

Response to Commentary on ‘Grace de Laguna’s Analytic and Speculative Philosophy’

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1. Introduction

The lead article [Katzav 2022b] and the commentary on it comprise the first collection of articles about the work of Grace Andrus de Laguna. Such a collection is long overdue and has only been possible because the commentators were willing to take the risk of exploring an almost entirely forgotten philosopher. I thank them for this. In what follows, I respond to the commentaries by Peter Olen [2022], Trevor Pearce [2022], Anthony Fisher [2022], Marguerite La Caze [2022] and Frederique Janssen-Lauret [2022]. In doing so, I bring out some of the value of de Laguna’s perspectivism and of her treatment of modality. I also further clarify how she departs from pragmatism and from analytic philosophy, and how she relates to continental philosophy. Randall Auxier’s [2022], Sophia Connell’s [2022] and Brigitte Nerlich’s [2022] commentaries respectively explore the direct impact of de Laguna’s work on subsequent American philosophy, on analytic philosophy, and on linguistics. Limitations of space mean that I must leave continuing these important explorations for another occasion.

2. De Laguna’s Perspectival Realism and Functionalist Theory of Mind

Olen [2022] examines the compatibility of de Laguna’s perspectivism with her teleological, functionalist analysis of mental phenomena.¹ De Laguna’s perspectivism, according to Olen, identifies the real with concrete experience and tells us that each science provides us with a perspective on concrete experience, one that is an abstraction and that is not, even when perspectives overlap in subject matter, undermined by other perspectives [ibid.: XXX–XXX]. Olen claims, however, that on de Laguna’s perspectivism, multiple perspectives on perception, cognition, and affect should be viable. We should expect there to be different ways of abstracting from our experience of mental phenomena [ibid.: XXX]. In tension with this, de Laguna sometimes seems

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¹ Following the lead article, I here describe de Laguna as a functionalist, that is, as claiming that mental states are the types of states they are by virtue of their causal roles but not solely by virtue of their roles in causing behaviour. I thus indicate that de Laguna rejects reductive analyses of types of mental phenomena in terms of behaviour. This is contrary to Olen, who describes her as ‘identifying mental concepts with external behaviour’ [Olen 2022: XXX].

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to take functionalist analyses of mental phenomena to completely capture their nature and writes in her book *Speech: Its Function and Development* that, in the future, ‘we may hope to replace epistemology by a scientific psychology of cognition’ [de Laguna 1927: 207]. As Olen reads her, she thinks that traditional epistemology, with its emphasis on the subjective perspective, might be replaced by an objective science.

Aside from suggesting that there is a threat of inconsistency in de Laguna’s work, Olen worries that her perspectivism is not fruitful. According to Olen, she supplements her functionalist account of affect, outlined in publications from the 1910s and 1920s, with a metaphysical account, developed later. In the metaphysical perspective, emotions attach to idealizations or abstractions rather than to the real. Olen [2022: XXX–XXX], however, worries that the metaphysical perspective does not depart from the functionalist one in an illuminating way. Indeed, Olen adds, it is not only unclear how a metaphysical account might illuminate a psychological phenomenon but it is problematic to accept fundamentally incompatible accounts. A metaphysical account, which here would take the perspective of experience, is fundamentally different from a functionalist one, which is third-personal and thus might best be thought of as being independent of experience all together [ibid.: XXX–XXX].

What Olen takes to be de Laguna’s perspectivism, however, is a form of monism articulated in her 1904 criticism of the pragmatist Henry Heath Bawden. She there states that the different sciences provide us with alternative abstractions ‘from the concrete experience which includes all reality’ [Andrus 1904a: 442]. This view assumes that experience is not just another perspective but transcends perspectives. Yet, at least by 1909, de Laguna rejects the view that reality is just ‘our unanalyzed immediate experience’ on the grounds that all experience is correctable [de Laguna 1909: 412–13]. Instead, she identifies the ideal, in the sense of that which is conceptualized, with the real, while contrasting both with immediate experience. She writes, ‘[t]he “real,” I should say, is never immediately experienced at all; it is always ideal’ [ibid.: 405]. In the following year, she writes, with her husband Theodore de Laguna, that ‘pure experience ... is an arbitrary construct, devised to stop up the loop-holes of a theory’ [T. de Laguna and G. de Laguna 1910: 234]. They go on, as required by their rejection of pure experience, to explain concept acquisition as an evolutionary process in which we acquire the ability increasingly to differentiate features of the environment rather than as a process of abstraction from a given [ibid.: 162–72]. (Grace) de Laguna continues to hold such a view of concept acquisition in her later work [de Laguna 1927; Katzav 2022b]. In line with all this, she argues that not only does conceptualization or thought itself only provide a perspective on reality but that so too does perception, and thus experience [de Laguna 1934]. Thus, when she presents perspectivism in her later work, it is just as the view that knowledge and perception are always from a certain perspective but nevertheless do reveal reality as it is [ibid.; Katzav 2022b].

Contrary to Olen, then, de Laguna’s perspectivism does not tell us that theories of the mental are abstractions from some concrete experience which has the mental as an ingredient. Rather, such theories are about our perspectives on the real, perspectives such as perception and thought. Moreover, while Olen’s understanding of de Laguna’s views might suggest, because we might think there must be multiple ways of abstracting from a given, the inevitability of different abstractions about the mental, her perspectivism does not. Without the posit of some given, there is no immediate reason to expect that any particular perspective will itself appear in multiple

perspectives. Indeed, de Laguna [1917: 183] is clear that it is an empirical matter to find out which perspectives there are and how they relate to each other.

Reference to concrete experience is also absent from de Laguna's later discussion of emotion [de Laguna 1963]. Nor does this later discussion provide a potential rival to her earlier understanding of emotion. The distinctiveness of the later discussion is that it distinguishes between primary and non-primary emotions. She tells us that non-primary motions, such as admiration or contempt, 'attach only to what is "idealized"' [ibid.: 180]. But here she is using 'ideal' in the same way as in her earlier work. She is merely stating that having non-primary emotions involves conceptualizing one's environment. As she explains, 'the objects to which these feelings attach are objects conceptualized as belonging to general classes and as characterized by qualities; that is, "ideal," or "idealized" objects' [ibid.: 174]. Thus, de Laguna is not using 'idealized' to refer to what is less real and, by implication, her view that some feelings are idealized does not imply that they are in some sense less real. And yet this demotion of feelings from being fully real is the basis for Olen's claim that de Laguna offers multiple perspectives on emotions.

De Laguna, in sum, neither offers, nor is committed to there being, incompatible, legitimate perspectives on emotions. Further, what de Laguna is doing in describing non-primary emotions as having ideal objects is making clear that such emotions belong to the cultural world and thus are, at least partly, to be classified and explained in the same way as other cultural phenomena, that is, in terms of their roles in developing and constraining cultural patterns. For concepts are, for de Laguna, essentially a social phenomenon [de Laguna 1966; Katzav 2022b]. This alignment between psychology and cultural anthropology was already set up in her earlier, functionalist treatment of emotions, where emotions are classified by their differing roles in developing and constraining social interaction [de Laguna 1918, 1927].

Still, de Laguna's metaphysical work starts out from the recognition of the partial, but irreducible, truth of the perspectives of the different sciences and aims to relate these perspectives to each other in a vision of reality [de Laguna 1942, 1951: 4, 16; Katzav 2022b]. This implies not only that each special science will illuminate aspects of the real that others fail to illuminate but that metaphysics will itself illuminate aspects of the real that the special sciences do not. So there remains the question of how de Laguna's discussion of emotion in a metaphysical context might be illuminating, a question that is made more pressing because she expresses the hope that the psychological treatment of emotion will one day be scientific.

In response, her discussion is illuminating partly because it offers a perspective on individuality, and on individuals that are selves, that illuminates and transcends the limitations of science. She offers such a perspective partly by suggesting that all individuals are qualitatively unique and thus cannot be fully characterized by thought, including any science [de Laguna 1917, 1966: ch. 6, 1981; Katzav 2022b]. What this implies about psychological treatments of the self, including functionalist analyses, is that they cannot fully explain human behaviour. On de Laguna's view, people's behaviour, and ultimately their freedom, is partly explained by the (in principle) unique way in which they play their cultural roles and thus in terms that transcend psychological explanations of behaviour [de Laguna 1966: ch. 6; Katzav 2022b]. Accordingly, de Laguna's metaphysics does aim to transform the perspective of psychology by suggesting that it cannot fully explain human behaviour and by suggesting that the full explanation lies in the uniqueness of human individuals. The result of this

transformation is, however, a corrected psychological perspective that is part of an overall cultural perspective that recognizes the limitations of psychology, rather than a new psychological perspective that sits alongside an older, equally viable one. Psychology can but acknowledge what is, from its perspective, the inexplicable aspects of human behaviour. Metaphysics, in turn, does offer a new perspective, but not one in which our mental characteristics have an explanatory role. Instead, metaphysics appeals to our individuality, which is admitted to be beyond thought, to explain our unique behaviour.

As for the worry that the claim that functionalism might become scientific is in tension with de Laguna's metaphysical perspective, it is not real given de Laguna's view of the in-principle limitations of the principles of individuation and explanation of psychology. The metaphysical perspective from which we can understand our freedom is compatible with psychology, when psychology's claims are appropriately restricted. Its explanations can only hold other things being equal and thus do leave room for metaphysics [de Laguna 1917: 183–4; 1966: ch. 6].

3. The Hegelian Implications of de Laguna's Critique of Pragmatism

Pearce [2022] depicts de Laguna as moving away from the Hegelian conception of philosophy of her teacher, James Edwin Creighton, and towards pragmatism. In de Laguna's discussion of Bawden, she assumes that philosophy should aim to develop a vision of reality as a whole and to do so by synthesizing the results of its criticism of the perspectives of the special sciences [Andrus 1904a]. This view of philosophy is the one put forward by Creighton in his call for a continuation of the work of Hegel [Creighton 1909]. Yet, Pearce notes that in 1909 de Laguna accepts that investigation is always from some definite point of view. On this basis, Pearce [2022: XXX-XXX] assumes she had, by 1909, 'abandoned the view that philosophy could provide a complete account of reality, synthesizing the partial standpoints of the various sciences'. Further, Pearce believes that de Laguna and her husband had moved towards a pragmatist position. According to Pearce [ibid.: XXX], by 1910, they 'fully embraced the functional psychological basis as well as the evolutionary method of the pragmatists'.

Grace de Laguna's view of the limitations of philosophy is, however, already there in her 1904 work on Bawden. She states, in her response to Bawden's commentary on her discussion of his work, that it would be absurd to think that philosophical vision could 'be couched in concrete words' or 'could ever express the fulness of reality' [Andrus 1904b: 663]. Nor does de Laguna's position on the nature of philosophy come to diverge from Creighton's in a substantial way. On the one hand, he too is explicit that the Hegelian task is open ended [Creighton 1909]. On the other hand, de Laguna's commitment to the Hegelian ideal of philosophy is lifelong (see Andrus [1899] and de Laguna [1942, 1966]) and is accompanied, as we will see in the next paragraph, by explicit recognition that she is working in Hegel's footsteps. This is not to say that de Laguna's views of philosophy did not change at all. For one thing, as we saw in section 2, she ceased to see philosophy as aiming to articulate the perspective of concrete experience. However, she did not waver on the core idea that philosophy aims to provide a vision of reality and, in doing so, uncover the limitations of established opinion. As for de Laguna's commitment to explaining psychological phenomena as adaptive

functions, this is a position she already articulates in 1899 [Andrus 1899], the same year she was first exposed to the pragmatist variant of evolutionary psychology [Pearce 2022: XXX]. There is thus no reason to suppose that de Laguna shifted towards, or even draws on, pragmatism as such for her evolutionary method.

Further, the substantial extent to which de Laguna disagreed with pragmatism's evolutionary method, specifically its insistence that each psychological phenomenon be an adaptation to specific circumstances, is made clear by the implications of this disagreement.

According to de Laguna and her husband [Katzav 2022a; Pearce 2022], while the pragmatist is correct that human cognition was, in its early stages of development, a tool for addressing specific problems in specific situations, it has evolved to be increasingly general in its ability to address problems. This evolution includes the development of standards for evaluating cognition and action that are relatively independent of specific problems and circumstances. These relatively independent standards include those of logic [T. de Laguna and G. de Laguna 1910] and ethics [de Laguna 1942]. Thus, cognition has ceased to be an adaptation to specific circumstances even if, ultimately, it remains loosely tied to context [Katzav 2022a]. As a result, philosophy is not limited to addressing local, practical problems, as pragmatism implied it was. Instead, one can view philosophy, as we have seen de Laguna does, as aiming to transcend the relatively context-dependent perspectives, and thus problems, confronted by special departments of knowledge. That de Laguna was aware that she was supporting Hegelianism is clear. She and her husband close their 1910 discussion of the evolution of cognition by explaining the importance of Hegel's *Science of Logic* for the philosopher investigating this evolution. If this book's rationalism and absolutism is set aside, and it is

viewed as a provisional solution of a problem, which, from the terms in which it is stated, can never be adequately solved, it becomes a treasure-house of inestimable wisdom, which the pragmatist, of all men, cannot afford to despise [T. de Laguna and G. de Laguna 1910: 216].

According to Pearce [2022: XXX-XXX], the reason Dewey never responded to de Laguna's criticism of pragmatism may be that he shared her commitment to the evolutionary method. If this were the reason for his silence, which I do not believe, he would have missed the depth of her criticism of his early pragmatism.

4. De Laguna on Potentiality and Modality

While the lead article follows de Laguna and examines her view that universals are potentialities in relation to Heidegger's similar position, Fisher [2022] relates de Laguna's view to work in analytic metaphysics. He argues that, although de Laguna does not belong to the analytic tradition, she offers a classic statement of views that have become important in analytic metaphysics, namely a powers ontology and modal dispositionalism. A powers ontology typically posits that all properties are modal, for example, powers, dispositions or potentialities. Modal dispositionalism is the view that possibilities are explained in terms of modal properties. According to Fisher, analytic metaphysicians would benefit from studying de Laguna's metaphysics. I agree. In what follows, I point towards her responses to two challenges Fisher raises for her metaphysics and differentiate her treatment of modality from modal

dispositionalism. Along the way, I emphasize some further differences between de Laguna's metaphysics and more recent, related work.

The first issue Fisher raises concerns de Laguna's view of individuality. Fisher reads her as having a view similar to that of the analytic metaphysician David Armstrong, one according to which an individual comprises a 'thin particular,' that is, the individual abstracted from its properties, and its properties [*ibid.*: XXX, XXX]. At the same time, however, de Laguna takes individuals to be ontologically fundamental and thus not to be 'subject to composition and decomposition talk' [*ibid.*: XXX]. Fisher's worry is that de Laguna must nevertheless give a story of the inner complexity of the individual if her position is not to lapse into nominalism.

However, de Laguna's position is not Armstrong's position. For de Laguna [1927: 355–7], the properties of the individual are aspects of the individual that are revealed from the perspective of conceptual thought. From that perspective, there is no more to the individual than its properties. However, as we saw in section 2, there is more to the individual than what concepts reveal. Metaphysics provides an additional perspective, one from which the individual is not composed of properties but is still qualitatively unique and still exists, in the sense that it is self-maintaining [de Laguna 1981; Katzav 2022b]. De Laguna thus posits no thin particulars. Moreover, she addresses the tension between the view that individuals are complex and the view that they are qualitatively unique by recognizing that these are different perspectives on individuals, with the latter one aiming to transcend the limits of thought [de Laguna 1981].

The second challenge to de Laguna's ontology concerns her modal ontology. It takes all possible worlds to be potential actualizations of what she calls 'the ideal continuum,' an unlimited potential for the potentialities of individuals [1966; Katzav 2022b]. Now, de Laguna takes the ideal continuum to be ontologically dependent on existing individuals. Fisher concludes from this that ultimately, for de Laguna, all possibilities are grounded in whatever individuals happen to exist. He, however, worries that her modal ontology accordingly needs to address the challenge of what makes possible powers that are alien. Such powers are neither actually possessed by individuals nor made up of simpler properties which are similar to those possessed by actual individuals but are not possessed by these individuals [Fisher 2022: XXX].

De Laguna, however, is clear that individuals are ontologically dependent on the ideal continuum, just as it is dependent on them. Indeed, for her, the ideal continuum comprises a fundamental category alongside that of individuals [de Laguna 1981]. So, on her view, facts about the ideal continuum do not reduce to, and are not fully grounded in, facts about individuals. Contrary to modal dispositionalism, then, de Laguna thinks that the ideal continuum has a fundamental role in explaining possibilities. As a result, what might be the case is not constrained by what is actually the case in the way that it is for modal dispositionalists and the problem of alien powers is bypassed.

A potential difficulty for those within the analytic tradition who are trying to understand de Laguna's methodology and metaphysical positions is their relationship to science and common sense. The tendency might be to read into her work a methodological commitment, which some analytic philosophers have, to justifying metaphysical claims on the basis of common sense. Thus, Fisher [2022: XXX] reads her as having the view that metaphysics should agree with common sense, but as thinking that metaphysics should also be a critic of common sense. I am not sure how to reconcile these two aspects of his interpretation of her work. However, there is no need to do

so. Fisher mistakenly takes a quote in which de Laguna notes Peirce's *stated* commitment to common sense informed metaphysics to be an expression of her views [*ibid.*: XXX; de Laguna 1951: 15]. De Laguna, moreover, immediately notes that, in practice, Peirce's metaphysics is a fallible, reason-based vision rather than a common-sense based one [de Laguna 1951: 15]. And, in describing her commitments, she is clear that there are just two tests of a metaphysical system, namely continued applicability to experience and being complementary to a theory of knowledge [de Laguna 1936, 1951: 17; Katzav 2022b]. None of this should be surprising given that she conceives of philosophy as a critic of established opinion.

5. De Laguna and Continental Philosophy

La Caze [2022] develops further my discussion of de Laguna's relationship with continental philosophy. In this context, the lead article focuses on de Laguna's critical discussion of Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time*, which she develops against the backdrop of their agreement that the being of a human is to be understood to include maintenance of the self and its world. La Caze observes that Heidegger came to agree with de Laguna's worry that *Being and Time*'s human being centred treatment of being fails both in its ambition to be part of a unified treatment of being and in its ambition to transcend idealism. La Caze, however, dismisses de Laguna's worry that Heidegger does not offer an account of how beings with our peculiar mode of being historically emerged from nature. According to La Caze [*ibid.*: XXX], Heidegger's interest is the being of beings rather than beings' evolution as beings. De Laguna's claim, however, is that it is not optional for Heidegger to explain how beings with our particular mode of being emerged from the biological world [Katzav 2022b]. The evolution of the human mode of being cannot be inexplicable, given that the evolution of human organisms is explicable and that the human mode of being is dependent on the human organism. By implication, any account of the human mode of being must make intelligible how it arises from, and fits, the biological one.

La Caze rightly notes that de Laguna's work is more closely related to that of Hannah Arendt than to that of Heidegger. Like de Laguna, Arendt has understanding the human individual as an important focus. So too, like de Laguna, Arendt takes human individuals to be essentially unique and takes their uniqueness to express itself in how they play their social roles. Not unrelated, both hold the view that there is more to the human individual than their physical, biological, psychological, and cultural characteristics. Further, their notion of the individual and its structure is central to their treatments of cognition and ethics [La Caze 2022: 6–8]. Although La Caze does not note this, Arendt also shares with de Laguna a focus on the political, though one that is far more pronounced than de Laguna's. De Laguna's [1946, 1966: ch. 6] account of freedom and justice is grounded in her ontology of the human individual, just as Arendt's ontology of the human individual grounds her understanding of the political world.

That said, de Laguna would, in addition to being sympathetic to much of what Arendt has to say, be critical of Arendt's limited development of a science-informed ontology, precisely for the reasons she is critical of Heidegger's work. La Caze, noting that de Laguna contrasts American naturalism and the more humanistic and idealistic European thought, concludes that de Laguna is not a continental philosopher despite the closeness of much of her work to that of Heidegger and Arendt. I think La

Caze is too quick here. As we have seen, de Laguna's critique of pragmatism and her view of philosophy fits the Hegelian tradition. This is equally true of de Laguna's view of the individual (see Harris [1933], for a discussion of closely related Hegelian views of the self). While there was an important strand of continental philosophy that excluded Hegelianism, it is now recognized to be, at least thematically and methodologically, an important part of continental philosophy. Moreover, continental philosophy includes, from a thematic and methodological perspective, major figures, such as Ernest Cassirer, Henri Bergson, Hegel himself and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who balance a concern with nature, the human and the ideal, much as de Laguna does. Although de Laguna takes philosophy to require critical engagement with the special sciences, it does so, on her view, with the aim of transforming their perspectives into one where the human finds a place [de Laguna 1966; Katzav 2022b]. Finally, when presenting the speculative tradition with which she identifies in her paper 'Speculative philosophy' (1951), de Laguna [1951] does include in it key figures, such as Bergson and Heidegger. The question whether to think of de Laguna as a continental philosopher deserves further thought, at least when the question is considered from a thematic and methodological perspective, as La Caze does. From the institutional perspective, however, de Laguna's career largely preceded the setting up of the institutions of continental philosophy and is thus best not thought of as belonging to the continental tradition.

6. De Laguna's Rejection of Analytic Philosophy

Frederique Janssen-Lauret's [2022] commentary is part of a project that aims to expand the canon of analytic philosophy. She recognizes that de Laguna was a speculative philosopher but nevertheless aims to bring her, as well as another speculative philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead, into the fold of analytic philosophy [ibid.: XXX, XXX]. Janssen-Lauret's view seems to be that these philosophers' reputations suffered because there has been an unduly narrow understanding of analytic philosophy. But while Janssen-Lauret is correct that they were important contributors to analytic philosophy, they were—as de Laguna explicitly says and even according to Janssen-Lauret's understanding of analytic philosophy—not analytic philosophers. Moreover, speculative philosophers were marginalized precisely because they were not analytic philosophers.

A first indication that de Laguna was not an analytic philosopher is that, when the term 'analytic philosophy' starts being widely used in the middle of the twentieth century, analytic philosophy is contrasted with speculative philosophy [Frost-Arnold 2017; Katzav 2018].² Indeed, de Laguna herself makes this contrast when identifying herself as a speculative philosopher. She writes to Willard V. Quine that

Professor Max Black tells me he has you taped to discuss analytic philosophy in the symposium planned for the 1950 meeting of the Eastern Division. I hope you are really going to do this; in fact one of the considerations which helped me finally to decide to undertake the job they wished on me – the discussion of speculative philosophy – was the expectation that you were to be, so to speak, my 'opposite number' [de Laguna 1950].

² I am not suggesting that analytic philosophy came into existence with the widespread use of 'analytic philosophy'. However, the use of the term at that time serves, in my view, as an indication of its meaning.

Similarly, in de Laguna's contribution to the symposium, which is her already noted paper, 'Speculative philosophy,' she states that a shared interest in the limits of conceptual thought links 'speculative metaphysics to the analytic philosophy which condemns it' [de Laguna 1951: 9]. In conversation in 1970, she expressed strong opposition to analytic philosophy.³

That de Laguna contrasted speculative and analytic philosophy is also clear from whom she includes in, and whom she excludes from, the speculative tradition. In addition to the continental figures already mentioned in section 5, namely Bergson and Heidegger, she includes John Dewey, Charles Saunders Peirce, George Santayana and Whitehead. No author ordinarily taken to be an analytic philosopher is in her list of speculative thinkers. Indeed, as far as I can tell, no author ordinarily taken to be an analytic philosopher made a real impact on her work.

Moreover, it was not only that de Laguna and others around her thought of her as a speculative, and not an analytic, philosopher but that, at the institutional and methodological levels, she and other speculative philosophers were not part of the analytic tradition. On my view, an adequate understanding of analytic philosophy should be based on an understanding of its institutional nature and of the ideology that its institutions supported. I document, with Krist Vaesen, the use of institutional power by key figures identifying as analytic philosophers systematically to exclude rival approaches of philosophy from key journals, funding agencies and philosophy departments in the Anglophone world. What was excluded was predominantly speculative philosophy and what was retained was a form of critical philosophy [Katzav 2018; Katzav and Vaesen 2022]. It is thus reasonable to understand analytic philosophy, at the institutional level, as a form of critical philosophy.

In this context, critical philosophy is characterized by being epistemically conservative, that is, by tending to avoid going beyond some body of established opinion and, by implication, to avoid critiquing that body. Instead, critical philosophy tends to accept a body of established opinion and to respond to philosophical questions by, in some sense, unpacking or reconstructing that body, for example, by elucidating or analysing its claims, by uncovering these claims' commitments or truthmakers, or by seeing how the claims fit together. While for some forms of analytic philosophy, such as logical empiricism, being epistemically conservative involves a tendency to avoid critiquing, or going beyond, science in making claims about reality, for other forms, such as ordinary language philosophy and much of twentieth century analytic metaphysics, it involved a tendency to avoid critiquing, or going beyond, common sense. Importantly, a commitment to critical philosophy is compatible with aiming to develop a systematic, positive metaphysics. Quine's view that our ontological commitments are to be determined by logically regimenting established theory and (perhaps) common sense, and then seeing what the results quantify over is a critical approach to ontology but permits developing a systematic ontology [Katzav 2022a]. David Lewis too, because of his view that philosophy does not aim, in any substantial way, to criticize or to justify established opinions but only to fit them into a system [Lewis 1973: 88], can be thought of as a critical philosopher.

Janssen-Lauret does capture part of the ideology of analytic philosophy in her attempt to classify de Laguna. Janssen-Lauret's 'guiding principle in counting

³ Personal communication with Leopold M. Montoya, who read philosophy to de Laguna when her sight was poor.

something as analytic philosophy is that it approaches philosophy as something constrained by the findings of the sciences, and seeks not to contradict those, but to integrate philosophy with them' [Janssen-Lauret 2022: XXX]. Janssen-Lauret adds that analytic philosophy tends to avoid mysterian views and to mimic the natural sciences in its methodology. She contrasts analytic philosophy with continental philosophy, which, on her view, tends not to engage with natural science and not to use its methodologies [ibid.: XXX-XXX]. This characterization is problematic partly because much of analytic philosophy was almost entirely concerned with common sense and, when it did appear to endorse the need to be constrained by science, often paid no more than lip service to this constraint. Indeed, as I point out in the lead article, analytic philosophy tended to oppose naturalism in philosophy, in the sense of the use of an empirical methodology, for a substantial part of its history, and with this to reject the goal of developing broad empirical hypotheses [Katzav and Vaesen 2017; Katzav 2022b]. Janssen-Lauret's characterization also does not recognize the diversity of approaches to philosophy, including approaches, such as the speculative one, that see engagement with science, and borrowing from its methodology, as compatible with going beyond it in various ways. The characterization thus encourages misinterpreting work by philosophers who do not fit the mould of analytic philosophy, as in the case of Janssen-Lauret's interpretation of de Laguna and Whitehead. No less important, Janssen-Lauret merely looks at the ideology of analytic philosophy, neglecting its institutional base. Still, Janssen-Lauret is correct that analytic philosophy was epistemically conservative.

De Laguna's and Whitehead's philosophies are incompatible with the critical methodology of analytic philosophy, including with this methodology as Janssen-Lauret understands it. In discussing de Laguna's metaphysics, we saw that it provided a perspective on things that critiques and goes beyond established opinion, including the special sciences. I should now add that de Laguna offers, with her husband, an epistemological critique of science, one that aims to show that scientific truths are no more than true enough for the restricted purposes to which they are put [T. de Laguna and G. de Laguna 1910: 150–5, 253; Katzav 2022a]. Thus, her epistemological critique opens the door for her metaphysics. Whitehead too thought of philosophy as offering a critique of established opinion, including of science, along with a metaphysics that was partly independent of science [Whitehead 1929; Stengers 2009; Levanon 201]. Indeed, the aim of going beyond established opinion was characteristic of speculative philosophy more broadly [Katzav 2018; Katzav and Vaesen 2022].

De Laguna's view that scientific methodologies have in principle limitations meant that she accepted that philosophy must, at least sometimes, employ a distinctive, non-scientific methodology, contrary to analytic philosophy as Janssen-Lauret understands it. When philosophy is engaged in extending or directly challenging claims in a science, as in de Laguna's psychology, it should borrow heavily from empirical, scientific methodology. But when philosophy engages with the limits of conceptual thought to develop a vision of reality, something else, including recognizing the place of mysticism in philosophy, is in order [de Laguna 1981]. Whitehead agreed. As he put it, 'philosophy is mystical' [Whitehead 1938: 237].

The critique of science offered by de Laguna and Whitehead was not concerned solely with in principle limitations of science, but also aimed to develop science. Thus, Whitehead [1922] motivated by metaphysical considerations, developed an alternative to Albert Einstein's general relativity. De Laguna's functionalist approach

to human cognition is part of a proposal for a future psychology and came with a critique of key strands of then existing psychology, including strands according to which psychology aims to describe the essentially private psychological states of organisms [de Laguna 1918, 1927; Katzav 2022b].

From an institutional perspective, finally, de Laguna did not belong to the analytic tradition. She was, as we have seen, a student of Creighton. Creighton was one of the key influences in the development of speculative, American philosophy in the twentieth century. He explicitly articulates a speculative vision for American philosophy and used his journal, *The Philosophical Review*, to support that vision as well as a venue that nurtured (though by no means exclusively) speculative philosophers, along with de Laguna [Katzav and Vaesen 2022]. De Laguna worked constructively with this tradition throughout her career. Importantly, she and the other speculative philosophers from her period were collectively excluded from the history of philosophy by analytic thinkers [Katzav 2018; Katzav and Vaesen 2022]. Whitehead too belonged to the speculative tradition, as we have seen de Laguna attest.

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