

Nonetheless, Byrne's emphasis on material and efficient causes may tend too far in the other direction. A traditional interpretation that requires a persisting substratum is already subject to difficulties regarding the unity of substance; specifically, it is subject to the objection that form is predicated of a substratum, and accordingly, all changes are accidental. Byrne retains the thesis, characteristic of traditional interpretations of Aristotle, that every instance of substantial change requires a substratum that persists or survives the change, but disagrees with the traditional interpretation because he takes it that such a substratum must be, at minimum, a body of some kind. Whereas a traditional interpretation can avoid difficulties by appealing to a robust relationship of metaphysical dependence between substratum and form, Byrne's account must carve out a similar relationship between physical body and nature. An emphasis on the multiple natures possessed by complex physical substances is a start in this direction, but it is nonetheless unclear how these natures hang together so as to produce a wholly unified being that reduces to neither form nor matter.

Although I ultimately find Byrne's account of Aristotle's natural world problematic, there is much that is valuable within this book. By emphasizing the role of material natures in Aristotle's system of the physical world, Byrne calls attention to aspects of Aristotle's natural philosophy that, until recently, have been largely neglected. Likewise, by developing an alternative to the theory of matter traditionally found in Aristotle and demonstrating its application to an explanation of natural change, Byrne provides an interpretation with which scholars of Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition will need to grapple.

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Jason W. Carter. *Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology: The Science of the Soul*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. xiii + 253. Cloth, \$99.00.

Once upon a time in the twentieth century, it was considered good sense by some to think that Aristotle began his *De anima* (*DA*) with a series of very Aristotelian theories about the soul, and that the function of its first book was to eristically taunt his predecessors for failing to appreciate hylomorphism, or patronizingly praise them for getting the odd bit right. Jason Carter deserves our thanks for showing how wrong-headed this reading of Aristotle is. His book begins with the much more sensible assumption that the review of previous δόξαι in *DA* I plays an important and even constitutive role for theses at the core of Aristotle's theory of soul and living things, prominent among them these two: that the soul is substance in the sense of form and is the form of that natural body with the potential for life (*DA* II.1, 412a19–21); that the soul is not only the formal cause in this way, but also an efficient cause of animal locomotion and change, and a final cause of the instrumental organization of living bodies (*DA* II.4, 415b8–24). Carter's main interpretive objective is to show how the discussion of previous theories of soul in *DA* I can be read as an integral part of Aristotle's scientific study of "psychology."

The book has four parts that mirror, in a way, the structure of *DA* I itself. Following a clear and concise introduction (1–17), Carter addresses Aristotle's "methodology of psychological inquiry" in the first part (21–55). This takes up questions raised in *DA* I.1. In two chapters on definition and explanation, Carter convincingly dispenses with the view that Aristotle's methodology in *DA* I is dialectical, and develops the interpretive thesis that Aristotle's method in *DA* I is rather to apply a "demonstrative heuristic" (36). The heuristic entertains existing accounts of soul with a view to testing them for aptness in constructing definitions that identify the natural kind of soul and its *per se* attributes, and in giving explanatory demonstrations of these attributes through truly causal middle terms. I found this interpretive thesis unconvincing: there is little evidence in *DA* I that Aristotle hopes to translate the wisdom of the ancients directly into the code of syllogistic, and if there were, that would be the worse for Aristotle's reputation as an interpreter of others' theories.

The second and third parts treat of “earlier theories of psychological motion” (59–139) and “earlier theories of psychological cognition” (143–189), respectively. The division into theories of motion and theories of cognition is suggested by Aristotle’s mode of presentation in *DA I*, where he identifies motion (κίνησις) and perceiving (αἰσθάνεσθαι) as the two things in respect of which the besouled seems to differ most from that without soul (*DA I.2*, 403b25–27), and treats these presuppositions in turn. But as Aristotle actually attributes *both* of these presuppositions regarding the soul to several theorists (certainly to Anaxagoras, Democritus, Plato, and Xenocrates), it is slightly misleading that Carter has divided the presentation in such a way as to place some (Plato, Democritus, Xenocrates, and Pythagorean theorists of the soul as harmony) in the “motion” camp and others (Empedocles and Anaxagoras) into the camp of “psychological cognition.” The reader should take this rather as a decision on Carter’s part to focus on particular aspects of Aristotle’s approach to these figures. The purpose of these core chapters of the book is to determine the sense and systematic importance of Aristotle’s statements on these theories and theorists, and relate them to Aristotle’s overall project in *DA*. Each of these chapters involves much tricky and difficult work, as Carter strives to extract precise philosophical positions from Aristotle’s sometimes elliptical testimony, and support these using the texts and fragments we have in hand. The result is informative, and though some details of Carter’s interpretations may be contentious among scholars of Pre-Socratic philosophy, even just these chapters richly reward the reader with illuminating insights on the Aristotelian, Platonic, Academic, and Pre-Socratic material.

The fourth part (193–218) concerns “two psychological puzzles” that emerge for Aristotle from his discussion of earlier theories: one concerning the soul’s uniformity, the other on soul’s divisibility. Carter’s closing arguments for interpreting Aristotle’s answer to these puzzles as a hylomorphic dualism come too abruptly, and are too brief, to be persuasive in this form. The introduction of the issue of *pneuma* in the final pages of the book does not help Carter’s cause. Here, more persuasive work would have to be done.

The conclusion ends, somewhat surprisingly, with the affirmation of the separated and immortal intellect and the proposition that this part of psychology properly belongs to theology (227). If Franz Brentano perdures as a separated intellect, he will approve.

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Kelly Arenson. *Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus*. London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019. Pp. x + 217. Cloth, £85.00.

Epicurus had a distinctive position on pleasure: the greatest possible pleasure consists in the absence of pain. The pain in question may be physical or psychological. Not to be hungry, cold, or otherwise distressed is the greatest pleasure that the body can know; to be free of fear, particularly the kind of vague, undirected anxiety that Lucretius called *cura*, is the most pleasant state that the mind can achieve. As Lucretius exclaims, “Do you not see that our nature cries out for nothing other than that pain be absent from the body and that it may enjoy in the mind pleasant sensations, far from anxiety and fear?” (2.16–18). Beyond this, Epicurus avers, pleasures can only be varied, not increased. Epicurus further distinguished between two kinds of pleasure, which he dubbed *katastematic* (or “static”) and *kinetic*. But which are the pleasures that fall under these two classes, respectively? The condition of wellbeing, when both the mind and the body are unafflicted, would seem a likely candidate for the static type of pleasure. Once you are not hungry, eating in itself will not increase your static pleasure. But there are pleasures that seem not to be related to pain at all. Examples of such pleasures, already noted by Plato, are the tastes of various foods, pleasing odors as of perfume and flowers, and the like. The consensus of most scholars, including this reviewer, has been that these constitute the class of kinetic pleasures: they