G. E. M. Anscombe
1919–2001

Biography

G. E. M. (Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret) Anscombe (1919–2001) graduated from St. Hugh's College, Oxford in 1941 with a *First* in Classics and Philosophy (*Literae Humaniores*). In 1942, she went to Newnham College in Cambridge to study with Ludwig Wittgenstein, with whom she closely collaborated until his death. After a career as Research Fellow (1946) and Teaching Fellow (1964) at Somerville College, Oxford, she returned to Cambridge as elected Chair of Philosophy. She served at Cambridge until her retirement in 1986.

During her time at Sydenham High School, Anscombe converted to the Catholic faith. She married fellow philosopher and Catholic convert Peter Geach in 1941, who joined her in studying with Wittgenstein. They had three sons and four daughters.

Anscombe made several groundbreaking contributions to twentieth century philosophy and is seen as one of the most brilliant philosophers of her time. She is also seen as a fierce person: for instance, she publicly denounced giving Harry S. Truman an honorary degree at Oxford, because according to her his use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki made him a mass murderer.

She worked on a wide range of topics in ethics, moral psychology, philosophy of mind and metaphysics. Her seminal monograph *Intention*, published in 1957, sparked extensive debate in the philosophy of action and remains widely discussed. Her ethics paper *Modern Moral Philosophy* (1958) not only coined the term *consequentialism* but also has been a key impetus for modern virtue ethics. In general, Anscombe introduced classical philosophical thought, especially as found in Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, to post-linguistic turn analytic philosophy—carving out a new methodology now known as *analytic Aristotelianism* or *analytic Thomism.*

Anscombe is also known for her work as Wittgenstein's editor, translator, and commentator, and, after his death, as one of the executors of his work. Her translation of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) required substantive editing on her part and is used to this day.

Anscombe spent the last years of her life in the care of her family in Cambridge, suffering from several ailments, and died age 81. Since her death, the interest for her philosophical legacy has only increased.

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Chapter 9
Anscombe's Approach to Rational Capacities

Naomi Kloosterboer

> *[I]nference is something separable from the attitude of the one who is making it.*
> —Anscombe 1989, 397.

Abstract Reigning orthodoxy in the philosophical study of human rational capacities, such as being able to act intentionally and to reason, is to characterize them in causal psychological terms. That is, to analyze these capacities in terms of mental states and their causal relations. It is against this background that the work of G.E.M. Anscombe has gained renewed interest. The main goal of this chapter is twofold. First, I will explicate Anscombe's philosophical approach by analyzing her account of intentional action and by relating it to the misperceptions of that account in (the history of) the philosophy of action. Importantly, Anscombe holds that an analysis of intentional action in terms of *what it is*, e.g., an event with certain specific features, cannot provide non-circular explanations. Instead, following Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Wittgenstein, Anscombe seeks to explicate intentional action in terms of its *form*, i.e., the *way in which it exists*. The second aim of the chapter is to show the import of Anscombe's approach by applying it to the philosophy of reasoning. After discussing two main problems for the current orthodox view in epistemological debates on reasoning, I will propose an alternative Anscombe-inspired view of reasoning. In this so-called form view of reasoning, reasoning is characterized as a tool to drag out implications, embodied in judgments of the form *p as following from q*. The upshot of the chapter is that concepts of our rational capacities do not depict certain psychological states or processes, but rather our involvement with *rational connections* that exist in our lives and practices.

N. Kloosterboer (✉)
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
e-mail: n.j.g.kloosterboer@vu.nl

9.1 Introduction

Reigning orthodoxy in the philosophical study of human rational capacities, such as being able to act intentionally, to reason, and to have self-knowledge, is to characterize them in causal psychological terms. That is, to analyze these capacities in terms of mental states and their causal relations. It is against this background that the work of G. E. M. Anscombe (1919–2001) has gained renewed interest.[1] Anscombe is known for the programmatic influence that she has had on, for instance, the debates on intentional action, perception, and moral theory (see, respectively, her 1957; 1965; 1958). There has also been, especially in the last two decades, a surge of Anscombe scholarship and a revival of her views in the philosophy of action and practical knowledge. Still, many other of her positive views are less well known. Her views on perception, for instance, hardly figure in the discussions on perception (but see Frey & Frey, 2017). Nor do her views on reasoning influence the epistemological debate on reasoning. This might be explained by the fact that Anscombe's style is quite unorthodox and notoriously difficult to understand. But surely, being difficult cannot be the whole story: many philosophers widely discussed are also difficult to understand. In the case of *Intention*, Stoutland comments that "it was too easily dismissed as the incomprehensible work of an eccentric genius who was, moreover, a woman" (2011a, 1).[2]

The main goal of this chapter is twofold. I will first explicate Anscombe's philosophical approach. Doing this is key to understanding Anscombe's views. As the distinctive nature of Anscombe's approach is most clear in the philosophy of action, I will first focus on that area of her work. After giving an impression of how the content of Anscombe's account of intentional action has been misunderstood (Sect. 9.2), I will then use this to identify a wrong interpretation of her approach (Sect. 9.3). The second aim of the chapter is to show the import of Anscombe's approach by applying it to the philosophy of reasoning. After discussing two main problems for the current orthodox view in epistemological debates on reasoning (Sect. 9.4), I will propose an alternative Anscombe-inspired view of reasoning (Sect. 9.5). This view furthermore helps to clarify the distinction between an approach to human rational capacities that seeks to analyze them in terms of mental attitudes and their relations and Anscombian, or Anscombe-inspired approaches (Sect. 9.6).

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[1] Stoutland, for instance, notes that "[p]hilosophers of a new generation, who are unwilling simply to take the dominant account of action for granted, have sought something different, which they have found in Anscombe" (2011a, 3). See for a very interesting project on Anscombe and the other women philosophers of the so-called wartime quartet: https://womeninparenthesis.co.uk/ and *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements* 87 (2020).

[2] What is striking in this regard is that there is an earlier draft version of *Intention* with comments by Philippa Foot, where Anscombe presents the arguments in a more linear style (see Haldane, 2020, 41). The existence of this earlier version serves to prove that the non-linear style in *Intention* was *on purpose* and an indication neither of the unsystematic nature of the ideas represented, as Dancy stated, nor of their rudimentary state, as Heath claimed (Dancy, 28; Heath, 282; both quoted in Wiseman, 2016, 1–3).

9.2 (Mis)understanding Anscombe

While Anscombe might be credited with putting philosophy of action back on the contemporary agenda, Donald Davidson's work is the progenitor of the dominant view of action, the *causal theory of action* (CTA). There is great similarity between Anscombe and Davidson: at around the same time they started working on action and they both accepted the thesis, also known as the Davidson/Anscombe thesis (Wilson, 1989), that actions are intentional *under a description* (Anscombe, 1957; Davidson, 1963).[3] It might therefore seem strange to contrast Anscombe's view of intentional action with that of Davidson. In recent debate, however, it has been argued that it is precisely this apparent similarity that has sparked misinterpretation of Anscombe's actual views.[4] Hence, contrasting Anscombe's view with Davidson's causal theory of action helps to pinpoint both how her views have been misunderstood and that this is due to misunderstanding her philosophical approach.

A short depiction of CTA runs as follows: an intentional action is a bodily movement with a certain mental cause, e.g., an intention or belief-desire pair, that involves a pro-attitude towards the action. Suppose I bring my bike to the repair shop, because I want to get my broken bike fixed and believe that bringing my bike to the repair shop will do the job. According to CTA, the content of what I want and believe make it rational for me to so act. At the same time, having this desire-belief pair moves me to act—it causes my movements. The relevant mental states thus cause and, given that the action is favored by their content, also rationalize that action.

CTA faces numerous problems of which I will discuss one: the problem of deviant causal chains.[5] It is actually Davidson himself who introduced a striking and familiar example that illustrates the problem:

> A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it might be the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it intentionally. (Davidson, 1973, 79)

In this example, the bodily movement of the climber, i.e., the loosening of his hold, is caused by mental states the content of which also rationalize the attitude. Still, concluding that the climber has thus acted intentionally seems absurd—he did not *purposefully* but only *accidentally* let go of the rope. Taking this problem seriously implies that CTA has to state additional requirements to explain which of the bodily movements that are both caused and rationalized by certain mental states are and

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[3] This thesis will be discussed further on.

[4] For an overview of the relation between Anscombe's and Davidson's work (or CTA more broadly), see Hornsby (2011), Lavin (2013), Marcus (2012), Stoutland (2011a). My aim is not to give an overview of similarities and differences between the two, let alone to do so comprehensively, but rather to relate the contrast in such a way that it suffices to show how distinctive Anscombe's approach is.

[5] Other eminent problems are the disappearing agent and an action's progressive nature, see, for instance, Hornsby (2008) and Lavin (2013) respectively.

which are not intentional actions. Trying to formulate such sufficient conditions to depict causation of "the right, non-deviant, kind" has, however, proven to be difficult. It seems impossible to demarcate deviant from non-deviant causation without using a prior notion of what it is to act intentionally and thus without giving non-circular explanations.[6]

Anscombe, although recognized as stern critic of CTA, is still often interpreted as being in line with this tradition. A common understanding of Anscombe is that she defines intentional action as action being done for a reason. This is partly based on one of the opening remarks in *Intention* (1957, § 5): "What distinguishes actions[7] which are intentional from those which are not? The answer I shall suggest is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting."

On this interpretation, her approach to action indeed seems similar to CTA: she tries to delineate intentional action from mere bodily movement by stating that the former and not the latter stands *in the right relation to the agent's reasons*. As Bratman states, the disagreement between Anscombe and proponents of CTA is about the nature of this relation: "Davidson and Goldman insist, while Anscombe emphatically denies, that the appropriate relation is in some significant sense a causal relation" (Bratman 1987, 6; cited in Ford, 2015, 130–131). Hence, an influential interpretation of Anscombe has been that her account is on a par with CTA, except that she thinks the relation between the reason and the action should be merely rationalizing and not also causal, as CTA states.

But although the lines quoted above give the impression that Anscombe's view is in line with the tradition of CTA, such an interpretation ignores the continuation of the quote: "But this is not a sufficient statement, because the question "What is the relevant sense of the question 'Why?'" and "What is meant by a 'reason for acting'?" are one and the same." If, as Anscombe here stresses, explicating the relevant why-question and the relevant kind of reason (namely a reason for action) is one and the same task, then by stating that intentional actions are actions subject to the question "Why?" that asks for reasons for action, she is not yet giving an account or definition of intentional action. A few lines later, she further underlines this conceptual dependence:

> Why is giving a start or gasp not an 'action,' while sending for a taxi, or crossing the road, is one? The answer cannot be 'Because the answer to the question 'why?' may give a *reason*

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[6] It thus seems impossible to explain how, as Davidson claims, "rationalization is a species of ordinary causal explanation" (1963, 685). Another important worry for CTA is that explanations consisting of rationalization and causation seem to exclude each other. This is a difficult issue and depends on views of rationalization and causation. Anscombe, for instance does not think they exclude each other if causation is understood in an Aristotelian/Thomistic way, namely as *formal cause* (Anscombe, 1957, § 48; Thompson, 2008).

[7] There is a difference in terminology between Anscombe and most contemporary action theory. Where Anscombe uses 'action' in its colloquial connotation (i.e., things we do, perhaps unintentionally), most contemporary action theory reserve 'action' for intentional action only.

in the latter cases,' for the answer may 'give a reason' in the former cases too; and we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for *action*'; we should be going round in circles.[8]

Going round in circles is of course not yet giving a satisfying definition. That would require stating sufficient conditions that can function as non-circular explanations of what intentional action is. Hence, Anscombe's statement that actions are intentional if the relevant question "Why?" is given application is not a statement about sufficient conditions of intentional action.

Could we still claim that it is a statement of a necessary condition of intentional action? Even that seems to be something that Anscombe denies (1957, § 17): "Of course a possible answer to the question 'Why?' is one like 'I just thought I would' or 'It was an impulse' or 'For no particular reason' or 'It was an idle action—I was just doodling.' The question is not refused application because the answer to it says that there is *no* reason, any more than the question how much money I have in my pocket is refused application by the answer 'None.'.

But if Anscombe neither means to state a sufficient nor necessary condition of intentional action, then what is she claiming? She claims that there is an intimate conceptual connection between intentional action, the application of the relevant question "Why?", and reasons for action. However, she is not yet explaining what intentional action *is*. That would require that the right sense of the question and the right kind of reason could be specified independently from any prior understanding of what intentional action is. Unfortunately, as Anscombe claims, they cannot function as non-circular explanations (1957, § 5).

From this limited exegesis of Anscombe's *Intention* it should be obvious that interpreting her position as on a par with the tradition of CTA is plain wrong. In fact, it already hints at Anscombe's skepticism about CTA even getting off the ground: if the concepts of intentional action, reason for action, and rationalization form a conceptual nexus, the search for additional conditions to distinguish deviant from non-deviant causation will be futile. No additional condition would, after all, change the existing conceptual dependencies (Anscombe, 1957, § 19). Hence the interpretation of Anscombe's position as being in line with the tradition of CTA should be rejected.

9.3 Anscombe's Philosophical Approach

But then how should we understand what Anscombe is doing in the opening sections of *Intention*? If she is not giving us a definition of intentional action, then what *is* she doing?

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[8] "Why did you give a start?" answered by "I thought I saw a face in the window."

"Why did you call for a taxi?" answered by "I am going to the airport."

A recent suggestion by Anton Ford is that Anscombe, in the first sections of *Intention*, is not explaining what intentional action is, but is identifying her topic (2015). As Anscombe writes on the first page, "we are in fact pretty much in the dark" about words like intent, intention, intentional and intentionally. Merely saying that your topic is intentional action is thus not yet saying much. Rather, explaining intentional action can only come off the ground after carefully describing what it is that must be understood.

The remark that we are in the dark about concepts in our daily life is exemplary for Anscombe's philosophical approach more generally. Whilst it is obvious that Anscombe's philosophy should be located after the linguistic turn, it should be distinguished from ordinary language philosophy (such as J. L. Austin's). Our ordinary language is too messy, or sometimes plain mistaken, and cannot be taken at face value if we want to understand concepts. At the same time, the concepts themselves are too messy to be captured in formal language (à la Frege or the early Wittgenstein). Instead, Anscombe's approach reflects the late Wittgenstein in being a *grammatical investigation*: we should carefully analyze the grammar or logic of a concept (see Wiseman, 2016, 13–17). Anscombe is thus seeking to capture the concepts that play a role in what people say, think and do in everyday life. But she also holds that these everyday concepts are too messy to be just picked and analyzed. Before being able to start such an analysis, it is necessary to first identify the topic that is delineated by the concept.

In the case of intentional action, Anscombe holds that the topic demarcates a class of actions that we call intentional and that cannot be understood without the special sense of the why-question, an answer to which gives a reason for action. Ford argues that identifying a topic in this way involves an appeal to a certain triangular nexus: (1) a theme, about which, and about which alone, (2) a certain kind of question can be asked, a question to which, and to which alone, (3) a certain kind of answer can be given (2015, 131). For Anscombe, this nexus consists of (1) intentional action, (2) Why?, and (3) reason for action.[9] Identifying the topic of *Intention* is a task that occupies Anscombe in the first part of the book (from §1–19). The arguments she gives in favor of her identification are a combination of determining what can be plausibly said about intentional action and showing that each of these statements cannot be seen as a definition of intentional action. For example, Anscombe points out that an agent who fails to know what she is doing—or, alternatively, an agent who knows this only by observation—is not in a position to answer the question "Why?", and thus cannot be said to be acting intentionally. However, she then immediately makes clear that we cannot use the concept of knowledge without observation to define the concept of intentional action (Anscombe, 1957, §6–9). For now, the most important point is that reading Anscombe as if she is giving a definition leads to

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[9] According to Ford, there is a striking analogy to be made between what Anscombe is doing and what Frege did in his inquiry into the concept of number: "In what follows, therefore, unless special notice is given, the only "numbers" under discussion are the positive whole numbers, which give the answer to the question "How many?"" (quoted in Ford, 2015, 131). (And hence the topic does not entail fractions, negative numbers, or irrational ones.) Frege's nexus is thus: (1) a countable, (2) How many?, (3) number.

misinterpreting her account. What Anscombe is thus doing is to *identify* or *isolate* her topic, not explaining it or giving a definition. That is the first part of misunderstanding what Anscombe's approach is.

What's more, Anscombe actually holds that we cannot explain intentional action by giving a definition. Later on in *Intention*, Anscombe distinguishes between two philosophical approaches to intentional action (1957, §47):

> If one simply attends to the fact that many actions can be either intentional or unintentional, it can be quite natural to think that events which are characterisable as intentional or unintentional are a certain natural class, 'intentional' being an extra property which a philosopher must try to describe. In fact the term 'intentional' has reference to a form of description of events. What is essential to this form is displayed by the results of our enquiries into the question 'Why?'.

Anscombe distinguishes here between two approaches: one that has been dubbed a *decompositional approach*[10] that delineates the "extra" property that intentional action has and unintentional action lacks, for instance, a mental state of intention. The other I propose to call the *form approach* in which *intentional* does not refer to an extra property but to a *form of description.* Let us try to make more precise what the difference between the two approaches is.

An approach to intentional action (and I believe this holds for other rational capacities, too) is decompositional when it, first, claims that there is common ground between intentional and unintentional action that one can use as a starting-point, such as a *mere doing* or *what merely happens*, and, secondly, identifies a property such as *a primary reason* or *intention* that is present in the case of intentional action but not in the case of unintentional action. As Lavin states:

> But whatever the specific disputes [between different theories of intentional action], the parties to them share a generic conception of a material process or event (the conditions of identity and individuation are free of intentionality) and the explanatory ambition of fitting action into a world of material processes so understood. And thus they share allegiance to the very general framework of the causal theory of action: that X did A intentionally is the arithmetic sum of *what merely happens* and something else. (2013, 278)

The basic idea of the decompositional approach is thus that intentional action can be decomposed or separated in an event, which can be recognized as single event without assumptions about its intentionality, and some feature (or right relation to some feature) that makes it an intentional action. That is, one's arm rising is an event that, given the right conditions such as the right causal and rationalizing relation to a relevant intention, is an intentional action of raising one's arm.[11]

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[10] Doug Lavin introduced this terminology, although he does not literally call it a decompositional *approach*, but "a decompositional conception of action" and "a decompositional analysis" (2013, 278–79).

[11] This is a famous example from Wittgenstein: "Let us not forget this: when 'I raise my arm', my arm goes up. And the problem arises: What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?" (1963, § 621). It is one of the leading questions for those pursuing a decompositional analysis of intentional action, probably to Wittgenstein's aversion.

According to Anscombe, this means that the decompositional approach, of which CTA is clearly a representative, holds that the question "what *x* is", can be answered by giving what Anscombe calls a translation, analysis or definition (Hlobil & Nieswandt, 2016, 181). It often has the following form: to be an *x* is to be an *y*; or *x* means the same as *y*. An example might be: Knowledge that *p* is a justified, true belief that *p* (or is a belief with the properties *justified* and *true*). Or: intentional action is an action done for a reason. Importantly, such an analysis must be informative and satisfying, but, especially, as Hlobil and Nieswandt write, it "must be non-circular: we must be able to understand *y* without any prior understanding of *x*" (2016, 181). Such a connection between *x* and *y* might be conceptual, but also one of metaphysical entailment or some kind of reductive explanation.

Contemporary analytic philosophy concerned with questions what a particular *x* is often follows the decompositional approach. In some discussions it might even seem to be the only approach available. Anscombe however claims that "definition is not the only mode of explanation" (Anscombe, 1981, 138; quoted in Hlobil & Nieswandt 2016,182). As Hlobil and Nieswandt convincingly argue, in her philosophy Anscombe often sets out to show that the decompositional approach does not work for the problem under consideration, and, as such, she makes room for a different approach (Hlobil & Nieswandt, 2016, 182).

What is Anscombe's form approach? Anscombe's method has long remained unexplored and is only recently the focus of scholarly debate (Haldane, 2020; Ford, 2015; Frey, 2013; Hlobil and Nieswandt, 2016; Stoutland, 2011a; Thompson, 2008; Vogler, 2001; Wiseman, 2016). What is plain in Anscombe's writing is that she pays close attention to what we say, think and do that relates to the topic under consideration. Her analysis focuses on the practices and abilities underlying our talk, thought and action. But what kind of philosophical understanding should this bring about? We might say that Anscombe's approach is essentially an approach that holds that some concepts can only be made sense of if we analyze them, not in terms of *what they are* (i.e., giving a non-circular account of their properties), but in terms of *how they are*: the way in which they exist. This might be put in terms of the *grammar of the concept* or *Aristotelian* or *Fregean categories*.[12]

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[12] Doing justice to the different interpretations of Anscombe's method, especially exploring whether the approach is confined to Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation (cf. Diamond, 1991, 2019; Wiseman, 2016) or whether it includes making metaphysical claims (Foot, 2001; Haldane, 2004; Thompson, 2008), would lead too far astray from the question of the relation between rational capacities and psychological processes. Given the claims she makes in *Intention*—for instance, that she sides with Aquinas in claiming that practical knowledge is the cause of what it understands—I cannot but conclude that she makes metaphysical claims too. But then one should ask what is meant by 'metaphysical claim' and whether that kind of metaphysical claim is not allowed for on the more Wittgensteinian interpretation—which just underlines the fact that the question of how these interpretations relate to one another and which should be favored, is a topic for a different paper. For the current chapter, a general idea of her approach suffices to bring into focus an alternative view of the relation between rational capacities and psychology.

What, then, does Anscombe mean when she writes that ""intentional" has reference to a form of description of events" (2001, §47)? Let's turn to Anscombe's own example of "a man pumping water into the cistern which supplies the drinking water of the house" (ibid., §23). What is the intentional action of this man and why does Anscombe claim that the intentional nature of his actions has to do with a *form of description*?

First of all, Anscombe notes that this man is not doing one thing, but many things at once: he is moving his arm up and down, he is operating the pump, he is filling the cistern, he is filling the water-supply of the house, and, in Anscombe's example, he is also poisoning the inhabitants of the house. On the other hand, the man is doing much more than only his intentional actions: he is breathing, he uses certain muscles, his heart is beating faster than usual, he is casting a shadow by moving his arm, he is moving the air. Anscombe's claim is that this apparent chaos of happenings cannot be disentangled by pointing out a specific feature that makes certain happenings intentional. After all, we can both say that he is pumping because he wants to poison the inhabitants but also that his heart is beating faster than usual because he wants to poison the inhabitants. If we then distinguish the two by saying that the one is a reason for action and the other a causal reason, we are again presupposing what we seek to explain. And here we see what makes Anscombe's why-question so appealing: this question allows us to distinguish between the two. Only in case of the former, such as "Why are you operating the pump?" will the question have application—"Why are you moving the air?" will not have application, because the agent will not be able to answer this question by giving a reason for action. What this shows, for Anscombe, is that only under some descriptions of what is happening will it describe the man's intentional action. Namely, those descriptions to which the relevant why-question is given application.

Secondly, Anscombe shows that the different descriptions applicable to what the man is intentionally doing are structurally related to each other. The many things that the man is doing are like elements of a teleological system—the different descriptions of the action being part of an overarching *telos* or goal.[13] As Anscombe writes (2001, §23, §26), this can be revealed in two ways: by asking the question "Why?" (going from A to D) or the question "How?" (going from D to A).

A.   I am moving the handle up and down.
B.   I am operating the pump.
C.   I am filling the cistern.
D.   I am replenishing the house water supply.

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[13] For more on the teleologic structure of intentional action, see, e.g., Anscombe (1979), Ford (2015), Schwenkler (2019), Stoutland (2011b), Thompson (2008, 2011).

Form of description thus refers to an underlying teleological structure, what Ford (2015) has dubbed *the arithmetic of intention*: just like addition and subtraction are functions of arithmetic, the questions "Why?" and "How?" are functions of the arithmetic of intention. The order is not a psychological order: the agent need not hold this order in his thoughts or have (already formed) mental states that reveal the order. But it must be an order that the agent *knows*, in the sense that she is able to answer the two questions (why and how) without the need of observation.[14] Anscombe thus claims that this teleological or means-end order is there whenever an action is done intentionally, and that it can be revealed by asking the relevant why-question and how-question (1957, §42). Hence, the form of description of events as intentional actions, as Anscombe writes, is "a type of description that would not exist if our question 'Why' did not" (1957, §46). If describing an event as an intentional action implies that it is part of a teleological structure, then such a description is, in order to make sense and be a meaningful description, dependent on the existence of the form of understanding embodied in the question "Why?".

Following this—still rather concise—exposition of the grammar of the concept of *intention*, we get the following contrast between the decompositional approach and the form approach: where the decompositional approach seeks to analyze intentional action in terms of a mere happening bearing the right relation to the agent's mental states, no such distinction between mere happening and a happening which involves the right mental states is available on Anscombe's approach. First of all, on the form approach, intentional action cannot be analyzed as a certain unit devoid of intentionality plus an intentional feature. The identity of what is happening is fixed by the description applicable, which in turn is determined by the means-end order that the agent manifests in her action—for instance, *operating the pump* and *poisoning the inhabitants* in the above example but not *moving the air* or *earning my pay* because this is not the agent's answer to the why-question. We identify *intentional actions in the world*, not something else plus an additional feature, e.g., a happening plus intention. Secondly, the concept of intention is primarily used, not to depict a certain state of mind, but to describe intentional actions. It is hence not a way of adding a feature to an event, but it is *a way of describing* (that is, identifying and individuating) events. Calling an action intentional thus means that the event that is the action can be described teleologically, and that the relevant questions "Why?" and "How?" are applicable to it.

This might raise the following question: what is it about certain events in the world that invites an intentional description?[15] This question actually seeks to steer

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[14] Hence, this does not amount to a behavioristic picture of intentional action for the main reason that the agent *consciously* acts—the agent has *practical knowledge* of what she is doing. The idea is that the question 'Why?' can only be given application by the agent if she knows what she is doing. The role of practical knowledge in Anscombe's account is left out of the discussion (for the most part), because to understand the idea and role of practical knowledge, you already need to understand that Anscombe's philosophical approach is different from the standard decompositional approaches in philosophy of action. For a more complete overview of Anscombe's account of action and of the concept of intention, see Falvey (2000), Ford et al. (2011), Lavin (2015).

[15] This question was raised by an anonymous referee.

Anscombe's account back to a property account: perhaps events have properties that determine whether they are actions? Because of this pull towards a property approach, the question is tricky to answer. The crucial point is that the concept of intention is not a concept with the character of selecting a natural class, such as events with certain properties. Anscombe even claims that "the demand for a criterion of identity of particular occurrences just as such is not a reasonable one" (1979, 217). Rather, the character of the concept is that it describes what is happening *in a certain form*, namely the form related to the question "Why?" that reveals a teleological structure. "When we 'speak of an action as intentional'," as Wiseman explains, "we mean: the description of what he is doing *occurs in this form*" (2016, 160). Hence, for Anscombe the right question, rather than asking which events invite this description, would be: which descriptions *can occur in this form*?[16]

To summarize, I have pointed out that Anscombe's approach is opposed to CTA in that she holds that the primary use of the concept of intention is not to depict a mental state but to describe and individuate events in a certain way. Intention is thus, in the first instance, not a concept denoting a psychological state, but a concept that allows us to make certain connections in the world, namely those connections that constitute a teleological order.

This marks the end of the first part of the paper and the explication of Anscombe's method regarding philosophy of action and of its contraposition to the orthodox view in the philosophy of action. The second part engages with the contemporary epistemological debate on reasoning and seeks to motivate an Anscombe-inspired view in the philosophy of reasoning.

9.4   The Causal Theory of Reasoning and Two Problems

The current orthodoxy in the philosophy of reasoning views reasoning as a psychological process and analyzes it in terms of the mental attitudes involved and the relations between them. For instance, Broome writes that "reasoning is a process whereby some of your attitudes cause you to acquire a new attitude" (2013, 221). McHugh and Way, too, state that in reasoning "[y]ou bring some existing attitudes to mind, saying their contents to yourself, and make a kind of transition to a further attitude which you thereby acquire" (2018, 167). And Boghossian writes that "[b]y 'inference' I mean the sort of 'reasoned change in view' that Harman (1986) discusses, in which you start off with some beliefs and then, after a process of reasoning, end up either adding some new beliefs, or giving up some old beliefs, or both" (2014, 2).[17] In a rather generalized way, these views thus present a *Causal Theory of Reasoning*

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[16] At least, this is the question that should be asked instead of what it is about events that invites intentional description. This is not to say that intentional actions are not events. But they are not events that can be identified and individuated prior to their connection to intentional actions. Rather, which events we pick out and how they are delineated is determined by our descriptions of what happens *as intentional actions*.

[17] *Inference* and *reasoning* are used interchangeably in this paper.

(CTR): reasoning is to move from premise-beliefs to a conclusion-belief, which is caused and rationalized by the premise-beliefs. Moreover, they hold that this change in attitudes is a mental process. All adherents of CTR admit that it does not yet describe sufficient conditions of reasoning, but it does state necessary conditions of reasoning.

It seems quite plausible that reasoning often involves such a change in attitudes. If you care to know whether there are any beers left (because perhaps you want one) or whether the snow is melting (because you want to make a snowman) or whether the streets are wet (because you want to go roller-skating), you might reason as follows:

(1)   If Jane had a beer, then there are none left. Jane had a beer. So, there are none left (McHugh & Way, 2018, 167).
(2)   If it rains, the snow melts. It is raining. So, the snow melts (Broome, 2013, 216).
(3)   If it rained last night, the streets are wet. It rained last night. So, the streets are wet (Boghossian, 2014, 2).

In these cases, you adopt a belief in the conclusion, e.g., that there are no beers left, that the snow melts, and that the streets are wet, and thus you change your attitudes.

Despite the initial plausibility of CTR, it does not explain why the move from premise-beliefs to a conclusion-belief is rational. Why is simply moving from one belief to another rational? This is a question about which conditions should be added to make CTR intelligible. The most influential response to the question what should be added is what Boghossian has introduced as the taking condition (2014, 5):

> **Taking Condition**: Inferring necessarily involves the thinker *taking* his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion *because* of that fact.

The Taking Condition is supposed to ensure that the causal relation between one's beliefs in the premises and one's belief in the conclusion is not merely causal but is of the right (non-deviant) and thus rationalizing kind. Boghossian's Taking Condition seeks to secure this by introducing another mental item, i.e., *the taking*, on top of the thinker's attitudes regarding the premises and conclusion. Given that such a *taking* is an additional item, the question arises which role this item is supposed to play in reasoning. In trying to account for the role of the taking, one inadvertently seems to run into regress problems. First, the role of taking in the inference should not be that of an additional premise, as is familiar from Carroll's argument (1895).[18] An added premise does not bridge the apparent gap between premises and conclusion. Moreover, the role of the taking should not be merely causal, but it should rationalize the inference. However, if it is to rationalize the inference, it seems unavoidable that the content of the taking should be related, by the thinker herself, to the content of the inference, and as of yet there appears to be no way to relate the two without any form of inference. Hence, the Taking Condition condemns accounts of inference

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[18] Carroll's regress argument is applicable to implications and thus to the aforementioned examples of reasoning. It isn't applicable to probabilistic support. See Atkinson and Peijnenburg (2017), 151–153.

to problems of regress. So, where CTA runs into problems of circularity in trying to formulate sufficient conditions, formulating sufficient conditions steers CTR into problems of regress, as is widely recognized and discussed in the debate.[19]

A problem that has not received much attention, however, is whether the starting point, i.e., thinking that reasoning is a psychological process of moving from premise-beliefs to a conclusion-belief, is even necessary. That is, whether it is necessary to analyze reasoning in terms of (supposed) mental states and relations between them. Anscombe would claim otherwise: she states that "inference is something separable from the attitude of the one who is making it" (1989, 397). After all, we seem to employ the concept of reasoning not only in cases where a person adopts, revises or withdraws a belief, but also in many cases where such a change in attitudes does not seem to occur, such as hypothetical reasoning, reasoning where one does not or fails to reach a conclusion, considering, or toying with an idea. The problem for CTR that I wish to formulate thus boils down to the following: on the strict definition propounded by CTR, many forms of thinking that we would intuitively call reasoning fall outside the scope of the concept of reasoning. This seems an artificial distinction to make from the outset—a thought gaining support by the availability of a different understanding of reasoning that does not presuppose such a strict scope of the concept of reasoning (see the next section).

Consider first the following example by Anscombe (1989, 395) that can be described as a case of *interpersonal reasoning* and which I have adapted to suit theoretical reasoning:

> Suppose I say to you: [premise 1:] "You live in a democracy." [Premise 2:] "If you live in a democracy, you should take responsibility." And suppose I then give you a prudish look with nothing more said, whereupon you think "Yeah, yeah, so I should take responsibility."

The idea of this example is that you (person B) draw the conclusion from the two premises I (person A) set forth. In order to make the inference, person B must think about all the elements of the inference (the propositions), but it does not require her to present the propositions in a certain way. That is to say, she does not need to have any attitudes towards the premises or conclusion to be able to *reason along* with person A.

Take, for instance, the conditional statement "If you live in a democracy, you should take responsibility." Making an inference does not require person B to believe the conditional, nor need it be true. Suppose person B knows that there are multiple exceptions to the conditional statement. For instance, children who live in a democracy should not take responsibility. They should be taken care of. Hence, the conditional is false and person B knows that it is false. Still, the reasoning is *comprehensible*

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[19] This is an extremely short review of the route from the Taking Condition to regress. For more in depth analysis of the problem and proposed solutions (or evasions), see, for instance, Boghossian (2014), Broome (2013), Chap. 12, McHugh et al. (2014).

to her (after all, the inference is still valid). Intuitively, she *can* still draw the conclusion that she should take responsibility. And she can do this despite the fact that she disbelieves the conditional statement postulated by person A.[20]

Or imagine a case where a person, say Clarissa, reasons through (1), i.e., from the premises that Jane had a beer, and that if Jane had a beer, then there are none left, to the conclusion that there are no beers left. However, Clarissa is really tired at the moment, so she actually does not adopt the belief that there are no beers left. We know this, because soon afterwards she gets up to grab a beer only to find out (again) that there are none left. (She might then even think to herself "Oh, right, Jane just picked the last," thereby acknowledging the train of thought she had just moments ago.) According to CTR, Clarissa's failure to actually change her belief is ground to deny that she has reasoned. But this seems absurd. A rational failure to adopt a belief in the conclusion should not be ground to decide whether the episode of thought one just went through was a piece of reasoning or not.

As a last example, consider hypothetical reasoning. This example takes a bit longer to spell out. Intuitively, hypothetical reasoning is precisely the kind of reasoning that brackets the question of whether one believes the premises and conclusion. The expression "for the sake of argument" is precisely to do just that: to bracket one's mental attitudes to the topic under consideration, i.e., one's commitments to the truth or falsity of the propositions involved in the inference. This implies that one's mental attitudes towards the propositions involved are *irrelevant* in the case of hypothetical reasoning. Take the following example from Valaris:

> I might…consider the hypotheses that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and infinitely good and that evil nevertheless still exists, and see what follows. I may do this while lacking or suspending any attitudes towards the original hypotheses, and without any disposition to adopt any particular attitude towards any consequences I deduce from them. … [W]hat attitudes the agent has towards her hypotheses is *irrelevant* to [hypothetical reasoning]: a theist, an atheist and an agnostic may deduce exactly the same consequences, and in the same way, from the original hypotheses, even if they take incompatible attitudes towards them. (2018, 4)

Thus, hypothetical reasoning, or reasoning where one is interested in some consequences of a set of claims, "does not appear necessarily to involve—much less to *consist in*—adopting or revising any such attitudes" (ibid.).[21]

Of course, advocates of CTR might seek to account for these examples by extending their analysis of reasoning, which, in the case of hypothetical reasoning, has already been tried.[22] Nonetheless, extending an account is not yet justifying the presupposition that reasoning should first and foremost be understood as a move from premise-beliefs to a conclusion-belief. Why not start with investigating the broader range of phenomena that we intuitively regard as reasoning? That is, not merely the

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[20] What's more, it seems she can also draw the conclusion while at the same time disbelieving it. But again, her belief or disbelief in the conclusion is not something that *follows* from going through the inference.

[21] See Kloosterboer (2019) for a full discussion of these and other examples against CTR.

[22] See, e.g., Broome (2013), McHugh and Way (2018).

activity of changing your mind, but also hypothetical reasoning, reasoning where one does not or fails to reach a conclusion, considering, or toying with an idea.

To conclude, there are many examples of activities that intuitively fall under the concept of reasoning that are excluded on CTR's strict definition of reasoning. This makes it seem as if CTR postulates as necessary a feature of reasoning, which in fact only specifies a particular kind of reasoning. As Anscombe claims, reasoning that involves a change in attitudes is but one instance of the more general phenomenon that reasoning, or making an inference, is.[23] Additionally, CTR faces the problem of making their account of reasoning sufficient. As I have briefly pointed out, attempts to formulate sufficiency conditions run into problems of regress. This means that the first task of Anscombe's method is completed: a demonstration of the at least apparent impossibility of giving a non-circular analysis of reasoning on CTR's approach, thereby creating room for an alternative approach. This is the task of the next section.

9.5   An Anscombian Form Approach to Reasoning

The alternative approach to reasoning that I want to sketch in this section is inspired by insights from Anscombe and from Frege. This so-called form view holds that when a person reasons, she makes use of conditionals,[24] manifested in making a judgment of the form *p as following from q*.[25]

Some recent accounts of reasoning seek to define reasoning as an activity with one specific aim. For example, McHugh and Way argue that "the ultimate point of reasoning is to get fitting attitudes. In other words, it is to *get things right*" (2018, 178). Valaris, by contrast, claims that the aim of reasoning should not be characterized on the attitudinal, and what he calls *syntactic* level, but on a *semantic* level: "the epistemic aim of reasoning is to reduce uncertainty about the world, via the elimination of alternative ways the world might be" (2017, 2016). But if we look at all the different ways and different contexts in which we reason, then it seems that reasoning has many different aims. We do not merely reason *to get things right* or to reduce uncertainty about the world, but also for the fun of it, to explore new possibilities, to open new possibilities (cf. Kompridis, 2000, 293), to determine what to do, investigate, etcetera.

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[23] And, relatedly, Wright states that we should "distinguish inference in general from *coming to a conclusion*…; no particular attitude to [a] proposition is implicit in inference itself" (2014, 28).

[24] Anscombe also speaks of *truth-connections* and I think we should understand it in such broad terms: often, in our everyday reasoning we use material implications, but conceptual relations or relations of logical consequence can of course also be used (for instance, when one learns the meaning of a word). Thanks for an anonymous referee for asking me to clarify this point.

[25] This is to say that if one reasons, then one judges that *p follows from q*. Using conditionals is thus using one's power to judge that some things follow from other things. Importantly, on my view, making a judgment is a mental *act*, not a *result* of a process of reasoning (or some other process or activity). More on this in the next section.

Where others seek to identify one specific aim of reasoning as its determining feature, I think we should do justice to the manifold goals with which we reason. To take up a suggestion made by Anscombe, we might say that reasoning is a way of using a specific kind of tool (1989). Reasoning is to put *implications* or *truth-connections* between propositions to a particular service.[26] This means that, even if reasoning does not have one specific aim, it does have a *point*: to drag out implications.[27]

Anscombe clarifies her argument with the following example about plant growth (1989, 394):

(1)   If these substances are in the soil, the plants will be fed by them. (if r then q)
(2)   If plants are fed with certain substances, there will be spectacular plant growth. (if q then p).

These implications might be put to different use. For instance, if it is given or assumed that these substances are in the soil (r), one should, in accord with (1) (if r then q) and (2) (if q then p), come to the (assumed) conclusion that there will be spectacular plant growth (p) (theoretical reasoning). Or, if one is to investigate why there is spectacular plant growth (p), one should, according to (2) (if q then p) and (1) (if r then q), examine the soil to check whether those substances are present (investigation). Again, these same considerations might figure in practical reasoning: if the objective is to attain spectacular plant growth (p), then, given (2) (if q then p) and (1) (if r then q), one should (decide to) put those substances in the soil (r).[28] Anscombe's formalizations might be of help here (1989, 393):

Theoretical reasoning	Investigation	Practical reasoning
r	Given: p	Wanted: that p
if r then q	if q then p	if q then p
if q then p	if r then q	if r then q
p	To investigate: r	Decision: r!

What should become apparent in the table is that the same implications are present in the distinct forms of reasoning. In each instance of reasoning, the "considerations and

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[26] What it is to put X to a particular service requires more detailed analysis and might require a different analysis in the case of theoretical and practical reasoning (see Müller, 1979). However, this does not impinge on the general point about reasoning.

[27] This holds for everyday human reasoning. Probabilistic logic (or *reasoning* as it is sometimes coined, which denotes a technical use of the term) falls outside the scope of this paper.

[28] The nature of practical reasoning, especially the kind of conclusion to which it leads, is of course topic of much debate. On Anscombe's view (following Aristotle), the most basic case of practical reasoning has as its conclusion an action, not a judgment about what one should do (hence, not just the *topic* of practical reasoning is different from theoretical reasoning; it really has a practical character or form). If an agent puts the substances in the soil in order to attain spectacular plant growth, she thereby manifests practical reasoning. She is doing one thing by doing something else and hence judging that the one follows from the other (that doing A is a way of, or part of, doing B).

their logical relations are just the same" (Anscombe, 1989, 392). But the implications are put to a different use: the role of the implications depends on the interests of the reasoner (the consequence of what is the case, the explanation of what is the case, or the means to achieve one's end). Hence, the *aim* of reasoning depends on the interests of the reasoner, but *the point* of reasoning is to drag out implications. The reasoner is reasoning and not doing something else (e.g., associating, fantasizing, etcetera) in order to put implications to her service. Hence, reasoning essentially consists of making use of conditionals.

But what does *making use of conditionals* entail? This question brings us to the second element of the form view: making use of conditionals is manifested in making a judgment of the form *p as following from q*. Making use of conditionals is to make a particular kind of judgment. In order to explain this form of judgment and why it is a genuine alternative to CTR, I want to return to Boghossian's Taking Condition. Boghossian's condition is inspired by the following statement of Frege: "To make a judgment because we are cognizant of other truths as providing a justification for it is known as *inferring*" (1979, 3). Boghossian interprets this as saying that "[a] transition from some beliefs to a conclusion counts as inference only if the thinker *takes* his conclusion to be *supported* by the presumed truth of those other beliefs" (2014, 4). This interpretation leads him to his formulation of the Taking Condition, which postulates *the taking* as an additional mental item involved in reasoning, with regress problems as a result.

Boghossian's interpretation of Frege's statement, however, is not uncontentious.[29] Frege does not mention any *taking* nor moving from premise-beliefs to a conclusion-belief. What Frege does mention is what must be true of a particular judgment in order for it to be a case of inferring. In contrast to Boghossian's interpretation, what Frege is doing here could well be interpreted as describing the *kind* of thing that reasoning is, namely making a specific *kind* of judgment. If one's judgment is such that one makes an inference, then one makes a judgment in virtue of its being supported by other (presumed) truths. If one infers that it is raining from seeing drops in the puddles outside, then one judges that it is raining *as following from the truth of* there being drops in the puddles outside. Put briefly, if one infers *p* from *q*, then one judges that *p as following from q*. On this interpretation, Frege does not describe a process or an additional mental state. Rather, he states what kind of judgment is involved in reasoning.

One might be inclined to think that claiming that reasoning consists of making a judgment of a specific form comes down to claiming that this form of judgment is a necessary condition of reasoning. But if it were merely another proposal of a necessary condition of reasoning, the approach would run into the same problems of circularity and regress as CTR. The reason for this is that it does not give us a non-circular understanding of the nature of reasoning. We can see this by asking the following question. What kind of *following* is at issue in a judgment of the form *p*

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[29] As Dawa Ometto pointed out to me, this is especially clear if one considers Frege's statement in its original: "Urteilen, in dem man sich anderer Wahrheiten als Rechtfertigungsgründen bewußt ist, heißt schließen." Quoted in, for instance, Rödl (2018, 175).

as following from q? Surely, it is the kind of following where the truth of *q* supports the truth of *p*, and not just a causal or temporal sequence between *q* and *p*. But saying that the kind of following we are after is a conditional is just to say that the person is reasoning and not memorizing a temporal sequence. In short, to understand a judgment of the form *p as following from q* is just the same as understanding what reasoning is. Hence the form of judgment explicated in Frege's statement should not be understood as a necessary condition of reasoning.

I hope the exposition of Anscombe's approach in the first part of this chapter suffices to indicate that Frege's form of judgment need not be understood as a specific feature or necessary condition of reasoning. Such understanding, after all, would just make us "going round in circles": judging that *p as following from q* does not provide us with an analysis of reasoning in terms of something else, but explicates the *form* that reasoning has. Frege's form of judgment reveals a structure inherent in all the things that seem to be united under the concept of reasoning. Whether a person is drawing up an argument, solving a puzzle, trying to follow someone else's line of reasoning, or deliberating about what to believe, she judges that something follows from something else. And whether a person sees a truth-connection immediately or needs some time to imagine all the different possibilities before seeing it, she judges that something follows from something else, thereby making use of conditionals.

To conclude, the form view parts ways on two central points in the current debate on reasoning. First, when we reason we are not always after the truth or after reducing uncertainty. Rather, we can use reasoning for many different aims. This is ground to conceive reasoning, not as an activity with an essential aim, but as putting a tool to use, and this tool consists of conditionals. We can thus say that the *point* of reasoning is to drag out implications. Secondly, making use of conditionals is manifested in making a judgment of the form *p as following from q*. Such a judgment is not an added feature that constitutes a train of thought as reasoning. Rather it describes the form of thought we call reasoning. The resulting view does not give a characterization of reasoning in terms of *what* it is, but in terms of the ways in which it exists: a specific kind of thought.

9.6   The Relation Between Reasoning and Psychology

Let me state what I take to be the central issue in comparing CTR to the Anscombe-inspired approach to reasoning. Denying that reasoning always involves a change in attitudes leaves much common ground in these different approaches unaltered. Proponents and adversaries of CTR consider reasoning as something we *do*; as a person-level activity in thought; and as something that is a conscious activity (which, as we will see later, need not necessarily be a mental *process*). Moreover, both sides agree that when a person reasons, she thinks certain thoughts and thus that, in a sense, reasoning depends on her psychological constitution. The point of disagreement is whether the involvement of a person's psychological constitution implies that reasoning should be characterized in psychological terms: that is, whether the

psychological items involved play a constitutive or an enabling role. I will address three points why, on the proposed form view, psychological processes are merely enabling conditions and not constitutive of what reasoning is.

First, mental attitudes are irrelevant in determining whether some thinking is reasoning. If reasoning is characterized as making use of truth-connections, embodied in making a judgment of the form *p as following from q*, then it is simply irrelevant whether mental attitudes are involved. What matters is not whether a specific conclusion is *believed*, but whether the thought or judgment involved has a specific form. This means that the involvement of mental attitudes is not, as CTR claims, constitutive of reasoning. Rather, it is the other way around. A change in attitudes can be a consequence of many different things, such as perception, forgetting, remembering, a bump on the head, and *also of reasoning*. What makes the case of reasoning distinct from these other cases of a change in attitudes is that a judgment of the form *p as following from q* is involved. It is this judgment that makes a change in attitudes an instance of reasoning.

As mentioned before, reasoning often results in a change in attitudes. When we seek to determine what to believe, do, value, investigate, etcetera, our attitudes will change in the course of reasoning. If a person believes that *q* and then makes the judgement *p as following from q*, this normally means that she will then also believe that *p*. That is to say that a person who believes (or wants, etc.) the premises, will, when she reasons, normally also believe (and do etcetera) the conclusion. I say "normally," because there may be irrational (and perhaps also a-rational) factors that influence the adoption of a new belief.[30] But again, the adoption of the belief itself or failure thereof does not indicate whether the person was or was not reasoning.

Secondly, there are no mental processes that are necessarily involved in reasoning. Whether mental processes are involved, and which mental processes are involved, does not determine whether a particular thought or episode of thought is an instance of reasoning. A person can judge that *p as following from q* instantaneously, as if she is *just seeing* the connection. Or she can first imagine that *q* is true but *p* is false; she might need to do some calculations; remember certain situations or conditionals; she might even need to write down the different possibilities, or speak to someone about it, before being able to judge that *p as following from q*. What makes a specific thought or an episode of thought an instance of reasoning is the involvement of judgments of this form, not the contribution of this or that mental process.

But is it not plausible to say that reasoning requires, perhaps not one particular mental process, but *some* mental process to be at work? Does making a judgment not depend on the functioning of psychological processes or, on the physical level, on neurological processes? Certainly, but so too does believing something, or being in any other kind of mental state. That is, having any thought or attitude at all depends on the workings of neurological processes. The consequence of this is that, on this reading, calling reasoning a mental process does not do any work, at least not in distinguishing it from other items in the mental realm that we, on a mental, folk

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[30] For instance, if one learns of something hurtful or of something contrary to many things one believes, it may take time for the belief to *sink in.* Cf. Valaris (2018).

psychological level, call states or attitudes. Hence, claiming that reasoning should not be characterized as a mental process is compatible with claiming that reasoning is enabled by underlying neurological and psychological processes. These processes are so-called enabling conditions.

This might raise the following question: How is it possible to think of reasoning as an *activity* of the person without it necessarily involving any mental process? This is a question meriting much broader treatment than I can give in this paper. For now, let me just mention that *process* is not the only form of activity in the mental realm. Judgment, for instance, is often categorized as a mental *act*. One main reason why such an act is not a process is that it doesn't take time (Geach, 1957; Roessler, 2013; Soteriou, 2009). There is, for instance, no stopping halfway when one judges that *p as following from q*. Still, the person who makes the judgment can be considered to be active, because making the judgment depends on *her* taking it to be true: there is a form of agency, as Boyle writes, "whose exercise [does] not consist in actively changing things to produce a certain result, but in actively being a certain way" (2011, 32). In a similar vein, reasoning might be considered an activity, even if it is not categorized as a process.

The final point concerns the logical versus psychological aspects of reasoning. Proponents of CTR often side with Harman's distinction between the category of logic and argument, i.e., relations between mere contents, and the category of reasoning as a psychological process, i.e., relations between mental attitudes (1986). CTR seeks to understand the latter category: reasoning as a psychological process. On the form view, reasoning itself need not but can involve relations between mental attitudes. But only if we are interested in how a person came to hold certain mental attitudes, will these relations become relevant. If one wants to discuss a piece of reasoning, question it, check it, determine whether it is good, then one engages only with the content, i.e., with what follows from what; with the truth-connections between the propositions. Only if one is interested in how certain mental attitudes and mental processes are informed (psychologically) by those connections, in the history of someone's mind, should we include mental attitudes in our description (cf. Vogler, 2001, 33–37). But being able to chronicle such a history as an *episode of reasoning* does not depend on which mental attitude caused another, but on how the content of those states is informed (psychologically) by truth-connections between propositions.

One might wonder whether this is to say that the logical and (causal) psychological aspects of reasoning relate to each other as different explanatory levels. I do not think so. The way I see it is that we are in the business of drawing different kinds of connections (i.e., logical and rational versus causal) in the world. But given that we ourselves have the capacity to draw the logical connections, these logical connections can (and should) inform the mental attitudes that we have.

As a final note, we may now see a similarity in the form accounts of intention and reasoning: where the first is a concept that allows us to drag out teleological connections in the world, the latter is a concept denoting our dragging out implications (teleological or others) in the world. As such, these concepts of our rational capacities do not depict certain psychological states or processes, but our involvement with rational connections that exist in our lives and practices.

9.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have, first, explicated Anscombe's philosophical approach by analyzing her account of intentional action and relating it to the misperceptions of that account in (the history of) the philosophy of action. Anscombe's philosophical approach includes the following. She seeks out philosophical puzzlements, shows why the standard philosophical approach of analysis and giving a definition of *what* something is, does not work, and then, by focusing on our practices and abilities surrounding the puzzling concept, sets out to show the *way in which it is*. The result is that the concepts under discussion are part of the logical structure of our thought and practices.

Secondly, I have used Anscombe's method to argue that CTR's aim to give necessary and sufficient conditions of reasoning runs into problems, so as to make room for an alternative approach. Next, I have developed an Anscombe-inspired form view of reasoning, where reasoning is characterized as a tool to drag out implications, embodied in making judgments of the form *p as following from q*. What is interesting is that, in line with this characterization of reasoning, Anscombe's account of intention might be put as follows: intention is a concept with which we drag out teleological connections in the world.

Although much more can and should be said in order to fully outline Anscombe's approach to human rational capacities, and about the similarities and differences between intentional action and reasoning, I hope to have made plausible that Anscombe's approach is especially helpful for concepts that are related to human rational capacities. They determine not just what we are, but precisely the way in which we are: a way that is embroiled in rational connections. It may seem that such an approach is unscientific. But whilst critical of certain science-driven assumptions in dominant views of action and reasoning, the views proposed are not anti-science. Rather, an Anscombian framework challenges the view that all concepts with which we understand human life can ultimately be understood as scientific concepts. In this time, in which science is given so much prominence in understanding who we *really* are, what *really* motivates us, reflecting on our approach to certain concepts is all the more important. This chapter has engaged in this endeavor by outlining the distinctiveness of Anscombe's approach and by showing its challenge to a psychological characterization of our rational capacities, i.e., a characterization in terms of mental attitudes and their rational and causal relations.

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