[64]

Elias and David have been presumed to be dependent on earlier commentators, stemming from Alexander, but they present an additional detail that is not present in any earlier source but which is mentioned by both of them: that in the *Protrepticus* Aristotle 'exhorted the young to philosophy'. In the version of Elias: ἐν τῷ Προτρεπτικῷ ἐπιγεγραμμένῳ, ἐν ᾧ προτρέπει τοὺς νέους πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν. In the version of David: ἔν τινι Προτρεπτικῷ αὐτοῦ συγγράμματι, ἐν ᾧ προτρέπεται τοὺς νέους ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν. The minute differences in details indicate that the two texts are not directly dependent on one another, but on some third text which, for the reason we just gave, is unlikely to be one of the other sources already discussed.[65] A plausible prima facie interpretation of this detail is that this is meant to be a description of those to whom Aristotle addressed his *Protrepticus* – he meant to encourage the young to do philosophy, the very people whom Callicles and Isocrates also encouraged to do philosophy in the context of discouraging the adults from doing philosophy. But against this is the fact that we know the work is reported to have been addressed to 'Themison, the king of Cyprians'. Another interpretation seems more likely: that this is a description of the dramatic setting of the dialogue, so that Elias and David (via their sources) are referring to the character Aristotle who was depicted in the dialogue as exhorting a group of young people to do philosophy. The situation would then fairly closely resemble the dramatic setting of Plato's *Gorgias* or *Euthydemus*. The fact that Aristotle could write a dialogue in which the dramatic setting resembled the kind of setting found in a Platonic dialogue is clear from the fact that several of the titles of dialogues attributed to Aristotle have the very same name as dialogues of Plato, e.g., the *Symposium*, and the *Protrepticus* is listed among those dialogues on the ancient lists.[66]

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[64]   David, *Prol. Phil.* = *CIAG* XVIII:2, p. 9.2–12, ed. Busse = testimonium A6 in Düring, *Aristotle's* Protrepticus.

[65]   What source or sources they depend on cannot be determined. As Stephen Menn (personal communication) pointed out to us, David's version may be referring to 'some protreptic' (and not 'a certain *Protrepticus*'), in which case Προτρεπτικῷ should not be capitalized in the report. In that case David's source would presumably be even more indirect than Elias.

[66]   On the ancient lists of Aristotle's writings, the *Protrepticus* falls in the middle of a list of known dialogues on the oldest list of Aristotle's writings, contained in Diog.

Both Elias and David initially represent the argument as a stand-alone declarative argument, specifically as a dilemma with two conditional propositions. In this respect they appear to have been influenced by the Stoicized version of the argument that also appears in Clement, Olympiodorus, and in the Anonymous Scholar. But in the elaboration that Elias and David give for the argument they do not appeal to the logical axiom 'p or not p', which is necessary to complete that version of the argument; instead, they both indicate a situation in which someone is described as engaged in an activity that can reasonably be described as doing philosophy. In Elias, this person is described as engaged in investigation: 'if it does not truly exist, even so we are obliged to investigate how it is that philosophy does not truly exist; but by investigating we would be doing philosophy, since to investigate is a responsibility of philosophy'; in David the person is described as making a demonstration: 'if someone says that you should not be a philosopher, they have used a demonstration, by means of which they refute philosophy; but if they have used a demonstration, then it is clear that they do philosophy'. These passages suggest that, just as Alexander's report does in a different way, that the original dramatic situation must have involved an apotreptic speech or set of speeches delivered against philosophy in direct speech, followed by a speech or speeches pointing out that that very activity can be defined as philosophy. If we assume this dialogical arrangement for Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, and that Aristotle himself offered the *ad hominem* argument about the self-refutation of an apotreptic speaker (or speakers) against philosophy, then we can account for all the evidence, and at the same time see the soundness of the argument itself. For in response to a literal 'investigation' or 'demonstration' about the question of whether or not one should do philosophy, the argument that the speaker was already doing philosophy and thus showed the need to do philosophy would in fact be a perfectly sound *ad hominem* argument.

We will now turn to a network of evidence showing that a comparable strategy was also deployed in Cicero's *Hortensius*, and we will argue that this is probably one of the respects in which Cicero's *Hortensius* was modeled on Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.

Laert. V.22; and at the top of a list of dialogues in the later list of Ptolemy al-Garib. It is number 12 on Diogenes' list, coming immediately after works that borrowed the titles of dialogues of Plato, namely *Statesman* (number 4); *Sophist* (7); *Menexenus* (8); *Symposium* (10), but before another work in which fragments of dialogue survive: Περὶ εὐγενείας αʹ (number 15). See Düring, *Aristotle's* Protrepticus, testimonia A8a-c, p. 45.

Aristotle's *Protrepticus* as a model for Cicero's dialogue *Hortensius*

Cicero was forced into retirement from politics in the mid 40s, and began a truly impressive period of writing philosophical dialogues: *Orator* was completed by 46, and the (lost) *Hortensius, Academica, De Finibus*, and *Tusculan Disputations* by 45, by which time he had also begun writing *De Natura Deorum*. During this time, Cicero was highly self-conscious of both his stylistic influences and innovations, and frequently commented on them in letters to his friends and in the prefaces to his dialogues. Consider a remark from Cicero's letter to Atticus of July 54.

> But you know the form of my dialogues: just as in my work on Oratory <*sc. De oratore*>, of which you speak so very handsomely, none of those taking part in the discussion could make mention of persons other than those they had known or heard, in the same way I have put this discussion on the State <*sc. De re publica*> that I have embarked upon into the mouths of Africanus, Philus, Laelius, and Manilius, with the addition of some young men, Q. Tubero and P. Rutilius, and Laelius' two sons-in-law, Scaevola and Fannius. So I am thinking of making a suitable occasion to address him in one of the prefaces which I am writing to each book, as Aristotle did in what he calls his 'exoteric' pieces (*ut Aristoteles in iis quos* ἐχωτερικοὺς *vocat*). I understand that you would favor that.[67]

This remark contains a very important piece of information: that Cicero followed Aristotle in writing 'introductions' or 'prefaces' (*prohoemiis*) to his *exoteric* works. In *De Oratore*, for example, Cicero addressed the work to his brother Quintus and introduced the work in his own voice (I.1–23), and explicitly describes the setting and characters (I.24–28), before giving over to the dialogue proper (I.28 and following). The fragmentary work *De Re Publica*, which was also probably addressed to Quintus, had a similar opening structure.[68] Cicero states that the inno-

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[67]   Cic., *Att.* IV.16.2 (c. 1 July 54), translated by David Roy Shackleton-Bailey, *Cicero: Letters to Atticus* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1999).

[68]   There is a reference to an addressee at I.13, although it is not exactly clear to whom. Our manuscript for *De re publica* begins in the middle of the proemium and runs from I.1–12, at which point the setting and characters are introduced (I.13–14), before the dialogue proper begins (I.14 and following). This format is a major departure from the dialogues of Plato which, however complex their dialogical structure and framing, never involve the author himself speaking to the addressee (and readers) *in propria persona* as Cicero does in *De or.* I.1–23. Cicero the author speaks to the reader in *De or.* I.24–27 in describing when and where the dialogue takes place (i.e., September 91 B.C.

vation of writing *proemia* to dialogues is due to Aristotle, and he suggests that such a *proemium* would be an appropriate place to address the work to an individual, as Cicero addressed *De Oratore* to Quintus. It follows that Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, if it was a dialogue, probably contained an introduction in which the author spoke in his own voice. This would have been an appropriate place for the address (or dedication), mentioned above, to Themison that is preserved in Stobaeus.[69] It would also have contained, probably, a description of the speakers (e.g., Isocrates of Athens, Heraclides of Pontus, and Aristotle himself) and the setting (e.g., a gymnasium in Athens where youth are gathered, as in the *Euthydemus*). Now consider another letter in which Cicero again refers to Aristotle:

> I have composed ... three volumes in the form of an argument and dialogue *On the Orator*, in the manner (so at least I intended) of Aristotle (*scripsi igitur Aristotelio more, quem ad modum quidem volui, tris libros in disputatione ac dialogo* De oratore). I think your son will find them of some use. They do not deal in the standard rules, but embrace the whole theory of oratory as the ancients knew it, both Aristotelian and Isocratean.[70]

It is not clear what exactly Cicero means by saying that he is following the 'Aristotelian pattern' (*Aristotelio more*). Because *De Oratore* is a dialogue, it is clear that he has in mind the *exoteric* works and not what Cicero elsewhere calls the *commentarii* (corresponding in some sense to the works of our *Corpus Aristotelicum*). The expression *Aristotelio more* refers to the style and genre of the work, and not merely to its contents, since Cicero points out that the work contains a complete treatment

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in a Tusculan villa). By contrast, where Plato gives a description of the setting and characters of the dialogue, the description is not given in the voice of Plato himself but rather one of the characters of the dialogue (e.g. Echecrates in Pl. *Phd.* 57a–59c). In Cicero's description of the setting of the *De Oratore*, he resorts to the scenery of Plato's *Phaedrus*. Cicero describes Scaevola asking Crassus why they don't 'imitate Socrates as he appears in the *Phaedrus* of Plato' (I. 28) and so they proceed to discuss rhetoric (with Antonius, Sulpicius, and Cotta) under a plane-tree – not, however, until cushions have been placed on the benches under the trees. Despite this overt reference to Plato's scene setting, Cicero's framing of *De Oratore* formally contrasts with that of the *Phaedrus*, since Plato begins *in media res* in the form of a script of dialogue between Socrates and Phaedrus.

69   See footnote 22.

70   Cic., *Fam.*, letter 20 (Letter of December 54 to Lentulus Spinther) = 1.9.23, translated by David Roy Shackleton-Bailey, *Cicero: Letters to Friends, Volume I* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2001).

of the rhetorical theories of both Aristotle and Isocrates. One possibility is that he may simply be referring again to the fact that *De Oratore* contains introductory material in the author's own voice before the dialogue proper begins, in which case it does not add new information to the above comment from his letter to Atticus quoted above. But against this is the fact that what Cicero describes as 'in the manner of Aristotle' is the existence of *disputatione ac dialogo*, not the structure of the literary work as a whole.

What, then, is distinctive about the argumentative and dialogical form of *De Oratore*? In order to answer that question, consider an outline of the contents and major speech exchanges of book I of *De Oratore*.[71]

> 1–23: Cicero's proemium.
> 24–29: Cicero's description of the scene and characters.
> 30–34: 'Crassus' praises oratory.
> 35–44: 'Scaevola' objects that Crassus has overrated oratory.
> 45–73: 'Crassus' replies by expanding the concept of the perfect orator.
> 74–79: 'Scaevola' repeats some objections.
> 80–95 'Antonius' enters some objections and considerations of his own.
> 96–204 'Crassus' reluctantly agrees to expand on the question: Is rhetoric an art?
> 205–209 'Sulpicius' asks for further discussion on certain points.
> 209–262 'Antonius' expounds his own views of the perfect orator.
> 263–265 'Crassus' requests that Antonius set his views out at greater length the next day.

Although there are five characters present in the dialogue, Scaevola serves only to introduce objections and does not voice views of his own, while the voices and arguments of Crassus and Antonius predominate, and we are told at the conclusion that 'Sulpicius and Cotta appeared to be in grave doubt as to which of the two speaker's discourses bore the closer resemblance to the truth' (I.262). In the proemium to Book II, Cicero refers back to 'the dialogue between Crassus and Antonius' (II.11), before introducing into the mix two new characters, including Q. Lutatius Catulus and his half-brother C. Julius Caesar Strabo Vopiscus (II.12). Although there are several interruptions of the speeches, the dialogue consists mostly of an exchange of longer speeches, the longest being Antonius, which runs for 53 consecutive sections.

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71   Adapted from Harris Rackham's introduction to volume I of the Loeb edition, in Harris Rackham and Edward William Sutton, *Cicero:* De oratore *Books I, II* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1942), xv–xxii.

If we are to extrapolate from this kind of *disputatione ac dialogo* to the *Protrepticus*, it would seem to support an interpretation according to which there may have been several characters with minor parts present, but the bulk of the dialogue was carried out by a few or even a couple of major speakers giving extended speeches punctuated by occasional transitions, some consisting of objections, others of requests for clarification and expansion.

In an earlier letter to Atticus, Cicero had described why he has included various persons – dead or living, including himself – in his dialogues.

> I had made a resolution not to put living persons in my dialogues, but because you wrote that it was Varro's wish [...] I have composed these and finished off the whole subject of Academic philosophy in four books [...] In them I have given Varro the arguments admirably assembled by Antiochus against the denial of certitudes. I reply to those myself. You make a third in our party. If I had made Cotta and Varro discuss it between them, as you suggest in your last letter, I should have been a *muta persona* (κωφὸν πρόσωπον). This is quite agreeable if the characters belong to history (*in antiquis personis*). Heraclides <of Pontus> did it in many works, and I myself in my six books *De Re Publica*. And there are my three *De Oratore*, of which I entertain a very good opinion. In these too the characters were such that I kept silent, the speakers being Crassus, Antonius, the elder Catulus, his brother C. Julius, Cotta, and Sulpicius. The conversation is supposed to have taken place when I was a boy, so that I could not take any part. But my recent compositions follow the Aristotelian pattern, in which the other roles in the dialogue are subordinate to the author's own (*quem autem his temporibus scripsi* Ἀριστοτέλειον *morem habent, in quo sermo ita inducitur ceterorum, ut penes ipsum sit principatus*). In the five books which I composed περὶ τελῶν I gave the Epicurean case to L. Torquatus, the Stoic to M. Cato, and the Peripatetic to M. Piso. I thought that would excite no jealousy, since none of them was still living. The treatise on the Academy I had given, as you know, to Catulus, Lucullus, and Hortensius. It must be confessed that the subject did not fit the persons, who could not be supposed ever to have dreamed of such abstruse matters.[72]

Whereas in the previous remarks the 'Aristotelian pattern' indicates that the dialogue (i.e. *De Oratore*) is prefaced by a proemium written

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[72] Cic., *Att.* 13.19.3–5, letter 326 (June 45), translation adapted from Shackleton-Bailey, *Letters to Atticus*.

in propria persona (and may also refer to the dialogue consisting of an exchange of relatively long speeches by a few speakers), in the above passage the expression Ἀριστοτέλειον *morem* refers to the author himself having a role – and in fact the leading role – in the dialogue itself, something that Cicero did *not* do in *De Oratore*, despite the fact that in the Letter to Lentulus Spinther quoted above Cicero says that in that work he also composed the work in the *Aristotelio more*. In both *De Oratore* and *De Re Publica*, the speakers are not living persons at the time the dialogue was written, and Cicero himself does not appear as a character. As he explains, this was in order to avoid anachronism, since the dramatic settings of these dialogues are too early for it to have been realistic for him to take part in the conversation. In *De Finibus*, however, Cicero did make himself the lead character, speaking at times in the past (50 and 79 BCE) to contemporaries who, by the time of publication, he had outlived.

The fact that Cicero here describes *De Finibus* as following 'the Aristotelian pattern' is a point that commentators seem to have ignored in their singular focus on the *Hortensius* as following the model of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*; and yet the fact that *De Finibus* survives in its entirety makes it, like *De Oratore*, valuable as an object of structural comparison. From this network of evidence, we can safely conclude that Cicero took himself to be following 'the Aristotelian pattern' in writing his dialogues by having the following elements, all of them present in *De finibus*: (1) a proemium that states the author's own intentions *in propria persona* (including an address or dedication to a known person – in the case of the *De finibus* to Brutus); (2) a dialogue in which there are named characters that exchange adversarial speeches, including living authors; (3) the presence of the author as a character in his own dialogue, and who is given the leading part.

Let us now turn specifically to the *Hortensius*, which has long been known to have been influenced by Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. The *Historia Augusta* asserts that the work was a protreptic: 'I think that you are not unacquainted with what Marcus Tullius said in his *Hortensius*, written following the example of a protreptic' (*nec ignota esse arbitror quae dixit Marcus Tullius in Hortensio, quem ad exemplum protreptici scripsit*).[73] But on close examination this statement can in fact hold very little weight: in addition to other obscurities, it is not clear what *ad exemplum protreptici*

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[73] The Two Gallieni XX.1–2, translating the text in David Magie, *The Scriptores Historiae Augustae Volume III* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 58.

scripsit means; in what respect Cicero is supposed to have followed the example of a protreptic is unclear.[74]

Let us briefly review some facts that can be established with a fair amount of confidence.[75] We are informed by Martianus Capella that 'the question whether we ought to philosophize is discussed in the *Hortensius*'.[76] The work was a protreptic dialogue consisting of four characters: Lucullus, Catulus, Hortensius, and Cicero (the same *dramatis personae* as in Cicero's *Academica Priora*). Quintus Hortensius Hortalus, a famous orator who lived 114–49 BCE, was portrayed as attacking philosophy (fragments 52, 59, 62, and 38). Cicero responded in a protreptic speech that came near the end (fragments 69–70, 99i, 101, and 102). Here is Cicero's own description of the *Hortensius* in his introduction to *De Finibus*.[77]

> To those who pour scorn on philosophy I made an adequate response in the book in which I defend and laud philosophy against the accusations and attacks of Hortensius. This book appeared to please you and all those whom I consider competent to judge, and so I undertook to write more, fearing that otherwise I might be perceived as exciting people's enthusiasm but unable to sustain it. As for those who take great pleasure in philosophy, but want it to be practiced only to a moderate extent – they are demanding a restraint that is hard to exercise. Philosophy is a pursuit which, once entered upon, cannot be limited or held back. In consequence, I regard as almost more just those who would altogether

[74] There is so little context that it seems impossible to recover what arguments are being referred to (which is of course ironic, given that the author suggests that the arguments are very well known). There must have been some mention of the fact that feuds can break out when a writer feels that his ancestors have been insulted, but that point seems to relate neither to any surviving fragment of the *Hortensius*, nor to any especially protreptic point. Ross and others have translated the key phrase in such a way that Aristotle's *Protrepticus* is directly referred to: e.g., 'which he modeled on the *Protrepticus*' (Ross, testimonium 1 of the *Protrepticus* in *Select Fragments*); 'written in imitation of the *Protrepticus*' (Magie in the Loeb of the *Historia Augusta*, who adds a note referring to Aristotle's *Protrepticus*). But it is possible, if not probable, that the author of the *Historia Augusta* meant to refer not just to Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, but generically to the protreptic genre.

[75] The following summary is based on the account of Charles Oscar Brink in his review of 'M. Ruch, *L'Hortensius de Cicéron – histoire et reconstruction*', *The Journal of Roman Studies*, 51 (1961), 215–222, at 218–219. The following edition has superseded the earlier editions, and its system of reference will be used: Laila Straume-Zimmermann, *Ciceros Hortensius* (Bern: Herbert Lang, 1976).

[76] Mart. Cap., 5:441 = fragment 7 in Straume-Zimmerman, *Ciceros Hortensius*.

[77] Cicero also mentions his defense of philosophy against its revilers in *Acad.* 2.5–6, *Tusc.* 2.1–4, 3.6, and *Div.* 2.1.

turn me away from philosophy, than those who would set bounds on the infinite and desire moderation when the greater the study, the greater the reward. If wisdom can be attained, one should not just acquire it but enjoy it to the full. And if its attainment is hard, there is none the less no end to the search for truth except its discovery. To tire of the search is disgraceful given that its object is so beautiful.[78]

By the survival of external reports, and by his own description, then, we know that the *Hortensius* was a work in which Cicero exchanged adversarial speeches with the literary character Hortensius, a real-life person, the most famous orator of his day. This Hortensius delivered a sustained *apotreptic* to philosophy. In addition to the responses known to have been in the voice of the character Cicero, there is a self-refutation argument that may have been voiced by Cicero or Catulus. As Lactantius reports:

> Hortensius in Cicero, when contending against philosophy, was pressed by a clever argument; when he said that men should not do philosophy, he seemed nevertheless to do philosophy, since it is up to philosophers to dispute what in life should be done, and what should not be done.[79]

This version of the self-refutation argument conforms perfectly to the interpretation that we have just been exploring on the basis of the report of Alexander of Aphrodisias about Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, and like Alexander's report, it shows none of the anachronistic stoicizing of the later reports: Cicero appears to have modeled Aristotle's argument directly, and its dialogical foundation, very closely.[80] This entire network of evidence – including Cicero's general remarks about how he imitated Aristotle, and both the internal and external evidence (the fragments and reports by other authors) indicate that Cicero's *Hortensius* was a work that

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[78]   Cic., *Fin.* 1.2–3, translated by Raphael Woolf, *Cicero: On Moral Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[79]   *Ciceronis Hortensius contra philosophiam disserens, circumvenitur arguta conclusione; quod cum diceret philosophandum non esse, nihilominus philosophari videbatur, quoniam philosophi est, quid in vita faciendum, vel non faciendum sit, disputare.* (Lactant., *Div. inst.* III.16.9 = fragment 49 in Straume-Zimmerman, *Ciceros* Hortensius).

[80]   In several other places, Cicero seems to have followed Aristotle's *Protrepticus* closely. For example, according to Augustine (*Contra Iulianum* 4.15.78 = fragment 99i in Straume-Zimmerman, *Ciceros* Hortensius), Cicero reportedly refers to Aristotle in comparing the soul-body relationship to the cruel method of torture used by the Tyrrhenian (or 'Etruscan') pirates: chaining living prisoners to corpses, a direct reference to Aristotle's *Protrepticus* (*apud* Iambl., *Protr.* VIII.48.2–8).

followed the Aristotelian pattern of writing dialogues in several ways, the most relevant for our present purposes being that he included adversarial voices in direct speech to deliver apotreptics against philosophy. But if Cicero modeled Aristotle in this way, and if the *Hortensius* contained apotreptic speeches against philosophy, then it seems to follow that Aristotle's *Protrepticus* must have contained apotreptic speeches against philosophy, and hence must have been a dialogue. Otherwise, upon what would Cicero have modeled his apotreptic speeches, and how else could his modeling of protreptic speeches have been responsive to those apotreptic speeches we know to have been present in his work?

In fact, we think on independent grounds that Aristotle had originally made the most famous oratorical writer of his own day (Isocrates) a character in his own dialogue, and this characterization was a model for Cicero's character 'Hortensius'. But the Isocratean character in Aristotle's work was evidently made to deliver not a general apotreptic to philosophy, like Hortensius, but instead a *protreptic* to a more limited conception of philosophy (and specifically to his brand of rhetorical and practical philosophy), combined with an *apotreptic* against the competing theoretical and mathematical conception of philosophy on offer at the Academy. It is interesting that in the above quotation Cicero refers to the nuanced position held by 'those who take great pleasure in philosophy, but want it to be practiced only to a moderate extent' – a statement which however much currency it may have had in Cicero's milieu, unmistakably resembles Plato's Callicles and Isocrates' classic employment of the same trope in the *Antidosis* (which, almost as soon as it was written was imitated and answered in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*). But we will return to this point in the next section as we turn to the characterization of that work specifically.

An Isocratean apotreptic speech originating in Aristotle's *Protrepticus* preserved in Iamblichus

In this last section, we introduce to modern readers a sophisticated apotreptic against Academic philosophy, spoken by the character 'Isocrates', an apotreptic that satisfies Aristotle's analysis and gives occasion for the other characters to respond with a great network of relevant protreptic arguments. Relative to Düring's 1961 edition, this is an expansion of the evidence base, but this is not our discovery; it was accepted as part of the Protrepticus for the first time by V. Rose (1886), and col-

lected in fr. 5 in the edition of R. Walzer (1934), before being collected
in fr. 5 of the translation of W. D. Ross (1952), which was reviewed by
D. J. Allan (1953) with a particular reference to this material (see note
3 above). After presenting the impugned evidence,[81] we provide argu-
ments to authenticate it and reverse Düring's innovative decision to ex-
clude it.

> If their end result is useless, the point for which the philosophers say
> they should be learned, it will necessarily be much more pointless to
> put effort into them. [8] And on what the end is, there is pretty much
> agreement among those who have been most precise about it. [10] For
> some of them say that it is knowledge of what is unjust and just and bad
> and good, a knowledge similar to geometry and the other sciences of
> that sort, while others say it is intelligence about nature as well as that
> sort of truth, the sort of intelligence that those around Anaxagoras and
> Parmenides proposed [79.7–15].
>
> So it should not be overlooked by someone who is going to scruti-
> nize these subjects that everything that is good and beneficial for the
> life of humans consists in being used and put into action, and not in the
> mere knowledge. [18] For we are not healthy by being acquainted with
> what produces health, but rather by applying it to our bodies, nor are we
> wealthy by knowing about wealth, but by possessing a very substantial
> amount nor, most important of all, do we live well by knowing certain
> sorts of beings, but by acting well, for this is truly what it is to be suc-
> cessful. [24] Hence it is appropriate for philosophy as well, if indeed it is
> beneficial, to be either a practice of good things or else useful for those
> sorts of practices [79.15–80.7].
>
> Now then, that it is neither itself a sort of production of things, nor
> is any other of the sciences previously mentioned, is clear to all; and
> someone could realize that it is not useful for actions either, from this:
> [5] We have the greatest example of this in the sciences that are similar
> to it and the opinions that underlie them, for we see the geometers being
> able to do none of those things that they observe by demonstration; and
> yet to divide an estate, and all the other properties of quantities as well
> as locations, is something that the land-surveyors can do on the basis of
> experience, whereas those who know about the mathematical subjects
> and the arguments about them know how they should act, but are not
> able to act [80.1–11].
>
> The case is similar with music and the other sciences in which the
> cognitive aspect is divided off from the empirical. [15] For those who
> determine the proofs and the arguments about harmony and other

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[81] Iambl., *DCMS* XXVI, 79.7-81.4 = fr. 5 Ross.

things like that are accustomed to enquiring, but take part in none of their practical functions, just like those who do philosophy. [19] In fact, even if they happen to be capable of handling something in them, when they learn the proofs, they automatically do it worse, as if on purpose, whereas those who have no knowledge of the arguments, if they are trained and have correct opinions, are altogether superior for all practical purposes. [23] So too with the subject matter of astronomy such as sun and moon and the other stars; those whose training has been in the causes and the arguments have no knowledge of what is useful for humans, whereas those who have what are called navigational sciences about them are capable of predicting for us storms and winds and many of these events. [81.1] Hence for practical activities sciences like this will be entirely useless, and if among activities they miss out on the correct ones, the love of learning misses out on the greatest of goods [80.13–81.4].

εἰ ἀχρεῖον αὐτῶν τὸ τέλος, δι᾽ ὅπερ αὐτὰ μανθάνειν φασὶ δεῖν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, πολὺ πρότερον ἀνάγκη μάταιον εἶναι τὴν περὶ ταῦτα σπουδήν. [8] περὶ δὲ τοῦ τέλους σχεδὸν ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες οἱ δοκοῦντες περὶ αὐτὴν μάλιστα ἠκριβωκέναι. [10] φασὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ δικαίων καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμην, ὁμοίαν οὖσαν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς τοιαύταις, οἱ δὲ τὴν περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀληθείας φρόνησιν, οἵαν οἵ τε περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Παρμενίδην εἰσηγήσαντο. [79.7–15]

δεῖ δὴ μὴ λεληθέναι τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων ἐξετάζειν, ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι καὶ πράττειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τῷ γινώσκειν μόνον· [18] οὔτε γὰρ ὑγιαίνομεν τῷ γνωρίζειν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὑγιείας, ἀλλὰ τῷ προσφέρεσθαι τοῖς σώμασιν· οὔτε πλουτοῦμεν τῷ γιγνώσκειν πλοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι πολλὴν οὐσίαν· οὐδὲ τὸ πάντων μέγιστον εὖ ζῶμεν τῷ γιγνώσκειν ἄττα τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ τῷ πράττειν εὖ· τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀληθῶς τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν. [24] ὥστε προσήκει καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος, ἤτοι πρᾶξιν εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ χρήσιμον εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις. [79.15–80.1]

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔθ᾽ αὕτη πραγμάτων ἐργασία τις οὔτ᾽ ἄλλη τῶν προειρημένων ἐπιστημῶν οὐδεμία, φανερόν ἐστι πᾶσιν· ὅτι δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐστὶ χρήσιμος εἰς τὰς πράξεις, ἐκεῖθεν ἄν τις καταμάθοι. [5] μέγιστον γὰρ ἔχομεν παράδειγμα τὰς ὁμοίας ἐπιστήμας αὐτῇ καὶ τὰς ὑποκειμένας δόξας· ὧν γὰρ εἰσιν οἱ γεωμέτραι δι᾽ ἀποδείξεως θεωρητικοί, τούτων οὐδενὸς ὁρῶμεν αὐτοὺς ὄντας πρακτικούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ διελεῖν χωρίον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα πάθη τῶν τε μεγεθῶν καὶ τῶν τόπων οἱ μὲν γεωδαῖται δύνανται δι᾽ ἐμπειρίαν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰ μαθήματα καὶ τοὺς τούτων λόγους ἴσασι μὲν ὡς δεῖ πράττειν, οὐ δύνανται δὲ πράττειν. [80.1–13]

ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας, ὅσαις διῄρηται τό τε τῆς γνώσεως καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐμπειρίας χωρίς. [15] οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀποδείξεις καὶ τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς διωρισμένοι περὶ συμφωνίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ὥσπερ οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, σκοπεῖν εἰώθασιν, οὐδενὸς δὲ κοινοῦσι τῶν ἔργων. [19] ἀλλὰ κἂν τυγχάνωσιν αὐτῶν δυνάμενοί τι χειρουργεῖν, ὅταν μάθωσι τὰς ἀποδείξεις, ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες, εὐθὺς αὐτὰ χεῖρον ποιοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ τοὺς μὲν λόγους ἀγνοοῦντες, γεγυμνασμένοι δὲ καὶ δοξάζοντες ὀρθῶς ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς χρείας. [23] ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν, οἷον ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων, οἱ μὲν τὰς αἰτίας καὶ τοὺς λόγους μεμελετηκότες οὐδὲν τῶν χρησίμων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴσασιν, οἱ δὲ τὰς ὑπὸ τούτων ναυτικὰς καλουμένας ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντες χειμῶνας καὶ πνεύματα καὶ πολλὰ τῶν γινομένων δύνανται προλέγειν ἡμῖν. [81.1] ὥστε πρὸς τὰς πράξεις ἀχρεῖοι παντελῶς ἔσονται αἱ τοιαῦται ἐπιστῆμαι· εἰ δὲ τῶν πράξεων τῶν ὀρθῶν ἀπολείπονται, τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀπολείπεται ἡ φιλομάθεια. [80.13–81.4]

We can authenticate this text as part of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* in the following way. Now that Bywater's attribution of Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* VI to Aristotle's *Protrepticus* has been authenticated,[82] we observe that a substantial proportion of the text of *Protrepticus* VI is identical to *DCMS* XXVI.[83] If the former text is from the *Protrepticus* then the latter must be, since the texts are identical. We must conclude, then, that at least part of *DCMS* XXVI was part of the *Protrepticus*. If we assume that he follows his normal procedure and uses a single source text throughout chapter XXVI, that must be part of the *Protrepticus*. Next we have to ask ourselves whether the earlier and later chapters are also based on the *Protrepticus*, since Iamblichus' technique is to use only one work at a time, and he often uses the same work over several consecutive chapters.[84] Note that it has been over sixty years since Merlan argued, and Festugière confirmed, that in *DCMS* XXIII Iamblichus' source text is Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.[85] We accept their results but cannot here discuss

[82] Ingram Bywater, 'On a lost dialogue of Aristotle', *Journal of Philology*, 2 (1869), 55–69. We argue in support of Bywater's attribution in Hutchinson and Johnson, 'Authenticating Aristotle's *Protrepticus*', at 269–278.

[83] *Protr.* VI, 38.3–7 = *DCMS* XXVI, 81.7–11; 38.10–14 = 81.12–16; 38.22–39.4 = 81.20–24; 39.16–40.1 = 82.1–11; 40.12–41.5 = 82.14–83.5.

[84] For example, Plato's *Republic* in *Protr.* XV–XVI, Plato's *Gorgias* in *Protr.* XVII–XVIII, and of course Aristotle's *Protrepticus* in Iambl., *Protr.* VI–XII.

[85] Philip Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* (1st ed. 1953, 3rd ed., The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1975); André-Jean Festugière, 'Un fragment nouveau du "*Protreptique*" d'Aristote'. *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger*, 146 (1956),

any further the question of where in the *DCMS* Iamblichus starts using Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.[86] And here we can only state but not discuss or defend the theory that Iamblichus stops using Aristotle's *Protrepticus* at the end of *DCMS* XXVII.[87]

Further evidence for its attribution to Aristotle is the way that this speech conforms perfectly to Aristotle's guidelines for apotreptic speech as presented in the *Rhetoric*, and in particular how it employs tropes about the utility of mathematics and theoretical philosophy. Now the details of this apotreptic to theoretical science are fascinating when we consider how far Aristotle went to work out the exact relationship – that is the architectonic structures – that govern the relations between the mathematical-theoretical mathematical sciences and the empirical-practical ones: these exact examples are mentioned and discussed in the *Analytica Posteriora* and other texts concerned with scientific method.[88]

But in the *Protrepticus*, Aristotle offered a general refutation of the apotreptic trope of utility, in a passage which strongly suggests a dialogical framework.

> To search for every science to produce some other thing and to require
> that it be useful is the demand of someone entirely mistaken about how
> much things that are good are in principle far apart from things that

117–27; accepted by Donald James Allan, 'The Fragments of Aristotle. Review of W. D. Ross, *Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta*', *The Classical Review* n.s. 6 (1956), 224–25.

[86]   If Merlan's attribution of *DCMS* XXIII is right, then it is prima facie likely that *DCMS* XXIV–XXV would also be attributable to Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, since the material in these two chapters intervenes between the authentic XXIII and XXVI material, and Iamblichus' usual method is to use a single source text before putting it back on the shelf and picking up another. The source text in these two chapters has long been identified as Aristotle, but the question has not been raised about which work of Aristotle the fragments should be attributed. It has been assumed, with great prima facie plausibility, that they originate from one of Aristotle's books *On the Pythagoreans*. But the issue needs to be studied further because Aristotle very frequently discusses Pythagorean positions in other general (dialectical) contexts, such as *De caelo* I, *Metaphysica* I and *Ethica Nicomachea* V, and so could easily have done so in the *Protrepticus*, where he certainly did mention Pythagoras (e.g. *apud* Iambl., *Protr.* IX, 51.8 – a passage discussed below). We also cannot in this context articulate the reasons for our view that Iamblichus starts using Aristotle's *Protrepticus* in *DCMS* XXI–XXII.

[87]   The bulk of *DCMS* XXVII is attributed to Aristotle's *Protrepticus* in D. S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson, 'Aristotle's *Protrepticus* and the protreptic of *De partibus animalium* I' (unpublished manuscript 2; available for download at www.protrepticus.info).

[88]   For discussion and bibliography, see Monte Ransome Johnson, 'Aristotle's Architectonic Sciences', in *Theory and Practice in Aristotle's Natural Science*, ed. David Ebrey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 163–86.

are necessities; they differ the most. [20] For among the things without which living is impossible, one should say that those that are appreciated on account of some other thing are necessities and joint causes, while all those that are appreciated for themselves, even if no other thing results from them, should be called goods in the strict sense; for this is not valuable because of that, and that for the sake of something else, nor does this vanish by going on to infinity – rather, this comes to a halt at some point. [25] So then it is absolutely ridiculous to search from everything a benefit other than the thing itself, and to ask 'Then where is the utility for us?' and 'What is it useful for?'. For what we say is truly said: such a fellow is not like anyone who knows what is morally good or anyone who makes any discernment between a cause and a joint cause.[89]

> τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν ἀπὸ πάσης ἐπιστήμης ἕτερόν τι γενέσθαι καὶ δεῖν χρησίμην αὐτὴν εἶναι, παντάπασιν ἀγνοοῦντός τινός ἐστιν ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· διαφέρει γὰρ πλεῖστον. [20] τὰ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἕτερον ἀγαπώμενα τῶν πραγμάτων, ὧν ἄνευ ζῆν ἀδύνατον, ἀναγκαῖα καὶ συναίτια λεκτέον, ὅσα δὲ δι' αὑτά, κἂν ἀποβαίνῃ μηδὲν ἕτερον, ἀγαθὰ κυρίως· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τόδε μὲν αἱρετὸν διὰ τόδε, τόδε δὲ δι' ἄλλο, τοῦτο δὲ εἰς ἄπειρον οἴχεται προϊόν, ἀλλ' ἵσταταί που. [25] γελοῖον οὖν ἤδη παντελῶς τὸ ζητεῖν ἀπὸ παντός ὠφέλειαν ἑτέραν παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ 'τί οὖν ἡμῖν ὄφελος;' καὶ 'τί χρήσιμον;' ἐρωτᾶν. [28] ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ, ὅπερ λέγομεν, οὐδὲν ἔοικεν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἰδότι καλὸν κἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τί αἴτιον τῷ διαγιγνώσκοντι καὶ συναίτιον.

This argument deploys a key rhetorical trope recommended by Aristotle in *Rhetorica* I. Recall that the ultimate end of all deliberative speech is εὐδαιμονία, and that apotreptic and protreptic speech is focused on the beneficial and the harmful. In order to explain these concepts Aristotle defines the good. This he does twice, in both I.6 and I.7, in a set of passages that are virtually a doublet, except for an extremely interesting difference in detail. Here is the second version:

> We call good: what is chosen for itself and not for the sake of something else, and what everything aims at, and what everyone would choose if they could have intellect and intelligence (καὶ οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἂν καὶ φρόνησιν λαβόντα ἕλοιτο);[90] and what is productive and preservative of such things, or is always accompanied by them. And that for the

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[89] Arist., *Protr.*, *apud* Iambl., *Protr.* IX.52.16–53.2.

[90] In the parallel passage in *Rh.* I.6.1362a21–29, this part reads: 'and what everything aims at, or everything having sensation or intellect, or that could get intellect; and what intellect would give to each, and what intellect does give to each in individual cases'

sake of which things are done is the end, and for each individual that thing is a good which fulfills these conditions in relation to himself. It follows, then, that a greater number of goods is a greater good than one or than a smaller number, if that one or smaller number is included in the count; for then the larger number surpasses the smaller, and the smaller quantity is surpassed as being contained in the larger.[91]

Aristotle's response to the Isocratean attack on theoretical philosophy, which has been fully authenticated as being part of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, goes directly to the fundamental issue of what is a good, and thus what is beneficial, and employs Aristotle's distinction in the *Rhetoric* between what is 'chosen for itself and not for the sake of something else' (which we may follow convention in labeling 'intrinsically valuable') and what is 'productive and preservative of such things' (i.e. 'instrumentally valuable'). Aristotle argues that the Isocratean apotreptic against mathematical and theoretical philosophy fails to recognize the basic distinction between kinds of good things, instruments and ends. Each and every theoretical science mentioned by Isocrates is considered by Aristotle to have intrinsic value: harmonics, astronomy, geometry. And Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* recommends rank-ordering things as being good on the basis of whether they apprehend the principles and causes of something – employing the exact same terminology in the *Protrepticus* as in the *Rhetoric*:

> And a thing is greater if it is a principle but the other is not. And also if it is a cause and the other is not, for the same reason. For existence or generation is impossible without a cause and principle. And if there are two principles, that from the greater is greater. And if there are two causes, what comes from the greater cause is greater; and conversely, of two first principles, the first principle of the greater thing is the greater, and of two causes the cause of the greater is the greater cause.[92]

Since Isocrates cannot recognize the causal structure of these sciences, he cannot distinguish the 'cause' from a 'co-cause' and thus cannot determine what is greater or better. Also, recall that in the *Rhetorica*, Aristotle argues that sciences can be rank-ordered on the basis of their objects:

(καὶ οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα, ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν, καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἑκάστῳ ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον νοῦς ἀποδίδωσιν ἑκάστῳ).

[91]   Arist., *Rh*. I.7, 1363b12–16.
[92]   Arist., *Rh*. I.7, 1364a10–15.

'the more valuable and beautiful the object of a science, the more valuable and beautiful the science itself is in due proportion'.[93] Aristotle has a clear means of rank-ordering the sciences relative to each other; by contrast Isocrates cannot even distinguish between which sciences are greater on the basis of their access to causes and principles. This response of 'Aristotle' to the apotreptic of 'Isocrates' is so consistent with the principles of Aristotle's philosophy and is such a well-focused response to it that we must conclude that Aristotle crafted the apotreptic of 'Isocrates' to be not only fully consistent with the philosophy of Isocrates but also exquisitely vulnerable to this response, later delivered as part of a sequence of refutations by his character 'Aristotle'.

This sequence of refutations to the surviving and lost apotreptic arguments of 'Isocrates' includes the rest of the material cited in *Protr.* VI and/or DCMS XXVI and XXVII, followed by the teleological arguments of *Protr.* VII and IX, all spoken by 'Aristotle'. After the dialectical and rhetorical flourishes directed against 'Isocrates' at the end of *Protr.* IX, 'Aristotle' deepens his counter-attack, in a speech cited in *Protr.* X, by undermining the Isocratean claim that the theoretical sciences lack practical value. We close our study of the Isocratean apotreptic by selecting this Aristotelian protreptic in *Protr.* X, displaying its relevance to the evidence excluded by Düring.

Just as the doctors who are sophisticated and most of those concerned with athletic training pretty much agree that those who are going to be good doctors or athletic trainers must be experienced about nature, so good legislators must be experienced about nature too, indeed much more than the former. [18] For the former are craftsmen of virtue only in the body while the latter, whose topic is the virtue of the soul and who pretend to be experts in the success and failure of the state, have much more additional need for philosophy. [22] For just like in the other craftsmanship skills the best of their tools were discovered on the basis of nature (in carpentry, for example, the carpenter's line, the standard rule, the string compass) [... *a line of text is missing* ...] for some are acquired with water, or with light and beams of sunshine, and it is by reference to these that we put to the test what is to our senses adequately straight and smooth - similarly the politician must have certain standards taken from nature itself, i.e. from the truth, by reference to which he judges what is just, what is good, and what is expedient. [54.12–55.3] ...

In the other skills the other skills people pretty much know that they do not get their tools and their most precise reasonings from the

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[93] Arist., *Rh.* I.7.1364b10–11; cf. *Top.* III.1, 116a21–22. And see footnote 44.

primary things themselves, but from what is second or third hand or further away; and they get their arguments from experience, whereas the imitation is on the basis of the precise things themselves only for the philosopher, for he is a spectator of these very things, not of imitations. [14] So just as no one is a good builder who does not use a measuring rod or any other such tool but compares them to other buildings, in a similar way perhaps, if someone either lays down laws for states or does his deeds by looking at and imitating other human deeds or political systems, whether the Spartan or that of the Cretans or of any other such state, he would be neither a good legislator nor a virtuous politician; for an imitation of what is not beautiful cannot be beautiful, nor can an imitation of what is not divine and stable in nature be immortal and stable. [22|23] But it is clear that the philosopher is the only craftsman to have both laws that are stable and actions that are correct and beautiful. [25|26] For he is the only one who lives looking at nature and at the divine and, just as if he were some good navigator who hitches the principles of his way of life onto things that are eternal and steadfast, he moors his ship and lives life on his own terms [55.7–56.2].

ὥσπερ γὰρ τῶν ἰατρῶν ὅσοι κομψοὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν γυμναστικὴν οἱ πλεῖστοι σχεδὸν ὁμολογοῦσιν ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀγαθοὺς ἰατροὺς ἔσεσθαι καὶ γυμναστὰς περὶ φύσεως ἐμπείρους εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς νομοθέτας ἐμπείρους εἶναι δεῖ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ πολύ γε μᾶλλον ἐκείνων. [18] οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῆς εἰσι δημιουργοὶ μόνον, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς ὄντες καὶ περὶ πόλεως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ κακοδαιμονίας διδάξειν προσποιούμενοι πολὺ δὴ μᾶλλον προσδέονται φιλοσοφίας. [22] καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις ταῖς δημιουργικαῖς ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως εὕρηται τὰ βέλτιστα τῶν ὀργάνων, οἷον ἐν τεκτονικῇ στάθμη καὶ κανὼν καὶ τόρνος † τὰ μὲν ὕδατι καὶ φωτὶ καὶ ταῖς αὐγαῖς τῶν ἀκτίνων ληφθέντων, πρὸς ἃ κρίνοντες τὸ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἱκανῶς εὐθὺ καὶ λεῖον βασανίζομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν πολιτικὸν ἔχειν τινὰς ὅρους δεῖ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, πρὸς οὓς κρινεῖ τί δίκαιον καὶ τί καλὸν καὶ τί συμφέρον. [54.12–55.3] …

καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τά τε ὄργανα καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους οὐκ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν πρώτων λαβόντες σχεδὸν ἴσασιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων καὶ πολλοστῶν, τούς τε λόγους ἐξ ἐμπειρίας λαμβάνουσι· τῷ δὲ φιλοσόφῳ μόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀκριβῶν ἡ μίμησίς ἐστιν· αὐτῶν γάρ ἐστι θεατής, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μιμημάτων. [14] ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ᾽ οἰκοδόμος ἀγαθός ἐστιν οὗτος ὅστις κανόνι μὲν μὴ χρῆται μηδὲ τῶν ἄλλων μηδενὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὀργάνων, ἑτέροις δὲ οἰκοδομήμασι παραβάλλων, ὁμοίως ἴσως κἂν εἴ τις ἢ νόμους τίθεται πόλεσιν ἢ πράττει πράξεις ἀποβλέπων καὶ μιμούμενος πρὸς ἑτέρας πράξεις ἢ πολιτείας ἀνθρωπίνας Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ Κρητῶν ἤ τινων ἄλλων τοιούτων, οὐκ

ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης οὐδὲ σπουδαῖος· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται μὴ καλοῦ μίμημα
καλὸν εἶναι, μηδὲ θείου καὶ βεβαίου τὴν φύσιν ἀθάνατον καὶ βέβαιον.
[22|23] ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι μόνου τῶν δημιουργῶν τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ νόμοι
βέβαιοι καὶ πράξεις εἰσὶν ὀρθαὶ καὶ καλαί. μόνος γὰρ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν
βλέπων ζῇ καὶ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, καὶ καθάπερ ἂν εἰ κυβερνήτης τις ἀγαθὸς
ἐξ ἀιδίων καὶ μονίμων ἀναψάμενος τοῦ βίου τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁρμεῖ καὶ ζῇ καθ'
ἑαυτόν [55.7–56.2].

This is a forceful argument directed squarely at Isocrates' political science as evidenced both by his own works and in the representation of its implications in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. Aristotle argues that the political scientist that pays attention to theoretical philosophy – including natural philosophy – does much better than one who prescribes laws merely by selecting from existing laws among cities like Sparta and Crete.[94]

Thus Aristotle's protreptic responses to the apotreptic of Isocrates argue both that it is unnecessary to demonstrate the utility of theoretical philosophy, and that theoretical philosophy is much more useful than the unmethodical procedure of Isocrates – a point on which Isocrates is also criticized by Aristotle in the last chapter of the *Ethica Nicomachea*, a chapter intertextually intertwined with Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.[95] Further, as we saw, this argument about the relative value of different sciences (or different kinds of science) was recommended as a trope by Aristotle himself in *Rhetoric* I.5.[96]

We have run out of space to discuss in further detail the interaction of the apotreptic speeches of Isocrates (and the Isocratean character in the *Protrepticus*), and their protreptic refutations by Aristotle. We have tried to do so elsewhere,[97] and would encourage other scholars to pursue these rich parallel veins of argument, some of which contain gold. But what we have outlined here is a sufficient first authentication of this apotreptic speech as part of Aristotle's Protrepticus. Since Rose in 1886 (and later Ross) gave no reasons for its inclusion, perhaps it seemed to Düring easy to exclude it, given his prior commitment that the lost work was not a dialogue. But the reasons actually advanced by Düring are

[94]   Arist., *Protr.*, *apud* Iambl., *Protr.* X, 54.12–56.2. The argument is discussed in Johnson, 'Aristotle's Architectonic Sciences', pp. 179–83.

[95]   See D. S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson, 'Protreptic Aspects of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics', *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. Ronald Polansky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 383–409.

[96]   See footnotes 44 and 93.

[97]   D. S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson, 'The *Antidosis* of Isocrates and Aristotle's *Protrepticus*' (unpublished manuscript 3; available at www.protrepticus.info).

thin and subjective: of 79.7–15 he states that 'I cannot find anything in this part of cf. 26 which can reasonably be connected with the argument of the *Protrepticus*' (p.207), but then includes 79.15-80.1 as a fragment of the *Protrepticus* 'with some hesitation' (p.208); at 80.1–81.4 he asserts that 'the text does not at all fit into the framework of the *Protrepticus*' (p.208). During's inability to perceive the importance of the entire passage to Aristotle's *Protrepticus* is due to the theory-ladenness of his observation of the text: his antecedent commitment to the theory that the work is a monologue and there is a continuous stand-alone declarative 'argument' in the work (expressed in the single voice of Aristotle) blinds him to the presence of other voices and points of view, and the way in which Aristotle actually offers several independent arguments against the various kinds of apotreptics confronted by Academic philosophers at the time.

The presence of adversarial speeches in the *Protrepticus* is to be expected given what Cicero says about his own method of composing dialogues following 'the Aristotelian pattern'. Both Cicero's *Hortensius* and Aristotle's *Protrepticus* are also reported to have contained a dialectical argument to the effect that a speaker offering a general apotreptic against philosophy refuted himself by a performative contradiction. Such arguments can only be valid if we assume that an actual interlocutor did offer an apotreptic against philosophy. Thus, a rhetorical, dialectical, and logical analysis of some of the reports and fragments of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* all point to the work having been a dialogue, as does the history of the reception and imitation of the work by Cicero.

In a later century, Cicero's *Hortensius* inspired Augustine with a great passion for philosophy, as he makes clear in some of the most moving passages of his *Confessions*; but later in his life, when he composed one of his earliest religious protreptics, Augustine chose to exploit the sub-genre established by Aristotle's *Protrepticus* and Cicero's *Hortensius*, in his anti-Ciceronian dialogue *Contra Academicos*. This work features an addressee (Romanianus) and an internal audience of youths, with the main parts being played by living speakers offering apotreptics to Ciceronian philosophy, and protreptics to Christianity; and the main speaker is the author himself. The style of protreptic work pioneered by Aristotle in his *Protrepticus* proved to be a robust vehicle that served the purposes of various authors, writing for their separate purposes in different centuries and other languages.