

RETHINKING PHILOSOPHY

A REFLECTION ON PHILOSOPHY, MYTH, AND SCIENCE

W. J. Korab-Karpowicz

What is philosophy? What is myth? What is science? None of these questions can easily be answered. Different philosophical schools define philosophy in accordance with their various philosophical standpoints. The numerous traditional stories to which the term “myth” is commonly applied cover an enormous area, so that it may be mistaken to look for some general definition of all myths. Some scientists maintain that there is no single category “science” and that a general characterization of science cannot be established.

The purpose of this essay is to establish a relationship between philosophy, myth, and science in reference to a historical perspective. If for methodological reasons we now disregard the above mentioned terminological difficulties and refer to a common-sense view of myth, philosophy, and science, it remains unquestionable that myth existed long before philosophy and modern science began as late as the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, this historical perspective is not introduced to affirm the positivistic view, according to which the history of humanity should be described in terms of three stages: theological (mythical), metaphysical (philosophical), and positive (scientific); nor is it presented to say that the positive one represents the final achievement of the human race. On the contrary, I will attempt to show that by departing from myth and original philosophy, modern men and women have concealed from themselves an intensely rich experience of life. In order to regain the love of wisdom, we need first to look backwards in order to move forward.

Myth and Its Dimensions

To some scholars myths are simply the imaginative products of a primitive mind. They are traditional stories, the narratives that are told in archaic, non-literate societies. To others, myths are sacred tales, revelatory and exemplary, because they are either literal or symbolic representations of reality and determine exemplary models of human actions. It is acknowledged that myths constitute a very complex and at the same time uncertain category.¹ I will propose a definition that will at least in part pay tribute to the complexity of myth: *myth is a wholeness attuned to the world as a whole and disclosing the world in its completeness.* In order to make this statement more clear, I need first to explain what I call “mythical attitude.”

“Mythical attitude” is an expression by which I characterize the way in which a member of a mythical archaic society relates to the world. It is commonly agreed upon that for the archaic human being the world is not what it is for us today. For archaic men and women the world as a whole is “thou.”² The world is unique and has an unprecedented character of a person, or even of a relative. Nature is the manifestation of the divine and is revered. Winds, rivers, headlands, mountains, springs, and animals are all personified and become subjects of myths. The natural world is permeated by forces which are depicted in divine and human terms. A member of a mythical society does not feel separated from, but rather engaged with, the world. “Thou” is not intellectually reflected upon, but experienced as life meeting life.³ Mythical attitude is thus one that can be best characterized by the word “engagement.” Further, it is neither the

attitude of a rational, disinterested observer nor of a self-interested hedonist, which can both be attributed to the modern individual. It is also not the attitude of a believer, based on faith.⁴ It is rather the attitude of an engaged devotee or lover.

Whether it is about the creation of the world, an animal, or an institution, a myth narrates something as if it would really happen. For the archaic human being myths are true stories that concern themselves with realities.⁵ Consequently, the world as “thou” reveals itself in myth firstly as a cosmological representation in which supernatural powers, miracles, and gods are believed to truly exist. This representation is real and sacred, but it is not objective. Being objective presupposes an attitude of an indifferent, neutral, and impartial observer, which is not the mythical attitude. The cosmological representation of myth is based on devotional engagement. For archaic men and women, nature or the world as a whole is not an object, but something magic, alive, and divine. This cosmological representation, which involves supernatural powers, is neither objective nor based on faith, but is taken literally by virtue of engaged devotion. However, as soon as humans lose their devotional engagement with the world, the cosmological representation may become invalid for them. They can “objectively” disprove the existence of “thou” and all supernatural phenomena.

Myth, the result of the revelation of “thou,” is always a whole. It is not created part by part. It is not a product of discursive or inductive reasoning. The ecstasy, the supreme mystical experience of the revelation, takes one beyond the realms of the sensorial and rational.⁶ The sudden revelation may reveal the world as it is as a whole in a myth. It is the experience of existence in its totality which can manifest the sacred and introduce new meaningful patterns upon man’s life and his world. When I say that *myth is a wholeness attuned to the world as a whole*, I mean

firstly that myth, the result of the revelation of the world as a whole, is completed as a whole already at its beginning by one who is the divine knower, the mystic, the inspired shaman, the godlike mortal, its receiver and creator. It is completed already at the beginning; and yet, it evolves. But it evolves as slowly as mythological society develops; that is, very slowly in comparison to the development of modern society. We can simply acknowledge that myth’s evolution proceeds from revelation to revelation. It can be stimulated by those few—the mystics—who would prove themselves to be divine knowers and who would understand the layers of meaning which constitute the wholeness of myth.

Myths are not simple and uniform. They are often multidimensional, endowed with different emphases and levels of meanings. A myth does not have mostly a fixed meaning, but a number of them. “Myth, like symbol, has its own particular ‘logic,’ its own intrinsic consistency which enables it to be ‘true’ on a variety of planes.”⁷ When I say that *myth is a wholeness*, I also mean all the levels or layers of meaning that can be found in myth constitute a wholeness and myths do not yield to one particular, partial interpretation. What is whole cannot be justifiably reduced to any of its parts. Yet the different levels of meaning can be discovered. Their discovery corresponds to what can be called an expansion of one’s understanding or spiritual growth. Myths are sacred tales, revelatory and exemplary, because they reveal the structure of reality to the archaic human being and supply him with exemplary models for his actions. They validate every custom and institution of a mythological society.⁸ But, as he grows spiritually, a member of a mythical society, the shaman or mystic is able to understand new meanings which are revealed to him in myth. Understanding is not a mere intellectual or theoretical category here. Initiated into new planes on which “thou” is revealed in myth, archaic man re-

sponds by way of his behavior and by his being.

The world as “thou” is a life presence whose qualities can be articulated because the “thou” can reveal itself. Humanity original experiences in meeting this “thou”—the experiences of existence in its totality which reveal to men and women the meaning of their being in the world—are conveyed in myths. Myth perpetuates the revelation of the “thou.” The purpose of many myths is to revoke, re-establish, or to re-enact the creative era in which the original meeting of humans and the “thou” took place. The original experiences that lay at the origin of myths can thus be reclaimed. These experiences are contained in different levels or layers of meanings that can be discovered in myth, and thus, recovered. Through the interpretation of the cosmological representation of myth which is mostly symbolic, the human being can regain an understanding of himself in the world. He can disclose the meaning of his being, which is the human-being-in-this-world, as well as the meaning of myth as such. When I say that *myth is a wholeness disclosing the world in its completeness*, I mean that myth is a certain interpretative unit, a unity of its different meanings that can be recovered and that can lead us back to the original experiences of humans meeting the world as a whole as “thou.”

From Myth to Philosophy

Even if we accept that myths are results of the revelation of a “thou” and are often founded upon an original experience that reaches beyond the sensorial and rational, we can still maintain that they are not illogical. They are indeed mostly susceptible to rational analysis and logical interpretation. An analysis of many myths would show that actions of gods and heroes often presuppose a keen analysis of given circumstances and are based on rational decisions.⁹ At least we can say that some myths represent complex logical systems that are different from those that

are usually found in contemporary Western societies. Yet, according to a common view, there is a radical separation between *muthos* and *logos*, between myth and philosophy. Myth is associated with the mysterious and illogical, and philosophy with the rational and logical. Myths are part of a way of life and state precedence and models for human actions, but unlike philosophy they do not seek to explain them on a rational basis. Myths use images; philosophy, concepts. Philosophy asks generalized questions, relies on systematic reasoning, and rejects the supernatural explanations of the world, but myths are usually confined to a particular mythological society, are unsystematic and deal with the sacred.

The beginning of philosophy is not the result of one brief shining moment of a sudden discovery of a rational, philosophical mind. Only on a very superficial interpretation are myths illogical and deprived of rational thinking. The emergence of philosophy in Greece was preceded by the rationalizing and systematizing of myths, such as we can find, for example, in Hesiod’s *Theogony*.¹⁰ The process by which myth gave way to philosophy is thus far from straightforward, extending over several centuries. Nevertheless, there are two aspects of this process that refer to the decadence of Greek myths and they, I believe, are the key to understanding the origin of philosophy.

The first aspect refers to the fact that myths do not only naturally evolve, but also are liable to undergo dramatic changes, caused especially by a foreign conquest and a sudden intrusion of a foreign mythology. Such a dramatic change may have occurred between the nineteenth and sixteenth century B.C. when Bronze Age tribes invaded Greece and brought with them a new religion. The early Greek deities were many, immanent and manifest in nature. Nature was the manifestation of the divine. The principal deity was the Mother Goddess or Mother Earth. With the arrival of the invaders, the principal deity becomes the god-man Zeus.

In archaic societies every significant action, including war, has a precedence in a mythical, exemplary model, and consequently takes place in the sacred time.¹¹ Zeus personifies and sets a precedence for the king of an ancient community, a just and wise ruler. In fact, as long the king rules in conformity with Nature, he is the Divine King, the mighty, revered guardian of harmony and order. Nature is still revered. The Divine King protects life. He marries the Mother Goddess of the local community. But with social development, which makes the communities larger, more self-sufficient and independent, the king becomes the symbol of might that can overcome the powers of nature. In the mythical war between the capricious forces of nature symbolized by Titans and the gods under the leadership of Zeus, the god-man is the winner. Consequently, it is he rather than nature who becomes feared and revered. The profane, factual acts thus gain the upper hand over the exemplary and mythical. The separation between the human being and “thou” begins. The Greek myths show that the original relationship of devotional engagement between humans and the “thou,” which is the foundation of mythical attitude, is, by the time of Homer and Hesiod, already seriously weakened.

In a mythical society there are two kinds of events that take place in time.¹² First are those that can be called sacred and take place in a sacred time because they find their validation or confirmation in myths. The second are those that follow no exemplary pattern and can be called profane. One of the most important functions of myth is to provide exemplary models for all significant human actions, to validate customs and institutions. However, in Greece in the sixth century B.C., when western philosophy is born, myth can no longer satisfactorily perform this function. Once the separation between humans and the “thou” is initiated, the volitional, aesthetic, and other profane elements

enter into myth. This in fact happens to the Greek mythology largely because of Homer and Hesiod. The classical mythology of Homer and Hesiod represents the triumph of the literary work against myth. The gods whom both Homer and Hesiod describe are not only divine, but also show their undisguised human faces. They are moved by passions and commit abuses. When Xenophanes and later Plato accuse these great poets of attributing to the gods all the things which are shameful, they address an audience that is already convinced. These ancient critics of classical mythology do not argue against religion or myth as such, but in the name of a higher idea of the divine they attack the shameful behavior of the gods as depicted by the poets. To sum up, the second important aspect of the process by which myth gave way to philosophy is the fact that Greek myths gradually lost their function as exemplary models for human actions and afflicted Greece with a religious and moral vacuum.

The Beginning of Philosophy

Many scholars perceive, perhaps rightly, something unique in the development of Greek philosophy. It is a widely spread opinion that Thales and his successors ask general questions about the world and propose general, rational answers that are no longer based on theological considerations. The Presocratic thinkers are believed to be not only the first philosophers, but also the first empirical scientists.¹³ For Husserl, the rationality and generality of both their questions and answers is a sign of a theoretical attitude, which is the basis of science and which can be sharply contrasted with a practical attitude that refers to myth.¹⁴ It is not my purpose to argue that some of these views may be misleading. In his book on *The Nature of Greek Myths*, Kirk shows that Thales, Anaximenes, and Anaximander continued to be strongly affected by mythical preconceptions, and their cosmologies were based

on the theogonical models provided by myths.¹⁵ My fundamental claim is that the way of inquiry that philosophy initiates is primarily the consequence of the decadence of Greek myths. In the initial stage of the development of philosophy, at least some philosophers try to make up for the loss that the corruption of myths brings about. From this point of view, there is no radical break in continuity between myth and philosophy.

By the time of the first philosophers, Greek myths, corrupted by the poets, do not provide humans with exemplary models for right conduct. They become bad stories. For Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Plato, and other Greek philosophers, the classical myth no longer performs its function, but becomes a source of confusion. We can find a striking confirmation of this statement in books II and III of the *Republic* where Plato openly criticizes Homer and Hesiod for teaching falsehoods and for giving bad images of what gods and heroes are like. The gods and heroes of Hesiod and Homer can no longer supply men and women with models for their behavior. The human being loses his devotional engagement with the world. Instead of following the ways prescribed by myth, men and women now choose poets and humans to be their teachers. Unable to undergo a deeper mystical experience, they are now deceived by appearances, the visible things. Heraclitus says:

For what thought or understanding have they? They follow the poets and take the crowd as their teachers, knowing that there are many bad and few good (fr. 104). Men are deceived over the recognition of visible things, in the same way as Homer, who was the wisest of all the Hellenes (fr. 56). Homer deserves to be turned out of the lists and whipped. (fr. 43)¹⁶

For the human being who loses his devotional engagement with the world, the original cosmological representation of myth becomes gradually invalid. He “objectively”

disproves the existence of the “thou.” He may still listen to myths, but for aesthetic or literary reasons. He becomes indifferent to Nature, and regards everything merely as an object of either his inquiry or exploitation. He becomes a self-seeking individual. When looking at the sea, he does not perceive Poseidon nor his horses. Myth becomes a foolish fantasy and is no longer valid for him.

The first Greek philosophers attempt to prevent their contemporaries from losing their engagement with the world. Their contemporaries lose their devotional engagement because of the corruption of the classical myth. Therefore, philosophy needs to replace myth in ancient Greece. Its function at the early stage is still similar to that of myth. By providing a representation of reality, philosophy reveals the meaning of the whole and directs human behavior. For the Milesians, the world is still alive and divine; it is a “thou.” For Thales water is *arche*, the unity and the origin of the living presence. Water makes things grow. It supports the growth and unceasing process of life. Anaximenes says that the original element, *arche*, is not water, but air. It is clear that he does not consider air merely as physical matter. Rather, for him air is also connected with the maintenance of life. It is an agent of vitality. Anaximander objected to the idea of a single, determinate constituent of our world being the original element. He is apparently the least understood among the Milesians. Anaximander declares *arche* to be *apeirion* (something indeterminate, inexhaustible, and indefinite). What he appears to say is that our beginning and end are not known to us. Anaximander reflects upon the very fact of human-being-in-the-world. We rise from chaos and go back to chaos. What is between is cosmos, the precious life. Further, Anaximander expresses the idea of a righteous universe when he says that things “pay penalty and retribution to each other for the injustice according to the assessment of time” (fr. 1). Nature for him is not only alive,

but like a person, it is moral and subjected to moral laws.

If we define scientists as those who attempt to describe the world “objectively” in terms of abstract principles and explain it by general laws, Milesians were certainly not scientists. For them the world is alive and divine, it is “thou.” They inquire into the world as a whole, and desire to know the whole, but such a knowledge postulates an engagement with the whole and not an “objective,” theoretical description. The engagement of the Milesians, and also of subsequent philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle, can be traced to the etymology of the word “philosophy” itself. In the proper sense of this word, “philosophy,” “love of wisdom” presupposes being engaged, the attitude of a lover, and not being indifferent. The philosophical attitude of first philosophers is thus still engagement. By contrast to mythological attitude it is not devotional, but rather affective engagement. The stress is no longer put on the supernatural, but rather on the pursuit of the knowledge of the whole and on understanding. It is true that by interpreting them in terms of his theory of four causes, already Aristotle misrepresents the cosmological representations of the Milesians. Further misinterpretations are obvious if we notice the word *phusis* (Nature) is often translated as “the real constitution” and the word *arche* by such terms as “substance” or “principle.” But the Milesians are first philosophers, the lovers, they are not empirical scientists.

Objectivity and the Scientific Attitude

For the modern man of science, the phenomenal world is primarily an “It,” an object of observation and experiment. According to a perhaps naive, but still prevailing positivistic account of science, science is objective.¹⁷ It derives its objectivity from the objectivity of observation. The way in which scientists look at the world is sometimes described as “scientific attitude.” In order to be

objective observers, scientists must be indifferent, disinterested, neutral, and impartial.¹⁸ Personal opinions or preferences have to be suspended. No subjective elements are allowed to intrude. Further, the objectivity of observation is the basis of science’s reliability. Science is believed to be reliable if it is based on objective, observational statements that can then be transmitted into laws and theories.

One of the key characteristics of modern science is objectivity. Objective, scientific knowledge is held to be independent of the human mind that either creates or understands it. But just as scientific knowledge, derived from observation, presupposes the scientific attitude of being an indifferent observer, so also its verification and sharing with other members of the scientific community requires the same attitude. Without this attitude science would neither be objective nor inter-subjective. Objectivity and scientific attitude are thus interrelated. If this, however, is truly the case, objective knowledge is not independent of the human mind as it is commonly believed. It is dependent upon the states of mind that constitute scientific attitude: on being indifferent, disinterested, neutral and impartial. While defending objectivity in science Karl Popper says:

My . . . thesis involves the existence of two different senses of knowledge or of thought: (1) knowledge or thought in the subjective sense, consisting of a state of mind or of consciousness or a disposition to behave or to act, and (2) knowledge or thought in an objective sense, consisting of problems, theories, and arguments as such.¹⁹

Popper radically distinguishes “objective” theories, problems, and arguments from “subjective” states of mind. But once we comprehend that objectivity in science presupposes scientific attitude as its foundation, we can no longer accept that objective scientific knowledge is free from subjectivity.

Objective theory is not independent of the human mind.

Being indifferent, disinterested, neutral, and impartial can be contrasted with being engaged. The scientific attitude of a modern empirical scientist lies thus in direct opposition to the mythological attitude, and also to the philosophical attitude, if we understand philosophy traditionally as the love of wisdom. If the scientific attitude seems emotionally neutral, both the mythological and philosophical attitudes are based on feelings, whether those are feelings of devotion, compassion, or the love of humanity and alive nature. But indifference, a lack of feeling, is a state of mind as well. There is subjectivity in scientific objectivity, namely, indifference. Science looks at the world “objectively,” indifferently as if it were an object, but in fact the world is not that. To look at the world as an object is a way of relating to it from a certain perspective and can in fact bring about only its abstraction. This is not the way to know the world as a whole. Science replaces “thou,” the life presence, with the dead world of abstracted objects.

Philosophy Rediscovered

The fact that there is a continuity between myth and philosophy that makes early philosophy look more similar to myth than to modern science does not mean that there are not significant differences between myth and philosophy. I wish to explore two distinctions that I believe to be fundamental. First, myth is a wholeness disclosing the world in its completeness. It signifies wisdom, the knowledge of the whole. But, already at its early stage, instead of being wisdom, philosophy is rather a pursuit of wisdom, the desire to arrive at the ultimate knowledge of everything, at the knowledge of the whole. Second, mythical attitude presupposes engagement with the world as a whole of which myth is itself a part. The cosmological representation in myth is founded on devotional engagement. “Objectively”

taken, myth may be seen as a foolish or fantastic story, but thus rationalized it does not lead us to the knowledge of the whole. It does not reveal the levels or layers of meanings which can be discovered in it. But a system of philosophy is founded on affective rather than devotional engagement. It can be taken as an object of an examination. This happens in fact already at the beginning of philosophy. Anaximenes says that *arche* is not water but air. Thus, he is certainly not devotionally engaged with Thales’ system. Early philosophy appears to have almost the same function as myth: philosophy reveals the meaning of the whole and directs human behavior. Yet, it is also already essentially different from myth. It does not claim the knowledge of the whole and does not posit devotional engagement toward itself.

Myth is a wholeness attuned to the world as a whole because those who live in myth and are guided by it are engaged on many different planes with the whole of which the myth is an integral part. By teaching humans and by regulating the way of their living in devotional engagement with the whole and by gradually disclosing many layers of its meaning, myth reveals the knowledge of the whole. But the knowledge of the whole is not merely theoretical. It is not merely a partial, intellectual knowledge. It embraces the whole of life. Myth reveals the knowledge for which philosophy in a proper sense looks. But it does not disclose this knowledge without appropriate devotional engagement. Myth is completed already at the beginning, whereas philosophy seeks to be completed at the end. Mythical societies live in eternity rather than in historical time. The societies in which philosophy or science plays an important part constantly seek their completion and are in a permanent dissatisfaction with the results of their findings. They live in history and are time oriented. Myth corresponds to eternity, philosophy to the discovery of history.

If myth is taken “objectively” its cosmological representation may no longer make

any sense. If a philosophy is subjected to an objective examination, it may perhaps be rejected, but it does not become senseless. The fact that philosophy may be objectively examined and therefore challenged contributes to both its development and decline. On the one hand, it develops into a rich conceptual and intellectual framework as a result of a great debate between contending world views, different schools and philosophical systems that has taken place in the history of philosophy. On the other hand, it declines because it finally ceases to be pursuit of wisdom and largely dissolves into sciences. The scientific paradigm, especially the positivistic one, transforms philosophy. It reduces philosophy to an exercise in language analysis, and deprives the rest of it of the right to exist. It also reduces the human being to a self-interested, self-seeking and thus rationalized individual, moved solely by his passions. Philosophy loses its original sense and, like science, becomes partial knowledge of a part. But I shall not immerse myself any further in the issue of the decadence of philosophy. I wish now to show how philosophy already at its beginning was doomed to decline, and how to regain the love of wisdom.

Philosophy defined as pursuit of wisdom can be understood as the desire to arrive at ultimate knowledge—the knowledge of the whole, but it neither is the knowledge of the whole nor does it posit devotional engagement toward itself. It can be subjected to a critical, objective, or even unsympathetic examination. Hence, there is a lack of consequence in and a danger to philosophy as such: philosophy is the love of wisdom, which presupposes affective engagement with the world, but it may be rejected by an indifferent or cynic sophist. In the long run, philosophy, which in its original form tries to make up for the loss that the corruption of myths brings about, had no chance of survival, like myth. In order to persevere, it had to develop two survival techniques. First, in

philosophers like Heraclitus, Plato, Hegel, and Heidegger, it developed highly ambiguous language and nonpenetrable esoteric content. Second, in philosophers like Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and Husserl it aimed at becoming scientific and thus at establishing an unshaken ground on which it could protect itself from possible criticism. In both cases the goal was the same: defense against the profane. When we carefully examine the basic ideas of some highly sophisticated and publicly admired philosophical writings, we can often discover their poverty. The form overcomes the actual content. When we carefully examine some simple myths of so called primitive people, with great surprise we can discover ideas of key importance to our lives. The content overcomes the form.

I would say that the contemporary esoteric stream in philosophy, even if it still inspires many doctoral and master's theses, has become today very problematic, especially in its post-modern version; whereas the scientific stream has contributed considerably to the decline of original philosophizing, especially in its positivistic and analytic versions. In the proper sense, philosophy is the love of wisdom; pursuit of the knowledge of the whole. But when it turns to be scientific and attempts to look at the world "objectively," that is, as if it were an object, it arrives only at the partial knowledge of a part. What remains largely unquestioned in modern science is its essence. The essence of scientific outlook is indifference. Science regards the world indifferently as an object of scientific research. Consequently, philosophy needs to follow its own path. Philosophy should not look at things as if they were just objects. It needs to recognize the illusion which the partial knowledge brings about. In the proper sense, philosophy as the love of wisdom presupposes being engaged with the world and not being indifferent.

This essay is not intended to provide easy answers to problems that are immense. Even if we do like to think about this, we are prob-

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ably all aware of our present human condition. As in the Greece of Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Plato there are still temples, but merely as something that reminds us of the past. Corrupted and weakened religion does not teach today's men and women to live in engagement with the world. Human vices and wicked ideas take the place of gods and become prized. For this reason philosophy arises: to reveal the meaning of the whole, to direct human behavior, and ultimately to prevent humans from destruction. But it fails. Perhaps it is true that it is "too late for God and too early for being." Perhaps it is now either too late or too early to ask God to

save us. Perhaps we can once more try the way of original philosophy that is the love of wisdom. But in such a case we have to avoid our old mistake. To place the world before us as an object of indifferent investigation can lead the world to be known only as an abstracted object and not as a whole. Under the surface of illusion that results from such investigation there is a universal knowledge that arises from our devotional and affective engagement with the world.

ENDNOTES

1. G. S. Kirk, *The Nature of Greek Myths* (London: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 38.
2. H. and H. A. Frankfort, *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967), p. 4.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
4. Faith as a unique means of salvation which we can find in Judaism and Christianity is not the devotional engagement that refers to mythological societies. See Mircea Eliade, *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 29ff.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 95ff.
7. Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1963), p. 426.
8. Kirk, *The Nature of Greek Myths*, p. 60.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 286f.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 293.
11. Eliade, *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries*, p. 37.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
13. Jonathan Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 1979), p. 4.
14. See Edmund Husserl, "The Vienna Lecture" in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, trans. by David Carr (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 280–82.
15. Kirk, pp. 295–300.
16. Heraclitean sayings are numbered according to the standard numeration of Diels. English translations of these sayings come from Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
17. For a naive view of empirical science see A. F. Chalmers, *What Is This Thing Called Science?* (St. Lucia, Qld.: University of Queensland Press, 1976), especially pp. 1–11.
18. W. Lawrence Neuman, *Social Research Methods*, 4th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), p. 9.
19. Karl R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 108–09.

International Relations, Bilkent University, 06533 Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey