Ibn Sina, Divine Simplicity and the Problem of Ineffability

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Abstract
This paper explores applying the truthmaker theory to address the challenge of divine simplicity and its alignment with Ibn Sina's understanding of divine attributes. It proposes that God's essence enables the predication of these attributes, eliminating the need for constituent properties. By adopting this approach, meaningful statements about God can be expressed without delving into ontological intricacies. The truthmaker account establishes a direct connection between God's necessary existence and the truthfulness of statements about Him, overcoming the barrier of ineffability. It offers a robust framework for understanding and expressing the truth of divine attributes while preserving divine simplicity. Ultimately, the truthmaker account provides a compelling resolution to the problem of ineffability in the realm of divine attributes in Ibn Sina's philosophy.

Keywords: Divine Simplicity, Ibn Sina, Divine Attributes, Truthmaker, Ineffability

Introduction

According to classical theism (Leftow, 1998), which was developed and defended by numerous medieval monotheistic philosophers, God is characterized as the ultimate being, possessing necessary existence that is completely independent of anything else. In this perspective, God, being perfect and self-sufficient, is regarded as the primary cause of all existence. Consequently, God surpasses all creatures in terms of ontology, lacking any form of compositionality.

Not only does God lack spatiotemporal parts, but he must also be devoid of any metaphysical or ontological components (Immink, 1987). In fact, there is no distinction between God's existence and essence. Thus, any attempt to make distinctions assumes compositionality, which is incompatible with God's nature. As a result, since God lacks any parts, he cannot be the subject of various attributes. In other words, there is no distinction between God as a subject and the attributes attributed to him; instead, all attributes ascribed to a simple God must be identical to him. Moreover, classical theism maintains that God's simplicity ensures the perfect coherence and unity of his divine nature, transcending any division or multiplicity within his being. This understanding affirms the indivisibility and inseparability of God's attributes, highlighting the holistic nature of his existence. Furthermore, classical theism asserts that God's simplicity is the foundation for his infinite perfection and absolute transcendence. By being devoid of any compositional elements or limitations, God is elevated above all conceivable boundaries, encompassing the fullness of divine perfection. In summary, classical theism presents God as an absolutely ultimate being, wholly independent and free from any form of compositionality, allowing for a unified and indivisible nature that encompasses all divine attributes. This is a general argument for the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS), borrowed from Vallicella (2019), Leftow (2006), and Wolterstorff (1991).

According to this line of reasoning, it becomes evident that God is fundamentally distinct from any familiar being. All creatures, whether material or immaterial, that are potentially knowable, exhibit a form of compositionality as described earlier. Even immaterial beings possess a metaphysical composition in which their essence and existence are separate (Hashemi, 2023, p. 168). To gain a deeper understanding of the connection between an object and its essence, explore the following: Hashemi (2017). To explore the distinction in Ibn Sina's philosophy, refer to Ibn Sina's works such as *Ilāhiyyāt*, I, 5, 31, 1–9 (Ibn Sina, date). Additionally, for further insights, see Bertolacci (2012). Due to the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS), which asserts that a simple God lacks all forms of metaphysical and physical compositionality, one might initially argue that God's essence is entirely ineffable, beyond human description. Building on the principle of divine simplicity, it follows that any statement in which an attribute is truthfully ascribed to God becomes impossible, as there cannot be a meaningful distinction between the unified God as a subject and the multitude of attributes attributed to Him. Consequently, no affirmative or positive attribute can be ascribed to God in any way. In other words, it appears that our positive discourse regarding God's essence is inherently devoid of meaning, as there is no intelligible positive language applicable to God. Instead, we can only express meaningful statements about God in negative terms, focusing on what God is not rather than what God is. It is worth noting that there are two contrasting perspectives regarding divine attributes and the existence of God. One perspective asserts that the concept of 'being' applies to God and other creatures univocally. On the other hand, the alternative perspective argues that God and creatures possess distinct modes of existence, treating the term "existence" as equivocal, with varying meanings depending on the subject being considered. Within this alternative approach, it is recognized that God, as the supreme and transcendent being, possesses a unique mode of existence that surpasses the limitations of created beings. While creatures

have a contingent and dependent form of existence, God's existence is understood as necessary, self-sufficient, and ontologically distinct. This acknowledgment of distinct modes of being highlights the incomparable nature of God and underscores the transcendence of divine attributes. By treating the term "existence" as equivocal, this perspective acknowledges its multifaceted nature when applied to God and created beings. It recognizes the fundamental disparity between the absolute and uncaused existence of God and the contingent and derived existence of creatures. This nuanced understanding of diverse modes of being encourages a deeper exploration of divine attributes and their relationship to the created order. It prompts us to contemplate how these distinct modes of existence impact the nature, characteristics, and interactions of God and creatures, thus contributing to a richer understanding of metaphysics and theology. Engaging with both the univocal and equivocal approaches is crucial, as they offer complementary insights into the intricate nature of being and existence, facilitating a comprehensive examination of the relationship between God and the created world (Hashemi & Hosseini, 2023, p. 6). It is important to note that this paper does not specifically address whether Ibn Sina adheres to an equivocal conception of being, as it falls outside the scope of the present discussion. For further information on this topic, please refer to De Haan (2015).

In light of the aforementioned observations, a compelling argument can be made that the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) leads to a radical interpretation of apophatic theology, wherein our language about God is primarily constructed in negative terms. At first glance, DDS appears to align with a semantic perspective that denies the ability of affirmative or positive sentences to truly capture the essence of God. According to the semantic thesis inherent in the radical form of negative theology, statements in which attributes are positively attributed to God's essence are rendered meaningless, while terms that are negated in relation to God's essence retain their significance. For a comprehensive exploration of apophatic theology (see Wolfson, 1976).

This radical version of apophatic theology emphasizes the limitations of human language and understanding when it comes to comprehending the nature of God. By acknowledging the ineffable and transcendent nature of the divine, it posits that positive assertions about God fall short in capturing the fullness of God's being. Instead, meaningful discourse about God is found in the negation or denial of finite and imperfect concepts that fail to encompass the infinite and perfect reality of God.

This approach invites a profound shift in our theological language, encouraging us to employ negative statements that highlight what God is not, to preserve the mystery and transcendence of the divine. By emphasizing the inadequacy of positive language to describe God's essence, this perspective directs us towards a more humble and reverent mode of discourse that acknowledges the inherent limitations of human understanding. While this radical apophatic theology may challenge conventional modes of theological expression, it opens a path for deeper contemplation and reverence in our approach to the divine. By embracing the notion that God's essence transcends human comprehension, we are invited to engage in a more nuanced and awe-inspiring exploration of the divine mysteries. The distinction I have presented here is derived from Buijs (1988). For further insights into the semantic process of referring (see Hashemi, 2022).

In his profound philosophical and theological works, Ibn Sina (980–1037) emerges as one of the key contributors to the development of the DDS. Moreover, the DDS assumes a paramount significance in Ibn Sina's renowned proof for the existence of God as the necessary existent (*wajib al-wujud*) (See Ibn Sina's *Metaphysics of the Healing*, VIII-4). To articulate a philosophical understanding of the God of Islam, Ibn Sina passionately puts forth a multitude of arguments in various texts. He meticulously contends that God possesses unique characteristics such as being immaterial, all-knowing, intellective,

powerful, and generous, among others, as outlined in the Quran. Interestingly, Ibn Sina's stance on human beings' ability to positively describe God implies a departure from the semantic theses of a radical version of negative theology or God's ineffability.

In this paper, the primary objective is to delve into how Ibn Sina's account of the Divine Differentiation Scheme (DDS) manages to avoid the challenge of ineffability. It explores the fascinating question of how it is conceivable for God to be radically distinct from all creatures while still remaining a subject that can be effectively expressed and comprehended. By scrutinizing Ibn Sina's perspective, we aim to gain insights into his philosophical framework and shed light on the intricate relationship between God's transcendence and the capacity for meaningful human discourse about the Divine.

Method

The purpose of this project is to delve into Ibn Sina's doctrine of the Divine Simplicity (DDS) and explore how it avoids the challenge of ineffability, focusing on the question of how it is conceivable for God to be radically distinct from all creatures while still being a subject that can be effectively expressed and comprehended. By examining Ibn Sina's perspective, the project aims to gain insights into his philosophical framework and shed light on the intricate relationship between God's transcendence and the capacity for meaningful human discourse about the Divine.

The project will adopt a rigorous analytical approach to Ibn Sina's writings, particularly his profound philosophical and theological works. The first part of the project will provide an overview of classical theism, highlighting the concept of God as the ultimate being characterized by necessary existence, independence, and lack of compositionality. It will explain how classical theism rejects the notion of spatiotemporal parts and asserts the coherence, unity, and simplicity of God's divine nature.

The second part of the project will focus on the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) and its implications for apophatic theology. It will delve into the idea that positive language and attributes attributed to God's essence become inherently meaningless due to the lack of distinction between God as a subject and the multitude of attributes. The project will explore the radical interpretation of apophatic theology that arises from DDS, emphasizing the limitations of human language and understanding when it comes to comprehending the nature of God. It will discuss the shift toward negative language and the preservation of divine mystery and transcendence.

The third part of the project will specifically examine Ibn Sina's contribution to the DDS and its relationship to his proof for the existence of God as the necessary existent. It will explore Ibn Sina's unique characteristics attributed to God, such as being immaterial, all-knowing, intellective, powerful, and generous, as outlined in the Quran. The project will highlight the departure from the radical version of negative theology in Ibn Sina's perspective and its implications for the challenge of ineffability.

Finally, the project will present a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of Ibn Sina's perspective on the DDS. It will discuss the ways in which his philosophical framework allows for meaningful human discourse about the Divine while maintaining God's transcendence and distinctness from creatures. The project will draw conclusions on the compatibility of Ibn Sina's approach with classical theism and its implications for theological expression and understanding.

Throughout the project, relevant philosophical and theological concepts will be explored, and scholarly sources will be consulted to support the arguments and analysis presented. The aim is to provide a thorough investigation into Ibn Sina's account of the DDS, offering insights into his perspective on God's transcendence and the possibilities of meaningful human discourse about the Divine.

Findings and Discussion

Ibn Sina and Devine Simplicity

Ibn Sina's compelling proof for the existence of God initiates with an elucidation of the concept of necessary existence. For Ibn Sina, the term "necessary existent" encapsulates the very essence of God—an entity that sustains itself without relying on any external cause for its existence. One version of Ibn Sina's argument establishes the proof as follows:

1. All beings are categorized as either necessary or contingent, meaning they are either self-caused or caused by another being (see Hourani, 1972).
2. A contingent being, by its nature, requires a cause for its existence. If it could bring itself into being by its own essence, it would be a necessary being rather than a contingent one.
3. The collective sum of all contingent beings cannot serve as the ultimate cause, as it would imply circularity—each contingent being would be the cause of the aggregate, leading to an infinite loop.
4. The cause cannot be attributed to every individual member of the aggregate, as this would mean each contingent being is the cause of all other contingent beings, including itself, resulting in an inescapable cycle.
5. Similarly, the cause cannot be limited to only a subset of the aggregate, since all members of the aggregate are contingent and caused. Furthermore, the member hypothetically assumed to be the cause of the aggregate would itself have a cause, and this subsequent cause holds greater legitimacy as the true cause.
6. Therefore, the aggregate of contingent beings ultimately traces its causality back to a necessary being external to itself (Ibn Sina, 1996, pp. 97-8; see also Davidson, 1987; De Haan, 2016).

Through this logical framework, Ibn Sina presents a persuasive argument that establishes the existence of a necessary being, which he identifies as God. After establishing the existence of a necessary being, the subsequent task is to demonstrate its possession of divine attributes. For Ibn Sina, the necessary existence serves as the sole foundation from which these divine attributes can be derived. Such attributes can be classified as either positive or negative.

The negative attributes stem from the necessary existent's intrinsic nature of being uncaused. These attributes are grounded in God's necessity and depict inherent traits that God possesses independent of anything external to Him. Essentially, God is conceptualized as an uncaused entity, self-sustaining and self-sufficient, requiring nothing beyond Himself. It is from this self-sufficiency that God transcends and surpasses any relationship with entities other than Himself. Consequently, this self-sufficiency serves as the wellspring of all negative attributes ascribed to God. Conversely, the positive attributes emanate from God's relationship with entities external to Himself. Since every contingent being is caused by God, all relational or extrinsic attributes find their subordination to God as the ultimate cause. These positive attributes arise from God's role as the primary cause, with all contingent beings being dependent upon God (Marmura, 1980).

In summary, the negative attributes derive from God's self-sufficiency and intrinsic nature as an uncaused being, while the positive attributes originate from God's role as the cause of all contingent beings and their relational aspects. By exploring both the negative and positive attributes, Ibn Sina unveils the multifaceted nature of the divine qualities inherent in the necessary existence.

This approach can be further illuminated by invoking Ibn Sina's well-established distinction between existence and quiddity. According to this differentiation, contingent beings are characterized by possessing quiddity (Ibn Sina, 2005, p. 276). However, "The First," referring to God, is uncaused, rendering the distinction between quiddity and existence inapplicable to Him. In other words, God's essence is solely encompassed by His very existence (Ibn Sina, 2005, p. 274). This concept of existence, being independent of any external cause, also implies the absence of any relational aspects within God's pure existence. The sheer existence epitomizes God's self-sufficiency and necessary existence (Ibn Sina, 2005, 280). On the other hand, contingent beings also possess existence, but their existence is not pure; it is qualified by a variety of quiddities, rendering them dependent on an external cause. From this perspective, God's necessity can once again be understood as His state of being uncaused and self-sufficient. Simultaneously, this necessity is intertwined with the positive attribute of sheer existence (Houser, 1999).

This breakthrough in Ibn Sina's framework presents a compelling solution to the problem of ineffability. By acknowledging the existence of actual attributes predicated on God, it becomes evident that God cannot be so simplistic that no notions of relation and negation apply to Him. Ibn Sina posits that God possesses two distinct categories of attributes: relational/causal attributes and negative/essential attributes. According to his fundamental assumption that "if an existent is necessary, then everything about it must be necessary" (Adamson, 2013, p. 178), both categories are essential for God's being.

For the necessary existence, attributes cannot be attributed to it arbitrarily or accidentally, as if they were arbitrarily affirmed or denied. Such attributes would then require a cause for their realization. As per Adamson's aforementioned classification, the necessary existent's attributes are either essential, coexisting with its nature, or they are relational attributes that necessarily follow from its existence. Consequently, the attributes that stem from God's causality are just as necessary as those arising from His nature as an uncaused being (Adamson, 2013, p. 179).

This comprehensive perspective allows Ibn Sina to embrace the necessity of God's attributes, both essential and relational, thereby reconciling the apparent tension between God's transcendence and the meaningfulness of human discourse about the Divine. By recognizing the necessary nature of these attributes, Ibn Sina presents a cohesive framework that accounts for the multifaceted aspects of God's existence and causality.

> If, thereafter, many positive and negative relations become attendant on Him, these are necessary concomitants of the essence that are caused by the essence; they exist after the existence of the essence, are not constituents of the essence, and are not parts of it (Ibn Sina, 2005, 273, translation modified).

When considering these two categories of attributes, the simplicity of God may face potential compromise through the attributes that are ascribed to Him due to His causal relationship with contingent beings, including omnipotence. The concept of "The First" embodies simplicity and is devoid of any composition in both its conceptual and actual nature. This is because if God were to consist of constituent parts, He would inevitably become reliant on those constituents, and the parts themselves would precede His existence. Such a notion is ultimately untenable:

> If God's essence arises by uniting two or more things, it would be necessitated by them and one of those things or all of them would precede necessary existent and be constituent of it. But the necessary existent is divided neither in meaning nor in quantity (Ibn Sina, 1996, vol. 3, 54, my translation). In Arabic as below.

لو التأم ذات واجب الوجود من شيئين أو أشياء يجتمع لوجب بها و لكان الواحد منها أو كل واحد منها قبل واجب الوجود و مقوما لواجب الوجود. فواجب الوجود لا ينقسم في المعنى و لا في الكم.

In this quote, Ibn Sina strongly critiques the notion of attributes as fundamental components of God. He takes aim at the "constituent account," which suggests that if a statement such as "a is F" is true, then the metaphysical constituent of "a," namely its "F-ness," must exist, thus affirming the truth of the statement (Brower, 2008, p. 16). However, Ibn Sina argues that adopting this perspective introduces internal division and differentiation within God, which directly contradicts his fundamental belief in divine simplicity. Furthermore, asserting that the necessary existent is not composed of meaningful parts implies that there is no distinction between quiddity (essential nature) and existence within it. Consequently, the necessary existent should be devoid of any genus or differentia. In a God without conceptual differentiation, any attempt to define God becomes impossible. Ultimately, this leads to the conclusion that any attempt to define God becomes inherently impossible, given the absence of distinct conceptual boundaries within God's being. For this reason, the First has no differentia. Since He has neither genus nor differentia, He has no definition (Ibn Sina, 2005, p. 277).

The semantic status of statements about God

The problem of ineffability within DDS (Divine Divine Simplicity) can be traced back to the notion that divine attributes are true of God because He possesses properties that justify their predication. According to this perspective, when we assert a true statement like "a is F," it implies the existence of "a's F-ness" as a distinct property (Brower, 2008, p. 4). This understanding is commonly referred to as the "property account," which encounters significant challenges when it comes to explaining the attribution of divine attributes while upholding the principle of divine simplicity. Plantinga astutely identifies two primary issues that plague the property account. Firstly, if God is identical to each of His properties, and if each property is identical to every other property, it follows that God would have only one singular property. However, we recognize that God encompasses a multitude of distinct attributes. Therefore, this idea conflicts with our understanding of God's diverse attributes.

Secondly, if God is identical to each of His properties, He would essentially be reduced to being a property Himself—an entity referred to as a "self-exemplifying property." This implication raises concerns because it diminishes the notion of God as a personal, transcendent being beyond mere properties or attributes. Thus, the property account faces significant challenges in both explaining the predicament of divine attributes and maintaining the fundamental principle of divine simplicity. This is untenable because:

> No property could have created the world; no property could be omniscient, or, indeed, know anything at all. If God is a property, then he isn't a person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, power, love or life (Plantinga, 1980, p. 47)

God is not only a substance but also a person, and it is essential to recognize that no substance can be exemplified as a property. In the context of DDS, it is crucial to uphold the idea that God's essence is entirely simple, and His properties are inseparable from Him. However, this requirement becomes problematic when we consider the existence of various instances of "a's F-ness" attributed to God.

To address this issue, the truthmaker account offers a means to predicate divine attributes directly on God's substance, without any intermediary properties. To delve further into the concept of truthmakers (MacBride, 2022). This approach highlights a distinction between how attributes are ascribed to God and how they are applied to creaturely beings. When it comes to God, power, for example, is immediately and essentially attributed to Him. In other words, God, as a necessary existent, serves as the truthmaker for statements like "God is omnipotent."

Conversely, this direct attribution is not possible for human beings. In a statement like "Socrates is just," justice is contingently and accidentally applied to Socrates, and he himself cannot serve as the truthmaker for that statement. A concrete individual like Socrates lacks the capacity to necessitate the truth of "Socrates is just." To address this predicament, various approaches have been suggested to account for the predication of accidental properties on contingent beings. Examples include considering their truthmakers as facts or non-transferable tropes (Brower, 2008, pp. 20-1).

To clarify further, contingent beings merely exemplify certain properties accidentally. In contrast, the truthmaking account asserts that "For all entities x and proposition p, if x is a truthmaker for p, then it is metaphysically necessary that if x exists, then p is true" (Griffith, 2013, p. 12). This implies that x necessarily entails the truth of p. Therefore, the truthmaker account offers a distinct explanation for the truth of divine attributes, which diverges significantly from the predication of attributes on creaturely beings.

Now, equipped with a solid foundation, we are prepared to delve into how the truthmaker account, aligning harmoniously with Ibn Sina's wording, justifies his understanding of divine simplicity. The challenge of divine simplicity arises from the apparent incompatibility between God's various attributes and the non-compositionality of His essence. If God's essence resists any form of differentiation, then how can statements such as "God is F" be understood as containing truth, thus inspiring belief?

To tackle this predicament, the first step is to demonstrate how attributes are genuinely predicated on God and how statements about God attain truthfulness. One prominent approach in addressing this issue involves conceptualizing God as the truthmaker for statements in which a divine attribute is ascribed to Him. A truthmaker is envisioned as the "ontological ground" for a truth—an entity whose mere existence renders a statement true. According to the truthmaker account of divine predication, if a statement like "God is F" is true, then there must exist a corresponding truthmaker that explains its truthfulness.

This notion of a truthmaker serves as a bridge to reconcile the compatibility of God's attributes and the non-compositionality of His essence. It provides a framework within which the predications of divine attributes can be justified, without compromising the underlying principle of divine simplicity. By positing a truthmaker for each true statement about God, the truthmaker account offers a coherent means of affirming the truth and meaningfulness of statements concerning God's attributes, despite the apparent tension among those attributes.

Therefore, the truthmaker account not only offers a solution to the challenge of divine simplicity but also aligns with Ibn Sina's perspective. It allows for a comprehensive understanding of how divine attributes are truthfully ascribed to God and how statements pertaining to God's nature can attain validity and belief.

(i)   God's F-ness exists.
(ii) God's F-ness is the truthmaker of 'God is F.' God's F-ness is identical with God (Brower, 2008, p. 17). This is entirely different formula from property account which states: "If an intrinsic predication of the form "*a is F*" is true, then *a's F-ness* exists, where this entity is to be understood as a property," (Brower, 2008, p. 4)

The notable advantage of the truthmaker account is that it does not rely on any presuppositions regarding God's properties. If there were numerous properties within God corresponding to what is attributed to Him in true statements such as "God is F," it would imply that God is composed of distinct properties, contradicting the principle of DDS. It is an unwarranted assumption to claim that every true statement

concerning God's attributes necessitates the existence of specific properties or states of affairs that validate its truthfulness.

Instead of positing a plurality of constituents within God to account for the truth of statements about Him, the truthmaker account elucidates divine attributes through the lens of God's simple and perfect substance. By focusing on God's fundamental essence rather than introducing additional properties, this approach aligns seamlessly with the notion of divine simplicity. It avoids the need for multiple constituents within God while providing a coherent framework for understanding and explaining the truthfulness of statements concerning His attributes.

A significant distinction arises between the process of predicating attributes to a necessary existent and ascribing properties to creaturely beings. In the case of the necessary existent, all attributes are directly attributed to God's substance, and it is His substance that renders the statements about Him true. Conversely, when it comes to creaturely beings, properties exist in parallel with attributes and play a role in accounting for the truth of statements. In simpler terms, the same property, such as knowledge, is validated through the existence of properties when referring to creaturely beings, whereas when it pertains to the necessary existent, it is substantiated through the existence of God's substance (Brower, 2008, p. 15).

The challenge of divine simplicity can be effectively addressed by embracing truthmaker explanations, which negate the necessity of properties in establishing the truth of statements about God. In this framework, God Himself embodies the truthmakers for every prediction made regarding Him. Essentially, if God is divine, He intrinsically encompasses everything that defines His divine nature (Ibid, p. 19).

This truthmaker theory harmoniously aligns with Ibn Sina's perspective on divine attributes, reinforcing the concept that these attributes are indeed identical to God's essence. According to Ibn Sina, if the attributes were not synonymous with God's essence, their attribution to Him would necessitate a cause external to His essence. However, such an idea contradicts the necessary existence of God, for nothing within God can be caused by something external to Him. Consequently, none of God's perfections can be considered posterior to His essence. Instead, every perfection that can potentially be ascribed to Him is both necessary for Him and identical to His essence (Ibn Sina, 1984, p. 6). This compelling argument serves as a testament that all divine attributes are essentially manifestations of God's own essence. It is through His essence that the ascription of attributes becomes possible, devoid of any requirement for constituent properties.

Therefore, the truthmaker theory not only provides a solution to the challenge of divine simplicity but also resonates profoundly with Ibn Sina's understanding of divine attributes. It reinforces the notion that divine attributes are inseparable from God's essence, emphasizing that His essence itself enables the predication of these attributes, rather than relying on any constituent properties whatsoever.

Taking stock

DDS (Divine Divine Simplicity) has long posed a challenging conundrum for theists, notably due to its association with various difficulties, including the problem of ineffability. In an attempt to resolve this predicament, a proposed solution emerges, asserting that DDS is not inherently incompatible with meaningful statements that positively describe God. Through the truthmaker account of divine attributes, the integrity of God's simplicity can be maintained while simultaneously upholding the meaningfulness of true statements concerning God. However, it is crucial to recognize that this solution does not completely absolve Ibn Sina's version of DDS from the charge of unknowability. The issue at

hand encompasses two distinct problems: one from a semantic perspective and the other from an epistemic standpoint. From a semantic viewpoint, the problem of ineffability arises, suggesting that God, as a purely simple entity, cannot possess a plurality of positive and distinct attributes. This conundrum challenges our ability to articulate comprehensive descriptions of God's nature.

On the other hand, the epistemic problem revolves around the notion of unknowability. It posits that if God is solely defined by what He is, then our knowledge of Him becomes limited. Human beings, in their capacity, can only attain negative knowledge of God, perceiving what God is not. The essence of God remains shrouded in complete mystery and unknowability, and our understanding is confined to acknowledging God's existence without truly comprehending His positive nature. This inherent unknowability gives rise to a form of negative theology that continues to permeate Ibn Sina's philosophical thought.

While the suggested solution presented in this paper successfully addresses the charge of ineffability, the epistemic problem persists and warrants its own resolution. Further exploration and investigation are required to unravel the complexities surrounding the knowledge of God and the potential avenues for attaining positive understanding within the framework of DDS.

The Significance of the Discourse

The philosophical discussion on the relationship between Ibn Sina's account of divine simplicity and God's attributes holds relevance in the Indonesian and Asian context. Indonesia, as a predominantly Muslim nation, has a rich intellectual tradition deeply influenced by Islamic philosophy. Exploring the compatibility of Ibn Sina's understanding with the truthmaker theory provides a framework for Indonesian scholars and philosophers to delve into the complexities of divine attributes while maintaining a connection with their religious heritage.

Moreover, Asia is home to diverse religious and philosophical traditions, where questions about the nature of God and the attributes ascribed to the divine are frequently explored. By engaging with the philosophical concepts of divine simplicity and truthmaker theory, scholars in the Asian context can contribute to the ongoing dialogue and seek a deeper understanding of these profound theological matters.

Furthermore, the clarity and conciseness offered by the truthmaker theory can be particularly valuable in cross-cultural contexts where the need for clear and accessible language is crucial. By providing a compelling resolution to the problem of ineffability, this discussion can enhance the understanding and communication of complex theological concepts within the Indonesian and broader Asian philosophical communities.

Conclusion

The truthmaker account offers a distinctive approach to explaining the truth behind the predication of divine attributes to God. This account allows us to designate an entity as a truthmaker without delving into its specific ontological category (Brower, 2008, 18). By doing so, it circumvents the challenge of reconciling God's properties with His essence, as these two aspects belong to different ontological categories. The truthmaker account enables us to articulate true and meaningful statements about God, where God as a necessary existent immediately necessitates the truth of the statements attributed to Him, all while upholding His divine simplicity. Through this approach, the barrier of ineffability is effectively overcome.

By focusing on the role of truthmakers rather than the intricacies of ontology, the truthmaker account provides a robust framework for understanding and expressing the truth of divine attributes. It allows us to navigate the challenge of ascribing properties to God's essence by establishing a direct connection between God as the necessary existent and the truthfulness of statements made about Him. As a result, the truthmaker account preserves the essence of divine simplicity while enabling us to convey meaningful truths about God without encumbering ourselves with ontological complexities. In essence, the truthmaker account offers a compelling resolution to the problem of ineffability in the realm of divine attributes.

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