Concepts, Space-and-time, Metaphysics (Kant and the dialogue of John 4)

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1 Introduction

In an empirically oriented common-sense ontology, first-order concepts are expected to be "concrete" and to denote sensible objects given in space and time, while other, "abstract", concepts should denote words, sentences, sets, numbers, or concepts themselves, possibly of a questionable ontological status, or, moreover, conceived merely as a manner of speaking, subjective representations, or "ideas" without an actually corresponding reality. In a formalized presentation, such an empirical theory would have a model comprising a first-order domain of sensible objects denoted (possibly in n-tuples) by predicates. The domain itself and the relations on the domain, as well as syntactic "objects" (terms, predicates, formulas – replacing concepts and judgments), remain abstract, metatheoretical entities that are not empirically given for the object theory. Besides, the domain and the relations on the domain may appear as members of a second-order domain if the formalization is extended to a higher-order setting, but, of course, this still does not make the first-order domain and the relations on it themselves empirically existing objects.

Some essential features of abstract, model-theoretic, concepts of a possible empirical theory are traceable back to Immanuel Kant's "transcendental logic" (with some characteristic differences).[1] Against this background, we examine the objective reality of the abstract concepts involved, putting them in the context of a possible religious experience as presented in the text of John 4.

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[1]For some significant connections of Kant's logical theory with modern logic, see, e.g., [1] and [23].

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2 From metatheory to metaphysical theory

It can be recognized that Kant's theory of transcendental ideas serves as a sort of first-order model for empirical reasoning and knowledge, where transcendental ideas represent three sorts of totalities of conditions of empirical knowledge:

(a) the totality with respect to a subject ("complete subject",[2] never occurring as a predicate, B 379): "I" ("mere consciousness", "determining Self"), which thinks, is the meta-theoretical subject "X" of all thoughts (e.g., of concepts), which are its predicates (B 404, A 402);[3]

(b) the totality of the "series" of conditions ("world") of an empirically given object: each such object is possible only if the whole series of its conditions, too, is in some way already given (B 436);[4]

(c) the totality of concepts as predicates ("the sum total of all predicates") – as if comprised in some common "ground" (B 607): "the most real being" (*ens realissimum*).[5]

These "transcendental" ideas do not belong to empirical knowledge as an object-theory, but to its metatheory. Kant further specifies this by assigning those ideas a

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[2][11], Vol. IV, p. 330.

[3]"I" is not a concept (or any representation) of an object, but just a general "form" of the knowledge of an object, since, as Kant points out, only by means of it do "I think anything" (B 404; cf. "I" is "that which I must presuppose in order to cognize any object", A 402). In this sense, we find "I" replaced in a standard first-order model simply by a chosen set of objects (domain). According to Kant's theory, the application of "I think" is restricted to the "manifold" (*Mannigfaltigkeit*) of what is given in a sensible spatio-temporal intuition. Let us note that the unity of a concept in Kant's (intensional) theory originates from the "analytical unity of consciousness", which "pertains to" the concept, while the unity of a concept (predicate) in a standard (extensional) first-order theory model-theoretically derives from the set itself (a subset of the domain) that is assigned to the concept as its extension.

[4]This is in accordance with the "principle of reason": "if the conditioned is given, the whole sum of conditions, and hence the absolutely unconditioned, is also given, through which alone the conditioned was possible)" (B 436). In standard first-order model theory, element (b) of Kant's model is replaced by a relational structure that is imposed on the domain by the interpretation of relation symbols and complemented by the conditions of the satisfaction of formulas.

[5]Cf. Kant's "principle of thoroughgoing determination", according to which each object should be determined with respect to each concept (B 599–600). In a first-order theory, the interpretation of one-place relation symbols replaces element (c).

non-constitutive, regulative (and heuristic, B 644) role for empirical knowledge.[6]

We will now focus on some structural similarities between Kant's system of transcendental ideas and the conceptual structure of religious knowledge (religious belief)[7] as presented in Jesus' dialogue with a Samaritan woman in John 4.[8] From the standpoint of religious knowledge, transcendental (metalogical) concepts obtain their specific objective reality and become metaphysical concepts (soul, world, God); in addition, the application of concepts in general extends to the realm of non-sensible objects ("noumena").[9]

We first summarize the progress of Jesus' dialogue with the Samaritan woman (with a slight rephrasing) in Figures 1 and 2.

We now briefly informally analyze the dialogue in John 4, comparing it with Kant's system of transcendental (metatheoretical) ideas.

2.1 Self

The idea of "self" ("I", "you", implicit in "we"), with knowledge, belief, speaking, and being as belonging to it, explicitly occurs and has an essential role in the dialogue of John 4. Two agents (selves), Jesus and a Samaritan woman, are engaged in the dialogue that is advancing step by step through logical reasoning and through a gradual evolving of new knowledge.

The logical idea of "I think" is recognizable where "I" is mentioned as a subject of epistemic (mental and verbal) acts.[10] In particular, the logical aspect of "self" is recognizable in the fact that the dialogue proceeds through the consider-

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[6]For Kant, transcendental ideas are "regulative principles for the systematic unity of the manifold of empirical cognition in general" (B 699).

[7]See on religious belief and knowledge in the introductory chapter of [17].

[8]For a theological interpretations of this episode, see, for instance, [10], [5] and [24]; for a theological-historical context, see, e.g., [22]. Here, we further elaborate our initial analysis in [16].

[9]Cf. B 395, footnote, with Kant's following critical remark: "Metaphysics has as the proper end of its investigation only three ideas: *God, freedom, and immortality* [...] The insight into these ideas would make *theology*, *morals*, and, through their combination, *religion*, thus the highest ends of our existence, dependent solely on the faculty of speculative reason and on nothing else". According to Kant, in the process of work we should proceed "from what experience makes immediately available to us, from the *doctrine of the soul*, to the *doctrine of the world*, and from there all the way to the cognition of *God*".

[10]Cf., for example, "if you knew the gift of God and who is saying to you [...]", John 4:10; "you are right in saying [...]", John 4:17; "what you have said is true", John 4:18; "I can see [θεωρῶ] that you are a prophet", John 4:19; "we worship what we understand", John 4:22; "I know that the Messiah is coming", John 4:25.

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J: Give me a drink.

S: You (a Jew) cannot ask me (a Samaritan woman) for a drink.
×

J: If you knew the gift of God, and who is speaking with you, you would have asked him, and he would have given you living water.

S: You do not even have a bucket.
×

J: The water I shall give will become a spring of water welling up to eternal life.

S: Sir, give me this water.

[see Figure 2]

Figure 1

ing of and finding solutions for the contradictions appearing during the conversation. As it will be seen, contradictions, as a means of a possible questioning, or at least of a clarification, of the theses that appear in the dialogue, are the main logical vehicles of the conversation between Jesus and the Samaritan woman (see the next subsection).

In the Gospel, "self" is not just an abstract, regulative idea, but denotes a being, at first only an empirical being (a Jew, a Samaritan woman; John 4:9),[11] and eventually a being "in Spirit and truth".[12] According to Kant, in metaphysical psychology a paralogism occurs that is based on the non-justified assumption of an

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[11]Cf. Kant's "empirical unity of consciousness": "One person combines the representation of a certain word with one thing, another with something else; and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical is not, with regard to that which is given, necessarily and universally valid" (B 140).

[12]It does not suffice for a worshiping agent to be in space and time, since the worship should take place "in Spirit and truth": "God is Spirit, and those who worship him must worship in Spirit and truth" (John 4:24). The spiritual *existence* of "self" in truth is explicit in Jesus' enunciation of his own being: "I am [the Messiah], the one who is speaking with you" (John 4:26; cf. subsection 2.3 below).

[continuation from Figure 1, S: Sir, give me this water]

J: Go call your husband.

S: I do not have a husband. ×

J: You are right. You have had five husbands, and the present one is not your husband.

S: You are a prophet. Our ancestors worshiped on Gerizim, you people worship in Jerusalem. ×

J: Now the worship must be in Spirit and truth.

S: The Messiah will tell us everything. ×

J: I am.

Figure 2

intuitive givenness of some persistent "self", which leads to the "inference" that "self" is a substance (B 411).[13] In distinction, the Gospel proposes a justification of the existence of "self" as a permanently ("eternally") given subject of religious (non-sensible, spiritual) experience.[14]

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[13]"Thus if that concept, by means of the term 'substance', is to indicate an object that can be given, [...] then it must be grounded on a persisting intuition as the indispensable condition [...] through which alone an object is given [...]. But now we have in inner intuition nothing at all that persists, for the 'I' is only the consciousness of my thinking." (B 412–413).

[14]Even in Kant's moral philosophy, "self" is merely a postulate, not a concept that denotes objective reality. If we want to avoid the paralogism of metaphysical psychology (Kant, B 411) by means of a new sort of knowledge proposed in John 4, we get the following correct syllogism:

What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance.
A thinking being, considered as existing in Spirit and truth, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject.
⊢
A thinking being, considered as existing in Spirit and truth, exists only as subject, i.e., as substance.

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2.2 World

We now proceed to a comparison of the dialogue of John 4 with Kant's transcendental idea of world – the totality of a series of conditions of empirically given objects and states (B 391) – and with Kant's corresponding cosmological antinomies. We will see that Kant's four conceptual aspects of a possible world totality – regarding (a) the composition of the whole of space-and-time, (b) the divisibility of matter, (c) causality, and (d) dependence in existence (B 438–443) – can also be found in John 4 (in a somewhat different way), as emerging one after another in the contradictions and their solutions unfolding during the dialogue.

Antinomies

Kant's antinomies arise from the question whether a given object and its state have some first condition (be it immediately given or not) or whether the series of its conditions is infinite (B 445–446). However, in John 4 it seems to be assumed that the world has the beginning in all four aspects (a) – (d) mentioned above (the beginning of time and space, the origin of matter, the first cause, and the unconditioned existence). So, the antinomies in John 4 arise from the problem whether the first condition (beginning) is immediately given (present) or whether it is given only through a (possibly long) series of intermediate conditions.

(a) EXTENSION OF SPACE AND TIME.

> Jesus: Give me a drink.
> Samaritan woman: How can you, a Jew, ask me, a Samaritan woman,
>   for a drink? (For Jews use nothing in common with Samaritans.)
> ⊢
> Samaritan woman: [Contradiction].
> (Cf. John 4:7–10).

Is a drink immediately available to Jesus, or should he look for it elsewhere and from someone else? To a significant extent, this can be interpreted in terms of Kant's first cosmological antinomy (B 454, 455), taking a drink as representing life (cf. "living water", John 4:10), and, in connection with this, as symbolizing time and space (flow and places, i.e., history, of life): *do I find the beginning of*

The expression "as existing in Spirit and truth" replaces Kant's "considered merely as such". In this way, "thinking" ("be thought") in the middle term is in the minor premise, too, understood with respect to a given (existing) object, not just with respect to the subject of thought (B 411, note).

my life, i.e., of my time and space, immediately here and now (*thesis*), or *should I return to the origins of my* (Jewish) *past, and go* out of this (Samarian) place back *to the land of my origin* (homeland, Galilee) (*antithesis*)?

> Thesis 1: The beginning of an agent's a time and the beginning of a's space are always immediately present.
>
> Antithesis 2: The beginning of an agent's a time lies in the (past) moment of the beginning of a's life, and the beginning of a's space lies in the (distant) place of a's origin.

Instead of Kant's opposition between the finite and the infinite regress in space and time, here we encounter the opposition between the immediate presence of the beginning of time and space, and its indirect givenness by means of intermediate segments of time and space.[15] Another interesting distinction appears regarding the conception of the beginning of space: in Kant, it is conceived as a possible end (outer limit) of space, while in John 4 it seems to be understood as the origin of space in relation to "self" (i.e., as home, homeland).

(b) DIVISIBILITY OF MATTER.

Jesus: If you knew the gift of God and x such that Jesus=x,
    you would have asked x and x would have given you living water.
Samaritan woman: Sir, you do not even have a bucket and the cistern is deep.
⊢
Samaritan woman: [Contradiction, except that Jesus is greater than Jacob].
(Cf. John 4:10–11).

Can water be reached from the deep well and given without a bucket? In other words, to come closer to the terms of Kant's second cosmological antinomy (B 440, 443), *can matter (reality) be immediately given, without any partitioning (thesis)*, or *is matter given only piecemeal, in portions consisting of some elementary units* ("a bucket") (*antithesis*)?

> Thesis 2: Matter can be immediately given to an agent a without any partition of matter.
>
> Antithesis 2: Matter is given to an agent a only in portions consisting of units.

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[15]The problem of mediation is already announced in the introduction to John 4: "[...] he [Jesus] left Judea and returned to Galilee. He had to pass through Samaria" (John 4:3–4).

Again, we note a difference: in Kant's antinomy, there is the opposition between the finite and the infinite partitioning of matter, whereas in John 4 the opposition is between the immediate givenness of matter, and the givenness of matter only by means of its partition (possibly as a long series of portions of matter).[16] Besides, we remark that Kant conceived the divisibility of matter by assuming that a thing to be divided (possibly into simple parts) is already given. In John 4, in distinction, the question regarding matter ("water") is whether it is available at all prior to its partition (thus, it is not atomism which is a central problem).

(c) CAUSATION.

Samaritan woman: Sir, give me this water [i.e., living water, which will become a spring of water welling up to eternal life].
Jesus: Go call your husband and come back.
Samaritan woman: I do not have a husband.
Jesus: You have had five husbands, and the one you have now is not your husband. What you have said is true.
⊢
Samaritan woman: [Contradiction].
(Cf. John 4:14–18).

Has the Samaritan woman an immediately present first ground of her own wish to get living water – thesis; or is her wish grounded on the whole causal series of states and events going back from the present to the past times out of her reach (five past husbands, with the present "non-husband") – antithesis? We can recognize an analogy with Kant's (third) antinomy of the causality of freedom and an endless series of the preceding causal events (B 441–442, 443), modified here into the antinomy between *the possibility that someone freely determines her (his) own wish/will* (*thesis*; cf. the Samaritan woman's wish as a possible free beginning of a new causal series), and *the determination by a (long) series of the preceding states* (*antithesis*; the Samaritan woman's determination by her past states).

> Thesis 3: An agent a can freely begin a causal series by means of a's wish or will.
> Antithesis 3: An agent a is determined by the preceding causal series of states.

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[16]Cf. for instance, "Sir, give me this water, so that I may not be thirsty or have to keep coming here to draw water" (John 4:15). That is, it is assumed that water is usually available only as a (long) series of portions of water drawn from the well.

It is interesting to note that in this antinomy the concept of causal beginning, both in John 4 and Kant, is related to free will/wish. However, in John 4 the (Samaritan woman's) wish is, at first, not directly related to an action, but to someone else's (Jesus') will ("Sir, give me this water"). We will come later (solutions below) to a related crucial difference from Kant's conception.

(d) DEPENDENCE IN EXISTENCE.

Samaritan woman: Sir, I can see that you are a prophet.
Our ancestors worshiped on this mountain [Gerizim], but
   you people say that the place to worship is in Jerusalem.
$\vdash$
[Contradiction].
(Cf. John 4:19–20).

Are the place and time of the presence of God (in worship) necessary in themselves, i.e., independent of any further condition – thesis; or are *the place and time of worship contingent* (e.g., Mount Gerizim for the Samaritans, Jerusalem for the Jews), *i.e., dependent, for example, on long sequences of different traditions*[17] – *antithesis*? The thesis is not explicit in the text, but is implicitly contained in the antithesis, which is in itself contradictory (the traditions mentioned are mutually exclusive),[18] as well as in the solution (see below).

> Thesis 4: God can be immediately present to an agent a independently
> of any contingent place and time.
> Antithesis 4: God is present to an agent a only in dependence of some
> contingent place and time.

We can compare this antinomy of John 4 with Kant's antinomy between the thesis that there is an absolutely necessarily existing being (the world itself, or some being outside the world), and the antithesis, according to which all beings exist contingently (cf. B 442, 443). In the context of John 4, the existence of God is already presupposed in the solution of the third antinomy (see solution (c) below). Hence, the fourth antinomy specifically concerns the question of the existence of God; in addition, it concerns His *presence* – not just some necessary existence, possibly completely separated from the events in the world.

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[17]As concluded in [22], p. 215, "the main difference between the Jews and the Samaritans was not their ethnicity or religiosity but the location of their cultic center".

[18]"There is no doubt that the building of the Gerizim temple [. . .] was met with disapproval by the Jews." As to the Samaritans, "Mount Gerizim [. . .] continued to be regarded as the only legitimate place of worship". ([22], pp. 212–213).

Solutions

Solutions of the antinomies in John 4 differ from Kantian solutions in that they solve each antinomy by *affirming the immediate presence in Spirit of the (unconditioned) totality (thesis)*, while *confining the antithesis (the totality accessible only through a possibly long series of conditions) merely to the sensible empirical world*. Only thesis is knowledge ("seeing") and about the true reality, while antithesis is ignorance.[19] In this way, a duplication of concepts arises (explicitly or implicitly): physical water and spiritual water, physical well and spiritual well (spring), physical giving/receiving and spiritual giving/receiving, physical drink and spiritual drink, physical thirst and spiritual thirst, time and space of the physical world and "time and space" of "Spirit and truth", physical husband and true husband, the truth of the physical world and spiritual truth, father (e.g., "our father Jacob", John 4:12) and Father, worship in a physical world and spiritual worship, physical self and spiritual self. By the term "physical", we intend to cover both the "natural" and the "historical" objects and states-of-affairs.[20]

As is well known, Kant gave a positive solution both for the thesis and for the antithesis only in the case of the third and the fourth antinomies: reducing them to subcontrarieties by distinguishing "sensible" from "intelligible" causality and dependence of existence.[21] On the other side, he resolved the first and the second antinomy by negating the thesis as well as the antithesis: reducing them to contraries because of the impossibility of the contradictory subject: the whole of time and space cannot be given in time and space, the whole partition of a material thing cannot be given in the thing, since this thing, which is, according to Kant, only our representation, is really divided only to the point up to which it is at a moment actually divided in our representation.[22] Regarding intelligible causality, let us recall that only the moral causality of freedom (connected with the third antinomy) received in Kant, in his practical philosophy, the status of objective reality.

(a) The first antinomy (extension of time and space). The solution confirms the thesis that the beginning of time and space is immediately present (Thesis

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[19]For instance, "[. . .] we know that this is truly the savior of the world" (John 4:42). "You people worship what you do not understand [οὐκ οἴδατε]; we worship what we understand [οἴδαμεν]" (John 4:22). "[. . .] no one can see the kingdom of God without being born from above" (John 3:3).

[20]See [17] for the distinction of naturalistic and historicist conceptions of knowledge in John 3.

[21]B 566, 587–589 and *Prolegomena*, [11], Vol. 4, pp. 343–347, §53.

[22]Cf. Kant's clarification in *Prolegomena* ([11], Vol. 4, pp. 341–342, §52c), and in B 545–555.

1) – as a "gift of God", while in the sensible world the beginning of time and space should be looked for (back) in the time and place of one's origin (Antithesis 1). In the Gospel, Jesus gives the solution by distinguishing between sensible empirical water and "living water", which is a "gift of God",[23] and which he presently possesses and could give to the Samaritan woman (cf. the first premise of the second antinomy above, John 4:10, and Figure 1). We note a specific way in which Thesis 1 itself is confirmed: living water is immediately available simply by asking for it in the right way (as for a gift of God).

Elaborating this a bit further, Thesis 1 leads to the equivalence relation (accessibility in time) on space points on the ground of the outer infimum (God), which is immediately related to a chosen inside point (Jesus, who comes from God; see John 4:25–26), and on the assumption of transitivity[24] and euclidity.[25] Of course, in a sensible world, there could be barriers which prevent accessibility in space and time.

This solution underlies the second antinomy (see above): whether matter (the content of space and time) can be given in space and time immediately, without any partition, or only piecemeal?

(b) The second antinomy (divisibility of matter). The solution affirms Thesis 2, according to which an indivisible origin of matter is immediately present, prior to any partition. This solution restricts the validity of Antithesis 2 to the sensible world, where we encounter only a (possibly long) series of portions of dividable matter, and it relates the validity of Thesis 2 to non-physical matter and "eternity".[26] In the words of the Gospel, what Jesus will give is not water in parts (in buckets), from some gradually accessible distance (from Jacob's deep well), but the spring of water and of eternal life:

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[23]According to *Genesis* 1:1–2, "in the beginning", before the creation of light, there was "a mighty wind sweeping over the waters" as a "pre-creation state". See the comment on this place in ([21], p. 10, note *).

[24]Transitivity is indicated, for example, by the above-quoted sentence "If you knew the gift of God [. . .]" (antinomy (b), also Figure 1). Besides, see later in the text (assuming that "water" is, in a way, present in words): "Many of the Samaritans of that town began to believe in him because of the word of the woman" (John 4:39).

[25]As an indication, we remark that the Samaritan woman, as well as other Samaritans in her town, heard Jesus' words, and then the Samaritans confirmed their belief to her: "[. . .] they said to the woman: 'We no longer believe because of your word; for we have heard for ourselves, and we know that this is truly the savior of the world' " (John 4:42).

[26]The possibility and the presuppositions of something like "eternal life", as well as the questioning of the received views on it, are the subject of the third and, eventually, the fourth antinomies.

> Everyone who drinks this water will be thirsty again; but whoever drinks the water I shall give will never thirst; [...] [it] will become in him a spring of water welling up to eternal life. (John 4:13–14).

This solution leads to a new (third) antinomy: to live in dependence on the physical world and its causal sequences seems to contradict the possibility to access the origin of eternal life. The problem should be answered by the next solution.

(c) The third antinomy (causation). The solution includes the affirmation of Thesis 3, about the causality of one's own wish (the possibility of a new causal beginning) through a (liberating) relationship to truth and God, as well as the affirmation of Antithesis 3, about an agent's dependence on a (long) causal sequence (e.g., tradition, personal history), as confined to the sensible empirical world. Thus, the Samaritan woman, living under the conditions of her past life (a sequence of husbands or "husbands") faces this fact (truth), and converts to the worship of God (in a way, she recognizes that truth comes from God).[27] The conversion to truth and the worship of God should make her free and able to break the preceding causal sequence of events, and to start a new sequence.[28] Such a new start does not exclude, but could perhaps rather require, having a true husband.[29] In a still wider perspective, the whole long causal sequence (history) consisting of "fathers" and "ancestors" (e.g., Jacob, Joseph) is now being replaced with the one present cause: the Father, as God is named by Jesus (John 4:21).[30]

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[27]Cf. Jesus' words in the Gospel: "I tell you what I have seen in the Father's presence", "you are trying to kill me, a man who has told you the truth that I heard from God" (John 8:38,40).

[28]See also John 8:32, "[...] the truth will set you free".

[29]A relation between husband and wife could be closely described by Kant's category of "reciprocity" (*Wechselwirkung*). Kant gives the "reciprocity" ("community") of the parts of a body as an example (B 112). This could be compared with the following place from *Genesis*: "a man leaves his father and mother and clings to his wife, and the two become one body" (Genesis 2:24). We can also notice here that the community of "man and wife" is a sort of a new causal beginning, discontinuity with past. Let us mention that there are strong indications in John 4 that Jesus could be understood, in some true, spiritual sense, as a bridegroom ([10]). However, according to *Genesis*, the community relationship between man and wife changed after the Fall to the rule of man over woman ("he [your husband] shall rule over you", Genesis 3:16); this one-sided causality could be related to the Samaritan woman's past husbands. The whole dialogue might be seen as a reversal of the Adam and Eve story of *Genesis*, that is, as a path leading back to the state of original unity with God.

[30]In general, the Samaritan woman lives in the whole historical tradition of her people. For example: "[...] our father Jacob, who gave us this cistern and drank from it himself with his children and his flocks" (John 4:12); and later: "Our ancestors worshiped on this mountain [Gerizim] [...]" (John 4:20). Cf. "The woman had found her security in the concept of *her* ancestors, but

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This causality of a new start in John 4 has obviously its counterpart in Kant's causality of freedom, but, in distinction, it is not reducible to an agent's (self's) "spontaneity" ("self-activity", B 446) without dependence on God.[31]

The causality of John 4, again, leads to a contradiction with respect to possible ways of God's presence, that is, between the immediate presence of God, independently of the contingencies of place and time, and the dependence of God's presence on some (contingent) place and time (see the fourth antinomy above).

Remark 1. *In terms of the system of mutually irreducible notions of possibility, imagination, and conception* (*as described by J.-Y. [4]*)*, we could interpret the somewhat surprising transition from the Samaritan woman's wish to get living water and eternal life to Jesus' request to her to call her husband, in the following way: we assume that her wish is* conceivable *for her* (*she understands it's meaning*)*, and also* imaginable (*for instance, in some Pentateuchal picture*[32])*, but there remains the question of* possibility (*aimed at by Jesus*)*: she cannot receive eternal life while still being in causal dependence on the sensible temporal world* (*her past life*)*. The solution is that she should make her wish independent of this temporal causal sequence by relating herself, in her self-knowledge* (*truth*)*, to God. In application to Kant's antinomy: we could conceive* (*by categories*) *what it means to act out of freedom and imagine it in some intuitive form, but the possibility of such a causality opens up, for Kant, only in the intelligible moral world* (*otherwise, the causality of freedom remains just* ens rationis *and* ens imaginarium*, i.e., a concept and an intuition without an object, see B 347–349*).

(d) The fourth antinomy (dependence in existence). The solution confirms Thesis

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this is now transcended by the reference to '*the Father*' [. . .]. There is a progression from a very narrow and limited view of the exclusivity of one group to the liberating discovery that God is the Father of all [. . .]" ([5], p. 152). Sometimes, the determination by one's physical origin may be insurmountable: "Jesus himself testified that a prophet has no honor in his native place" (John 4:44).

[31]For instance: "the idea of spontaneity, which could start to act from itself, without needing to be preceded by any other cause that in turn determines it to action according to the law of causal connection" (B 561); "a causality in our power of choice such that [. . .] it might [. . .] begin a series of occurrences *entirely from itself*" (B 563).

However, Kant points out: "The confirmation of the need of reason to appeal to a first beginning in the series of natural causes is clearly and visibly evident from the fact that (with the exception of the Epicurean school) all the philosophers of antiquity saw themselves as obliged to assume a *prime mover* for the explanation of motions in the world, i.e., a freely acting cause, which began this series of states first and of itself" (B 478).

[32]E.g., Exodus 17:6: "Strike the rock, and the water will flow from it for the people to drink". Cf. Num 20:11.

4, according to which the necessary being, God, is immediately present (exists) – not in some space and time of a sensible world, but "in Spirit and truth": "the hour is coming, and is now here, when true worshipers will worship the Father in Spirit and truth" (John 4:23). In the sensible world, God is not immediately present, but probably only through a (long) intermediate sequence of the dependence on past events (coming, finally, to the beginnings of a religious tradition).

Here we observe the similarity with Kant's distinction between the "intelligible" necessity ("in Spirit and truth"), and "sensible" contingency. However, in John 4, not only is a necessarily existent being aimed at, but also its presence (in worship).[33] Thus the difference results between the presence of a necessary being in Spirit and truth, and a long "series of dependent existences" (B 587), eventually leading to some non-present (separate) necessary being.

We see that Spirit should be "something" that is independent of the contingent sensible world, although, at the same time, it should be somehow active in that world. It is also clear that the truth about the sensible world is not as such part of the sensible world, although it is related to that world. The question about *how* God can be immediately present to us in Spirit and truth remains open and is addressed in the final section of the dialogue.

2.3 The highest reality

We outline how the idea of God as the most real being (*ens realissimum*) (see (c) on page 2) can be traced back to the dialogue in John 4. In the Samaritan woman's utterance on what she knows about the worship of God in Spirit and truth, the idea of God as the source of the knowledge of "everything" (of truth) is clearly present:

> I know that the Messiah is coming, the one called the Anointed; when he comes, he will tell us everything. (John 4:25).

The Messiah is "the one whom God has sent" and who "speaks the words of God" (John 3:34, cf. Dt 18:18,22). Thus the Messiah's knowledge of "everything" stems from God, who, in some way, possesses truth about "everything".[34] Since

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[33]For Kant, in distinction, "the necessary being would have to be thought of as entirely outside the series of the world of sense (as an *ens extramundanum*), and merely intelligible; this is the only way of preventing it from being subjected to the law of the contingency and dependence of all appearances" (B 589).

[34]This "everything" is later reflected in the Samaritan woman's words: "Come see a man who told me everything I have done. Could he possibly be the Messiah?" (John 4:28, cf. John 4:39). The Samaritan woman's awareness that omniscience is grounded in God is confirmed by her wish

truth about everything is truth with respect to all possible predicates (according to the "principle of complete determination", see (c) on page 2), God obviously possesses the totality of all concepts (predicates). Here, a Kantian reasoning can be applied according to which God is completely determined by the idea of the "possession of all reality" (*Allbesitz der Realität*), as the entity having all positive properties (the negative ones being defined by means of the corresponding positive ones), and thus should be conceived as *ens realissimum* (B 604).

In distinction to Kant's view, in John 4 God is not merely a regulative ideal (or a postulated being), not even a being that will be present only in the future (as in the Samaritan woman's above-quoted statement, John 4:25), but is conceived as actually existing – present here and now, in the dialogue itself. This presence is indicated by the self-revealing words: "I am [ἐγώ εἰμι],[35] the one who is speaking with you" (John 4:26).

3 Through dialogue to a metaphysical experience (a formalization)

Summarizing the preceding section, it can be said that in John 4 a metatheoretical conceptual structure is present that is analoguous to Kant's system of transcendental ideas, one of the main differences being that these ideas should have actual denotation in religious experience instead of having a merely regulative or postulated role. Accordingly, the system of transcendental ideas should become a religiously based metaphysical system. This actual denotation of metaphysical concepts, as well as of concepts in general, should be grounded in their spiritual sense, as presented in John 4.[36]

In the following, we describe in a formal way how a religious reality of metaphysical concepts is achieved through the dialogical interaction of agents (Jesus, the Samaritan woman). To that end, we use a modification of justification logic

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to worship God after Jesus told her "everything she has done", see the third antinomy above and John 4:18–20,29,39.

[35]This is "an Old Testament self-designation of Yahweh" ([21], p. 1439, footnote ‡). "It [the affirmation ἐγώ εἰμι] was used to manifest the living presence of God who makes himself accessible to his people. Jesus using this title manifests the visible presence of God to the Samaritan woman and eventually to the Samaritans" ([24], p. 134).

[36]John 4 could be compared with John 3, where, in Jesus' dialogue with Nicodemus, we cannot see Nicodemus succeeding to access the spiritual reality (Nicodemus remained dependent on his naturalistic and historicist knowledge) (see [17]).

(stemming from [9]; see also [2]), where the concepts that were observed above as being transformed from metatheoretical to metaphysical ones will be interiorized into an object theory.

3.1 System QJDR

The vocabulary consists of individual constants $c, d, e, c_1, \ldots$ and individual variables $x, y, z, x_1, \ldots$; predicate letters P_j^i; =; $\neg, \rightarrow$; the quantifier symbol $\forall$; term operation symbols $+, \cdot, !$, and gen_x. Individual terms are individual variables and constants, and complex terms $(t + u), (t \cdot u), !t$, and $\mathsf{gen}_x(t)$, where t and u are individual terms.

Formulas are of the shape $Pt_1 \ldots t_n, t = u, \neg\phi, (\phi \rightarrow \psi), \forall u\phi, t\colon \phi$ with the meaning 't has/gives evidence that ϕ', and $t\colon\colon \phi$ meaning 't wishes (requests) ϕ'. Symbols $\wedge, \vee, \leftrightarrow$ and $\exists$ are defined in the usual way.

We will also informally use accommodated English words to facilitate the understanding of translations. $\bot$ will stand for a contradiction, $\phi \wedge \neg\phi$.

The axiomatic system QJDR is designed on the basis of justification logic systems QLP by [6] and FOLP by [3], without factivity (an analogue of modal axiom **T**), with the addition of $=$ and wish operator $\colon\colon$, and with individual terms as evidence and wish terms.

The axioms are:

CPC	classical propositional tautologies
$\forall$**a**	$\forall x\phi \rightarrow \phi(t/x)$, t is substitutable for x in ϕ
$\forall$**b**	$\forall x(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \forall x\psi)$, $x \notin \mathsf{free}(\phi)$
Id	$x = x$
Rg	$x = y \rightarrow \exists z\, z\colon x = y$ $\qquad \neg x = y \rightarrow \exists z\, z\colon \neg x = y$
Sub	$x = y \rightarrow (\phi(x) \rightarrow \phi(y))$, ϕ is atomic
JMon	$x\colon \phi \rightarrow (x + y)\colon \phi$ $\qquad y\colon \phi \rightarrow (x + y)\colon \phi$
JK	$x\colon (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (y\colon \phi \rightarrow (x \cdot y)\colon \psi)$
J4	$x\colon \phi \rightarrow !x\colon x\colon \phi$
J$\forall$	$t\colon \phi \rightarrow \mathsf{gen}_x(t)\colon \forall x\phi$, $x \notin \mathsf{free}(t)$
DMon, DK, D$\forall$	like **JMon, JK, J$\forall$**, respectively, with $\colon\colon$ for $\colon$
DJK	$x\colon\colon (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (y\colon \phi \rightarrow (x \cdot y)\colon\colon \psi)$
JDK	$x\colon (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (y\colon\colon \phi \rightarrow (x \cdot y)\colon\colon \psi)$
DJ4	$x\colon\colon \phi \rightarrow !x\colon x\colon\colon \phi$

as well as the following special axioms:

SA1J $InTruth(x) \rightarrow (x\colon \phi \rightarrow \phi)$
SA1D $InTruth(x) \rightarrow \neg x\colon\colon \bot$
SA2 $InTruth(x) \rightarrow InTruth(!x)$
SA3 $InTruth(t) \rightarrow InTruth(\mathsf{gen}_x(t))$, with $x \notin \mathsf{free}(t)$
SA4 $(InTruth(x) \wedge InTruth(y)) \rightarrow InTruth(x \cdot y)$
SA5 $InTruth(x + y) \rightarrow (InTruth(x) \vee InTruth(y))$
SA6 *special axioms* including meaning postulates about non-logical symbols (to be introduced, sometimes implicitely, during the formalization of the dialogue of John 4).

Rules are modus ponens (**MP**), universal generalization (**UG**), and axiom justification (**AJ**): if $\vdash \phi$, then $\vdash c\colon \phi$, where ϕ is an axiom, and c a justification constant – according to some constant specification function **CS**, which assigns a justification constant to each axiom (in our translation of John 4, the assigned constants will be, informally, j and s).

In addition, some *facts* (possibly evidence and wishes) will appear as proof lines in the translation of the reasoning in the dialogue of John 4.

In some places with complex agents involving only one basic agent t, we will use an indexed expression $(t)^n$ for short.

1. $\phi \in \mathrm{Ev}(\llbracket t \rrbracket)$ *or* $\phi \in \mathrm{Ev}(\llbracket u \rrbracket) \Longrightarrow \phi \in \mathrm{Ev}(\llbracket t \rrbracket + \llbracket u \rrbracket)$,
   $\phi \in \mathrm{Wish}(\llbracket t \rrbracket)$ *or* $\phi \in \mathrm{Ev}(\llbracket u \rrbracket) \Longrightarrow \phi \in \mathrm{Wish}(\llbracket t \rrbracket + \llbracket u \rrbracket)$,

2. $\phi \rightarrow \psi \in \mathrm{Ev}(\llbracket t \rrbracket)$ & $\phi \in \mathrm{Ev}(\llbracket u \rrbracket) \Longrightarrow \psi \in \mathrm{Ev}(\llbracket t \rrbracket \cdot \llbracket u \rrbracket)$,
   $\phi \rightarrow \psi \in \mathrm{Wish}(\llbracket t \rrbracket)$ & $\phi \in \mathrm{Wish}(\llbracket u \rrbracket) \Longrightarrow \psi \in \mathrm{Wish}(\llbracket t \rrbracket \cdot \llbracket u \rrbracket)$,
   $\phi \rightarrow \psi \in \mathrm{Ev}(\llbracket t \rrbracket)$ & $\phi \in \mathrm{Wish}(\llbracket u \rrbracket) \Longrightarrow \psi \in \mathrm{Wish}(\llbracket t \rrbracket \cdot \llbracket u \rrbracket)$,
   $\phi \rightarrow \psi \in \mathrm{Wish}(\llbracket t \rrbracket)$ & $\phi \in \mathrm{Ev}(\llbracket u \rrbracket) \Longrightarrow \psi \in \mathrm{Wish}(\llbracket t \rrbracket \cdot \llbracket u \rrbracket)$,

3. $\phi \in \mathrm{Ev}(\llbracket t \rrbracket) \Longrightarrow t\colon \phi \in \mathrm{Ev}(!\llbracket t \rrbracket)$ (positive introspection),
   $\phi \in \mathrm{Wish}(\llbracket t \rrbracket) \Longrightarrow t\colon\colon \phi \in \mathrm{Ev}(!\llbracket t \rrbracket)$ (positive introspection),

4. $\phi \in \mathrm{Ev}(\llbracket t \rrbracket) \Longrightarrow \forall x \phi \in \mathrm{Ev}(\mathbf{gen}_x(\llbracket t \rrbracket))$, $x \notin \mathsf{free}(t)$
   $\phi \in \mathrm{Wish}(\llbracket t \rrbracket) \Longrightarrow \forall x \phi \in \mathrm{Wish}(\mathbf{gen}_x(\llbracket t \rrbracket))$, $x \notin \mathsf{free}(t)$.

The satisfaction of a formula is defined classically for atomic, compound and quantified formulas. For evidence and wish formulas, the conditions are as follows:

(a) $\mathfrak{M} \models_{\mathrm{v}} t \colon \phi \Leftrightarrow \phi \in \mathrm{Ev}(\llbracket t \rrbracket)$,

(b) $\mathfrak{M} \models_{\mathrm{v}} t \colon\colon \phi \Leftrightarrow \phi \in \mathrm{Wish}(\llbracket t \rrbracket)$.

In principle, it should not be difficult to define the denotation of $InTruth$ and of the non-logical relation symbols used below.

3.2   Translation of the dialogue

We will now translate some characteristic moments of the dialogue. Instead of formal descriptive symbols, we will mainly use abbreviations which by themselves indicate their meaning; j will denote Jesus, s the Samaritan woman, w physical (transient) water, and w' true (eternal) water. In the translation, we will focus on the interconnection of agents that is being established during the process of resolving contradictions and of increasing knowledge. Numbers in square brackets will indicate the reference of a reply or an opposition to a previous proposition in the dialogue.

Part 1   At the beginning of the conversation, Jesus actually asked for true water (w'), but this was not properly understood by the Samaritan woman. We will, first, show Jesus' request and beliefs (in a slightly simplified way) in the sense that the Samaritan woman thought they were meant, and thereafter we will express that they are being perceived so by the Samaritan woman:[37]

1	$j \colon\colon Gives(s, j, w)$	fact
2	$j \colon (j \colon\colon Gives(s, j, w) \to (\neg j \colon\colon Gives(s, j, w) \to \bot))$	**AJ**
3	$(j)^g \colon ((Jew(j) \wedge Samaritan(s)) \to \neg j \colon\colon Gives(s, j, w))$	**SA6**, **AJ**
4	$j \colon (Jew(j) \wedge Samaritan(s))$	fact
5	$((j)^g \cdot j) \colon \neg j \colon\colon Gives(s, j, w)$	$3, 4$ **JK**, $[1]$
6	$((j \cdot j) \cdot ((j)^g \cdot j)) \colon\colon \bot$	$1, 2, 5$ **JK**, **JDK**

As mentioned above, this is not quite what Jesus meant – it is how the Samaritan woman understood his words (the numerals in parentheses indicate the respective sentences of the formalization above):

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[37]For simplicity, the translation is in some places reductive on the ground of context. For example, 'to give a drink' is translated as 'to give water', and the Samaritan woman's question on how Jesus can ask her for a drink is translated simply as the assumption that Jesus is actually not asking her (because he should not ask her) to give him water. See a detailed interpretation, for example, in [5], pp. 115–122.

7	$s\colon ((1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3) \wedge (4))$	fact
8	$(s)^h\colon (((1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3) \wedge (4)) \to (6))$	1-6 **AJ**
9	$((s)^h \cdot s)\colon (6)$	$7, 8$ **JK**
10	$(s)^i\colon ((6) \to \neg InTruth(((j \cdot j) \cdot ((j)^g \cdot j))))$	**SA1D**, **AJ**
11	$((s)^i \cdot ((s)^h \cdot s))\colon \neg InTruth(((j \cdot j) \cdot ((j)^g \cdot j)))$	$9, 10$ **JK**
12	$((s)^j \cdot ((s)^i \cdot ((s)^h \cdot s)))\colon \neg InTruth(j)$	9 **SA4**, **AJ**

We take that Jesus is aware of 12 (that the Samaritan woman, in her reasoning, does not believe him at the time). He therefore introduces another viewpoint by advancing his belief that what should happen is $Gives(j, s, w')$, referring to "true water". However, this is understood by the Samaritan woman again as $Gives(j, s, w)$, i.e., as referring to sensible water.

Let us now assume that $j\colon Gives(j, s, w')$ (1) as well as $s\colon \neg Gives(s, j, w)$ (2) hold. Since we take that j has evidence about all logical axioms, and since we thus get

$$j\colon (Gives(j, s, w') \to (Gives(j, s, w') \vee \neg Gives(s, j, w))),$$

so, starting from (1), $(j \cdot j)\colon (Gives(j, s, w') \vee \neg Gives(s, j, w))$ follows. In an analogous way, starting from (2), we can derive $(s \cdot s)\colon (Gives(j, s, w') \vee \neg Gives(s, j, w))$. From both sentences we obtain $((j \cdot j) + (s \cdot s))\colon (Gives(j, s, w') \vee \neg Gives(s, j, w))$ by **JMon**. Hence, we derive:

$$(j\colon Gives(j, s, w') \ \vee \ s\colon \neg Gives(s, j, w))$$
$$\to ((j \cdot j) + (s \cdot s))\colon (Gives(j, s, w') \vee \neg Gives(s, j, w)).$$

In addition, an application of the proof example by [2], p. 10, to our context shows that evidence for $j\colon Gives(j, s, w') \vee s\colon Gives(j, s, w')$ includes the positive introspection of s and j, that is $(j\colon Gives(j, s, w') \vee s\colon Gives(j, s, w')) \to ((j \cdot {!}j) + (s \cdot {!}s))\colon (j\colon Gives(j, s, w') \vee s\colon Gives(j, s, w'))$.

Part 2 By a reasoning similar to that in Part 1, we obtain the following sequence: (1) $j\colon\colon Gives(j, s, w)$ (fact), (2) $(j)^k\colon (Gives(j, s, w) \to HasBucket(j))$ (**SA6, AJ**), (3) $((j)^k \cdot j)\colon\colon HasBucket(j)$, (4) $j\colon \neg HasBucket(j)$ (fact), (5) $j\colon (HasBucket(j) \to (\neg HasBucket(j) \to \bot))$, (6) $((j \cdot ((j)^k \cdot j)) \cdot j)\colon\colon \bot$. Like in Part 1, $((s)^{i'} \cdot ((s)^{h'} \cdot s))\colon \neg InTruth(((j \cdot ((j)^k \cdot j)) \cdot j))$ holds, and thus, for some complex built of s, an evidence for $\neg InTruth(j)$ again results (cf. **SA4**).

Therefore, Jesus introduces a more explicit distinction between w and w', which is noticed (although still not fully understood) by the Samaritan woman:

1	$j :: Gives(j, s, w')$	fact
2	$j \colon (Drinks(s, w') \to NeverThirsty(s))$,	
	$\quad j \colon (Neverthirsty(s) \to Drinks(s, w'))$	fact
3	$s :: Neverthirsty(s)$	fact
4	$(j \cdot s) :: Drinks(s, w')$	$2, 3$ **JDK**
5	$s \colon (Drinks(s, w') \to Gives(j, s, w'))$	fact
6	$(s \cdot (j \cdot s)) :: Gives(j, s, w')$	$4, 5$ **JDK**, [1]

However, the realizability of $(s \cdot (j \cdot s)) :: Gives(j, s, w')$, that is, of getting "a spring of water welling up to eternal life", depends on a further ascent, to be initiated by Jesus, in the Samaritan woman's knowledge.

Part 3

1	$s \colon j :: \exists x(Call(s, x) \wedge HusbandOf(x, s))$	fact
2	$s \colon \neg\exists x HusbandOf(x, s)$	fact, [1]
3	$j \colon HasDoneS(s)$	fact, "he told me everything I have done", John 4:39
4	$\forall y(HasDoneS(y)$	the meaning of $HasDoneS$,
	$\quad \to \neg\exists x HusbandOf(x, y))$	**SA6**
5	$(j)^l \colon (\neg\exists x HusbandOf(x, s)$	$3, 4$, assuming $j \colon (2)$ as a
	$\quad \wedge s \colon \neg\exists x HusbandOf(x, s))$	fact, [2]
6	$s \colon j \colon HasDoneS(s)$	3 fact
7	$j \colon HasDoneS(s) \to Prophet(j)$	**SA6**
8	$s \colon (j \colon HasDoneS(s) \to Prophet(j))$	7 **AJ**
9	$(s \cdot s) \colon Prophet(j)$	$6, 8$ **JK**
10	$\forall x(Prophet(x) \to InTruth(x))$	**SA6**
11	$(s \cdot s) \colon (Prophet(j) \to InTruth(j))$	10 **AJ***
12	$((s \cdot s) \cdot (s \cdot s)) \colon InTruth(j)$	$9, 11$ **JK**, [12] of Part 1, cf. Part 2

(*In line 11, we apply **AJ** (for s) and $\forall$**a** to line 10, and hence, again by means of **AJ**, we get $s \colon (\forall x(Prophet(x) \to InTruth(x)) \to (Prophet(j) \to InTruth(j))$ as an intermediate step). Of course, the beliefs of lines 9 and 12 are true:

13	$Prophet(j)$	$3, 7$
14	$InTruth(j)$	$10, 13$

For 13, see Dt 18:18 and cf. with John 1.

Part 4 Thus, the Samaritan woman concludes that, in some place, God should be worshiped:

1   $(s)^l\colon (\exists x\, Prophet(x)$ **SA6**, **AJ**
      $\rightarrow \exists x\, WorshipedIn(god, x))$
2   $(s \cdot s)\colon (Prophet(j) \rightarrow \exists x\, Prophet(x))$ $\forall$**a**, tautology, **AJ**
3   $((s \cdot s) \cdot (s \cdot s))\colon \exists x\, Prophet(x)$ 9 of Part 3. **JK**
4   $((s)^l \cdot ((s \cdot s) \cdot (s \cdot s)))\colon \exists x\, WorshipedIn(god, x)$ 1, 3 **JK**

However, there is controversy about the place of worship:

5   $samaritans\colon WorshipedIn(god, gerizim)$ fact, [4]
6   $jews\colon WorshipedIn(god, jerusalem)$ fact, [4]
7   $s\colon (WorshipedIn(god, gerizim)$
      $\rightarrow (WorshipedIn(god, jerusalem) \rightarrow \perp))$ fact
8   $((s \cdot samaritans) \cdot jews)\colon \perp$ 5–7 **JK**
9   $\neg InTruth(((s \cdot samaritans) \cdot jews))$ 8 **SA1J**

According to the Samaritan woman it cannot be that both Samaritans and Jews are right regarding the place of worship. Thus Jesus points to worship in Spirit and truth as the solution to the controversy (see the next, final, part).

Final Part

1   $j\colon \forall x(WorshipedIn(god, x)$ fact
      $\leftrightarrow (InTruth(x) \wedge InSpirit(x)))$
2   $s\colon \exists x\, TheAnointed(x)$ fact ($\exists x$ refers also to the future), [1]
3   $s\colon \forall x(TheAnointed(x)$ fact, [1] (cf.: x "will tell us
      $\rightarrow (InTruth(x) \wedge InSpirit(x)))$ everything", John 4:25)
4   $j\colon \forall x(TheAnointed(x) \rightarrow x = j)$ fact, [2]

   We derive some consequences not explicitly stated in the Gospel's text:

5   $(s)^n\colon (\forall x(TheAnointed(x) \rightarrow x = j)$ first-order logic,
      $\rightarrow (\exists x\, TheAnointed(x) \rightarrow TheAnointed(j)))$ iterated **JK**
6   $((s)^n \cdot j)\colon (\exists x\, TheAnointed(x) \rightarrow TheAnointed(j))$ 4, 5 **JK**
7   $(((s)^n \cdot j) \cdot s)\colon TheAnointed(j)$ 2, 6 **JK**
8   $((s \cdot s) \cdot (((s)^n \cdot j) \cdot s))\colon (InTruth(j) \wedge InSpirit(j))$ 3, 7 **JK***
9   $((j)^m \cdot ((s \cdot s) \cdot (((s)^n \cdot j) \cdot s)))\colon WorshipedIn(god, j)$ 1, 8 **JK***, [1]

(*See analogous note * for line 11 of Part 3.) Line 9 includes some propositional logic as evident to j. Of course, according to **J4** the following is derivable: $!(((s)^n \cdot j) \cdot s)\colon (((s)^n \cdot j) \cdot s)\colon TheAnointed(j)$ as well as $!((j)^m \cdot ((s \cdot s) \cdot (((s)^n \cdot j) \cdot s)))\colon ((j)^m \cdot ((s \cdot s) \cdot (((s)^n \cdot j) \cdot s)))\colon WorshipedIn(god, j)$. In addition, everything that was in the proof until line 9 stated for s holds for j, too, from where and from line 14 of Part 3, it follows (by **SA1J**):

10	$\forall x(TheAnointed(x) \rightarrow x = j)$	see 4
11	$InSpirit(j)$	see 8
12	$WorshipedIn(god, j)$	see 9

Thus, non-formally expressed, the result is that Jesus (j) is a true, spiritual self ("I am") in which God should be worshiped.

As the Samaritan woman returned to her town, she told the people about what had happened; thus she may have reasoned in more general terms. For example, her reasoning from Part 2 might also have been as follows: from her generalized wish

$$s\,{::}\,(HumanInTown(x) \rightarrow Neverthirsty(x)),$$

and from $j\colon (Neverthirsty(x) \rightarrow Drinks(x, w'))$ (cf. Part 2, line 2) it follows (with a bit of s's evidence of propositional logic) that

$$((s \cdot s) \cdot j)\,{::}\,(HumanInTown(x) \rightarrow Drinks(x, w')).$$

Obviously, from

$$s\colon (Drinks(x, w') \rightarrow Gives(j, x, w'))$$

we can derive (again, on the ground of s's evidence of propositional reasoning)

$$((s \cdot ((s \cdot s) \cdot j)) \cdot s)\,{::}\,(HumanInTown(x) \rightarrow Gives(j, x, w')).$$

Now, according to $\mathbf{D}\forall$, we conclude:

$$\mathrm{gen}_x(((s \cdot ((s \cdot s) \cdot j)) \cdot s))\,{::}\,\forall x(HumanInTown(x) \rightarrow Gives(j, x, w')).$$

In distinction to John 3 (a conversation with Nicodemus), we see how through the complexity of the agents' interconnections and during the progress of resolving contradictions and of gaining knowledge, the agents become "reborn" in the "water" of the dialogue and "in Spirit".

At the same time, we see how metaphysical concepts, especially the concepts of self, world and God, if approached from a religious veiwpoint, could obtain a sort of objective reality beyond the realm of sensible objects.

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