

The development of dialectic  
and argumentation theory in  
post-classical Islamic  
intellectual history

by

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## DEDICATED TO MY MOTHER



**Hadice Akçay-Karabela**

**(Hacer Hanım)**

**(1938- 2008)**

If this work succeeds at all, it is due to my mother, Hadice Akçay-Karabela, known as Hacer Hanım among her friends, who lived through the difficulties I faced while working towards my Ph.D. dissertation. She died on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2008 of a sudden heart attack. She decided to leave the city of Isparta on 23<sup>rd</sup> February 2008 for Erbaa, for reasons nobody has understood (at that time she was living in Ankara not in Isparta, instead of leaving Isparta for Ankara, she decided to leave for Erbaa spontaneously), to plant 23 trees in the backyard of the house in which she raised eight children. After she planted the trees she passed away alone. No sultan or president or king or general of an army or scientist or pope; no banker or cartel or oil company or big TV network or ayatollah holds the key to as much power as she has. None is as rich. For hers is the invincible weapon against the evils of this earth: a rock-solid heart. I do not speak her language, yet the eloquence of her life speaks to me. The last words I heard from her in a firm tone of voice a month before she died were these: “*Hayatta hep ‘gözün aydın olsun’a gelmezler, bir arada ‘başın sağolsun’a gelirler. Bazen gülersin bazen ağlarsın. Aman! Hayat böyle bir şey oğlum be.’*”

*Your Son*  
Mehmet

## ABSTRACT

This dissertation is an analysis of the development of dialectic and argumentation theory in post-classical Islamic intellectual history. The central concerns of the thesis are; treatises on the theoretical understanding of the concept of dialectic and argumentation theory, and how, in practice, the concept of dialectic, as expressed in the Greek classical tradition, was received and used by five communities in the Islamic intellectual camp. It shows how dialectic as an argumentative discourse diffused into five communities (theologians, poets, grammarians, philosophers and jurists) and how these local dialectics that the individual communities developed fused into a single system to form a general argumentation theory (*ādāb al-baḥth*) applicable to all fields.

I evaluate a treatise by Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī (d.702/1302), the founder of this general theory, and the treatises that were written after him as a result of his work. I concentrate specifically on work by ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d.756/1355), Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d.816/1413), Taṣkōprüzāde (d.968/1561), Saçaklızāde (d.1150/1737) and Gelenbevî (d.1205/1791) and analyze how each writer (from Samarqandī to Gelenbevî) altered the shape of argumentative discourse and how later intellectuals in the post-classical Islamic world responded to that discourse bequeathed by their predecessors.

What is striking about the period that this dissertation investigates (from 1300-1800) is the persistence of what could be called the linguistic turn in argumentation theory. After a centuries-long run, the *jadal*-based dialectic of the classical period was displaced by a new argumentation theory, which was dominantly linguistic in character. This linguistic turn in argumentation dates from the final quarter of the fourteenth century in Ījī’s impressively prescient work on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. This idea, which finally surfaced in the post-classical period, that argumentation is about definition and that, therefore, defining is the business of language—even perhaps, that language is the only available medium for understanding and being understood—affected the way that argumentation theory was processed throughout most of the period in question.

The argumentative discourse that started with Ibn al-Rāwandī in the third/ninth century left a permanent imprint on Islamic intellectual history, which was then full of concepts, terminology and objectives from this discourse up until the late nineteenth century. From this perspective, Islamic intellectual history can be read as the tension between two languages: the “language of dialectic” (*jadal*) and the “language of demonstration” (*burhān*), each of which refer not only to a significant feature of that history, but also to a feature that could dramatically alter the interpretation of that history.

## RÉSUMÉ

### **Titre: Le développement de la dialectique et théorie de l'argumentation dans la période post-classique de l'histoire intellectuelle islamique**

Cette dissertation est une analyse de l'évolution de la théorie dialectique et d'argumentation dans l'histoire intellectuelle islamique post-classique. Les préoccupations centrales de la thèse sont les suivantes: les traités sur la compréhension théorique de la notion de la théorie dialectique (de logique) et d'argumentation, et comment, en pratique, la notion dialectique, tel qu'elle est exprimée dans la tradition grecque classique, a été reçue et utilisée par les cinq collectivités du camp intellectuel islamique. Cette étude démontre comment la notion dialectique en tant que discours argumentatif a été diffusée dans cinq collectivités (théologiens, poètes, grammairiens, philosophes et juristes) et comment ces notions logiques locales, développées dans les différentes communautés, se sont fusionnées en un seul système pour former une théorie d'argumentation générale (*ādāb al-baḥth*) applicable à tous les domaines.

J'évalue un traité de Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī (d.702/1302), le fondateur de cette théorie générale, et les traités qui ont été écrits après lui en tant que succession de son travail. Je me concentre spécifiquement sur les travaux de 'Adud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d.756/1355), Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d.816/1413), Taşköprüzâde (d.968/1561), Saçaklızâde (d.1150/1737) et Gelenbevî (d.1205/1791) et analyse comment chaque auteur (de Samarqandī à Gelenbevî) a modifié la forme du discours argumentatif et comment les intellectuels, venus par après dans le monde post-islamique classique, ont répondu à ce discours transmis par leurs prédécesseurs.

Ce qui est frappant, de la période que cette thèse étudie (de 1300-1800), est la persistance de ce qu'on pourrait appeler le tournant linguistique dans la théorie de l'argumentation. Après plusieurs siècles, la notion

dialectique de la période classique basée sur *jadal* fût remplacée par une nouvelle théorie d'argumentation qui était principalement de caractère linguistique. Ce tournant linguistique dans l'argumentation est daté du dernier quart du quatorzième siècle dans le travail sur '*ilm al-waḍ'* impressionnant et prémonitoire d'al-Ījī. Cette idée, qui est finalement émergée dans la période post-classique, disant que l'argumentation décrit une définition et que, par conséquent, la définition est l'utilité du langage —et même peut-être, que le langage est le seul moyen disponible pour comprendre et être compris— a influencé la façon dont la théorie d'argumentation a été formulée dans la majeure partie de la période en question.

Le discours argumentatif qui a commencé avec Ibn al-Rāwandī au troisième/neuvième siècle a laissé une empreinte permanente dans l'histoire intellectuelle islamique qui s'est remplie de concepts, de terminologie et d'objectifs de ce discours jusqu'à la fin du dix-neuvième siècle. Selon cette perspective, l'histoire intellectuelle islamique peut être lue comme une divergence entre deux langues: le "langage dialectique" (*jadal*) et le "langage démonstratif" (*burhān*), dont chacun se réfère non seulement à une caractéristique importante de cette histoire, mais à une caractéristique qui pourrait changer radicalement l'interprétation de cette histoire.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Eric L. Ormsby, my thesis supervisor and a man of letters, not only for his oversight and assistance with the planning, execution and writing of this project, but also for his constant support throughout my years at McGill, even after his retirement. Co-supervisor Professor A. Üner Turgay's raw passion for my work as well as his concern for precision and detail has ensured that everything ended up in its proper place. Emeritus Professor Donald P. Little provided me with the intellectual stimulus to understand the classical period of Islamic history in a different way, but even more than his thought-provoking lectures, I thank him for introducing me to the world of the eighteenth-century English playwright and actor, Colley Cibber (d.1757), which helped me to grasp the dialectical relationship between writing (*theory=ashes*) and acting (*re-writing=burning*).

Hearty appreciation goes to Emeritus Professors Josef van Ess and Fuat Sezgin for their endless enthusiasm and precious time in Tübingen and Frankfurt. Dr. Larry B. Miller has assisted me a great deal (thanks to Prof. Ormsby), even though he has not been working in academia for twenty years. I also received excellent assistance from the director of Süleymaniye Library Emir Eş. I thank my sister, Prof. Nevin Karabela: reminding me to swim like fish in two diametrically opposite directions at all times "to find the truth."

I also thank Professor Issa J. Boullata, Professor Wael B. Hallaq, Associate Dean of Graduate Studies Professor Lisa Travis and Dean of Students Professor Jane Everett for their support in various ways in the completion of my Ph.D. at McGill. Many thanks to Prof. Şükrü Özen of ISAM, Prof. Hüseyin Sarioğlu of Istanbul University, Prof. M. Said Özervarlı, Prof. Bilal Kuşpınar, Charles Fugere, Dr. Ezgi Demirtaş, Faika Öz-Çelik, Dr. Fi Nanson, Gökhan Çelik, Emre Ünlüçayaklı, Yaşar Acat and Necmettin Pehlivan for their excellent company: they will not be forgotten. Also a woman of letters, Pollyanna, a *beautifulfreak*, made created-*kalām al-Mehmet* more colourful: *Merci à toi*. A doctoral fellowship for this research provided by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) is here acknowledged with so much appreciation.

Last but by no means least, I should record my intellectual debt to the independent Kurdish scholar, Seydâ Abdullah, for showing me how to examine and then analyze any kind of text through our reading of Sayyid Quṭb's (d.1966) *Fī Zilāl al-Qur'ān* and the eleventh-century Sufi figure Abū al-Qāsim al-Kushayrī's (d.465/1072) *Risāla al-Qushayriyya*. His principle of asking "who reveals to whom whose truth for what purpose" has been a great value to me: *Xwedê ji te razi be*.

## ABBREVIATIONS

- EI*<sup>2</sup> *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed., 12 vols. Leiden, 1960-2002)
- Esmâ* Bağdatlı İsmâil Paşa, *Hediyyetü'l-Ârifîn Esmâ ül-Müellifîn ve Âsâr ül-Musannifîn* (2 vols., Istanbul, 1951-1955)
- GAL* Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur* (2nd ed., 2 vols., Leiden, 1943-1949); *Supplement* (to 1st ed., henceforth *Suppl.*), 3 vols., Leiden, 1937-42.
- GAS* Fuat Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums*, (12 vols. to date, Leiden: Brill, 1967)
- İslâm* *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (37 vols. to date; Istanbul, 1988-)
- Keşf* Katib Çelebi, *Keşf el-Zunûn* (2 vols., Istanbul, 1943)
- Miller Larry B. Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory: A Study of the Development of Dialectic in Islam from the Tenth through Fourteenth Centuries* (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1984)
- OM* Bursalı Mehmed Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri* (Istanbul, 1334-43)
- Ta'rifât* 'Alî b. Muḥammad al-Jurjānî, *Ta'rifât* (Beirut: 'Ālam al-Kutub, 1987)
- TG* Josef van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. Und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra* (6 vols., Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1991-97)
- Shaqā'iq* Taşköprüzâde, *al-Shaqā'iq al-Nu'māniyya fî 'Ulamā' al-Dawlah al-'Uthmāniya*. Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1985.
- Zeyl* Bağdatlı İsmâ'il Paşa, *Zeylu Keşfi'z Zunûn* (2 vols.; Istanbul 1945-47)

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4. Saçaklızâde (d.1150/1737)
5. Gelenbevî (d.1205/1791)

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## INTRODUCTION

The notion of dialectic—in the sense of a “speech between two,”—was of remarkable importance in the pre-modern world. It is however, as Ignacio Angelelli pointed out, regarded by modern historians of philosophy as having little relevance to modern (mathematical) logic.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, Arabic dialectic (*jadal*) has been largely ignored by historians of Arabic philosophy,<sup>2</sup> due in part to its denigration by Fārābī and Averroes. Nonetheless, dialectic was an integral part of philosophy in Greek antiquity and what we now call ‘logic’ was one of the first stages of philosophy to be technically described as ‘dialectic.’<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Even though modern argumentation theorists are unwilling to correlate the study of argumentation and dialectic with “doing logic,” it is a well-known fact that before 1800, dialectical argumentation was processed extensively in most books on logic and was regarded as fundamental to the discipline. See Ignacio Angelelli, “The Techniques of Disputation in the History of Logic,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 67 (1970), p. 800.

<sup>2</sup> The literature on philosophical, theological and juristic dialectics remained largely unknown until Josef van Ess’ article on disputation practice in theological discourse, George Makdisi’s work on the scholastic method of education and Larry Miller’s significant dissertation on the development of dialectic from the fourth/tenth to eighth/fourteenth centuries. However, these works were sporadic and did not reflect any widespread scholarly interest in Arabic dialectic. There have also been some important works on Greek and European dialectics such as Hans Baltussen’s *Peripatetic Dialectic* (Leiden: Brill, 2000) and Donald L. Felipe’s dissertation entitled “Post-Medieval Ars Disputandi” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas, 1991).

<sup>3</sup> On the origins of logic and philosophy in this respect, see Ernst Kapp, *Greek Foundations of Traditional Logic* (New York, 1942); Gustav Emil Müller, *Plato, the Founder of Philosophy as Dialectic* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1965); G.E.L. Owen, *Aristotle on Dialectic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) and Francisco J. Gonzalez, *Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato’s Practice of Philosophical Inquiry* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998). On the relationship between Plato’s dialectic and Aristotle’s logic, see

The *ādāb al-baḥṭh*, literally the arts or rules of investigation, arose in the Islamic world at the end of the seventh/thirteenth century and provided for the first time, a complete and systematic argumentation theory which was easy to apply across the disciplines. This science owed its genesis to the earlier Muslim jurists' *'ilm al-khilāf* (the science of juristic differences) and works on *jadāl* (dialectic) that were based on the theories set out in Aristotle's *Topics*. Theologians and jurists came to accept this central discipline of logic as an essential tool for theology as well as for legal studies, but a gradual transition took place from the strictly legal, philosophical and theological dialectic (*jadāl*)<sup>4</sup> to the universal theory of argumentation represented by the *ādāb al-baḥṭh*: a synthesis of all that came before it.

The theory of argumentation (*ādāb al-baḥṭh*) in particular did not become part of the official Ottoman *madrassa* (Islamic colleges) curriculum until the ninth/fifteenth century.<sup>5</sup> One of the most famous authors of the

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Friedrich Solmsen, "Aristotle's Syllogism and Its Platonic Background," *Philosophical Review* 60 (1951): 563-71.

<sup>4</sup> The method of *jadāl* was originally applied exclusively to theological subjects and later came to be used in jurisprudence and philosophy. However, the word dialectic (*jadāl*) had different meanings for theologians, philosophers and jurists who each defined it in accordance with their respective disciplines.

<sup>5</sup> Cevat İzgi, *Osmanlı Medreselerinde İlim*, 2 vols. (İz Yayıncılık: İstanbul, 1997), vol. 1, pp. 35-70; Cahit Baltacı, *XV.-XVI. Asırlarda Osmanlı Medreseleri* (İstanbul: İrfan Matbaası, 1976), pp. 25-50 and A. Süheyl Ünver, *Fatih Külliyesi ve Zamanı İlim Hayatı* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1946), p. 110.

*madrasa* tracts of that era was Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 702/1303), who was well known for his *Risāla fī ādāb al-baḥth*; a famous and influential text from the eighth/fourteenth to tenth/sixteenth centuries, which was rivalled only by the epistle of ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d.756/1355).<sup>6</sup> In this context, the works of Samarqandī and Ījī were commented on by a considerable number of scholars<sup>7</sup> and, in the two centuries following their deaths, Kemalpaşazâde (d. 940/1543), Taşköprüzâde (d. 968/1560), Mehmed Birgivî (d.981/1573), Saçaklızâde Muhammed Maraşî (d.1150/1737) and Gelenbevî (d.1205/1791) contributed individual treatises on the subject. *Ādāb al-baḥth* as a theoretical genre of argumentation theory carried on until the late nineteenth century.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> For these two works and their analysis, see the third chapter.

<sup>7</sup> Al-Bihishfī al-Isfarā’inī (d. 749/1348), Quṭb al-Dīn al-Kīlānī (d. 830/1427), al-Maybudī (d. 904/1498) and Mas‘ūd al-Rūmī al-Shirwānī (d. 905/1499) all commented on Samarqandī’s work. Among them, al-Shirwānī’s commentary was glossed on by Aḥmad Dunquz (d. 870/1465), Dawwānī (d. 907/1501) and ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Kāshī (tenth/sixteenth century). Ījī’s work was commented on by Jurjānī (d. 816/1413), M. al-Tabrīzī al-Ḥanafī (d. 900/1494), al-Birjandī (d. 932/1525), al-Jundī (tenth/sixteenth century), ‘Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā’inī (d. 944/1537), Mīr Abū’l-Faṭḥ Ardabīlī (d. 975/1567) and Muḥsin al-Wazīrī (d. 979/1571). Mīr Abū’l-Faṭḥ’s famous commentary was glossed on by al-Kaffawī (tenth/sixteenth century). For the full names of these authors and their works, see Rudolph Mach, *Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts (Yahuda Section) in the Garrett Collection Princeton University Library* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 285-293 and Rudolph Mach and Eric Ormsby, *Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts (New Series) in the Princeton University Library* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

<sup>8</sup> Prominent figures from this period include Abdülkerīm Çelebî Akhisârî (d.1629), Hasan Tîrevî (d.1680), Nisârî Mehmed Kayserî (d.1701), Bosnevî (d.1707), Çilli Ömer (d.1710), Antâkî (d.1718), Mûsâ Efendî Abdullâh Tokâdî (d.1721), Saçaklızâde Muhammed Maraşî (d.1737), Mustafa Hâdfîmî (d.1747), İsmâil Gelenbevî (d.1791), Ahmed Şevkî (d.1809) and Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (d.1895).

## I. SURVEY OF SCHOLARSHIP AND METHOD

Since the middle of the twentieth century, our knowledge of this formative period of Islamic intellectual history has been expanded by a vast range of edited Arabic texts, individual studies and general historical works, but nevertheless, the fact remains that the scholarship on Islamic intellectual history has dealt almost exclusively with the period from Ishāq al-Kindī (d.260/873) to Ibn Rushd (d.595/1198). A look at Hans Daiber's *Bibliography of Islamic Philosophy* provides an idea of the extent to which previous research (until 1999) has either concentrated on, or neglected, certain periods in the history of Islamic philosophy.<sup>9</sup> This weighting is primarily because, from the time of Montgomery Watt and Joseph Schacht (who perceived a decline in Islamic intellectual history after Ghazālī, or at the latest from 657/1258 up to the early nineteenth century and Napoleon's invasion of Egypt), there has been a consistent tendency to make general statements<sup>10</sup> regarding certain sources, rather than to undertake the long and

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<sup>9</sup> Hans Daiber, *Bibliography of Islamic Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 1999).

<sup>10</sup> For these statements, see Robert Brunschvig and von Grunebaum (ed). *Classicisme et déclin culturel dans l'histoire de l'Islam* (Paris : Besson-Chantemerle, 1957), p. 93; George Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, 3 vols. (Baltimore: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1927), I, p. 747; Joseph Schacht, "Theology and Law in Islam," in *Theology and Law in Islam*, ed. G. E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971), p. 21; W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1962), p. 162; H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1947), pp. 1-38 and idem, *Mohammedanism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 146; Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University

arduous investigations that an accurate assessment would necessarily entail.<sup>11</sup>

From this perspective, research has been hampered by factors other than a lack of texts, editions and materials. In many respects, it appears that earlier scholars in the field of Islamic intellectual history have failed to understand the nature of their problem. The unwillingness to delve into the so-called ‘dark ages’ of Islamic intellectual history led Watt, among many others, to find a convenient rationalization for this dilemma: instead of examining post-classical intellectual products, scholars in the field simply thought up reasons for this supposed stagnation, which they accepted, to use Bertrand Russell’s term, as “self-evident”.<sup>12</sup>

However, more recently there has been a reaction to this decline thesis: Reinhart Schulze, Stefan Reichmuth and Khaled el-Rouayheb have all cited examples of a resurgence of interest in certain fields of knowledge

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Press, 1970), p. 358; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Traditional Islam in the Modern World* (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1987), p. 184; Toby E. Huff, *The Rise of Early Modern Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 47-60.

<sup>11</sup> However, such an analysis of Islamic philosophy has been shown to be quantitatively inaccurate in the sense that there was a significant increase in the production of philosophical texts during the post-classical period. See Robert Wisnovsky, “The Nature and Scope of Arabic Philosophical Commentary in Post-Classical (CA. 1100-1900 AD) Islamic Intellectual History: Some Preliminary Observations,” in *Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries*, ed. P. Adamson, H. Baltussen and M. W. F. Stone (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2004), pp. 149-191.

<sup>12</sup> This well-known term (“self-evident”) that Russell used caused a great deal of debate between him and Wittgenstein. For this debate, see the opening pages of Wittgenstein’s *Notebooks 1914-1916* (Blackwell: Oxford, 1961).

from the eighteenth century onwards.<sup>13</sup> If decline was, then, the framework of inquiry in Islamic intellectual history during the early period of scholarship, ‘anti-decline’ has become the fashionable paradigm today. Yet despite the arguments made in the cause of ‘anti-decline,’ the field has not yet been able to move beyond the thesis itself or its antithesis.

It is in this respect that this dissertation takes a different approach to that of its predecessors. The difference, in this context, is not that of synthesis in the Hegelian sense (after the clash of thesis-antithesis), but rather in the sense that it takes on the role of path-finder. Here, path-finding is *not* about calculating the best (or shortest) way to get Z from A, but about getting the right questions rather than the right answers and making problems rather than solving them in the name of synthesis.

The primary objective of this dissertation is then, to formulate questions by probing the processes and evolutions that the concepts of dialectic and argumentation theory underwent in the post-classical period,

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<sup>13</sup> For these examples, see Roger Owen, “The Middle East in the Eighteenth Century – An ‘Islamic’ Society in Decline? A Critique of Gibb and Bowen’s *Islamic Society and the West*,” *Bulletin of the British Society of Middle Eastern Studies* 3.2 (1975): 101-112; Reinhart Schulze, “Das Islamische achtzehnte Jahrhundert: Versuch einer historiographischen Kritik,” *Die Welt des Islams* 30 (1990): 140-159; idem, “Was ist die islamische Aufklärung?,” *Die Welt des Islams* 36 (1996): 276-325; Stefan Reichmuth, “Bildungskanon und Bildungsreform aus der Sicht eines Islamischen Gelehrten der Anatolischen Provinz: Muḥammad al-Sajaqlī (Saçaqlı-zāde, gest.um 1145/1733) und Sein Tartīb al-‘Ulūm,” in *Words, Texts and Concepts Cruising the Mediterranean Sea*, ed. R. Arnzen and J.Thielmann (Pecters Publishers: Leuven, 2004), pp. 493-520; Khaled El-Rouayheb, “Was There a Revival of Logical Studies in Eighteenth-Century Egypt?” *Die Welt Des Islams*, 45, 1 (2005): 1-19 and idem, “Opening the Gate of Verification: The Forgotten Arab-Islamic Florescence of the 17th Century,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38 (2006): 263-81.



by comparing them with their classical counterpart (*jadal*) but ignoring both opposing positions. The reason for this is twofold: both accounts of Islamic intellectual history (decline and anti-decline) fail to define their terms ('decline,' and its opposite, 'progress') within the history of ideas.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, the amount of work that lies before the student of Islamic intellectual history is so enormous, that any attempt to offer distinct definitions can be no more than speculation at this stage.

Although Larry Benjamin Miller first studied the evolution of *adab al-jadal* into *ādāb al-baḥth*, and the relation of both to Aristotle's *Topics* in 1984,<sup>15</sup> I have since uncovered additional manuscripts that he believed to be either lost or unavailable. These include the *Mulakhkhaṣ fī 'ilm al-Jadal* by Abu Ishāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083),<sup>16</sup> the *Muntakhal fī 'ilm al-Jadal* by Ghazālī (d. 505/1111),<sup>17</sup> the *Mansha' al-Nazar* by Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 687/1288) and the *Mu'taqadāt* and *Anwār* by Samarqandī (d. 702/1303). These sources are essential for drawing a more complex picture of the evolution of the concept of dialectic in Islamic intellectual history.

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<sup>14</sup> But in the context of the Ottoman decline, an exception should be made since Cemal Kafadar at least attempted to clarify the "definition problem" in this respect, see his article; "The Question of Ottoman Decline," *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 4 (1998):30-75.

<sup>15</sup> Larry B. Miller, "Islamic Disputation Theory: A Study of the Development of Dialectic in Islam from the Tenth through Fourteenth Century" (unpublished PhD. dissertation, Princeton University, 1984, hereafter referred to as *Miller*).

<sup>16</sup> I have recently finished a critical edition of al-Shīrāzī's work on legal dialectic, the *Mulakhkhaṣ fī 'ilm al-Jadal*, with Professor Nevin Karabela of Süleyman Demirel University for publication. I am also in the process of editing Samarqandī's *Mu'taqadāt* and *Anwār* with Necmettin Pehlivan of Ankara University.

<sup>17</sup> There is also a very recent edition of *Muntakhal fī 'ilm al-Jadal* available by 'Alī b. 'Abd Aẓīz al-Umayrinī (Beirut: Dār al-Warrāq, 2004).

However, in this dissertation, I propose to focus in particular on a variety of texts on *jadal* in the classical period and *ādāb al-baḥth* in the post-classical period, from Samarqandī and Ījī to Saçaklızâde and Gelenbevî. In addition to these texts, minor treatises and commentaries on the *ādāb al-baḥth*, will be addressed where relevant. The number of sources from this era on *ādāb al-baḥth* is quite staggering; however, my research will be limited to certain treatises and their commentaries on the *ādāb al-baḥth* in manuscript format. In the following pages, I will explain the sources that I have used in detail.

Miller has discussed the development of dialectic (*jadal*) that was indebted to the earlier *khilāf* literature<sup>18</sup> in Islamic intellectual history, of which the post-classical *ādāb al-baḥth* formed part of the process of the evolution of dialectic. His work is a developmental (chronological) study of the dialectic and systematic disputations described in the theoretical writings of Islamic theologians, jurists and philosophers from the fourth/tenth to the eighth/fourteenth centuries, when the *ādāb al-baḥth* arose as a new discipline. My aim is to locate the post-classical *ādāb al-baḥth* in this context and demonstrate how it can be distinguished from the classical concept of *jadal* by looking into the differences that developed over time, instead of by merely asking what constitutes *ādāb al-baḥth*.

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<sup>18</sup> The method used in *khilāf* was dialectical, and its subject matter involved studying the differences of opinion and disagreements among authorities and schools in various fields. Although jurists were the major contributors to this field, theologians and grammarians also produced extensive literature in *khilāf*.

The two central aims of this dissertation are thus, first, to revise and update Miller's study and, second and more importantly, to extend the discussion into the post-classical response to the classical period in order to ask questions about the nature of the evolution that took place in Islamic intellectual history.

To achieve this aim, I will employ a method of textual analysis that concentrates on (a) the terms used in the genre to express conceptual differences; (b) the reasons for shifts in the meanings of terms and concepts; and (c) the disagreements among authors over these meanings. Comparisons between these texts are intended to demonstrate how far authors accepted, questioned or ignored the prevailing conventions of the discourse. It can then be determined how other participants in the discourse responded to disputes and differences. When using this approach, however, the period under research must be relatively long (four centuries), as it is difficult to identify the connections between short-term shifts in meaning within the limits of inherited concepts.

This thesis is important for two reasons. Initially because the *ādāb al-baḥth* represented one of the most important developments in post-classical Islamic intellectual history, due to its interdisciplinary use as a universal theory (replacing *jadāl*, which had enjoyed prevalence for centuries), and secondly, because the *ādāb al-baḥth* was fundamental to *madrassa* education in this period and thus students had to master it prior to

further training in both theology and jurisprudence. Consequently, a basic understanding of this literature is indispensable for any interpretation of post-classical Islamic intellectual history.

## II. SOURCES AND ITINERARY

This study is, to a large extent, based on manuscripts on *ādāb al-baḥth* from the post-classical period. I focus on five authors as core samples, namely, ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d.756/1355), Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d.816/1413), Taşköprüzâde (d.968/1561), Saçaklızâde Maraşî (d.1150/1737) and Gelenbevi (d.1205/1791), as well as including a number of treatises on *ādāb al-baḥth* to clarify my argument in chapters 3 and 4. However, extensive primary sources in Arabic and secondary material including literary critiques and biographical and historical accounts in Ottoman Turkish, Arabic, English, German and French are also examined. This thesis uses Miller’s work as the basis of comparison between the classical and post-classical periods although in some areas, I update the material by bringing new data to compensate for where Miller’s study is lacking. I not only introduce poets and grammarians into the discussion of classical period dialectic development, but also, and more importantly, refer to the above mentioned post-classical authors who wrote on *ādāb al-baḥth* in order to compare the post-classical period with its classical counterpart.

I open the first chapter with the story of Ḥayy b. Yaqzān. My aim in beginning with this famous tale is to demonstrate the importance of Ḥayy's case not only in understanding the concept of dialectic as such, but also in the context of Islamic intellectual history. In particular, I wish to exemplify the way in which the case brings into play the dichotomies, paradoxes and contradictory poles of discourse that are embedded within the history in which it was articulated. Since I take the story of Ḥayy b. Yaqzān as the starting point of post-classical Islamic intellectual history, the case can be used to examine how the concept of the dialectic—in the sense of “speech between two”—was first introduced in the classical period. After that, I focus on the origin of the Translation Movement in the Abbasid period to contextualize how Aristotle's *Topics* maintained its power in the classical period of Islamic history and functioned for practical purposes as a political tool while becoming a more systematic dialectical thinking, what I would call the language of dialectic (later to come into a clash with that of demonstration).

From this base, in the second chapter, I present the diffusion of dialectic (as an argumentative discourse) in five communities in Islamic intellectual history: that of theologians, poets, grammarians, philosophers and jurists. My concern in this chapter is not only treatises on the theoretical understanding of the concept of dialectic, but how, in practice, the concept of dialectic expressed in Greek classical tradition was received

and used for different ends by these five communities in the Islamic intellectual camp. Even though poets and grammarians never wrote on the theoretical genre of dialectic, their use of dialectic in their respective fields and the controversies around such uses, whether in poetry, grammar or even sometimes in Qur'anic exegesis, contributed to the discourse. These diffusions prove that dialectic was the undisputed phenomenon in this period, a fact attested to by emphasis on the tension between the language of demonstration (*burhān*) and the language of dialectic (*jadal*).

The third chapter begins with an analysis of how these local dialectics (as disputation and claims to knowledge) transform into a single system to form a general argumentation theory applicable to all fields. I then evaluate Samarqandī's treatise, considering him as the founder of this new system, and the treatises that were written after him as a result of his work. I concentrate specifically on those by the above mentioned five post-classical authors in order to test Miller's claim in his study *Islamic Disputation Theory* that "none of these [post-classical] writings went much beyond the rules that Samarqandī gave in the *Risāla* and *Qusṭās*."<sup>19</sup> Even though the choice of these authors may appear arbitrary, they represent trajectories in the development of argumentation theory in the post-classical period that start with Samarqandī's treatise on argumentation theory in the

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<sup>19</sup> Miller cites specifically five names: 'Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d.756/1355), Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d.816/1413), Taşköprüzâde (d.968/1561), Saçaklızâde Maraşî (d.1150/1737) and Gelenbevi (d.1205/1791); see *Miller*, p. 237.

late thirteenth/early fourteenth century. This chapter demonstrates how argumentation theory transforms into a definition theory by the time that Saçaklızâde was writing in the eighteenth century.

In the fourth chapter, after demonstrating the evolution of argumentation theory in the post-classical period, I analyze this conceptual shift in Islamic intellectual history by focusing on an aspect of Arabic philosophy of language (*'ilm al-waḍ'*) and argumentation theory (*ādāb al-baḥth*) in order to explain, what I would call, the “linguistic turn” in argumentation theory. I also introduce four discussions that are crucial to understanding dialectic and argumentation theory. The first discussion concentrates on dialectical discourse in literature focusing on the three main figures, i.e., *aşık-maşuk-rakib* or lover-beloved-rival, in Ottoman divan poetry in order to point out how the literature that developed in Islamic culture is more dialectical in style than Islamic studies have revealed until now. This section provides a useful starting point for theories on the relationship between dialectic and literature and for further inquiry by future researchers. The second concentrates on the comparison between Latin *ars disputandi* in the post-medieval western tradition and the *ādāb al-baḥth*, in order to comment on their similarities and differences. This section also raises an important question about scholarship in the field of post-classical Islamic and post-medieval Western intellectual history. The third discussion takes Goethe’s conversation with Eckermann on Islamic

education as its basis, in order to appraise their observations in relation to post-classical Islamic intellectual history. The fourth discussion concerns the form of a debate over poetry and truth in nineteenth-century Istanbul in order to show how the terminology of argumentation theory (*ādāb al-baḥth*) infused into the very heart and reasoning of Ottoman intellectual history and, more importantly, how that theory operated in practice.

In the appendices, I have edited two texts on argumentation theory in post-classical Islamic intellectual history as core samples: Samarqandī's *Risāla* and Taşköprüzâde's *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth*. By making these texts available, based on the manuscripts (found in the Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi in Istanbul and the Bibliothèque National in Paris), I have been able to strengthen the argument of my thesis. For the sake of clarity and, sometimes, of ease, I have also included a glossary as the subject matter of this thesis is theoretically complex in and of itself. Finding the correct English terms was challenging, but in all cases, I have attempted to provide the most appropriate English terms possible.

### III. CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND TERMS

I also have a special concern for the clarification of concepts and terms used in this thesis since every word in the title has a distinct sense. Understanding these individual words is the first condition of being able to



comprehend the whole title—though only as a first step. In what follows, I will describe what is meant by “development, dialectic, argumentation theory and post-classical Islamic intellectual history” within the context of my thesis. First, what is meant by the choice to use the word “development.”

### **1. Development**

The word “development” is used to denote a process of becoming more complex. The close relationship between “development” and “transformation” compelled me to choose the former, since I see development as a change in superficial structures whereas transformation seems to indicate a change in deep structures. Both represent changes, but they each have different goals. Any change may be developmental (i.e. the development of child’s brain), but that does not mean that it is a transformation. In biological terms, development is the process of biological progress involved in an organism gradually changing from something simple to something more complex. Transformation is the replacement of superficial structures by deeper ones in order to move to a different form of awareness. For this reason, it is more accurate at this stage to use the term development since I have not found enough evidence to interpret changes in the perception of dialectic in post-classical Islamic intellectual history as changes to deep structure.

## 2. Dialectic

To say that dialectic is a word with a long history is to state the obvious. In this thesis, the word dialectic refers to a type of speech between two individuals or groups that uses the question and answer method. By using this method, then, dialectic is a practice of arguing with others (or with an opponent) aiming at victory rather than testing the validity of inferences, which is the territory of logic. When we use the word “dialectic,” we refer to Arabic word *jadāl* but not exclusively. Sometimes we use *khilāf* to refer to dialectic as a type of speech between jurists about their differing opinions. As a specific theoretical genre on disputation techniques, by dialectic I mean in particular the works on *jadāl* written by Arabic Aristotelian philosophers (their books on *jadāl* or commentaries on Aristotle’s *Topics*) and the works of theologians and jurists on *adab al-jadāl*. Any other usage of the term dialectic will be noted in the footnotes.

## 3. Argumentation Theory

Argumentation as a theoretical genre (not as oral public disputation) refers to treatises on *ādāb al-baḥṭh* (or *‘ilm al-munāẓara* and *ādāb al-baḥṭh wa’l-munāẓara* interchangeably) written from the fourteenth century on up until the late nineteenth century. With *ādāb al-baḥṭh*, as will become clear,

I will also refer to a universal method of argumentation as a way of searching for the truth of arguments as opposed to the classical idea of dialectic as the winning of an argumentation. The relationship between dialectic (*jadal*) and argumentation theory (*ādāb al-baḥth*) is based on the fact that the latter takes its theoretical base from the former and changes its objective from victory to truth.

#### 4. Post-Classical Islamic Intellectual History

The notion of post-classical presupposes a classical or a past; however, there is a difference between “classic” and “classical:” classic implies excellence or that something is “the best of its kind” for instance, in the expression “a classic example,” whereas classical means well-established, not modern but old. This pair of words came into use dominantly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as Europe began to identify itself with antiquity, especially that of ancient Greece and Rome and began to adhere to the idealized styles and forms of Greek or Roman culture.<sup>20</sup>

I define post-classical Islamic intellectual history, therefore, as the history of ideas, incorporating elements of its classical (well-established) period’s structure and utilizing them through relatively different means. In

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<sup>20</sup> On the etymology and early history of “classic” and “classical”, see Mark Kaunisto’s phenomenal study, *Variation and Change in the Lexicon: A Corpus-Based Analysis of Adjectives in English Ending in -ic and -ical* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007), pp. 59-94.

a general sense, it is not meant to represent any specific intellectual movements in a given period, but rather a cross-section of reasoning styles loosely defined by the criteria of being derivative. For example, in the context of argumentation theory, Samarqandī as a derivative thinker and a synthesizer of earlier writings, represents the beginning of the post-classical period since his treatise on *ādāb al-baḥṭh* is derived from classical forms of *‘ilm al-khilāf* and *adab al-jadal*.

Even more generally and not merely in relation to argumentation theory, Ibn Ṭufayl (d.581/1185) provides an ideal starting point for an examination of post-classical Islamic intellectual history, especially as his “classic” philosophical tale, Ḥayy b. Yaqzān, displays the principal philosophical tendencies of his age, in addition to those of his predecessors (classical). “Post-classical Islamic intellectual history” and the “post-classical period” are used interchangeably to denote the period from the Andalusian Ibn Ṭufayl up until the codification of Islamic law in the Ottoman Mecelle (*majalla*) enacted in 1876. Although this chronological choice is arbitrary, using the Mecelle codification as the closing stage is useful because it revealed that, to use Wael Hallaq’s words, “the traditional system was rendered irrelevant, useless and a thing of the exotic past.”<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Wael B. Hallaq, “Can the Shari‘a be Restored?,” in *Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity*, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Barbara F. Stowasser (Oxford: Altamira Press, 2004), p. 26.

Therefore, this date is the symptom of a new development and a practical end to the post-classical period.

#### IV. A NOTE ON REFERENCES, TRANSLITERATION SYSTEMS AND DATES

For the interpretation of the Graeco-Arabic translation movement in the classical period of Islamic intellectual history, I am heavily indebted to Dimitri Gutas' study *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*.<sup>22</sup> I use Larry Miller's translation of texts from the classical period in the second chapter (the jurists' section especially) and in the third chapter in the section on Samarqandī, and Bernard Weiss's in the section on *'ilm al-waḍ'* in the fourth chapter. However, I also follow my own translation in some cases as well as modifying Miller's to clarify meanings. For Aristotle's *Topics* I mostly consult Robin Smith's translation, otherwise as noted. For Qur'anic quotations, I have at times followed Majid Fakhry (in addition to providing my own) as in the format (Q. 26:221) the first number (26) referring to the chapter number (*sūra*) and the second number (221) referring to the number of the verse (*āya*). As for the Prophet Muḥammad's sayings (*ḥadīth*), I used A. J. Wensinck's *Concordance* to locate them in their particular *ḥadīth* collection.

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<sup>22</sup> Dimitri Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early 'Abbāsī Society (2th-4th/8th-10th centuries)* (New York: Routledge, 1999). Henceforth referred to as Gutas, *Greek Thought*.

In transliterating words, names, titles, terms or phrases written in an exclusively Arabic context, I employ the old Arabic transliteration system of the Institute of Islamic Studies (Times New Arabic). All Ottoman in Arabic script, and Turkish personal names and titles are given in the modern Turkish spelling or in their Ottoman Turkish form (for example Taşköprüzâde, not Ṭāshkubrīzādeh, Saçaklızâde, not Sachaqlīzādeh). In the first instance, I provide a full name and afterwards, use the best known or last name.

As a matter of principle, I provide references to individuals and their works by their full title as found in Carl Brockelman's *GAL*, Fuat Sezgin's *GAS*, Bağdatlı İsmâ'il Paşa's *Hediyyetü'l-Ârifin Esmâ ül-Müellifin*, and Katib Çelebi's *Keşf el-Zunûn*. For birth and death dates of persons that are included in my thesis, I have mostly followed the dates given in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (second edition). Dates are given, where appropriate and as much as possible, according to the Islamic (*hijrî*) and Christian (Julian/Gregorian) calendars; thus, 710/1310 corresponds to 710 *anno hegirae* and 1310 *anno domini*.

I applied two procedures for translating technical terms; first, for the general meanings of terms such as *mashhūrāt* and *musallamāt*, as commonly accepted by the authors in the period in question (either classical or post-classical), I consult Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī's *Ta'rifāt*, and second, for more specific meanings and their usage by particular authors, I refer to the author

in question. As for the biographies of authors and persons, I mostly relied on the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (second edition), the Turkish *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (published by Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı) and some other bibliographical sources. For figures such as Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Fārābī or Ibn Rushd (Averroes), among many others who are well-known in Islamic studies, biographical information is not provided unless a particular aspect requires it.

## *Chapter 1*

### THE FORMATION OF AN ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE

#### I. ḤAYY B. YAQZĀN AND THE OTHERS: “SPEECH BETWEEN TWO”

Let us begin with the story of a child in twelfth century Andalusia in Spain.<sup>23</sup> It is actually a tale of two islands rather than the story of a child *per se*. One island is uninhabited, yet on this island a child appears spontaneously.<sup>24</sup> The child is Ḥayy b. Yaqzān, “Living son of the one who is awake.” He is suckled by a gazelle, and on the death of his mother is left to his own resources. Ḥayy grows up without human intervention in complete isolation, rather like the castaway Robinson Crusoe.<sup>25</sup> His innate intelligence develops gradually. Through seven successive stages, and over a period of seven years, he relives what is essentially the evolution of

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<sup>23</sup> The story is based on Ibn Ṭufayl’s philosophical tale, *Risāla Ḥayy b. Yaqzān*. The original Arabic terms in parenthesis are taken from the Arabic tale. In this thesis, I have used Fuat Sezgin’s reprint of Gauthier’s 1936 edition: Ibn Ṭufayl, *Risāla Ḥayy b. Yaqzān*, ed. Léon Gauthier, reprint of the Edition Beirut 1936 by Fuat Sezgin (Frankfurt: Ma’had Tārīkh al-‘Ulūm al-‘Arabiyya wa’l-Islāmiyya, 1999).

<sup>24</sup> Another version of the story tells that Ḥayy floats towards the island in a box which was sent out by his mother—a remote allusion to the fate of Moses in the Qur’ān (Q. 20:38-40). On the history of different versions of the story of Ḥayy, see A. -M. Goichon, “Ḥayy b. Yaqzān,” *EI*<sup>2</sup>, III, p. 330-34.

<sup>25</sup> There is a long history connecting Ibn Ṭufayl’s *Ḥayy* with Daniel Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe*, see the following works: Riad Kocache, *The Journey of the Soul: the Story of Hai bin Yaqzan as Told by Abu Bakr Muhammad bin Tufail* (London: Octagon Press, 1982); Nawal Muhammad Hassan, *Ḥayy bin Yaqzān and Robinson Crusoe: A Study of an Early Arabic Impact on English Literature* (Baghdad: Al-Rashid House, 1980); idem, “A Study in Eighteenth Century Plagiarism,” *The Islamic Quarterly* 27 (1983): 31-48 and Samar Attar, *The Vital Roots of European Enlightenment: Ibn Tufayl’s Influence on Modern Western Thought* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007).



humankind: he discovers fire, develops tools, domesticates animals, contemplates the stars, and forms a notion of the universe through ceaseless observation (*baḥth*) and reflection (*naẓar*). Then he enters the realm of metaphysics and proves for himself the existence of an all-powerful Creator. Ultimately, without either prophetic aid or revelation, he achieves the utmost fullness of knowledge and contentment in mystical union with God. At this stage of his development, while he is as yet unaware of the existence of another island or indeed, of the human race, he is amazed one day to discover, walking on his very own island, a creature shaped like himself.

This man is named Absāl, and he has just arrived from the neighbouring island—an inhabited and civilized place where the king Salāmān reigns, and where life is regulated by a system of rewards and punishments dictated by conventional religion. Absāl represents the archetype of rationalist thought, and is dedicated to speculative theology—a *mutakallim*. Salāmān is the archetype of a Mālikī jurist (*faqīh*). By contrast, Absāl is much more anxious to delve into esoteric concerns (*bāṭin*), to discover the mystical dimension of things (*al-ma‘ānī al-rūḥānīya*), and to fathom their allegorical interpretation (*ta’wīl*). In short, he is naturally predisposed to constant cogitation (*fīkr*), incessant reflection (*ta’ammul*), and the search for the deeper meaning of things. He is prepared to bring the fruits of rational speculation (*ma‘qūl*) to bear on matters already addressed by doctrines handed down on past authority (*manqūl*). However, prior to his

meeting with Ḥayy, he had constantly struggled with unresolved problems and difficulties.<sup>26</sup> Absāl had reached a higher level of self-discipline than his compatriots, and believed that asceticism and solitude would help him to realise his highest spiritual ambitions. He had therefore renounced the world and had come to end his days on this little island, which he had thought to be uninhabited.

Absāl teaches Ḥayy conventional language and is astonished to discover that through direct intuitive experience, Ḥayy already knows everything that Absāl had discovered to be true through his religion (*sharīʿa*). As soon as Ḥayy learns about the condition of the people on the other island from Absāl, he is moved with compassion and determines to seek them out and offer them the benefits of his knowledge. Accordingly, the two friends set out together, with Absāl acting as an intermediary for his friend.<sup>27</sup> However, they fail in their pedagogic mission because Ḥayy's exposition of the truth is far above the heads of his audience, who regard it with suspicion as a dangerous innovation. Salāmān, the ruler of the island, along with his people, find Ḥayy's teachings to be beyond their customary framework of expectations: it threatens their way of life, or to use one of Pierre Bourdieu's terms, their *habitus*.<sup>28</sup> Enslaved by the hereditary chains

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<sup>26</sup> Ibn Ṭufayl, *Risāla Ḥayy b. Yaqzān*, p. 144.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 144-46.

<sup>28</sup> Bourdieu argues that *habitus* is learned through "practical mimesis" in the sense that no one is born with it. Bourdieu's primary concern is with the unconscious power of *habitus* through which objective social conditions become naturalized and reproduced without ever

of the five senses, their intelligence (*‘aql*) can only respond to concrete imagery (*ẓāhir*) while their moral nature is in most cases stimulated by nothing higher than the promise of rewards and the threat of punishments. Ḥayy soon sees enough to convince him that the life that this island’s people lead following Muhammad’s teachings, as expressed in the Qur’ān, is the only effective method in their case. He respectfully apologises to them for his intrusions, and is content to see them remain faithful to the religion of their fathers. He then returns with his friend Absāl to the uninhabited island.<sup>29</sup> Throughout the tale Ḥayy’s quest is always on behalf of the truth: he is constantly willing to seek out the truth about things (*min al-baḥṭh ‘an al-ḥaqā’iq al-ashyā’*).<sup>30</sup>

Written in Arabic by the twelfth-century Andalusian scholar Ibn Ṭufayl (d.581/1185), the tale of Ḥayy b. Yaqzān brings into play the dichotomies, paradoxes and contradictory poles of discourse embedded

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becoming the subject of explicit reflection. See Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 73. In this context, for example, Adeline Masquelier (a cultural anthropologist) says that, “head coverings of Muslim women, would be mimetically learned to eventually become a social skin—an intimate part of women’s social persona—as well as the basis for “naturalizing” moral rules. Through *habitus*, the generative principle, social rules are inscribed in the bodies and dispositions of persons. From this perspective, “what is learned by the body” is *not something that one has*, like knowledge that can be brandished, but *something that one is*.” (Emphases on *having* and *being* are mine). See Adeline Marie Masquelier, *Women and Islamic Revival in a West African Town* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), p. 214. On the application of Bourdieu’s term *habitus* to the Muslim religious practices, see Saba Mahmood, “Rehearsed Spontaneity and the Conventionality of Ritual: Disciplines of *Ṣalāt*,” *American Ethnologist* 28 (2001): 827-53 and Daniel Winchester, “Embodying the Faith: Religious Practice and the Making of a Muslim Moral Habitus,” *Social Forces* 86 (2008): 1753-780.

<sup>29</sup> Ibn Ṭufayl, *Risāla Ḥayy b. Yaqzān*, pp. 147-55.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

within the culture in which it was articulated. It is a philosophical allegory, much like Plato's cave, except in the fact that Ḥayy lives alone on an island. Ibn Ṭufayl's tale, though poetic in style,<sup>31</sup> provides an ideal starting point for an examination of post-classical Islamic intellectual history, especially as it displays his extensive knowledge of the principal philosophical tendencies of his age, in addition to those of his predecessors.<sup>32</sup> It also raises many of the most probing questions posed not only by epistemology, but also by the Aristotelian conception of the nature of logic and of poetics.<sup>33</sup> The text itself frames a dialogue between the theologian (Absāl), the *philosophus autodidactus* (Ḥayy) and the jurist (Salāmān). However, Ibn Ṭufayl addresses his readers in strictly philosophical terms. He borrows from Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Bājja, Fārābī and Ghazālī, but admits that their teachings were insufficient to bring him to the level of discourse that he was seeking, which can only be broached through an intuitive awareness and understanding, distinct from rational analysis. For him, "the level to which

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<sup>31</sup> Ibn Ṭufayl was also a poet and therefore, expresses himself in an imaginative form that adds vividness, interest and colour to his subject which is harnessed by reasoning, and touches on a variety of subjects from plants to the moon, from fire to God. In this sense, he is also a philosopher. It is not easy to separate one from the other. On the poetry of Ibn Ṭufayl, see Ibn Idhārī, *Bayān al-Mughrib fī Akhbār al-Andulus wa'l-Maghrib*, ed. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm al-Kattānī (Beirut, 1985), pp. 114-15; Ibn Sa'īd al-Maghribī, *al-Mughrib fī Hul al-Maghrib*, 2 vols, ed. Shawqī Ḍayf (Cairo, 1985), II, p. 86; and al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu'jib fī Talkhīṣ al-Akhbār al-Maghrib* (Cairo, 1963), pp. 155-58.

<sup>32</sup> For Ḥayy b. Yaqzān as a philosophical text, see J. C. Bürgel, "Ibn Ṭufayl and His Ḥayy Ibn Yaqzān: A Turning Point in Arabic Philosophical Writing," in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed. Salma Khadra Jayyusi (Leiden: Brill, 1992), pp. 830-848.

<sup>33</sup> Salim Kemal, "Justification of Poetic Validity: Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy Ibn Yaqzān and Ibn Sīnā's Commentary on the Poetics of Aristotle," in *The World of Ibn Ṭufayl: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, ed. Lawrence I. Conrad (Leiden: Brill, 1996), pp. 195-228.

Abū Bakr [Ibn Bājja] refers,” for example:

is reached by use of discursive reasoning (*bi ʿarīq al-ʿilm al-naẓarī waʿl-baḥṭh*), and no doubt he reached it—but he did not go beyond it. The level of which I spoke at the outset is something quite different, although the two are alike in that nothing revealed here contradicts what is revealed by discursive reason...Now these states (*aḥwāl*), as Abū ʿAlī [Ibn Sīnā] describes, are reached not by theorizing, syllogistic deductions, postulating premises, and drawing inferences, but solely by intuition.<sup>34</sup>

Although Ibn Ṭufayl affirms that through reason one can perceive what empirical observation can never discover—the Aristotelian appreciation of the forms of things and logical arguments for the existence of God—he asserts that the level of understanding of which he speaks lies beyond the powers of rational demonstration. His encounters with Absāl and Salāmān indicate an intuitive affinity with religious forms of expression and an instinctive understanding of metaphysical truths that does not depend on the repudiation of their literal content. But likewise, just as reason reaches beyond the literal content of religion (*ẓāhir*), the level of knowledge and understanding that Ibn Ṭufayl sought is based on a transcendent state of awareness. Access to this state is not gained “through intellectual speculation based on syllogistic deduction, postulation of

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<sup>34</sup> Ibn Ṭufayl, *Risāla Ḥayy b. Yaqzān*, pp. 6-7. Lenn Evan Goodman, *Ibn Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* (Los Angeles: gee tee bee, 2003), pp. 96-7. I have only used Goodman’s translation in direct quotations from *Risāla Ḥayy b. Yaqzān*, but, in some cases, I have modified his translation or translated myself.

premises, and the drawing of inferences” (*bi tarīq al-‘ilm al-naẓarī wa’l-baḥṭh / lā ‘alā sabīl al-idrāk al-naẓarī al-mustakhraj bi’l-maqāyisi wa taqdīm al-muqaddamāt*),” but rather through *dhawq*: by direct intuitive experience. This could be likened to the way in which a blind man, regardless of how intensely he studies the subject of colours, can never be said to “know” them except by regaining his sight.<sup>35</sup>

Upon closer inspection, we can see that an “internal dialectic”<sup>36</sup> informs Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān’s entire experience. This will become clear when we focus on the fundamental proposition of the story in the following paragraphs. In Aristotle’s *Topics*, dialectical arguments are conducted in the form of an either/or question, i.e., “[i]s animal the genus of man or not?” with respect to received views or dialectical propositions.<sup>37</sup> A dialectical proposition, in Aristotle’s *Topics*, is one that expresses an *endoxon*, that is, a reputable opinion accepted by everyone, by most people, or by a consensus

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<sup>35</sup> Ibn Ṭufayl, *Risāla Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān*, p. 7.

<sup>36</sup> I am not using the word in the sense of a Hegelian “internal dialectic:” a species of internal contradictions in which there are three stages, i.e., two opposites, thesis and antithesis and the merging of those opposites into an organic unity in the third stage known as synthesis. What I mean by “internal dialectic,” there is an explicit dialectic throughout *Risāla Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān* in which Ḥayy does not grow up and experience his seven stages with human contact, or, to be more precise, human opinions. In the Aristotelian sense, dialectic deals with things only “in relation to opinion,” not, as philosophy does, “in relation to truth” (Aristotle, *Topics* 105b30-1). As stated at the beginning of the story, Ḥayy is constantly seeking out the truth about things (*min al-baḥṭh ‘an al-ḥaqā’iq al-ashyā’*) on an island with no human contact and thus no access to other people’s opinions or even to the most reputable opinion (*endoxa*).

<sup>37</sup> Aristotle, *Topics*, 101b32.

of experts (wise people).<sup>38</sup> Aristotle characterizes the term *endoxa* as follows:<sup>39</sup>

Reputable [*endoxa*] are those things which are believed [*dokounta*] by either all, or most, or the wise, and by all, most famous and reputable [*endoxoi*].<sup>40</sup>

On the other hand, the validity of demonstration requires that its premises should be true, primary, self-evident, necessary, prior to and better known than the conclusion (*Post. An.*, 71b20-2). Otherwise the argument will not serve as a demonstration or proof of the conclusion. Aristotle consistently distinguished between demonstration and dialectic in four separate logical treatises<sup>41</sup> and in his *Metaphysics*, by defining demonstration as being scientifically true conclusions reached by necessary inference from scientifically true premises, and dialectic as probable truths reached by necessary inference from probable premises based on general opinion, that of the wise, the majority or everyone.

For example, the fundamental proposition<sup>42</sup> conveyed by Ḥayy b. Yaqzān's story is that Ḥayy's development takes place in complete isolation

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<sup>38</sup> For these explanations and *endoxa*, see Aristotle, *Topics: Books I and VIII*, trans. Robin Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Book I (100a25-31), (104a10-15), (104b3) and Book VIII (155b1-25). In his *Topics*, Aristotle gives “respecting elders, revering gods, and honouring parents” as examples of *endoxa*; see Book 5, 553.14.

<sup>39</sup> For an analysis of *endoxa* in Aristotle, see C. D. C. Reeve, “Dialectic and Philosophy in Aristotle,” in *Method in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Jyl Gertzler (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), pp. 227-252.

<sup>40</sup> Aristotle, *Topics* 100b21-3; repeated in *Topics* 101a11-13.

<sup>41</sup> *Prior Analytics*, 24a21b-16; *Posterior Analytics*, 81b17-23; *Topics*, 100a25-23; *Soph. El.*, 172a15-21; *Metaphysics* 2.

<sup>42</sup> By “fundamental proposition” in Ḥayy, I refer to his condition, i.e., his being in complete isolation from human contact, customs and conventions. As a result of this, his conclusions

from human contact, customs, and the commonly accepted opinions of experts and received traditions. Ḥayy educates himself through acute and sustained observation, and through experimentation. He sets out to establish his philosophical method without entertaining any logical presuppositions. To be more precise, there are no commonly accepted truths or premises (*mashhūrāt*) intrinsic to his learning method, which is not based on dialectics (*jadal*) but on demonstration (*burhān*) and therefore, he works with firsthand premises for the purposes of demonstration. On the other hand, he is not put to the ‘truth test’ by a dialectical reasoning that requires the existence of a contradictory position or challenge.<sup>43</sup> Ludwig

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are reached through the primary, *a priori* and self-evident premises: for example, nobody tells Ḥayy (a child) that fire burns him (conclusion), what he learns is prior to the conclusion since he first burns himself. It is worth mentioning at this point the famous experiment attributed to the Emperor Frederick II (d.1250), one of the most powerful Roman Emperors of the Middle Ages (after a half century of his rule, Ibn Ṭufayl died in 1185). Frederick II confined several newly-born children in an isolated rural area so that they would grow up without any human contact and education, similar to Ḥayy b. Yaqzān’s situation. His intention was to find out what kind of language these isolated children “naturally” would speak when they reached the right age. The result was disastrous: none of them spoke and all the children died despite being fed properly. For a survey of the larger context of Friedrich’s experiments, see Thomas Curtis Van Cleve, *The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen: Immutator Mundi* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 317 and Adriana S. Benzaquén, *Encounters with Wild Children: Temptation and Disappointment in the Study of Human Nature* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), p. 111. In this respect, see also A. J. Ayer, “Could Language be Invented by a Robinson Crusoe?,” in *The Private Language Argument*, ed. Owen Roger Jones (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 50-61.

<sup>43</sup> Ḥayy’s truth (what he learned on his island) was challenged as soon as he met Absāl, the ruler of another island, Salāmān, and its inhabitants as described above. He changed the realm in which he lived, i.e., from demonstration (in isolation, *in itself*) to dialectic (in interaction, *in comparison*). Most works on Arabic logic give the following example as one of the true, primary and necessary propositions (*awwaliyyāt* and *badīhī*) which produce demonstration (*burhān*) and gives us a certain knowledge (*yaqīn*): two is a number bigger than one and the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (*al-kullu a’zam min al-juzz*). For just a number of examples, see Ghazālī, *Mi’yār al-‘ilm fī al-Mantiq* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1990), p. 178-9, 235, 243; Abharī, *Kashf al-Ḥaqā’iq*, ed. Hüseyin



Wittgenstein would consider Ḥayy to be an inauthentic philosopher because he does not take part in disputations (*jadal*)—he is like a boxer who never goes into the ring.<sup>44</sup>

In proceeding with his own distinctive processes of investigation, Ḥayy moves from sensible (or tangible) phenomena to conceptual levels of understanding. He contemplates heavenly bodies and infers, from a series of observations and arguments concerning the creation and eternity of the world, the existence of an Efficient Cause that does not however assume a

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Sarioğlu (Istanbul, 1998), pp. 193-94 and Ṭūsī, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal* (Beirut: Dār al-Adwā', 1985), p. 27. However, dialectic challenges these true and necessary premises in practice. In order to clarify, I will give an example from soccer (European football). According to the above-mentioned example, 11 should be bigger than 10. However, on the soccer field (not *on paper* and *off the field*) we see that 10 players sometimes win a match against 11 men. This is one of the reasons why the French philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre said: “[i]n football everything is complicated by the presence of the other team [opponent].” See Sartre’s *Critique of Dialectical Reason: Theory of Practical Ensembles* (NLB, 1976), vol.1, p. 473. In fact, *often*, one player is able to determine the fate of the game in comparison to other ten teammates (therefore, making the part bigger than the whole, not the other way around according to “the true and *a priori* premises”). This great struggle between “individuality” and “system” has been acted out in practice by two famous Russian coaches, Valeriy Lobanovskiy (1939-2002) and Eduard Malofeyev (b.1942). The historian of football tactics, Jonathan Wilson, brings out this tension: “Lobanovskiy made his players aware that they were not individuals, that individual skill was only of use within the context of system. The tactics were not chosen to suit the best players; instead, the players must have fit his system. Malofeyev, on the other hand, was concerned with individuality and self-expression. He was like a psychologist, analysing players to discover something in them, i.e., their strong and weak points to get the best out of them [not for the purpose of team’s system but for the player themselves]... The rivalry between two coaches was the rivalry between two minds: Lobanovskiy was a coach by mathematics, seeing his players as numbers to be deployed, but not of much *one* whereas Malofeyev was more romantic working by his instincts and wanting his players to express their best on the pitch,” see Jonathan Wilson, *Inverting the Pyramid: The History of Football Tactics* (London: Orion, 2009), pp. 245-47. On the dialectical tension between “a star-team” and “a team of stars” and total football, see Jonathan Wilson, *The History of Football Tactics*, pp. 218-52.

<sup>44</sup> This expression is taken from the memoirs of his student, M. O’C. Drury. Wittgenstein once remarked: “[a] philosopher who is not taking part in discussions is like a boxer who never goes into the ring.” See Rush Rhees, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Personal Recollections* (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), p. 132. Instead of engaging with people on the other island, Ḥayy avoids discussions with them and returns to his own island.

bodily shape. It should be emphasized that God’s attributes are entirely distinct from the categories of the phenomenal world (*shāhid*).<sup>45</sup> Indeed, after the age of 35, Ḥayy is transformed from a natural scientist into a dedicated mystic.<sup>46</sup> This mystical experience (*dhawq*), argues Ibn Ṭufayl, cannot be described in the form of propositions but only through a method of indirect communication, or through a “thin veil” (*ḥijāb laṭīf*)—neither naked nor dressed.<sup>47</sup> By the time of his transformation, Ḥayy was 50 years old<sup>48</sup> and given his educational development, an appeal to authority or received opinions was simply not an option. It is clear that each hypothesis stood or fell before the twin pillars of observation (*nazar*) and reason (*‘aql*) for Ḥayy, especially as there was no access to either revelation or reports (*naql*) on his island.<sup>49</sup>

After completing his edition of Fārābī’s work on the *Kitāb al-Jadal*, Dominique Mallet gave exhaustive attention to the story of Ḥayy in tracing the trajectories of dialectic in Islamic intellectual history from Fārābī down

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<sup>45</sup> Ibn Ṭufayl, *Risāla Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān*, pp. 73-90.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., pp. 90-8. On the relationship between naturalism and mysticism in the context of Ibn Ṭufayl, see Sami S. Hawi, *Islamic Naturalism and Mysticism: A Philosophic Study of Ibn Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy bin Yaḳẓān* (Leiden: Brill, 1974).

<sup>47</sup> Ibn Ṭufayl, *Risāla Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān*, p. 156. The Qur’an also says that God does not speak to men except “by revelation or *from behind a veil*” (Q. 2:118). On the concept of the “thin veil” in Ibn Ṭufayl, see Lawrence I. Conrad, “Through the Thin Veil: On the Question of Communication and Socialization of Knowledge in Ḥayy Ibn Yaḳẓān,” in *The World of Ibn Ṭufayl*, ed. Lawrence I. Conrad (Leiden: Brill, 1996), pp. 238-66.

<sup>48</sup> Ibn Ṭufayl, *Risāla Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān*, pp. 116-35.

<sup>49</sup> It is interesting to note here that the Granadan Mālikī jurist Abū Ishāq al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388) held that even in the absence of revelation, human reason (*‘aql*) arrives at conclusions similar to those of people who receive revelation. See, Muhammad Khalid Masud, *Shatibi’s Philosophy of Islamic Law* (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1995), p. 157.

to Averroes. Dialectic and rhetoric are both, in Mallet's words, "city girls,"<sup>50</sup> that is, they are distinct in nature from the thought processes of the solitary child of the island.<sup>51</sup> Ḥayy is not affected by *mashhūrāt* (the commonly accepted opinions of many) or by *musallamāt* (the commonly accepted opinions of philosophers or scholars in specific fields).<sup>52</sup> The *Kitāb al-Jadal* is an interpretation of, or to be more precise, a fragmented commentary on, Aristotle's *Topics*. The meaningful connections and correspondences between the different forms of argument and dialectic elaborated on in the traditional commentaries, prompt further investigation

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<sup>50</sup> I am not sure if by "city girls," Mallet is referring to a common perception of "city girls" as being loose (or low) in character as opposed to more conservative "country girls," when Mallet puts dialectic and rhetoric into the category of continental city life style. However, his metaphorical analogy, I think, matches the categories of Arabic Aristotelian philosophers' perception of rhetoric and dialectic as being epistemically low-grade in comparison to the apodictic demonstration (*burhān*). The book *Where the Girls Are Edited*, an anthology of country girls' stories in the city, shows that both girls may appear to be exact opposites (country girls seem to be innocent and maybe even ignorant while city girls seem to know more and be exposed to more), but at the heart of the matter, they are searching for the same thing. On the dynamics between "city girls" and "country girls," see *Where the Girls Are Edited*, ed. D. L. King (Cleis Press, 2009).

<sup>51</sup> « Bien sûr, la trajectoire – du commentaire des *Topiques* au commentaire des *Topiques* via la traité d'Ibn Tufayl – fleurit le paradoxe puisque la dialectique, de conserve avec la rhétorique, est confisquée par nature à l'enfant solitaire. L'une et l'autre sont également continentales, filles de la cité. » Dominique Mallet, *La préférence pour les images: aspects de la dialectique dans les philosophies d'Alfarabi, d'Ibn Ṭufayl et d'Averroes* (Beirut: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1998), p. 1.

<sup>52</sup> In his *Ta'rifāt*, Jurjāni defines *jadal* (dialectic), as a type of syllogism (*qiyās*) which consists of the two kinds of premises (*mashhūrāt* and *musallamāt*) and aims to force the opponent (*ilzām al-khaṣm*) to accept the fallacy of his position and to convince (*ifhām*) people who cannot grasp the premises of demonstration (*burhān*); see *Ta'rifāt*, p. 106. The *mashhūrāt* and *musallamāt* are accepted premises, i.e., the statements accepted by one's opponent in argumentation. The difference between *mashhūrāt* and *musallamāt* is that whereas the former are accepted by laypersons and the masses, the latter are accepted only by the professionals and experts in certain fields. These premises belong to the class of propositions which are not certain (not *yaqīnī*). Examples for *mashhūrāt* include the statements: "Justice is good," "Injustice is bad," "Lying is bad," or "To kill human beings is legally forbidden." For *mashhūrāt* and *musallamāt*, see *Ta'rifāt*, p. 267; Deborah Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 1990), pp.141-48. Henceforth Deborah Black, *Logic*.

into the nature of this theoretical discourse from Fārābī to Ibn Rushd. This same body of work will also help to determine the place of dialectic in Arabic literature and beyond as the manner in which dialectic is used indicates a certain intimacy with the *Dialogues* of Plato, who associated the “dialogue form” with the classical exercise of thought.<sup>53</sup>

*Ḥayy b. Yaqzān* presents a brief history of the dominant forms and methods of thinking in Islamic intellectual history and in this respect it is striking how Ibn Ṭufayl’s characters are archetypes of persons who can be observed throughout the period extending from the third/ninth to the sixth/twelfth centuries. Notably, in the three centuries that preceded Ibn Ṭufayl, the ‘Abbasid period of Islamic history was characterized by what I would term its “dialectical milieu.” It is useful here to borrow one of John Wansbrough’s defining terms in Islamic historiography, although the phrase “*sectarian milieu*” is somewhat inexact as an explanatory term given the critical nature of this debate.<sup>54</sup> Accordingly, I transpose the term “sectarian” for “dialectical.” In fact, the formidable conflicts of interest and raging controversies that led to the creation of these different sects during

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<sup>53</sup> On Plato’s *Dialogues* and “the dialogue form” as the classical exercise of thought, see the second chapter of C. J. Rowe’s *Plato* (London: Bristol Classical, 2003) and Christopher Gill, “Afterword: Dialectic and the Dialogue Form in Late Plato,” in *Form and Argument in Late Plato*, ed. Christopher Gill and Mary M. McCabe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 283-311.

<sup>54</sup> John Wansbrough coined this term with his *The Sektarian Milieu: Content and Composition of Islamic Salvation History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). His work shows the significance of the religiously and culturally diverse climate in which Islamic salvation history developed in an atmosphere of inter-religious polemics.

this formative period of Islamic history were the expression of an ongoing dialectic of thesis and antithesis. As we proceed toward the full elaboration of our thesis, more reasons than ever emerge to characterize the discourse across these formative centuries as belonging to an overridingly “*dialectical milieu*.”

It is evident above how one such concept, i.e., the dialectic (in the sense of “speech between two,”) caught the imagination of Ibn Ṭufayl and other Muslim thinkers during the sixth/twelfth century. The fact is, however, that from as early as the beginning of the second/eighth century, Muslim theologians began to ask theological questions that were dialectical in nature. During the Umayyad period, for instance, they reached two opposing conclusions on human agency:<sup>55</sup> firstly, the Qadarite view (*Qadarīya*)<sup>56</sup> held that human beings exercise such extensive power over their acts, that free-will belongs to the individual alone; and secondly, the Jabrite view (*Mujbīra* or *Jabriyya*)<sup>57</sup> held that no action can be properly said

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<sup>55</sup> There were other theological tendencies in the Umayyad period such as Murji’ites, the alleged Jahmites, and other individuals such as Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-Ḥanafīya (d.718), Ja’d b. Dirham (d.737), Jahm b. Ṣafwān (d.746), Imām Ja’far (d.765) and Abu Ḥanīfa (d.767). However, the two mentioned above became the most dominant in the period in question.

<sup>56</sup> The word *qadar* literally means God’s determination of all events, including what people choose to do. One would expect a Qadarite to be someone who maintains that God determines everything, but in fact the term historically came to mean the opposite, i.e., one who asserts that *qadar* belongs to human beings and thus, a Qadarite is a believer in human free will. On the Qadarite movement, see Josef van Ess, “Ḳadariyya,” in *EI*<sup>2</sup>, IV, pp. 368-72.

<sup>57</sup> Jabrites (known as *jabriyya* and *mujbīra*): “an early theological movement that upheld the doctrine of *jabr*, or divine compulsion [as opposed to the Qadarites’ favouring of free will]. The Jabrites maintained that it is not humans but God alone who acts, that human beings

to belong to the prerogatives of the creature at all, since God determines everything.<sup>58</sup>

The Qadarite movement encouraged theoretical<sup>59</sup> and active opposition to the Umayyad regime due to its exponents' belief in human free will and responsibility before God. The Umayyad caliphate,<sup>60</sup> at least after 'Abd Mālīk b. Marwān I (d.86/705), openly took up a deterministic position and demanded that all followers recognize the acts of their leaders as "God's will." The Qadarites asked in turn whether the actions of rulers were really "God's will" and if so, whether believers should accept everything that comes from this source.<sup>61</sup>

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have no real power over their choices and actions, and that all events are ultimately determined by God's will. Accordingly, they argued in defence of *qadar*, or predestination," see Peter S. Groff, *Islamic Philosophy A-Z* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) p. 117.

<sup>58</sup> Isfarāyīnī, *al-Tabṣīr fī al-Dīn wa-Tamyīz al-Firqah al-Nājiyah 'an al-Hiraq al-hālikīn* (Beirut: 'Ālam al-Kutub, 1983), pp. 19-25; Shahrastānī, *Kitāb al-Milal wa'l-Niḥal* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmīyah, 1992), I, pp. 22-41, 71; W. Montgomery Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought*, p. 117.

<sup>59</sup> Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's *Risāla on qadar*, composed between 75/694 and 80/699 (the beginning of the revolt of Ibn al-Ash'ath), is basically a theoretical questioning of caliphal authority. For Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's treatise, see Julian Obermann, "Political Theology in Early Islam: Hasan al-Basri's Treatise on Qadar," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 55 (1935): 138-162. There is now a very thorough book on al-Baṣrī, see Sulaiman Ali Mourad, *Early Islam between Myth and History: al-Hasan al-Basri (110H/728CE) and the Formation of his Legacy in Classical Islamic Scholarship* (Leiden: Brill, 2006). See also Michael Cook, *Early Muslim Dogma: A Source-Critical Study* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 112-23 and Josef van Ess, *TG*, vol. 2, pp. 41-50.

<sup>60</sup> For the Umayyad conception of the caliphate, see Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, *God's Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). On free will and predestination in early Islam, see W. Montgomery Watt, *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam* (London: Luzac & Company, 1948).

<sup>61</sup> Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *Munya wa'l-Amal* (Beirut: Dār al-Nadā, 1990), pp. 23-4; idem, *Kitāb Ṭabaqāt al-Mū'tazilah*, ed. Susanna Diwald-Wilzer (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1961), pp. 25-27; Josef van Ess, *Zwischen Ḥadīth und Theologie: Studien zum Entstehen prädestinatianischer Überlieferung* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1975), pp. 179-94 and idem, "Ḳadariyya," in *EI*<sup>2</sup>, IV, p. 370.

This politico-theological debate during the first centuries of Islam—“the first integration period,” to use Gustave E. von Grunebaum’s phrase<sup>62</sup>—has continued to provoke Muslim thinkers right up to the present day.<sup>63</sup> Indeed, the Umayyads can be said to have shaped this debate to such an extent that it is now considered to be their permanent legacy within Islamic dialectical theology.<sup>64</sup> Although their approach was not systematic, it was nonetheless “dialectical in nature.”<sup>65</sup> Montgomery Watt, for his part, argues that it presented “the Umayyad apologia for their rule and the

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<sup>62</sup> Grunebaum writes: “[t]he civilization which the conquering Arabs brought out of the Peninsula was the result of a *first integration* of local cultural elements with elements derived from the Jewish, the Christian, and, through their mediation, the Hellenistic traditions, with the message of Islam serving at the same time as an additional constituent and as the crystallizing catalyst. This first Islamic integration imposed itself on a sizable proportion of the subject populations while it was undergoing a keen struggle with the autochthonous cultures.” Gustave E. von Grunebaum, “The Problem: Unity in Diversity,” in *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization*, ed. von Grunebaum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 23.

<sup>63</sup> See Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī’s (d.1954) *Mawqif al-Bashar taḥta Sulṭān al-Qadar* (Cairo: al-Maṭba‘a al-Salafiyyah, 1352/1933). Ṣabrī’s deterministic (*jabrī*) views were in turn sharply criticized by the Hanafite jurist Zāhid al-Kawtharī (d.1952): see al-Kawtharī, *al-Istibṣār fī al-Taḥadduth ‘an al-Jabr wa-al-Ikhtiyār* (Cairo: Dār al-Anwār, 1370/1951).

<sup>64</sup> Joseph Schacht, “Theology and Law in Islam,” in *Theology and Law in Islam*, ed. G. E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971), pp. 7-8.

<sup>65</sup> By “dialectical in nature,” here (as opposed to the later reference “language of dialectic” used at the end of this chapter), I refer to the Hegelian dialectic in the sense that everything else in history moves in three stages (the first *thesis* stage, followed by a stage that negates it: *antithesis*, and finally reaching the third, *synthesis*). Following this line of reasoning, we can say that the Ash‘arites set out to discover a bridging theory (a Hegelian *synthesis*), namely, the concept of acquisition (*kasb*), as a means of reconciling the ‘compulsion’ of the Jabrīte and the free will of the Qadarīte. The Ash‘arites, scriptural rationalists for whom reason was always at the service of revelation, insisted that although all actions are determined by God, human beings can “acquire” responsibility for them through their actions. Eventually the Maturidites, the allies of the Hanafites, arrived and declared that Ash‘arites were merely determinists (*jabrī*). (See Watt, *The Formative Period*, p. 126). From this perspective, the Ash‘arite synthesis is both the end of a dialectical process and the beginning of another process in which the synthesis of the old functions as a thesis of the new.

counter-argument of their opponents,”<sup>66</sup> while Josef van Ess argues that the debate seems to have reflected an elementary theological dispute and not a systematic *kalām* one, since no homogeneous *kalām* school, in the strict sense, had even been established at that time.<sup>67</sup>

What, then, might define the early conception of the dialectic? What were its uses in the different branches of the sciences, and when and why was it first introduced? The following pages will demonstrate that the emergence of the dialectic (*jadal*) and the practice of argumentation (*munāẓara*) were originally instigated for purely political, and, therefore practical purposes.<sup>68</sup> The use of dialectic (*jadal*), which originally derived

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<sup>66</sup> W. Montgomery Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973), p. 82.

<sup>67</sup> Josef van Ess, “The Beginnings of Islamic Theology,” in *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning*, ed. John Emery Murdoch and Edith Dudley Sylla (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 88-9.

<sup>68</sup> I use the terms ‘practical’ and ‘political’ interchangeably. The reason, in my opinion, that practical and political are identical in the context of classical Islamic history, particularly because the Qadarite movement, an anti-thesis to the foundation of the Umayyad Empire, was taken as a source of inspiration to be a thesis of the newly-established Abbasid Empire (successors of the Umayyads). For example, Wāṣil b. Atā (d.748) and ‘Amr b. ‘Ubayd (d.761), the founders of the Mu‘tazilite school which was a strong ally of Abbasid Empire, developed the views of the Qadarites. On the whole, the Qadarites were a precursor to the Mu‘tazilites in the development of *kalām*. The replacement of the Umayyads by the ‘Abbasids changed *the relevance of the doctrine to current politics*. The Qadarites were no longer seen as a focus of opposition to the government in the Abbasid period, but were seen rather as potential supporters, especially during the period when the caliph al-Ma‘mūn was officially backing certain Mu‘tazilite doctrines as we will see in the following pages. On the development of the Qadarite movement, see Josef van Ess, *Zwischen Ḥadīṭ und Theologie: Studien zum Entstehen prädestinatianischer Überlieferung* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1975), pp. 179-94 and M. Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought*, pp. 107-14. The anecdote of al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/869) is significant at this point. He relates that the debate over *qadar* took place in an Islamic context owing to questions raised by the Qur’ān itself, while, ironically, the solutions proposed by all the parties *used the same Qur’ān* and its concepts. See Abū ‘Uthmān al-Jāḥiẓ, “Fī Ṣinā‘at al-Kalām,” in *Rasā’il al-Jāḥiẓ*, 3 vols. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanjī, 1979), vol. 3, pp. 320-21.



from politics and was deployed as a practical tool against the opponents of the Abbasid regime, constituted the most significant single feature of Islamic intellectual history, and it was not only significant in itself but even now, continues to pose problems for the interpretation of Islamic cultural history.<sup>69</sup> Alfred North Whitehead urged that recent developments in physics require that the categories “substance” and “attribute” be replaced by the categories “process” and “influence.”<sup>70</sup> Therefore, before discussing the post-classical period, we must address the question of historical process: that is, “how did we get here?” or, to be more exact, “what kind of intellectual trajectories influenced and shaped the post-classical period?”

First, we will examine how the concept of the dialectic—in the sense of “speech between two”—was first introduced within Islamic intellectual history. In speaking of its introduction, I do not mean to deny the existence of a dialectical tradition in the Arabian Peninsula, especially within the

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<sup>69</sup> In her book, *Islam and Democracy*, Fatema Mernissi (b.1940), a Moroccan feminist writer and sociologist, suggests that *jadal* is the best *jihad* method because “convincing the enemy by using *jadal* was the most potent method the Prophet used to preach and increase the number of his followers.” She also explains that the secret of the Al-Jazeera TV network’s success is in its role as “the reviver of *jadal*.” “The genius of the Al-Jazeera team,” she writes, “formed by Arab men and women media professionals who gained their experience working in the London-based Arab Section of the British Broadcasting Corporation, was to reintroduce *jadal*, the art of polemics and controversy, as the basic concept of their most-watched programs [such as] *Ar-Ra’y al-Ākhar* (The Other Opinion) and *Al-Ittijāh al-Mu’akiss* (The Opposite Direction), which bring together groups with divergent opinions and encourages them to defend their positions by using *jadal*—logical arguments that allow the viewers to draw their own final conclusions.” See the introduction to the second edition of her *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World*, trans. Mary Jo Lakeland (Cambridge: Perseus Publishing, 2002), pp. ix-xxi.

<sup>70</sup> John Losee, *A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 1.

Christian, Syriac and Persian communities, whose knowledge of Greek dialectics preceded and even paralleled the period of the creation of Islam as an established religion. Recent studies show that dialectic and refined modes of argumentation was not something indigenous to the Arabian Peninsula;<sup>71</sup> but for Islam—considered to be an established religion in that region—it was emphatically something new.

In this respect, it is plausible to claim that dialectic was distinctively “new” because the Qur’ān, the source of this newborn religion, took only one side in a given field of debate and was not interested in presenting the other side. Consequently there was little opportunity to present opposed or contrasting sides of an argument within what quickly came to be viewed as a *canonical discourse*. Even though there is a constant interplay of opposites in the Qur’ān, for example, belief (*imān*) versus unbelief (*kufī*),<sup>72</sup> this internal tension (generated by the Qur’ān) nonetheless indicates that a rejection of God and His messengers will result in a punishment from God.<sup>73</sup> Instead of listening to the ‘other,’ God in the Qur’ān simply threatens the

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<sup>71</sup> Annelie Vlogers & Claudio Zamagni (eds.), *Erotapokriscis: Early Christian Question-and-Answer Literature in Context* (Leuven: Peeters, 2004); Adam H. Becker, *The School of Nisibis and Christian Scholastic Culture in Late Antique Mesopotamia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) and Joel Thomas Walker, *The Legend of Mar Qardagh: Narrative and Christian Heroism in Late Antique Iraq* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

<sup>72</sup> On the interplay of opposites in the Qur’ān, see David Marshall, *God, Muhammad and the Unbelievers: A Qur’anic Study* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999).

<sup>73</sup> For some examples of punishment stories, see the following verses in the Qur’ān: Q.7:74-78; Q.7:89-94; Q.11:61-68; Q.11:85-99; Q.15:80-84; Q.21:70-77; Q.23:45-48; Q.25:38-40; Q.26:10-66; Q.26:69-102; Q.26:192-227; Q.37:98; Q.39:24-26; Q.41:15-16; Q.44:37-39; Q.50:12-14; Q.54:23-41.

unbelievers (the questioners of His authority) by creating a black and white world-view in which, besides faith in God and Muhammad, there is only unbelief (*kufī*)<sup>74</sup> and punishment stories:<sup>75</sup> apart from Islam there is only a bunch of “losers,”<sup>76</sup> apart from truth (*ḥaqq*) there is only error (*bāṭil*).<sup>77</sup>

As Ibn Khaldūn (d.808/1406) brilliantly argues: “Muhammad possessed the Qur’anic revelation alone and he explained it directly by his words and deeds. No transmission (*naql*), speculation (*nazar*) or analogical reasoning (*qiyās*) was needed.”<sup>78</sup> He was by dint of his very existence and his *raison d’être*, the authority, and in transmitting, speculating and reasoning, he stood alone. There was no higher authority to challenge him, at least not in the Muslim community as it then existed. Battles and wars were the means chosen to answer unsolved or recalcitrant problems, or as a practical means of dispensing with any party that dared to question his

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<sup>74</sup> For a systematic treatment of the concept of unbelief in the Qur’ān, see Toshihiko Izutsu, *Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur’ān* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1966); idem, *God and Man in the Koran; Semantics of the Koranic Weltanschauung* (Tokyo: Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1964); Marilyn R. Waldman, “The Development of the Concept of *Kufī* in the Qur’ān,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 88 (1968): 442-55.

<sup>75</sup> On the punishment stories in the Qur’ān, see Alford T. Welch, “Formulaic Features of the Punishment-Stories,” in *Literary Structures and Religious Meaning in the Qur’ān*, ed. Issa J. Boullata (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), pp. 77-116. Welch points out that the *sūra* of poets (chapter 26, *al-Shu‘arā’*) has the most fully developed schematic form of five punishment stories.

<sup>76</sup> The Qur’ān says (3:85): “And whoever seeks a religion other than Islam, it will not be accepted from him and he will be one of the losers in the Hereafter,” and (3:91): “Those who have disbelieved and died in disbelief, the earth full of gold would not be accepted from any of them if it were offered as a ransom. They will have a painful punishment, and they will have no helpers.”

<sup>77</sup> This refers to the following verse: “*jā’a al-ḥaqq wa zahaqa al-bāṭil*: Verily the truth has come and falsehood has perished” (Q. 17:81).

<sup>78</sup> Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah*, trans. Franz Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), v. 3, p. 23. (hereafter Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah*).

supreme authority.<sup>79</sup> It is therefore, no surprise to hear the famous dictum from ‘Aḍud al-Dīn Ījī (d.756/1355)<sup>80</sup> and Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d.792/1389):<sup>81</sup> “[s]word and spearhead both achieve what demonstration (*burhān*) cannot achieve.”<sup>82</sup> It was easier to convince people through a “demonstration of power,” i.e., the sword and spearhead, than by using the method of rational demonstration (*burhān*).

Muhammad certainly was the “final judge” of all matters among his own community.<sup>83</sup> However, in the aftermath of his death, and with the thoroughgoing changes in Muslim society in light of the victories over the

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<sup>79</sup> On the early conquests and origins of Holy war (*jihād*), see Reuven Firestone, *Jihad: The Origins of Holy War in Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Fred McGraw Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests* (Princeton University Press, 1981) and Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

<sup>80</sup> For Ījī’s biography, see the third chapter in the analysis section of his treatise on argumentation theory. For Ījī, see *GAL*, II, pp. 267-71 and *Suppl.*, II, pp. 287-93.

<sup>81</sup> “Sa‘d al-Dīn Taftāzānī (1322-1389), born in Taftāzān, a village in Khurāsān, renowned author on grammar, rhetoric, logic, theology, law and Qur’ān exegesis. Al-Taftāzānī’s fame rests mainly on his commentaries on well-known works in various fields of learning, which came to be widely used in teaching at *madrāsas* until modern times. In theology he sometimes upheld Māturīdī positions against Ash‘arī criticism, but he also often endorsed Ash‘arī doctrine. Altogether, he backed a broad, though anti-Mu‘tazilī Sunnism, which was in accord with later concepts of Sunni orthodoxy;” see *EI*<sup>2</sup>, X, pp. 88-89 and *GAL*, II, pp. 215-16; *Suppl.*, II, pp. 301-304.

<sup>82</sup> The original Arabic text in Ījī’s *Mawāqif* reads: “*al-sayf wa’l-sinān yaf‘alāni mā lā yaf‘al al-burhān.*” See ‘Aḍud al-Dīn Ījī, *Mawāqif fī ‘Ilm al-Kalām* (Beirut: ‘Ālam al-Kutub, 1983), p. 397. The whole sentence appears in Taftāzānī’s *Sharḥ al-Maqāsid* beginning with (*mā yaza‘ al-sulṭān akthar mim mā yaza‘ al-Qur‘ān*), afterwards with a various change (*lisān* instead of *sinān* or *sayf*). In reference to the first part of the sentence, Taftāzānī says “we believe that this is one of the sayings of some of the companions of the Prophet or the second generation after the Companions (*ṭābi‘īn*).” See Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Maqāsid*, 5 vols. (Beirut: ‘Ālam al-Kutub, 1983), vol. 5, p. 237. For Ījī’s *Mawāqif*, see *Kçf*, II, 1891; *Esmā*, I, 527 and *GAL*, II, 208 and for Taftāzānī’s *Sharḥ al-Maqāsid*, see *Kçf*, II, 1780, *Esmā*, II, 430, *GAL*, II, 216.

<sup>83</sup> The Qur’ān states: “*But no, by the Lord, they can have no (real) Faith, until they make you judge in all disputes between them, and find in their souls no resistance against your decisions, but accept them with the fullest conviction.*” (4:65)

Persians and Syrians, new ideas were progressively introduced, not least through the assimilation of a conquered people. This period of imperial expansion aggressively enlisted the Muslim empire in a struggle to find new apparatus since there was no longer a “final judge” who enjoyed *a priori* position among his community. Likewise, there was an imperative need to use different tools, since new challenges needed to be solved in new ways, if only to explain different states of being and different modes of cultural and political expression. When one language (the language of the Qur’ān, i.e., *naql*) could not be understood, another language (rational reasoning, i.e., ‘*aqḥ*) would have to be used.<sup>84</sup> This switch in language led Arent Jan Wensinck (d.1939) to declare that:

Muḥammad [was] overshadowed by Aristotle. Allah [was] no longer the God of the Kuran, of the pious ancestors and of man’s religious experience. He [was] now a logical deduction from the existence of the universe.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> In the early days of Islamic history, the Qur’an and Prophetic tradition (representing *naql*) were extensively used as sources of knowledge and evidence, but later on, other methods such as *ray*, *qiyās* and *ijtihād* and *ijmā* (representing ‘*aqḥ*) were included. In the later period, the discord between Ash‘arism and Ḥanbalism meant a greater reliance on reason (‘*aqḥ*) in the circles of *mutakallimūn*, at the expense of proofs based on tradition (*naql*). The Ash‘arite theoretician ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 1038) makes it clear which authority should be given priority. “It is permitted (*yajūz*),” he writes, “to bring a Qur’anic proof to confirm what reason (‘*aqḥ*) has already demonstrated.” A tangible expression of the exact opposite view was the destruction by Ḥanbalites of the edifice built over al-Ash‘arī’s tomb. See, Ibn ‘Asākir, *Tabyīn* (Damascus, 1928), p. 413.

<sup>85</sup> A. J. Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed* (Cambridge: CUP, 1932), p. 248.

Muslim people encountered “the other,”<sup>86</sup> i.e., representatives of previous faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism) but “the other” as Eric Ormsby points out, “[h]ad the advantage of a well-developed language of discourse and sophisticated modes of argumentation,”<sup>87</sup> and he continues:

In the Arabian peninsula, to be sure, heathen Arabs had lived among Jews and Christians, but now, for the first time, they found themselves espousing an alternative worldview, and yet they lacked the intellectual weapons with which to pursue a conquest of minds and hearts, as well as bodies.<sup>88</sup> Christians and Jews, by contrast, possessed extremely supple and well-honed modes of discourse and persuasion... [By using the skills of] Christian Nestorian scholars, then, [the Graeco-Arabic translation movement] cast their translations of Greek science, medicine and philosophy from Syriac into Arabic, coining and minting new technical terms where none had existed in Arabic before.<sup>89</sup>

With the advent of Islam, not only the Graeco-Arabic translation movement (which began in Baghdad shortly after its establishment in 762)

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<sup>86</sup> Farid Esack, “Muslims Engaging the Other and the *Humanum*,” in *Sharing the Book: Religious Perspectives on the Rights and Wrongs of Proselytism*, ed. John Witte Jr. and Richard C. Martin (New York: Orbis Books, 1999), pp. 118-141.

<sup>87</sup> Eric Ormsby, “Arabic Philosophy,” in *From Africa to Zen: An Invitation to World Philosophy*, ed. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 109.

<sup>88</sup> For the conquest of minds and hearts in early Islam, see Donna E. Arzt, “Jihad for Hearts and Minds: Proselytizing in the Qur’an and First Three Centuries of Islam,” in *Sharing the Book: Religious Perspectives on the Rights and Wrongs of Proselytism* (New York: Orbis Books, 1999), pp. 79-94.

<sup>89</sup> Ormsby, “Arabic Philosophy,” pp. 109-110. Not only new technical terms were minted into the Arabic language with regard to the translation activities in Umayyad and Abbasid periods, but also there is quite foreign vocabulary in the Qur’ān as well. To give just one example of a new term, for instance, Michael Carter says that “[*Y*]aqīn (certainty) was a pre-Islamic word... The Aramaic on the Syriac borrowings jointly testifies to a long-standing cultural interaction.” See Michael Carter, “Foreign Vocabulary,” in *Blackwell Companion to the Qur’ān*, ed. Andrew Rippin (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), p. 131.

but also debates between Christians and Muslims, resurrected Greek dialectic as a means of creating a distinctive Arabic dialectic. By the third/ninth century, argumentative discourse had permeated all intellectual fields from poetry to jurisprudence, from grammar to theology and philosophy. The caliphs and the ruling elite of the newly established Arab Abbasid dynasty (750-1258) introduced a large body of non-literary and non-historical secular Greek works on science and philosophy to serve as a response to pressing political and social problems. Once introduced and sponsored from the top, the translation movement found further support from below, especially in the hands of scholars who had been actively recruited to the capital by the same elite that controlled and directed the translations.<sup>90</sup>

As with any other historical reality, many social, political, ideological and even economic factors could have played a determining role during the first stage of the appearance of dialectical texts in Arabic. The most significant of these factors was the rich development of Islamic theology, which led to passionate debates among all groups, movements and social hierarchies. At the center of discussion was the question of legitimacy of succession to the caliphate, the relationship of the leadership to faith, and the debates pitting free will against determinism. In this

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<sup>90</sup> For the Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement, see Dimitri Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early 'Abbāsīd Society (2th-4th/8th-10th centuries)* (New York: Routledge, 1999).

context, there arose a *Kontroversstheologie* (theology of controversy), as characterized by van Ess, which was to incisively influence the political discourse of early Muslim society.<sup>91</sup> During this period, there was no interest in the dialectic *per se*. The main concerns to be mooted were theological and political in nature. Nonetheless, this was the context in which a more systematic and fully-fledged version of dialectical thinking emerged during this formative period of Islamic intellectual history. Taking these social, religious and political currents as our indispensable base for the examination and interpretation of cultural paradigms, we will proceed to examine how the various tools of the dialectic were used for different and even contradictory purposes during the course of Islamic intellectual history.

## II. FROM ATHENS TO BAGHDAD: THE TRANSLATION MOVEMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF ARISTOTLE'S *TOPICS*

The 'Abbasid caliph al-Mahdī (d.169/785)<sup>92</sup> commissioned the translation of Aristotle's *Topics* into Arabic (known as *Kitāb al-Jadal*) before any other Greek works.<sup>93</sup> The translation was undertaken by the Nestorian patriarch, Timothy I (d.208/823)<sup>94</sup> in about 165/782 in response,

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<sup>91</sup> Josef van Ess, *TG*, I, p. 48.

<sup>92</sup> For al-Mahdī (regn. 775-785), see *EI*<sup>2</sup>, V, pp. 1230-38.

<sup>93</sup> Gutas says: "[a]l-Mahdī must have had good advisors; they suggested nothing less than the work that started it all: Aristotle's *Topics*." See Gutas, *Greek Thought*, p. 67. The complete translation of *Organon* into Arabic is kept today in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. See Bibliothèque Nationale, *Manuscrit arabe* (No: 2346).

<sup>94</sup> For Timothy I (727-823), see Lawrence E. Browne, "The Patriarch Timothy and the Caliph al-Mahdi," *The Muslim World* 21 (1931): 38-45. For a detailed account of Syriac



according to his letters, to al-Mahdī's "royal command."<sup>95</sup> The key question that emerges asks why this particular book of Aristotle's attracted the caliph's attention in the initial stages of the translation movement. The answer may lie in the fact that *Topics* deals with dialectic (*jadal*): the art of argumentation on a systematic basis. Its aim is to develop a method that would enable the defence of or opposition to a thesis based on commonly held beliefs and accordingly, it provides rules of engagement concerning the question and answer process between two parties, the questioner and his respondent. Yet the question of why there was a need for such a discipline in the time of al-Mahdī persists.

The emergence of Aristotle's *Topics* in Arabic was not only a question of translation. It represented the diffusion of the features of one culture to another. From this perspective, dialectic is a perfect window into the crosscurrents of Islamic intellectual history with all its theological and political manoeuvres, negotiations, shifts, ruptures, successes and disappointments. Dimitri Gutas offers two reasons that explain the phenomenon of the early appearance of Aristotle's book on dialectic in Islamic culture. First, he says, the 'Abbasid state claimed universalism on

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translators, see John W. Watt, "Syriac Translators and Greek Philosophy in Early Abbasid Iraq," *The Canadian Society for Syriac Studies Journal* 4 (2004): 15-26, p. 17. Prof. Watt's recent book is a contribution towards understanding the Syriac appropriation of Greek philosophy and its influence on the early Islamic civilization. See John W. Watt, *Rhetoric and Philosophy from Greek into Syriac* (Farnham: Ashgate Variorum, 2010)

<sup>95</sup> Gutas, *Greek Thought*, pp. 61-2.

the basis of the fact that the stars and ultimately the “omnipotent God”<sup>96</sup> had pre-ordained them for a mission on earth and that therefore, there could be only one people truly chosen by God. Second, he claims that the phenomenon was a question of a proselytizing religion.<sup>97</sup> “Proselytism,”<sup>98</sup>

Gutas says:

by definition, implies that one religion, and within that religion, one version of it, is true; this is the foundation of its appeal. As such, any currents of proselytism in a society generate opposition from two general quarters: [1] within the religion, from those who feel excluded because they have adhered, for whatever reasons, to different versions; [2] outside the religion, from the adherents of other religions, who resist not only because they naturally defy the implication that their religion is not true, but also because they would necessarily be supplying the converts and hence lose power.<sup>99</sup>

A battle between what the ‘Abbasid establishment defined as Islam and what its opponents did, was therefore, inevitable. The same was true for relations between Islam and other religions. Predominantly, the

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<sup>96</sup> Gutas does not use the word “omnipotent” for Abbasid regime’s concept of God; however, this term “omnipotent” refers to the Ormsby’s discussion on Islamic formulation of theodicy by theologians and different personalities in Umayyad and Abbasid period. Ormsby says that “[T]heodicy in Islam was first formulated in reaction to conceptions of God that stressed his unqualified [illimitable] omnipotence [*qudrah*],” see Eric Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought: The Dispute over al-Ghazālī’s “Best of All Possible Worlds* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 16-31. (Hereafter Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought*).

<sup>97</sup> Gutas, *Greek Thought*, p. 62.

<sup>98</sup> On proselytism in the context of Islamic history, see Richard C. Martin. “Conversion to Islam by Invitation: Proselytism and the Negotiation of Identity in Islam,” in *Sharing the Book: Religious Perspectives on the Rights and Wrongs of Proselytism* (New York: Orbis Books, 1999), pp. 95-117.

<sup>99</sup> Gutas, *Greek Thought*, p. 64.

confrontation took the form of disputation and debate because of the large number of people involved. It also helped the ‘Abbasid caliphs further manage the political and social opposition generated by the growing number of converts.<sup>100</sup> For example, al-Mas‘ūdī assigns the ‘Abbasid caliph al-Mahdī the credit of leading the fight against the numerous dualist sects:

Al-Mahdī was the first to order the theologians who were proficient in dialectic disputation, especially scholars of research (*al-jadaliyyīna min ahl al-baḥth min al-mutakallimīn*) to compose books to refute the above-mentioned heretics (*mulḥidīn*), both those that had renounced their faith and others. The theologians then furnished demonstrative proofs (*barāhīn*) against their stubborn opponents (*al-mu‘ānidīn*), swept away the dubious arguments championed by the heretics, and made the truth shine forth to all who had doubted.<sup>101</sup>

It was not only the *zanādiqa* (Manichaeism and all heretics) who presented both an implicit and explicit threat, Christians and Jews, the formidable intellectual opponents of the new religion (Islam) with centuries of experience in the region, did as well. Al-Mahdī’s advisors, says Gutas, suggested as a defensive weapon nothing less than the work that started the translation movement: Aristotle’s *Topics*.<sup>102</sup> Not only did al-Mahdī demand that the *Topics* be translated, but he also studied in preparation for debate with a Christian so as to apply the rules and techniques of argumentation

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>101</sup> Al-Mas‘ūdī, *Murūj al-Dhahab wa Ma‘ādin al-Jawhar*, ed. Charles Pellat, 7 vols. (Beirut: Publications de L’Universite Libanaise, 1974), v. 5, p. 212.

<sup>102</sup> Gutas, *Greek Thought*, p. 67.

outlined in the work. As his opponent he chose the Nestorian patriarch, Timothy I, the very man from whom he had commissioned the translation in the first place. This debate offers a good example of the application of the rules of disputation in the *Topics*.<sup>103</sup>

Aristotle's work, more than any other, underpinned the inter-faith debate during the first two 'Abbāsid centuries. As al-Mas'ūdī notes (and as quoted earlier), al-Mahdī was the first to introduce both the method and the social attitude of disputation for settling or promoting religio-political issues. "This had far reaching consequences", argues Gutas, "the most significant of which would appear to be, in subsequent centuries, the rise of law as the dominant social expression of Islam as a religion."<sup>104</sup> Participating in debate and excellence in disputation (*munāẓara*) were acts of political significance, and *munāẓara* was always apt to increase the prestige of a participant. Centuries later, al-Ghazālī came to the attention of Nizām al-Mulk (d.485/1092) mainly because of "his excellence in

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<sup>103</sup> The Caliph al-Mahdi accused the Christians of falsification (*tahrīf*) in this debate. The Syriac text of this disputation was edited and translated into English by Alphonse Mingana in *The Apology of Timothy the Patriarch before the Caliph Mahdi* (Gorgias Press, 2009). The logical structure of this disputation can be found in Hans Putman, *L'église et l'Islam sous Timothée I (780-823): étude sur l'église nestorienne au temps des premiers `Abbasides: avec nouvelle édition et traduction du Dialogue entre Timothée et al-Mahdi* (Beirut: Dār el-Machreq, 1975). For a summary of this debate in English, see Ivor Mark Beaumont, *Christology in Dialogue with Muslims: A Critical Analysis of Christian Presentations of Christ for Muslims from the Ninth and Twentieth Centuries* (London: Paternoster, 2005), pp. 21-27. See also Sidney H. Griffith, "The Syriac Letters of Patriarch Timothy I and the Birth of Christian Kalām in the Mu'tazilite Milieu of Baghdad and Baṣrah in the Early Islamic Times," in *Syriac Polemics*, ed. Wout J. Van Bekkum, Jan W. Drijvers and Alex C. Klugkist (Leuven: Peeters, 2007), pp. 103-132.

<sup>104</sup> Gutas, *Greek Thought*, p. 69.

disputation and his command of language.” The latter disputed with distinguished individuals and debated tough adversaries in the vizier’s assemblies, which brought his name to everyone’s attention.<sup>105</sup> Thus, disputation eventually became the practice *par excellence* in intellectual circles for two reasons: the political (control of power through knowledge) and the personal (career-building). When the jurists established the first Islamic colleges in the fourth/tenth century, it was to teach dialectic and jurisprudence,<sup>106</sup> which indicates that during the early Abbasid period, political activism and personal ambition in Islamic society were achieved through dialectical argumentation.

In this context, the *miḥna* (religious trial/inquisition) may be seen as an attempt by the central government to regain control over Islamic dogma via *jadāl* and *munāẓara*. After the initial effort of al-Mahdī, al-Ma’mūn (d.218/833) engaged in an intensive propaganda campaign in order to re-establish the centralized authority of his office and even to expand its extent in his person.<sup>107</sup> This campaign aimed at two goals: to establish that he was indeed the champion of Islam (the foundation of the state) and to impress on all observers that he was the final arbiter of the true interpretation of Islam,

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<sup>105</sup> Eric Ormsby, *Ghazali: The Revival of Islam* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008), p. 29.

<sup>106</sup> On the importance of dialectic within Islamic sciences with special emphasis on the Islamic jurisprudence, see George Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981); idem, “The Scholastic Method in Medieval Education: An Inquiry into its Origins in Law and Theology,” *Speculum* 49 (1974): 640-61.

<sup>107</sup> Josef van Ess, *TG*, vol. 3, pp. 448-455 and Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, *God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 90-93.

all others being secondary. In order to achieve the first objective, al-Ma'mūn initiated a war against the infidels—in this case the Byzantines—in order to expand the boundaries of *Dār al-Islām* (territory of Islam). The second goal could be achieved only by separating the principle of religious authority from the religious scholars (*'ulamā'*) who had enjoyed dominance until this point. That religious authority had to be reclaimed by the caliph (*'ulu'l-amr*), who would be supported by an intellectual elite (*'ulamā'*)<sup>108</sup> in making his personal judgement in interpreting the texts based on reason (*'aql*): the ultimate and the proper measure of things.<sup>109</sup>

Arriving at a judgment and convincing others was the mission of the caliph,<sup>110</sup> who would avail himself of disputation and dialectical argumentation. These would be the tools in forming a judgment on religious questions based on reason, and not the statements of religious leaders based on transmitted authority. His intention was to convince the public that his judgement should be final. To this end, the translation movement offered him significant support.<sup>111</sup> Throughout his *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, Gutas highlights the centrality and political context of the *Topics* in the translation movement. The movement was far from a mere intellectual

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<sup>108</sup> Josef van Ess, "Political Ideas in Early Islamic Religious Thought," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 28 (2001):151-164, p. 162.

<sup>109</sup> Gutas, *Greek Thought*, pp. 82-3.

<sup>110</sup> For an analysis of al-Ma'mūn's conception of the caliphate throughout his reign, see John A. Nawas, "A Re-examination of Three Current Explanations for al-Ma'mūn's Introduction of the Miḥna," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26 (1994): 615-29.

<sup>111</sup> Gutas, *Greek Thought*, p. 83.

exercise; it was politically and completely in the service of the centralized authority of al-Ma'mūn, as the historian al-Mas'ūdī explains:

Al-Ma'mūn arrived in 'Irāq and held sessions with theologians and admitted to his company scholars who had distinguished themselves in dialectical disputation (*jadal*) and debate (*munāzara*), people like Abū'l-Hudhayl and Nazzām as well as their partisans and adversaries. He had jurists and the learned among men of general culture attend his sessions (*majlis*); he had such men brought from various cities and stipends for them allocated. As a result, people developed an interest in conducting theoretical speculation (*nazar*) and learned how to investigate (*baḥth*) and use dialectic (*jadal*); each group among them wrote books in which it championed its cause and through which it supported its doctrines (*madhhab*).<sup>112</sup>

Furthermore, when al-Ma'mūn embraced this new system (regaining control over Islamic dogma via *jadal* and *munāzara*) for largely practical reasons, Mu'tazilates adored it and supported him with their famous doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'ān. This implies that if the Qur'ān is created then it can be interpreted, since expressions are fixed whereas meanings are not. But again, who would be the final arbiter in the inevitable clash over different interpretations of the Qur'ān? The answer is the Caliph al-Ma'mūn (or at least a group of scholars he legitimized as authority on such positions).<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj al-Dhahab*, v. 5, p. 214 and Gutas, *Greek Thought*, pp. 77-8.

<sup>113</sup> Gutas, *Greek Thought*, p. 83.

On the other hand, *ahl al-ḥadīth*, or the traditionists<sup>114</sup> (and later the Ḥanbalites), who held the opinion of the uncreatedness of the Qur'ān, were the targets of the infamous *miḥna* because they opposed dialectical theology (*kalām*) and dialectics (*jadāl*) advocated by the Mu'tazilite (allies of al-Ma'mūn).<sup>115</sup> Even though Ma'mūn's era was a time of suppression, the Hanbalites still waged a quiet resistance (in fact, Hanbalite scholars were said to have been arrested, questioned and executed).<sup>116</sup> However, the reason the Ḥanbalites (following in the wake of the *ahl al-ḥadīth*) opposed the dialectic was also essentially political, because it meant the loss of their claim to religious knowledge and of course, consequently, to *religious authority*. It is no surprise therefore, that the *ahl al-ḥadīth*, represented by Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, included a variety of Muḥammad's sayings (*ḥadīth*) in their *ḥadīth* collection, which disapproves of employing dialectic (*jadāl*) in the strongest terms.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> The traditionists (*ahl al-Hadīth* or *ahl-Sunna*) were jurists who maintained that traditions from the Prophet, even though they were transmitted only by isolated individuals and were weak in terms of their authenticity, outshone mere jurist's opinion (*ra'y*). On *ahl al-ḥadīth*, see Joseph Schacht, *EI*<sup>2</sup>, I, p. 259 and Ignaz Goldziher, *The Zāhirīs: Their Doctrine and Their History*, trans. Wolfgang Behn (Leiden: Brill, 1971), pp. 3-5.

<sup>115</sup> On the relation between the Mu'tazilite (*ahl al-nazar*) and *miḥna*, see W. M. Patton, *Aḥmed ibn Ḥanbal and the Miḥna* (Leiden: Brill, 1897).

<sup>116</sup> Notably their leader, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, was severely beaten and jailed for two years after his refusal of the Mu'tazilite doctrine of *khalq al-Qur'ān*. See W. M. Patton, *Aḥmed b. Ḥanbal and the Miḥna*, pp. 90-113 and Gutas, *Greek Thought*, pp. 161-63.

<sup>117</sup> For a number of examples of *ḥadīth* strongly condemning the use of *jadāl* in general and in particular, in answering to specific questions such as *qadar* in the *ḥadīth* collection of *ahl al-Ḥadīth* party, see Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, *Musnad al-Imām Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal*, 6 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1980), vol. 4, p.146; vol. 5, p. 256; vol. 6, p. 48 and Ibn Mājah, *Sunan Ibn Mājah*, 5 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Ma'rifa, 1996), vol. 1, pp. 33-43.



A group of circumstances contributed to the translation of other Greek books on the subject, just as they had to the translation of the *Topics* during the caliphate of al-Mahdī and extensive use of it by al-Ma'mūn during his reign. *Topics* was required to provide guidance in Arabic for the method of disputation, while the translation of other Aristotelian corpus (exact sciences) was sought out to be used in these theological debates in order to establish the facts from the physical world (*shāhid*). Arguing that one can only know the unseen (*ghā'ib*) via the seen (*shāhid*),<sup>118</sup> theologians mined these other translated works for visible data about the imperceptible world.<sup>119</sup> It becomes very clear at this point that, as Gutas demonstrated, the reason behind the demand for the translation of the Aristotle's *Physics* [seen world] was rooted in “the cosmological component of the theological debates [unseen world].”<sup>120</sup>

Thus, Aristotle's *Topics* came to be translated and enjoyed a sustained influence in Islamic intellectual history. Whatever al-Mahdī's or al-Ma'mūn's rationales were, the victory of dialectic had a permanent

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<sup>118</sup> The theologians' method of acquiring knowledge about God is called *istidlāl bi'l-shāhid 'alā al-ghā'ib* or *istishhād bi'l-shāhid 'alā al-ghā'ib*—a method that uses observable indications found in the present world (*shāhid*) to drawing conclusions about the imperceptible world (*ghā'ib*). Theologians (*mutakallimūn*), therefore, used the exact sciences in the Aristotelian corpus to demonstrate rationally the existence of God and of His attributes among many other theological questions. On this method, see Ibn Furak, *Mujarrad Maqālāt al-Ash'arī*, ed. Daniel Gimaret (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1987), pp. 310-15 and Joep Lameer, *Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory and Islamic Practice* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), pp. 204-32.

<sup>119</sup> Gutas, *Greek Thought*, p. 72.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 61-74. Gutas identifies these two works, i.e., Aristotle's *Topics* and *Physics* as of central interest in what he calls “the exigencies of inter-faith discourse” during the time of translation movement.

significance for Islamic intellectual history. Dialectic, Ormsby says, “was a weapon essential for *defending* the truths of the faith, but *not* an instrument by which truth itself could be found.”<sup>121</sup> In one sense, every intellectual community had its own truth in its respective discipline, as did each school of law, theology or grammar. Wittgenstein claims in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* that “the world is all that is the case,”<sup>122</sup> but we will see that “the case” was different according to each observer. A wide range of thinkers, extending from Muslim jurists to Jewish thinkers in the Muslim domain, and from the prolific Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-‘Arabī (d.638/1240)<sup>123</sup> to later Sufīs,<sup>124</sup> even the Ḥanbalites<sup>125</sup> used “the language of dialectic”<sup>126</sup> in

<sup>121</sup> Ormsby, *Ghazali: The Revival of Islam*, p. 64.

<sup>122</sup> Original text reads: “Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist,” see Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 6.

<sup>123</sup> Michael Sells suggests that “Ibn al-‘Arabī’s language forms a comprehensive discursive dynamic or genre, a *mystical dialectic* in which the perspective shift is symbolized by the polishing of the mirror.” (Italics are authors own). Ibn al-‘Arabī achieves this type of dialectic by shaking the *habitus* (conventional way of seeing things) and continual change. See, Michael Sells, “Ibn ‘Arabī’s Polished Mirror: Perspective Shift and Meaning Event,” *Studia Islamica* 67 (1988), pp. 123-34.

<sup>124</sup> For example, the case of fifteenth-century Sufi Nūr al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī’s (d.898/1492) *Durra al-Fākhira* is worthy of mention. Nicholas Heer, who translated his work into English, tell us the story behind Jāmī’s work: “Taşköprüzâde in his *Şhaqā’iq al-Nu‘mānīya* relates that the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II requested a treatise to be written adjudicating (*muḥākama*) between those groups studying the sciences of truth (‘*ulūm al-ḥaqīqah*), namely, the theologians, the Sūfīs, and the philosophers. Jāmī therefore wrote his treatise, called *Risāla fī Taḥqīq Madhhab al-Şūfīya wa’l-Mutakallimīn wa’l-Ḥukamā’* (aka *al-Durra al-Fākhira*), in which he judged those groups who made truth-claims with respect to six questions (God’s existence, His unity, His knowledge, His will, His power, and His speech). The *muḥākama* was a genre of writing in which the author compared two opposing points of view or positions and then attempted a mediation or possibly a synthesis between them. The famous work of this type was Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s *al-Muḥākamāt*, in which he attempted to reconcile the two opposing views, i.e., Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s and Naşīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s as expressed in their respective commentaries on Ibn Sīnā’s *Ishārāt*,” see Nicholas Heer, *The Precious Pearl* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1979), pp. 1-9. What is more important about this work and about Heer’s notes, in my opinion, is that they are a clear

support of their respective cases, to such an extent that language became a truth-meter or, to be more precise, a truth-serum that elicited truth through its infusion.<sup>127</sup>

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demonstration of how the post-classical terminology of argumentation theory (*ādāb al-baḥṭh*) is infused into the Sufi literature. For this reason, the translator (Heer) is at pains, in his notes on Jāmī's treatise, to explain this terminology using Ījī's *Ādāb*, Taşköprüzâde's *Risāla* and Saçaklızâde's *Risāla al-Waladiyya* (which will be examined in the third chapter), see pages 74-75, 153-54 and 225. For the usage of terminology, see for example, *mustanad* (backing), p. 37; *naqḍ tafṣīlī* (particular refutation) and *naqḍ ijmālī* (general refutation), p. 121.

<sup>125</sup> The spread of Sufism through the work of Ibn al-'Arabī and of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Rumi (d.672/1273), the unrest caused by the Mongol invasions, which favoured the spread of popular mysticism, and the movement of Ash'arism in the direction of philosophy required that the Hanbalites defend their doctrinal positions in a language and style which demonstrated understanding of their opponents' positions. By the time of Ibn Taymīya (d. 1328), there was clearly no other option than the utilization of the basic method of the Ash'arites. Dialectic, Ibn Taymīya states, is found in the Qur'an and therefore constitutes a legitimate means of defending Islam. "There is nothing reprehensible," he argues, "in addressing a group in its own technical terminology or its own language, if this becomes necessary." The use of terms like *jawhar* (atom), *'araḍ* (accident) and *jism* (substance), the fundamental vocabulary of Ash'arite atomism, was condemned by Hanbalite *imāms*, he holds, only because of the false concepts attached to these words or because recourse to them was still unnecessary in their time. But Ibn Taymīya was living in a different age. If true doctrine is first properly understood, he maintains, "[t]here is indeed great advantage to be gained from employing the technical language of one's opponents in argumentation." See Ibn Taymīya, *Fatāwā*, I, pp. 374-79; cited in Joseph N. Bell's *Love Theory in Later Hanbalite Islam* (Albany, SUNY Press, 1979), pp. 54-55.

<sup>126</sup> By "language of dialectic," I propose a specific type of dialectic that considers a *constant argumentation* between "différend" (identities of two autonomous figures) and "change" (the evolution of their respective self-interests). My proposition at this point (as opposed to my earlier use of "internal dialectic" in Ḥayy's case) involves a partly Hegelian dialectic in the sense that the latter self (antithesis) cancels or eliminates the former self (thesis) although the result is not synthesis but two incompatible positions. For example, Islam cancels Christianity, therefore assuming to be post-Christianity, or al-Ash'arī eliminates his former Mu'tazilī self, therefore becoming a post-Mu'tazilī, or Ghazālī in his *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* eliminates Ibn Sīnā and, in turn, Ibn Rushd in his *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* cancels Ghazālī, thus making them all post-something. At the same time, I should mention that there is an inherent relationship between the "language of dialectic" and "dialectic as a method" of philosophy. It is almost impossible to separate the two from each other. This is one of the reasons why the usage of the word 'dialectic' in different senses poses a major challenge throughout this thesis. For language of dialectics in different senses, see Joachim Israel, *The Language of Dialectics and the Dialectics of Language* (Copenhagen: Humanities Press, 1979).

<sup>127</sup> Truth serum (known as the truth drug) is a psychoactive medication used (for legal or medical purposes) to make patients or clients unrestrained so that they share their thoughts without hesitation (although truthfulness is not guaranteed). It is a common misconception

From these foundations, the next chapter will focus on how a certain number of Islamic intellectual communities (theologians, poets, grammarians, jurists and philosophers) in the classical period learned to speak the language of dialectic (as in theory and practice), and will discuss how it was diffused into their respective fields.

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that truth serum will make people tell you the whole truth. On the social and cultural history of truth serum in America, see Alison Winter, "The Making of "Truth Serum"," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 79.3 (2005): 500-533.

## *Chapter 2*

### I. ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE ACROSS THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES<sup>128</sup>

Even though the standard categorization of intellectual communities may be subject to debate on a theoretical basis, in practice a poet could still be known as a poet even if he had written on grammar or theology. For example, few would disagree on Farazdaq's (d.110/728) status as a poet, Fārābī's (d.339/950) as a philosopher, Ash'arī's (d.324/935) as a theologian, or Imām al-Shafī'ī's (d.204/820) as a jurist. The notion only becomes problematic when approaching a new intellectual space—a space characterized by the introduction of a new and different wavelength: I refer of course to the post-classical period. With Abū al-Walīd Ibn Rushd (d.595/1198), who served as the chief judge (*qāḍī al-quḍāt*) of Cordoba in Spain in the twelfth century, it is unclear whether it would be more appropriate to call him a jurist or a philosopher. For the medieval West, his commentaries on Aristotle made him primarily a philosopher, “Averroes Philosophus,” but for Islamic intellectual history, he seems to have been more of a jurist (*faqīh*).<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> I use the term “argumentative discourse” in the sense of a dialectical interaction in which the communities I discuss maintain incompatible positions. I will elucidate on this further below, via Lyotard's term *différend*.

<sup>129</sup> For Ibn Rushd's work as a Mālikī jurist, see R. Brunschvig, “Averroes Jurist,” in *Études d'Orientalisme* (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1962), part I, pp. 35-68.

Nevertheless, the point of this chapter is to show how dialectic and argumentative discourse diffused into different fields of inquiry in classical Islamic intellectual history as the next chapter will demonstrate how “diffusion” became “fusion” in the post-classical period. Diffusion strengthened local communities (of poetry, grammar, law, philosophy and theology) and gave them their identity. Through dialectic, these communities realized that identity. My definition of “local communities” is the result of the line drawn by dialectic showing the *différend* (to use Jean-François Lyotard’s term)<sup>130</sup> between them. Josef van Ess and Bernard Weiss argue that the systematic establishment of *madhāhib* (schools) in theology (van Ess) or law (Weiss) occurred after the diffusion of dialectic and

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<sup>130</sup> The term *différend* literally means dispute, difference or disagreement; however, Lyotard describes *différend* as “[a] case of conflict, between at least two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment [*a priori* rule] applicable to both arguments. One side’s legitimacy does not imply the other’s lack of legitimacy.” Any such judgment, he argues, is at best partial, since “the rules of the genre of the discourse by which one judges are not those of the judged genre or genres of discourse.” For Lyotard, such a judgment produces certain implications because “a case of *différend* between two parties takes place when the “regulation” of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom.” Jean-François Lyotard, *The Différend: Phrases in Dispute*, trans. G.V. Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. xi-9. I find Lyotard’s *différend* useful in thinking about differences between the five intellectual communities (examined in this chapter) and understanding the criticisms that these communities direct towards each other. I take those five communities as different cultures playing different language games which give them their identities, i.e., that of theologians, philosophers, jurists, grammarians and poets in addition to Islamic, Arabic, Persian or any other cultures to which they may think they belong. In this context, for example, Ghazālī may, in Lyotard’s terms, say: “there is a *différend* between Abū ‘Alī (Avicenna) and me. I am a *faqīh* (Muslim jurist) whereas he is a philosopher. Therefore my *a priori* in reasoning and extracting the judgments (*ḥukm*) is first and foremost the Qur’ān and the Sunna of Prophet whereas they (the Qur’ān and the Sunna) are not *a priori* for Abū ‘Alī as each regimen corresponds to a mode of presenting a universe, and one mode is not translatable into another.” In this sense, there are many situations where a dispute cannot progress because the debaters do not “speak the same language.”

argumentative discourse in these fields.<sup>131</sup> Discourse gave them their identity: once the members of a *madhhab* started claiming their difference, they clarified who they were. George Makdisi goes beyond these explanations (of the establishment of *madhāhib* in theology and law) by further declaring that, “[w]ithout it [dialectic], Islam could not have remained Islamic.”<sup>132</sup>

Interestingly enough, during the classical period diffusion and fusion, division and unification, and difference and likeness also existed simultaneously. For example, imagine two jurists from two different legal schools who take care to defend their school’s *différend* to the extent that they have trouble recognizing each other: for the philosopher, at the end of the day, both are jurists and yet in turn, for a jurist, non-jurists belong to different modes (such as philosophy, theology, grammar or poetry). When drawing clear lines of *différend*, these five communities also draw their own line of local identity: that of the jurist or that of the theologian, and this serves to clarify the language that they use in their respective fields.

On the other hand, fusion increased the power of the whole system by generalizing and creating a new theory of argumentation in post-classical Islamic intellectual history—a synthesis of all that had come before it. This,

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<sup>131</sup> Josef van Ess, “The Beginning of Islamic Theology,” in *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning*, ed. J. Murdoch and E. Sylla (Boston: D. Reidel, 1975), p. 105 and Bernard G. Weiss, “Uṣūl-related Madhhab Differences in Āmidī’s *Iḥkām*,” in *Studies in Islamic Legal Theory*, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 293-313.

<sup>132</sup> George Makdisi, “The Scholastic Method in Medieval Education: An Inquiry into its Origins in Law and Theology,” *Speculum* 49 (1974), p. 649.

in turn weakened local systems, leading van Ess to argue that Islamic intellectual history ended its career with the age of *ādāb al-baḥth*, making it the final development of Arabic dialectic.<sup>133</sup> The next section will look at how this process of diffusion was accomplished by the first *theologians* (*mutakallimūn*).<sup>134</sup>

## 1. THEOLOGICIANS: MUTAKALLIMŪN OR AHL AL-JADAL

The *mutakallimūn*, also known as the *ahl al-jadal*,<sup>135</sup> strove to rationalize Islam in the face of increasing civil and sectarian warfare in the eighth century. It was of crucial importance to develop rational answers (though mainly in the service of their political and practical ends) to such questions as: who is a Muslim? Does sin require punishment? Do we have free will? What decides whether one is a Muslim or not—words or actions? The theologians undertook disputations with Christians, Jews, Manichaeans,

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<sup>133</sup> Josef van Ess, “Text and Context,” in *Text and Context in Islamic Societies*, ed. Irene A. Bierman (California: Ithaca Press, 2004), p. 1.

<sup>134</sup> Following in the footsteps of van Ess, who suggests that *kalām* “is not defined by reference to its contents as *theo-logia* (something about God, as a logos about God) but it is defined in terms of its stylistic form, the dialectical method of argumentation [*theological*],” I find the term “theologian” to be the most useful definition of *mutakallim* (plural *mutakallimūn*). Van Ess adds that beyond using a certain type of argument, a *mutakallim* should hold two fundamental doctrines: (a) that revelation is not the primary source of knowledge since one must first prove that God exists, and (b) that knowledge is greater than belief (being its goal). Van Ess, “The Beginning of Islamic Theology,” pp. 105-106.

<sup>135</sup> Terms such as *ahl al-kalām*, *ahl al-jadal* and *ahl al-nazar* were used interchangeably to denote the dialectical theologians (*mutakallimūn*). See, for example, *ahl al-jadal* as used by Ash‘arī in *Maqālāt al-Islamiyyīn*, ed. Helmut Ritter (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980), p. 294, and the use of *ahl al-nazar* in *EI*<sup>2</sup>, I, p. 266. On the relationship between the terms, i.e., *ahl al-jadal* and *ahl al-kalām*, see Shlomo Pines, “A Note on an Early Meaning of the Term *Mutakallim*,” *Israel Oriental Studies* 1 (1971): 224-240.



Zoroastrians and other denominations under the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid dynasties.<sup>136</sup> Even though purely religious subject matter (content) would seem to be the reason for this clash, the real cause was the competition between different socio-cultural classes.<sup>137</sup>

In this context, the Greek logical and dialectical arsenal was originally recruited by Mu‘tazilite *kalām* in order to defend the Islamic community against Christian, Jewish and Manichean intellectual skill, and, more importantly, against the polemics and rhetoric of those Islamic sects which were considered to be heretical (*zindīq* or *mulḥid*). The purpose was twofold: to repel any threat coming from inside or outside the faith, and to preserve what was true in their opinion. Van Ess argues that *kalām* did not come from “an apologetic struggle against the unbelievers,” but rather from intra-Islamic disputes over the question of predestination (*qadar*) and free will (*irāda*), which had profound political implications.<sup>138</sup> On the other hand, Goitein notes that “extremely developed Christian theology as well as

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<sup>136</sup> On early Christian and Muslim disputation literature, see Gabriel Said Reynolds, *A Muslim Theologian in the Sectarian Milieu: ‘Abd al-Jabbār and the Critique of Christian Origins* (Leiden: Brill, 2004); David Bertaina, *An Arabic Account of Theodore Abu Qurra in Debate at the Court of Caliph al-Ma‘mun: A Study in Early Christian and Muslim Literary Dialogues*, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington: The Catholic University of America, 2007).

<sup>137</sup> On the clash of socio-cultural classes, see Mohammed Arkoun, *The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought* (London: Saqi Books, 2002), especially chapter 5 entitled “Authority and Power in Islamic Thought.”

<sup>138</sup> Josef van Ess, “The Beginning of Islamic Theology,” p. 88.

philosophical rationalism and also Persian dualism constituted challenges which Islam could not afford to ignore.”<sup>139</sup>

Of course, the *mutakallimūn* had to justify the tools that they were using, namely, *jadāl*.<sup>140</sup> For this they turned to the following verses in the Qur’ān: “[b]ring your proof (*burhān*), if you are truthful,” (Q.27:64), “[a]rgue with them (*jādilhum*) in the best manner” (Q.16:125) and “[a]rgue not (*lā tujādil*) with the People of the Scripture (*ahl al-kitāb*) unless it be in a way that is better” (Q.29:46). After all, this was a method used by God to dispute with the Jews and the non-believers, and a method that God taught his prophet:<sup>141</sup> for the Islamic theologians, *jadāl* was a valid method for attaining truth and was, therefore, a duty enjoined upon every Muslim.<sup>142</sup> The great theologian Ash‘arī identified *jadāl* with one of the slogans of the early Mu‘tazila, “*al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf wa nahy ‘an al-munkar*.”<sup>143</sup> The concept of *al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf wa nahy ‘an al-munkar*<sup>144</sup>—the duty laid upon each Muslim to enjoin people to do what is good and to forbid what is

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<sup>139</sup> S. D. Goitein, “Between Hellenism and Renaissance-Islam, the Intermediate Civilization,” *Islamic Studies* 2 (1963), pp. 217-33.

<sup>140</sup> On the theoretical justification of the use of *jadāl* by theologians, see Ibn Furak, *Mujarrad Maqālāt al-Ash‘arī*, ed. Daniel Gimaret (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1987), pp. 292-95. Henceforth Ibn Furak, *Mujarrad*.

<sup>141</sup> Ibn Furak, *Mujarrad*, p. 293.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, 292.

<sup>143</sup> Van Ess claims that this slogan was important in justifying the theological missionaries who held disputations in order to convert the non-believers. Josef van Ess, “Disputationspraxis in der islamischen Theologie: Eine vorläufige Skizze,” *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* 44 (1976), pp. 50-51.

<sup>144</sup> For an exhaustive study of the role of the concept of *al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf wa nahy ‘an al-munkar* in the evolution of Islamic law, theology and ethos, see Michael Cook, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

wrong according to God’s law—constitutes a significant part of the individual’s authority in the religious domain.<sup>145</sup> The Qur’ān (3:104) calls the faithful “the best of communities” and elaborates that this is so because ‘*they enjoin the good (ma’rūf) and forbid the bad (munkar) and believe in the One God.*’ This famous prophetic tradition elaborates on the individual’s authority as follows:

Whoever among you sees an evil act [*munkar*] let him/her change it by his/her hand [*yad*]. If this is not possible, let him/her change it by his/her tongue [*lisān*]. If he/she is not able to do that either let him/her despise it in his/her heart [*qalb*]. But this latter is the weakest form of faith.<sup>146</sup>

Each believer, therefore should use *jadal* for commanding right and forbidding wrong by using “his/her tongue,” although the Prophet’s call to counteract wrong (*munkar*), is, first, with physical force which is the strongest form of faith.<sup>147</sup> Ibn Furak (d.406/1015),<sup>148</sup> among others, in his

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<sup>145</sup> *Ma’rūf* is often defined as “what is acknowledged and approved by Divine Law.” The Qur’ān urges the Prophet and the believing community again and again, with strong emphasis, to “command the *ma’rūf* (good) and forbid the *munkar* (bad).” In this context, *ma’rūf* means any acts arising from, and in consonance with, the true belief, and *munkar* means any acts that would conflict with God’s commandments. For *ma’rūf* and *munkar*, see Toshihiko Izutsu, *Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur’an* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1966), pp. 213-17.

<sup>146</sup> The original Arabic of the *ḥadīth* reads: “*Man ra’ā minkum munkaran fa’l-yughayyirhu bi-yadihi fa-in lam yastaṭi’ fa-bi-lisānihi fa in lam yastaṭi’ fa-bi-qalbihi wa dhālika aḍ’af al-īmān.*” This saying of the Prophet Muḥammad can be found in *Sahīḥ Muslim* in the chapter on faith (*īmān*) as well as in al-Tirmidhī, al-Nasā’ī and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal. On the history and different interpretations of this *ḥadīth*, see Jamāl al-Bannā, *Tafsīr Ḥadīth Man ra’a minkum munkaran fa’l-yughayyirhu* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1988).

<sup>147</sup> Ḫijāb’s suggestion, as mentioned in the first chapter, i.e., “[s]word and spearhead both achieve what demonstration (*burhān*) cannot achieve” confirms Prophet’s counterattack style towards wrong (*munkar*), first, with physical force (hand) instead of tongue (*lisān*).

<sup>148</sup> Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan Ibn Furak, see *GAL, Suppl. I*, pp. 277-78.

*Mujarrad Maqālāt al-Ash‘arī*, cites the above mentioned verse (Q.16:125) to justify the use of *jadāl* in interreligious debates since defending the truth against doubters is a duty incumbent upon every Muslim.<sup>149</sup> Furthermore, this type of *jadāl* was seen as good dialectic (*maḥmūd*) because the Qur’ān advises it.<sup>150</sup>

According to van Ess, *kalām* “is not defined by reference to its contents as theo-logia (something about God, as a logos about God) but it is defined in terms of its stylistic form, the dialectical method of argumentation.”<sup>151</sup> Hugo Sanctallensis,<sup>152</sup> a medieval Christian Spaniard who translated an Arabic text on the art of disputation into Latin in the twelfth century, complained that Muslims plainly gave more attention to the formal structure of their theology than to its content, something he intended to avoid by not writing his book in the “Arabic” style of the disputation between opponents.<sup>153</sup>

In this context, as a philosopher, Fārābī is not a neutral observer. Accordingly, in his *Iḥṣā’ al-‘Ulūm*, Fārābī observes that *kalām* developed as a method of speech by which to support *a priori* positions, not just as a tool for theological speculation. He sees *kalām* as “the faculty that allows one to

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<sup>149</sup> Ibn Furak, *Mujarrad*, p. 292.

<sup>150</sup> al-Kātib, *al-Burhān fī Wujūh al-Bayān*, ed. Aḥmad Maṭlūb and Khadīja Ḥadīthī (Baghdad: Sā‘adat Jāmi‘a, 1967), pp. 222-25. The author’s full name is Ishaq b. Ibrāhīm.

<sup>151</sup> Josef van Ess, “The Beginning of Islamic Theology,” p. 105.

<sup>152</sup> On Hugo Sanctallensis’ translations, see Charles Homer Haskins, *Studies in the History of Medieval Science* (New York: F. Ungar, 1960), pp. 67-81.

<sup>153</sup> Roy Mottahadch, *The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), pp. 81-82.

render his opinions (*ārāʾ*) and religious actions (*afʿāl*) victorious and to invalidate (*tazyīf*) all opposing theses.”<sup>154</sup> For example, the invalidity of Christianity was “already” (*a priori*) firmly established by the Qurʾān and therefore, the business of the theologian was to prove with his reason (*ʿaql*) what had been established by revelation (*naql*).<sup>155</sup> Whatever the motivation or the origin of *kalām* may have been, one thing is clear, whether it was used as an apologetic weapon against the unbelievers or in intra-Islamic disputes to silence marginal voices, all arguments of this type have a familiar structure: “*fā in qālū* (if they say) *naqūlu* (in response, we say).”<sup>156</sup>

The art of dialectic, in this respect, touched the very heart of *kalām*. Dialectical method through question and answer, van Ess says, was “the lonely pleasure of deduction from given [a priori] and undisputed material,”<sup>157</sup> and he elaborates:

Thinking is *discussion* in *kalām*; the word *kalām* itself means “speech,” conversation with somebody. Truth is found in answer and query, *jawāb wa-suʿāl*; there is a *masʿūl*, one who is asked because he has promoted a thesis for which he is “responsible,” and there is a *sāʿil*, an interrogator who tries to question this thesis... one is reacting against a contrary attitude; one does not

<sup>154</sup> Fārābī, *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm*, ed. Osman Amine (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1948), pp. 107-13.

<sup>155</sup> For Fārābī’s presentation of the *mutakalimūn* conception of *ʿaql* and the difference between philosophers and theologians, see: See Fārābī, *Risāla fīʾl-ʿAql*, ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1986), pp. 3-12.

<sup>156</sup> On the origins of *kalām*, see Michael Cook, “The Origins of Kalam,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 43 (1980): 32-43; Richard M. Frank, “The Kalām, an Art of Contradiction-Making or Theological Science? Some Remarks on the Question,” *Journal of American Oriental Society* 88 (1968): 295-309 and idem, “The Science of Kalām,” *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 2 (1992): 7-37.

<sup>157</sup> Josef van Ess, “The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology,” p. 23.

develop a truth because of its internal evidence, but because of the untenability of the contrary; the method always recalls an imaginary trial. We hear it in the style of nearly every theological treatise: *wa-in qāla qā'ilun.. qulnā..* “if somebody says... we answer...,” or *wa-lā yuqālu inna... li-annā naqūlu...,”* “one cannot say here... because we would answer, then...”<sup>158</sup>

This type of *kalāmīc* thinking as religious disputation became a developed art form in the ninth and tenth centuries, practiced by scholars and theologians among the various religious communities under the Umayyad and 'Abbasid rules. Urban elite Muslims, philosophers, poets, and rulers would gather for an evening session of *majlis* (“salon of inquiry”) which featured at least two famous jurists or theologians disputing points of theology, law or Arabic grammar.<sup>159</sup> This elite entertainment was homogeneous and, thus, open to others than the Muslim elite, i.e., Christians, Jews and even atheists.

For example, the Andalusian grammarian al-Ḥumaydī (d.488/1095),<sup>160</sup> a student of Ibn Ḥazm, reports an anecdote of another

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<sup>158</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>159</sup> There are many examples that could be provided here but they are beyond the scope of my thesis. For a variety of examples, see the following comprehensive work: *The Majlis: Interreligious Encounters in Medieval Islam* (Wiesbaden, 1998), ed. H. Lazarus-Yafeh, M. R. Cohen, S. Somekh and S. H. Griffith and Sidney H. Griffith, “The Qur’ān in Arab Christian Texts; The Development of an Apologetical Argument: Abū Qurrah in the Majlis of al-Ma’mūn,” *Parole de l’Orient* 24 (1999): 203-33.

<sup>160</sup> His full name is Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad b. Abī Naṣr Fuṭūḥ al-Ḥumaydī; for more information on him, see *GAL*, I. P. 413; *Suppl.*, I, pp. 578-79; *EI*<sup>2</sup>, vol.3, pp. 573-74 and *Islām*, vol. 18, p. 358.

Andalusian scholar, Abū ‘Umar (d.tenth century),<sup>161</sup> a Mālikī *faqīh*. In the tenth century on his visit to Baghdad, Abū ‘Umar was asked if he had attended the sessions (*majālis*) of the *mutakallimūn*. He replied that he had done so twice before and would never return. When asked why, Abū ‘Umar described a hall that was crammed with members of all the sects, including Sunni Muslims, innovators (referring to Shi‘ī and Mu‘tazilī theologians), Zoroastrians, materialists (*dahrīya*), heretics (*zanādiqa*), Jews, Christians, and other non-believers. Each sect had its own head who spoke (a *mutakallim* or a *mujādil*) on behalf of his religious school (*firqā*) or doctrine (*madhhab*) and disputed about it. One session that Abū ‘Umar attended was organized by a *mutakallim* from among the unbelievers (*min al-kuffār*) who, in opening the session, said to the assembled people:

You are gathered here for the purpose of disputation (*munāzara*). Let us not allow any of the Muslims to advance any arguments using their book (Qur’ān) or the sayings of their Prophet for we do not accept these as truth or acknowledge them. Therefore, we will conduct the disputation only with rational evidences (*hujaj al-‘aql*) and with what speculative reasoning (*nazar*) and analogical reasoning (*qiyās*) will permit.<sup>162</sup>

After the conquest and with the commencement of rule over diverse communities and cultures, the process of convincing became rational and intellectual rather than confrontational (war). Physical force was not

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<sup>161</sup> I have not been able to find any bio-biographical information on Abū ‘Umar; however, Ḥumaydī gives his full name as Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Sa’dī and if this Abū ‘Umar is ‘Abū ‘Umar al-Qāḍī, then his date of death is 320/932; see *Islām*, vol. 10, p. 211.

<sup>162</sup> Al-Ḥumaydī, *Jadhwat al-Muqtabis fī Tārīkh al-‘Ulamā’ al-Andulus*, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, 1983), vol. 1, pp. 175-76.

necessary since the physical bodies were already subjected, so, the next step was to continue on a mental and intellectual level. The question was this: which community is truly in possession of truth? This difficulty can be detected in the Nestorian (East Syrian) ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s (d. around 850) *Kitāb al-Masā’il wa’l-Ajwiba*—a book written with the aim of preparing Christians to be able to negotiate their theological identity among Muslims.<sup>163</sup>

What is the difference between a religion having harmony and agreement, which depends on signs (*āyāt*) and proof (*burhān*), and a religion that is a result of human fabrication without signs or proof? We see all kinds of people professing different religions. In their possession are scriptures that differ regarding commands and prohibitions, laws and statutes, as well as raising of the dead, resurrection, reward and punishment. Each camp claims that their book is God’s promise for His creation, which His messengers have brought, and that on its behalf He made manifest His signs and His proof at their hands.<sup>164</sup>

The Mu‘tazilites and other Muslims who engaged in disputation with their religious opponents were no less willing to bear witness to their

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<sup>163</sup> ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī also wrote, along very similar lines of reasoning, a treatise on the discernment of the true religion called *Kitāb al-Burhān*. On the significance of Baṣrī’s *Kitāb al-Burhān*, see Sidney H. Griffith, “‘Ammār Al-Baṣrī’s ‘*Kitāb al-Burhān*,’ Christian *Kalām* in the First Abbasid Century,” *Le Muséon* 96 (1983): 145-81. For a systematic survey of the topics of controversy between Muslim and Christians and Christian response to the arguments of Muslims in Abbasid period, see Sidney H. Griffith, “Answering the Call of the Minaret: The Topics and Strategies of Christian Apologetics in the World of Islam,” in *Die Suryoye und ihre Umwelt: 4 deutsches Syrologen-Symposium in Trier 2004*, ed. M. Tamecke and A. Heinz (Münster: Studien zur Orientalischen Kirchengeschichte, 2005), pp. 11-42.

<sup>164</sup> ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, *Kitāb al-Masā’il wa’l-Ajwiba* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1986), pp. 135-36.



faith than the Hanbalite traditionalists who refused to grant Christians, Jews, and other non-Muslims, to use Richard C. Martin's term, "a public hearing."<sup>165</sup> They saw the religious other as far too serious a threat to be engaged on equal grounds and, therefore, preferred the sharper boundaries (*différend*) between Muslims and non-Muslims.

These earlier oral disputations, however, were not systematic. In order to see the emergence of a theoretical basis in theological dialectic we now turn to one of the earliest books on Arabic dialectic:<sup>166</sup> the *Kitāb Adab al-Jadal* of the arch-heretic and (very) controversial figure in Islamic intellectual history,<sup>167</sup> Ibn al-Rāwandī (d.298/910).<sup>168</sup> His text is not available, but the controversy that his work created for subsequent literature is very informative.<sup>169</sup> Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī al-Ka'bi (d.319/931), a

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<sup>165</sup> Richard C. Martin, "Conversion to Islam by Invitation: Proselytism and the Negotiation of Identity in Islam," in *Sharing the Book: Religious Perspectives on the Rights and Wrongs of Proselytism*, ed. John Witte Jr. and Richard C. Martin (New York: Orbis Books, 1999), p.115.

<sup>166</sup> For Ibn al-Rāwandī's work, see *GAS*, I, pp. 620-21.

<sup>167</sup> As a controversial figure, see Josef van Ess, "Ibn ar-Rēwandī, or the Making of an Image," *Al-Abhāth* 27 (1978-79): 5-26.

<sup>168</sup> Ibn al-Rāwandī: "[A]bū al-Ḥusayn Aḥmad b. Iṣḥāq al-Rāwandī lived in Iraq in the second half of the ninth century. At the beginning of of his career, Ibn al-Rāwandī was an ordinary *mutakallim*, and a respected figure among the Mu'tazila of Baghdad. Because of reasons that are not very clear (however some sources cite some blow to his pride), he then broke with his Mu'tazilite comrades and started to direct verbal attacks against them. He quickly became known as the archetype of the heretic (*zindīq*) in Islam, though in varying degrees of interpretation of the nature of his heresy;" see Sarah Stroumsa, *Maimonides in His World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 45-47. For a summary of the biographical sources regarding Ibn al-Rāwandī, see the introduction of al-Ḥayyāṭ's *Kitāb al-Instiṣār*, edited by H.S. Nyberg (Cairo, 1925); 'Abd al-Amir al-A'sam, *Tarīkh Ibn al-Rāwandī* (Beirut, 1975); Sarah Stroumsa, *Freethinkers of Medieval Islam: Ibn al-Rāwandī, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, and Their Impact on Islamic Thought* (Brill: Leiden, 1999), pp. 37-46.

<sup>169</sup> Sarah Stroumsa explains this in the following: "[t]he Muslims mercilessly persecuted Ibn al-Rāwandī while he was alive, and did not give him rest even after his death. His books

member of the Baghdādī school of Mu‘tazila, wrote an entire book on dialectic (*Kitāb al-Jadal wa ādābi ahlih wa taṣhīhi ilalih*) to correct the mistakes in Ibn al-Rāwandī’s work.<sup>170</sup> Ka‘bī’s work was subsequently refuted by Ash‘arī (d.324/936) in his *Sharh Adab al-Jadal wa al-Naqd ‘alā al-Balkhī*,<sup>171</sup> but Ash‘arī was more interested in exposing al-Balkhī’s mistakes than in defending Ibn al-Rāwandī.<sup>172</sup> Māturīdī (d.333/944) later joined in supporting Ibn al-Rāwandī’s cause.<sup>173</sup> Fārābī (d.950) on the other hand did not agree with Ash‘arī and Māturīdī and wrote *Kitāb al-Radd ‘ala’r-Rāwandī fī Adab al-Jadal* in order to refute Ibn al-Rāwandī.<sup>174</sup> Unfortunately, none of these works survives today.

Even though we do not have access to any of the above mentioned texts, other sources provide a fair idea of the content of the earlier discourse and tenth-century teaching on dialectic. The Karaite Jew, al-Qirqisānī (d. after 325/937) devoted a section of his *Kitāb al-Anwār wa’l-Marāqib* to *jadal*.<sup>175</sup> The Mu‘tazilī historian Abū Naṣr Muṭahhar Ibn Ṭāhir Maqdisī

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were in effect banned, and there is no reason to suspect that already during the eleventh century even Muslims found it difficult to find any manuscripts of his books;” Stroumsa, *Freethinkers of Medieval Islam*, pp. 207-8. On the repercussions of Ibn al-Rāwandī’s heretical ideas and his style of, what Stroumsa calls, free thinking on Islamic philosophy, see Stroumsa, *Freethinkers*, pp. 188-192.

<sup>170</sup> For al-Ka‘bī’s work, see *GAS*, I, pp. 622-23.

<sup>171</sup> For Ash‘arī’s work, see Ibn ‘Asākir, *Tabyīn Kadhib al-Muftarī* (Damascus: Maṭba‘at al-Tawfiq, 1347), pp. 131-4 and *GAS*, I, pp. 602-6.

<sup>172</sup> Josef van Ess, “Disputationspraxis,” pp. 31-2.

<sup>173</sup> For al-Māturīdī’s work, see *Esmā*, vol. 2, p. 36.

<sup>174</sup> On relationship between the works of Fārābī and Ibn al-Rāwandī, see Josef van Ess, “Al-Fārābī and Ibn al-Rāwandī,” *Hamdard Islamicus* 4 (1980): 3-15.

<sup>175</sup> Ya‘qūb al-Qirqisānī, *Kitāb al-Anwār wa’l-Marāqib*, ed. L. Nemoy, 5 vols. (New York: Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1939-43).

(d.355/965)<sup>176</sup> opens his world history *Kitāb al-Bad' wa'l-Tārīkh* with a chapter on *jadal*,<sup>177</sup> while his contemporary, Abū al-Ḥusayn Ishāq b. Ibrāhīm b. Sulaymān Ibn Wahb (tenth century), included a section entitled *bāb fīhi jadal wa mujādala* in his *al-Burhān fī Wujūh al-Bayān*.<sup>178</sup> Ibn Fūrak also expounds Ash'arī's theory of *adab al-jadal* in his *Mujarrad*.<sup>179</sup>

Those works on the theoretical dialectic (*jadal*) of the classical period contain a virtually complete system of the rules of disputation: there are rules on how a debate should start; what sorts of questions are allowed; how to determine who has lost the debate; and rules of general conduct (ethical and strategic). There are five themes in common that are examined in these works: (1) the relation of *jadal* to speculation (*naẓar*); (2) question and answer; (3) counter-objection (*mu'arāḍa*); (4) the signs of defeat; and (5) the rules of conduct (*ādāb al-jadal*).<sup>180</sup> At the outset, however, we should be aware of what dialectic is and what it is not.

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<sup>176</sup> His full name is Abū Naṣr Muṭahhar Ibn Ṭāhir Maqdisī. *Kitāb al-Bad' wa'l-Ta'rīkh* (The Book of Creation and History) was written in the province of Sijistan at the behest of a minister of the Samanid dynasty; see *GAL, Suppl.* I, p. 222; *GAS*, I, p. 337 and Camilla Adang, *Muslim Writers on Judaism and the Hebrew Bible: From Ibn Rabban to Ibn Hazm* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), pp. 48-50.

<sup>177</sup> The name of the chapter (*faṣḥ*) is *fī tathbīt al-naẓar wa tahzīb al-jadal*.

<sup>178</sup> The authorship of this book has been controversial since we now know that the real author is Abū al-Ḥusayn Ishāq b. Ibrāhīm b. Sulaymān Ibn Wahb although it was believed (because of Ṭāhā Ḥusayn's edition in 1938) that the author was Qudāma b. Ja'far al-Kātib (d.337/948) and the title was *Naqd al-Nathr*. For this clarification, see S. A. Bonebakker, *The Kitāb Naqd al-Shi'r of Qudāma b. Ga'far al-Kātib al-Bagdādī* (Leiden: Brill, 1956), pp. 15-19.

<sup>179</sup> See the section "*fī ibāna madhhāhibihī fī bāb al-jadal wa aḥkāmihī wa ādābihī*" in his *Mujarrad Maqālāt al-Shaykh Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī*.

<sup>180</sup> Ibn Furak, *Mujarrad*, pp. 317-21. The following is a summary of Miller's account; see in detail in Miller, pp. 9-50.

According to the early period authors (the above-mentioned tenth century authors), there are two sides in dialectic (*jadal*), and to be more precise, there are two real participants in the debate: the questioner (*sā'il*) and the respondent (*mujīb*). The respondent is not required to raise any questions at all. He needs only put forward the grounds for his argument since he is only defending his thesis. He does not, however, have to bring forward a proof because his primary role is defensive. It is also clear that if there are more than two positions, what is taking place can no longer be called dialectic. Therefore, dialectic is simply between the two.<sup>181</sup>

There are also two sorts of questions in dialectic: one is “restrictive” (*al-ḥajr*) and the other “non-restrictive” (*tafwīḍ*).<sup>182</sup> The restrictive question is one for which the answer is a part of it, for example, an appropriate answer to the question, “was it so, or not?” could either be, “it was so” or “it was not really so.” Conversely, in a non-restrictive question the answer does not form part of the question and thus one could ask, “what do you say about that?” and the respondent could reply by saying, “A and B.” No element of this response was a part of the question. The person who uses non-restrictive questions in dialectic is either seeking instruction, seeking to deceive (*mughālata*) or simply does not understand what “dialectic” is.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> Ibn al-Furak cites Ash'arī in the following: “[D]ialectic (*jadal*) is only possible when there are two people involved (*anna al-jadal la yaṣīḥ illā min ithnayn*),” see Ibn Furak, *Mujarrad*, p. 294.

<sup>182</sup> Ibn Furak, *Mujarrad*, 295 and Miller, p. 25.

<sup>183</sup> Miller, pp. 26-7.

In dialectic, the questioner asks questions in order to refute the respondent's thesis. Epistemic discussion is concerned with proof; dialectic is concerned with defending or attacking any thesis. The questioner does not seek to know what establishes the respondent's thesis, but rather what refutes it. He or she can refute the thesis without bothering to refute his/her opponent's proof. Epistemic questions may occur in the course of a dialectical discussion when one seeks to understand or conceptualize a word's meaning. But epistemic questions, in and of themselves, are out of place in dialectic. This is especially true with the particle "*mā*," referring to a thing's essence (*jawhar*). A question like "what is man?" is not dialectical. Just as the question "what is your opinion about A and B?" which sounds so natural to our ears, is also incorrect in dialectic.<sup>184</sup>

Since dialectic was a commonly applied method in various fields, several kinds of dialectics emerged in the classical period. I call these local dialectics: philosophical, theological and legal dialectics. The following pages will turn away from dialectic as a theory, and explore how dialectical discourse entered into poetry and grammar in the classical period (and then return to how philosophers and jurists dealt with the question of dialectic). Both poetry and grammar are important in understanding the trajectories of dialectic in Islamic intellectual history, particularly because of (a) the importance of language in argumentation (the next two chapters describe

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<sup>184</sup> Miller, pp. 17-25.

how this was particularly true in the post-classical period and thus how understanding the diffusion of dialectical discourse into the grammarian's discourse is vital), (b) the key role poetry plays in recognising Arabic language as the language of argumentation, (c) poetry's relationship with poetics, (d) its use in argumentation as a source of evidence (known as *istishhād bi'l-shi'r*), and (e) Arab Aristotelian philosophers' perception of poetics and dialectic (that rhetoric and dialectic does not lead, in their eyes, to certainty (*yaqīn*) and truth, whereas demonstration (*burhān*) does). Clearly then, a discussion on poets and of grammarians is essential here.

## 2. POETS: THE CASE OF RHYME VERSUS REASON

Poetry (*shi'r*) was a problematic issue from the very origins of Islam. There is even a chapter in the Qur'an called "poets" (*surat al-Shu'arā*, 26). The Qur'an itself is often very poetic, yet denies that it is poetry. The opponents of Muḥammad used this argument, accusing him of being "a crazy poet" (*shā'ir al-majnūn*) or "a soothsayer" (*kāhin*) as a way of undermining his claim to be a prophet,<sup>185</sup> but this is refuted by the scripture itself:

It is the speech of a noble Messenger; and it is not the speech of a soothsayer; how little do you remember. It is the revelation from the Lord of the worlds. (Q. 69: 40-43).

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<sup>185</sup> Q. 37:36 that reads: [A]re we going to forsake our gods for the sake of a poet possessed?"

Is it an accident that the Qur'ān does not pay attention to philosophers or lawyers or any other intellectual community discussed in this chapter except poets? Of course not. God is supposed to be impervious to accident (*munazzah*), which leaves the question, in the spirit of Cicero, *cui bono*? What is the point of this emphasis on poets and poetry at the expense of philosophers, theologians or lawyers?

The answer is that the Qur'ān came as a demonstration (*burhān*); indeed, one of the names of the Qur'ān is *Kitāb al-Burhān* (Book of Demonstration) since it brings absolute evidence (*dalīl*) and undeniable proofs (*hujaj*). Avicenna went even so far as to say that the Prophet Muḥammad was endowed with a supreme ability to hit upon the middle terms of demonstrative syllogisms (*qiyās al-burhānī*).<sup>186</sup> The Qur'ān, as a book of demonstration, therefore, does not deal with rhetoric or poetry. It does use a kind of positive dialectic (*jadāl al-ḥasan*) as Ibn al-Furak maintains, since God argues with unbelievers over the “better way,”<sup>187</sup> but poetry was essentially characteristic of unbelievers and poets, and thus poets are portrayed in the Qur'ān as liars and as those who hide the truth:

Shall I inform you upon whom do the Evils descend? They descend upon every lying and wicked person. They listen eagerly, but most of them liars. And as to the poets, those who go astray follow them. Do you not see how they

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<sup>186</sup> Dimitri Gutas, “Avicenna: De Anima (V 6). Über die Seele, über Intuition und Prophetie,” in *Hauptwerke der Philosophie. Mittelalter*, ed. K. Flasch (Stuttgart, 1998), pp. 90-107.

<sup>187</sup> Ibn Furak, *Mujarrad*, pp. 292-93.

wander in every valley? And that they say what they practice not? (Q. 26:221-226).

Despite the explicit charges against poetry in the Qur'ān, the writing of verse continued to play a central role in Arabic culture and Islamic intellectual history. When the Mu'tazilites began to assert themselves in the ninth century (via translations comprising Aristotle's *Organon*), their influence was felt far beyond the field of theological polemics. In fact, as will be discussed later, these polemics made for more exact prose (which left its mark on poetry) in the *munāzara* style by its use of syllogism.<sup>188</sup>

Poetry's logical structure, however, does not result in a conclusion that has to be generally accepted (*mashhūrāt*). Arab Aristotelian philosophers placed great importance on the idea of a structure of knowledge that can be characterized in terms of different kinds of syllogism in the Aristotelian sense. According to this view, there are different levels of knowledge, of which demonstrative argument (*burhān*) was the strongest; in this form of argument, the premises are certain (*yaqīn*) and the conclusions derived are self-evident and *a priori* (*badīhī*) premises, such as *awwaliyyāt* and *fiṭriyyāt*. In this hierarchy, poetry occupies the lowest level.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> For the influence of Mu'tazilites in this respect, see Tarif Khalidi, "Mu'tazilite Historiography: Maqḍisī's *Kitāb al-Bad' wa'l-Tarīkh*." *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 35 (1976), p.11.

<sup>189</sup> Deborah Black, *Logic*, pp. 94-102.



In the following pages, I will briefly explain the types of premises used in the syllogism and the classification of syllogisms according to their truth-values,<sup>190</sup> in order to understand the tension between poetry (poets), philosophy (philosophers), and even theology (theologians). I will not go into the details of these premises except in brief descriptions since my point in bringing them up here is to show that demonstrative argument is constructed from certain premises which make the other group low-grade (non-certain premises) in order to indicate the status of poetry among this epistemic categories.<sup>191</sup> First of all, the types of premises (*muqaddimāt*) used in the syllogism (*qiyās*) are listed below (the reason for the division is to clarify the truth-value in judgment (*taṣdīq*)).

### 1. Certain (*yaqīnī*) Premises

The demonstrative argument (*burhān*) is constructed from these premises:

- 1.1. Awwaliyyāt (Necessary, *a priori* without the aid of sense perception)
- 1.2. Fiṭriyyāt (Immediately known)
- 1.3. Maḥsūsāt / Mushāhadāt (Acquired through the five senses)
- 1.4. Mujarrabāt (Empirical, based on sense perception and reasoning)
- 1.5. Mutawātirāt (Reliable reports)

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<sup>190</sup> These terms are taken from Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī's *Qusṭās al-Afkār* and Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*.

<sup>191</sup> For these premises, especially the second group, i.e., non-certain ones, see Deborah Black, *Logic*, pp. 138-238.

## 2. Non-Certain (*yaqīnī*) Premises

- 2.1. Mashhūrāt (Commonly accepted or reputable)
- 2.2. Musallamāt (Accepted axioms in certain fields of sciences)
- 2.3. Maqbūlāt (Received Premises)
- 2.4. Maznūnāt (Presumed Premises)
- 2.5. Muḥayyalāt (Imaginative Premises)
- 2.6. Wahmiyyāt (Estimative Premises)

The next table<sup>192</sup> presents the classification of syllogisms according to their truth-values and according to their result in the mind:

TRUTH-VALUES	MENTAL RESULT	ARISTOTELIAN WORK
All true	Creating certainty ( <i>yaqīn</i> )	Kitāb al-Qiyās and Kitāb al-Burhān (apodictic)
More True than False	Creating strong opinions ( <i>ẓann</i> )	Kitāb al-Jadal (dialectic)
Equally True and False	Creating persuasion ( <i>iqnāʿ</i> )	Kitāb al-Khaṭāba (rhetoric)
More False than True	Creating error ( <i>mughalata</i> )	Kitāb al-Ḥikma (sophistic)
All False	Creating imaginary pictures ( <i>takhyīl</i> )	Kitāb al-Shiʿr (poetics)

<sup>192</sup> I borrow the diagram from Wolfhart Heinrichs who originally takes from Dimitri Gutas; see his article “Takhyīl: Make-Believe and Image Creation in Arabic Literary Theory,” in *Takhyīl: The Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics*, ed. Geert Jan van Gelder and Marle Hammond (Exeter: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2008), p. 5.

In this hierarchy of different kinds of syllogism, the premises differ in their strength, and so the conclusions vary in accordance with the type of knowledge concerned. Here, poets and poetry do not produce certain knowledge: they yield an imaginary picture and emotion, not the demonstrative argument (*burhān*) which, the *falāsifa* argued, was of great use.

However, this poetry works in a specific way. Through demonstration or dialectic, and after examining different opinions, it is possible to arrive at the true (in the case of demonstration) or the strongest (in the case of dialectic) option among many other choices. In poetry, it is an emotion that is the strongest and most reasonable among the many conflicting emotions inside of us. Demonstration and dialectic help to clarify our knowledge and opinions whereas poetry clarifies our emotional muddle. Deciding between opposing emotions is essential in order to maintain sanity; one must decide and progress, or else stagnate in a rut of indecisiveness.

It comes as no surprise to see how the Hanbalite love theorists tried to deal with love by reducing it to an argument as to how love starts, develops and ends.<sup>193</sup> Words have meanings, and meanings are what people

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<sup>193</sup> On later Hanbalites' love theory, see Joseph N. Bell, *Love Theory in Later Hanbalite Islam* (Albany, SUNY Press, 1979) and Lois Anita Giffen, *Theory of Profane Love Among the Arabs: The Development of the Genre* (New York: New York University Press, 1971).

often react to emotionally: it is at this point, Oliver Leaman says, that poetry comes into the picture, to “function cognitively in the realm of emotion,”<sup>194</sup> it is the conclusion of a form of reasoning even though it is not in the “rational space,” like *burhān* and *jadāl*. Realizing the low levels that poetry occupies in the rational space, Arab poets in the ninth century tried to balance this attitude, which is why Ibn al-Rūmī (d.283/896)<sup>195</sup> challenged the philosophers who always claimed to occupy the top rung in the scale of demonstration. He says:

Whenever you seek one skilled in philosophical analysis  
(*baḥṭh*) and theoretical knowledge (*nazar*)  
There am I to equal the philosophers.<sup>196</sup>

Robert C. McKinney’s study of Ibn al-Rūmī and his poetics in the context of what I call a “dialectical milieu” displays the diffusion of the argumentative network in the classical period.<sup>197</sup> Aristotelian logic and dialectic, particularly the methods of analysis and the systems of argument

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<sup>194</sup> Oliver Leaman, “Poetry and the Emotions in Islamic Philosophy,” in *Classic Issues in Islamic Philosophy and Theology Today*, ed. A-T. Tymieniecka and Nazif Muhtaroglu (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), pp. 139-150.

<sup>195</sup> His full name is Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn al-‘Abbās ibn Jurayj al-Rūmī and he is an Arab poet of Greek descent. For Ibn al-Rūmī, see *GAL*, I, p. 79; *Suppl.*, I, pp. 123-25 and *GAS*, II, pp. 585-88. For an analysis of Ibn al-Rūmī’s poetry, see two individual studies: Beatrice Gruendler, *Medieval Arabic Prose Poetry: Ibn al-Rūmī and the Patron’s Redemption* (London: Routledge, 2003) and Robert C. McKinney, *The Case of Rhyme versus Reason: Ibn al-Rūmī and His Poetics in Context* (Leiden: Brill, 2004). Henceforth McKinney, *The Case of Rhyme*.

<sup>196</sup> Dīwān Ibn al-Rūmī, poem no. 26, cited and translated by McKinney, *The Case of Rhyme*, p. 295.

<sup>197</sup> Even though McKinney’s work has been criticized by Julie Scott Meisami (and she makes important points), McKinney’s work still has some value in understanding the dialectical milieu in the context of Ibn al-Rūmī and poetry in general. For Meisami’s review of McKinney’s book see *Journal of Islamic Studies* 17:3 (2006): 352-58.

employed by the theologians (*mutakallimūn*) in their *munāẓaras*, did have an effect on poetic style.<sup>198</sup> Examples of disputation (*munāẓarā*) in poetry and prose already existed in early Arabic literature.<sup>199</sup> The third/ninth century scholar and ‘man of letters’ al-Jāḥiẓ (d.255/869) composed prose works that contained disputes between ‘two opponents’ on various subjects such as race, virtue and sexuality. Ibn al-Mu‘tazz reports that al-Nazzām “drew his inspiration for his poetry from dialectical theology (*kalām*) and the art of disputation (*jadāl*).”<sup>200</sup> Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī describes Nazzām’s style as ‘*alā madhhab al-Mu‘tazila* (in the manner of Mu‘tazilites referring to the dialectical argumentation),<sup>201</sup> just as Ibn al-Anbārī described the methods and style of the Mu‘tazilite al-Rummānī’s works on grammar as recalling the manner of dialectical discourse.<sup>202</sup> Al-Marzubānī (d. 384/994) also observes that the poet “would mix his verse with terms from logic” in the

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<sup>198</sup> The use of logical argumentation (*jadāl* or *kalām*) in literature has been treated by Wolfhart Heinrichs in connection with the prose dialogues in al-Ṭūfi’s work, see Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Gadal bei al-Ṭūfi’: Eine Interpretation seiner Beispielsammlung,” *ZDMG Supplement* iii, 1 (XIX. Deutscher Orientalistentag, Freiburg, 1975, ed. W. Voigt), pp. 463-73. On poems using dialectical style (*jadāl*), see Iṣḥāq b. Ibrāhīm b. Sulaymān b. Wahb al-Kātib, *al-Burhān fī Wujūh al-Bayān* [published as pseudo-Qudama b. Ja‘far, *Naqd al-Nathr*].

<sup>199</sup> There is a significant Ph.D. dissertation worthy of mention on *munāẓara* as a literary genre in fourth/tenth century written by Hussein Al Saddik under the supervision of Emeritus Professor Mohammed Arkoun in 1989, five years after Larry Miller completed his dissertation under the supervision of the late Professor Rudolph Mach and Josef van Ess. Al Saddik sees the *munāẓara* genre as a social discourse and, accordingly, demonstrates the relationship between the *munāẓara* genre and the Arabo-Islamic society with a special focus on the relationship between the function of the genre and its change with the evolution of society. See his dissertation, Hussein Al Saddik, *Les genres littéraires au quatrième siècle de l’Hégire (à propos de la munāẓara)*, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Paris, 1989).

<sup>200</sup> Ibn al-Mu‘tazz, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shu‘arā’*, p. 272; cited in McKinney, *The Case of Rhyme*, p. 127.

<sup>201</sup> Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, vol. 6, p. 97; cited in McKinney, *The Case of Rhyme*.

<sup>202</sup> Ibn al-Anbārī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Udabā’*, p. 234; cited in McKinney, *The Case of Rhyme*.

tenth century.<sup>203</sup> This literary genre (*munāẓarā*), initiated by al-Jāhiz, reached its full development by the end of the fourth/tenth century<sup>204</sup> and became more and more widespread in the fifteenth century.<sup>205</sup>

Written dispute poems (*munāẓarā*), as opposed to the oral *munāẓara*, are those in which competitors, either persons or objects, debate and claim superiority over each other.<sup>206</sup> *Munāẓara* poems resulted from the internal development of contest poems (*naqā'id*) and the *maqāmāt* (sessions or

<sup>203</sup> Al-Marzubānī, *Mu'jam al-Shu'arā*, p. 128; cited in McKinney, *The Case of Rhyme*.

<sup>204</sup> On *munāẓara* poems, see E. Wagner, "Munāẓara," in *EI*<sup>2</sup>, vol.7, pp. 565-568; John N. Mattock, "The Arabic Tradition: Origin and Developments," in *Dispute Poems and Dialogues in the Ancient and Mediaeval Near East*, edited by G. J. Reinink, Herman L. J. Vanstiphout (Leuven: Peeters, 1991), pp. 153-63; Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Rose Versus Narcissus: Observations on an Arabic Literary Debate," in *Dispute Poems and Dialogues in the Ancient and Mediaeval Near East*, pp. 179-198 and Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, "The Essay and the Debate (Al-Risāla and Al-Munāẓara)," in *Arabic Literature in the Post-Classical Period*, ed. Roger Allen and D.S. Richards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 134-144.

<sup>205</sup> Edward Browne, *A Literary History of Persia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-29), vol. 2, pp. 148-52.

<sup>206</sup> Many examples can be provided, among them, winter versus spring or summer, pen versus sword, day versus night and Persian versus Arab. In *munāẓara* poems, the point is to bring the opposites to the stage (or to use the poet's terminology, into the *maydān al-khiwān*, i.e., "the battleground of the table") and make them wrestle until the moment of truth ("*el momento de la verdad*," a term used in Spanish bullfighting when the matador kills the bull) arrives. I use the expression "the moment of truth" for *munāẓara* poetry since the whole point of these poems is to conclude with one side's victory over his/her opponent (*khaṣm*). There is no *munāẓara* poetry in which the debate ends in a draw: the final result must be either a win or a loss. The expression "moment of truth" was first introduced into the English language in 1932 by Ernest Hemingway (d. 1961) in his *Death in the Afternoon*, one of the best books ever written on bullfighting. The maneuvers between man and bull in the *corrida* (literally means running) can be considered as a dialectical relationship between life and death, more specifically though, between man and animal in the arena where one must be dead at the end of the fight. Beatriz Penas Ibanez, in her analysis of Hemingway's *Death in the Afternoon*, aptly brings the tension between the "learned=established" and "instinctive=natural" styles: "[T]he bullfighter represents social forces: he enters the ring equipped with a well-defined system of taurine norms and conventions, which are part of and stand for the more general cultural order to which they belong. The bull's death (the bullfighter's victory) confirms the supremacy of the socialized man over the purely instinctive "natural" and therefore innocent or Edenic creature, the animal." See her article: "Very Sad but Very Fine": Death in the Afternoon's Imagist Interpretation of the Bullfight-Text," in *A Companion to Hemingway's Death in the Afternoon*, ed. Miriam B. Mandel, (Rochester: Camden House, 2004), pp. 143-164.

assemblies) boasting between two rivals or opponents. In *munāzara* poems, we see that grammarians' or caliphs' debating sessions (*majlis*) turn into an arena (*maydān*). For example, if diners debate among themselves then "the battleground of the table" (*maydān al-khiwān*) becomes the place of action. For theologians and grammarians, *majlis* were the place of such action.<sup>207</sup> Such poetry features a tight argument made up of a series of questions and answers: the questions are answered by the poet himself in the manner of *jadal*, i.e., by eliminating the potential answers one by one. These poems, to use McKinney's analogy, are "constructed like arguments, in which the premises are marshaled towards conclusions."<sup>208</sup>

An example of such a poem is Ibn al-Rūmī's syllogism-style piece that reproduces the famous juridical debate over the analogy between *khamr* and *nabīdh* (wine):

The Iraqī has declared that date wine is permissible  
saying: "the two things forbidden are wine of the grape  
and intoxication."

While the Hijazi has said: "the two drinks are one and the  
same;"  
In the discrepancy wine has been made permissible."<sup>209</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> Ibrahim Gerics, *A Literary and Gastronomical Conceit* (Wiesbaden: Verlag, 2002).

<sup>208</sup> The modern Arabic literary critic Shawqī Ḍayf observes that, in this period, i.e., the dialectical milieu, "poetry was no longer a purely emotive and rhetorical art. Indeed, it became quite intellectual... Poetry, like prose had begun to rely on logic and clarity. This style of composition [using logic and dialectical argumentation] served as a bridge between the traditional separate domains of prose (*al-nathr*) and poetry (*al-shi'r*)." See Shawqī Ḍayf, *al-Fann wa Madhāhibu fī al-Shi'r al-'Arabī*, pp. 206-7; cited in McKinney, *The Case of Rhyme*, p. 294.

<sup>209</sup> *Dīwān Ibn al-Rūmī*, poem no. 737; translated by McKinney, *The Case of Rhyme*, p. 280.

What kind of argumentation strategies then, did *munāzara* poets employ in their poems? To take Ibn al-Rūmī as an example, the contestants (i.e. the poet and his patron), argue by using the formulae “I said” and “you said.” Questions are answered by the poet himself in a dialectical manner, eliminating any potential answers to find the best possible one. The patron has the final word in this disputation and he concludes his argument by telling the poet not to persist in this dispute. Near the conclusion, the poet dedicates the poem, to a third party whom he designates as “an arbiter (*ḥākim*)” and to whom he appeals to deliver judgment between “the two adversaries” (*al-khaṣmānī*).<sup>210</sup>

However, not everyone thought that using logic and dialectical syllogism in poetry was appropriate. A number of poets complained about the intrusion of logic into the domain of poetry and insisted that they did not feel positive about this poetic innovation.<sup>211</sup> The poet al-Buḥturī (d.284/897), a Bedouin in his poetic character (*a‘rābī al-shi‘r*),<sup>212</sup> says that:

You have imposed upon me the structures of your logic  
Whose truth would put an end to poetry’s charming lie!

“He of the Ulcers” (Imru’ al-Qays) was no devotee of logic  
What genus is it, and what is its cause?

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<sup>210</sup> Beatrice Gruendler, *Medieval Arabic Prose Poetry: Ibn al-Rūmī and the Patron’s Redemption* (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 165-67.

<sup>211</sup> For al-Buḥturī’s arguments, see McKinney, pp. 356-60.

<sup>212</sup> For Buḥturī, see *GAS*, II, pp. 560-64, and an analysis of his poetry, see also Gustave E. Von Grunbaum, *A Tenth Century Document of Arabic Literary Theory and Criticism* (Chicago, 1950), pp. 84-115 and Al-Āmidī, *al-Muwāzana bayna Shi‘r Abī Tammām wa’l-Buḥturī*, ed. Aḥmad Ṣaqr, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1992).



For poetry consists in mere glimpses, enough the subtle sign,  
Not in idle rambling on protracted propositions.<sup>213</sup>

The poet Abū al-‘Alā al-Ma‘arrī (d.973/1057) mocked the developments as “a dazzling monument of mere fine words,” in which the disputers “cease not ever, north and south, / drawing out syllogisms interminable.”<sup>214</sup> But despite the complaints and nostalgia for the ‘good old days’ of *mufākhara*,<sup>215</sup> and *munāfara*,<sup>216</sup> the new direction (the poetry of the

<sup>213</sup> *Dīwan al-Buhturī*, poem no. 68, verses 14-16, I, 209; translated by McKinney, *The Case of Rhyme versus Reason*, p. 35.

<sup>214</sup> The original couplet reads: “*Wa mā yazālūna fī shām wa fī yaman – Yastanbiṭūna qiyāsan mā lahu amadu.*” Commentator Naḏīm ‘Adī says: “*Wa mā yazālūna yastanbiṭūna al-aqsiyat allatī lā ghāyata lahā wa-lā nihāya.*” The title of the poem is “*al-tanāfus fī al-dunyā*,” which means “Struggle for the World.” The first opening couplet reads: “*Lawlā al-tanāfus fī al-dunyā lammā wuḏi‘at – Kutubu al-tanāzur lā al-Mughnī wa-la al-‘Umadu.*” See al-Ma‘arrī, *Luzūm mā lā yalzam*, edited and commented on by Naḏīm ‘Adī, 2 vols., v. 1, p. 417. R.A. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Poetry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921), p. 268.

<sup>215</sup> *Mufākhara* (from the root *fakhara*, “boasting”) is a contest for the honour of the poet and the tribe he represented. These public oral contests were held at annual fairs in pre-Islam or in later periods, in the caliph’s court. The following is an example of *mufākhara*: “A rich person from Yaman in the Abbasid period bought 6 slave girls. One day the Caliph ordered them to praise themselves (*mufākhara*) and belittle their opponent (opposite): the white girl is to compete with the black one, the fat one with the slim one, and the blond with the brunette. All of them were equal in terms of praising themselves and beating their opponents. Afterwards, the Caliph bought all of them (quoted in *Arabian Nights Encyclopaedia*, p. 289). However, *mufākhara*, as a literary genre, indicates contest poems in which the metaphor of the sword and pen appears often. It is composed in verse taking the form of stylish boasting debates between personifications of pairs such as summer and winter and the poor and the rich.

<sup>216</sup> *Munāfara* (from the root *nafara* “hate” or “enmity”) was the Arab tribal institution of competing for glory and status based on wealth and material power with the intention of establishing a top-down hierarchy. As a literary genre, *munāfara* is a type of contest poem in which the two parties dispute over their honour before a judge. Two groups were brought together to express their honour (*mufākhara*), then a *munāfara* took place which often ended with the sword. *Mufākhara* and *munāfara* tested the mental and physical courage of tribesmen. On these types of contest in tribal society, see Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture* (London: Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1950), pp. 89-104.

*badīʿ*) was taking over.<sup>217</sup> The persistent dichotomy between convention and invention in this period affected poets' style focusing more on meaning and clarity over expression in their poetry.<sup>218</sup>

The influence of this style (*munāẓara* poetry) was felt far beyond Islamic intellectual history. The twelfth-century Spanish Hebrew poet, Yehudah al-Ḥarizī imitated the eleventh-century Arab philologist, al-Ḥarīrī's *Maqāmāt* by using a technique of *munāẓara* in which argumentation proceeds, principally by presenting opposites (day versus night or youth versus age) and concluding that one side is the winner.<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> Suzanne Pinckney Stetkevych, in her article "Toward a Redefinition of "Badī" Poetry," puts the *badīʿ* poetry into a context to evaluate what it meant for Arab and Islamic history in the following: "the 'Abbasid poet of the "new" style realized that the Golden Age of the *Jahiliyah* was no more, it was the ruined abode, irreparably changed, the repository of old and archetypal yearnings; nothing remained but the vague traces of a tribal heritage, long since abandoned for the glories of Empire and Islam. Time has changed the poet too; in psyche and in sensibility he is no longer the bedouin warrior and lover, pouring forth his heart "in profuse strains of unpremeditated art," but the consciously cultivated litterateur of the Caliphal court. And yet the 'Abbasid "*badīʿ*" poet returned for inspiration to the traces of the primordial dwelling whose once sweet waters now have the tearful taste of melancholy. Thus the "new" poetry was still nourished from the traditional tribal well-spring of Arabic literature, but it was changed by the passage of time, the relentless march of history, to consciously and self-consciously reflect the urban Islamic culture of the 'Abbasid empire. The so-called "*badīʿ*" poetry that emerged in late second and early third century Basra and Baghdad was the recognition and expression in literature of this irrevocable change. As such it was welcomed by those who revelled in the headlong rush into a new era, but it came as a threat to those who cherished the illusion of continuity with Jahiliyah times and preferred to remain under the protective wing of the Golden Age... Rather, *al-madhhab al-kalāmī* [the dialectical manner] is precisely that mode of thought, abstract, dialectical, metaphorical, that, as the analyses of the rhetorical figures demonstrate, distinguishes 'Abbasid courtly culture from Jahiliyah tribal society and which, in the realm of literature, created the new *badīʿ* style distinct from the poetry of the Ancients." See her article in *Journal of Arabic Literature* 12 (1981), pp. 1-29. For the tension between conservatives and the new style (*badīʿ*), see Mansour Ajami, *The Neckveins of Winter: The Controversy over Natural and Artificial Poetry in Medieval Arabic Literary Criticism* (Leiden: Brill, 1984).

<sup>218</sup> See Beatrice Gruendler, *Medieval Arabic Prose Poetry*, pp. 10-12.

<sup>219</sup> Clark Colahan and Alfred Rodriguez, "Traditional Semitic Forms of Reversibility in Sem Tob's Proverbios morales," *Journal of Medieval Renaissance Studies* 13 (1983): 33-50

Shem Tov, another Spanish Jewish poet, appropriates the famous Arabic pen and sword dispute (*munāzara*) and calls it the “*debate between the Pen and the Scissors*” in order to castigate Gonzalo Martinez de Oviedo, Master of the Order of Alcantara and the instigator of anti-Semitic persecutions in fourteenth century.<sup>220</sup>

### 3. GRAMMARIANS: FROM THE SCORPION CONTROVERSY (*Mas’alat al-Zunbūriyya*) TO IBN AL-ANBARĪ

Following on from the way in which poetry was affected by the dialectical discourse, this section focuses on how grammarians felt about the influence of that discourse in their field. In order to understand this influence in the study of grammar (*naḥw*), the following three facts from the classical period of Islamic history should be taken into account.

The first discussions of a grammatical nature centered on the recension of the Qur’an and its apparent fixation for the purpose of ritual recitation. This was important because, immediately following the death of the Prophet, there were multiple ways in which the Qur’anic text was recited. Some of this variation resulted from the numerous dialects in the Arabian Peninsula, which meant that the text was read and interpreted differently depending on which dialect was employed. There was, then, an

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and David S. Segal, “Rhyme and Reason: The Thirty-Fourth Gate of Alḥarizī’s Tahkemoni,” *Prooftexts* 3 (1983): 55-62.

<sup>220</sup> Clark Colahan, “Santob’s Debate between the Pen and the Scissors,” (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1977).

intense desire to preserve a single accurate text of the revelation with all the consonants and vowels (*ḥaraka*) correctly indicated.

The second discussion focused on the collection and criticism of pre-Islamic or ancient Arabic poetry. The need to collect this poetry developed out of the need to explain various passages in the Qur'an which contained unusual (*gharīb*) vocabulary and grammatical structures.

The third discussion was related to the reform, initiated by the 'Umayyad caliph 'Abd al-Mālik ibn Marwān (reign. 65/685 – 86/705), by which Arabic became the sole administrative language of the Muslim empire. As the territory under Muslim rule expanded and non-Arabic speaking people (*mawālī*) were integrated into the empire, a need developed to teach some kind of "standard" Arabic for the purpose of communication and in order to avoid grammatical mistakes or linguistic fallacies (*lahn*).<sup>221</sup> This became more apparent and necessary after the 'Abbasids came to power in 750, at which time the center of power moved east to Iraq, away from the peninsular Arab homeland.

Consequently, in order to preserve the purity of the Arabic language, linguists turned to the Bedouins, who lived in the desert (*bādiya*) and travelled throughout the Arabian Peninsula, to gather data on the usage of

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<sup>221</sup> Jāḥiz, *al-Bayān wa'l-Tabyīn*, ed. 'Abd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1948-50), v. 1., pp. 69-74 and Suyūfī, *Akhbār*, in *Rasā'il fi'l-Fiqh al-Lughā*, ed. 'Abdallāh al-Jubūrī (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1982), pp. 167-8.

Arabic vocabulary (*jam‘ al-lughā*) among these people.<sup>222</sup> Any use of the language at a distance from urban centres (*amṣār*) was considered to be pure and eloquent Arabic (*fuṣḥā*). The grammarians’ admission of the supremacy of this Arabic even brought extra income for the Bedouins as they were hired to teach ‘pure Arabic’ in the large cities. This ‘pure Arabic’ was acknowledged to be the language of Bedouins (*kalām al-A‘rāb*).<sup>223</sup>

This dialectical tension between the city and the desert came to a head in a disputation in the eighth century between the representative of the Basra school of grammar, Sībawayh (d.180/796) and a member of the Kufan school, al-Kisā‘ī (d.183/799). The case, known as the *mas’alat al-zunbūriyya* (the Scorpion dispute), is an account of the greatest victory of pure Bedouin usage (*kalām al-A‘rāb*) over reasoning in language. The point of the dispute was the following expression: “I thought that the scorpion stung more severely than the wasp, and behold, the one is like the other.” The puzzle was whether *fā idhā huwa hiya* or *fā-idhā huwa iyyāhā* was the correct way to express “the one is like the other.”<sup>224</sup>

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<sup>222</sup> For different scholars’ travels to the desert for the purpose of collecting data from the Bedouins, see Ibn al-Anbārī, *Nuzhat al-Alibbā fi Ṭabaqāt al-Udabā*, ed. Ibrāhīm al-Sāmarrā‘ī (Baghdad, 1970), p. 59, 73-78; Qifṭī, *Inbāh*, v.1., p. 259, v. 2, p. 258 and idem, v.4., pp. 120-23.

<sup>223</sup> Qifṭī, *Inbāh al-Ruwāt ‘alā Anbāh al-Nuḥāt*, ed. Muḥammad Abū Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 4 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, 1986), v. 4, p. 133.

<sup>224</sup> On the debate over *zunbūriyya*, see Joshua Blau, “The Role of the Bedouins as Arbiters in Linguistic Questions and the Mas’ala az-Zunbūriyya,” *Journal of Semitic Studies* 8 (1963): 42-51 and Nevin Karabela, “Zunburiyye Tartışması ve Arka Planı,” *Ekev Akademi Dergisi* 3/2 (2001): 257-264.

The disputants never reached an agreement but finally decided to submit the case to a group of Bedouins for arbitration. The latter decided that the Kufan, al-Kisāʿī had won the dispute. Regardless of the different versions of this story, one element is common to all narrations: Sībawayh's neglect of the Bedouins' speech cost him the victory, however strong his arguments (which were based on theoretical framework) might have been. In the end, al-Kisāʿī triumphed on the basis of evidence from the *kalām al-Aʿrāb*. The *masʿalat al-zunbūriyya* serves as a typical example of the tension between Arabic grammar and the sources of grammar. There is a language known as Arabic: it is not only the language of the Arabs, but also the language of God. This language has grammar, but what the source (or sources) of its grammar is, was a pivotal question in the history of Arabic grammar.

Later grammarians, overemphasizing the importance of theoretical rules in grammar (*qiyās*-reasoning and deduction) without verifying these rules against living Bedouin speech, caused a great deal of debate. The debate between the Arab grammarian, Sīrāfī (d.368/979) and the Greek logician, Mattā (d.328/940), which itself was never solved, reveals the symptoms of this tension. Originally, the debate started as a political issue and continued as a reaction to the fusion of Greek logic into different fields, specifically into theology and jurisprudence. Sīrāfī saw Arabic grammar as a science that reflected both the linguistic conventions of the Bedouins and

the logical premises of reason. Debate brought out the tensions between tradition (*naql*) and reason (*aql*), Arab and Greek, expression (*lafẓ*) and meaning (*ma‘nā*).<sup>225</sup>

Even though the ninth century saw great resistance to Greek logic by grammarians such as Ibn Qutayba (d.276/889), Aḥmad b. Ṭayyib al-Sarakhsī (d.286/899), Abū Abbās al-Nashī (d.293/906) and, finally, al-Zajjāj (d.311/923), theorists of the next generation could not help but use dialectic in grammatical works.<sup>226</sup> First, Ibn al-Sarrāj (d.316/928) and al-Rummānī (d.384/994) employed *samā‘* and *qiyās* as methods of solving grammatical problems.<sup>227</sup> Then Ibn al-Jinnī (d.392/1001) added *ijmā‘* to those two methods in his own attempt to find answers.<sup>228</sup>

Ibn al-Sarrāj begins his *Uṣūl* by defining *naḥw* (grammar) as a “science which the early grammarians distilled from the speech of the Arabs (*kalām al-A‘rāb*) by means of induction (*istiqrā‘*).” He further suggests that *uṣūl* literature, concerning the foundations of Arabic grammar, enables the linguist to extract the ‘*illas* (causes, reasons) and thus to decipher in which

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<sup>225</sup> For a detailed study of this debate, see Muhsin Mahdi, “Language and Logic in Classical Islam,” in *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture*, pp. 51-83; R. Arnaldez, “Mantīq” in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New ed., 11 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1960), pp. 442-452.

<sup>226</sup> For a discussion of the influence of Aristotelian logic on Arabic grammar, see Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal, *Logique aristotélicienne et grammaire arabe: Étude et documents* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1983).

<sup>227</sup> *Samā‘* represents the authenticity of the source from which linguistic data is derived. This is referred to as *naql* (transmission), contrary to the material which some grammarians derive through *qiyās*. Ibn al-Anbārī includes the Qur’an, the prophetic *sunna* and the speech of the Arabs under *naql*. See Anbārī, *Luma‘ al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-Naḥw*, ed. Sa‘īd al-Afghānī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1971), pp. 83-4.

<sup>228</sup> Ibn al-Jinnī, *al-Khaṣā‘is*, ed. Muḥammad ‘Ali al-Najjār (Cairo: Maṭba‘at Dār al-Kitāb al-Miṣrīyya, 1952), pp. 1-3.

speech authentic, genuine Arabic intellectual culture operated.<sup>229</sup> Equally, however, Ibn Jinnī deals with the epistemological status of Arabic grammar and its *uṣūl*, and the importance of epistemology in his approach is underscored by the fact that he devotes a whole chapter in the first volume of his *Khaṣā'is* to the issue.<sup>230</sup>

Zamakhsharī (d.538/1143) composed an entire book on peculiarities in a grammatical analysis of the Qur'ān entitled *Nukat al-A'rāb fī Gharīb al-I'rāb* (Subtleties of the Bedouins in the Peculiarities of Grammatical Analysis). The work deals with the peculiarities of language in the form of questions and answers (*masā'il wa-ajwiba*), and in this as well as in his Qur'ān exegesis (*tafsīr*) *al-Kashshāf*, a set pattern of theoretical question-and-answer form is quite evident. It is in fact, the most obvious structure in his text.

Later, the systematic philologist Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad Ibn al-Anbārī (d.577/1181) wrote a work on the methodology of grammar, inspired by the dialectical method that had already made its way into legal theory and theology. In his *al-Ighrāb fī Jadāl al-I'rāb wa Luma' al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-Naḥw*, Ibn al-Anbārī claims that his work was the first to be written in this field. The title closely resembles that of a work on legal theory, *al-Luma' fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* by Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī (d.476/1083) and in yet

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<sup>229</sup> Ibn al-Sarrāj, *al-Uṣūl fī al-Naḥw*, v. 1., p. 35.

<sup>230</sup> Ibn al-Jinnī, *al-Khaṣā'is*, pp. 3-5.



another of his works, *al-Inṣāf fī Masā'il al-Khilāf bayna al-Baṣriyyīn wa'l-Kūfiyyīn*, Ibn al-Anbārī explains that:

A group of jurists asked me to write a fine book that contains the most famous questions of disagreements (*masā'il al-khilāf*) between grammarians of Baṣra and Kūfa similar to what has been done in jurisprudence, i.e. disputed questions of law between Shafi'ī and Abū Ḥanīfa to be the first book to have written in the Arabic grammar. I wrote according to that order [referring to the juristic *khilāf*].<sup>231</sup>

He claims that nobody had ever written such a book in the field of grammar that was similar to those works on juristic differences (*khilāf*) and also that he introduced two branches of knowledge into the science of *naḥw* (grammar): first *'ilm al-jadal* (dialectic) and *'ilm al-uṣūl* in *naḥw*.<sup>232</sup> Ibn al-Jinnī introduced the theory of grammar (*uṣūl al-naḥw*) with his *al-Khaṣā'is*, but Ibn al-Anbārī developed it in detail in his *al-Ighrāb fī Jadal al-I'rāb*. He also wrote *al-Jumal fī 'ilm al-Jadal*—a work on dialectic.<sup>233</sup> Ibn al-Anbārī's endeavour in *naḥw* influenced thinkers in the post-classical period, especially Suyūṭī (d.911/1505), who developed the sources of grammar in his *al-Iqtirāḥ fī Uṣūl an-Naḥw*.<sup>234</sup>

What is most significant in this period is the increasing desire to apply dialectical reasoning not only to grammar but also to rhetoric

<sup>231</sup> Ibn al-Anbārī, *al-Inṣāf fī Masā'il al-Khilāf bayna al-Baṣriyyīn wa'l-Kūfiyyīn* (Cairo, 1955), pp. 5-7.

<sup>232</sup> Ibn al-Anbārī, *Nuzhat al-Alibbā' fī Ṭabaqāt al-Udabā'*, p. 8.

<sup>233</sup> Dhahabī, *Siyar A'lāmi'n-Nubalā'*, v.12, p. 115.

<sup>234</sup> For Suyūṭī, see *GAL, Suppl.*, II, 180.

(*balāgha*), as Wansbrough notes the rise in the appeal of logical and dialectical reasoning in the dialectical milieu and afterwards, especially in the works of Khaṭīb al-Qazwīnī (d.738/1338) and Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d.792/1389)<sup>235</sup>

#### 4. PHILOSOPHER: BURHĀN VERSUS JADAL

In order to understand the case of the philosophers we must first understand their common forefather: Aristotle. Aristotle devoted three books of his *Organon* to different kinds of arguments: (a) *Posterior Analytics* to demonstration, (b) *Topics* to dialectic, and (c) *On Sophistical Refutations* to sophistic arguments. Among them, demonstration is the most important, since it is only demonstration that leads to scientific knowledge. At the beginning of his *Topics*, he compares the inquiries of the philosopher and the dialectician and the distinction he draws affected the perception of theologians held by the *falāsifa* (philosophers); namely that the theologian is simply a dialectician who uses commonly accepted opinions (*mashhūrāt*) as premises instead of certain premises (*yaqīnī*).<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>235</sup> John Wansbrough, “A Note on Arabic Rhetoric,” in *Lebende Antike: Symposium für Rudolph Sühnel*, ed. H. Meller and H. J. Zimmermann (Berlin: E. Schmidt, 1967), pp. 55-56.

<sup>236</sup> As I pointed out in the poets’ sections there were two types of premise: (a) certain (*yaqīnī*) premises and (b) non-certain premises. The type of premise determines used in syllogism the truth-value of syllogism as demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical or poetical.

To this end, Fārābī, in his *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, dug in his heels to distinguish philosophy from theology (*kalām*).<sup>237</sup> He argued that dialectic, which is never free from doubt, differs from epistemic ('ilmī) discussion because the latter seeks the truth in the form of scientific proof (*burhān*).<sup>238</sup> Even though Fārābī made a distinction between philosophy rooted in certainty (*falsafa yaqīniyya*), which is based on apodictic demonstration (*burhān*), and philosophy deriving from opinion (*falsafa maznūna*), based on dialectic and sophistry, his attitude towards theology (as being dialectical) did not change.<sup>239</sup> Theology, in Fārābī's system, has no chance of being demonstrative although he does offer philosophy that chance. Accordingly, for Fārābī, *jadal* is a method of disputation that takes place between two parties with the objective either of one's own defence or winning an argumentation. The fundamental feature of this method is the use of commonly accepted premises (*mashhūrāt*).<sup>240</sup> This term will always be uncovered in writings on *jadal*.<sup>241</sup>

Ibn Sīnā thought along the same lines. For him, the syllogisms of dialectic are only semi-syllogisms, inferior to those of science, as the

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<sup>237</sup> Recently, Stephen Menn dealt with this aspect of *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* in detail in his article (especially pp.84-97), "Al-Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* and His Analysis of the Senses of Being," *Arabic Sciences of Philosophy* 18 (2008): 55-97.

<sup>238</sup> Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, ed. Muhsin Mahdi (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1968), pp. 145-51.

<sup>239</sup> Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, pp. 153-57.

<sup>240</sup> Fārābī, *Ihsā'ul-'Ulūm*, pp. 76-77.

<sup>241</sup> For Fārābī's evaluation of dialectical arguments, see K. Gyeyke, "Al-Fārābī on the Logic of the Arguments of Muslim Philosophical Theologians," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 27 (1989): 135-143.

premises of the former are *mashhūrāt*, or established by the opponent, while those of the latter are true and *a priori*. Dialectic (*jadal*), therefore, does not produce certainty (*yaqīn*),<sup>242</sup> it only offers conjecture (*ẓann*).<sup>243</sup> Ibn Rushd also clearly distinguished the philosopher from the dialectician, by which he meant the theologian. For him, the philosopher uses demonstrative syllogism whereas the dialectician (theologian) formulates questions and answers, and always addresses himself to another person.<sup>244</sup> The theologian, therefore, is not isolated on an island like Ḥayy b. Yaqzān searching for the truth of things, but rather is always in the ring like Wittgenstein's boxer, waiting for his opponent.

In the case of theologians, the difference between dialectical (yes or no) and epistemic (open-ended) questions is central. The two restrictive question formats in Arabic, first “*hal...am..?* (is x the case or is x not the case?),” and second “*a-laysā?* (is it not the case that...?),” are strictly dialectical. The “*mā...?*” “what is...?” question, which probes at essence (*jawhar*), is reserved by Aristotle for epistemic questions.<sup>245</sup> Questions like

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<sup>242</sup> Arabic Aristotelian philosophers constantly distinguish certain premises from probable ones. True or a priori propositions are made of premises such as “two is a number bigger than one” or that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (*al-kullu a'ẓam min al-juzz*),” as pointed out in the first chapter.

<sup>243</sup> See Dimitri Gutas, “The Logic of Theology (*Kalām*) in Avicenna,” in *Logik und Theologie. Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalter*, ed. Perler Dominik and Rudolph Ulrich (Leiden: Brill 2005), pp. 59-72.

<sup>244</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, ed. Muḥammad 'Imāra (Cairo: Dār al-Ma 'ārif, 1972), pp. 30-38 and 55-62.

<sup>245</sup> Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, Book II.2 89b36-90.

“what is man?” are the specialty of the philosopher, not the dialectician. Epistemic questions, by themselves, are out of place in dialectic.

All three Aristotelian Arabic philosophers (Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd) who interpreted Aristotle’s *Topics* in their works specifically on *jadāl*, considered that dialectic, first, is an art (*not a method*) involving question and answer; second, uses generally accepted opinions (*endoxa* in Greek, *mashhūrāt* in Arabic) as premises, to defend or destroy any thesis; and third, does not lead to truth.<sup>246</sup>

Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā both see victory (*ghalaba*) as a major motivation in dialectic. This, of course, affects the intention and objective of the dialectician: in dialectic, the questioner asks questions in order to refute the respondent’s thesis in order, primarily, to gain a victory. By contrast, epistemic discussion is concerned with proof in order to investigate the quality of proof. In dialectic, however, the questioner is not concerned with what establishes the respondent’s thesis, but rather what refutes it.<sup>247</sup>

A poignant example of this is when al-Ghaylān al-Balkhī (d.590/1194), i.e., Farīd al-Ghaylānī, insisted that he was not committing himself to proving the temporal origin of bodies (against the notion of a pre-eternal chain of events represented by Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā), but was refuting Ibn Sīnā’s opinion. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī replied by saying that “in

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<sup>246</sup> Miller, pp. 52-86.

<sup>247</sup> Miller, pp. 65-67.

this case, this will not be intellectual and scientific inquiry (*baḥṭh*), but a kind of disputation (*mujāḍala*) with a particular point on a particular point. [Instead] tell me the proof of the falsity of the notion of a pre-eternal chain of events.”<sup>248</sup>

Ibn Sīnā made a distinction by placing *munāẓara* far from *jadal*. *Munāẓara*, he said, “is derived from speculation (*nazar*) and reflection (*i’tibār*)” and continued:

Its purpose is to investigate (*mubāḥatha*) the two opposing opinions which have been entrusted—I mean that each one of the interlocutors is entrusted with each one of them (the opposing opinions) in order that it may become clear to them which one of them is holding the true opinion (*al-muḥḥiq*) and that the second may help him (*yusā’idu*) to this end.

The word *munāẓara* is derived from *nazar* and *nazar* signifies neither victory (*ghalaba*) nor contention (*mu’ānada*). But *jadal* signifies prevailing through speech in forcing one’s opponent to accept one’s position (*ilzām*) as well as an abundance of power and craft (*ḥīla*) slightly removed from what is thoroughly moral and fair.<sup>249</sup>

Ibn Rushd delimited a hierarchy according to the intellectual abilities of the various groups. He talked in his *Faṣl al-Maqāl* about the people of dialectic (*jadal*) as an intermediate class between the rhetorical and the

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<sup>248</sup> Rāzī, *Munāẓarāt fi Bilād mā warā al-Nahr*, in Fathallah Kholeif, *A Study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and his Controversies in Transoxiana* (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1966) pp. 60-1; cited in Ayman Shihadch, “From Al-Ghazālī to Al-Rāzī: 6th/12th Century Developments in Muslim Philosophical Theology,” *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 15 (2005): 141-79, p. 161.

<sup>249</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Jadal*, p. 15; translated by Miller, p. 62.

demonstrative. By this intermediate class, Ibn Rushd was referring to *mutakallimūn* (theologians), especially the Ash‘arites, whose arguments fell short of the demonstrative on account of the uncertain character of their premises, which were generally accepted (*mashhūrāt*).<sup>250</sup> At the bottom of the hierarchy were those who could only really understand rhetorical arguments, that is, those who played upon the emotions and religious feelings of the audience. At the top, on the other hand, were the philosophers who could fully understand demonstrations and theoretical knowledge. This was the basic attitude of *falāsifa*.

## 5. JURISTS

Dialectic (*jadal*), Miller says, took hold of jurisprudence and became an essential part of it over the course of three periods: (1) the emergence of works featuring the *jadal* method, which when devoted to *furū‘* are called *khilāf* (juristic disagreement) or *tariqa* (method) works in juristic literature; (2) the production of assorted texts from a century later when logic was first joined to jurisprudence by Ghazālī; and (3) when (thirteenth century) those works that show the transition from subject-specific (legal or theological or philosophical) dialectic to the universal theory of argumentation were

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<sup>250</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, pp. 50-62.

represented by the treatise of Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī (d.702/1303), *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth wa'l-Munāzara*.<sup>251</sup>

We have sources from the eleventh century that specifically focus on juridical dialectic. One of the earliest is Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī's (d.476/1083) *Ma'ūnat fī al-Jadal*, an abridged version of his *Mulakhkhaṣ fī'l-Jadal*. The other two key works are by his students at the Nizāmiyya College in Baghdad. Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī (d.474/1081), the Andalusian Mālikī jurist, wrote *al-Minhāj fī Tartīb al-Hijāj* while the Hanbalite jurist, Ibn 'Aqīl (d.513/1119), wrote *Kitāb al-Jadal 'alā Ṭarīqat al-Fuqahā'*. The latter also devotes a section of his *Wāḍiḥ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* to disputation. Another earlier treatise by Abū Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d.436/1044), entitled *Kitāb al-Qiyās al-Shar'ī*, was brought to the attention of scholars by Wael Hallaq.<sup>252</sup> However, one of the most detailed works in this discipline is Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī's (d.478/1085) *al-Kāfiya fī al-Jadal*.<sup>253</sup>

When it comes to *furū'*, which serves as the basis of *fatwā* practice, Hallaq says that, "one must know what the generally accepted doctrine was in his *madhhab*." This is why the subject of *khilāf* was so important.

The study of *khilāf* was the means by which the jurists came to know what the *madhhab*-opinions were. Law students, for instance, are often reported to have studied law, *madhhaban wa-khilāfan*, under a particular teacher.

<sup>251</sup> Miller, p. 87-8.

<sup>252</sup> Wael Hallaq, "A Tenth-Eleventh Century Treatise on Juridical Dialectic," *Muslim World* 77 (1987): 189-227.

<sup>253</sup> Miller, pp. 88-90.



The Mālikite Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr emphatically states that for one to be called a jurist (*faqīh*), he must be adept at the science of *khilāf*, for this was par excellence the means by which the jurist could determine which opinions represented the authoritative doctrines of the *madhhab*.<sup>254</sup>

In juridical dialectic, *jadal* means question (*mas’ala*) and answer (*jawāb*), and just as in theological dialectic there are two types of questions, so in juridical dialectic there are restrictive (is cheating on your partner good or bad?) and non-restrictive or open-ended (what is cheating?) questions. Law is opinion-oriented since a jurist states his opinion on a question (*mas’ala*). Juwaynī seems to have been the only jurist who understood the distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive questions:

A questioner’s questions are divided into various types (*wujūh*): one which specifies the juristic qualification through questioning; the questioner says, “is date-brandy forbidden or allowed?” For (in this sort of question) it is necessary that the response be from a part of the question, so that you reply “Forbidden” or “Allowed.” This type of question is called restrictive (*su’āl al-ḥajr wa’l-man’*).

Another type is when you ask the question in a general manner (*mujmalan*) where you intend to give the respondent the choice in the matter: “what do you think about date-brandy?” and this is called a non-restrictive question (*su’āl tafwīd*).<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>254</sup> Wael Hallaq, *Authority, Change and Continuity in Islamic Law*, p. 158.

<sup>255</sup> Juwaynī, *al-Kāfiya fī al-Jadal*, p. 80; translated in *Miller*, p. 93.

Restrictive and non-restrictive questions led to the establishment of the juristic status of the case at hand, such as in the first question “does Ḥanafī or Shāfi‘ī have an opinion about this point of law or not?” or in the second, “there are two opinions reported on Imām Mālik’s authority about such an issue. Do you choose one of them or are they both equal in your eyes?” Bājī rejects the use of non-restrictive questions in juridical disputation simply because the respondent is left at a loss as to what he is being asked about. The questioner should always make his question plain.<sup>256</sup>

According to Ibn Khaldūn there were two important methods (*tarīqa*) in juristic dialectic. One was that of Abū al-Yusr Muhammad al-Pazdawī (d.493/1100) who only used revelation and Prophetic tradition as sources of evidence, while the other was that of Rukn al-Dīn al-‘Amīdī (d.615/1218) who used anything he could find from different fields as sources of evidence.<sup>257</sup> Marwazī (d.462/1069) and Raḍī al-Dīn al-Sarakhsī (d.543/1149) had different methods again. Even though Pazdawī’s work is not extant, we do have a clear idea of the method of the previous three legal argumentation theorists (Rukn al-Dīn ‘Amīdī, Marwazī and Sarakhsī). In their form and style the basic method is to state the problem, the evidence, the objections and their solution. Sarakhsī, for example, follows this procedure:

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<sup>256</sup> Miller, pp. 90-94

<sup>257</sup> Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, pp. 30-34.

1. He states the problem: “our *ulamā* say that *zakāt* is obligatory on all jewellery but al-Shāfi‘ī says that it is not.”
2. He proceeds to give a proof.
3. He lists the opponent’s objections: “as for his statement... we say: we do not grant that” or “even if were to grant that... why do you say that...”
4. He then responds to the objections: “although the proof that you mentioned indicates the preponderance of jewellery over all other forms of material possessions used as currency, nevertheless, we have another piece of evidence which shows that they are all on the same level...”<sup>258</sup>

There are more than two disputants in a juristic dialectic. In the previous stages, dialectic was understood, especially by the theologians, to take place between two specific opponents, something like (to use van Ess’s term) “a boxing match.”<sup>259</sup> In the later period of juristic dialectic (especially from the eleventh century onwards), it transformed into being more like “a tag team” match to borrow Miller’s term.<sup>260</sup> *Jadal* (dialectic) is no longer understood then, as simply a sequence of questions and answers between two participants, but it is an equivalent to *munāẓara* (speculation) at this time. This change occurred with Barawī’s clear break from the earlier method in his acceptance of audience participation in disputation—something omitted by the previous works on *jadal*. Barawī added a sense of

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<sup>258</sup> Miller, p. 145.

<sup>259</sup> Van Ess, “Disputationspraxis,” p. 25.

<sup>260</sup> Miller, p. 167.

“helping one another speculate” (*al-ma‘ūna ‘alā al-naẓar*) to the word *jadal*.<sup>261</sup> This was the breaking point: *jadal* now lost its adversary feature (its winning spirit in a Wittgensteinian or van Essian “boxing match”) which opened the door for more than two participants (namely, questioner and respondent) in a debate.<sup>262</sup> I should point out at this point that modern argumentation theorists are searching for a term to describe a situation in which there are multiple positions, each drawing a different conception of a problem (instead of the two positions in dialectic). It has been suggested that a debate with more than two positions could be called a “polylectic,” a biologic term used for insects that gather food from multiple sources such as honeybees.<sup>263</sup>

However, this did not solve the problem and the polemical aspects of disputations eventually resulted in a differentiation being drawn between *baḥth* and *jadal*. In his *al-Burhān fī Wujūh al-Bayān*, Abū al-Ḥusayn Ishāq b. Ibrāhīm al-Kātib, argues that in *baḥth*, one seeks the *burhān*, the decisive

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<sup>261</sup> Miller, pp. 165-68.

<sup>262</sup> Barawī’s suggestion reminds us Taṣköprüzâde’s new definition of *munāẓara* as *mushāwara* (consultation) which allows more than two participants. See third chapter for an analysis of Taṣköprüzâde.

<sup>263</sup> Professor David Hitchcock, a professor of philosophy at McMaster University and one of the Canadian argumentation theorists, suggested in Argumentation Theory List (ARGTHRY) that “[c]ontrary to what a lot of people believe, the word “dialectic” does not come from the word for “two” and the word for “speaking.” It comes from the word “dia,” meaning “through,” and the root “leg-”, from the verb “to speak.” Thus “dialectic” etymologically is the art (“ic,” as in “arithmetic” or “physics”) of speaking through, i.e. the art of conversing. A conversation needs at least two participants, but can have as many as you like. So a multi-participant conversation, in which participants take more than two positions on an issue, is also a dialogue, and the art of engaging well in such a conversation is also dialectic.” E-mail correspondence on the ARGTHRY mailing list, November 17, 2007.

proof (which is also a term of reference for the Qurʾān) with no ambition to convince an adversary of a premise or proof. In *jadāl*, one argues against an opponent and forces him to concede to the argument presented.<sup>264</sup> Ibn ʿAqīl (d.513/1119)<sup>265</sup> makes a similar differentiation between *nazar* and *jadāl*. He asserts that the practitioner of *baḥṭh* seeks to attain the truth, whereas the practitioner of *jadāl* attempts to force his opponent to shift from one thesis to another by way of argumentation.<sup>266</sup> In works by Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d.687/1289), Samarqandī’s (d.702/1303) teacher, the word *jadāl* no longer applies to dialectic: its role has been usurped by *munāzara*—a word in turn, which no longer has any association with question and answer. Now, the questioner is not posing questions, instead he is bringing forward objections and counter-objections (*muʿarāḍa*).<sup>267</sup>

By the thirteenth century, before Samarqandī, the identification of logic (*mantīq*) with dialectic (*jadāl* or *munāzara* were both used) was commonly used because most authors on juristic dialectic argued that “every jurist, consultant and theologian must know the science of dialectic and that the rules of dialectic form the only science that separates the true from the

<sup>264</sup> Ibn Wahb al-Kātib, *Kitāb al-Burhān fī Wujūh al-Bayān*, p. 179.

<sup>265</sup> Abūʿl-Wafāʾ ʿAlī Ibn ʿAqīl is a prominent Hanbalite scholar. For Ibn ʿAqīl, see GAL, *Suppl.* I, 687. For a comprehensive study on him, see George Makdisi, *Ibn Aqīl: Religion and Culture in Classical Islam* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997).

<sup>266</sup> Ibn ʿAqīl, *al-Wāḍiḥ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, vol 1, p. 61; also cited by Makdisi in *Rise of Colleges*, p. 110.

<sup>267</sup> Miller, p. 183.

false and distinguishes the sound from the unsound.”<sup>268</sup> It was from this final stage, at the end of the thirteenth century, that a new teaching emerged, a general teaching on disputation—the *ādāb al-baḥṭh*. It represented a synthesis of all that had come before it. Logic now became the final arbitrator, as the theory of disputation freed itself from the requirements of theology and jurisprudence and could thus be applied to all sciences, including philosophy and grammar. The next chapter will turn to a fuller discussion of the *ādāb al-baḥṭh* and follow some analyses of these intellectual communities.

## II. ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITIES

The first two centuries of Abbasid rule, between 750 and 950 witnessed what Devin Stewart calls “the Rise of Theory.” During this period, most intellectual disciplines from theology to grammar, poetry to jurisprudence, formalized and conceptualized.<sup>269</sup> This was accomplished through the introduction of Greek (*awāʿil*) sciences into the new religion in the Arabian peninsula.<sup>270</sup> None of these developments took place in

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<sup>268</sup> Miller, p. 174.

<sup>269</sup> Devin J. Stewart, “Muhammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī’s al-Bayān ‘an Uṣūl al-Aḥkām and the genre of Uṣūl al-Fiqh in the Ninth Century Baghdad,” in *Abbāsīd Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of ‘Abbasīd Studies*, ed. James E. Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), p. 321.

<sup>270</sup> *Awāʿil* referred to as Greek exact sciences (math, physics, etc.) in the translation movement of the Umayyad and Abbasid period, came to be used as a dividing line between *‘ulūm al-shar‘iyya* (religious sciences) and *‘ulūm al-awāʿil* (rational sciences).

isolation from each other, nor did they occur on their own terms. Rather, they interacted with each other on various levels.

This interaction between Islamic and Greek sources was facilitated by the Arabic language and it was here that grammarians (*naḥwiyyūn*) came into the picture. Grammarians, the guardians of the language of the Arabs (*kalām al-‘Arab*), found that their importance was enhanced with the new religion: Arabic was no ordinary language, it was the medium of God (*kalām al-Allāh*). Logicians, on the other hand, challenged grammarians by arguing that grammar deals with utterances (*alfāz*), while only logic could examine the significant meaning (*ma‘nā*) of those utterances. The famous debate between al-Sīrāfī against the Greek logician Mattā, in the fourth/tenth century, showed that Arabic was not merely a medium of expression, just as Greek logic was not merely an instrument. The Arabic language, with its grammatical theory (*uṣūl al-naḥw*) became a system of thinking in fields from jurisprudence to Qur’ān exegesis, just as, conversely, a system of thinking (Greek dialectical tradition)—consciously or unconsciously—became *another language* by the tenth century.

Philosophers also supported logicians on the basis of the opinion that language was relevant only as a vehicle for universal truths, which were measured by logic independently of language—a universal standard.

Disputes over language<sup>271</sup> by philosophers, grammarians and theologians provide an important source of material to study the role and function of poetry in the classical period. Poetry was important in the understanding of language. It was even used as a source of evidence in argumentation (known as *istishhād bi'l-shi'r*) to clarify the definition of a word or a concept. Language was important in order to understand the text (the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*), whereas the text was important because everything (law, theology, ethics, even history) revolved around it. In this context, poetry played a vital role in the establishment of Arabic language (*wad' al-lughā*) as we will see in the fourth chapter.

However, the ancient Greek dispute over poetry re-emerged in classical Islamic intellectual history. Poetry and philosophy have long had a difficult relationship. Plato, for example, used the concept of *mimesis* to denigrate poetry on the grounds that it has no direct access to truth. He gave validity only to certain limited types of morally useful poetry. The problem had been partially solved by Aristotle, who defined the relationship between poetry and truth as one of difference.<sup>272</sup> However, he subordinated poetry to philosophy as the discipline that defines its purpose and limits,

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<sup>271</sup> The dispute over the origin and function of language among intellectual communities will be discussed in detail in the fourth chapter.

<sup>272</sup> See Gerald Frank Else, *Plato and Aristotle on Poetry*, ed. Peter Burian (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986).



which meant that poetry still required philosophical legitimacy and that philosophy still enjoyed precedence over poetry.

A similar process took place in Islamic intellectual history: the Qur'ān defined the purpose and boundaries of poets and of poetry. The power of reason and rational thinking, expressed by the words *nazar*, *fikr* and *'aql* in the Qur'ān, pointed to the reality of things (*ḥaqīqa*) and therefore reigned supreme over the “imagination” and “emotions” of poets, which by themselves led to illusion. In the eyes of the Arabic Aristotelian philosophers (Fārābī-Ibn Sīnā-Ibn Rushd), poetry had only a small part to play since it did not contribute to the establishment of truth: its focus was on the imagined (*takhyīl*), which is usually false.<sup>273</sup>

Among this epistemic diversity (whether demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, or poetic), the key question is who is the king of the “virtuous city of epistemology?”<sup>274</sup> The *falāsifa* claimed to be rulers since, they

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<sup>273</sup> Deborah Black, *Logic*, pp. 181-96.

<sup>274</sup> In using “virtuous city” (*madīna al-fāḍila*) here, I refer to Fārābī’s two works: (a) *Kitāb ārā’ Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila* (*On the Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City*) and (b) *Kitāb al-Siyāsa al-Madaniyya* (*The Book of Political Regime*). In his *Siyāsa*, Fārābī discusses a variety of non-virtuous cities such as the ignorant city (*madīna al-jāhiliyya*), the vicious city (*madīna al-fāsiqa*), the city in error (*madīna al-ḍālla*) and the metamorphosed city (I translate the last non-virtuous city *madīna al-mutabaddala* as “metamorphosed state,” thanks to Kafka’s metamorphosed Gregor Samsa). It is interesting to note that Fārābī begins with the “ignorant cities” (*al-madīna al-jāhiliyya*) by using the word *jāhiliyya* for non-virtuous cities; however this is not a lighthearted choice since *jāhiliyya* is a term used in the Qur’ān to designate the pre-Islamic age of ignorance, but it refers also to an unbelieving society that does not accept God and His Messenger Muḥammad. On Fārābī’s virtuous and non-virtuous cities, see Gina Bonelli, “Fārābī’s Virtuous City and the Plotinian World Soul: A New Reading of Fārābī’s Mabādī’ Ārā’ Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila,” (unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Montreal: McGill University, 2009).

insisted, they used demonstration.<sup>275</sup> For them, in this “city,” every *topos* has a different epistemic status according to the way in which it is stated (demonstratively, dialectically, rhetorically or poetically), which results in theologians (or dialecticians) being consigned to the second rank, and poets to the lowest.<sup>276</sup> Theologians saw this effort as futile, since there were indemonstrable principles (*a priori*) in each science; indeed, without those principles, *burhān* had no function. Jurists, grammarians and poets were clearly not preoccupied with these questions to the same intensity as the *mutakallimūn* and *falāsifa*.

The sharp Aristotelian distinction between dialectic and demonstration continued in the Muslim tradition in that philosophers claimed to follow the method of demonstration in their investigation of any subject in order to reach certain knowledge, and accused theologians of using dialectic. This left theologians, in the eyes of philosophers, with no chance of reaching certain knowledge, but instead being confined to opinion (*ẓann*). Philosophers considered the arguments of theologians to have only a relative value, although the theologians themselves attributed their

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<sup>275</sup> Fārābī envisaged a philosopher-king (*raʾīs* or *imām*) as a model of political governance similar to that of Plato, and imagined that the city would ideally be ruled by a philosopher who would not be bound by existing law when establishing new law, see Fārābī, *Kitāb ārāʾ Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*, pp. 42-47.

<sup>276</sup> On the definitions and treatment of *topos* by Arabic philosophers, see Ahmed Hasnawi, “Topic and Analysis: The Arab Tradition,” in *Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?* ed. by R. W. Sharpley (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 28-62.

arguments with absolute certainty and were aware of the importance of what they were doing.

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī (d.1954), for example, a twentieth-century theologian and one of the last Ottoman *ṣeyhülislâm*, argued that people who posed as philosophers and scientists in Egypt were also using dialectic to convince persons like him (who did not comprehend their *a priori* premises) of their arguments. As a theologian, Ṣabrī was deliberately employing the tool (*jadal*) against philosophers and pseudo-scientists who did not “understand” his premises, even to the point of making them decide to use dialectic (*jadal*) “until I make sure that I knock out all of the philosophers and scientists who insist on using apodictic demonstration in this intellectual wrestle.” Like any member of a given scientific field, the theologians were using dialectic to convince people who did not accept the *a priori* foundations of their respective discipline. If philosophers and scientists did not accept his *a priori* (his *différend*) as a theologian, Ṣabrī maintained, they should not be expecting him to accept theirs.<sup>277</sup>

When it comes to the diffusion of dialectic in the classical period of Islamic law (950-1258),<sup>278</sup> it is evident that tension arose between consensus (*ijmāʿ*) and disagreement (*ikhtilāf*). Dialectic became important not only for

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<sup>277</sup> Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Mawqif al-‘Aql wa-al-‘Ilm wa-al-‘Ālam min Rabb al-‘Ālamīn wa-‘Ibādīhi al-Mursafīn*, 4 vols. (Cairo: Dār Ihya’ al-Kutub al-‘Arabī, 1950), vol. 1, pp. 35-47.

<sup>278</sup> This is an arbitrary date, however, I chose this time frame (950-1258) because I start the real diffusion after the controversy that Ibn al-Rāwandī created for subsequent literature. I take Abū Bakr al-Qaffāl al-Shashī’s (d.336/947) first sign of it in jurisprudence.

obtaining legal consensus (*ijmā'*), but also for determining the quality of a legal opinion. Whereas consensus generated a unity of doctrine, the opinion of an individual jurist (*ra'y*) generated disagreement (*khilāf*, or, as a field of study on its own, '*ilm al-khilāf*').<sup>279</sup> The tension between consensus (*ijmā'*) and disagreement (*ikhtilāf*) was represented by the parties of two camps: the fallibilists (*mukhaṭṭi'a*), who held that every *mujtahid* is not correct, and the infallibilists (*muṣawwiba*) who held that every *mujtahid* is correct (*kull mujtahid muṣīb*).<sup>280</sup>

The fallibilists used the existence of dialectic (*jadāl* and *munāẓara*) as the basis of their argument. "If we accept that every *mujtahid* is correct," said the *mukhaṭṭi'a*, "then not only was there no point to disputation or disagreement (*jadāl* or *khilāf*), but there could be no disputation or disagreement. Hence, all the books written on the subject would be meaningless. Moreover, there would be no qualitative analysis of *ijtihād*."<sup>281</sup> This showed not only the existence of competing doctrines and opinions in Islamic law, but also the level and hierarchy of opinions. There was a real contest between which doctrine (*madhhab*) or which answer (*jawāb*) to a question (*mas'ala*) was the strongest or the best. This was one of the reasons why Ottoman judges were required to pass their judgments

<sup>279</sup> Hallaq, *Authority, Change and Continuity*, pp. 57 and 110.

<sup>280</sup> On this tension in Islamic legal theory, see Aron Zysow, "The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1984), pp. 459-483.

<sup>281</sup> Bāḥī, *Iḥkām al-Fuṣūl*, p. 627, Āmidī, *Iḥkām*, vol. 2, p. 418 and Ibn Hummām, *al-Taḥrīr*, vol. 3, p. 394; cited in Zysow as well, see his *Economy of Certainty*, pp. 480-81.

according to “the soundest opinions of the Ḥanafī jurists (*aṣaḥḥ al-aqwā*), never the weak ones.”<sup>282</sup> Any judgment that had been based upon weak opinions in the Ḥanafī school of law was deemed invalid, meaning that the case in question could be reheard.<sup>283</sup>

From this perspective it could be said that the history of *uṣūl al-fiqh* is a history of questions and answers (*masā’il wa ajwiba*). The problem here is then, what kind of questions these were. According to Islamic theologians and jurists, as we have seen, there were two types of questions, restrictive (is cheating punishable?) and non-restrictive (what is cheating?). In accordance with these examples, one could ask whether Islamic law only asks and answers restrictive questions at the expense of non-restrictive questions. If there is one definition of cheating (in answer to the restrictive question), there should not be any different (*khilāf*) answer to the non-restrictive question, i.e., any different definition of cheating. But who is responsible or liable for defining what cheating is? Who is the definer in practical terms? The Lawgiver (the giver of *a priori*), or the lawmakers? This is a question that must await further research.

The common thread running through all versions of the story of dialectic in Islamic intellectual history is that dialectic was used in all disciplines in order to not allow someone to make a mistake. Of course, this

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<sup>282</sup> Ebussuud Efendi, “Ma’rûzât,” in *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, ed. Ahmet Akgündüz, 4 vols. (Istanbul: Fey Vakfı, 1992), vol. 4, p. 39.

<sup>283</sup> Ebussuud Efendi, “Ma’rûzât,” vol. 4, p. 50.

was not based on any altruistic ambition. It was based on the desire to win at argumentation and to reveal the mistakes of one's adversary in order to prevail (either intellectually or ethically). This is evident in the presence of the expression “*akhṭa'ta* (you are mistaken!)” in disputations.<sup>284</sup> It was used by one of the disputants whenever he perceived an error in the reasoning of his adversary. Every disputant, irrespective of his field, pointed out mistakes for the sake of winning because nobody was happy to lose. Grammarians, in public *munāẓaras*, used *laḥanta* (you have made a linguistic mistake)<sup>285</sup> and theologians used *kafarta* (you have committed blasphemy).<sup>286</sup> Whether *akhṭa'ta* or *laḥanta* or *kafarta*, the rationale was the same: “I am right,” and anyone who did not accept his mistake or defeat (*maghlūb*) was labeled “*mu'ānid* (pig-headed).”<sup>287</sup>

The clear separation between the fields of study (theology, law, grammar, philosophy and poetry) and their respective methodologies determined the way that evidence (*dalīl*) was used to prove, for example, that A is B. When it came to what the evidence signified (*dalālāt* or things signified), grammarians claimed to be the authority since “things signified” were the business of language. Again, in turn, grammarians had to use the

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<sup>284</sup> Zajjājī, *Majālis al-'Ulamā'*, p. 9, Ibn al-Anbārī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Udabā'*, p. 63, al-Tawḥīdī, *al-Imtā' wa'l-Mu'ānasa*, v. 1, pp. 112-14 and al-Bayhāqī, *Manāqib al-Shāfi'i*, vol. 1, pp. 459-60; cited in McKinney, *The Case of Rhyme*, p. 326.

<sup>285</sup> Zajjājī, *Majālis al-'Ulamā'*, p. 9; cited in McKinney, *The Case of Rhyme*, p. 326.

<sup>286</sup> Zajjājī, *Majālis al-'Ulamā'*, p. 10 and al-Bayhāqī, *Manāqib al-Shāfi'i*, vol. 1, pp. 459-60.

<sup>287</sup> Ibn Ḥazm, *Tafsīru Alfāzin tajrī bayna'l-Mutakallimīn*, p. 416 and idem, *Taqrīb li-Ḥaddi al-Mantiq*, p. 328; cited in McKinney, *The Case of Rhyme*, p. 326.

“language of demonstration” in order to show why A signified B, but not C. Theologians set out to show there was a Maker, just as jurists had to find a justification (*ta‘īl*) for why God wanted us to do a certain thing and not another. Perhaps the most important defining moment in Islamic intellectual history, the above mentioned intellectual communities’ competition over, what Gerhard Endress calls, “the language of demonstration,” brought the party of the rational sciences into conflict with the parties of religious tradition and legal exegesis.<sup>288</sup> The reason for the struggle over this “common denominator,” namely, the “language of demonstration,” was that language was used to convey universal concepts and thus whoever held that weapon (the language of demonstration=certainty) would be accepted by their whole audience.

In the next chapter, I will demonstrate how Samarqandī responded to those different claims to knowledge in order to transfer their data from their *local* systems to a *central* system, *ādāb al-baḥth*—a system, which he claims to have created in order to test “their truth (*izhāran li’ṣ-ṣawāb*).”

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<sup>288</sup> Gerhard Endress, “The Language of Demonstration: Translating Science and the Formation of Terminology in Arabic Philosophy of Science,” in *Early Science and Medicine. A Journal for the Study of Science, Technology and Medicine in the Pre-Modern Period* 7 (2002): 231-54, p. 244.

### *Chapter 3*

## FROM LOCAL THEORIES TO A GENERAL THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION: THE *ĀDĀB AL-BAḤṬH*

### I. SAMARQANDĪ: TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY

After more than two centuries of the diffusion of argumentative discourse into theology, philosophy, law, grammar and poetry in the classical period (tenth through twelfth centuries), Samarqandī claimed to have discovered the science of “*ādāb al-baḥṭh*.” His claim is well substantiated, as most authors of tracts on *ādāb al-baḥṭh* in the post-classical period also mention his name and credit him as their predecessor in this field. Although the sources of information on Samarqandī’s life are hardly rich, they still provide the basic details. His full name is Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ashraf al-Ḥusaynī al-Samarqandī.<sup>289</sup> We do not know when he was born, but we can ascertain that at some point around 1268 he came to stay in Mardin (which was under the rule of the Artuklu dynasty at that time) where he gave courses to students and wrote *Miftāḥ al-Nazar*, his commentary on *Muqaddimat al-Burhāniyya fī ‘Ilm al-Jadal*,<sup>290</sup> which was

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<sup>289</sup> *GAL*, I, p. 615; *Suppl.*, I, pp. 849-50 and *Keşf*, vol. 1, pp. 39, 105.

<sup>290</sup> Samarqandī, *Şahā’if al-Ilāhiyya*, MS. 1688, fol.1a, Şehit Ali Paşa, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi.



itself written by his teacher, Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d.687/1288).<sup>291</sup> Even though there is controversy<sup>292</sup> surrounding the date of Samarqandī's death, based on two pieces of evidence,<sup>293</sup> we can safely assume that he died in the year 702/1302. He wrote mostly on logic, juristic dialectic and argumentation theory, theology and philosophy but he was also an expert in astronomy.

However, for this thesis, the most important of his writings is the short treatise (of no more than 3000 words) entitled *Risāla fī Samarqandiyya fī Ādāb al-Baḥth* (henceforth *Risāla*)—its only competitor in the field was the treatise of Āḩud al-Dīn al-Ijī known as *Ādāb al-‘Aḩud*. The *Risāla* is the most famous version of Samarqandī's rules of disputation and the most popular treatise in the post-classical period. He divides the work into three parts:

- (a) The definition of the elementary terms of the discipline, such as disputation (*munāẓara*), proof (*dalīl*), hint (*amāra*), *petitio principii* (*dawarān*), objection (*man*'), counter-

<sup>291</sup> His full name is Burhān al-Dīn Muḩammad ibn Muḩammad al-Nasafī. See *GAL*, I, 615, *Suppl.*, I, 849.

<sup>292</sup> Katip Çelebi gives the date as 600/1203 (*Kçf*, I, p. 39), but both BaĒdatlı İsmail Paşa and Brockelmann think that this is inaccurate, and therefore, gives the date as 690/1291 should be correct. See *Hediyetü'l-Arifin*, vol. 2, 106; *GAL*, I, p. 615 and *Suppl.*, I, pp. 849-850.

<sup>293</sup> See the note of the copyist in Samarqandī's *al-Şahā'if*, MS 2432, fol. 33b, Laleli section, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi. Furthermore, Samarqandī's scribe (*mustansiḩ*), *al-Ma'ārif* Muḩammad b. Maḩmūd b. ‘Umar al-Ghāzī gives the exact date of Samarqandī's death as 22 Shawwāl 702/1302: for this and further information, see Samarqandī, *Ma'ārif*, MS 2432/5, fol. 141a, Laleli, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi. Also see Samarqandī's own note “after 700” as the date of commentary which shows that he lived at least until the year of 700: Samarqandī, *al-Şahā'if*, Şehit Ali Paşa, MS 1688, fol.1a, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi. For *Şahā'if*, see *GAL*, I, 468; *Suppl.*, I, 850.

evidence (*mu'arāḍa*), backing (*mustanad*) and contradiction (*naqḍ*).<sup>294</sup>

(b) The order of disputation (*tartīb al-baḥth*), i.e., how to lead argumentation, to establish and refute a thesis, and the roles of the questioner and the respondent.<sup>295</sup>

(c) The application of this procedure to several case problems (*masā'il*), such as theology (*kalām*), philosophy (*ḥikma*) and juristic differences (*khilāf*).<sup>296</sup>

After defining the essential terms of disputation and explaining the order of debate, Samarqandī elaborates on how his rules of disputation work by providing “core samples” from various fields:

(1) Theology: the necessary existent (*wājib al-wujūd*) is one.<sup>297</sup>

(2) Philosophy: the necessary existent (*wājib al-wujūd*) does not exercise free will (*fā'il bi'l-ikhtiyār*), and must be necessary in itself (*mūjib bi'l-dhāt*).<sup>298</sup>

(3) Jurisprudence: al-Shāfi'ī, may God have mercy on him, says, “the father possesses the power to force (*ijbār*) his virgin daughter of legal age (*bakr al-bāligha*) to marry,” contrary to (*khilāfan*) what Abū Ḥanīfa says.<sup>299</sup>

What is most remarkable here is that a method similar to that which one may find in juristic *ṭarīqa* and *khilāf* literature is now employed in

<sup>294</sup> Samarqandī, *Risāla*, fol. 189b, MS. 4437 Ayasofya, Süleymaniye Library. Henceforth Samarqandī, *Risāla*.

<sup>295</sup> Samarqandī, *Risāla*, fol. 190a.

<sup>296</sup> Samarqandī, *Risāla*, fol. 193a.

<sup>297</sup> Samarqandī, *Risāla*, fol. 193a.

<sup>298</sup> Samarqandī, *Risāla*, fol. 193b.

<sup>299</sup> Samarqandī, *Risāla*, fol. 194a.

philosophy and theology. This method consists of, first, laying down the thesis along with its proof, and then citing objections and responses.<sup>300</sup> Samarqandī, in his *Risāla* (and his *Qusṭās al-Afkār*), aims to lift techniques and terms from their theological and juristic contexts and make them the components of his general theory. Samarqandī's choice of samples from certain fields (theology, philosophy and jurisprudence)<sup>301</sup> is not random; rather, each was selected with a particular purpose in mind, as he considered his treatise to be a general theory of argumentation. He presents a justification for his innovation, i.e., *ādāb al-baḥṭh*, in the following manner in his *Qusṭās al-Afkār* (Scales of Thoughts):<sup>302</sup>

It has been the custom of our predecessors to place a chapter on dialectic (*jadal*) in their books on logic. But since the science of juristic dialectics (*khilāf*) of our times does not need it, I have brought in its stead a canon (*qānūn*) for the art of disputation (*ādāb al-*

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<sup>300</sup> On *ṭarīqa* and *khilāf* methods, see George Makdisi, “The Scholastic Method,” pp. 640-661; idem, *Ibn ‘Aqil: Religion and Culture in Classical Islam*, pp. 69-72.

<sup>301</sup> Samarqandī's choice of examples from these three fields corresponds with Ibn Ṭufayl's choice of characters in his *Ḥayy b. Yaqzān* (theologian Absāl, *philosophus autodidactus* Ḥayy and the Mālikī jurist Salāmān) as discussed in the opening chapter of this thesis. This relation demonstrates the dominance of three fundamental fields and their players in post-classical Islamic intellectual history.

<sup>302</sup> *Qusṭās al-Afkār* (known also as *Qisṭās al-Mizān*, and the earliest copy of which dates from 690/1291, eleven years before his death) is Samarqandī's comprehensive work on logic, formulated in the footsteps of his predecessors Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā and intended for advanced students. It divides logic into two basic chapters (*maqāla*), namely *taṣawwūrāt* (conceptions) and *taṣdīqāt* (assertions), and Samarqandī puts the (twelfth) section on *al-baḥṭh wa'l-munāzara* at the end of the *taṣdīqāt* chapter, pointing out that earlier philosophers included a section on *jadal* at the end of their works on logic. This chapter is original in the sense that there had not been a treatment of argumentation as a theory in a logic book before. However, even Samarqandī's originality was exceeded by Saçaklızâde's in the eighteenth century. I will discuss this further at the end of this chapter where I will treat the whole argumentation theory as *taṣawwūrāt* and *taṣdīqāt*. For *Qusṭās*, see *GAL*, I, p. 616.

*baḥth*) and its order, the proper formulation of speech (in disputation) and its rectification.

This art goes towards establishing a thesis and explaining it, just as in logic, with respect to deliberation and thought; for, through it we are kept on the desired path and are saved from the recalcitrance of speech.

Although it has been observed by the experts, no one has yet gathered its scattered parts. This is, indeed, what I intend to do in what follows.<sup>303</sup>

In fact, Samarqandī's originality does not lie in discovering something novel but, as he himself points out, comes from putting all these rules of disputation into a single treatment and formulating them as a whole. The fourteenth-century observer, Ibn Khaldūn (d.808/1406), points out the trajectories of dialectic and argumentation theory in the following from his *Muqaddima*, finished in 779/1377:

Dialectic involves knowledge of the proper behavior in disputations among the adherents of the legal schools and others... which help either to safeguard an opinion or to demolish it, whether that opinion concerns jurisprudence or any other subject. There are two methods. There is the method of [Abū al-Yusr Muhammad] al-Pazdawī [d.493/1100] which is limited to the evidence of religious law from texts, general consensus, and argumentation. And there is the method of [Rukn al-Dīn] al-'Amīdī [d.615/1218] which applies quite generally to every argument used in argumentation, no matter which scholarly discipline it belongs [to].

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<sup>303</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās al-Afkār*, fol. 59a, MS. 3399, Topkapı Palace, Sultan III. Ahmed Library. Henceforth Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*.

The ‘Amīdī just mentioned was [the] first to write on his method. Therefore, its invention was ascribed to him. He wrote a brief book, entitled *al-Irshād*. Later on, he was followed by such recent scholars as al-Nasafī and others who walked in his steps and followed the way he had shown. Many works were written on the method.<sup>304</sup>

As a predecessor to Ibn Khaldūn, Samarqandī emphasizes the same point at the beginning of his *Risāla*, and tells the reader the objective of writing his treatise:

This is a treatise on the rules of investigation (*ādāb al-baḥṭh*) which is required for every literate person [to prevent] him from fallacies in his argumentation (*fi’l-baḥṭh*) and makes easier the path of understanding [the other] (*fahm*) and of explaining oneself [to the other] (*tafhīm*). Although such was already in circulation among verificationists (*muḥaqqiqīn*), it was not yet strung along a thread, nor was put it together in a single treatment. I, therefore, wanted to put its scattered bits into order and gather what has been transmitted of it up until now.<sup>305</sup>

From this time on, the expression *ādāb al-baḥṭh* came to be used synonymously with the expression *‘ilm al-munāẓara* to denote the new science. The choice of the two names, *baḥṭh* and *munāẓara*, over *jadāl* is not accidental. The terms *baḥṭh* and *munāẓara* are found exclusively throughout the post-classical period in the titles of most tracts on argumentation theory.

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<sup>304</sup> Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah*, pp. 31-32.

<sup>305</sup> Samarqandī, *Risāla*, fol. 189b.

*Baḥṭh*, literally meaning “digging,”<sup>306</sup> has an early link with the Aristotelian dialectic since the word “*baḥṭh*”<sup>307</sup> appears on the margins of the Paris manuscript of the *Organon* with the word “*nazar*” as an alternative name for the dialectic.<sup>308</sup> The word *ādāb*, literally etiquettes, is a plural form of *adab*—a word with a long and puzzling history. *Adab* implies courtesy, refinement, culture or enlightenment within the context of the *adab* tradition in Arabic literary history.

There is a conscious and determined effort amongst post-classical argumentation theorists not to use the word *jadal* (dialectic) for this new science. From the tenth century onwards, there was an emphasis on “good” (*maḥmūd*) and “bad” (*madhmūm*) dialectics<sup>309</sup> but in the post-classical period beginning with Samarqandī, the discussion no longer questions whether dialectic (*jadal*) is good or bad; indeed, the issue is concluded. *Jadal*, understood as “the spirit of winning,” was therefore perceived to be negative as opposed to ‘the spirit of finding the truth,’ which was considered to be more positive.

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<sup>306</sup> Edward William Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon*, 8 vols. (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1968), vol. 1, p. 155. Henceforth Lane, *Lexicon*.

<sup>307</sup> The word “*baḥṭh* (investigation)” was also used in the title of one of al-Ash‘arī’s works: *al-Ḥaṭṭh ‘alā al-Baḥṭh* (The Encouragement to Investigation), the purpose of which was to encourage the study of *kalām*, or dialectical theology. On Ash‘arī’s *al-Ḥaṭṭh*, see R. M. Frank, trans. and ed. “al-Ash‘arī’s Kitāb al-Ḥaṭṭh ‘alā al-Baḥṭh,” *Mélanges de l’Institut Dominicain d’Etudes Orientales du Caire* 18 (1988): 83-152.

<sup>308</sup> These marginal comments were published by A. Badawī. See his *Manṭiq Aristū*, 3 vols (Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, 1980), vol. 2, p. 492, note 7 (for notes, pages 467-733). The original *Organon* is in Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, Manuscrit arabe (No: 2346).

<sup>309</sup> al-Kātib, *al-Burhān fī Wujūh al-Bayān*, pp. 222-25.

The reason why dialectic was deemed to be bad can be attributed simply to the dialectician's (*mujāḍil*) objective: not to find the truth, but rather to win. Samarqandī defines *munāẓara* as “a discussion between two sides in order to reveal the truth.” “If it is not done to reveal,” Samarqandī says, “it is dialectic (*mujāḍala*).”<sup>310</sup> Samarqandī's statement “it is dialectic” also exposes the limits of *munāẓara* for him, i.e., that something is no longer *munāẓara* if it is not done to reveal the truth. This demonstrates the clear shift that Samarqandī makes in the post-classical period: *jadāl* is not *munāẓara* and vice versa. In the classical period, however, the perception was different. For example, Ghazālī's teacher, al-Juwaynī, did not see any difference between disputation (*munāẓara*) and dialectics (*jadāl*), saying that “both are legitimate methods of finding the truth.”<sup>311</sup> In any case, the lines were not as forceful or clear in the classical period as Samarqandī's writings demonstrate.

What, then, is Samarqandī's theory of finding the truth as opposed to *jadāl*, “the theory of winning?” In the following pages, I will provide an outline of his general theory (which is applicable to all fields of investigation). However, before delving into his theory, Samarqandī first explains that there are various different fields of inquiry (different scientific fields in the modern sense), and he specifies what those fields are, and what

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<sup>310</sup> Samarqandī, *Sharḥ al-Muqaddimat al-Burhāniyya*, fols. 40b-41b. MS.1203 Reisülküttab. Süleymaniye Library.

<sup>311</sup> Juwaynī, *Kāfiya fī al-Jadal*, p. 3.

sort of evidence they require. He claims that every field of knowledge is either concerned with (a) expressions (*alfāz*), (b) their references (*ma‘ānī*) or (c) both for the purpose of investigation:

To the first category [*alfāz*] belong lexicography (*lughā*), prosody (*‘arūd*), grammar, and so forth; to the second [*ma‘ānī*] belong metaphysics, physics, mathematics, medicine, ethics, and generally speaking, whatever has no connection whatsoever with words; to the third [both expressions and their references] belong Qur’ān exegesis (*tafsīr*), the science of *ḥadīth*, the *uṣūl al-fiqh*, *fiqh*, and so forth.<sup>312</sup>

Samarqandī further explains that all the sciences have their own technical terminology (*iṣṭilāḥāt*) and axioms (*musallamāt*), but since they have different objectives, they use evidence with different degrees of precision. These circumstances make the application of principles or proofs from one science to another difficult. The objective of this new science (*ādāb al-baḥṭh*) is to establish a thesis (*taqrīr*) and explain it (*tahṛīr*)<sup>313</sup>— what we may properly call the “theory of proof” regardless of its field. Samarqandī considers that his theory can be applied to all fields.<sup>314</sup>

He also discusses in detail the definitions of the techniques and rules of disputation in his *Qusṭās al-Afkār*, his *al-Mu‘taqadāt* and his *al-Anwār*.

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<sup>312</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol.59a.

<sup>313</sup> *Qusṭās*, fol. 59a-b. The two words, *taqrīr* and *tahṛīr* are noteworthy because they appear both in Nasafī’s text and as the titles of Saçaklızâde’s works *Taqrīr al-Qawānīn* and *Tahṛīr*. The former establishes the laws for Saçaklızâde’s argumentation theory while *Tahṛīr* explains what is not clear in his *Taqrīr*.

<sup>314</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol.59a; idem, *Risāla*, fol. 89b.



In particular, the twelfth section of his *Qusṭās* is devoted to disputation (*al-baḥṭh wa'l-munāzara*). I will therefore now present an outline of his theory from two of his works, *Qusṭās* and *Risāla*.

I have to mention at the outset that there are two parties in argumentation, namely, the questioner who asks questions and the answerer who has a thesis or a claim. Samarqandī uses *sā'il* as the technical term for the questioner and *mu'allil* for the answerer. We translate *mu'allil* as proponent (of a thesis) instead of as answerer; he simply lays down his thesis before responding to the questions posed by the questioner. Accordingly, I will use the abbreviations Q (questioner) and P (proponent, i.e., answerer or respondent) throughout my thesis to denote the two participants of a debate. I will also use two words (proof and evidence) interchangeably referring to the term *daḥīl*.

## II. THE OUTLINE OF THE THEORY

### 1. MOVING STAGES IN ARGUMENTATION

#### STAGE 1: Laying Down the Argument

The proponent (*mu'allil*, henceforth “P”) begins the disputation by laying down his thesis. Before he establishes the proof (*daḥīl*) for his thesis (*idda'ā*), P explains the objects of his investigation (*tahrīr al-mabāḥith*) and

establishes the arguments so that the point of dispute (*ṣūrat al-nizāʿ*) becomes completely clear.<sup>315</sup> An objection (*manʿ*) cannot be levelled at him while he is laying things out unless he starts establishing the evidence for his thesis.

Questioner (*sāʿil*, henceforth “Q”), may ask P to explain the expressions he uses so that both Q and P understand the same meaning from the same expression.<sup>316</sup> At this stage, Q may also demand a verification of P’s attribution (*taṣḥīḥ al-naql*) of the opinions and beliefs. This is simply because defects often occur in debate if P pretends to be arguing with someone other than his actual opponent and uses premises granted by this other person as if they were granted by his actual opponent.<sup>317</sup>

At no stage are definitions subject to proof, therefore, *manʿ* (objection) cannot be used against a definition.<sup>318</sup> However, if P claims to give a complete definition (*ḥadd tāmm*) and to base it on the proximate genus and proximate specific difference, then Q can use *manʿ* so that P has to clarify that the genus and specific difference are both proximate.

If P argues that his definition derives from certain people’s conventions, then Q can use *manʿ* so that P is pressed to verify the source of his claim (*taṣḥīḥ al-naql*).

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<sup>315</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol. 59b; Miller, p. 210.

<sup>316</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol. 61a; Miller, p. 222.

<sup>317</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol. 59b; Miller, p. 210.

<sup>318</sup> This is because *manʿ* does not only mean “objection” in the technical terminology of *ādāb al-baḥṭh*. It also means “asking for evidence (*dalīl*) to support a statement” and thus definitions are not subject to proof. See Miller, p. 208.

STAGE 2: Establishing Proofs (*adilla*) for the Argument

P begins to establish a proof (*dalīl*) for his thesis or argument (*idda‘ā*). Every proof requires at least two premises (*muqaddima*),<sup>319</sup> and thus P establishes minor and major premises in order to reach the conclusion which is his thesis. At this stage, Q may start raising objections. If he does not object then everything is clear. If Q does object, then he must do so either before P completes his evidence (as P is only completing one of the premises of his evidence), or after P completes his evidence (*dalīl*) totally.

This means that Q may object before P finishes bringing his proof or afterwards. If the former (before P is finished), then Q may merely object (*mujarrad al-man‘*) or not. “He may do so or not” in Samarqandī’s language implies that if Q does not use this option, he will have another one in the next step. This is clear from a close reading of the text because after every instance of the phrase, “do so or not” we encounter another option for Q.

Now, if Q does not raise mere objection, as mentioned above, he has another option: he may raise an objection with backing (*mustanad*) or without it.<sup>320</sup> Mere objection (*mujarrad al-man‘*) without backing may be made with the phrase “we do not accept that.”

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<sup>319</sup> The Arabic text in the *Qusṭās* reads: “*wa kullu dalīlin adnāhu an yakūna murakkaban min muqaddimatayn.*” *Qusṭās*, fol. 59b.

<sup>320</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol. 59b; Miller, p. 211.

If an objection is made with backing, the objection is strengthened.

Q may object with backing in the following three manners:

- (a) We do not accept that it is so; why could it not be otherwise?
- (b) We do not accept that this is implicated; this implication would hold were that the case.
- (c) We do not accept that this is so; how could it be, when the situation is of this sort?<sup>321</sup>

At this point of debate, there is a third possible form of objection which is something other than (1) mere objection or (2) objection with backing: this third form is usurpation (*ghaṣb*). Usurpation occurs when Q starts arguing for a thesis; this, as we know, is P's role. Q's usurpation of P's position is disallowed by the experts since as long as P is presenting his argument, all Q can do is agree or object with backing. But if he objects using proof (*dalīl*) or otherwise, to disprove a specific premise, then this leads to random and chaotic behaviour in disputation (*khabt fī'l-baḥth*), the discussion may be drawn out, and the objective (*maṭlūb*) will not be realized.<sup>322</sup>

In order to refute Q's objection with backing, P can make an exhaustive division between Q's backing and its alternatives, and use a process of elimination to exclude Q's backing. However, sometimes, refuting the backing of Q's objection does not necessarily mean "the

<sup>321</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol. 60a; Miller, p. 213.

<sup>322</sup> Samarqandī, *Sharḥ al-Qusṭās*, fol. 166a; *Risāla*, fol. 191a,b; Miller, p. 213.

removal of objection itself.”<sup>323</sup> Equally, P may make Q’s backing the alternative of an exclusive disjunction, and, therefore, show that this leads to absurd consequences. This method is called *taqrīb*.<sup>324</sup>

### STAGE 3: Completion of Proof and Beyond

P completes bringing his proof. If Q objects after P finishes bringing his proof, he may either grant P’s proof or not. But if he accepts only the proof (*dalīl*), then he must reject that it proves P’s point (*madlūl*) basing himself on some other pieces of evidence or not.<sup>325</sup>

In the first case, i.e., when P’s proof (*dalīl*) does not necessarily show the object of evidence, i.e., the *demonstrandum* (*madlūl*), Q may object to the proof on the grounds that the logical qualification or judgment (*ḥukm*) is absent from the proof. This is called general refutation (*naqd al-ijmālī*) since it refutes the premises of P’s proof in a general manner.

If Q does not object to any of P’s premises, then he accepts them by default. However, Q has another option at this stage. He can respond to P by bringing counter-evidence (*mu‘ārāḍa*). There are three types of counter-evidence: (a) reversal (*qalb*), which occurs when Q uses P’s evidence to draw a different conclusion, (b) counter-proof through the similar (*mu‘ārāḍa bi’l-*

<sup>323</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol.60b; Miller, pp. 217-18.

<sup>324</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol.61a; Miller, p. 218.

<sup>325</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol. 59b; Miller, p. 211.

*mithl*), if the evidence that Q uses is only similar to P's and (c) counter-proof by means of something different (*bi'l-ghayr*).

When Q uses *mu'āraḍa*, a role reversal takes place: P transforms into Q. The reversal is risky and introduces elements of chance and subterfuge not dissimilar to a game of poker. However, some post-classical theorists say that *mu'āraḍa* (counter-argument) is the most effective way of destroying P's thesis. If *mu'āraḍa* is used, the participants progress on to the next stage.

#### STAGE 4: Role Reversal

Since Q brought a counter-argument against P's thesis, P is now in the role of Q, and thus, is asking questions to his new P. The roles have changed: P is Q and vice versa. Therefore, Q (ex-P) has to raise questions by using the three techniques of objection (*man'*, *naqd/munāqada* or *mu'āraḍa*) to prevent his opponent from establishing his counter-proof if he wants to regain and maintain his former P role.<sup>326</sup>

At this stage, all the rules that applied to the original Q and P apply in the same way. The rules stay the same, but the roles change.

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<sup>326</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol.60a; idem, *Sharḥ al-Qusṭās*, fol. 166a, *Risāla*, fol. 191b; Miller, p. 215.

### STAGE 5: The End of Debate

The debate continues until P is silenced (*ifhām*) or Q is forced to accept P's argument (*ilzām*).<sup>327</sup> If P and Q each employ the techniques at hand (Q making advances with his objections and P countering them with further evidence to defend his thesis), there has to be a point during the course of the debate where P is no longer able to answer Q's objections or Q must accept defeat and thus accept P's thesis whether it is true or false. If Q denies P's win and his thesis, P would be forced to bring an infinite number of proofs. This possibility is not accepted on the grounds that it would lead to the absurdity of an infinite chain of reasoning.<sup>328</sup> The debate is concluded either with Q's acceptance of P's argument or with P's inability to continue further.

The end, at some point, is a certainty and this point is the foundation of the new science. Miller suggests that it is only this concept "(disputation must be finite)" that establishes Samarqandī as a pioneer of *ādāb al-baḥth*, because all classical period writings on dialectic focused on the signs of defeat in disputation, not on a firmer logical foundation with regard to why a debate *should* be finite.<sup>329</sup> Miller explains that Samarqandī believes that a debate should be finite because "Samarqandī understands the relation of the

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<sup>327</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol.59b; Miller, p. 211.

<sup>328</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol.60a; Miller, p. 219.

<sup>329</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol.61a; Miller, pp. 219-220.

proof (*daḥīl*) to the proven (*madlūl*) as that of the cause (*'illa*) to its effect (*ma'lūl*).”<sup>330</sup> To be more precise, as some cause has an effect and its effect has an effect and so on, *ad infinitum* (*tasalsul*), so, in the same way, the proof (*daḥīl*) leads to the proven (*madlūl*) and the proven (*madlūl*) proves something else *ad infinitum*.

## 2. ROLES OF P AND Q

### A. Questioner (Q)

In Samarqandī’s theory of argumentation, Q’s role is that of an attacker of the thesis maintained by the respondent. However, Q is also required to give grounds for his objections. If he does not provide any reasons for objecting to P’s proof, he is guilty of self-importance, of being pretentious (*mukābara*) and of demonstrating eristic behaviour (*'inād*), and his objection does not merit a reply. In another case, Q reduces P to silence by showing the contradictions involved in his thesis. Alternatively, when the role reversal takes place, the triumph lies in Q’s counter-evidence (his thesis as a new respondent) contradicting the thesis defended by the respondent.

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<sup>330</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol.61a; Miller, p. 219.



Essentially, Q has four types of objections at his disposal which Samarqandī defines in the first part of his *Risāla*:

(1) *Man‘* literally means objection; however, in Samarqandī’s technical language, *man‘* also means “asking for evidence.” There are two types of objection, (a) *Man‘ al-mujarrad* (mere objection) and (b) *Man‘ ma‘a al-sanad* (objection with backing). When Q objects to P it does not exclusively denote his opposition, he is also asking P to clarify a point or verify his sources, especially when clarifying incomplete definitions and verifying attributions or quotations (*taṣḥīḥ al-naql*).

(2) *Naqd* is the method of inconsistency and self-contradiction. This can be employed by demonstrating the absence of the logical quality or judgment (*ḥukm*) in P’s evidence. Q acknowledges P’s evidence (*dalīl*) and objects to what is proven (*madlūl* or *demonstrandum*) by negating the strength of *madlūl* simply because P’s evidence (*dalīl*) does not show the object of evidence (*madlūl*). There is a contradiction between *dalīl* and *madlūl* and thus, Q may contradict P and his proof.

(3) *Munāqada* is the objection (*man‘*) to a premise of the evidence. Using this, Q tries to disallow one of the premises (*muqaddama*) of P’s evidence. Since there are two premises for the evidence, it is enough to focus specifically on one of them.

(4) *Mu‘āraḍa* is establishing a proof (*dalīl*) that is contrary to the one that P establishes: a counter-evidence. It is equivalent to saying, “what you

just have mentioned may in fact indicate the strength of the proven (*madlūl*), but we still have something which negates it.” That something indicates another proof (*dalīl*).<sup>331</sup> There are three types of counter-evidence as mentioned above (stage 3).

### B. Proponent (or Answerer “P”)

According to Samarqandī, the respondent has to respond to every objection that Q brings, either by bringing further evidence (*dalīl*) to support the disputed premise or by alerting Q to something that he has forgotten or overlooked.<sup>332</sup> The only exception is the issue of definition since definitions are not subject to proof (as mentioned earlier), thus Q may only ask for clarification or specification of a definition.

The following table offers a graphic representation of Samarqandī’s order of debate and of the roles assigned to P and Q. This table will also clarify the differences and changes in the theory of argumentation in the post-Samarqandī and post-classical Islamic intellectual periods that I will discuss in the following pages.

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<sup>331</sup> Samarqandi, *Risāla*, fol. 90a.

<sup>332</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol.59b and 60a, Miller, p. 211.

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>PROPONENT (ANSWERER)</b> - P - (<i>mu'allil</i>)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>STAGES</u> Exchanges between P&amp;Q</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>QUESTIONER</b> - Q - (<i>sā'il</i>)</p>
<p>P sets down his thesis (<i>idda'ā</i>) and argument (<i>qawl</i>)</p>	<p><u>1st Stage</u>  Laying Out the Thesis or the Argument</p>	<p>No objection (<i>man'</i>) is allowed</p>
<p>P starts establishing proof (<i>dalīl</i>) for his thesis  P lays out two premises (<i>muqaddama</i>) for his proof</p>	<p><u>2nd Stage</u>  Establishing Proofs for the Thesis  and  Establishing Premises for the Proof</p>	<p>1. No objection is made by Q or</p> <p>2. If he wishes to, Q can raise an objection (<i>man'</i>) before P completes his proof: this is called <i>man' al-mujarrad</i> (mere objection) or</p> <p>3. Q can raise an objection with backing before P completes his proof: this is called <i>man' ma'a al-sanad</i>.</p> <p>Usurpation (<i>ghaṣb</i>) occurs when Q starts arguing for a thesis before P completes establishing his proofs, but this is P's role. Q usurps P's position and this is not allowed.</p>

<p>P completes his proof (<i>dalīl</i>) for his thesis</p>	<p><u>3rd Stage</u></p> <p>Completion of Proofs</p>	<p>1. Q may object to the proof on the grounds that the qualification (<i>ḥukm</i>) is absent: this is called general refutation (<i>naqd al-ijmālī</i>) since it refutes the premises of P's proof in a general manner</p> <p>or</p> <p>2. If Q does not object to any of P's premises, he can respond to P by bringing counter-evidence (<i>mu'āraḍa</i>).</p> <p>There are three types of counter-evidence: (a) reversal (<i>qalb</i>) where Q uses P's evidence to draw a different conclusion, (b) counter-proof through the similar (<i>mu'āraḍa bi'l-mithl</i>), if the evidence that Q uses is only similar to P's and (c) counter-proof by means of something different (<i>bi'l-ghayr</i>).</p>
<p>P and Q switch roles at this stage: Role Reversal</p> <p>P can use the techniques of <i>man'</i>, <i>munāqaḍa</i> and <i>mu'āraḍa</i></p> <p>Defends by bringing further proofs.</p>	<p><u>4th Stage</u></p> <p>Role Reversal</p>	<p><i>Mu'āraḍa</i> (counter-argument) begins and therefore, Q becomes P, and vice versa.</p> <p>Q may raise objections by generating the <i>naqd al-ijmālī</i>, <i>munāqaḍa</i> and</p>

<p>Or</p> <p>Defends by alerting Q to something he has forgotten or overlooked. This technique is called <i>tanbīh</i>.</p>		<p><i>mu‘āraḍa</i> as many times as possible against P’s proofs.</p>
<p><i>Iḥām</i>: P is silenced.</p> <p>Infinite chain of reasoning (<i>tasalsul</i>) is not accepted.</p>	<p><u>5th Stage</u></p> <p>The End</p>	<p><i>Ilzām</i>: Q is forced to accept P’s argument</p>

### III. POST-SAMARQANDĪ

Following Samarqandī’s leadership, a great number of scholars wrote treatises on *ādāb al-baḥth*; however, for Miller, “none of these writings<sup>333</sup> went much beyond the rules that Samarqandī gave in the *Risāla* and *Qusṭās*.”<sup>334</sup> Indeed, as the founder of this new science, Samarqandī was followed by a considerable number of Ottoman scholars: Hüseyin Şâh Çelebî Amâsî (d.917/1512), Kemâlpaşazâde (d.949/1543), Fahreddin el-Hüseynî (d.967/1560), Birgivi Mehmed Efendi (d.980/1573), Abdülkerîm Çelebî Akhisârî (d.1038/1629), Hasan Tîrevî (d.1091/1680), Nisârî Mehmed

<sup>333</sup> Miller cites specifically five names: ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d.756/1355), Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d.816/1413), Taşköprüzâde (d.1561), Saçaklızâde Maraşî (d.1150/1737) and Gelenbevi (d.1205/1791).

<sup>334</sup> Miller, p. 237.

Kayserî (d.1112/1701), Çilli Ömer (d.1122/1710), Antâkî (d.1130/1718), Mûsâ Efendî Abdullâh Tokâdî (d.1133/1721), Cârullah Veliyyüddîn Efendi (d.1150/1738), Mustafa Hâdîmî (d.1160/1747), Akkirmanî Muhammed Kefevî (d.1173/1760), İsmâîl Gelenbevî (d.1205/1791), Ahmed Şevkî (d.1224/1809) and Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (d.1312/1895).<sup>335</sup>

In the following pages, I will discuss the extent to which Miller's assertion is plausible for post-classical Islamic intellectual history. In order to accomplish this, after providing a short biography of five post-classical authors whom Miller particularly mentions by name in his study, ('Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī, Taşköprüzâde, Saçaklızâde and Gelenbevi), I will turn to their work and focus on the differences between them, and especially on the way in which their works differ from the theory that Samarqandī set out at the very end of thirteenth century. My choice of authors is not based solely on Miller's assertion; indeed, these tracts and their commentaries were the most studied texts in *madrassa* (Islamic colleges) education in the post-classical period. The legacy of *ādāb al-baḥṭh* that was left in the educational system of Islamic colleges finally even attracted the attention of Goethe (d.1832) in the nineteenth century, which I will discuss in the next chapter.

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<sup>335</sup> For the full names of these authors and their works, see Rudolph Mach, *Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts (Yahuda Section) in the Garrett Collection Princeton University Library* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 285-293 and Rudolph Mach and Eric Ormsby, *Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts (New Series) in the Princeton University Library* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

### 1. ‘AḌŪD AL-DĪN AL-ĪJĪ (d.756/1355)

Our first author is the Shāfi‘ite jurist and Ash‘arite theologian ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Rukn al-Dīn b. ‘Abd al-Ghaffār al-Bakrī (since he is known as either Ījī or ‘Aḍud by his contemporaries and in the tracts on argumentation theory, I will henceforth refer to him simply as Ījī). He was born after 680/1281 in the town of Īj which belonged to the Shiraz province at that time (and which is still in modern day Iran). He was a child of the first generation that followed the Mongol invasion of Baghdad in 1258 during a period of political instability under the rule of Ilkhanids. After taking his education under the famous author of Qur’anic exegesis,<sup>336</sup> ‘Abdallāh ‘Umar al-Bayḍāwī (d. 716/1316)<sup>337</sup> and serving as a judge (*qāḍī*), Ījī was appointed as the chief judge in Shirāz where he met the famous Persian poet, Ḥāfiz (d.792/1390). In early 756/1355, because of his previous attempt (sometimes around 1353) to act as a negotiator between two competing rulers over the town of Shirāz, he was found guilty, arrested and imprisoned in the castle dungeon of Diraymiyān at Īj where he died in the same year.<sup>338</sup>

Ījī is an interesting figure even though his treatise on *ādāb al-baḥṭh* cannot claim to be original in the sense that Samarqandī’s work was. Nonetheless, his popularity in the post-classical period is evident from the

<sup>336</sup> *Tanzīl wa Asrār al-Ta’wīl*, GAL, I, p. 417.

<sup>337</sup> GAL, I, p. 416.

<sup>338</sup> Josef van Ess, “Al-Īdjī,” *EI*<sup>2</sup>, vol. 3, p. 1022.

great number of commentaries (*sharḥ*) and glossaries (*hashiya*) that have been written on his individual works.<sup>339</sup> Ijī's treatise on '*ilm al-waḍ'*, what I would call, "the science of the creation of meaning" is only about 500 words long while his treatise on *ādāb al-baḥth* is less than 150 words, shorter than a conference abstract. To give just one example that demonstrates the popularity of this single page: as late as the eighteenth century, a certain Sharīf Sa'ādat Allāh 'Alī Āmidī al-Gharzawānī wrote 90 folios of commentary on this one page treatise alone.<sup>340</sup> This text, "shorter than a conference abstract" though it is, became the only rival to Samarqandī's treatise from the fourteenth century up until the eighteenth century. Ijī, however, established himself with his *Kitāb al-Mawāqif fī 'ilm al-Kalām*, which was used alongside his treatise on *ādāb al-baḥth*, as the basis for the teaching of theology in Islamic colleges in the post-classical period.<sup>341</sup>

Nevertheless, this section will now focus on Ijī's one page tract, *Ādāb al-'Aḍud*.<sup>342</sup> This work is extraordinary in one particular aspect: it is

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<sup>339</sup> Other than his treatise on '*ilm al-waḍ'* and his *Ādāb* as well his treatise on ethics (*Akhlaq al-'Aḍud*) and on creed (*Aqā'id al-'Aḍudiyya*) which was commentated on by about 15 different scholars. For commentaries, glosses and superglosses on Ijī's *Ādāb al-'Aḍud*, see Rudolph Mach, *Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts (Yahuda Section) in the Garrett Collection Princeton University Library*, pp. 286-89.

<sup>340</sup> This manuscript is located in Manisa İl Halk Library; however, I have not been able to find any biographical information on Gharzawānī. Based on the copy of his manuscript, at least we know that he was alive in 1125/1712. See *Sharḥ Ādāb al-'Aḍudiyya*, fol. 89a, MS 2029/1. Henceforth Gharzawānī, *Sharḥ Ādāb al-'Aḍudiyya*.

<sup>341</sup> *Mawāqif* was used for the content of theology and the *ādāb al-baḥth* treatise, as a necessary methodological tool to be used in any field, including theology.

<sup>342</sup> In *GAL*, the title is given as "*al-Risālah al-'Aḍudiyah fī Ādāb al-Baḥth wa'l-Munāzarah*," see *GAL*, II, pp. 208-9; *Suppl.*, II, p. 287; *Kçf*, I, p. 41 and *Esmâ*, I, p. 527.



the only treatise on this topic, which finishes with a couplet.<sup>343</sup> Thus while the analysis of Samarqandī's work began with his opening lines of his *Risāla*, now, the analysis of Ījī's treatise will start from the very end where he refers to the following verse:

*Inna al-kalām lafī al-fu'ād wa innamā  
Ju'ila al-kalām 'alā al-fu'ād dafīlan*

Some copies of Ījī's treatise and some of its commentaries use the word *lisān* instead of repeating the word *kalām* in the second part of the poem as one of the famous glossators commentating on Ījī's treatise, Mīr Abū al-Faṭḥ Ardabīlī (d.975/1567) points out in *Ḥashiya 'alā 'Aḍudiyya*.<sup>344</sup> The second version reads:<sup>345</sup>

*Inna al-kalām lafī al-fu'ād wa innamā  
Ju'ila al-lisān 'alā al-fu'ād dafīlan*

Both versions of the couplet have a history in the Islamic thought and exploring their significance will help to determine the context of the couplet in Ījī's treatise. The two translations are as follows:

<sup>343</sup> Ījī, *Ādāb al-'Aḍud*, fol.8a MS. 129, Hacı Hayri Abdullah Efendi collection, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi. Henceforth Ījī, *Ādāb al-'Aḍud*.

<sup>344</sup> Mir Faṭḥ Ardabīlī, *Ḥashiya 'alā 'Aḍudiyya*, fol.59a, MS.4915 Adnan Ötügen Collection, Ankara Milli Kütüphane. Henceforth Ardabīlī, *Ḥashiya*.

<sup>345</sup> For the use of "*lisān*" instead of "*kalām*," see another copy of Ījī's treatise, *'Aḍudiyya min 'ilm al-Ādāb*, fol.60b, MS 4915, Adnan Ötügen Collection, Milli Kütüphane Library and Muḥammad Ḥanafī Tabrīzī's commentary on Ījī, *Sharḥ al-Ādāb al-'Aḍudiyya*, fol.50a, MS 4437, Ayasofya Collection, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi. For Tabrīzī (d.900/1494), see *GAL*, II, p. 267, *Suppl.*, II, p. 287.

First version; “Verily the seat of words is in the hearts,<sup>346</sup> and the words are a mere indicator of what is in the heart.”

Second version; “Verily the seat of words is in the hearts, and the tongue is a mere indicator of what is in the heart.”

Margin notes in some commentaries on Ijī and the above mentioned Gharzawānī provide a complete form of the poem in the main text<sup>347</sup> even though the full version is taken from the *diwān* of its supposed author, the ‘Umayyad Christian Arab poet Akḥṭal (d.92/710).<sup>348</sup> This attribution will be discussed in later paragraphs. The whole poem reads as follows:

*La ta‘jabannak min khaṭīb khuṭbatin  
Ḥattā yakūnu ma‘a al-kalām aṣīlan*<sup>349</sup>

“Do not be amazed by the speech of an orator until  
his words become genuine.”

*Inna al-kalām lafī al-fu‘ād wa innamā  
Ju‘ila al-lisān ‘alā al-fu‘ād daḥīlan*

<sup>346</sup> In original Arabic, the word *fu‘ād* is hard to translate because of the historical distinction between *fu‘ād* and *qalb* which both mean heart. However, it was generally understood that *qalb* referred to the heart as both a biological organ and an emotional one (that keeps changing), while *fu‘ād* was mostly used to denote heart in the abstract sense and is thus more stable. For *qalb*, see the entry “Ḳalb” by J. C. Vadet in *EI*<sup>2</sup>. Sufis have a considerable amount of work produced in this area most notably, see Nicholas Heer’s translation of the ninth century Sufi al-Hakīm al-Tirmidhī’s (d.898) work *Bayān al-Farq baynal-Ṣadr wa’l-Qalb wa’l-Fu‘ād wa’l-Lubb* (on the distinction between the chest, the heart, the inmost heart and the inmost intellect). *Three Early Sufi texts*, trans. Nicholas Heer (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2003).

<sup>347</sup> Gharzawānī, *Sharḥ Adāb al-‘Aḍudiyya*, fol.88b. One of Ijī’s commentators al-Jundī (d.sixteenth century) also mentions two usages of the word, i.e., *lisān* and *kalām* by commentators; see al-Jundī, *Sharḥ Adāb al-‘Aḍudiyya*, fol.15b, MS. 3038, Esad Efendi collection, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi. For al-Jundī, see *GAL*, II, p. 268 and *Suppl.*, II, p. 288.

<sup>348</sup> For al-Akḥṭal, see *GAS*, II, pp. 318-32.

<sup>349</sup> Akḥṭal, *Diwān Akḥṭal*, p. 234.

“Verily the seat of words is in the hearts, and the words are a mere indicator of what is in the heart.”

As stated in the second chapter, poetry was used as a source of evidence in argumentation (known as *istishhād bi'l-shi'r*) to clarify the definition of a word or a concept.<sup>350</sup> In legal theory, theology and even Qur'anic exegesis (*tafsīr*), there are many examples of authors quoting Arabic poems (both pre-and post-Islamic) to clarify a meaning. It is reported that Imām Shāfi'ī claimed that he, “studied Arabic literature [referring to Arabic poetry] for many years in order to become a better jurist.”<sup>351</sup>

This single couplet in Ijī's treatise (*Inna al-kalām lafi al-fu'ād wa innamā — Ju'ila al-kalām* [or *lisān*] '*alā al-fu'ād dalīlan*) was used by Ash'arite theologians (*mutakallimūn*) and theorists (*uṣūliyyūn*) to deal with the complicated issue of the word of God (*kalām Allāh*) referring to the Qur'ān. This problem is directly linked to debates around whether the Qur'ān was created or not, or, to be more precise, whether the Speech (*kalām*), one of the attributes of God (*ṣifa*), was eternal (*qadīm*) or created

<sup>350</sup> On *istishhād*, see İsmail Durmuş, “İstiṣhad,” *İslām*, vol. 23, pp. 396-97. Ibn al-Anbārī, mentioned in the second chapter, follows this method in his book *al-Insāf fi Masā'il al-Khilāf* when he clarifies a meaning he uses a couplet by simply using the “poet said that” formula.

<sup>351</sup> Fuat Sezgin, *Tarīkh Turāth al-'Arabī* (Riyad: Jami'a al-Imām Muḥammad b. Su'ūd, 1991), vol.1, p. 179; Ibn Kaṣīr, *al-Bidāya wa'l-Nihāya*, vol.10, p. 252.

(*makhḷūq & muḥdath*).<sup>352</sup> Evidently, speaking is impossible without the attribute of Speech first being established. To this end, theologians and theorists made a distinction between *kalām nafṣī*, which means the speech of the mind and *kalām lafẓī* which means uttered speech: the speech of the mind (*kalām nafṣī*) refers to the ideas of the mind which do not need letters or words to express them.<sup>353</sup>

A useful example to elaborate on this point is when the Qur'an cites (Q.20:9-36) that Allāh says "God spoke to Moses."<sup>354</sup> This is simply an utterance, which is created, but the words signify is not speech, but rather the "meaning" from Allāh. The proof that the Ash'arites provide for this kind of interpretation is Akḥṭal's couplet; "Verily the seat of words is in the hearts, and the words are a mere indicator of what is in the heart," and therefore, the utterance of the Qur'an is not considered uttered speech (*kalām lafẓī*), but only an indication of speech just as the Qur'an that is read today is not the words of Allāh, but only an indication of the meaning of His speech (*kalām nafṣī*).

Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī explains the distinction between *kalām nafṣī* and *kalām lafẓī* in the following manner. "Suppose we write down the

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<sup>352</sup> On the Speech of God, see A. S. Tritton, "The Speech of God," *Studia Islamica* 36 (1972): 5-22.

<sup>353</sup> For different positions on this issue, see Harry A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Kalam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 235-303. Henceforth, Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Kalam*.

<sup>354</sup> For another example, see Eric Ormsby, "The Faith of Pharaoh," in *Reason and Revelation in Islam*, ed. Todd Lawson (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 471-89.

formula “fire is a burning substance” and we utter it and memorize the words.” This, he says, “would not lead us to conclude that the real essence of fire is a sound and letter.” In this sense then, he argues that the Qur’an, the uncreated Word of God, is “an eternal thing (*ma‘nā*) existing in the essence of God.”<sup>355</sup> This idea did not originate with Taftāzānī as two centuries before, Ghazālī (d.505/1111) had followed the same line of reasoning in a slightly different tone:

If [it is conceivable that] the speech of God could actually be incorporated into the paper [of the Qur’ān] by the writing of His name on it, then it would be conceivable for actual fire to burn the paper [of the Qur’ān] by writing the word ‘fire’ on it.<sup>356</sup>

Ghazālī, in his *Risāla al-Qudsiyya*, the Jerusalem tract, elaborates on this debate by referring to the couplet at the end of Ijī’s treatise:

He, the Most High, is speaking (*mutakallim*) a speech which is *sui generis* (*qā’imun bi-dhātihī*); it is neither sound nor letter. For His speech does not resemble that of any other, just as His existence (*wujūd*) does not resemble that of any other. [Human] speech is in reality that of the soul (*kalām al-nafs*); sounds are formed into letters merely as indicators, just as sounds are sometimes indicated by movements and gestures. How could this [matter] be obscure to a foolish group, and be so plain to ignorant poets (*jahla al-shu‘arā*)? One of them said: ‘Verily the seat of words (*kalām*) is

<sup>355</sup> Cited in Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Kalam*, p. 286.

<sup>356</sup> Ghazālī, *Risāla al-Qudsiyya*, edited, translated, annotated and introduced by A. L. Tibawi in “Al-Ghazālī’s Tract on Dogmatic Theology” *The Islamic Quarterly* IX, 3-4 (1965): 65-122, p. 107.

in the heart, and the tongue is a mere indicator of  
[what is in] the heart.’<sup>357</sup>

This serious claim (that the Qur’an as *kalām nafsī* is only meaning, and that therefore, it is not created) was supported by a single couplet written by a Christian Arab poet. Taftazānī attributes this poem to Akḥṭal<sup>358</sup> although Ibn Furak attributes it to the famous Umayyad poet, Ḥuṭay’a (d.41/661).<sup>359</sup> Ghazālī quotes Akḥṭal’s above mentioned couplet by saying “one of the poets said” without mentioning his name, however, most commentators on Ījī’s *ādāb al-baḥṭh* mention Akḥṭal’s name.<sup>360</sup> The Hanbalite camp did not accept this couplet as an explanation of God’s speech, and, in particular, Ibn Qayyīm al-Jawziyya (d.751/1350),<sup>361</sup> the most loyal disciple of Ibn Taymiyya (d.728/1328), opposed it by claiming that the couplet “cannot be a source of evidence because Akḥṭal is a Christian Arab and Christians went astray by accepting Jesus as the Word of God<sup>362</sup> (*Logos*

<sup>357</sup> Ghazālī, *Risāla al-Qudsiyya*, p. 106, translated by Tibawi. I put Arabic original words in paranthesis in order to follow the idea of *kalām al-nafsī* more closely.

<sup>358</sup> Earl Edgar Elder, *A Commentary on the Creed of Islam: Sa’d al-dīn al-Taftazānī on the Creed of Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 58. Henceforth Elder, *A Commentary on the Creed of Islam*.

<sup>359</sup> Ibn Furak, *Mujarrad*, p. 68. For Jarwal b. Aws (his nickname, Ḥuṭay’a means “dwarf”); see *GAS*, II, pp. 236-38 and Ignaz Godziher’s articles on this poet and editions of his poems (*Dīwān Jarwal bin Aws al-Ḥuṭay’a*) in the *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft (ZDMG)* XLVI (1892): 1-51, 173-225, 471-527.

<sup>360</sup> For some examples, see Gharzawānī, *Sharḥ Ādāb al-‘Aḍudiyya*, fol.88b and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn ‘Arabshāh al-Isfarā’inī, *Sharḥ Ādāb al-‘Aḍudiyya*, MS 3038, fol.28a, Esad Efendi collection, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi. For al-Isfarā’inī (d.944/1537), see *GAL*, II, p. 268; *Suppl.*, II, p. 288; *Kçf*, I, p. 41 and *Esmâ*, I, p. 26.

<sup>361</sup> For Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, see *GAL*, II, pp. 127-29 and *Suppl.* II, pp. 126-28.

<sup>362</sup> On *Logos* as word of God, see Daniel J. Sahas, *John of Damascus on Islam: The Heresy of the Ishmaelites* (Leiden: Brill, 1972), pp. 103-122.

or *kalimatullāh* in Arabic).”<sup>363</sup> Moreover, the twelfth-century ‘Ibādite theorist, Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm Warjalānī (d.570/1174),<sup>364</sup> went further by suggesting that “a word of Christian infidel poet (*bi-kalāmi kāfir naṣrānī*) cannot be trusted for understanding the Qur’an.”<sup>365</sup> One of Ījī’s commentators refers to Akḥṭal as an “infidel” (*min al-kuffār*),<sup>366</sup> as well as reminding us of his nickname,<sup>367</sup> which means “the loquacious,” in the sense of someone who talks nonsense.<sup>368</sup> Nevertheless, Ījī as an Ash‘arite does not have any problem quoting Akḥṭal.

There were, in fact, four main bodies of opinion on this debate in Islamic theology:

(a) Qur’an is created, based on the concept of word as speech, assuming articulation and movement, since this word is created on the lips of Muḥammad or reciters, or on the papyrus where it is written by human beings (Mu‘tazila position),

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<sup>363</sup> Ibn Qayyīm al-Jawziyya, *Qaṣḍdah al-Nūniyya*, in *Sharḥ al-Qaṣḍdah al-Nūniyya, al-musammā al-Kāfiya al-Shāfiya fī al-Intiṣār lil-Firqa al-Nājiya lil-Imām Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya*, commented by Muḥammad Khafīl Harrās, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1986), vol. 1, p. 112.

<sup>364</sup> Warjalānī was “trained in part at Cordova, and was an expert in *ḥadīth* scholarship and Qur’anic exegesis. In his *Dafīl wa’l-Burhān*, he presented his ideas on the general development of of Ibadism,” see J.C. Wilkinson, “Ibāḍī Theological Literature,” in *The Cambridge History of Arabic Literature: Religion, Learning and Science in the ‘Abbasid Period*, ed. M. J. L.Young, J. D. Latham, and R. B. Serjeant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 38.

<sup>365</sup> Warjalānī, *al-‘Adl wa’l-Inṣāf fī Ma‘rifat Uṣūl al-Fiqh wa’l-Ikhtilāf*, 2 vols. (Oman: Wazārat al-Turāth, 1984), vol.1, pp. 35-36. Warjalānī also provides several verses from the Qur’an to prove that speech (*kalām*) was *lisānī* not *nafṣī*.

<sup>366</sup> Gharzawānī, *Sharḥ Adāb al-‘Aḥudiyya*, fol.88b.

<sup>367</sup> Akḥṭal’s real name is Ghiyāth b. Ghawth.

<sup>368</sup> For al-Akḥṭal’s biography, see R. Blachere, “Akḥṭal,” *EI*<sup>2</sup>, vol. 1, p. 330.

(b) Qur'an is uncreated, since it does not pertain not to the world of creation (*khalq*) but to the world of commandment (*amr*) (Ḥanbalite position),

(c) Qur'an is uncreated, not only on the lips and in the hearts but also in writing on paper by following a saying of 'Ā'isha: "whatever lies between the two covers of the book (about 600 pages) is the Word of God" (Ḥashwiyya position), and

(d) Qur'ān as the Word of God is eternal and uncreated (Ash'arites and Maturidites).<sup>369</sup>

A great deal of highly nuanced work has focussed on this debate, much of which is beyond the scope of my thesis. At this point, I will clarify Ṭijī's position on the issue of speech and the createdness of the Qur'ān and then go on to explain how he takes this central debate in Islamic theology and applies it to his argumentation theory. Ṭijī's treatise *Aqā'id al-Aḍudiyya*,<sup>370</sup> (another of his famous works from the post-classical period) clearly indicates his stand:

Qur'ān is the word of God (*kalām Allāh*), not created (*ghayr makhlūq*), written on papers (*maṣāḥif*) and recited. A written piece (*maktūb*) is different from the act of writing (*kitāba*) and the recited (*maqrū'*) is different from the recital [act of reciting] (*qirā'a*) just as preserved material (*maḥfūz*) is different from the act of preserving (*ḥifẓ*). As for the names of God

<sup>369</sup> For details, see the entry "Kalām," by L. Gardet in *EI*<sup>2</sup>, vol. 4, p. 468.

<sup>370</sup> For Ṭijī's *Aqā'id al-Aḍudiyya*, see *Kcṣf*, II, p. 1144; *Esmā*, I, p. 527; *GAL, Suppl.*, II, p. 291.



(*asmā*), those names are established by the Qur'ān [*tawqīfī*, meaning that they are God-given, and therefore, not relative (*iḍāfī*)].<sup>371</sup>

With this established, it is possible to turn to Ījī's treatise on *ādāb al-baḥth*. The first section of *Ādāb al-Aḍud* focuses on the roles of participants in a debate before going on in the second section to cite the above mentioned *kalām Allāh* problem as an example of debate. Ījī opens his treatise by reducing P's responsibility down to two options: P is either someone who quotes (*nāqil*) or someone who poses a thesis (*mudda'ī*). However, he does not use the exact terms, Q (*sā'il*) and P (*mu'allil*), as Samarqandī did. "If P attributes (*naql*), then, the accuracy of the attribution (*ṣiḥḥa*) must be demonstrated, whereas if he proposes a thesis (*mudda'ā*), then proof (*dalīl*) is required."<sup>372</sup> Objection (*man'*) can only be directed towards attributions and theses figuratively (*majāz*). By *majāz*, Ījī means the opposite of real since at this level Q's objection is not a real objection (*man' al-ḥaqīqī*), so P need not take it as such. Q's objection at this stage means the seeking of a proof for P's premises if P is proceeding to establish his thesis. If P does not have a thesis, but is instead using quotation, it is

<sup>371</sup> Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī, *Jalāl Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id al-'Aḍudiyya* (Istanbul: n.p. 1310), pp. 63-65. For Dawwānī's (d.908/1502) commentary on Ījī's *'Aqā'id*, see *Esmā*, II, p. 224; *GAL*, II, p. 209; idem, *Suppl.*, II, p. 291.

<sup>372</sup> Ījī, *Ādāb al-'Aḍud*, MS 129, fol.8a, H. Hayri Abdullah Efendi collection, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi. Henceforth Ījī, *Ādāb al-'Aḍud*.

not necessary to provide evidence for sources except if P implies his own endorsement for what his source claims.

There are two types of objection that ʿIjī’s treatise shares with Samarqandī’s work, i.e., mere objection (*man‘ al-mujarrad*) and objection with backing (*ma‘a al-sanad*). In ʿIjī’s treatise, Q’s well-founded objection with backing cannot be refuted by P unless P has an alternative backing that is equal (*musāwīyan*) to Q’s objection (*man‘*). P’s thesis can be refuted on grounds of irrelevancy (*takhalluf*), i.e., the absence of qualification (*ḥukm*) in P’s proof (*dalīl*), or it can be countered by an opposing proof (*dalīl al-khilāf*). In the last two cases, P becomes *māni‘* (ʿIjī’s commentator al-Tabrīzī points out that *māni‘* refers to *sā’il* in technical language, which means Q). What this means, therefore, is that a role reversal takes place at this stage: the former P (*mu‘allil al-awwal*) becomes Q.<sup>373</sup>

Based on this introduction, al-Tabrīzī states in his *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*, that “the second part is the beginning of the exemplification (*tamthīl*) of all that ʿIjī talked about in the first part.” ʿIjī starts his treatise with the following: “*idhā qulta bi-kalāmin...*” which translates to mean “if something is said, then the speaker is either quoting from someone or arguing something.” This is followed by the expository section: “*bi-an taqūlu...*” meaning that, [for example] “if someone claims that God is a

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<sup>373</sup> Tabrīzī, *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*, MS 4437, fol.48b, Ayasofya collection, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi. Henceforth Tabrīzī, *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*.

speaker (*mutakallim*) with eternal speech (*kalām azalī*)” then there are two choices available: either the speaker is quoting (*nāqil*) from the book entitled<sup>374</sup> *Maqāṣid* or making a claim via proof that He attributed Speech to Himself (*dhātihī*) in the Qur’ān: “*And God spoke to Moses.*”<sup>375</sup>

It is essential to remember that ʿIjī is an Ash‘arite theologian, and that therefore, in his example, the debate is between a Mu‘tazilite and an Ash‘arite. Even though he does not mention it directly in his treatise, it is evident that ʿIjī’s P is an Ash‘arite and his Q is a Mu‘tazilite because his P takes the position of defending the Ash‘arite stand (that the Word of God is eternal, and therefore, uncreated). I will, thus, provide the following debate in a dialogue format that is consistent with ʿIjī’s text and with his commentator, Muḥammad Ḥanafī al-Tabrīzī’s text.<sup>376</sup> I have provided ʿIjī’s original Arabic text in the appendices.<sup>377</sup>

<sup>374</sup> ʿIjī gives the name of the book *Maqāṣid* as an example. Commentators are at a loss to identify ʿIjī’s reference, whether he refers to Ghazālī’s *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa* or Taftazānī’s *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*. See for this confusion, Muḥammad al-Bardāʿī, *Sharḥ Risāla al-‘Aḍudiyya fī Adāb al-Baḥth*, MS 4436, fol.18a, Ayasofya collection, Süleymaniye; Tabrīzī, *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*, fol.49a and Jundī, *Sharḥ Adāb al-‘Aḍudiyya*, MS 129, fol. 27a-b, H. Hayri Abdi Efendi, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi.

<sup>375</sup> Tabrīzī, *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*, fols. 48b-49a.

<sup>376</sup> I have chosen Tabrīzī particularly because they are the most studied text in the *madrassa* curricula in the post-classical period; see Cevat İzgi, *Osmanlı Medreselerinde İlim*, vol. 1, pp. 35-70; Cahit Baltacı, *XV.-XVI. Asırlarda Osmanlı Medreseleri*, pp. 25-50; A. Süheyl Ünver, *Fatih Külliyesi ve Zamanı İlim Hayatı*, p. 110. For Tabrīzī (d.900/1494)’s commentary entitled *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*, see *GAL*, II, p. 267, *Suppl.*, II, p. 287; *Kçf*, p. 41; *Esmâ*, II, p. 218. The MS I use is for *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya* is MS 4437, Ayasofya collection, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi in Istanbul. Henceforth Tabrīzī, *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*.

<sup>377</sup> I put the following copy in the appendices: ʿIjī, *Adāb al-‘Aḍud*, MS 129, fol.8a, H. Hayri Abdullah Efendi collection, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi.

## EXAMPLE OF DEBATE

**P:** God is a speaker with eternal speech (*Allāh ta‘ālā mutakallimun bi-kalāmin azalīyin*)<sup>378</sup>

**Q:** We do not accept this (*lā nusallimu*), why is it so?<sup>379</sup>

Comment:<sup>380</sup> If P is simply quoting from a book, Q can only ask him for the source of his quotation (*naql*). However if this is P’s thesis, Q’s mere objection (*man‘ al-mujarrad*) means that he is asking P for evidence that supports his claim. In that case then, P provides his evidence:

**P:** God’s word is eternal because He refers to Himself in the Qur’ān: “And God spoke to Moses directly.” This is our evidence.<sup>381</sup>

**Q:** We object (*man‘*) to this since the qualities attributed to God in the Qur’ān are attributed in a metaphorical sense (*majāzī*). The real attribution (*ḥaqīqa*) of terms such as hand, foot and chair is made to human beings; they are only attributed metaphorically to God.<sup>382</sup>

**P** (defends against Q’s objection): If the Word of God, as you claim, is only the Word of God in a metaphorical sense, then the validity of your proof negates itself since you do not accept the original meaning of the

<sup>378</sup> Tabrīzī, *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*, fol.49a, lines 1-2; Ijī, *Ādāb al-‘Aḍud*, fol.8a, lines 6-7.

<sup>379</sup> Tabrīzī, *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*, fol.49b, line 1.

<sup>380</sup> I have provided my own comments in this case in order to make the reader aware of what is happening throughout the course of the debate.

<sup>381</sup> Tabrīzī, *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*, fol.49a, lines 8-9; Ijī, *Ādāb al-‘Aḍud*, fol.8a, line 8.

<sup>382</sup> Tabrīzī, *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*, fol.49b, lines 1-3; Ijī, *Ādāb al-‘Aḍud*, fol.8a, lines 8-9.

Word (*ma'na al-aṣlī*). Proof is necessary when we assume a different meaning from the apparent one, and therefore, the original meaning is real whereas the metaphor is secondary (*far'*). If this (not accepting the original meaning) is the case, we will have to turn to the metaphorical meaning of the word without proof (*dalīl*) which is Qur'ān. This is not acceptable.<sup>383</sup>

Comment: This objection (*man'*) is now rebutted as the participants revert back to the original meaning of what was said in the Qur'ān. At this stage, P proves that Speech is identified with God in the Qur'ān, and therefore refutes the objection (*man'*) and forces Q to move on to the next step.

Q: I accept your point. But, if we take the Word of the Qur'ān (which is God's Speech) as real, not metaphorical, then we suggest that God refers to Himself in the Qur'ān as the Creator (*khāliq*) in the following verse: He (*khalaqa*) created Seven Heavens (Q.65:12). This means that God creates: the Creation (*khalq*) is His eternal attribute, and therefore, everything, including the Qur'ān, is created.<sup>384</sup>

Comment: This method is *naqd* since Q is contradicting P's assertions with his own proof (*dalīl*), i.e., accepting the use of words in the real sense as opposed to the metaphorical one in the Qur'ān. Next, since P

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<sup>383</sup> Tabrīzī, *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*, fol.49b, lines 4-7; Ijī, *Ādāb al-'Aḍud*, fol.8a, line 9.

<sup>384</sup> Tabrīzī, *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*, fol.49b, lines 7-12; Ijī, *Ādāb al-'Aḍud*, fol.8a, line 9.

is an Ash‘arite, Q (the Mu‘tazilite) will try to expose another of P’s mistakes: the problem of evil. To accept that God is the Creator (and the creation is His eternal attribute) without interpreting metaphorically, i.e., taking the first or original (*asl*) meaning of the word ‘creation,’ means that the question of who is ‘creating’ all of the evil things on Earth arises. Ash‘arites are known for developing the term *kasb* in order to avoid this Mu‘tazilite challenge,<sup>385</sup> which presents the Ash‘arites not only with the problem of the createdness of the Qur’an (*khalq al-Qur’ān*), but also with the problem of evil—in this sense the challenge kills two birds with one stone.

**P:** To claim that “God creates: the Creation (*khalq*) is His eternal attribute [and] therefore, everything, including the Qur’ān is created,” ignores the fact that there is a relationship (*iḍāfa*) between power (*qudra*) and the object of power (*maqdūr*). Power (*qudra*) is an eternal attribute (*ṣifa al-azaliyya*) affecting His objects (*maqdūrāt*), which are subject to His power during their relations (*ta‘alluq*). When Allah brings the object of

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<sup>385</sup> Binyamin Abrahamov summarizes the Mu‘tazilite challenge and the Ash‘arite response in the following. “The Mu‘tazilites asserted that if God were to create a man’s unbelief while commanding him to believe, He would be unjust in punishing him for unbelief, since the man could not, in this situation, help but disbelieve. According to them ought implies can. In upholding man’s responsibility for his own actions, the Mu‘tazilites saved God’s justice, but according to the Ash‘arites, detracted from God’s omnipotence [*qudrah*]. The Ash‘arites taught that since God is the sole Creator, He creates human actions. In order to safeguard both God’s omnipotence and man’s responsibility, al-Ash‘arī, having been influenced by the teaching of al-Najjār, developed a theory of *kasb* (lit. acquisition) according to which God creates man’s actions while man appropriates them and thus becomes responsible for them.” See B. Abrahamov, “A Re-Examination of al-Ash‘arī’s Theory of “Kasb” According to “Kitāb al-Luma,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 2 (1989), p. 210.

power (*maqdūr*) into existence, He is creating (*khalq*), so the *maqdūr* (the thing which is subject to power) comes under two powers but in two different ways. The act (*khalq*) is a *maqdūr* of Allah from the standpoint of being brought into existence (*al-ījād*), and a *maqdūr* from the standpoint of acquisition (*kasb*).<sup>386</sup> Therefore, God's speech is necessarily metaphorical because in addressing His Creation, God attributed words to Himself just as much as he attributed the Creation to Himself.<sup>387</sup>

Comment: Ash'arites behave cautiously here since the Mu'tazilite challenge might lead one to believe that the Qur'ān is something created by one of God's creatures, not by God Himself.

Q: We do not accept (*la nusallim*) that there is a relationship (*iḍāfā*) between power and the object of power. The attribute of Creation (*khalq*), like the attribute of Power (*qudra*), is a real attribute (*ḥaqīqī*), not a metaphorical one. Similarly, the attribute of Speech is not eternal, because it is composed of letters which have to be arranged in a certain order, and therefore, the *kalām* (and thus Qur'ān) is a product of created and arranged letters (*al-ḥurūf al-ḥāditha*).<sup>388</sup>

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<sup>386</sup> For a discussion of this issue in Islamic theology, see Eric Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Earl Elder, *A Commentary on the Creed of Islam*, p. 86.

<sup>387</sup> Tabrīzī, *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*, fol.49b, lines 1-3; Ījī, *Ādāb al-'Aḍud*, fol.8a, lines 9-10. At this point, I also benefited from the marginal notes in MS 4915, Adnan Ötügen collection, Milli Kütüphane in Ankara, accordingly; MS 4915, fol. 58a.

<sup>388</sup> Tabrīzī, *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*, fol.49b, lines 15-21; 50a, lines 1-2. Ījī, *Ādāb al-'Aḍud*, fol.8a, lines 10-11.

**P:** We do not accept that speech (*kalām*) is formed from created letters (*al-ḥurūf al-ḥāditha*) alone [neither do we accept that the Word of God is formed of created letters]. Our backing (*sanad*) for this is the following couplet by the poet Akḥṭal: Indeed the seat of words is in the hearts, and the words are a mere indicator of what is in the heart.<sup>389</sup>

*Inna al-kalām lafī al-fu'ād wa innamā  
Ju'ila al-lisān 'alā al-fu'ād dalīlan*

According to Ijī's arrangement in his *Ādāb*, the Ash'arite party wins this debate since P has the last word. Ijī does not go beyond this poem since for the Ash'arite, the debate ends after the quotation of this couplet which solves the real problem: the meaning of words (and their meaning). To be more precise, the meaning of 'meaning' is uncovered by referring to Akḥṭal's poem which explains that meaning.

In reality, Akḥṭal's poem was not accepted by everyone, not only because he was a Christian Arab or an infidel but also on the basis of the Ash'arite response. For example, the famous Mu'tazilite Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār (d.416/1025 ) refuted the Ash'arite theory of *kalām nasfī* (the speech of the mind) because *kalām* (speech), in an Ash'arite sense which does not need letters and sound to express itself, did not really mean speech. For

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<sup>389</sup> Tabrīzī, *Risāla al-Ḥanafīyya*, fol.50a, lines 3-6; Ijī, *Ādāb al-'Aḍud*, fol.8a, lines 12-15.



him, it meant knowledge (*ilm*) and will (*irāda*).<sup>390</sup> The Ḥanbalites thought that Akḥṭal's usage was a metaphorical one, and in particular, Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī (d.716/1316), who was among the Ḥanbalite camp, argued that the real version of the poem was "*Inna al-bayān la fī al-fu'ād*," and therefore not words "*kalām*," but explanation "*bayān*". "Even if we accept both versions," explains Ṭūfī, the meaning is metaphorical and signifies conceptions (*taṣawwurāt*).<sup>391</sup> However, all the prominent Ash'arite theologians considered that this type of *kalām* meant "speech of mind" (*nafsī*): the real meaning (*ḥaqīqa*) that Akḥṭal's couplet attested to.<sup>392</sup>

The subtle point is thus: if two parties, P and Q, cannot agree on the definition of a word or a concept, then they cannot proceed in the disputation. To be exact, the existence of a debate is dependent upon the agreement of definitions. Otherwise, it becomes simply a disputation that focuses increasingly on definitions instead of on a thesis, which places argumentation theory in the category of definition theory. This is the decisive moment (and the final one) that *ādāb al-baḥth* reaches in works by Saçaklızâde in the post-classical period, which I will expound upon in the

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<sup>390</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī fī Abwāb al-Tawḥīd wa'l-'Adl*, ed. Ibrāhīm Madkūr, 16 vols. (Cairo: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa, 1960), vol. 7, pp. 14-17.

<sup>391</sup> Ṭūfī, *Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Rawḍa*, ed. Abd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī (Beirut: Mu'assasa al-Risāla, 1988), vol. 2, p. 15.

<sup>392</sup> For some examples, see Ibn Furak, *Mujarrad*, p. 68; Juwaynī, *Kitāb al-Irshād ilā Qawāṭi' al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-I'tiqād* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanjī, 1950), p. 108 and Baqillānī, *Taqrīb wa'l-Irshād al-Saghīr*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥamīd ibn 'Ali Abū Zunayd, 3 vols. (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risāla, 1998), vol. 1, p. 317.

following pages after providing synopses of Jurjānī and Taṣkōprüzâde's treatises.

## 2. SAYYID SHARĪF AL-JURJĀNĪ (d.816/1413)

‘Ali b. Muḥammad Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī, known as Sayyid Sharīf (or *muḥaqqiq* Sharīf) in *ādāb al-baḥth* treatises, was born in 740/1339 near Astarabad. He studied in Herat (modern day western Afghanistan) under Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī (d.766/1364) just before the latter died, but the old man advised him to go to his pupil Mubarakshāh in Egypt, just as Frege suggested to Wittgenstein that he go to Russel. Jurjānī persisted in Herat to benefit from Taḥṭānī's teachings until his death and then left for Karaman (Konya in modern day Turkey) to meet the Arabic linguist and famous Turkish Sufi Cemāleddīn Muhammed Aksarāyî (d.773/1371) who unfortunately died before Jurjānī's arrival. However, he did meet Aksarāyî's prominent student (who would later become the first Ottoman Şeyhülislām) Molla Fenârî (d.834/1430) there.

In Karaman, Jurjānī and Fenârî became friends and went to Egypt together to study under Taḥṭānī's above mentioned student, Mubarakshāh (d.786/1384), known as Akmal al-Dīn al-Bābartī, who was also a prominent student of Ījī's. Jurjānī took a course on Ījī's famous *Mawāqif* from Mubarakshāh and later wrote a commentary on the work as well as

commenting on Ijī's *Ādāb al-'Aḍud*. After ten years in Egypt, Jurjānī went to Shiraz where he was appointed as a professor in 778/1377. When Timurlenk captured the town in 795/1393, Jurjānī was taken to Samarkand where he had his celebrated debate (*munāẓarat*) with Taftazānī. After Timurlenk's death in 807/1405, Jurjānī returned to Shiraz where he died in 816/1413.<sup>393</sup>

While Ijī does not deal with the definition of his terms in his *Ādāb al-'Aḍud* (he simply takes them for granted), Jurjānī begins his treatise on argumentation theory (*Ādāb al-Sharīfiyya*)<sup>394</sup> by discussing the terms he uses just as Samarqandī does in his *Risāla*. Jurjānī makes a distinction between *munāẓara* and *mujādala* claiming that *munāẓara* is “two opponents’ turning towards each other (*tawajjuh*) in terms of the relationship between two things, in order to reveal the truth.”<sup>395</sup> The term *tawajjuh* is difficult to translate, but it will appear in the following pages in the context of its connotation as *ṣinā'at al-tawjīh* (the art of corresponding/relevance),<sup>396</sup>

<sup>393</sup> This account of Jurjānī's biography mostly depends on A.S. Tritton's entry on Jurjānī in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*; see Tritton, “Al-Djurdjānī, ‘Alī b. Muḥammad,” *EI*<sup>2</sup>, vol. 2, p. 602.

<sup>394</sup> I could not find Jurjānī's individual treatise *Ādāb al-Sharīf* in either Turkish or North American archives at the time of writing my thesis, therefore, in this section, I use the published version for an analysis. See Jurjānī, *Ādāb al-Sharīfiyya*, in *Majmū'ah Mushtamila 'alā al-Ātī Bayānuh*, ed. Maḥmūd al-Imām Maṣūri (Mahābād: Kitāb-furūshī-yī Sayyidiyān, 1353/1934-5), pp. 132-36. Henceforth Jurjānī, *Ādāb al-Sharīfiyya*.

<sup>395</sup> Jurjānī, *Ādāb al-Sharīfiyya*, p. 132. The original Arabic text reads: “*al-munāẓara tawajjuh al-mutakhāsimayn fī al-nisba bayna al-shay'ayn iẓhāran li'l-ṣawāb wa'l-mujādala hiya al-munāẓa'a lā li'l-iẓhār al-ṣawāb bal li-ilzām al-khasm.*”

<sup>396</sup> *Tawjīh* literally means turning towards an object, pointing, directing and, in modern Arabic military terms, guidance, for example in commanding a unit. In this sense, the art of *tawjīh* refers to directing or controlling an argument or marshalling it towards a conclusion.

which was one of the new names of *ādāb al-baḥth* in Saçaklızâde and Gelenbevî's works. *Mujādala* (*jadāl* in action), as opposed to *munāẓara*, is a dispute (*munāẓa'a*); not aiming to reveal the truth, but rather to defeat the opponent (*ilzām al-khaṣm*).

After defining these two basic terms (*munāẓara* and *jadāl*), Jurjānī goes on to define eighteen others, namely (in order): *mukābara*, *naql*, *taṣḥīḥ al-naql*, *mudda'ī*, *sā'il*, *da'wā*, *maṭlūb*, *ta'rīf*, *dalīl*, *tanbīh*, *amāra*, *man'*, *muqaddima*, *sanad*, *naqd*, *shāhid*, *mu'āraḍa* and *ghasb*. His treatise, furthermore, consists of nine discussions, two supplements (*tatimma* and *takmila*), a conclusion and an advisory note (*waṣiyya*), but it eschews traditional order while covering most of the basic issues (i.e., the roles of P and Q, thesis, proof, premises, objection, counter-objection) mentioned earlier.<sup>397</sup>

Jurjānī introduces two discussions that Samarqandī does not include that are central to the history of *ādāb al-baḥth*. Firstly he points out that some (he does not cite their names) have doubted the validity of: (a) counter-objection (*mu'āraḍa*) against *mu'āraḍa*; (b) counter-objection against another counter objection (*bi'l-badāha*); and (c) bringing another

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In order to guide (*tawjīh*) an argument, each part (premise) of it that contributes to the conclusion has to be relevant to the other parts.

<sup>397</sup> Jurjānī, *Adāb al-Sharīfiyya*, pp. 132-33.

proof against one that is self-evident. For all these cases, Jurjānī claims in his *Ādāb al-Sharīfiyya* that “the truth is that they are all valid.”<sup>398</sup>

In terms of strategies, Jurjānī suggests in his second discussion that using *naqḍ* (invalidation) or *mu‘ārāḍa* (counter-objection) merely to raise doubt when P cites a proof is an inferior tactic. He claims that it is deceitful since P’s opponent does not claim the truthfulness of his own statement but simply undermines P using *man‘* (objection) as a weapon. Jurjānī further suggests that counter-objection (*mu‘ārāḍa*) benefits Q the most since it is the ultimate weapon at Q’s disposal. However, it is also the riskiest and, therefore, is best delayed until Q can see all sides of P’s argument.<sup>399</sup>

It is interesting to note that Jurjānī ends his treatise with advice (*waṣīyya*) for his readers. He says that haste (*isti‘jāl*) is not regarded positively in argumentation (*lā yuḥsan*): “[t]here is benefit to both sides, in the absence of haste.” But the most interesting idea comes in his last sentence, which reads:

It is necessary to speak in every matter according to one’s role [or responsibility]. Therefore, one does not speak of certainty (*yaqīnī*) when one’s responsibility concerns probability (*ẓannī*), nor does one do so when the situation is the other way around.<sup>400</sup>

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<sup>398</sup> Ibid., pp. 135-36.

<sup>399</sup> Ibid., p. 136.

<sup>400</sup> Jurjānī, *Ādāb al-Sharīfiyya*, p. 136. The Arabic text reads: “*wa min al-wājib al-takallam fī kullī kalām bimā huwa waẓīfatuhu falā yatakallam fī’l-yaqīnī bi-waẓā’if al-ẓannī wa lā bi’l-‘aks.*”

This sentence is interesting because it is not clear whether Jurjānī places the *ādāb al-baḥth* in the category of Aristotelian demonstration that leads to certainty, or in that of dialectic that leads to probability. It also draws importance from the fact that Samarqandī's famous commentator, Kamāl al-Dīn Mas'ūd al-Rūmī al-Shirwānī (d.905/1499),<sup>401</sup> argued that in the science of *ādāb al-baḥth*, *dalīl* meant certainty (*yaqīn*) that referred to demonstration (*burhān*).<sup>402</sup> It is well known that in Aristotelian logic, dialectic was seen as only being capable of attaining probability (as opposed to certainty); the method of true science was taught in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. The quest for truth was understood as a quest for certainty by Islamic theologians and philosophers, although they often disagreed about the way certainty (*yaqīn*) was obtained. In this context then, dialectic (*jadal*) was understood by theologians to be a valid means for obtaining truth. As Miller noted, the Muslim theologians placed more confidence in dialectic than philosophers did in the Aristotelian tradition. The former, he says, emphasized its value as a means of attaining truth, while the philosophers dissociated it from demonstration (*burhān*), relegating it to an

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<sup>401</sup> For al-Shirwānī's work, see *GAL*, I, p. 615 and *Suppl.*, I, p. 849.

<sup>402</sup> Kamāl al-Dīn Mas'ūd al-Rūmī al-Shirwānī, *Sharḥ al-Adāb al-Samarqandī*, fols 33b-35a, MS 2537, Ayasofya collection, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi,

inferior position as “an art,” more useful for defeating an opponent than for discovering the truth.<sup>403</sup>

G. E. L. Owen has drawn attention to the fact that most of the Aristotelian corpus fits the paradigm of dialectic more closely than it does that of demonstration, even though Aristotle himself preaches the use of demonstration.<sup>404</sup> My question is whether a similar concern arises when we examine Islamic philosophers’ notion of *jadal* and *burhān*? In other words, do Fārābī’s or Avicenna’s works, for example, in whole or in part, put the dialectical method, instead of demonstration, into practice since they also preached the use of *burhān* like Aristotle? Jurjānī’s last sentence raises this question, and it certainly requires a critical investigation.

### 3. TAŞKÖPRÜZÂDE (d.968/1561)

‘Işām al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Muşţafā b. Khalīl Taşköprüzâde was born in Bursa (in modern day western Turkey) in 901/1495. He studied first in Ankara, then in Bursa, and finally in Istanbul under prominent scholars. In particular he focused on dialectic (‘*ilm al-jadal*) and juristic differences (‘*ilm al-khilāf*) under the Tunisian Mālikī scholar, Mawlānā Muḥammad al-

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<sup>403</sup> Larry Miller, “Al-Fārābī’s Dispute about the *Adab al-Jadal*,” in *Acts of the International Symposium on Ibn Turk, Khwārezmī, Fārābī, Beyrūnī and Ibn Sīnā* (Ankara: Atatürk Culture Center, 1990), p. 185.

<sup>404</sup> G.E.L. Owen, “Tithenai ta Phainomena,” in *Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy*, ed. M. C. Nussbaum (London, 1986), pp. 239-51.

Maghūsh al-Tūnusī (d.947/1540)<sup>405</sup> from whom he received his first teaching license (*ijāza*). Taşköprüzâde found a teaching position in 931/1525 in a *madrassa* in Dimetoka and worked there for two years before being promoted to Istanbul in 933/1527. After 20 years of teaching in Edirne, Istanbul and the Balkan region, he became the judge of Bursa in 952/1545 and later the judge of Istanbul in 958/1551 but had to resign from this position in 961/1554 because of failing eyesight (he later became blind). In the following years, he devoted himself to dictating his works until his death in Istanbul in 968/1561.<sup>406</sup>

Taşköprüzâde wrote on theology, philosophy, logic, rhetoric, semantics, ethics and jurisprudence as well as a commentary on İjî's work on ethics entitled *Akhlaq al-'Ađudiyya*. However, he is most celebrated for two of his works in particular: the biographical, *Shaqā'iq al-Nu'māniyya fi 'Ulamā' al-Dawlat al-'Uthmāniyya*, and the encyclopedic *Miftāh al-Sa'āda wa Mişbāh al-Siyāda*.<sup>407</sup>

In the latter work (*Miftāh*), Taşköprüzâde brings another definition to *munāzara*, namely, *mushāwara*, what I would call “cooperative games” as opposed to “non-cooperative games,” (although he does not explore this in his individual treatise on *ādāb al-baḥth*). In his *Miftāh*, Taşköprüzâde says

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<sup>405</sup> For Muḥammad al-Maghūsh al-Tūnusī, see Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Nahrawāli, *Journey to the Sublime Porte*, ed. Richard Blackburn (Beirut: Orient-Institut, 2005), pp. 44-46.

<sup>406</sup> See for this bibliographical information, Barbara Flemming, “Taşköprüzâde,” *EI*<sup>2</sup>, vol. 10, p. 351.

<sup>407</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 351.



that “*munāẓara* is consultation (*mushāwara*)<sup>408</sup> to bring the truth out (*li-istikhrāj al-ṣawāb*), therefore it can only occur where there is thoughtfulness (*ta’ammul*) [and] fairness (*inṣāf*) not where there is wheeling-dealing (*hīla*) and the participants are pretentious (*muta’annitan*), i.e., pretending to be seekers of knowledge, but not aiming at truth (*ṭāliban li’l-ḥaqq*).” Despite its pitfalls for the participant, Taşköprüzâde was aware of the importance of *munāẓara* for Muslim education and he deals with this issue in the education

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<sup>408</sup> The term *mushāwara* that Taşköprüzâde uses is key in both classical and post-classical Islamic history since, together with *mashwara* and *shūrā* it was used by advisory boards consisting of Kurayshīs, which eventually chose ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān as the third caliph after the assassination of ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb in 23/644. The practice of consultation by the *shaykh* of a tribe with his leading men dates from pre-Islamic Arabia, and thus on ‘Umar’s death the *shūrā* represented a continuation of tribal practice. The term *mushāwara* was frequently used in the nineteenth century by the opponents of *Sultanic* rule, (amongst others, young Ottoman liberals and religious conservatives such as Bediüzzaman Said Nursî) in order to justify the Ottoman Empire’s transformation of governmental structure from *Sultanic* rule to constitutional and consultative government (*Meşrutiyet*) referring to the Qur’anic verse: [believers] conduct their affair by mutual consultation, *wa-amruhum shūrā baynahum*, 42:38 in *al-Shūrā* (consultation). In 1909, even the Sultan’s speech from the throne mentions the constitutional government (*Meşrutiyet ve Meşveret*, i.e., *mashwara* in Arabic) “as prescribed by the holy law as well as by both reason and tradition.” But the Sultan, the supreme authority, was no longer the final judge of matters like al-Mahdî and al-Ma’mûn, rather he was a consultant. See Bernard Lewis, “Mashwara,” *EI*<sup>2</sup>, vol.6, p. 724 and A. Ayalon, “Shūrā,” *EI*<sup>2</sup>, vol. 9, pp. 505-6. Another example is the creation of the *Huzur Dersleri* (Imperial Presence Lectures) in the eighteenth century by Sultan Mustafa III (r.1757-74). These were a kind of *majlis* session in classical Islamic history where participants were assigned as lecturers and respondents. A session typically started with the lecturer’s (*mukarrir*) introduction of the Qur’anic verse under discussion followed by his comments using Baydāwî’s famous *tafsîr* (Qur’anic exegesis). The respondents (*muhâtabûn*) in turn offered their questions and objections. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the participants (*ulamā*) of the *Huzur Dersleri* agreed on an interpretation, the Ottomans used the consensus to back legal and administrative decisions. The search for consensus, Madeline Zilfi, says “was no doubt a motive behind the Huzur’s establishment. Collective judgments were a crisis-management technique.” On *Huzur Dersleri*’s “consensus-generating potential,” see Madeline C. Zilfi, “A Medrese for the Palace: Ottoman Dynastic Legitimation in the Eighteenth Century,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 113.2 (1993): 184-191 and idem, *Politics of Piety*, p. 228. For an example of the importance of *Huzur Dersleri* in the early twentieth century in the context of Mustafa Sabri who was one of the respondents (*muhâtab*) of the *Huzur Dersleri* from 1897 until 1913, see my MA thesis, “One of the Last Ottoman Şeyhülislâms, Mustafa Sabri Efendi (1869-1954)” (unpublished MA thesis, McGill University, 2003), pp. 32, 34, 37, 38.

sections of the *Miftāḥ*. Accordingly, he quotes an anonymous expression:

“[o]ne hour’s debate is better than one month’s repetition.”<sup>409</sup>

As his *Miftāḥ* and *Risāla* on *ādāb al-baḥth* reveal, Taşköprüzâde was more concerned with the manners of the participants (*ādāb*) than with the debate itself. I will provide a translation of the section in his treatise on the etiquette of debate which is missing in works by Ījī, Jurjānī and partially lacking in Samarqandī’s texts.

In his *Risāla* and his own commentary on it, Taşköprüzâde mentions nine protocols (*ādāb*) that have to be observed during the course of debate.<sup>410</sup>

(1) P and Q should refrain from being very brief (*ījāz*) in order to avoid confusion.

(2) P and Q should refrain from being very wordy (*iṭnāb*) to avoid losing track of the issue under discussion.

(3) P and Q should refrain from utilizing strange words (*alfāz al-gharība*) in order not to make the debate difficult.

(4) P and Q should refrain from utilizing ambivalent terms (*lafẓ al-mujmal*) without limiting (*bi-lā taqyīd*) themselves to technical terminology (*iştilāḥī*) in their respective fields because there should not be any uncertainty (*taraddud*) in understanding the terms used by participants in the debate (although there is nothing wrong with seeking an explanation or asking a question to clarify the meaning of ambivalent terms).

<sup>409</sup> Taşköprüzâde, *Miftāḥ al-Sa’āda*, vol. 1, p. 30. The Arabic text reads: “*muḥāraḥatu sā’ah khayr min takrār shuhur.*”

<sup>410</sup> For Taşköprüzâde’s both *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth* and his own commentary (*Sharḥ*), see *GAL*, II, p. 561; *Suppl.*, II, p. 633. I use MS 4430, Ayasofya collection in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi. Henceforth, Taşköprüzâde, *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth* and *Sharḥ*.

(5) P and Q should refrain from interrupting their opponent before understanding what he is saying (*dakhl qabl al-fahm*) or his point (*murād*), therefore they should wait until their opponent finishes talking before commencing their own speech.

(6) P and Q should refrain from offensive attacks (*ta'arruḍ*) that are not acceptable in *munāzara* since its objective is to bring out the truth in one session (*fī majlisin wāḥidin*).

(7) P and Q should refrain from laughing (*ḍahk*), raising voices (*raf' al-ṣawt*) and similar distractions such as showing impulsiveness or moving hands to provoke the opponent. These are not only signs of foolishness but are the attributes of ignorant people (*awṣāf al-juhḥāl*) who want to cover their ignorance by such actions.

(8) P and Q should refrain from participating in a debate with people who are respected and loved (*ahl al-mahāba wa'l-iḥtirām*) by the society. The participant will not be able to focus on the debate because these people's charisma will affect the whole debate through external influence.

(9) P and Q should not underestimate the abilities of their opponent since doing so will weaken the beginning of the debate and could result in the weaker opponent winning because the stronger is underprepared or too casual in his approach. To be silenced (*ilzām*) by a weak participant because one's thought too little of one's opponent is the worst situation in debate.<sup>411</sup>

#### 4. SAÇAKLIZÂDE (d.1150/1732 or 37 or 42)

Although his full name is Muḥammad b. Abī Bakir al-Mar'ashī al-Ḥanafī, this scholar is generally known as Saçaklızâde since he comes from the famous Saçaklızâde family. He was born in 1091/1680 in Maraş, a

<sup>411</sup> Taşköprüzâde, *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth*, fol.2b and idem, *Sharḥ*, fols. 8a-9a.

province in the Ottoman Empire, and took courses with Darendeli Hamza Efendi (d.1152/1739) in Malatya and Tefsîrî Mehmet Efendi (d.1111/1699) in Sivas (in modern Turkey). Following this, Saçaklızâde went to Damascus to study with the famous scholar ‘Abd al-Ghanî al-Nâbulî (d.1143/1731), and then returned to Maraş where he taught until he died. There is controversy surrounding the date of his death however: *Shaqā’iq* and *Osmanlı Müellifleri* give it as 1145/1732, whereas *Hediyyetü’l-Ârifîn* and *GAL* record it as 1150/1737, and *Sicill-i Osmânî* claims that it is 1155/1742.<sup>412</sup>

Saçaklızâde is important in the history of argumentation theory in three main ways. Firstly, he positioned argumentation theory in the category of obligatory sciences (*farḍ al-kifāya*) for the Muslim community. *Farḍ al-kifāya* is a serious task which puts the whole community under pressure, but it can be sufficiently fulfilled if enough members of the community take part, even though the responsibility rests on the shoulders of the community as a whole.<sup>413</sup>

Secondly, Saçaklızâde makes a clear distinction between *jadāl* (dialectic) and *‘ilm al-munāẓara / ādāb al-baḥth* (argumentation theory). For him, *jadāl* is like sophistry and is used extensively by Muslim jurists

<sup>412</sup> For Saçaklızâde’s life and works, see ‘Umar Riḍā Kaḥḥālah, *Mu‘jam al-Mu’allifîn* (Maḥba‘at al-Taraqqî, 1957), vol. 9, p. 118; Mehmet Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmânî: Tezkire-i Meşâhir-i Osmâniyye* (Istanbul: Sebil Yayınları, 1997), vol.1, p. 276; *GAL*, II, p. 370, 487; *Suppl.*, II, p. 498 and *Esmâ*, vol. 1, p. 322.

<sup>413</sup> Saçaklızâde, *Tartīb al-‘Ulūm*, ed. Muḥammad b. Ismā‘îl al-Sayyid Aḥmad (Beirut: Dār al-Bashā’ir al-Islāmiyya, 1988), pp. 141-49.

(*fuqahā'*) to serve rhetorical purposes.<sup>414</sup> For this reason, it has been understood that *jadāl* is associated with the science of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) but for Saçaklızâde, the technique of *jadāl* is designed to control and manipulate the opponent, and therefore has nothing to do with finding the truth. Alternatively, the objective of *munāzara* is to find the truth regardless of in whose hand it is: either P's or Q's.<sup>415</sup>

Finally, the third, and most important aspect of Saçaklızâde's centrality in argumentation theory is that the field would never have progressed so far without his theory of definition, which will be discussed below.

*Risāla al-Waladiyya*, as Saçaklızâde claims in his *Tartīb al-'Ulūm*, is the abridgment of the most important points in his *Taqrīr al-Qawānīn al-Mutadāwala min 'Ilm al-Munāzara*.<sup>416</sup> He also says that he had not seen a comprehensive work on argumentation theory, one that covered all aspects of the science and looked into its profound mysteries, until his own time. I

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<sup>414</sup> Saçaklızâde, *Tartīb al-'Ulūm*, pp. 211-12.

<sup>415</sup> Saçaklızâde, *Tartīb al-'Ulūm*, p. 142.

<sup>416</sup> Saçaklızâde, *Tartīb al-'Ulūm*, p. 141. Saçaklızâde also collected his own notes on the margins of the *Taqrīr* which resulted in a separate book entitled *Tahrīr al-Taqrīr*. He explains this at the beginning of his *Tahrīr*: “[w]hen I wrote the treatise *Taqrīr al-Qawānīn al-Munāzara* I took notes on the margins of the book, but I was afraid that those notes on the margins would be lost so I brought them together in a separate notebook with some additions so that a student reading the treatise may study.” See *Tahrīr al-Taqrīr*, p. 1.

will therefore present Saçaklızâde's argumentation theory from the basis of his two main works: *Taqrîr* and *Risāla al-Waladiyya*.<sup>417</sup>

He divides *Taqrîr* and *Risāla* into two basic sections: simple conceptions (*taşawwurāt*) and assertions (*taşdıqāt*)<sup>418</sup> with an introduction (that defines the terms used in argumentation theory) and a conclusion on the end of debate. These divisions are completely new as this kind of organization had not been present in *ādāb al-baḥth* literature until this point. Although Saçaklızâde's method comes somewhat out of the blue it is, from beginning to the end, a highly creative approach to argumentation theory. Most of the classical and post-classical works on Arabic logic would be divided into conceptions and assertions, namely *taşawwurāt* and *taşdıqāt* but here, Saçaklızâde applies this method to *ādāb al-baḥth* by putting a great deal of effort into organizing his theory. The centrality of his choices in

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<sup>417</sup> For *Taqrîr al-Qawānîn*, see *GAL*, II, p. 487; *Suppl.*, II, p. 498 and *Esmâ*, vol. 1, p. 322. For *Risāla al-Waladiyya*, see *GAL*, II, p. 486 and *Suppl.*, II, p. 498. I use Saçaklızâde's *Risāla al-Waladiyya* MS 6150 Hacı Mahmud Efendi collection, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (henceforth Saçaklızâde, *Risāla al-Waladiyya*) and published version of *Taqrîr al-Qawānîn al-Mutadāwalah min 'Ilm al-Munāzara* (Istanbul, 1322). Henceforth, Saçaklızâde, *Taqrîr al-Qawānîn*.

<sup>418</sup> A *taşawwur* is a simple concept, i.e., man, soul, etc. whereas *taşdıqāt* are statements "man is mortal" or "Socrates is wise" which can be affirmed or denied. To make an assertion about something we must first be able to form a concept of it, but the reverse is not the case, simply because we can have a conception without making any truth claim about it. There is quite a lot literature on these two central terms in Arabic logic. See, e.g., Harry A. Wolfson, "The Terms *Taşawwur* and *Taşdıq* in Arabic Philosophy and their Greek, Latin and Hebrew Equivalent," in *Studies in the History and Philosophy and Religion*, ed. I. Twersky and G.H. Williams (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 478-492; Josef van Ess, *Die Erkenntnislehre des 'Aḩudaddîn al-Īcî: Übersetzung und Kommentar des ersten Buches seiner Mawāqif* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1966), pp. 95-112; Miriam Galston, *Opinion and Knowledge in Farabi's Understanding of Aristotle's Philosophy* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1973), Deborah Black, *Logic*, pp. 71-78 and Joep Lameer, *Al-Fārābî and Aristotelian Syllogistic: Greek Theory and Islamic Practice* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), pp. 265-276.

organization is such that I have included the contents lists of both *Taqrīr* and *Risāla* in order to show Saçaklızâde's thorough and creative approach before I offer my own analysis.

**A- *Taqrīr al-Qawānīn al-Mutadāwala min 'ilm al-Munāzara*  
(Establishing the Laws Used in the Science of Argumentation)**

Definition of Terms (*ta'rīfāt*):

*munāzara, qanūn, baḥth, tawjīh, jadal, munāzara*

Introduction (*muqaddima*): Interpretation of Terms Used in Argumentation Theory

*Man', muqaddamat al-dalīl, taqrīb, mulāzamat, sanad, tanwīr al-sanad, naqd, naqd al-ta'rīf, naqd al-muqaddima, naqd al-dalīl, mu'araḍa, dalīl, tanbīh*

FIRST PART (*maqṣad*) on CONCEPTION (*TAŞAWWURĀT*)

First Section (*maqām*) on Definition (*Ta'rīfāt*)

Chapter 1- Definition of 'Definition' (*taqsīm al-ta'rīf*)

Chapter 2- Conditions of Real Definition (*sharā'it al-ta'rīf al-ḥaqīqī*)

Chapter 3- Points of Objections to Definitions (*fīmā yaruddu 'alā al-ta'rīfāt*)

Article 1: On Objection (*man'*)

Article 2: Contradicting (*naqd*) the Validity (*ṣiḥḥa*) of P's Definition on the Grounds that "Definition (*ta'rīf*) is Not Equal to the Defined (*mu'arraf*)"

Article 3: Contradicting the Validity of P's Definition on the Grounds that "P's Definition Necessitates Circularity (*dawr*)"

Article 4: Contradicting the Validity of P's Definition on the Grounds that "P's Definition Necessitates Infinite Regress (*tasalsul*) and Other Absurdities (*muḥālāt*)"

Article 5: Counter-objection to Linguistic Fallacies (*aghālīt al-lafziyya*)

Article 6: On Counter-objection (*mu'āraḍa*) to Definitions

Second Section on Division (*Taqṣīmāt*)

Chapter 1- On Definition of Division and Types of Division

Chapter 2- On the Aim of Division: Limitation (*ḥaṣr*)

Chapter 3- On the Relationship between the Divided (*muqassam*) and its Parts

Chapter 4- Is Division the Subject-Matter of Conception (*taṣawwur*) or Assertion (*taṣdīq*)?

Chapter 5- The Analytical Relationship between Division (*taqṣīm*) and Definition of Parts (*ta'rīf al-aqsām*)

Chapter 6- Conditions of Division (*sharā'iṭ al-taqṣīm*)

Chapter 7- Conditions of Limitation (*ḥaṣr*) and of its Defined Subject

Chapter 8- Responsibilities of Questioner (*sā'il*) and Respondent (*mujīb*) in the course of Division

Article 1: On Objection (*i'tirāḍ*) to Division in Itself (*nafs al-taqṣīm*)

Article 2: On Objection to the Aim of Division which is Limitation (*ḥaṣr*)

Article 3: On Objection to the Definition that Division Contains

SECOND PART (*maqṣad*) on ASSERTION (*TAṢDĪQĀT*)

First Section on Objection (*Man'*)

Chapter 1- On Backing (*sanad*)

Chapter 2- Objection to the Part of Proof (*juz' al-dalīl*)—Major (*kubrā*) and Minor (*sughrā*) Premises in Syllogism (*qiyās*)

Chapter 3- On Objection to one of the Conditions that Yield Proof



Chapter 4- On Objection to the Approximation of Proof (*taqrīb al-dalīl*)

Chapter 5- On Establishing the Point of Fallacy (*ghalaṭ*) and Usurpation (*ghaṣb*)

Chapter 6- Responsibilities of P (*mu'allil*) during Q's objection to one of the premises of P's proof or Q's Objection with Backing

Subdivision 1: On Refuting the Objection (*ibtāl al-manʿ*)

Subdivision 2: On Refuting the Backing (*ibtāl al-sanad*)

Subdivision 3: P's Move on to (*intiḳāl*) Another Proof (*dalīl al-ākhar*) to Prove his Thesis during Q's Objection to one of Premises of P's Proof.

Subdivision 4: P's Move on to (*intiḳāl*) Another Debate (*baḥth al-ākhar*) after Q's Refutation of P's Thesis without Proof or of one of Premises of P's Proof

### Second Section on the Method of Inconsistency (*Naqd*)

Chapter 1- On Definition of *Naqd*

Chapter 2- On Broken Contraposition (*naqd al-maksūr*)

Chapter 3- On P's Responsibility when Q Contradicts P's Proof

### Third Section on Counter-Objection (*Mu'āraḍa*)

Chapter 1- On Types of Counter-Objection

(a) Counter-Proof through the Similar (*mu'āraḍa bi'l-mithl*)

(b) Counter-Proof by Means of Something Different (*mu'āraḍa bi'l-ghayr*)

Chapter 2- On P's Responsibility during Counter-Objection

Conclusion (*Khātima*): The End of Debate (*intihā' al-baḥth*)

## **B- *Risāla al-Waladiyya fi Ādāb al-Baḥth wa'l-Munāzara***

FIRST PART on DEFINITION (*Ta'rīf*)

- Chapter 1- Explaining the Objection to Minor Premises (*al-sughra*)  
 Chapter 2- On Establishing *reductio ad absurdum* (*ibtāl*)  
 Chapter 3- On Defective Definition (*nāqīḍ al-ta'arīf*)

#### SECOND PART on DIVISION (*Taqṣīm*)

- Chapter 1- Conditions of the Validity (*ṣiḥḥa*) of Division  
 Chapter 2- On Dividing the Universal into its Particulars (*taqṣīm al-kullī ilā juz'īyyātihī*)  
 Chapter 3- On Objection to the Limitation of Division  
 Chapter 4- On Dividing the Whole into its Parts (*taqṣīm al-kull ilā ajzā'ihī*)  
 Chapter 5- On Clarifying the Intention (*taḥrīr al-murād*)

#### THIRD PART on ASSERTION (*Taṣdīq*)

- Chapter 1- On Objection (*man'ā*)  
 Chapter 2- On Counter-Objection (*mu'ārāḍa*)  
 Chapter 3- On the Method of Invalidation (*naqḍ*)

#### Conclusion (*Khātima*)

As is evident from the contents of his two texts, Saçaklızâde's work represents the cultivation and culmination of earlier theories containing highly developed terminology and dealing with nuances. This is one of the reasons why his works on *ādāb al-baḥth* were in the Ottoman *madrassa* curriculum and why Azhar University held him in such high regard until 1925 (Azhar University professors published and commented on Saçaklızâde's work).<sup>419</sup>

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<sup>419</sup> I will discuss this in the fourth chapter.

## STRUCTURAL NOVELTY

It is interesting to note that Saçaklızâde even includes an index at the beginning of his book just as contemporary writers do (theirs, though, are at the end because of the difference between Arabic and English tradition). Despite all that he represents, Saçaklızâde humbly believed that his book was “just an introduction to rarities of this discipline [*ādāb al-baḥth*].”<sup>420</sup> Not only does he define his terms at the beginning of his book (as was standard at the time), but he also gives a history of the interpretation of those terms by argumentation theorists, in order to open the issues up to discussion and then provide his own definitions.

He often follows the dialectical method of first providing the objections to his theory, concept or idea and then clarifying the response as follows: “if you were to say A, I would respond B.” This was a new method in *ādāb al-baḥth* literature in the post-classical period. Most often Saçaklızâde explains what is meant by the quotations that he uses from other books on argumentation theory, before offering his own analysis of those quotations. He is very careful in this area, especially when indicating the beginning and end of quotations.

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<sup>420</sup> Saçaklızâde, *Taqrīr al-Qawānin*, p. 2.

Dividing or reducing the argumentation theory into two sections (*taṣawwurāt* and *taṣdīqāt*) is the most important structural novelty that Saçaklızâde employs, but it goes beyond novelty of form: it also contains novelty of content, a conceptual originality. So why does Saçaklızâde divide the theory into two?

### CONCEPTUAL ORIGINALITY

The first part of his book (*taṣawwurāt*) deals with concepts and how to clarify them in order to allow for solid definitions, and the second part deals with assertions (*taṣdīqāt*); the techniques of the debate, the role of Q and P. Now, Saçaklızâde's originality exceeds Samarqandī's in two ways:<sup>421</sup> the first is structural, as Saçaklızâde sees the whole theory of argumentation as two sections divided into conceptions (*taṣawwurāt*) and assertions (*taṣdīqāt*). The second exists more at the conceptual level, as he sees definition as part of conception (*taṣawwurāt*) in argumentation. Everything that Saçaklızâde writes about definition, or the rules that he establishes for the validity of true definition, is encompassed within his *taṣawwurāt*

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<sup>421</sup> The first instance of Samarqandī's originality is found in his *Qustās*, where he includes a section on argumentation theory in the assertions' (*taṣdīqāt*) section. This had never been done before by any logician. The second instance is in his reduction of the entirety of his views on logic down to two basic ideas: conceptions or mental perceptions (*taṣawwurāt*) and assertions (*taṣdīqāt*), suggesting that humans first conceive of things and then make assertions about them.

(conceptions) sections. Defining, for Saçaklızâde therefore, like conception, determines the final outcome of argumentation.

It is clear then, from these elements, that Saçaklızâde pays a great deal of attention to the issue of definition, the conditions for the validity of definition, division, limitation, objection and counter-objection to definition. It is this first part of the book on definition that marks Saçaklızâde out in the history of Arabic argumentation theory. Such an approach does not exist in any other treatise on *ādāb al-baḥṭh* with this intensity.

Saçaklızâde claims that, “there is no argumentation (*munāẓara*) about definitions (*taʿrifāt*) since there is no judgment (*ḥukm*) in concepts (*taṣawwurat*). Argumentation proper is about assertions (*taṣdīqāt*).”<sup>422</sup> But again, without concepts, there can be no assents: conceptions are directly related to definitions, which explains why Saçaklızâde establishes conditions (*sharṭ*) for the validity of definitions. In his technical language, the one who defines is called *māniʿ*, and the one who opposes this definition is called *mustadill*.

## DEFINITIONS

According to Saçaklızâde, definitions can be one of two kinds: either (a) nominal definitions (*taʿrīf al-lafẓī*) or (b) actual definitions (*taʿrīf al-*

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<sup>422</sup> Saçaklızâde, *Taqrīr al-Qawānīn*, pp. 12-13.

*ḥaqīqī*). He considers the first type to be the concern of linguists (*ahl al-lughā*), and therefore focuses himself on the second type: the actual definitions.

#### CONDITIONS FOR ACTUAL DEFINITION (*ta'rif al-ḥaqīqī*)

(1) The definition (*ta'rif*) should be clearer (*wuḍūh*) than the term defined (*mu'arraḥ*) and therefore, metaphor (*majāz*) and equivocal or homonym (*mushtarak*) usages are not allowed.<sup>423</sup>

(2) The definition should be equal (*musāwī*) to the term defined, which means that it should include all of its constituent elements (*jāmi' al-af'rād*) and exclude other elements that do not make up its components (*māni' 'an al-aghyār*). Here Saçaklızâde summarizes the approach that earlier scholars (*mutaqaddimūn*) took towards definition: the more general (*a'amm*) can be defined by the more specific (*akhaṣṣ*). For example, man (general) can be defined by white man (specific) or black man (specific). Animal (general) can be defined by horse (specific) or dog (specific). This means that if a black man is defined, the definition can be accepted as that of man as well, or if a dog is defined, the definition can be accepted as that of animal. The more specific definition sufficiently defines the more general.

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<sup>423</sup> Saçaklızâde, *Risāla al-Waladiyya*, fol.1b; idem, *Taqrīr al-Qawānin*, p. 14.

However, Saçaklızâde explains that later scholars (*muta'akhkhirūn*) hold the opinion that “definition should be equal (*musāwī*) to the term defined.” This means that the more general (*a'amm*) should be defined by the more general, and the more specific (*akhaṣṣ*) by the more specific. For example, man can be defined by horse or dog as “animal” because they are the same genus (*jins*), as to those scholars, “same” means equivalent (*musāwī*), and therefore, black person should be defined by white person, not by man. Man is equal to animal because they are both more general (*a'amm*) terms. For Saçaklızâde, this approach made defining clearer and allowed each thing to assume its proper place.<sup>424</sup>

(3) The definition should not fall into the pitfalls of infinite regress (*tasalsul*), circularity (*dawr*) and of combining contradictories (*ijtimā' al-nāqiḍayn*). For example, in the claim that “knowledge (*'ilm*) is the discovery of what is known (*ma'lūm*),” the word *ma'lūm* causes circularity (*dawr*) and therefore such a claim is invalid (*fāsid*). If knowledge is defined as the discovery of what is already known, then there is no knowledge. If there is no knowledge (*'ilm*), then, there is no *ma'lūm* (what is known).<sup>425</sup>

As mentioned above, definitions are not subject to proof in argumentation. Q may only ask for clarification or specification of definition. Objection (*man'at*) can be leveled at P's definition if it is *ta'rīf al-*

<sup>424</sup> Saçaklızâde, *Risāla al-Waladiyya*, fol.1a-1b; idem, *Taqrīr al-Qawānin*, p. 14.

<sup>425</sup> Saçaklızâde, *Risāla al-Waladiyya*, fol.1b; idem, *Taqrīr al-Qawānin*, p. 14.

*lafzī*, but objection (*manʿ*) cannot be used for actual definition (*taʿrīf al-ḥaqīqī*). For example, if P says “this is a chair,” he should refer to a chair which is present. The existence of the chair cannot be objected to because it is present. Q could at this stage question the nominal definition by simply saying “that which you refer to is not a chair but a throne.”

The second type of objection (*manʿ*) is negation of deficient definition by providing an argument. Deficit definitions may occur if the definition does not meet the requirement of the actual definition (*taʿrīf al-ḥaqīqī*), as mentioned above. Simply put, more than half of Saçaklızâde’s work deals with the problem of definition, division and limitation before even coming to discuss the reasoning in argumentation. Even at the beginning of *Taqrīr* and *Risāla*, after defining the basic terms used in *ādāb al-baḥth*, Saçaklızâde moves quickly on to the question of definition. This is wholly novel and is Saçaklızâde’s personal innovation.

In Ijī’s example, the final point in the debate over the createdness of the Qur’an came down to the definition of a word and its meaning. Aristotle stresses that the starting point for dealing with people who advance eristical arguments is definition (*Metaphysics*, 1012a/17-28), because defective definition is the most common fallacy in argument (*Soph. El.*, 168b/19-21) and attacks on definition are always made more easily than those on reasoning in arguments (*Topics*, 111b/12-16).



For example, a Q will not consent to a P's conclusion until he and P have settled the meaning of the word "cheating," and he cannot allow another argument to stand by any means. This is because, to establish or defeat a thesis, the meanings of a term that are appropriate to one's case must be brought forward, leaving the rest aside (*Topics*, 110b/28-32).

In Saçaklızâde's work, it is clear that Q frequently draws attention to P's definitions. When he defines a term, for example, he says, 'this is in old Arabic, meaning A or B,' attacking P's definition of 'definition.' Now, the strength of argument is equal to the clarity of P's definitions and therefore, the result of P's ignorance of words vitiates his reasoning. Q does not have to bring (or produce) a new proof (*dalīl*) or a new premise and does not need to show the fallacy in an existing premise, he can simply hold an argument through an attack on definition to rephrase P's entire argument. Until Saçaklızâde, Q was focusing on P's argument, but now Q is focusing on P's definitions (and therefore his divisions and limitations).<sup>426</sup>

What is most interesting in Saçaklızâde's case is that Aristotle believes that the exact account of definition is more scientific than dialectical and is thus the business of the *Posterior Analytics* (II, 3-13) and not of the *Topics*, where it is usually said that definition should simply express essence (101b/21,39; 139a/34). During the classical period, dialectic was interested in "hal" questions (i.e., is cheating good or bad?) not "mā"

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<sup>426</sup> Saçaklızâde, *Risāla al-Waladiyya*, fol.1b-4b; idem, *Taqrīr al-Qawānin*, pp. 15-31.

questions (i.e., what is cheating?) which ask the essence of something. The paradigm shift that took place with Saçaklızâde corresponds to this Aristotelian sense: *ādāb al-baḥth* was now dealing with definition.<sup>427</sup>

In this sense, *ādāb al-baḥth* as a theory tried to replace *Kitāb al-Burhān* in Arabic logic (Posterior Analytics) when all post-classical authors on *ādāb al-baḥth* were attacking old *jadāl* (dialectic) that only answered restrictive questions. Saçaklızâde demonstrated that it was possible in the post-classical period, as far as the eighteenth century was concerned, to give a full and perfect definition of something that showed both its “essence” and all its properties through division (*taqṣīm*) and limitation (*ḥaṣr*). But, did this make *ādāb al-baḥth* more scientific than dialectical? Answering this question is the task of next chapter. I will now present Gelenbevî’s work on *ādāb al-baḥth* preceded by his brief biography.

## 5. GELENBEVÎ (d.1205/1791)

Şeyhzâde ‘İsmâ‘îl b. Muştafâ Gelenbevî was born in Gelenbe near Manisa, a town belonging to the city of Saruhan in the province of Aydin in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire. His background differs slightly to that of the other notable figures in *ādāb al-baḥth* who have been mentioned.

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<sup>427</sup> Miller in this respect informs us that “[A]ccording to the commentators [of Aristotle], Aristotle’s questions are really two sets of questions, one referring to complex *quacsita* and the other to simple ones. In the former (*quacsita*), one seeks the cause, in the latter, the definition... Al-Kâtib remarks that *jadāl* is essentially concerned with the cause (*‘illa*) whereas *burhān* is concerned with definition.” See Miller, pp. 30-31.

Gelenbevî's father died when he was a child, and he is said to have spent most of his time idly walking the streets of Gelenbe, sometimes playing games with his friends. During this time, one of his father's friends reprimanded the young boy, reminding him that he came "from a family of scholars yet was indifferent to the world of knowledge and was wasting his life in the streets." This warning affected Gelenbevî accordingly, and he decided to take courses in the local *madrassa* before moving alone to Istanbul.

Once there, he was accepted to Fatih Külliye (University), which was one of the best at that time, and because he was a promising orphan child, the University provided Gelenbevî with accommodation. He took courses on Arabic and Islamic religious sciences from the Yasincizâde Osman, and logic, physics and mathematics from Muhammed Emin Efendi, who was known in Istanbul as the 'walking library' (*ayaklı kütüphane*). While studying under Emin Efendi's supervision, Gelenbevî wrote his first book, *Burhân fî 'ilm al-Mîzân*, which focused on logic. Even though Emin Efendi criticized Gelenbevî for writing hurriedly and publishing *Burhân* before finishing his studies (in particular before completing Taftâzânî's book on rhetoric *Muṭawwal*) he acknowledged the talent of his student.

Gelenbevî's writing tended to focus on logic even though he was also an expert in mathematics and on completion of his studies, he taught geometry and mathematics in the Naval Academy (*Mühendishâne-i Bahr-i*

*Hümâyûn*) in Istanbul until he was appointed as the judge (*qāḍī*) of Mora by Sultan Selim III in 1790. Gelenbevî held this position for one year, until his death in 1791.<sup>428</sup>

After demonstrating how argumentation theory became a kind of definition theory, it is clear from Gelenbevî's *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth*,<sup>429</sup> that his response was to follow Saçaklızâde's new approach to the theory. Gelenbevî follows the conceptual originality but not the structural novelty of Saçaklızâde's theory. For example, whereas the latter puts definition and division at the beginning of his work, Gelenbevî puts those central sections at the end of his *Risāla*, although he does discuss them in great detail.<sup>430</sup> However, at the beginning, after defining *baḥth* and *munāzara*, he uses the word *tawjīh* (corresponding) as *şinā'at al-tawjīh* (the art of corresponding/relevancy): this is the new name for *ādāb al-baḥth* in Saçaklızâde and Gelenbevî's works.<sup>431</sup> Giving a new name to *ādāb al-baḥth* is also completely novel. It not only encompasses the rules of argumentation, but it also presents an art of relevancy. By *tawjīh*, Saçaklızâde and Gelenbevî both mean that P and Q must correspond to each other: Q raises objections to refute P's thesis, and therefore, Q's objections

<sup>428</sup> For Gelenbevî's life and his works in detail can be found in the following studies by Abdulkuddüs Bingöl, *Gelenbevi İsmail* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988) and idem, *Gelenbevi'nin Mantık Anlayışı* (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1993).

<sup>429</sup> For Gelenbevî's *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth*, see *GAL Suppl.*, II, p. 302. I use MS 403 in Çelebi Abdullah collection, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi. Henceforth Gelenbevî, *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth*.

<sup>430</sup> Gelenbevî *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth*, fols. 27b-29a; Saçaklızâde, *Taqrīr*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>431</sup> Ibid., fols. 21b-22a.

have to be relevant to P's thesis. Otherwise, there is nothing to debate because Q's objections are not relevant.<sup>432</sup>

The fundamental issue of *ādāb al-baḥth*, as we saw, is the problem of proof (*dalīl*), since Q asks P to bring his proof (in *man'* stage) or refutes that proof (*munāqaḍa* stage) or asks P to object to the thesis (*mu'arāḍa* stage). The importance of proof in argumentation theory led Gelenbevî, as it did Saçaklızâde, to spare a section on evaluating the historical evolution of the relationship between proof (*dalīl*) and the proven (*madlûl*). Gelenbevî cites different approaches to the concept of proof, namely the approaches of logicians, Ash'arites, philosophers, Mu'tazilites and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in order to make his readers aware of different approaches.<sup>433</sup>

After providing the conditions for definitions and earlier scholars and later scholar's approaches to definition, Gelenbevî argues that Q can even raise an objection to P's definition of clarity and of uncertainty based on the relative value of these terms. In today's language, Gelenbevî says that one person's uncertainty would be another person's clarity and vice versa. He reveals the depth of definition and division as a central problem, which is reflected by their inclusion in debate examples.<sup>434</sup> In the Samarqandī and post-Samarqandī period, examples were drawn exclusively from the fields of theology, philosophy and jurisprudence. In Gelenbevî's

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<sup>432</sup> Gelenbevî *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth*, fols. 21b-22a; Saçaklızâde, *Taqrīr*, pp. 2-5.

<sup>433</sup> Gelenbevî *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth*, fols. 23b-24a.

<sup>434</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 27b-28a.

era, examples are related to definitions and divisions. For example, Q objects to P's definition of objection, contradiction and of counter-argument by saying that their definitions are all invalid, and P tries to defend his definition of techniques.<sup>435</sup>

Another example could be Q objecting to P's division and P trying to defend it (*taqsīm*). This affected the terms used in *ādāb al-baḥth*: new terms emerge such as *tahrīr al-murād*, meaning that P has to clarify his objective or aim (*murād*) in the debate so that the points of dispute becomes clear for Q. In order to accomplish this, P has the responsibility of clarifying his points as soon as he notices that Q does not understand or has misunderstood his definitions or the meanings of words that he is using.<sup>436</sup> This is not apparent in any other texts in the post-classical period except for those by Saçaklızâde and Gelenbevî.

When I compare the authors analyzed in this chapter with Miller's claim (that none of these writings<sup>437</sup> went much beyond the rules that Samarqandī gave in the *Risāla* and *Qusṭās*), I find his assertion implausible. He may be correct when it comes to Ījī, Jurjānī and Taşköprüzâde but for Saçaklızâde, Miller is mistaken. Most of the authors followed what Samarqandī had established with some modifications and refinements, as

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<sup>435</sup> Ibid., fols. 28b-29a.

<sup>436</sup> Ibid., fols. 25b-26a.

<sup>437</sup> As mentioned above, Miller cites the five authors Ījī, Jurjānī, Taşköprüzâde, Saçaklızâde and Gelenbevî. See Miller, p. 237.

Miller suggested, but Saçaklızâde represents a new paradigm focusing mostly on definition and making it the central issue in argumentation. Saçaklızâde's novelty did not go unnoticed: when the Ottoman *madrassa* system was undergoing difficult changes in the nineteenth century, his *Risāla* was one of the few works suggested by the committee for Ottoman *madrassa* students,<sup>438</sup> and indeed his work was used as the chief textbook on argumentation theory at Azhar University until the twentieth century.<sup>439</sup>

What is more important than refuting Miller's conclusion, though, is to analyze and answer how these processes (in works from Samarqandī up to Saçaklızâde) took shape in the way that they did and how post-classical Islamic intellectuals responded to the argumentative discourse that was bequeathed to the post-classical world by their predecessors. The final chapter will respond to these questions.

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<sup>438</sup> Hüseyin Atay, "Medreselerin Islahatı," *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 25 (1982):1-43, p.18.

<sup>439</sup> James Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt* (London: Cass, 1967), p. 65.

## *Chapter 4*

### ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESSES

#### I. CONCEPTUAL SHIFTS BETWEEN THE CLASSICAL AND POST-CLASSICAL PERIODS

The present analysis of the processes that transformed argumentation theory will cover the period 1300-1800, carving out the territory from Samarqandī to Gelenbevî. What is striking about this period is the persistence of what could be called the *linguistic turn* in argumentation theory. After a centuries-long run, the *jadāl*-based dialectic of the classical period came to be displaced by a new argumentation theory which was dominantly linguistic in character. I argue that this *linguistic turn* in argumentation dates from the final quarter of the fourteenth century in Ījī's impressively prescient work on *'ilm al-waḍ'*. This new idea, that argumentation is about definition and that therefore, defining is the business of language (and perhaps even that language is the only available medium for understanding the speaker and being understood by the listener), affected the way that argumentation theory was processed throughout most of the period in question.



The fifteenth- through eighteenth-century *'ilm al-waḍ'* and *ādāb al-baḥth* (philosophy of language and argumentation theory) appear to have more in common than has ever been suggested by scholars in the field. However, it must be noted from the outset that *ādāb al-baḥth* deals with the question of *dalīl* (sign or indicator), whereas *'ilm al-waḍ'* deals with the counterpart *dalālāt* (things signified) or *madlūl* (thing indicated), and thus the two connect logically through the identity between signs and things signified. In other words, the central problem of *ādāb al-baḥth* is the question of proof, which means that every argument or claim requires a proof; for example, a brunette woman claims that her husband is cheating on her. In order to prove this she presents a strand of blond hair from her husband's coat, and the process of proof (*dalīl*) and proven (*madlūl*) begins. In this process *ādāb al-baḥth* is interested in the use of hair as proof whereas *'ilm al-waḍ'* is interested in what this proof proves (is the hair a sign of adultery, and if so, what kind?). To be precise, *'ilm al-waḍ'* asks: how do we, either as laymen or specialists in a certain field, construct the meaning of adultery so that we can ascertain whether or not this is an adulterous incident, and if it is, what type of adultery is it? How does finding a piece of hair on one's partner's coat (*dalīl*) come to be perceived as a sign of that partner cheating (*dalāla*)? Are the things signified established by legal, linguistic, cultural or even historical forces?

Bernard Weiss' meticulous study unearthed the emergence of this genre (*'ilm al-waḍ'*),<sup>440</sup> which is known in Islamic jurisprudence as the givenness of language (*waḍ' al-lughā*). Although my presentation of this genre and Ijī's work will entirely depend on Weiss' account (1966),<sup>441</sup> I will go beyond his work and introduce different phases (in particular, the post-Ijī period), which Weiss has not covered. In order to understand the phenomenon of *'ilm al-waḍ'* (which went hand in hand with *ādāb al-baḥth* in the post-classical period; most *ādāb al-baḥth* authors wrote individual treatises on *'ilm al-waḍ'* as well),<sup>442</sup> it is necessary to understand how this discussion was passed to Ijī's and Saçaklızâde's generations from their predecessors, so that the way in which *'ilm al-waḍ'* had already affected the *ādāb al-baḥth* by Saçaklızâde's time becomes clear.

Language (*lughā*) comes into being when expressions (*alfāz*) and meanings are brought together. If they are separated from each other, then all that remains are mere sounds on the one hand (gibberish-like speech with

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<sup>440</sup> It is very hard to give a literal translation of the title of this science, however, through the process of our discussion the different senses of the meaning of *'ilm al-waḍ'* (if not the literal translation) will become clear. For these difficulties, see Bernard Weiss, "Ilm al-waḍ': An Introductory Account of a Later Muslim Philological Science," *Arabica* 34/3 (1987), p. 339.

<sup>441</sup> Therefore, the following pages are a summary of Weiss' dissertation, and instead of using quotation marks I will simply mention the exact pages in footnotes from his dissertation; see Bernard George Weiss, "Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought: A Study of "Waḍ' al-Lughah" and Its Development," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1966). Henceforth Weiss, *Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought*. I also checked most of the original sources that Weiss cites in his study just for the sake of accuracy.

<sup>442</sup> For the full names of these authors and their works, see Rudolph Mach, *Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts (Yahuda Section) in the Garrett Collection Princeton University Library*, pp. 293-97.

no actual meaning) and pure abstract ideas on the other. Language is the totality of expressions together with the totality of their meanings. Expressions are citizens of the external physical world (*khārijī*), whereas meanings are natives of the internal intelligible world (*dhihnī*).<sup>443</sup> Language fills the gap between these two worlds (the external and the mental). In a logical order; if there is A: expression (*lafz*), then there is B: the meaning (*ma'nā*). If there is B then the mystery of C arises: '*ilm al-waḍ'*' or the assignment of a meaning to an expression, i.e., the when, for what purpose, how and who that assign a specific meaning to a specific expression.

In the context of Islamic intellectual history, this concept is particularly significant since God is believed to have spoken to human beings through the Prophet, following which His words were recorded in a Book. It is then, up to mankind to listen and obey and therefore, in order to understand, man has no option other than the language in which the Book is written. If human beings master the language, they can understand what God has said: language is the only *point of contact* between God and man since we do not know where He is or what He does. The idea of the language as a given is elaborated in terms of a radical doctrine of semantic fixity. The givenness of language (what is provided and established, with respect to language), is the relationship between expressions (*alfāz*) and meanings (*ma'ānī*). Expressions are established (*wuḍi'a*) for their meanings,

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<sup>443</sup> Weiss, *Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought*, pp. 1-3.

and what is established cannot be changed. This guarantees that the expressions of the sacred text have a fixed and constant meaning which the Muslim community will never lose, since these meanings are rooted in the given: nothing is lost in translation.<sup>444</sup>

In this context, the discussion of the origin of language was concerned primarily with this expression-meaning relationship. The question of how language comes into being was understood as a question of *how expressions come to be related to their meanings*. At the foundation of this discussion, lay a desire to demonstrate the ground on which the givenness of the expression-meaning can be established. There were five principal positions in terms of the origin of language:<sup>445</sup>

1. Naturalist: Language is a natural affinity (*munāsaba ṭabīʿīya*), represented by ʿAbbād Ibn Sulaymān (d.250/864).
2. Conventionalist: Language is social convention (*iṣṭilāḥ*), represented by Muʿtazīlī Abū Hāshim (d.321/933).
3. Revelationist: God is the namer of things, represented by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d.323/935).
4. Compromise Theory: God reveals some elements and the remainder is convention, represented by Abū Iṣḥāq al-Isfarāʾīnī (d.418/1027).
5. Non-Committal View (*waqf* or *tawaqquf*): Both conventionalist and revelationist views are logical possibilities (*iḥtimāl*), represented by great theologian al-Bāqillānī (d.403/1013).

An actual controversy did not occur until the turn of the ninth century when the diffusion of argumentative discourse reached the

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<sup>444</sup> Ibid., pp. 4-7.

<sup>445</sup> Ibid., pp. 8-18. For discussion of the Islamic debate on the origin of language in depth, see Bernard Weiss, "Medieval Muslim Discussions of the Origin of Language," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft* 124 (1974): 33-41.

dialectical milieu (mentioned in the first chapter). However, among those, two views came to dominate the debate, namely, those of Mu‘tazilites and Ash‘arites. For Mu‘tazilites (conventionalists), Arabic as the language of the Arabs was a socially constructed phenomenon referring to the Qur’anic verse: “[w]e sent no Prophet unless with the tongue of his people in order that he may enlighten them.” (Q.14:4).<sup>446</sup> In his *Kitāb al-Mu‘tamad*, the Mu‘tazilite legal theorist Abū Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d.435/1044), goes beyond maintaining that the term *waḍ‘* means the establishment of language by social convention, to suggest that it also means the establishment of language by lexicographers (*ahl al-luġha*). In this sense, the lexicographers are said to have established Arabic language (*waḍa‘ū al-Arabiyya*).<sup>447</sup>

On the other hand, for Ash‘arites (revelationists), the discontinuity between the language of the Arabs and of the Qur’ān was more apparent than the continuity. They emphasized this discontinuity on the grounds that language was, for them, the result of divine instruction referring to the Qur’anic verse (2:31): “*God taught Adam all the names*” (*‘allama Ādam al-asmā’ kullahā*). This meant that the relationship between expressions and meanings was rooted in the nature of God, in the divine articulateness, and also that man learns both expressions and meanings from God. The terms

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<sup>446</sup> The Mu‘tazilites believed that this verse testified to the fact that language precedes revelation and it was this awareness that led them to adopt a method of Qur’ān interpretation in which philological principles were extracted through the study of pre-Islamic poetry; see, Weiss, p. 27.

<sup>447</sup> Abū Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, *Kitāb al-Mu‘tamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Damascus: Institut Francais de Damas, 1964), p. 16.

around which the controversy revolved were: *iṣṭilāh* (technical language), *tawāḍu‘* (conventional meaning) and *tawāṭu‘* (convention) for convention thesis, and *tawqīf* (Divine instruction), *ilhām* (inspiration) and *wahy* (revelation) for divine origin thesis.<sup>448</sup>

It is important at this stage to ask what it was about the conventionalist position that commended it to the majority of Mu‘tazilites. It appears to have been a question of *khalq al-Qur‘ān* (the createdness of the Qur‘ān). The Mu‘tazilites, in defending their position, emphasized the created nature of speech in general. Speech, they argued, consists of sounds, which are transient. God cannot be said to speak (*mutakallim*) since he does not enter into the ephemeral order; he can only be said to cause speech.<sup>449</sup>

The conventionalists in turn advanced the following arguments. To reference authority, they cited the Qur‘anic verse (14:4): “we never sent a messenger, but [to teach] in the language of his people,” which implies that language precedes revelation. Arguing from reason, they proceeded to suggest that if God is the author of language, then to know language, i.e. to know that expressions are established for certain meanings, is to know something about God. This implies a necessary knowledge of God within man, which renders humans responsible (*taklīf*). Moreover, how could God

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<sup>448</sup> Weiss, *Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought*, pp. 18-25. For a discussion of the views of the grammarians on the debate about the origin of language, see Mustafa Shah, “The Philological Endeavours of the Early Arabic Linguists: Theological Implications of the *tawqīf-iṣṭilāh* Antithesis and the *Majāz* Controversy: Part I,” *Journal of Qur‘anic Studies* 1 (1999): 27-46.

<sup>449</sup> Weiss, *Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought*, pp. 33.

convey language to humans when He himself possesses no physical presence? Divine instruction in language requires the use of hands to gesture towards the objects to which the names being taught belong.<sup>450</sup> In other words, the idea of the divine origin of language requires a humanlike representation of God, and this was one of the most serious challenges that the Mu'tazilites levelled at the Ash'arites.

This controversy eventually reached an impasse in the early eleventh century when the Shafi'ite jurist, Abū Ishāq al-Isfarā'inī, proposed a compromise between the revelationist and conventionalist views. According to him, God created a kind of 'minimal' language, which was sufficient to enable mankind to meet its basic needs and to enter into the social relations necessary to establish conventions. Through convention, language could develop beyond the original 'minimal' stage and thus, language was a phenomenon created by God and expanded by human beings.<sup>451</sup>

However, this compromise failed to gain wide acceptance and the debate over the origin of language declined in the eleventh century. Al-Bāqillānī (d.403/1013) declared that neither the "theological" nor the "conventionalist" points of view have conclusive evidence on their side and

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<sup>450</sup> Recently Sophia Vasalou has analysed the views of Baṣran Mu'tazilites on the origin of language using certain key elements of Wittgenstein's critical framework towards language, see S. Vasalou, "Their Intention Was Shown by Their Bodily Movements: The Baṣran Mu'tazilites on the Institution of Language," *Journal of History of Philosophy* 47:2 (2009): 201-221.

<sup>451</sup> Weiss, *Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought*, pp. 31-34.

that therefore the question of the origin of language should be held in suspension (*tawaqquf*). This suspension view was accepted as the last word on the subject by most later theologians and legal theorists. From al-Bāqillānī's time onward, the divine origin of language has been seen as a logical possibility (*iḥtimāl*) to be entertained, but not advocated. The same is also true of the conventional origin of language.<sup>452</sup>

Belief in the divine origin of language did not disappear altogether, however, but continued to be asserted by two ultra-conservative groups within Islamic intellectual history: the Zāhirites, especially the most representative of this school Ibn Ḥazm (d.456/1064), and the Ḥanbalites. Ibn Taymīyah (d.728/1328), the chief representative of Ḥanbalite thought, insisted that the conventionalist view was an innovation, formulated by certain scholars as a justification for the notion of metaphor (*majāz*).<sup>453</sup>

The significance of all of these early debates for the later development of the givenness of language (*waḍ' al-luḡha*) is simply that the givenness of language was accepted as a fact which did not require further justification. Such a thing as the language of the Arabs existed prior to the time of the Prophet, the Qur'ān and Sunna were written in this language, and therefore, a knowledge of this language was fundamental to the understanding of the Qur'ān and Sunna. Precisely how Arabic came into

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<sup>452</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>453</sup> Ibid., p. 35.



being was a matter of detail. The fact was that it existed and was thus a given that could be taken at face value. The term *wadʿ*, then, rather than expressing a particular doctrine of the origin of language, came to express the present status of language as *established*. What matters therefore, is not how language came into being at some remote point in the past—an unknown mystery—but rather the status of language *now*, as a *given*, as starting point of thought.<sup>454</sup>

Only that which is established in language is relevant to the interpretation of texts. The successors of the Muʿtazilites introduced a special introductory section into their books which dealt with the givens of language. This section was entitled “linguistic premises” (*al-mabādīʾ al-lughawīya*), and within it, the term *wadʿ* served as a main point.<sup>455</sup>

In this debate, the issue of the metaphor (*majāz*)<sup>456</sup> also offered quite a challenge, and thus, the metaphor is defined as an expression which is used to signify a meaning other than the meaning for which it has been established (*wudiʿa*). The word “lion,” for example, has been established for a particular kind of animal. When used to signify a courageous man, it has

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<sup>454</sup> Weiss, *Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought*, p. 41.

<sup>455</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>456</sup> On different senses of the word *majāz* in classical Islamic intellectual history, see Wolfhart Heinrichs, “On the Genesis of the *Ḥaqīqa-Majāz* Dichotomy,” *Studia Islamica* 59 (1984):111-40; idem, “Contacts between Scriptural Hermeneutics and Literary Theory in Islam: the Case of *Majāz*,” *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften* 7 (1991/92): 253-84; B. Reinert, “Madjāz,” *EP*, V, pp.1025-6 and Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, *Asrār al-Balāgha, The Mysteries of Eloquence*, ed. Hellmut Ritter (Istanbul: Government Press, 1954).

actually been severed from the meaning for which it was established and transferred to another meaning. For this reason, those who rejected metaphor argued that it represented a usage of language that was contrary to its original establishment; it was a violation of language itself, a wilful manipulation of language.<sup>457</sup>

The Mu'tazilites tried to show that metaphor, rather than being a violation of language, was a central part of it, and this created problems. To claim that metaphors are established like other words deprives them of their distinctiveness and assimilates them into ordinary words. It was through this process that the opponents of the Mu'tazilites disposed of the metaphor.<sup>458</sup> The word "lion," the opponents claimed, was established for two meanings: "predatory animal" and "courageous man" and could be used to denote either one. Each usage was separate and legitimate in accordance with a separate establishment.

How is it possible then, to define which words had been established for which meanings? This can only be discovered through transmission (*naql*).<sup>459</sup> The establishment of an expression for a particular meaning is

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<sup>457</sup> Weiss, *Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought*, pp. 49-51.

<sup>458</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

<sup>459</sup> "Zarkashī (d.744/1344), for example, lays down five conditions for the obligatory acceptance of a word through transmission (*naql*): (1) It must be proved by a strong chain of transmitters to be of Arabic origin. (2) The trustworthiness of the transmitters must be established. (3) The word must be transmitted from someone who is considered to be a great authority (*hujjah*) in matters of language. (4) The transmitter must actually hear the word from the one from whom he transmits it. (5) Those who transmit it from him must

essentially a fact of history and consequently, the subject of transmission takes its place within a language that is *already* established. *Lughā* and *waḍ‘* are, therefore, closely related terms here; knowledge of one equates to knowledge of the other. The only avenue to *waḍ‘ al-lughā* is transmission (*naql*); the only authority in language is what is transmitted from the Qur’ān, Sunna and *kalām al-‘Arab*. With the latter (*kalām al-‘Arab*), lexicographers (*ahl al-lughā*) drew chiefly on the pre-Islamic poets, though many of them also consulted with contemporary Bedouins.<sup>460</sup>

As for Islamic law, when it comes to established meanings, certain expressions (which are primarily Qur’anic, for example, *ṣalā*, or daily prayers and *ṣawm*, or fasting) were recognized to have meanings in the context of law which they do not have in ordinary language. The problem was whether to interpret such expressions in accordance with their “linguistic” or their “legal” meanings in particular cases. Jurists, therefore, had to know the established meanings of particular expressions (*dalālat al-waḍ‘iyya*) in order to ascertain the meaning of texts. The literal sense (*ẓāhir*) is the starting point of legal interpretation where there are two types of signification: explicit (*dalālat al-manṭūq*) and implicit (*dalālat al-*

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also hear the word from him.” Cited in Weiss, *Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought*, p. 68.

<sup>460</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

*mathūm*). The former is more fundamental for jurists since it is the ascertainment of the literal sense.<sup>461</sup>

By this point in Islamic intellectual history, philologists had recognized the possibility of technical vocabularies. “When an artisan creates tools for his profession,” says Weiss, “he must give these tools names; these names constitute a vocabulary peculiar to him and his co-workers, which is quite distinct from the language proper.” Technical vocabularies arise out of a special *wadʿ* in which a group of artisans or specialists participate. This type of *wadʿ* is characterized as *wadʿ al-ʿurfi*, distinct from *wadʿ al-lughawī*. The latter exclusively forms the basis of language itself and is authoritative for the whole community. *Wadʿ al-ʿurfi* is authoritative only in the domain in which it is operative. For legal theorists, the question was whether to take *al-wadʿ al-lughawī* or *al-wadʿ al-sharʿī* (a special legal *wadʿ*) as the basis of the legal idiom.<sup>462</sup>

This basis (*givenness*) was pragmatic, rather than theoretical. Every system of thought must begin somewhere, and a system based on a given text must necessarily begin with language. If the system is to be solid and stable, so must the language upon which it rests in the final analysis be solid and stable. Language must be above the shifting movements of human

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<sup>461</sup> Ibid., pp. 72-73.

<sup>462</sup> Ibid., pp. 79-81.

affairs; it must be a given, an absolute, a fixed and reliable point of reference. That which is given is understood to be “established.”<sup>463</sup>

The idea of the givenness of language reached its fullest expression with Ijī’s treatise on ‘*ilm al-waḍ’*.<sup>464</sup> His emphasis shifts from the givenness of certain features of language (metaphor, generality, homonymity, synonymity) to the givenness of language in its totality as he finally attempted to demonstrate that language in its totality is established, as Weiss has shown. The science of post-classical ‘*ilm al-waḍ’* explores this presupposition of the classical period’s legal theorists by attempting to show how all elements in language have been established, and thereby to calculate systematically the idea of the givenness of language in its totality (not only expressions but also formal elements of language, i.e. forms of words, suffixes, etc.).<sup>465</sup> The meaning of a sentence is simply the sum total meaning of its parts and of the units contained in it.<sup>466</sup> Each unit thus has

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<sup>463</sup> Ibid., pp. 87-88.

<sup>464</sup> For Ijī’s treatise on ‘*ilm al-waḍ’* entitled *Risāla al-Waḍ’iyya al-‘Aḍudiyya*, see *Kc̣şf*, I, 877,898; *Esmâ*, I, 527; *GAL*, II, 208 and idem, SII, 288.

<sup>465</sup> Weiss, *Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought*, pp. 90-93. See also Bernard Weiss, “A Theory of the Parts of Speech in Arabic (Noun, Verb and Particle): A Study in ‘*Ilm al-Waḍ’*,” *Arabica* 23/1 (1976): 23-36.

<sup>466</sup> Ijī’s new approach towards language resembles the twentieth-century Russian soccer coach Valeriy Lobanovskyi’s new approach to football in Russia after the great struggle between “individuality” and “system.” The football critic Jonathan Wilson tells us that “[t]he player in Lobanovskyi wanted to dribble, to invent tricks and to embarrass his opponents, and yet, as he later admitted, his training at the Polytechnic Institute drove him to a systematic approach, to break down football into *its component tasks*. Football, he explained, eventually became for him a *system of twenty-two elements*—two sub-systems of eleven elements—moving within a defined area (the pitch) and subject to a series of restrictions (the laws of the game). If the sub-systems were equal, the outcome would be a draw. If one were stronger, it would win.” See Jonathan Wilson, *The History of Football Tactics*, p. 236.

its own proper meaning and therefore, in the sentence “*Zayd fī al-dār*” (Zayd is in the house), Zayd stands for the idea of the person Zayd,<sup>467</sup> *fī* stands for the idea of “in-ness” (*zarfiyya*), and *al-dār* stands for the idea of a particular house. These ideas, when assembled, produce the total meaning of the sentence.<sup>468</sup>

In the sentence, “*jā’a Zayd min al-Baṣra*” (Zayd came from Basra), “from,” like the other expressions, stands for an idea, (“commencement”) but unlike the idea signified by other expressions, this idea is implicit within the ideas signified by the expressions surrounding “from.” “From” (*min* in Arabic) stands for the idea of from-ness, or “commencement” (*ibtidā’*) but this idea is not regarded for its own sake as the meaning of “from.” It is viewed rather, as an instrument for relating other ideas to each other and therefore, “from” does not merely signify “commencement,” it signifies “commencement” as an idea, which relates the idea of Basra and to the idea of “coming” to each other.<sup>469</sup>

In this context, Ijī’s treatise on *‘ilm al-waḍ’* examines the categories of *waḍ’* and then the manner in which these categories are applied to the elements of language, in response to the classical period. Ijī’s objection to the earlier scholars’ (*mutaqaddimūn*) treatment of the language is that the

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<sup>467</sup> Zayd, a male name, is used as a legal phantom in Islamic legal literature (with its female counterpart Hind) corresponding to the Richard Roe of English judicial function.

<sup>468</sup> Weiss, *Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought*, pp. 110-11.

<sup>469</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

earlier scholars considered that personal pronouns, relative pronouns and demonstrative pronouns were established for universal ideas arising in the mind of the author of the language. For example, “he” is established for the idea of a single male person who is absent (*ghā’ib*) from the speech situation. If one were to look up the meaning of “he” in a lexicon, one would certainly not expect to find an exhaustive list of all those particulars to which “he” has referred or can refer to; rather one would expect to find some sort of abstraction. This *mutaqaddimūn* view meant that the meanings of expressions like “he” were to be located outside of actual speech situations.<sup>470</sup>

To say “(the one) who came from Basra is a noble man,” does not indicate a particular (*one who*) by means of a mental content (*maḍmūn*) which is quite universal. The content, i.e. the meaning, of the phrase “*came from Basra*” is universal, since many particular persons can be said to have come from Basra. A particular person cannot be identified by means of such a general phrase, just as the author of language cannot establish such an expression for “each particular” subsumed under a universal idea, when each particular is not present before him in such a way that he can take into account.<sup>471</sup>

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<sup>470</sup> Ibid., pp. 98-107.

<sup>471</sup> Ibid., pp. 112-13.

What Ijī objected to in this view of the ancients (*mutaqaddimūn*), says Weiss, was that it did not provide an adequate basis for the givenness of the demonstrative character of expressions (*ma'rifa*) like “he.” It was necessary to affirm that such words were established for particular ideas, and the givenness of the *ma'rifa* could only be affirmed in the way of the modern scholars (*muta'akhkhirūn*). Because, “[t]he ancients relied too heavily on pseudo-meanings (ideas in the mind of the author of language), which had little to do with the meanings that these expressions had in every day usage.”<sup>472</sup>

Accordingly, Ijī advanced a new theory of the establishment of personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns and relative pronouns. In this theory, these pronouns (unlike other expressions) were not established for ideas arising in the mind of the author of language. Instead, they were established in the following manner: the author of language forms an idea but instead of establishing an expression for the idea as such, he establishes the expression for each particular subsumed under the idea. The author of language does not establish the expression for a class, i.e. the class of all those particulars subsumed under the idea; “he” does not signify a class, but rather it signifies a single particular. “He,” therefore, is established for each particular in such a way that when the expression is used, only one particular is understood. To elaborate, I will give an example: to say “Zayd

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<sup>472</sup> Ibid., pp. 103-4.



went to Basra” asserts a *relationship* between a particular substance (Zayd) and a particular action, (his going to Basra). The idea of “going to Basra” is in itself *universal* since many persons may go to Basra, but when predicated of Zayd it becomes a *particular* going to Basra, (Zayd’s going to Basra) and therefore, Zayd’s going to Basra may be different from Hind’s or John’s.<sup>473</sup>

In the post-Ījī period, tracts on ‘*ilm al-waḍ’* asked two important questions. The first concerned whether time is of such a nature that it can be particularized. Is the time expressed in *dhahaba Zayd* (Zayd went), for example, a universal idea (i.e., past time, or *al-māḍī*), which can be used to characterise the action of going, or is it a particular time, i.e., the exact point in time in which Zayd went? Does Zayd’s going to Basra in August 1918 characterize the *action* of going to Basra or his going to Basra *in August 1918*?<sup>474</sup> This issue was not resolved.

The second issue in the post-Ījī evolution of the history of Arabic philosophy of language, and the most important one in my opinion, concerns “the relationship between the author’s will (*irāda*) and the signification of an expression (*dalāla*).” As Ījī did not study this area, later authors working on ‘*ilm al-waḍ’* expatiated on the question as to whether or not an author (*al-wāḍi’*) can determine what he or she means by his or her expression. This basic question implies the further query of whether or not God (as an

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<sup>473</sup> Ibid., pp. 104-5.

<sup>474</sup> Ibid., pp. 138-9.

author) can determine what He means by His expression in the Qur'an. In other words, the final and ultimate question that *'ilm al-waḍ'* writers asked, was who determines meaning: writers or readers?<sup>475</sup> This issue was not resolved either.

## 1. THE LINGUISTIC TURN IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY

How then, did, *'ilm al-waḍ'* affect the structure of argumentation theory? How did language become the arbiter of truth? Even though there may be signs of the inclusion of linguistic concerns in argumentation theory before Saçaklızâde, the most clear influence is attested to his works, *Taqrîr* and *Risāla*. I will now investigate *Taqrîr* in order to elaborate on the discussion so far.

The aim of argumentation, according to Saçaklızâde and Gelenbevî, is to grasp the knowledge of particulars (*juz'*) even though the subject-matter of argumentation itself is universal (*kullî*).<sup>476</sup> In order to accomplish this knowledge of particulars, argumentation theory initially focused on definitions (*ta'rifāt*), divisions (*taqsīm*), delimitations (*ḥaṣr*) and the use of words (*alfāz*) in defining, dividing and delimiting things.<sup>477</sup> As a result of this, Q can (in the post-classical period), object to P's definition (or

<sup>475</sup> Muḥammad Raḥmî, *'Ujālat al-Raḥmiyya*, (Istanbul: n.p.,1311), pp. 70-72.

<sup>476</sup> Arabic text reads: (a) *wa 'ilm al-munāzara qawānīn yu'rafu bihā aḥwāl al-abḥāth al-juz'iyya*; (b) *wa mawḍu' 'ilm al-munāzara al-abḥāth al-kulliyā*.

<sup>477</sup> Gelenbevî *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth*, fols. 1a and Saçaklızâde, *Taqrîr*, p. 2.

division) on the basis that P does not use the rules of Arabic grammar, or Q can object to P because P's use of a personal pronoun is incorrect.<sup>478</sup>

More importantly, Q can object to P on the basis that *wad'* is the relation between expression and meaning, but P's use of metaphor (*majāz*) is incorrect because a word is established (*wuḍi'a*) for one meaning but not another.<sup>479</sup> The examples provided in the definition, division and limitation sections of *Taqrīr al-Qawānīn* are concerned with the totality of meaning that is achieved by giving total definitions for each individual word, because argumentation cannot proceed before the definition is established.<sup>480</sup> For example, in his *Taqrīr*, Saçaklızâde says that restrictive particles such as *rubbamā* (perhaps or sometimes), *qad* (may, might or possibly) and *min* (probably) express limitation (*ḥaşr*) in division (*taqsīm*).<sup>481</sup> Now, if Q

<sup>478</sup> Gelenbevî *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth*, fols. 21a and Saçaklızâde, *Taqrīr*, p. 5.

<sup>479</sup> Gelenbevî *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth*, fols. 21b and Saçaklızâde, *Taqrīr*, p. 15.

<sup>480</sup> Saçaklızâde, *Taqrīr*, pp. 1-23.

<sup>481</sup> The omission of the restrictive participle "*rubbamā*" (sometimes or perhaps) by Moroccan feminist sociologist Fatema Mernissi (b.1940), when representing Ghazālī's views on female orgasm in her book *Beyond the Veil*, has caused a great deal of controversy in the past few years. Consequently, Sayyed Muhammad Rizvi (b.1957), a Toronto-based Twelver Shī'ah scholar and author, criticized how Mernissi's omission of the restrictive participle prevented "totality of meaning," in argumentation in his book *Marriage and Morals in Islam*: "[T]hen she quotes Ghazālī's statement about the pattern of ejaculation of the sexes as follows, "...The woman's ejaculation is a much slower process and during that process her sexual desire grows stronger and to withdraw from her before she reaches her pleasure is harmful to her." (*Beyond the Veil*, p. 38). By this statement, Mernissi wants to prove that in Islam woman is considered sexually more active than man is. When I read this statement for the first time, I said to myself that this could not be true at all times: sometimes the male ejaculates first and at other times, the female ejaculates first. And I was surprised that Ghazālī would say such a thing. So I checked the Arabic statement of Ghazālī and noticed that while translating the above quotation, Mernissi has conveniently left out the word "*rubbamā*" which means "sometimes." (Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā'*, vol. 2, p. 148). So the correct statement of Ghazālī is that "The woman's ejaculation *sometimes* [not always] is a much slower process..." With this correction, Mernissi's argument loses its

objects to P's division, claiming that he aimed at limitation (*haṣr*) by his division, which is not valid, P can respond by pointing out the fact that he used the restrictive participles (*rubbamā*, *qad* and *min*) when making division.

In order to elaborate, I will use a sentence containing *qad:qad yakūnu'l-shāhidu ṣādiqan* (the witness may be telling the truth). Here, *qad* is not viewed as distinct from the whole sentence. “*Qad*” (May be) stands for an idea, a possibility. It does not signify “possibility,” but instead merely signifies probability as a relative idea, an idea which relates to the idea of witness and the possibility of his/her telling the truth. Therefore, by using “may be” (*qad*), P can make a limitation (*haṣr*) since the witness telling the truth is only a possibility, not a certainty.

As mentioned above, technical vocabularies arise from a special *wadʿ* in which a group of specialists participate. This type of *wadʿ* is characterized as *wadʿ al-ʿurfī* (customary usage by specialist), distinct from *wadʿ al-lughawī*. It is exclusively the latter which forms the basis of language itself and which is authoritative for the whole community. *Wadʿ al-ʿurfī* is authoritative only in the domain in which it operates. Now, in Saçaklızâde's *Risāla*, the words *ʿurfī*, *iştilāhī*, *qanūn al-ʿArab* and *qanūn al-lughā* are extensively used. Saçaklızâde uses *ʿurf* and *iştilāh* interchangeably

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legs.” See Sayyed Muhammad Rizwi, *Marriage and Morals in Islam*, 2nd edition (Scarborough: The Islamic Education & Information Centre, 1994), p. 19.

to denote the givenness of language in argumentation so that every community's given (established) language must be taken into account.<sup>482</sup>

In Ījī's treatise among others, there are two basic roles for P: if P speaks it is either to quote someone (*nāqil*) or to maintain something (*iddi'ā*).<sup>483</sup> However, Saçaklızâde introduces six categories which introduce new terms: now, if P speaks he either defines (*ta'rîf*) or divides (*taqsîm*) or asserts (*taşdıq*) or makes an incomplete complex statement (*murakkab al-nāqis*)<sup>484</sup> or a simple statement (*mufrad*) or orders (*inshā'*). In the last two categories (*mufrad* and *inshā'*), *munāzara* cannot exist because there is nothing within them to be discussed (*mufrad* consists of simple statements like "Zayd," "book," or "horse" and *inshā'* statements are commands or imperatives such as "do this," "do not do that," or "I hope"). But the first four categories are the subject matter of argumentation (*munāzara*).<sup>485</sup> Gelenbevî and other argumentation theorists have followed these categories.

These efforts emphasizing the totality of language that can be understood by everyone were not original to eighteenth-century post-classical Islamic intellectual history. In fact, the seventeenth century features many example of thinkers working towards this goal: Francis Bacon (d.1626) thought that it would be possible to create a language whose

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<sup>482</sup> Saçaklızâde, *Taqrîr*, pp. 15-20 and *Risāla al-Waladiyya*, fols. 1a-2b and 7a-9b.

<sup>483</sup> Ījī, *Adāb al-'Aḍud*, MS. 129, fol.8a.

<sup>484</sup> Instead of saying "this book is Zayd's," which is *murakkab tām*, P says "Zayd's book," which is *murakkab al-nāqis*.

<sup>485</sup> Saçaklızâde, *Risāla al-Waladiyya*, fols. 1a-2a.

philosophical grammar was perfect, while Gottfried Leibniz (d.1716) later claimed that creating a scientific language was a necessity in discovering the truth.<sup>486</sup> Also in the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Sufi, Muhyî Gülşenî (d.1012/1604),<sup>487</sup> attempted to create such a universal language called ‘Bâleybelen’ (known as *Lisân al-Muhyî*)—the first known non-European<sup>488</sup> constructed language adventure.<sup>489</sup> This final attempt tried to unite Arabic, Persian and Turkish into one language, but Muhyî’s real intention was not to fuse these languages but rather to create (*inshâ*) a new language using these three tools, so that the secrets of God’s knowledge (*kanz makhfî*) could be unveiled (*kashf*). For Muhyî, creating a special language meant opening a path for discovery.<sup>490</sup>

After the *linguistic turn* in argumentation, its seed becomes evident in practice. The preparation of *Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliye* (i.e., *Majalla* in Arabic) is another case in point. The head of the *Mecelle* committee,

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<sup>486</sup> For an exhaustive study of these efforts in Europe, see Umberto Eco, *The Search for the Perfect Language* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).

<sup>487</sup> Muhyî Gülşenî is a Turkish dervish of the Gülşenî order, who was born in 934/1528 in Edirne and who died in Cairo in 1012/1604; for Gülşenî, see Tahsin Yazıcı, “Muhyî-i Gülşenî,” *İslâm*, vol. 31, pp. 79-81.

<sup>488</sup> For a list of constructed languages and their inventors in history, see Arika Okrent, *In the Land of Invented Languages: A Celebration of Linguistic Creativity, Madness, and Genius* (New York: Random House, 2010), pp. 298-314. In this list, Muhyî Gülşenî is positioned second, directly after the creator of *Lingua Ignota*, Hildegard von Bingen (twelfth century).

<sup>489</sup> Muhyî’s basic grammar and dictionary (more than fifteen thousand words) was recently edited by Mustafa Koç, *Bâleybelen: İlk Yapma Dil* (Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2005).

<sup>490</sup> Muhyî Gülşenî, *Bâleybelen*, pp. 53-79.

Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (d.1895),<sup>491</sup> and his team were aware not only of the centrality of language, but also of the importance of establishing universal or general (*kullî*) principles, since it was impossible to have a specific solution for every single individual case in law before those cases had occurred.<sup>492</sup> Once the general principles were extracted from a variety of sources they could be applied to specific cases as they arise.<sup>493</sup>

## 2. BETWEEN VICTORY AND TRUTH

The new theory (*ādāb al-baḥth*) emerged as an alternative to classical *jadal*-based dialectic by criticizing the old system's thirst for victory as an obstacle to searching for truth. The theorists of *ādāb al-baḥth* claimed that the objective of the method was to bring the truth out in either P's or Q's hand, but was this really the case? In the following pages I will problematize this claim both by using texts written during the period in question and also by introducing historical events to investigate its integrity.

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<sup>491</sup> Ahmed Cevdet Paşa is also an author of an individual treatise on argumentation theory entitled *Ādāb al-Sadād min 'ilm al-Ādāb*.

<sup>492</sup> A. Refik Gür, *Hukuk Tarihi ve Tefekkürü Bakımından Mecelle* (Istanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1975), p. 98-110 and Osman Öztürk, *Osmanlı Hukuk Tarihinde Mecelle* (Istanbul: I. I. A. V., 1973), p. 36.

<sup>493</sup> These sources only include works by respected Hanafite jurists' opinions in addition to the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* (excluding the opinions of other three Sunnī legal schools).

In his *Qusṭās*, Samarqandī, gives two pieces of advice to the respondent when P answers Q:

If Q asks a question, then it is a good move (*tadbīr*) on R's [P's] part not to rush into answering it; rather, he should make Q formulate it properly and precisely; for often, he is not up to it and he loses; or, the falsity of his position becomes clear; or, R [P] thinks up the answer (while Q reformulates the question).<sup>494</sup>

To further this, Samarqandī says that Q has to ensure that he has detailed accounts from P so that he can quickly detect any falsehoods that arise from P's proof and insist on evidence in order to expose them. He also points out that neither P nor Q should give each other too much leeway since "many errors can derive from one little thing."<sup>495</sup>

This paragraph demonstrates how the objective of *ādāb al-baḥth* is not far from *adab al-jadal*; the proponent of this new science and Samarqandī's agenda is questionable from its very inception. If the objective of this science is to find the truth (*izhāran li's-ṣawāb* or *izhāran li'l-ḥaqq*) even in the hand of our opponent, then there should be no need for this kind of 'wheeler dealing' moves. The phrases "he loses," "the falsity of his position becomes clear," "neither P or Q should give each other too much leeway," and "many errors can derive from one little thing" sound manipulative, and draw the objective of this new science into question.

<sup>494</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol.60b; Miller, 217.

<sup>495</sup> Samarqandī, *Qusṭās*, fol.61b; Miller, p. 223.



If the objective of *ādāb al-baḥth* is to search for truth rather than to achieve victory then why are these etiquettes necessary? Of course ‘the search for truth’ serves only as a stratagem in the scheme of the dialectical gymnasium games of Greek antiquity. History is rich with examples: in the classical period, the word for juristic difference (*khilāf* and *ikhtilāf*) was associated with the field of law. There are abundant sources dealing with this question in every school of law (*madhhab*) although they differ in their concentration on the field of *khilāf*. Here, the jurists’ game of ‘difference’ is based on the prophetic cliché (used extensively by the jurist for the jurist), “*ikhtilāfu ummatī raḥmatun*” (my community’s differences of opinion is a blessing)<sup>496</sup> only applied to the four legal schools (Ḥanafī, Shafī‘ī, Malikī, Ḥanbalī) since, as “recognized schools,” their disagreements were valid. However, disagreements raised by Ja‘farī *madhhab*, a Shi‘ite school, were

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<sup>496</sup> Ottoman intellectual, a medical doctor, free-thinker, an ideologist of the Young Turks of Kurdish descent Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932) interpreted this *ḥadīth* very differently than conventional meaning, he says in the following: “[T]he real meaning of *ikhtilāfu ummatī raḥmatun* is totally different from what we understand from it today... The *ummah* of Muhammad is one thousand three hundred thirty one years old. Which of the following will be described as *raḥma*: the balance between today’s *ummah* of Muhammad and the *ummah* of Muhammad thirteen hundred years ago or *ikhtilāf* between the first and the fourteenth century *ummahs* of Muhammad from the viewpoints of science, ideology, and civilization. This is what I understand from *ikhtilāfu ummatī raḥmatun*. The people who have such a faith believe in silly tales and refuse the application of the law of evolution to genesis. The men of science maintain that genesis had been realized through a long period of time about millions of years and through evolution, and since it is possible to observe the continuation of evolution today, obviously it makes more sense to accept this explanation ... Therefore, believing in this or that person’s claim maintaining that “God created the universe in an instant” despite all scientific proofs, tests, experiences, and observations is a clear *kufi*. The law of evolution also causes the evolution of the religions of people in accordance with their understanding.” Translated by Şükrü Hanioglu in his article “Garbcılar: Their Attitudes toward Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic,” *Studia Islamica* 86 (1997): 133-58, p. 140.

not: their disagreement would not be accepted as such and therefore were not a source of blessing but a source of trouble.<sup>497</sup> From the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries, the Shi‘ites put the Ja‘farī *madhhab* forward to be accepted as the fifth *madhhab*, but the Ottoman sultan, the protector of Sunni world, Yavuz Sultan Selim (r.1512-1520) refused, claiming that he would “not accept the Ja‘farī’s as the fifth true (*ḥaqq*) *madhhab*.” This situation and its resolution shows that argumentation in action (not in theory) did not set out to find the truth but to maintain the power and the *status quo*.<sup>498</sup>

The founder of the Zāhirite school Dāwūd b. ‘Alī b. Khalaf (d.270/884)<sup>499</sup> provides another example of the use of manoeuvres in argumentation. The famous chronicler of early Islamic history and jurist Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d.310/923) relates that:

Dāwūd b. ‘Alī possessed knowledge of speculative reasoning (*nazar*) and developed certain approaches to employ in disputations so as to cut off his adversaries. The latter debated about definite proofs for a legal problem. When he saw that his adversary was deficient in tradition, he would steer the discussion to it. When he would discuss traditions with him, he would steer him to jurisprudence and when he saw that

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<sup>497</sup> Imām Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq (d.148/768), the sixth imām of the Shi‘ites, gave shape to a specific legal school named after him called Ja‘farī school (*al-madhhab al-ja‘farī*). On the origins and early history of Shi‘ites, Ismailis, see Farhad Daftary, *A Short History of the Ismailis: Traditions of a Muslim Community* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998).

<sup>498</sup> On the problem of fifth *madhhab*, see Devin J. Stewart, *Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver Shiite Responses to the Sunni Legal System* (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 1998) pp. 112-14.

<sup>499</sup> For Dāwūd b. ‘Alī and the Zāhirī school, see Ignaz Goldziher’s classic work, *The Zāhirīs: Their Doctrine and Their History* (Leiden: Brill, 1971).

his opponent was deficient in both tradition and jurisprudence, he would steer him to logical disputation (*jadal*).<sup>500</sup> Dāwūd cleverly switched subjects when he noticed that his adversary had a certain weakness.<sup>501</sup>

The central point in these examples is that they describe the people who were on the top in Islamic political or intellectual history (the supreme Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Selim and the founder of the one of the most influential schools of thought in Islamic intellectual history). Both theories (classical period *jadal* and truth oriented post-classical *ādāb al-baḥṭh*) seem to depend on the same notion: that there is a truth and that truth must be exclusive and unique: it cannot be two things. If there are two truths, then one of them must *necessarily* be stronger or truer than the other one, making one side always weaker or less true or presuming this hierarchy, and thus, in my opinion, nurturing competition and eliciting power relations. So is *ādāb al-baḥṭh* a new theory? Or is it an old version of *jadal* disguised as *izhāran li'l-ṣawāb* (finding the truth)? I use the word “old” not in the sense of classical or post-classical, but to denote a way of thinking. It is implausible though, to argue as Miller does,<sup>502</sup> that the change in title (*ādāb al-baḥṭh* instead of *jadal*) brought the change in contents. By “contents,” I do not

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<sup>500</sup> It refers to Aristotle’s *Topics*.

<sup>501</sup> *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, translated by Franz Rosenthal (New York: SUNY Press, 1989), vol.1, p.121. I modified the translation.

<sup>502</sup> Miller, p. 236.

mean the table of contents or the structure but the essence or substance of something.

The objective of this new science (*ādāb al-baḥth*) was to find out what the truth, or the truth of a thesis<sup>503</sup> was, instead of conquering it (winning a debate). In fact, the truth had already been discovered in the *ādāb al-baḥth* (as a universal method of argumentation). It is no accident that there was not even a single reaction to the *ādāb al-baḥth* in the post-classical period, even while there were a considerable number of forceful criticisms directed towards Greek (Aristotelian) logic (*manṭiq*) both in the classical and post-classical periods.<sup>504</sup> It is remarkable to note that in the post-classical period, the anti-Greek stance in logic was held by not only Hanbalite Ibn Taymiya but also by the founder of the Kadızâdeli movement<sup>505</sup> in the Ottoman Empire, Mehmed Birgivi (d. 981/1573) who is reported to have asked in one of his sermons, “who sheds a tear if a logician

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<sup>503</sup> The use of the terms true or truth (*ḥaqq* and *sawāb*) caused confusion for theorists, and consequently, a certain Abū ‘Abd al-Allah b. Abū Bakr b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn Jamā‘a wrote on the distinction (*farq*) between the terms, *sidq*, *ḥaqq* and *ṣawāb* in his treatise, *Risāla fī al-Farq bayna al-Ṣidq wa’l-Ḥaqq wa’ṣ-Ṣawāb*, MS 1587, Köprülü Kütüphanesi, Fâzıl Ahmed Paşa Section.

<sup>504</sup> On the history of opposition to ancient Greek learning (including logic) in Islamic intellectual history, see Ignaz Goldziher, “The Attitude of Orthodox Islam Toward the ‘Ancient Sciences’,” in *Studies on Islam*, trans. and ed. by M. L. Swartz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981). For Ibn Taymiyya’s forceful criticism of Aristotelian logic, see Wael Hallaq, *Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

<sup>505</sup> On the Kadızâdeli movement and their clash with Sivasîzâde movement, see Madeline Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age 1600-1800* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), pp. 129-181 and *İslâm*, vol. 24, pp. 100-102.

dies?”<sup>506</sup> However, Birgivi himself wrote a treatise on *ādāb al-baḥth* and his *Risāla* was commented on by a number of scholars. This raises the question of how *ādāb al-baḥth* came to be accepted as “the queen of sciences,” respected even by the most conservative quarters, such as Kadızâdeli Mehmed Birgivi’s.

## II. DIALECTICAL DISCOURSE IN LITERATURE

My first discussion on the dialectical discourse in literature focuses on the three main figures in Ottoman divan poetry: *âşık-mâşuk-rakîb* (lover-beloved-competitor). This focus intends to point out how the literature that developed in Islamic culture is more dialectical in style than Islamic studies have revealed until now, not only looking at Ottoman poetry, but also Arabic<sup>507</sup> and Persian poetry. No large scale dialectical analysis of literature seems to have been conducted<sup>508</sup> (especially with respect to post-classical Islamic intellectual history), and therefore, an exploratory and introductory section on dialectic in literature is indispensable for understanding the concept of dialectic and argumentation theory in post-classical Islamic

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<sup>506</sup> Katib Çelebi, *The Balance of Truth*, translated by GL. Lewis (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957), p. 136.

<sup>507</sup> On the enemies of love in an Arabo-Andalusian context, see Patrizia Onesta, “Lauzinger-Wāshī-Index, Gardador-Custos: The “Enemies of Love” in Provençal, Arabo-Andalusian, and Latin Poetry,” *Scripta Mediterranea* 19/20 (1998-99): 119-42.

<sup>508</sup> Even though a number of studies point this out, there has not been a single study of dialectical tradition in Islamic literature. For an analysis of one of the figures, i.e., *rakîb* (the opponent), see Ahmet Atillâ Şentürk, *Rakîb’ce Dair* (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1995) and Metin Akkuş, *Nef’î Divanı’nda Tipler ve Kişilikler* (Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1995).

intellectual history and comparing it with its classical counterpart for a broad understanding of the field.

### 1. Dialectical Tension Between *Aşık* (Lover), *Maşuk* (Beloved) And *Rakîb* (Opponent)

As the third chapter demonstrates, there are two sides in argumentation: questioner and respondent, one side defending a thesis and the other attacking it. Now, in Ottoman *divan* poetry there are two sides in love: lover (*âşık*) and his opponent (*rakîb*). Both want to win the beloved (*mâşuk*). The lover (*âşık*) makes his claim as a thesis: “I love this girl,” and the opponent (*rakîb*) consistently challenges until the lover gives up or is silenced so that *rakîb* wins the beloved. Nineteenth-century dictionaries, such as *Lügat-ı Nâcî* and *Kâmûs-u Türkî*, define *rakîb* as someone who loves another person’s lover, or, an intruder who does not value the union of two hearts.<sup>509</sup> Almost in all cases, *rakîb* is a male chasing someone else’s girl instead of finding himself one—a kind of *plagiarist in love*.

Ahmet Atillâ Şentürk, in his study *Rakîb’e Dair* (On *Rakîb*), mentions the great struggle and confusion over the role and meaning of *rakîb* in the game of love. He says that until the sixteenth century, the role

<sup>509</sup> Cited in Ahmet Atillâ Şentürk, *Rakîb’e Dair*, p.1. The original definitions of *rakîb* in the two dictionaries are as follows: (a) *Lügat-ı Nâcî*: “*Diğcrini men’ ile kendi işini tervîc etmeğe çalışan, engel,*” (Istanbul, 1322/1904, p. 443), and (b) *Kâmûs-u Türkî*: “*Diğcriyle aynı şeye tâlib ve hâhişger olan, bir mahbûbeye dildâde olan aşıkların yekdiğcrlerine nisbeten beheri,*” (Darüssaâde 1317/1899, p. 669). For the Arabic definition of *raqîb*, see Edward William Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, vol. 3, p. 1134.

of *rakīb* in poetic texts was that of a protector or guardian of the girl against the pseudo-lovers (weak arguers).<sup>510</sup> However, from the sixteenth century on, the perception of old-*rakīb* changes: as attested in divan poetry, *rakīb* was now seen as the enemy of lovers (*adû/a'dâ*) or the 'other' (*gayr/ağyâr*).<sup>511</sup> This change seems to have occurred because *rakīb* openly started to challenge the lover (*aşık*) by claiming proprietorship over the girl (*mâşuk*) at this time.

The following examples from Ottoman divan poetry reveal this tension between the three players in love:<sup>512</sup>

Yâr içün ağyâr ile merdâne ceng itsem gerek  
İt gibi murdar rakib ölmezse yâr elden gider.

For my love, to fight bravely against enemies is a must  
If the *rakīb* does not die like a dog, my lover will go [from my hands]

Bular birbirinin ışkına hayran  
Rakib ortada fitne sanki şeytan

They adore their love for each other  
*Rakīb* is a trouble-maker between us like Satan<sup>513</sup>

<sup>510</sup> In some cases in Arabic culture, *rakīb* was hired by the beloved's husband or the girl's parents for the duty of surveillance. This was an Arabic custom with roots in ancient Bedouin society; see Patrizia Onesta, "Lauzinger-Wāshī-Index, Gardador-Custos," p. 129.

<sup>511</sup> Ahmet Atillâ Şentürk, *Rakīb 'e Dair*, pp.11-15.

<sup>512</sup> All of these examples are taken from Ahmet Atillâ Şentürk, *Rakīb 'e Dair*.

<sup>513</sup> Satan was seen as *rakīb* in divan literature against Adam. It is worth mentioning here that Shahrastānī (d.1153) in his *Kitab al-Milal wa'l-Nihal* portrays Satan as a sceptic Q (*sā'il*) asking questions to angels and God (depicted as P (*mujīb*)) providing the debate in *munāzara* format. I wish to mention here that unfortunately I lost my reference notes from my research trip (Istanbul in 2006 summer)—a *madrassa* student's note on the margins of

Ara yirde rakib itden çođidi  
Ol iki aşika rahat yođidi

There were more *rakîb* than dogs  
There was no rest for the two lovers [*aşık* and *maşuk*]

The *rakîb* figure is often described as a constant figure who always poses a potential challenge to the two lovers. Halîlî (d.890/1485) writes in his *Firkat-name* (Book of Separation):

Bana çekdürdi cevri ile cefâyı  
Rakîbe sürdürdi zevk ü sefâyı

She made me suffer  
And she gave *rakîb* a good time

It was almost impossible to escape from the threats of the *rakîb*, and therefore, poets believed that the only way to relieve the anxiety that the *rakîb* caused, was to wait for his death. Necâtî (d.914/1509) thought that this was futile because “one dog (*rakîb*) will die but there will be other dogs who come along soon.”<sup>514</sup> The only way to get rid of this demon figure, the

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one of the copies of commentary on *ādāb al-baḥṭh* states, as far as I remember: *lam yas'al wa huwa lā sā'il huwa Allāhu mujīb* which translates as: “He does not ask question and is not questioner, Allah is answerer,” referring to one of God’s well-known 99 names, i.e., *al-Mujīb*. The student, in his copy of *ādāb al-baḥṭh*, was also pointing out that God is always P, never Q. I hope to locate this manuscript in my next research trip to Istanbul.

<sup>514</sup> These examples are taken from Ahmet Atillâ Şentürk, *Rakîb'e Dair*, p. 78.





The two opposing emotions (abstract) are created by two real participants (namely *âşık* and *rakîb*) in the heart of beloved (*mâşuk*) to test which one is stronger or truer. *Rakîb* always questions both the lover and the beloved and his role is to push the lover (real) to define the nature of *aşk*, or love (abstract) by his opposition. The point here is that the dialectic between the lover and his opponent is to distinguish true love (strong) from false love (weak). In argumentation, the real concern is to distinguish the strong argument (true) from the weak (false). In medieval Persian poetry, the words *şahîh*, *saqîm*, *haqq*, *bâtil* were used to differentiate true and false love. For *rakîb* (*raqîb*) the *adab al-baḥth* terminology *mâni* (*mâni'*, or stopper), and *müddei* (*mudda'î*, or proponent) were used.<sup>517</sup>

The dialectical relationship between *âşık-mâşuk* and *rakîb* can be described as a verbal battle against an opponent in which the poet makes the participants (the proponent of love (*âşık*) and the questioner of love(r) (*rakîb*) debate a thesis (both love as abstract or beloved as real), answer objections (to the accusation of not loving), and offer evidence (of love). In fact it is more like a public debate than a conversation. I use the term “lover” simply because, in *divan* poetry, there is a real dilemma between whether *rakîb* opposes the concept of love (non-figurative) or the lover

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<sup>517</sup> In this respect, see Julie Scott Meisami's meticulous study: *Medieval Persian Court Poetry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 268-70.

himself (figurative).<sup>518</sup> Does *rakīb* want then, to demonstrate the fallacy of the lover's thesis (his love towards *mâşuk*) or to demolish him and win the girl (*mâşuk*) for himself? In another words, using *ādāb al-baḥth* terms, is *rakīb* trying to find the truth, or is he aiming at victory?

### III. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LATIN *ARS DISPUTANDI* AND ARABIC *ĀDĀB AL-BAḤTH*

The literature on disputation (*ars obligatoria*) in the West, emerging in the later Middle Ages (late twelfth century) and known as the *logica moderna*, was transformed in the sixteenth century into a new method called *ars disputandi*. Works of *ars disputandi* were commented upon by a considerable number of post-medieval scholars in Europe from the sixteenth until the eighteenth century but both Arabic and Latin genres on argumentation theory underwent changes in their post period. This section will locate the post-medieval Latin *ars disputandi* method in comparison with the post-classical Arabic *ādāb al-baḥth* in order to see how both theories can be distinguished from their classical forms and where both (Latin and Arabic tradition) meet and differ.<sup>519</sup>

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<sup>518</sup> Metin Akkuş, *Nef'i Divanı'nda Tipler ve Kişilikler*, p. 24-31.

<sup>519</sup> I am not an expert on medieval (*ars obligatio*) and post-medieval theories of argumentation (*ars disputandi*) in the Latin tradition, and therefore, my analysis will be based particularly on Donald L. Felipe's dissertation and some secondary literature.

However, before concentrating on *ars disputandi* literature, I wish to raise an important question about scholarship in the field of post-classical Islamic and post-medieval Western intellectual history with regard to the history of logic. Literature on disputation published from around the mid-sixteenth to the mid-eighteenth century is cited as being from the “post-medieval” period. The post-medieval *ars disputandi* was largely unknown to contemporary scholarship until Donald L. Felipe’s unpublished dissertation, entitled *Post-Medieval Ars Disputandi*,<sup>520</sup> was written in 1991. Despite Jennifer Ashworth’s declaration that, “nothing of interest to the logician was said after 1550 at the very latest,” Felipe undertook a critical study of logic books that were published between the mid-sixteenth and the mid-eighteenth century on methods and techniques of disputation, and showed that this was not the case.<sup>521</sup>

As mentioned in the introduction, for many years students of Islamic intellectual history concentrated on the classical period of Arabic philosophy. There has been, of course, some scattered interest in the post-classical period, but such works have been very sporadic and have contributed little to our understanding of the era. In this context, until the beginning of the present century the view was held (it almost became an

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<sup>520</sup> Donald L. Felipe, “Post-Medieval Ars Disputandi,” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas, 1991). Henceforth Felipe, *Post-Medieval Ars Disputandi*.

<sup>521</sup> See Jennifer Ashworth’s *Language and Logic in Post-Medieval Period* (Dordrecht, 1974), preface xi.

axiom) that not only the development of Arabic logic, but Islamic intellectual history in general, ended in the fourteenth century and remained in stagnation from that point onward.<sup>522</sup> Interestingly enough, the same problematic exists in both Latin and Islamic fields: both previous scholarships emphasized the idea that there was “nothing original after the fourteenth century.” As Felipe’s study shows, the question of stagnation is not confined to the field of Islamic intellectual history. One of the symptoms of this issue, in my opinion, has been the lack of communication between Islamic intellectual history and the history of philosophy in general.

With this crucial question in mind, I will now present the *ars disputandi*. The long and rich historical tradition of disputation (*ars obligatoria*), of which post-medieval Latin argumentation theory (*ars disputandi*) is a part, requires a summary. The general historical background to the post-medieval *ars disputandi* provided here cannot claim to be a detailed analysis; it intends merely to locate the post-medieval theory in this tradition and to explore how later argumentation theory can be distinguished from medieval *ars obligatoria*, in order to compare it eventually with *ādāb al-baḥth*. It must be noted that Q (*sā’il*) and P (*mu’allil*) in *ādāb al-baḥth* works are referred to as opponent (*opponens*) and respondent (*respondens*) in *ars disputandi* literature.

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<sup>522</sup> For these arguments and their proponents and anti-declinists, see introduction section.

The influence of Aristotle's *Topics* on the history of disputation theory and practice is beyond question: The *Topics* influenced the style and structure of the medieval *ars obligatoria*. In addition to the *Topics*, the historical background to the post-medieval *ars disputandi* includes a complex medieval tradition of disputation, which can be divided into two different groups: (a) the famous *quaestio* literature, in which the disputation examples begin with a question and follow with a series of arguments offered by the opponent to reach a solution, and (b) the *ars obligatoria* literature. The *quaestio* sources, like *khilāf* literature in Islamic legal history, only provide examples of disputations and do not reflect on the rules and strategies of the method. As a result of this, they cannot reveal the medieval "disputation theory." *Ars obligatoria* literature (the *obligationes*), on the other hand, has quite a different character; the works are rich with explanations of rules to be observed in disputation and consequently, offer a theoretical approach to disputation.<sup>523</sup>

From the thirteenth until the sixteenth century (post-medieval period), disputation theory focused on the *ars obligatoria*. Medieval disputation, *quaestio*, begins with a question followed by arguments against the position being defended. Post-medieval disputation, on the other hand, begins with a statement and explanation of the thesis, which a respondent

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<sup>523</sup> Felipe, *Post-Medieval Ars Disputandi*, pp. 4-15. This literature has been examined at great length in the works of Spade, Stump, Ashworth, D'Ors and others. Ormsby has also further useful references, see his *Theodicy*, especially, pp.84-86 and notes 164-5.

(P) defends against the objections of an opponent (Q). In responding, the respondent can concede, deny or distinguish, and if he distinguishes, he must deny the premise of the opponent in one sense and accept it in another. From this perspective, the medieval *quaestio* is more dynamic than the post-medieval method, because each side is allowed to argue their own perspective.<sup>524</sup>

The outline of the new method (*ars disputandi*) is as follows. There are generally two *personae* in the method, an opponent (questioner) and a respondent (answerer). A president (*praeses*) who moderates the disputation is considered to be a third *persona*, however, he does not determine the outcome and thus his duty is not to announce a winner or a loser but to apply the rules of the game like a soccer referee. Winning or losing the argumentation is the sole responsibility of the two participants (disputants). The subject matter of the disputation is a thesis which is circulated by the respondent prior to the act of disputation itself. The thesis cannot be *evidently* true or false (it has to be a matter of controversy), and cannot violate accepted ethical standards. The disputants themselves should be well-versed in logic, have knowledge of the subject-matter under dispute, and have good moral character.<sup>525</sup>

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<sup>524</sup> Felipe, *Post-Medieval Ars Disputandi*, pp. 28-40.

<sup>525</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 41-50.

In the post-medieval period, a disputation began with the statement of a thesis rather than with a question as in older models. The thesis is then attacked by the opponent with an argument. The respondent, however, is not obliged to provide a counter-argument but is merely required to defend the argument by employing certain response-moves. Responses, or solutions, are disputation moves by which the respondent attempts to solve the opponent's objection, i.e. to show that the opponent's argument does not contradict the thesis. There are several such response-moves, of which the above mentioned principal statements are: "I deny (*nego*)," "I concede (*concedo*)," and "I distinguish (*distinguo*)." There are primarily two types of denial which are variations on the move *nego*: a simple denial or a bare negation of a premise that throws the burden of proof on to the opponent.<sup>526</sup>

In many seventeenth- and eighteenth-century German scholastic sources on disputation, two methods are clearly defined: (a) the "Modern" Syllogistic method and (b) the "Old" Socratic method. The criterion to distinguish and identify the methods is based on the fact that in the modern method, *syllogistic arguments are offered* by an opponent (who is called an arguer) to attack a thesis proposed by a respondent, whereas in the old method, a questioner attacks the thesis of a respondent (answerer) by *offering a series of questions*. This criterion makes the modern (post-

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<sup>526</sup> Ibid., pp. 53-55.



medieval) method *an argument method* (syllogistic) and the old method, *a question method*.<sup>527</sup>

There are critics who consider the old method to be inferior to the modern method, for example, Christian Thomasius (d.1728) considers the modern method to be an improvement insofar as the syllogistic arguments required by the modern method allow for discourse that is more accurate. Jacob Syrbius (d.1738) agrees that the modern syllogistic method is superior, specifically because it is easier and more effective in guarding against errors. However, Syrbius is not explicit about how the syllogistic method achieves this.<sup>528</sup>

The modern method requires that the opponent gives syllogistic arguments in disputation. The primary intention of this rule is not to limit the kinds of arguments in disputation, but to provide a means for evaluating the formal implications of any proposed argument. This was an attempt to establish an implication between premises and conclusion; for example, in early seventeenth-century Cambridge, the opponent would follow a carefully plotted line of syllogisms designed to trap the answerer into a position where he may be logically forced, step by step, into admitting the exact opposite of his thesis.<sup>529</sup>

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<sup>527</sup> Ibid., pp. 56-77.

<sup>528</sup> Ibid., pp. 56-63.

<sup>529</sup> Ibid., pp. 41-50.

The opponent is the only participant who is allowed to argue in the modern method, which makes the *distinguo* move<sup>530</sup> the heart of the post-medieval disputation method. The later method is not so much concerned with airing two opposing positions for review as it is with disentangling the ambiguities of words (the use or abuse of words). In this sense, the act of forming the *status controversiae* (the principle of stating the main question) is the duty of the opponent: the overall purpose of this act is to clarify the meaning of the thesis under dispute for the disputants and the audience.<sup>531</sup> The modern method (*ars disputandi*) places more emphasis on the clarification of the meanings of the terms of a thesis than on the consideration of arguments for and against that thesis. The opponent, in forming the *status controversiae*, must explain the thesis according to the meaning of the respondent. If the thesis is ambiguous, then the opponent is allowed to question the respondent about its meaning. This is the only point in the modern method at which the respondent is allowed to make interrogative moves. The opponent can ask one or two questions if the meaning of his thesis is obscure.<sup>532</sup>

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<sup>530</sup> After the repetition phase, the respondent may move in one of three possible ways: (a) *distinguo*, (b) *concedo*, (c) *nego*. *Distinguo* is the correct reply to propositions suggested by the opponent that are ambiguous and therefore must be distinguished. See, Ignacio Angelelli, "The Techniques of Disputation in the History of Logic," *The Journal of Philosophy* 67 (1970), p. 808.

<sup>531</sup> Felipe, *Post-Medieval Ars Disputandi*, pp. 78-98.

<sup>532</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 78-81.

The primary purpose of disputation in the new method (*ars disputandi*), is the “investigation” or “confirmation” of truth. The overall structure of *ars disputandi* is uniform to a certain extent in the post-medieval period, as depicted in the following diagram:<sup>533</sup>

OPPONENT	RESPONDENT
	(Stage 1) Proposal of Theses
(Stage 2) Formation of Objections	(Stage 3) Solution of the Objections
(Stage 4) Exception to the Given Responses	
<b><u>Respondent’s Duties:</u></b>	
1- Proposing Thesis	
2- Repetition ( <i>Assumptio</i> )	
3- Responding to Arguments	

It is significant that the seventeenth-century German logician Conradus Horneius (d.1649) does not limit disputation to the field of “probable argumentation,” which is dialectical, but extends it to demonstrative argumentation as well.<sup>534</sup> This is quite different from Aristotle’s view as expressed in the *Organon*, where dialectic is strictly defined as a method treating the dialectical syllogism, i.e. probable argumentation. The *ars disputandi* in Horneius has a much broader application than Aristotle’s disputation method in *Topics*, but there are

<sup>533</sup> I borrow this diagram from Felipe’s dissertation.

<sup>534</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 88-90.

further similarities and differences between *ars disputandi* and *ādāb al-baḥṭh*.

### 1. Similarities

1. The historical origin of the method. The Arabic *ādāb al-baḥṭh* and the Latin *ars disputandi* traditions could both be traced to a common intellectual forefather: Aristotle. The influence that his *Topics* has had on the development of theory is undeniable.

2. The historical development of the method. In both *ars disputandi* and *ādāb al-baḥṭh*, the argumentation theory was developed in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century on the basis of an earlier method.

3. Shared omissions. Neither theory mentions the conditions of how to determine when a disputation is won or lost.

4. Shared aims of disputation. In both cases, the aim of the disputation is the discovery of truth (truth or falsity of a thesis).

5. The historical relationship within the method. In terms of the relationship between the old and the modern methods, both Arabic and Latin scholarship criticize the old, and prefer the modern method.

6. Shared role of language. In both cases, more and more emphasis is placed on the role of language used in argumentation, to ensure that both disputants speak the same language. If the thesis is ambiguous, the

opponent is allowed to question the respondent about the meaning of the thesis.

7. Mutually exclusive conclusions. Both theories maintain that thesis and antithesis cannot be simultaneously true: the truth is singular and final at a given time in dialectic.

8. The historical progression of the method. When the aim changed (given that the aim of the modern method is the investigation of truth), the rules changed as well in order to facilitate the achievement of the aim.

9. Shared legal limitations. Both theories are influenced by their own legal traditions: in terms of burden of proof, *ars disputandi* by the Roman legal tradition; in terms of proof (*dalīl*), *ādāb al-baḥṭh* by Islamic legal tradition.

## 2. Differences

1. Presence of historical background. There are chapters in *ars disputandi* theory on the history of dialectic and disputation (for example, the Socratic method by questions, the Eleatic custom by dialogues, Megarian dialectic, Platonic disputation, Aristotelian disputation, Epicurean logic, Stoic disputation, Scholastic disputation, Ramist dialectic and others). There is interest in the historical background of disputation theory (i.e. interest in ancient sources on logic) although it appears to be a late-

seventeenth and early-eighteenth century phenomenon (even in many tracts and dissertations devoted to the old question method). For *ars disputandi* the old method becomes an object of history, whereas *ādāb al-baḥth* tracts do not have this historical approach. There is no historical introduction to dialectic in treatises on *ādāb al-baḥth*, and therefore, the direct connection to Greek antiquity is lost.

2. Presence of a moderator. There is a president (moderator) in the disputation in the *ars disputandi* whose role it is to intervene and point out a formal error in the opponent's argument, which the respondent has missed. The president, in this capacity, functions as the guarantor of the validity of objections against the thesis. There is no such person acting as a moderator in Arabic *ādāb al-baḥth* tradition, where the judge is assumed to be simply the audience (real or virtual).

3. Importance of sourcing quotations. In *ādāb al-baḥth*, P has to verify if he attributes a statement to someone or makes a quotation from a book (*taṣḥīḥ al-naql*) since the concept of *naql* (as transmission as well as a source of knowledge) occupied a central place in Islamic intellectual history. There is no such serious concern in *ars disputandi* literature.

#### IV. GOETHE'S CONVERSATION WITH ECKERMANN ON *ĀDĀB AL-BAḤṬH*

A century later, exactly 100 years after Saçaklızâde's death (1732), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (d.1832) made an observation about argumentation theory. It does not appear that Goethe was aware of Saçaklızâde's works or that he had even heard of *ādāb al-baḥṭh*, but through a conversation he had with the German poet, Johann Peter Eckermann (d.1854), it has become apparent that he was an incredibly observant character. The conversation took place over dinner in Erfurt in April 1827.<sup>535</sup>

The Mohammedans begin their instruction in philosophy with the doctrine that there exists nothing of which the contrary may not be affirmed. Thus, they practise the minds of youth, by giving them the task of detecting and expressing the opposite of every proposition; from which great [intelligence] in thinking and speech is sure to arise. Certainly, after the contrary of any proposition has been maintained, doubt arises as to which one is really true. But there is no permanence in doubt; it incites the mind to closer inquiry and experiment—from which, if rightly managed, certainty proceeds; and in this alone can man find thorough satisfaction.<sup>536</sup>

Eckermann responds to Goethe's observation: "you remind me of the Greeks who made use of a similar mode of philosophical instruction: as is

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<sup>535</sup> Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Gespräche mit Goethe in den letzten Jahren Seines Lebens*, ed. Johann Peter Eckermann (Leipzig: Brodhaus, 1885), pp. 241-42.

<sup>536</sup> Goethe, *Gespräche mit Goethe*, pp. 241, for English translation, I have used John Oxenford's *Conversations with Goethe* (London: J.M.Dent & Sons Ltd, 1930), p. 190.

obvious from their tragedy, which in its course of action, rests only upon contradiction—not one of the speakers ever maintaining any opinion of which the other cannot with equal dexterity maintain the contrary.”<sup>537</sup>

After the dinner, when Goethe takes Eckermann to the garden, the latter points to the writings of the German *dramaturg*, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (d.1781), by specifically referring to Lessing’s *Laocoon*.<sup>538</sup> “He never leads us directly to results, but always takes us by the philosophical way of opinion, counter-opinion, and doubt, before he lets us arrive at any sort of certainty. We rather see the operation of thinking and seeking than obtain great views and great truths that can excite our own powers of thought and make ourselves productive.” “You are right,” says Goethe; “Lessing himself is reported to have said, that if God would give him truth [for free], he would decline the gift, and prefer the labour of seeking it for himself.”<sup>539</sup>

This kind of Islamic argumentative discourse—knowing things by the denial of their opposites—is “a good standard,” Goethe says, “which we can apply to ourselves and others, to ascertain the degree of mental progress we have attained.” At this point, Goethe also makes a comparison between

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<sup>537</sup> Goethe, *Gespräche mit Goethe*, p. 241; idem, *Conversations with Goethe*, p. 190.

<sup>538</sup> This book is a dialectical essay on the limits of painting and poetry where Lessing opposes the idea of writing poetry by employing the same devices as one would in painting. For Lessing, both, poetry and painting should be treated “like two just and friendly neighbours,” neither of them can occupy the domain of another since poetry is extended *in time* whereas painting is extended *in space*. See Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry* (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1874), p. 110.

<sup>539</sup> Goethe, *Gespräche mit Goethe*, p. 242; idem, *Conversations with Goethe*, p. 191.



himself and Lessing: for Goethe, Lessing always loved “the region of doubt and contradiction the most,” whereas he says “I am wholly the reverse. I have always avoided the contradictions, have strived to dispel doubts within me, and have uttered only the [certain] results I have discovered.”<sup>540</sup>

On the basis of Goethe’s conversation with Eckermann, I will discuss the use of *ādāb al-baḥth* in Muslim educational systems focusing specifically on Ottoman *madrassa*, and on how the phenomenon of *ādāb al-baḥth* was received in the Middle East in the post-classical period, specifically at Azhar University in Egypt in the nineteenth century.

The educational history of the Ottoman Empire *Kevâkib-i Seba*, the Seven Stars (written at the request of French government in 1741 so that they might benefit from the Ottoman system), gives details about the eighteenth-century Ottoman *madrassa* system and disputation-oriented curriculum. Students take five classes every week and are required to prepare one or two lines from a book to discuss in the class with the professor. The professor is naturally the arbiter in the discussion and finally gives his opinion on the debated issue. *Ādāb al-baḥth* was studied after logic and before *kalām*, *uṣūl* and *fiqh* in the curriculum and therefore, it formed a bridge between logic, and theology and jurisprudence. According to *Kevâkib-i Seba*, first level *madrassa* students (*iktisar*) were required to study Taşköprüzâde’s treatise with his own commentary on his *Risāla fī*

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<sup>540</sup> Ibid, p. 242; ibid, p. 191.

*Ādāb al-Baḥth*. Shirwānī's commentary on Samarqandī along with *Ādāb al-Ḥusayn*, Ījī's *Ādāb* with Tabrīzī's commentary on Ījī and Mir Ardabili's glossary on Tabrīzī were compulsory for second level (*iktisad*) students<sup>541</sup> while advanced level students are required to read Saçaklızâde's two works, *Risāla al-Waladiyya* and *Taqrīr al-Qawānīn*.<sup>542</sup>

We do not know how Goethe heard of the disputatious character of Muslim education, maybe through *Kevâkib-i Seba*'s French translation or through his intellectual environs, but the field of *ādāb al-baḥth*, which was dominated by Ottoman authors, came to be fully recognized in Egypt in the early nineteenth century. This was an important experience in Egypt led by the rector of al-Azhar Ḥasan al-‘Aṭṭār (d.1250/1835),<sup>543</sup> who taught the greatest forerunner of modern literary prose in Egypt, Rifā‘ah Rāfi‘ al-Ṭaḥṭāwī (d.1290/1873).<sup>544</sup> The reception of the Ottoman-made *ādāb al-baḥth* in Egypt and Syria played a significant role in religious disputes and, especially ‘Aṭṭār's employment of *ādāb al-baḥth* in these disputes served

<sup>541</sup> Cevat İzgi, *Osmanlı Medreselerinde İlim* (İz Yayıncılık: İstanbul, 1997), vol. 1, p. 72.

<sup>542</sup> James Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt* (London: Cass, 1967), p. 65.

<sup>543</sup> For Ḥasan al-‘Aṭṭār's biography, see J. Brugman, *An Introduction to the History of Modern Arabic Literature in Egypt* (Leiden: Brill, 1984), pp. 15-17. The most detailed study on ‘Aṭṭār is Peter Gran's dissertation, "A Study in the Indigenous Origins and Early Development of Modern Culture in Egypt: The Life and Writing of Shaykh Hasan Al-‘Attar (1766-1835)," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1974). Henceforth Gran, *Ph.D. dissertation*.

<sup>544</sup> For al-Ṭaḥṭāwī, see J. Brugman, *An Introduction to the History of Modern Arabic Literature in Egypt*, pp. 18-25.

more secular needs, as Peter Gran argued, for “reconciling, adjusting, and modifying.”<sup>545</sup>

‘Aṭṭār’s role, therefore, deserves special attention not only because of his experience as an individual but also because his relationship with *ādāb al-baḥṭh* reveals something about post-classical Islamic intellectual history. The following is a summary of Aṭṭār’s story as told by Gran in his *Islamic Roots of Capitalism*.

In 1795 in Egypt, ‘Aṭṭār finished writing his first work on *ādāb al-baḥṭh*,<sup>546</sup> entitled *Ḥashiyat al-‘Aṭṭār ‘alā Sharḥ ‘alā Risālat al-Waladiyya*. At this time, he was relying mostly on Indian sources. This reliance made him realize the isolated state of the field in Egypt, which can be attested to by this excerpt from the introduction to his second work on *ādāb al-baḥṭh*:

Muḥammad al-Mar‘ashī, known as Sajaqli-zadeh [Saçaklızâde], was the most famous of the later distillers of *ādāb al-baḥṭh* in his *Taqrīr al-Qawānīn* and then his *Risāla Walādiyya*...when al-Zabīdī was in Egypt, no one taught these two books, nor were they known of, until some trouble-makers (*al-afātīn*) from among the established professors came to Egypt. One such person let me read a copy of *Taqrīr al-Qawānīn*, which I hastened to copy and then to understand. But there were still some obstacles in

<sup>545</sup> Peter Gran, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760-1840* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998), pp. 148-50.

<sup>546</sup> ‘Aṭṭār wrote three works on *ādāb al-baḥṭh*: (1) *Ḥashiyat al-‘Aṭṭār ‘alā Sharḥ ‘alā Risāla al-Waladiyya li-Muḥammad al-Mar‘ashī* (MS.36484 (147), folios 29-80, Cairo: al-Azhar), dated 1210/1795 (cited above); (2) *Ḥashiyat al-‘Aṭṭār ‘alā Sharḥ Muḥammad al-Bahnisi ‘alā al-Risāla al-Waladiyya li-l- al-Mar‘ashī*, (MS.14484, 400 Majāmi‘, folios 71b-98a, Cairo: al-Azhar), dated 1226/1811; (3) *Ḥashiyat al-‘Aṭṭār ‘alā Sharḥ Muḥammad al-Tabrīzī al-Ḥanafī ‘alā al-Risāla al-‘Aḍudiyya fī Ādāb al-Baḥṭh wa’l-Munāzara li-‘Aḍud al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ījī* (MS. 36484 (147), folios 1-28, Cairo: Al-Azhar), dated 1242/1826. See Gran, *Ph.D. dissertation*, vol. 2, p. 465.

my way to reading the *Waladiyya* as I did not have any commentaries on it...So I depended on some good books in the field ... and began to write in our country, which was then invaded. I had written only one chapter when these misfortunes and confusions occurred, so I set out to Turkish lands and found among the scholars there a much greater interest in this essay, as is evidenced by their commentaries. I found in Alexandretta a commentary written by some scholars who had originally come from Turkey, which compensated for the insufficiencies of others.<sup>547</sup>

Those above mentioned established professors, who ‘Aṭṭār calls, “*afātīn*” (trouble-makers) although he means it positively, finally reached Egypt in the nineteenth century. ‘Aṭṭār continued to praise scholars who wrote on *ādāb al-baḥṭh* in Turkey. Gran says that:

The study of *ādāb al-baḥṭh* was well known in Turkey in the eighteenth century, but its principal recovery in Egypt came in the early nineteenth century. There were few texts of *ādāb al-baḥṭh* written in al-Azhar in the eighteenth century, but the character of the discipline changed with the growing interest in *ādāb al-baḥṭh*. ‘Aṭṭār gained a head start in this field, which was little known in Egypt. His works became standard texts.<sup>548</sup>

‘Aṭṭār wrote his second work on *ādāb al-baḥṭh* in 1811 explaining “after my return to Damascus from Turkey, I had begun writing a certain book [*ādāb al-baḥṭh*], arriving at the chapter entitled ‘*taqsīm*’ [division]...

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<sup>547</sup> ‘Aṭṭār, *Ḥaṣhiya ‘alā Sharḥ al-Bahnīsī*, fol.71b-72a, translated in Gran, *Ph.D. dissertation*, vol. 2, p. 466 and idem, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism*, p. 149.

<sup>548</sup> Gran, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism*, p. 148.

and completed the work in September 1811.”<sup>549</sup> Even though he completed his own second work on *ādāb al-baḥth* in Damascus, on his return to Egypt, he taught *ādāb al-baḥth* to some prominent scholars who had not studied it before. In the early nineteenth century, Damascus, in fact, was a center of controversy over the doctrine of unity (*waḥdat al-wujūd*), Māturīdism versus Ash‘arism, as well as Wahhabism. Gran argues that these controversies were noticeable in Damascus which created a particular pressure for ‘Aṭṭār to study *ādāb al-baḥth*:

This is manifested in his striving for precision of meaning, through rules, which could be understood, rules concerning the generalization of meaning or concerning whether a word was used as a metaphor, as an honorific, or, if not as a metaphor, then in a combination form between the literal and the metaphorical.<sup>550</sup>

The above paragraph is the summary of what was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter about the post-classical evolution of argumentation theory, which was represented in its clearest terms by Saçaklızâde. In ‘Aṭṭār’s last work on *ādāb al-baḥth*, which he wrote after he had returned to Egypt, he explains that what was new for him was the rationale that *ādāb al-baḥth* provided. He called it an “independent discipline,” and claimed that its rules helped to distinguish the general from

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<sup>549</sup> Ibid, p. 106.

<sup>550</sup> ‘Aṭṭār, *Ḥaṣhiya ‘alā Sharḥ al-Bahnīsī*, fol. 81a, translated in Gran, *Ph.D. dissertation*, p. 467 and idem, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism*, p. 149.

the particular, and that it provided many rules of argumentation. ‘Aṭṭār went on to compare it to logic as it served many other fields, “since no field is free from the conflicts of views which require reconciliation, adjustment and modification.”<sup>551</sup> What stands out in this work, Gran says, is the concept of the “independent field.”<sup>552</sup> This corresponds to Samarqandī’s claim that *ādāb al-baḥth* is a general or universal argumentation theory that can be applied to any science.

For future researchers, I would like to raise a question via Peter Gran’s argument that *ādāb al-baḥth* or argumentative discourse serves somewhat secular needs such as reconciliation, adjustment and modification. It was perceived, at least through ‘Aṭṭār’s eyes, that this was what the Ottoman Empire had achieved and passed on to Egypt. Is it possible that the more a society, like the Ottomans, is open to argumentative culture, with rules and etiquettes for discussing two opposing views, the more that society is ready to reconcile, accommodate and modify? Would that make a society more democratic, as Fatema Mernissi argued in her *Islam and Democracy*?<sup>553</sup> A cultural anthropologist, a sociologist, or a political scientist could answer this question in greater depth.

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<sup>551</sup> ‘Aṭṭār, *Ḥashiyat al-‘Aṭṭār ‘alā Sharḥ Mullā Ḥanafī*, folio 3a and Gran, *Ph.D. dissertation*, pp. 467-68.

<sup>552</sup> Gran, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism*, p. 149.

<sup>553</sup> Fatema Mernissi, *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World* (Cambridge: Perseus Publishing, 2002), pp. ix-xxi.

V. *HAKİKİYYÛN* VERSUS *HAYÂLİYYÛN*: THE FORM OF A DEBATE OVER POETRY AND TRUTH IN NINETEENTH CENTURY OTTOMAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

After pointing out Eckermann’s conversation with Goethe on the argumentative character of the Islamic educational system (through *ādāb al-baḥth*) in the eighteenth century, and the reception of that system in Egypt at Azhar University in the nineteenth century (as Gran points out), I will now present a case that went beyond the educational system of Islamic colleges (*madrassa*) to the very heart and reasoning of Islamic intellectual history. This example is important because it reveals the terminology of *ādāb al-baḥth wa’l-munāzara* in action, and how the tension between the classical and post-classical periods was robustly embedded in Islamic intellectual history by this time. In late nineteenth-century Istanbul, the legacy of the struggle over the language of demonstration (as opposed to the language of dialectic)<sup>554</sup> triggered the outbreak of intellectual clashes in literary history<sup>555</sup> (especially poetry) between proponents of *hayaliyyûn*

<sup>554</sup> By “the language of demonstration,” I refer to *munāzara* and *baḥth*, and accordingly, by “the language of dialectic,” to *jadāl*.

<sup>555</sup> On another aspect of the *hayaliyyun* and *hakikiyyun* debate in the nineteenth century over novel writing (*roman*) and story writing (*hikāye*) as expressed in Halit Ziya’s (1866-1945) theoretical work *Hikāye*, see Fazıl Gökçek, “Halit Ziya’nın “Hikaye”sinin Tefrikası ile Kitap Baskısı Arasındaki Farklar Üzerine,” *Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Araştırmaları Dergisi* 13 (2007): 117-128.

(romanticism) represented by Menemenlizâde Mehmet Tahir (d.1903)<sup>556</sup> and *hakikiyyûn* (realism) represented by Beşir Fuad (d.1887).<sup>557</sup>

Beşir Fuad's fundamental opposition was to the dominance of romanticism in Ottoman literature up until the nineteenth century, and he questioned the notion of *hayâl* (unreal, imagination) as opposed to *hakikat* (reality, truth) in his famous writings on “*Şiir ve Hakikat*” (Poetry and Truth).<sup>558</sup> He proposed that Ottoman poets put too much value and meaning into *hayâl* (unreal, imagination) in their poetry as opposed to representing *hakikat* (real, truth).<sup>559</sup>

However, it is the form of the debate between Beşir Fuad (*hakikiyyûn*) and Mehmet Tahir (*hayâliyyûn*) that is relevant here, more than its content. Beşir Fuad consciously divides his work on poetry and

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<sup>556</sup> Menemenlizâde Mehmet Tahir (1862-1903), born in Adana, a student of the prominent Turkish writer, Rezaizade Mahmut Ekrem (1847-1914). Tahir's poems were published in journals such as *Tercümân-ı Hakikat*, *Envâr-ı Zeka*, *Mir'at-ı Âlem* and *Berk*, worked also together with Beşir Fuad for *Haver* magazine (but because of their conflict, the magazine's publication was terminated), worked as the director of correspondence writings in the Ministry of Education and taught literature in a number of high schools and colleges. For Tahir, see the comprehensive study by Necati Birinci, *Menemenlizâde Mehmet Tahir: Hayatı ve Eserleri* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1988).

<sup>557</sup> Beşir Fuad (1852-1887) was born in Istanbul, he attended Fatih Secondary School (*rüştiye*) and Syria Jesuitical School, and in 1871 Military High School. Two years later he graduated from the War Academy, and served as the camp assistant for Sultan Abdülaziz, he went to the Montenegro (1875) and Russian (1877) wars as a volunteer. After he left the army, Fuad worked as the editor of the newspaper, *Ceride-i Havâdis* and finally committed suicide at an early age in a manner contributing to scientific knowledge by taking notes at his death-bed up to the point of losing his consciousness in order to prove that all, including death, could be explained through science. On Fuad's life and works, see the most comprehensive study by M. Orhan Okay, *Beşir Fuad: İlk Türk Pozitivisti ve Natüralisti* (Istanbul: Hareket Yayınları, 1969). Henceforth Okay, *Beşir Fuad*.

<sup>558</sup> Fuad's writings on poetry and truth were edited and published by Handan İnci in 1999; see Beşir Fuad, *Şiir ve Hakikat* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999). Henceforth Beşir Fuad, *Şiir ve Hakikat*.

<sup>559</sup> Beşir Fuad, “Menemenlizâde Tahir Beyefendi'nin Gayret'de Neşreyledikleri Makale-i Cevabiyelerine Cevap,” *Saadet* 3 (1886): 553-91.



truth into two parts: (a) Mûnâzara (*munâzara*) and (b) Cedel (*jadal*) and he says:

This book *Şiir ve Hakikat* (Poetry and Truth) contains two sections. The first section is under the heading of “*Mûnâzara*” which includes my two correspondences with Menemenlizâde Mehmet Tahir that I wrote free from personal matters (*şahsiyyât*). The title of second section, on the other hand, is “*Cedel*,” confining to three pieces that I published elsewhere: *Yetmiş Bin Beyitli Bir Hicviye* (Seventy Thousand Satirical Couplets), *Çevir Kazı Yanmasın* (Turn the Cat in the Pan)<sup>560</sup> and *Tekrar Çevir Kazı Yanmasın* (Turn the Cat in the Pan Again).<sup>561</sup>

We have seen the great struggle between *jadal* and *munâzara* in Islamic intellectual history, especially in the choice of the post-classical authors to use *munâzara* over *jadal* as a dividing concept, which relegated *jadal* to a negative category. This tension is most evident in Fuad’s generation in the late nineteenth century, for example, if Fuad’s opponent argued against only him (and not his thesis), Fuad would respond in *cedel* style, disregarding the rules of *mûnâzara*.

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<sup>560</sup> *Çevir Kazı Yanmasın*, literally “turn the goose so it does not burn,” is an idiom used in Turkish referring to someone who changes his/her side or opinion after realizing that his/her initial argument was wrong and claims that he/she in fact defended the second argument in the first place. This changing behaviour has the negative connotation of being contradictory and people who manifest such behaviours are seen as cunning and crafty. See Hasan Pulur, *Olaylar ve İnsanlar* (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993), p. 91. In this sense, *Çevir Kazı Yanmasın* has a sense of “turning a cat in a pan,” according to Harrison William Weir in the following: “Toone says: “[t]he proverbial expression, ‘to turn a cat in a pan,’ denotes a sudden change in one’s party, or politics, or religion, for the sake of being in the ascendant, as a cat always comes down on its legs, however thrown;” see Harrison William Weir, *Our Cats and All About them: Their Varieties, Habits, and Their Management* (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1889), p. 180.

<sup>561</sup> Beşir Fuad, *Mektubât* (Istanbul: n.p., 1305/1889); cited in Beşir Fuad, *Şiir ve Hakikat*, p.16.

Aristotle defines peevishness in argumentation as “disputing agonistically” and claims that to use anything at hand is to argue against the opponent and not the thesis.<sup>562</sup> Fuad says that if his opponent’s point is not his thesis, but the opponent (Fuad himself), then, he would not waste his time following the rules of *münâzara* with someone who does not understand what *münâzara* is: instead he would employ *cedel* style. All the participants in the debate over poetry and truth complain about their opponents not following the rules of *münâzara*. For example, Fuad says that:

For participants who do not respect the rules of *münâzara* (*kâide-i münâzara*), who violate its etiquettes (*dâire-i edeb*), direct criticism towards their opponents instead of their theses, and employ tools and techniques in order to manipulate the argumentation (*mübâhese*) there is only one response that can be given as directive: no stooping or lowering oneself (*adem-i tenezzül*).<sup>563</sup>

Menemenlizâde Mehmet Tahir withdrew himself from this debate due to powerful attacks that came from Hüseyin Rahmi (1864-1944), one of the proponents of *hakikiyyûn*. Tahir, thus, wrote the following to the board of the journal *Mizân*:

If they objected to my ideas within the limitations of the rules of argumentation (*edeb-i münâzara*) I could

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<sup>562</sup> Aristotle, *Topics*, 161a:15-25.

<sup>563</sup> Beşir Fuad, “Üdebâdan İstirhamım,” *Saadet*, issue 402 (1886); cited in Beşir Fuad, *Şiir ve Hakikat*, p.18.

have responded my answer accordingly. But in this case, there cannot be any better response than silence (*sükût*) for now.<sup>564</sup>

Silence does not solve the problem for Namık Kemal (d.1888)<sup>565</sup>

who participated in this debate as a proponent of *hayâliyyûn*, because

“if my response is also silence,” he continues:<sup>566</sup>

There is a possibility that this could be interpreted as losing (*mağlubiyet*) the argumentation.<sup>567</sup> On the other hand, if it is countered (*mukâbele*) with proof (*delil*), then the opponents (*ashâb-ı itirâz*) are employing whatever weapon they have at hand because they feel that they cannot win the argumentation if the rules of *münâzara* are thoroughly employed...What they are doing is just simply cursing, i.e., using bad language (*ezcümle söğüyorlar*).<sup>568</sup>

<sup>564</sup> Hüseyin Rahmi “Fünun ve Edebiyat: Mecbahis-i Edebiyat,” *Mizan* 4 (1886); cited in Beşir Fuad, *Şiir ve Hakikat*, p. 21.

<sup>565</sup> Namık Kemal (1840-1888), born in Tekirdağ in the Ottoman empire, the son of the court astrologist Asım Bey, one of the pioneers of Turkish nationalism, one of the Young Turks, poet, novelist and playwright. He served in the Translation Office of the Porte in Istanbul and fled to Europe in 1867 where he was the editor of the newspaper *Hürriyet* (Freedom). Upon his return in 1870, he worked as the editor of the paper *İbret* (Warning) and he was exiled to Cyprus in 1873. In 1876, he was invited to assist in preparing the constitution, but he was soon banished to the island of Lesbos, this time by Sultan Abdülhamid II. See the entry “Nâmik,” in *EI*<sup>2</sup>, vol. 4, pp. 875-79.

<sup>566</sup> *Namık Kemal'in Mektupları* (Letters of Namık Kemal), edited by Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, 4 vols. (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1986), vol. 4, pp. 390-94; cited in Beşir Fuad, *Şiir ve Hakikat*, p. 23.

<sup>567</sup> Namık Kemal is right in his concern about silence being interpreted as losing (*mağlubiyet*) the argumentation, as we know that in the classical period silence (*sukût*) was considered to be one of the signs of defeat (*dalâ'il al-inqitâ'*) and incapacity (*'ajz*) in disputation. On the signs of defeat, see *Miller*, pp. 39-46.

<sup>568</sup> The verb Kemal uses “*söğmek*” means using F words in conversation.

Muallim Nâci (d.1893),<sup>569</sup> the son-in-law of playwright Ahmet Mithat Efendi (d.1912), asks whether this dispute *per se* even exists by making a distinction between *mübâhese* (dispute) and *münâza‘a* (quarrel) in the following:

I wonder if the argumentation (*mübâhese*) itself exists among our intellectuals. Two participants of debate (*mübâhis*, referring to P and Q) appear and start an argument by writing, one participant “rapes the debate,”<sup>570</sup> and the other counter-attacks him in the same way (*mukâbele-i bi’l-misî*). Argumentation then takes on the colour of a quarrel (*münâzaa*). The debate loses its real objective (*maksad*) and then the squabble goes on and on! (*bir dırıltıdır gider!*)<sup>571</sup>

Given that argumentation was becoming more and more personal instead of serving the real subject-matter, i.e., the tension between imagination (*hayâl*) and truth (*hakikat*), Naci, one of the supporters of *hakikiyyûn* (realism), clarified his position not to be labelled as the “enemy of poetry (*adüvv-i şiiir*),” in the following.<sup>572</sup>

<sup>569</sup> Muallim Naci (1850-1893), born in Istanbul, a poet and a Turkish literary critic, playwright and the compiler of a dictionary known as *Lûgat-ı Nâci*. For Muallim Naci and his works, see Abdullah Uçman, *Muallim Naci: Hayatı, Kişiliği, Eserleri* (Istanbul: Toker Yayınları, 1998).

<sup>570</sup> Naci uses the word *tecâvüz* which literally means rape; however here it means “breaking the rules of argumentation.” This idea of raping the debate seems a little metaphorical but it is significant in that it may loosely correspond to the usurpation (*ghasb*) in *âdâb al-baḥṭh*.

<sup>571</sup> Cited in Beşir Fuad, *Şiir ve Hakikat* by Handan İnci, p. 26.

<sup>572</sup> Beşir Fuad, *İntikad*, ed. with Muallim Naci (Dersaadet, 1304/1888), p. 27; cited in Okay, Beşir Fuad, p. 179 and Beşir Fuad, *Şiir ve Hakikat*, p. 25.

We need more proponents of consciousness (*ṣuûriyyûn*) instead of poetry (*ṣiiriyyûn*). In fact, I am not against poetry, but rather I am against the idea of limiting poetry to exaggeration (*mûbalaġa*), imagination (*hayâl*) and delusions (*evhâm*).<sup>573</sup>

The lack of concern for the rules of argumentation to be followed in this debate led Fuad to suggest “losers” should be proud since the protocols of debate were not being followed in practice in line with the theory propounded in *‘ilm al-munāẓara* or *ādāb al-baḥṯ* works:

Instead of showing the truth (*sevâb*)<sup>574</sup> or falsity (*sakîm*) of an opinion (*fikir*) in debate (*mûbâhese*), silencing the opponent (*muârîz*), using every tool whether they are wrong or right, has become the path of feeling proud (*medâr-ı iftihar*) among participants. To me, it is the exact opposite, i.e., the loser (*maġlub*) should feel proud more than the winner (*galîb*) at the end of this debate. The reason for this is that participants start argumentation in a polite manner (*edîbâne*) but later it produces an effect of insulting one another (*müṣâteme*) because the debate is mixed with enmity (*kin*), animosities (*aġrâz*) and personal matters (*ṣahsiyyât*). As a result, the arena of

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<sup>573</sup> This can be likened to the tension between Sunnīs and, those whom Taftāzānī (d.1389) calls, “the Sophists (*sūfasā’īya*)” and “the Mulish school (*al-‘inādīya*).” He says that “[s]ome of the Sophists deny the “real essences of things” and maintain that they are fancies (*awhām*) and vain imaginations (*khayālāt*)... They assert that they are in doubt and that they are in doubt even of their doubt, and so on.” See Earl Edgar Elder, *A Commentary on the Creed of Islam: Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī on the Creed of Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), pp. 13-14. Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī (d.981), as quoted by Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (d.1023) in his *Muqābasāt*, describes the Mu‘tazilites as dialecticians and sophists and the *falāsifa* as those who are concerned with “essential problems.” See the section on the difference between the method of theologians (dialecticians) and of philosophers (*fi’l-farq bayna ṭarīqat al-mutakallimīn wa ṭarīqat al-falāsifa*) in *Muqābasāt* (Cairo: Dār Sa‘ād al-Ṣabāḥ, 1992), pp. 223-24. For *wahm* and *wahmiyyāt*, see *Ta‘rifāt*, pp. 310-11. In the context of Arabic philosophy, see Deborah Black, *Logic*, pp. 204-7.

<sup>574</sup> *Sevâb* refers to the main objective of argumentation theory, i.e., “to find out the truth (*izhâr al-ṣawâb*) in order to prevent one from falsity (*saqîm*).”

argumentation (*mevdân-i mübâhese*) falls into the hands of those who rape the boundaries of the debate protocols (*dâire-i edeb*).<sup>575</sup>

Then, in 1890, came the above mentioned Ahmet Mithat Efendi, one of the grandfathers of Turkish literature, who also wrote a book on Beşir Fuad,<sup>576</sup> calling the whole debate “useless, since the nature of literature, by definition, was based on imagination (*hayâl*) not truth (*hakikat*), therefore, nobody should look for reality or truth in literature.” To him, the participants in this debate were failing to see the central problem: the “definition” of literature (*edebiyat*). This focal point made him dismiss the dispute over poetry and truth as redundant.<sup>577</sup>

This particular event among others<sup>578</sup> reveals without doubt that *jadal* was viewed negatively as a return to the primitive practices of an old mentality as opposed to the relatively enlightened *munâzara*. Some even argued that Ottoman society was in stagnation because the people were living a lifestyle of *jadal* (*cedel-nümâ*) while Western countries (*akvâm-ı*

<sup>575</sup> Beşir Fuad, *Victor Hugo* (Istanbul: n.p., 1302/1884), p. 254.

<sup>576</sup> Ahmed Mithat Efendi, *Beşir Fuad* (Istanbul: Tercüman-ı Hakikat Matbaası, 1304/1886).

<sup>577</sup> Ahmet Mithat Efendi, *Ahbar-ı Asâra Tamim-i Enzâr (Edebi Eserlere Genel Bakış)*, ed. Nüket Esen (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), pp. 142-43. On realism as represented in different senses in Western literature, see Erich Auerbach’s classic work *Mimesis* written while Auerbach (1892-1957) was teaching in Istanbul, *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).

<sup>578</sup> For an example of how the prominent Egyptian journal *al-Muqtataf* played a pioneering role in the process of developing disputation (*munâzara*) principles so that they could be observed in the journal in the late nineteenth century, see Dagmar Glass, “An Ounce of Example is Better than a Pound of Instruction:” Biographies in Early Arabic Magazine Journalism,” in *Querelles privées et contestations publiques. Le rôle de la presse dans la formation de l’opinion publique au Proche Orient*, ed. Cristoph Herzon, Raoul Motika and Michael Ursinus (ISIS : Istanbul, 2002), pp. 11-23.

*garb*) were progressing with positive sciences (*fenn*).<sup>579</sup> As is clear from this case, the argumentative discourse that started with Ibn al-Rāwandī in the third/ninth century left a permanent imprint on Islamic intellectual history, which was surrounded by this discourse's concepts, terminologies and objectives from that time up until the late nineteenth/early twentieth century. From this perspective, Islamic intellectual history can be read as the tension between two languages: the "language of dialectic" and the "language of demonstration." I see dialectic (represented by *adab al-jadal*) and demonstration (represented by *ādāb al-baḥth*) as tools for interpreting the whole of Islamic intellectual history, since they refer not only to a significant feature of that history, but also to a feature that poses problems in the interpretation of that history.

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<sup>579</sup> Baykara Dede (1883-1935), a Mevlevi poet, argued this in his poetic play *Hüsn ü Aşk*, and the original lines as follows: "Akvâm-ı garb fennile etmekte irtifâ / Biz zorbalarla burda bütün gün cedel-nümâ... Âlem tenevvür eyledi bizlerse uykuda / Dünya tecceddüd eyledi biz eski kaygıda." See Mustafa Erdoğan, "Türk Edebiyatında Bilinmeyen İlginç Bir Eser: Manzûm Hüsn ü Aşk Tiyatrosu," *Gazi Üniversitesi Hacı Bektaş Veli Dergisi* 28 (2003): 247-58, p. 254. For Baykara Dede, see Nuri Özcan, "Baykara Abdülbâki," *İslâm*, vol. 5, pp. 246-7 and Mustafa Erdoğan, *Meşrutiyetten Cumhuriyete Bir Mevlevi Şeyhi Abdülbâki Baykara Dede: Hayatı, Şahsiyeti, Eserleri ve Şiirleri* (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2003).

## CONCLUSION

This dissertation has analysed the evolution of argumentation theory in post-classical Islamic intellectual history. The intention of this analysis was to examine not only post-classical argumentation theory as it was expressed in a unique and particular genre known as *ādāb al-baḥth*, but also how the concept of dialectic (*jadal*), a legacy from the classical era, influenced and shaped post-classical argumentation theory. Through an examination of five communities (theologians, poets, grammarians, philosophers and jurists), from classical Islamic intellectual history who predated the post-classical period and whose work contributed to the legacy of dialectic, this thesis has demonstrated how dialectic as argumentative discourse diffused into these local intellectual communities. The tension between the language of demonstration (*burhān*) and the language of dialectic (*jadal*) proves that those identities were realized through dialectic itself: specifically, through the line that dialectic drew, highlighting the *différend* between *burhān* and *jadal*.

In turn, post-classical Islamic intellectual history saw the fusion of those individual local dialectics (as disputation and reasoning) into a single system forming the general argumentation theory of *ādāb al-baḥth*, which is applicable to all fields. Post-classical intellectuals responded positively to



the founder of this general theory, Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī (d.702/1302) and to his treatise. Consequently, a great many intellectuals followed his work; however, this dissertation concentrated specifically on ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d.756/1355), Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d.816/1413), Taşköprüzâde (d.968/1561), Saçaklızâde (d.1150/1737) and Gelenbevî (d.1205/1791) because of the distinct contributions that they have made in response to Samarqandī’s treatise on *ādāb al-baḥth*. The analysis of these texts uncovered the influence of post-classical philosophy of language as expressed in the genre of *‘ilm al-waḍ’*. By the eighteenth century, *‘ilm al-waḍ’* and *ādāb al-baḥth* had become increasingly interlinked.

What is notable about the period (1300-1800) from Samarqandī to Gelenbevî was the persistence of what could be called the “linguistic turn” in argumentation theory. After a centuries-long run, the *jadal*-based dialectic of the classical period came to be displaced by a new argumentation theory, which was dominantly linguistic in character. This “linguistic turn in argumentation” dates from the final quarter of the fourteenth century in Ījī’s impressively prescient work on *‘ilm al-waḍ’*. This new idea, that argumentation is about definition and that therefore, defining is the business of language—and perhaps even that language is the only available medium for understanding the speaker (*fāhm*) and being

understood by the listener (*tafhīm*)—affected the way that argumentation theory was processed throughout most of the period in question.

The argumentative discourse that started with Ibn al-Rāwandī in the third/ninth century left a permanent imprint in Islamic intellectual history. The concepts, terminology and objectives of this discourse remained evident up until the late nineteenth century. From this perspective, Islamic intellectual history during this period can be read through the tension between two languages: the “language of dialectic” (*jadal*) and the “language of demonstration” (*burhān*), each of which refer not only to a significant feature of that history, but also to a feature that could dramatically alter the interpretation of that history.

## APPENDIX - 1

### GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS

Please keep in mind that terms change slightly according to the author and the time period in which they are used; however I have tried to provide the most *generalized meaning* for each term for the sake of preparing a glossary for readers. Even though, in part, I have benefited from Miller's thesis for the evolution of this glossary, I have nonetheless developed more accurate and up to date definitions by employing post-classical terms used by authors such as Ijī, Jurjānī, Taşköprüzâde, Saçaklızâde and Gelenbevî.

**adab:** professional and elite culture; in the first centuries of classical period (eighth through tenth centuries) it was generally a literary culture, but the concept came to gain the more specialized connotation of secretary, of administration, of judgeship (*qāḍī*), and even of the spiritual refinement that was the goal of the intellectual Sufis

**ahl al-ḥadīth:** traditionists, those who held a different view of legal theory from that of *ahl al-ra'y* and rejected all forms of personal opinion (*ra'y/ijtihād*) connected with rational speculation (*nazar*)

**ahl al-i'rāb:** Kūfan and Baṣran grammarians

**ahl al-jadal:** the term used for dialectical theologians (*mutakallimūn*), especially Mu'tazilites

**ahl al-nazar** (aka **nuzzār**): scholars who are interested in a purely theoretical branch of discourse, used excessively for Mu'tazilites

**'ālim:** a learned man who possesses knowledge (*'ilm*), particularly in Islamic sciences as distinguished from the *hakīm*, the man working in foreign (Greek) sciences (*awā'il*)

**'aql:** the most important concept in Islamic intellectual history, it literally means the reason or rational faculty, but is specifically used for the intellect as opposed to both the body and the lower faculties of the soul (*hawā*); the mind as opposed to the egoistic self (*nafs*)

**‘aqlī:** knowledge derived from discursive reasoning (*nazar*) and not merely from report (*khabar*) or on the authority of another by way of transmission (*naql*); rational sciences as opposed to those based on the authority of tradition (*naqlī*)

**baḥṭh:** literally ‘digging’ and investigation, but the term came to denote the science of argumentation theory known as *ādāb al-baḥṭh*

**bāṭil:** used to denote false arguments

**bayyina:** evidence

**burhān:** a demonstrative and apodictic proof resulting from the syllogistic method outlined in the *Analytics* by Aristotle and recognized, particularly by philosophers, to be the chief characteristic of scientific knowledge

**ḍalīl:** proof or evidence (literal). However, in the technical language of *ādāb al-baḥṭh*, it refers to a piece of evidence that points to a judgement, a rule or a legal qualification (*ḥukm*). If a *ḍalīl* does not indicate a *ḥukm* then it cannot be considered as *ḍalīl*. Consequently, a questioner could raise an objection (*manʿ*) and contradict P (*naqḍ*)

**ḍalīl al-khilāf:** an opposing proof

**daʿwā:** a thesis

**dawarān:** an argument in which the proponent suggests that a given thing might be the cause of a given phenomenon

**fahṣ:** an investigation or inquiry

**farq:** a distinction in the sense of a difference i.e. “He drew a distinction between day and night,” rather than as a level achieved i.e., “He was awarded a BA Honours with Distinction”

**fasād:** falsity

**faṣl:** differentia

**ghalaba:** victory

**ghasb:** the usurpation of a proponent’s position by the questioner

**ḥadd:** a definition

**Ḥadīth:** (narrative, talk) with the definite article (*al-ḥadīth*) is used for Tradition, being an account of what Prophet Muhammad said or did, or of his tacit approval of something said or done in his presence. The study of tradition is called *‘ulūm al-ḥadīth* (the sciences of Tradition) and the traditionists, **ahl al-ḥadīth** (see above)

**ḥaqq:** truth, reality; the truth of an argument or the truth of a thesis

**ḥukm:** a legal judgment or juristic qualification (or statement depending on the context in which the word is used). In the technical language of *ādāb al-baḥth*, *ḥukm* is the absence of the logical quality or judgment (*ḥukm*) in P's proof (*dalīl*)

**ḥamlī:** categorical

**ḥikāya:** a citation (*naql* is also used interchangeably)

**idda‘ā:** a claim

**ifhām:** silencing the respondent, the victory of the questioner

**ījāz:** being very brief in debate so as to confuse both the proponent and the questioner

**‘illa:** cause, reasoning or *ratio legis* (sometimes in the post-classical period *sabab* is used interchangeably)

**ilzām:** the victory of the respondent, when the questioner is forced to accept the respondent's thesis

**iltizām:** implication

**‘inād:** contentiousness in disputation

**inqiṭā‘:** defeat

**inṣāf:** fair play in disputation

**intiḳāl:** digression in disputation

**istidlāl**: demonstration

**iṣṭilāh**: technical terminology

**istilzām**: necessary consequence

**istiqrā'**: induction

**i'tirād**: objection

**iṭnāb**: the instance of a participant being very wordy so that the participants (the proponent and the questioner) lose the track of the issue under the discussion

**jins**: genus

**Kalām**: dialectical theology based on Scriptural texts that employ a dialectical method (*jadal*) of reasoning in defence of the Islamic creed; *jadal* was rejected as illicit by the *ahl al-ḥadīth* and as unscientific (not *burhānī*) by the *falāsifa* (philosophers)

**khaṣm**: the opponent

**khāṣṣa**: property

**lāzim**: an implication, conclusion, or thing implied

**luzūm**: consequence (one thing necessitates another thing)

**mabda'** (plural **mabādi'**): principle, starting point, axiom

**madlūl**: that which is proven, the object of evidence or *demonstrandum*

**maḥall al-nizā'**: the point of dispute

**maḥmūl**: predicate (*maḥkūm bihī* is also used)

**malzūm**: implicant

**man'**: objection

**māni'**: the one who defines: the proponent, (literally the objector or preventer, referring to the figure of *rakib* in Ottoman divan love poetry)

**marāsīm al-jadal**: the rules of dialectic

**mas'ala**: case, question or thesis. Arab philosophers also refer to a thesis (in the sense of hypothesis) as *waq'*

**masā'il**: propositions or problems

**mashhūrāt**: opinions that are generally accepted by many or by a group of scholars

**maqbulāt**: generally received opinions

**maṭlūb**: objective or aim (sometimes used to mean problem); the quaesitum

**mawḍi'**: *topos*

**mawḍū'**: subject-matter

**Mihna**: the Abbasid regime's scrutiny of opponents (*ahl al-ḥadīth/Hanbalites*) to a defined standard instituted by the caliph al-Ma'mūn (r.198-218/813-833) on the subject of the created Qur'an advocated by Mu'tazilites

**mirā'**: eristic reasoning or contentiousness

**mu'allil**: proponent of a thesis (P) since he provides the evidence for the premises of his thesis, or sometimes *mujīb* (the answerer or respondent) is used interchangeably

**mu'anada**: contention

**mu'araḍa**: counter-argument to P's thesis

**mughālaṭa**: fallacious reasoning, sophistry

**muhāl**: absurd or impossible

**muhmal**: indefinite

**mūjab:** affirmative

**mujādil:** the dialectician (*jadaliyyūn* is used to denote the plural, dialecticians)

**mujīb:** the respondent or answerer (or *mu'allil*, the one who has an argument or a thesis)

**mukābara:** a snobbish sense of superiority, feeling mighty or peevishness

**mulāzama:** implication

**munāqaḍa:** the invalidation of one of the proponent's premises

**munāzir:** the disputant

**muqābala:** (literally opposition), the point at which a pair of contrasting ideas elaborated in a balanced compound is emphasised by two words of opposite meaning in a line, for example; day and night, whiteness and blackness, fat and thin

**muqaddima:** a premise

**muṣādara 'alā al-maṭlūb:** the point at which a conclusion that is yet to be proved is taken as grounds for reasoning

**musallamāt:** technical language in a specific field and axioms of science

**mustadill:** the participant who opposes the proponent's definition

**muṭābaqa:** a linguistic correspondence: things signified (*dalālat*) rely on this correspondence (*muṭābaqa*) between an expression (*lafẓ*) and what it represents (*ma'nā*)

**muṭālaba bi taṣhīh:** the method of asking for verification or making the opponent explain his proof

**nafy:** negation

**naqd:** the method of inconsistency, self-contradiction, or invalidation

**naql:** quotation, report, revelation



**naqlī:** transmitted information and knowledge as opposed to rational knowledge (*aqīlī*) derived from one's own speculative reasoning (*nazar*)

**naṣṣ:** textual evidence

**naw':** species or a specific kind

**nazar:** speculative or discursive reasoning as opposed to intuitive knowledge (*ma'rifa*) or the acceptance of truth on authority (*taqlīd*)

**nāzīr:** investigator

**nisba:** the relationship between two objects, for example, between a subject (*mubtada'*) and a predicate (*khabar*)

**qaḍīyya:** proposition

**qalb:** the method of reversal in argumentation (considered as a type of counter-evidence)

**qawl:** argument

**qiyās:** analogical reasoning: in jurisprudence, the method and source of law by comparative methods; in *kalām*, a method that is dialectical rather than strictly syllogistic (*qiyās al-jadalī*)

**safsāṭa:** sophistry

**sā'il:** the questioner (Q), the one who objects to P's claim

**sanad:** backing, referring to the Q's objection either (a) with backing (*sanad* or sometimes *mustanad*) or (b) mere objection (*man' al-mujarrad*)

**saqīm:** unsound (*fāsīd* is also used interchangeably)

**ṣawāb:** true, truth of a thesis

**shāhid:** testimony

**shartī:** conditional

**shubah:** pseudo-arguments

**sibr wa'l-taqṣīm:** the technique of division and elimination; when P lists all the possible causes of an event or a fact and then eliminates all but one

**ṣifa:** description or attribution

**siḥḥa:** soundness or authenticity

**su'āl al-ḥajr:** a restrictive question

**su'āl al-tafwīd:** a non-restrictive question

**ṣūra:** form

**taḍammun:** inclusiveness

**tahrīr al-murād:** the clarification of a proponent's objective or aim (*murād*) requested by the questioner in a debate so that the points of dispute becomes clear for that questioner

**takhalluf:** irrelevancy

**ta'īl:** the justification of an argument or rationale, i.e., to state the *'illa* (the reason or cause). In the technical language of *ādāb al-baḥṭh*, the one who states the *'illa* is called *mu'allil* (P), and the one who questions the proponent's *'illa* is called *sā'il* (Q)

**talāzum:** implication

**tanbīh:** alerting Q to something which is known *a priori* (this is P's duty)

**taqṣīm:** division in definitions

**ṭarf al-awsaṭ:** the middle term

**ṭarīqa:** method of a either particular jurist (*ṭarīqat As'ad al-Mihanī*) or of a particular legal school (*ṭarīqat al-fuqahā'*)

**tasalsul:** an infinite chain of reasoning

**tashīh:** verification

**taṣhīḥ al-burhān**: the verification of the proof

**taṣhīḥ al-‘illa**: the verification of the cause

**taṣhīḥ al-naql**: the verification of a report or quotation

**taslīm**: agreement or acknowledgment

**wad‘**: convention

**yaqīn**: certainty

## APPENDIX - 2

## EDITION OF SAMARQANDĪ'S RISĀLA ON ĀDĀB AL-BAĤTH

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

### الفصل الأول في التعريفات

المنظرة: هي النظر بالبصيرة من الجانبين في النسبة بين الشئيين إظهارا للصواب. والدليل: هو الذي يلزم العلم به العلم بشئ آخر وهو المدلول. فإما هي التي يلزم من العلم بها الظن بوجود المدلول وما يتوقف عليه وجود الشئ ان كان داخلا فيه يسمى ركنا. وإن كان خارجا فإن كان مؤثرا في وجوده يسمى علة، وإلا شرطا. والعلة التامة جملة ما يتوقف عليه وجود الشئ. والتعليل هو تبين علة الشئ. والملازمة هي كون الحكم مقتضيا للآخر. والأول هو الملزوم، الثاني هو اللازم، والدوران هو ترتب الشئ على الشئ الذي له صلوح العلية إما وجودا أو عدما أو معا. والأول هو الدائر والثاني هو المدار. والمناقضة هي منع مقدمة الدليل. والمعارضة هي إقامة الدليل على خلاف ما أقام الدليل عليه الخصم والنقض هو تخلف الحكم عن الدليل. والمستند ما يكون المنع مبنيا عليه.

### الفصل الثاني في ترتيب البحث

إذا شرع المعلل في تقرير الأقوال والمذاهب فلا يتوجه عليه المنع. لأن ذلك بطريق الحكاية إلا إذا انتهض بإقامة الدليل على ما ادعاه. فالسائل إما أن يمنع في شئ أو لا يمنعه فيه أصلا، فإن لم يمنع فظاهر، وإن منع قبل تمام دليله وهو أن يكون على مقدمة من مقدمات دليله أو يمنع بعد تمام دليله. فإن منع مقدمة من مقدمات دليله فإما ان اقتصر بمجرد المنع أو لم يقتصر. فإن لم يقتصر، فإما أن يقول المستند أو لم يقل، والمستند كما يقول لا نسلم لزوم ذلك. وإنما يلزم هذا ان لو كان كذلك وذلك هو المناقضة. فإن لم يقل مستندا بل يستدل بدليل على انتفاء تلك المقدمة وذلك يسمى بالغصب وهو غير مسموع عند المحققين لاستلزامه الخبط في البحث. نعم بل يتوجه ذلك بعد إقامة المعلل الدليل على تلك المقدمة كما سيأتي ذكره. وان منع بعد تمام الدليل فذلك على قسمين. فإما

ان لا يسلم الدليل بعد التمام بناء على تخلف الحكم عنه في شئ من الصور. أو يسلم الدليل ويمنع المدلول واستدل بما ينافي ثبوت المدلول. والأول هو النقض الإجمالي. والثاني هو المعارضة وعلما أن النقض إما تفصيلي وهو المناقضة المذكورة أو إجمالي. وتوجيهه أن يقال ما ذكرتم من الدليل غير صحيحي لتخلف الحكم عنه في تلك الصورة، واما المعارضة فطريقها أن يقال ما ذكرتم وان دل على ثبوت المدلول ولكن عندنا ما ينفيه. وإذا شرع في الدليل يصير المعلل ههنا كالسائل ثم وبالعكس. والمعارضة والنقض الاجمالي هما يأتیان في مقدمات الدليلي أيضا. وذلك بالنسبة إلى تلك المقدمة يكون معارضة ونقضا إجماليا. وبالقياس إلى مجموع الدليل مناقضة على سبيل المعارضة وتفصيليا على طريق الإجمال. هذا من طرف السائل أما من طرف المعلل فإذا منع مقدمة من مقدمات دليله فيلزم عليه دفعه إما بدليل أو بتنبيه كما يقول العالم متغير لأنا نشاهد التغييرات فيه من الحركات والآثار المختلفة. وإن أتى بدليل ثان فاما أن منع السائل أيضا أو سلم فان منعه فالأقسام المذكورة تأتي فيه من المناقضة والمعارضة والنقض. وكذلك إن أتى بدليل ثالث ورابع فصاعدا وح ينتهي إلى إلزام المانع أو إقحام المعلل لأن المعلل إن انقطع بالمنع والمعارضة فحصل الأفحام والا فلا يخلو أن ينتهي إلى أمر ضروري القبول أو لا ينتهي. فإن كان الأول يلزم الإلزام وان كان الثاني يلزم الأفحام لانه ح اما ان يلزم التسلسل من طرف المبدأ أو عجز المعلل عن الدليل. والثاني ظاهر والأول محال. وبتقدير تسليمه يلزم إقحام المعلل لأنه لا يمكنه إثبات أمور لا نهاية لها. تنبيه: منع المقدمة فد لا يضر المعلل بأن يكون انتفاء تلك المقدمة مستلزما لمطلوبه وجوابه أن يردد المعلل بأن يقول إن كانت تلك المقدمة ثابتة يتم ما ذكرنا. وإن لم تكن يلزم المدعى. ولنمثل بعض ما ذكرنا في مسألة للتوضيح. مسألة: العالم مفتقر إلى المؤثر لأن العالم محدث وكل محدث مفتقر إلى المؤثر فله مؤثر ينتج العالم له مؤثر. فأن قيل لا نسلم ان العالم محدث يقول لأن العالم متغير وكل متغير حادث وهذا دليل ثان. أما بيان الكبرى فلان كل متغير هو محل الحوادث وكل ما هو محل الحوادث فلا يخلو عن الحوادث وكل ما لا يخلو من الحوادث فهو حادث ينتج ان كل متغير فهو حادث. أما بيان ان كل متغير محل الحوادث فهو أن التغير يكون من حالة إلى حالة وتلك الحالة حادثة. وهي قائمة بذلك المتغير فذلك المتغير محل لها. فإن قيل لا نسلم لم لا يجوز أن يكون التغير بزوال ما كان لا يحصل امر ما كان او بزوال ما كان وعلى التقديرين يكون محلا للحوادث. أما الأول فظاهر. وأما الثاني فلان كونه عدميا لا ينافي حداثيته ولا وصفيته فإذا ثبت أن كل متغير هو محل الحوادث فلا يخلو من الحوادث لأنه لا يخلو عن قابلية

ذلك الحادث، وقابليته حادثة لأنها مشروطة بإمكان وجود الحادث حادث وقابليته حادثة. وإنما قلنا إن إمكان وجود الحادث حادث، لأنه لا يمكن أن يكون أزليا لأن الحادث ما يكون عدمه سابقا عليه والشئ مع كون عدم سابقا عليه لا يمكن أن يكون أزليا. وإذا لم يكن في الأزل يكون مكانه حادثا. فللسائل أن يقول هذا إنما لزم من أخذ الحادث مع شرط كونه حادثا. أما بالنظر إلى ذاته فلا وكيف هذا لأنه يلزم أن ينقل الشئ من الامتناع الذاتي إلى الإمكان الذاتي وهذا مناقضة بطريق المعارضة لأن توجيهه أن يقال ما ذكرتم وأن دل على حدوث إمكان الحادث ولكن عندنا ما ينفيه، وذلك لأنه لو كان كذلك يلزم الانقلاب وهو محال وإذا خلص المعلل عن هذا المقام يقول إذا كان إمكانه حادثا وتكون تلك القابلية مشروطة بهذا الإمكان فتكون حادثة. وحينئذ لا يخلو من أن تكون تلك القابلية من لوازم وجود المتغير أو لم تكن. فإن كانت فثبت المطلوب. وإن لم يكن فكذلك نقول في القابلية الثالثة فيلزم إما التسلسل أو الانتهاء إلى قابلية لازمة. والأول باطل فتعين الثاني. وكل ما لا يخلو عن الحوادث فهو حادث لأنه لو كان أزليا لكانت الحوادث أزلية وهو محال. ولقائل أن يقول لا نسلم أن ما لا يخلو عن الحوادث فهو حادث لم لا يجوز أن يكون الشئ أزليا وهو لا يخلو عن الحوادث بأن يكون كل حادث سابقا على الآخر لا إلى أول. ولئن سلمنا ذلك ولكن عندنا ما ينفيه وذلك أن كل ما لا بد له في مؤثرية الله تعالى في إيجاد العالم إما أن يكون ثابتا في الأزل أو لم يكن والثاني مستلزم للمحال فتعين الأول لأن كل ما لا بد له لو لم يكن حاصلًا في الأزل يكون بعضه حادثا فح يلزم إما أن يكون الحادث قديما أو التس وكلاهما باطل لأن كل ما لا بد له في مؤثرية ذلك الحادث لا يخلو من أن يكون ثابتا في الأزل أو لم يكن فإن كان الأول يلزم قدم ذلك الحادث لامتناع تخلف المعلول كما سنبين فبعضه حادث والكلام فيه كالقلام في الأزل أما القدم أو التس فاذا ثبت أن كل ما لا بد له في المؤثرية حاصل في الأزل يلزم أزلية العالم لأنه إن كان حادثا فاختصاص حدوثه بوقت معين لا يخلو من أن يكون لأمر زائد على ما كان في الأزل حاصلًا أو غير حاصل هذا خلف. وإن كان الثاني يلزم رجحان أحد جانبي الممكن لا لمرجح وهو محال. فإن قال المعلل لا نسلم أن الترجيح بلا مرجح محال فذلك المنع مما لا يضر المعلل لأن السائل يقول لا يخلو من أن يكون ذلك محالا أو لم يكن فإن كان يتم ما ذكرنا فإن لم يكن فجاز وجود العالم بدون المؤثر فبطل أصل دليلكم أن كل محدث فله مؤثر. وجوابه ح بالنقض الإجمالي وهو كما يقول المعلل ما ذكرتم غير صحيح بدليل التخلف في الحوادث اليومية. وإذا ثبت أن العالم محدث فنقول كل محدث ممكن وكل

ممكن فله مؤثر لامتناع ترجيح أحد طرفي الممكن المتساوي للطرف الآخر بلا مرجح فيصدق ان العالم له مؤثر وهو المطلوب.

### الفصل الثالث في المسائل التي ابتدعتها

ونذكر ههنا ثلاثة مسائل منها الأولى من علم الكلام والثانية من علم الحكمة والثالثة من علم الخلاف.

#### المسئلة الأولى من الكلام

نقول واجب الوجود واحد، لأنه لو كان اثنين فلا يخلو من أن يكون بينهما ملازمة أو لا. ولا سبيل إلى شئ منهما فيلزم أن لا يكون اثنين. وإنما قلنا إنه لا يجوز أن يكون بينهما ملازمة لأنه لو كان كذلك يلزم بين واجب الوجود وغيره علاقة. وذلك يوجب الاحتياج. وعدم الملازمة أيضا محال لأنه لو كان كذلك يلزم جواز الانفكاك بينهما لأنه لو لم يجز يلزم ثبوت الملازمة بينهما والتقدير بخلافه والانفكاك محال فكذلك جوازه لأن جواز المحال محال. وفيه منع لطيف. وهو أن يقال إن عنيت بجواز الانفكاك جواز الافتراق فلا نسلم ان اللازم من عدم الملازمة هو هذا لجواز أن لا يكون بين الشئيين ملازمة مع ثبوتها بالضرورة كقولنا كلما ما كان الانسان حيوانا كان الله تعالى موجودا. وان عنيت به جواز ثبوت أحدهما بدون الآخر على معنى انه يجوز ثبوت أحدهما من غير احتياج إلى الآخر سواء كان الآخر ثابتا أو لم يكن فذلك لازم. لكن لم قلت أنه محال.

#### المسئلة الثانية من الحكمة

واجب الوجود يجب أن يكون موجبا بالذات لأنه لو كان فاعلا باختيار فلا يخلو من أن يكون فعله في الأزل جائزا أو لم يكن. وكل واحد منهما باطل. فالقول بكونه فاعلا باختيار فلا يخلو من ان يكون فعله في الاول لجائزا او لم يكن وكل واحد منهما باطل. فالقول بكونه فاعلا باطل وإنما قلنا ان كل واحد من القسمين باطل لأنه لو كان فعله أزليا يلزم أحد الأمرين الممتنعين. وهو اما كون الأزلي حادثا أو كون الفاعل بالاختيار موجبا لأنه لا يخلو من أن يكون له قصد وإرادة في ذلك الفعل أو لم يكن فإن كان يلزم حدوث فعله وإن لم يكن فيلزم كونه موجبا لا فاعلا هذا خلف. وأما إذا لم يكن فعله جائزا في الأزل فيكون ممتنعا ثم صار ممكنا فيلزم انقلاب الشئ من الامتناع الذاتي إلى الامكان الذاتي هذا خلف. وجوابه أن يقال ما ذكرتم وإن دل على ذلك ولكن عندنا ما ينفيه وذلك لأنه

لو كان موجبا يلزم اما كون الواجب معلولا لغيره أو جائز العدم وكل واحد منهما باطل. وإنما قلنا ذلك لأنه لو كان موجبا فلا بد وأن يكون معلوله الأول موجودا معه فلا يخلو من أن يكون معلوله الأول جائز العدم أو لم يكن. فإن لم يكن يلزم أن يكون واجبا فح يلزم أن يكون الواجب معلولا لغيره وإن كان جائز العدم وكلما كان المعلول جائز العدم كانت علته الموجبة أيضا كذلك لأن المعلول ح لازم لها. وجواز اللازم يوجب جواز عدم الملزوم فيلزم أن يكون الواجب جائز العدم هذا خلف. تنبيه: يشبه أن تكون المعارضة في المعقولات كالنقض للدليل.

### المسئلة الثالثة من علم الخلاف

قال الشافعي الأب يملك إجبار البكر البالغة على النكاح خلافا لأبي حنيفة رحمه الله. لنا فيه أن إحدى الولايتين ثابتة. وهو إما قبل الإجماع أو عند الإجماع وأيا ما كان يلزم المطلوب. وإنما قلنا إن إحدى الولايتين ثابتة لأنه لا يخلو من أن يكون شمول الولاية للوقتين علة لأحد الشمولين مطلقا أي شمول الولاية وشمول عدمها أو لم يكن. وأيا ما كان يلزم إحدى الولايتين. أما إذا كان علة فيظن، لأن شمول الولاية سواء كان متحققا أو لم يكن يلزم إحدى الولايتين. وإن لم يكن علة فكذلك لأن عليته ليست مدارا لنقيض شمول العدم وجودا وعدمها في نفس الأمر لأنه لو لبث شمول الولاية أو الافتراق بين الولايتين ثبت نقيض شمول العدم سواء كانت العلية متحققة إذا لم تكن مدارا لنقيض شمول العدم يلزم نقيض شمول العدم. لأن العلية إذا كانت ثابتة كان نقيض شمول العدم ثابتا فعند عدمها يجب أن يكون ثابتا في الجملة وإلا لكانت العلية مدارا له وجودا وعدمها هذا خلف. وإذا ثبت نقيض شمول العدم فأما أن يصدق شمول الولاية أو الافتراق. وأيا ما كان يلزم إحدى الولايتين وهو المطلوب. فإن قيل سلمنا أن العلية ليست مدارا في نفس الأمر لكن لم قلتم أنها كذلك على تقدير عدم علية شمول الولاية لجواز أن يكون ذلك التقدير لمحال. والمحال جاز أن يستلزم محال آخر. نقول هذا المنع لا يضرنا لأنه لو كان ذلك التقدير ثابتا في نفس الأمر صح ما ذكرنا وإن لم يكن تلزم العلية وبها يحصل المقصود كما مر.


آداب البحث

تمت الرسالة



## APPENDIX - 3

## ĪJĪ'S TREATISE ĀDĀB AL-'AḌUDIYYA



Courtesy of Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul  
 Source: Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi  
 H. Hayri Abdullah Efendi Collection  
 MS. 129, fol.8a.

## APPENDIX - 4

## EDITION OF TAŞKÖPRÜZÂDE'S ĀDĀB AL-BAĤTH

أحمدك اللهم يا مجيب كل سائل، وأصلي على نبيك المبعوث بأقوى الدلائل، وعلى آله وصحبه المتوسلين بأعظم الوسائل، ما جرى البحث بين المجيب والسائل. (أما بعد) فهذه رسالة لخصتها في علم الآداب مجتنباً عن طرفي الاقتصاد الاخلال والاطناب، والله أسأل أن ينفع بها معاشر الطلاب، وما توفيقى إلا بالله عليه توكلت وإليه المآب (اعلم) أن المناظرة هي النظر بالبصيرة من الجانبين في النسبة بين الشئيين إظهاراً للصواب ولكل من الجانبين وظائف وللمناظرة آداب. أما وظيفة السائل فتلاث: المناقضة والنقض والمعارضة، لأنه أما أن يمنع مقدمة الدليل والدليل نفسه أو المدلول فإن كان الأول فان منع مجرداً عن الشاهد أو بالسند فهو المناقضة ومنها نوع يسمى بالحل وهوتعيين موضع الغلط وأما منعه بالدليل فهو غضب غير مسموع عند المحققين لاستلزامه لخبط نعم قد يتوجه ذلك بعد إقامة الدليل على تلك المقدمة وان كان الثاني فان منع بالشاهد فهو النقض وأما منعه بلا شاهد فهو مكابرة غير مسموعة اتفاقاً وان كان الثالث فان منع بالدليل فهو المعارضة وأما منعه بلا دليل فهو مكابرة غير مسموعة أيضاً اتفاقاً. وأما وظيفة المعلل أما عند المناقضة فإثبات المقدمة الممنوعة بالدليل أو بالتنبيه عليها أو بإبطال سنده ان كان السند مساوياً له اذ منعه مجرداً غير مفيد أو إثبات مدعاه بدليل آخر وأما وظيفة المعلل عند النقض فنفي شاهده بالمنع و إثبات مدعاه بدليل آخر وأما وظيفة المعلل عند المعارضة فالتعرض لدليل المعارض إذ يصير المعلل كالسائل وبالعكس ثم ان من يكون بصدد التعليل قد لا يكون مدعياً بل ناقلاً عن الغير فلا يتوجه عليه المنع بل يطلب منه تصحيح النقل فقط هذا الذي ذكرنا طريق المناظرة وأما مالها فهو انه لا يخلو البحث اما ان يعجز المعلل عن إقامة الدليل على مدعاه

ويسكت فذلك هو الاقحام أو يعجز السائل عن التعرض له بأن ينتهي دليل المعلل إلى مقدمة ضرورية القبول أو مسلمة عند السائل وذلك هو الالزام فحينئذ ينتهي المناظرة إذ لا قدرة لهما على إقامة وظيفتهما لا إلى نهاية. وأما آداب المناظرة فهي تسعة آداب أنه ينبغي أن يحترز المناظر عن الإيجاز والاطناب وعن استعمال الألفاظ الغريبة وعن اللفظ المجمل ولا بأس بالاستفسار وعن الدخول قبل الفهم ولا بأس بالإعادة وعن التعرض لما لا دخل له في المقصود وعن الضحك ورفع الصوت وأمثالها وعن المناظرة مع أهل المهابة والاحترام وأن لا يحسب المناظر حقيراً. هذا غاية ما يراد في هذا الباب. تمت الرسالة بعون الله الملك الوهاب.

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