

# EXISTENTIA

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"τί ποτε βούλεσθε σημαίνειν ὅποταν  
»ὄν« φθέγγησθε."

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*John W.M. Krummel*

SPATIALITY  
IN THE LATER HEIDEGGER:  
TURNING – CLEARING – LETTING



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## SPATIALITY IN THE LATER HEIDEGGER: TURNING – CLEARING – LETTING

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### INTRODUCTION

**W**hen one speaks of Heidegger, the relation of being to time or temporality is what idately comes to mind. And yet the significance of spatiality and place in Heidegger's ontology has attracted the attention of some scholars in the recent decades, especially in his existential hermeneutic and analytic of the human "being-(t)here" (*Dasein*) of the period up to 1929.<sup>1</sup> During that early period however spatiality plays a subordinate role to the ontological primacy of temporality. In this paper I would like to show that it is really in the later periods that we see in

<sup>1</sup> For example on spatiality in the early (1920s) Heidegger, see the following: Yoko ARISAKA, "Heidegger's Theory of Space: A Critique of Dreyfus," in *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 38, no. 4 (December, 1995), pp. 455-467; Y. ARISAKA, "Spatiality, Temporality, and the Problem of Foundation in *Being and Time*," in *Philosophy Today*, vol. 40, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 36-46; Edward CASEY, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997); E. CASEY, *Getting Back into Place: Toward Renewed Understanding of the Place-World* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1993); Hubert DREYFUS, *Being-in-the-World, a Commentary on Heidegger's «Being and Time» Division I* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991); Robert FRODEMAN, "Being and Space: A Re-Reading of Existential Spatiality in *Being and Time*," in *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 23, no. 1 (January 1992); Jeff MALPAS, "Uncovering the Space of Disclosedness: Heidegger, Technology, and the Problem of Spatiality in *Being and Time*" in *Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity*, vol. 1, ed. by Mark A. Wrathall and Jaff Malpas (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Maria VILLELA-PETTIT, "Heidegger's Conception of Space" in *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments*, vol. 1, ed. by Christopher Macann (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 117-140; Tetsuro WATSUJI, *A Climate: A Philosophical Study* (Tokyo: Japanese Government, 1961).

For discussions of spatiality in Heidegger's later (post-1929/30) works, see the following: Stuart ELDEN, "Heidegger's Hölderlin and the Importance of Place," in *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 30, no. 3 (October 1999); S. ELDEN, *Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History* (London: Continuum, 2001); S. ELDEN, "The Place of Geometry: Heidegger's Mathematical Excursus on Aristotle," in *Heythrop Journal*, Vol. XLII, no. 3 (July 2001); Friedrich-Wilhelm VON HERMANN, "Topology and Topography of Nihilism: From the Debate Between Ernst Jünger and Martin Heidegger," in *Online Originals*, 2005 (<http://www.onlineoriginals.com/show-item.asp?itemID=287&articleID=13>); William KLUBACK and Jean WILDE, "An Ontological Consideration of Place," in Heidegger, *The Question of Being*, trans. by William Kluback and Jean Wilde (New Haven, CT: College & UP, 1958); George F. SEFLER, "Heidegger's Philosophy of Space," in *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 17, no. 3/4 (Fall 1973), pp. 246-254; Eliza STEELWATER, "Mead and Heidegger: Exploring the Ethics and Theory of Space, Place, and the Environment," in *Philosophy and Geography I: Space, Place, and Environmental Ethics*, ed. by Andrew Light and Johnathan M. Smith (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Pub., 1997); Georg Christoph THOLEN, "Einschnitte: Zur Topologie des offenen Raumes bei Heidegger" (<http://waste.informatik.hu-berlin.de/mtg/archiv/tholen.htm>); Alejandro A. VALLEGA, *Heidegger and the Issue of Space: Thinking on Exilic Grounds* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 2003).

ἄλλει τὸν Πέρση ἀντίπαλό  
κρατεῖ ἀσπίδα μὲ ἔμβλημα  
μα, ἀναξυρίδες, φρυγικὸ  
δα) καὶ φαρέτρα.  
, Βασιλικὸ Μουσεῖο).

Heidegger signs of a greater appreciation for the ontological significance of spatiality. We see this especially in the post-1930 developments of his earlier notion of an unconcealing "opening"—and its various versions—that establishes worlds and implaces man in an environment of dwelling. The later thinking moves beyond any alleged temporocentrism of his works (primarily *Sein und Zeit*) of the 1920s. In today's global age, when a plurality of identities clash and merge amidst mutual *others*, a recognition of the ontological significance of spatiality—the "space" of our inter-relations and mutual distinctions, the opening wherein "worlds" and "horizons" of being unfold—is incumbent. In this respect, Heidegger's thinking in regard to this matter may have something to contribute to our own ways of being and ways of thinking about being today.

Region, *πόλις*, world-earth, the fourfold, nearness and farness, home and homelessness, the uncanny, journeying and locality, topology, place, and a variety of other "spatial" motifs, make themselves manifest in Heidegger's later attempts to think being. This begins with the idea of "the open" or "clearing" that is parallel to, inseparable from, the temporality of unconcealment. Towards the end of his career in 1969 Heidegger tells us that his thinking has moved from the "meaning of being" to the "truth of being" and finally to the "place of being". By looking, in the context of that statement, into the "spatial" motifs that become pronounced in Heidegger's post-1930 works, this paper shall examine what one may call the "spatiality" of being in Heidegger's later periods.

This move to a greater appreciation of spatiality, I believe, has much to do with his complex notion of "the turn" or "turning" (*die Kehre*) as well as with his so-called "shift" (*Wendung*) in his thinking that turned to that "turning" during the 1930s. This connection between the "spatial" in Heidegger, his shifts in thinking, and that very concept of the "turn"—relations not necessarily made thematically explicit by Heidegger himself—has yet to be elaborated upon by commentators examining the significance of spatiality in Heidegger. In discussing the significance of spatiality in Heidegger's later works, I will thus explicate its connection to his so-called shift in thinking and to his conception of the turning. That shift made in the 1930s was a move that converted his attention away from the human existential hermeneutic and more directly to the structure of the very matter of thought itself.<sup>2</sup> My contention is that this shift in thinking was a move *beyond* his earlier examination of the horizon (*Horizont*) (i. e., time) required for the projections referring to the sense/meaning (*Sinn*) of being. Furthermore this shift, moving *beyond* the horizon of time as the meaning of being, was a move *towards* a "space"—variously discussed in terms of the open, the clearing, the expanse, the region, etc.—that *allows for* such horizontal projection in the first place. The very "matter of thought" that becomes discussed in the 1930s *Beiträge* as "the turning" of "en-ownment" (*Ereignis*) involves this opening or clearing (*Lichtung*) of a "space" in the strife of unconcealment-concealment. This in turn underscores the very *alterity* from out of which the emission of the *Sinn* of being is possible, that is, an alterity pointing *beyond* the horizon and *to* the opening expanse. In other words, this shift, in pointing to that spatiality of being, radicalizes Heidegger's anti-subjectivism. In the 1940s and 50s this spatialization becomes further developed in terms of a "regionalizing" (*Gegnen*) in explicit distinction from the "horizon". The implications in all of this for human spatiality, i. e., our receptivity *vis-à-vis* the alterity of *Ereignis* or *Gegnen*, is moreover made explicit in Heidegger's discussions in terms of "letting" (*Lassen*) or "releasement" (*Gelassenheit*). Through these forays from the 1930s to the 1950s and on, Heidegger's thinking touches

<sup>2</sup> This "turn" that Heidegger makes historically in his thinking, from the "early Heidegger" to the "later Heidegger" is *Wendung* rather than *Kehre*. Despite the common misunderstanding that employs *Kehre* to designate this historical shift in his thinking, *Kehre* rather refers to the very matter of that thinking to which his thought turned, that is, the very "turning", a reciprocity or reversal, involved in the unfolding of being for man's being-(t)here: "Das Denken der Kehre *ist* eine Wendung in meinem Denken." ("The thinking of the turning [reversal] *is* a turn [change, shift] in my thinking...") [RL xxiiic/xxiiig] See Heidegger's letter of 1962 to William Richardson, which is included as the preface to RICHARDSON'S *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (NYC: Fordham UP, 2003, 1963) in bilingual form, referred to here as RL followed e for the English and g for the German page.

nificance of spatiality. We notion of an unconcealing implaces man in an environment of temporocentrism of his being, when a plurality of identities and ontological significance of his being, the opening wherein respect, Heidegger's thinking is about our own ways of being and

ess, home and homeless—a variety of other “spatial” ways to think being. This begins comparable from, the tempo-Heidegger tells us that his way of being” and finally to the “spatial” motifs that we shall examine what one

has much to do with his common so-called “shift” (*Wendung*). This connection between the concept of the “turn”—relating to himself—has yet to be examined in terms of spatiality in Heidegger. In the next sections, I will thus explicate its nature in the turning. That shift in thinking after the human existential manner of thought itself.<sup>2</sup> My earlier examination of the turning to the sense/meaning dimension of time as the meaning of the open, the horizontal projection in the text of the 1930s *Beiträge* as well as clearing (*Lichtung*) of the turn underscores the very possibility, that is, an alterity in words, this shift, in point-of-view. In the 1940s and “regionalizing” (*Gegnen*) in the text of this for human spatiality, is moreover made explicit as “releasement” (*Gelassenheit*). Heidegger's thinking touches

in the “early Heidegger” to the misunderstanding that employs refers to the very matter of that reciprocity or reversal, involved in the text *ist eine Wendung in meinem Denken [shift] in my thinking...*) [Richard is included as the preface to *Heidegger: A Collection of Essays*: Fordham UP, 2003, 1963] in the German page.

upon what I see as an ontological excess environing man to spatially constitute his being while unfolding *via* a temporal dynamic.

The aim of this paper then is to look into what Heidegger's 1930s shift to the turning of being and the ensuing later developments in his thinking of the 1940s and beyond, implies in regard to spatiality, and how this affects his understanding of the human relation to being. My intention however is not to simply reverse the sense of priority from temporality to spatiality. For Heidegger, e.g. in the *Beiträge*, rather comes to view the ontological movements of spatializing and temporalizing to be an inseparable one-fold of “time-space” (*Zeit-raum*). The spatializing (opening, clearing, regionalizing) itself is an occurrence of temporal happening (event).

For our purpose, we need to first familiarize ourselves with the significance of the so-called “turning” (of the “enowning event,” *Ereignis*) that underlies the “shift” in Heidegger's thinking. This will be the topic of the first section. I shall then discuss the spatiality this implies with a focus upon Heidegger's conceptions of the open or the clearing and of the region. Section two will look at what Heidegger calls the “openness” implied in the turning; section three will explore Heidegger's characterization of the open's opening as a “clearing”; and section four will examine Heidegger's discussions of that clearing-turning in terms of the “regionalizing of the region”. We will then discuss in the final section Heidegger's conceptions of “freedom”, “letting”, and “releasement” in the face of the “overwhelming” “excess” of being. This will allow me to inquire into what Heidegger's spatial thematics of being examined in the previous sections tells us about man's finite spatiality *vis-à-vis* that spatializing (as well as temporalizing) event of being. Aside from these motifs of turning, openness, clearing, region, and letting, there are many other concepts in the later Heidegger that bring out this spatiality of being, some of which I listed above. However for the sake of conciseness and length, I shall confine myself to the discussions of these five themes.

## 1. TURNING<sup>3</sup>

To fully understand the significance of the “open” (*Offen*) and its spatiality in Heidegger's post-1930 works, we need to first take note of its complex relation to “the turn” (*die Kehre*) and how this relates to Heidegger's so-called “shift” (*Wendung*) in thinking from his earlier to later works. For several decades until recently much of Heidegger scholarship have assumed that what Heidegger meant by “turn” (*Kehre*) was identical to his own historical shift (*Wendung*) in thinking—i. e., from the so-called “earlier Heidegger” to the so-called “later Heidegger”—that purportedly took place during the 1930s. However with the recent and long awaited publication in the late 1980s of the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Contributions to Philosophy)*, which he had worked on during the mid-to-late 1930s, this misunderstanding has been corrected by many commentators. The “turn” itself is not to be identified with any historical change in his thought. Rather it is the very “matter of thought” (*Sache des Denkens*) itself, to which Heidegger's thinking has shifted its focus during the 1930s. And the shift in thinking's focus to this very matter, as the thinking of being—in a two-folded significance of the genitive *of*—, is itself to be understood as instigated by the “turning” of being. In other words being turns thinking to think this very turning as the matter to be thought. With such an idea Heidegger thus inscribes that very shift in thinking within the historical occurrence of being itself. This has also much to do with Heidegger's key concept of *Ereignis*, the “enowning event” of being. In this section I shall examine what Heidegger means by “turning” in relation to “enowning” and his “shift” in thinking. This will prepare us for an examination of the “open” in the next section and on to the spatiality of being in Heidegger's post-1930 works.

<sup>3</sup> My understanding of the meanings of *Kehre* and *Wendung* is indebted to the readings by Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad in their introduction to their translation of Heidegger's *Beiträge* and in their essays in *Companion to Heidegger's «Contributions to Philosophy»*, ed. by Scott, Schoenbohm, Vellega-Neu, and Vallega, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 2001); and also by Friedrich-Wilhelm von HERMANN's *Wege ins Ereignis: Zu Heideggers „Beiträgen zur Philosophie“* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1994).

To speak in Heideggerian language, in opening the open, being-(t)here (i. e., human existence, *Dasein*) is itself opened up within the open. Heidegger develops his conception of the open in the *Beiträge* in terms of a “turning” that is ultimately not man’s doing, but *of, by,* and *in* being—or “beyng” (*Seyn*) as spelled according to its archaic form.<sup>4</sup> This underscores man’s receptivity *vis-à-vis* the alterity *of* and *in* what Heidegger calls “the open”. That is, in opening, constructing, constituting, the world, human beings are themselves constituted, “thrown” into the situation they find themselves in. I shall further discuss the meaning of “the open” in the following section. For now let me concentrate on the “turn”. In order to understand Heidegger’s alleged shift in thinking during that time-period (1930s, from the “earlier” to the “later” Heidegger), we need to turn our attention to that very “turning” to which his thinking turns.<sup>5</sup> What Heidegger during this period views to be at stake in his thinking of the turn is the very relationship between man and being that enhances or unfolds what is ownmost to man in light of the understanding of being as unconcealment. (see GFP 214/BQP 181)<sup>6</sup> That is, the shift in his attention to what he calls “the turn”, is a shift in focus to what occurs ontologically as the “enowning event” (*Ereignis*), the happening of being as unconcealment, unconcealing beings by bringing them into their “own” and “en-owning” man into his own destiny, opening up his “(t)here” (*Da*).<sup>7</sup> On this basis Heidegger’s previous terminology of ontological difference and transcendence collapses. The task is no longer to *transcend* or surpass beings to being, beingness, or the world (“the horizon”) in light of which beings appear. Instead the task is to inquire into its very *happening* as enowning, its “truth” (i. e., unconcealment, ἀλήθεια, *aletheia*) and its clearing (i. e., its *aletheic* opening), its temporalizing and spatializing occurrence.<sup>8</sup> (B 250-51/C 177)<sup>9</sup>

Such an inquiry, for Heidegger, corresponds to one’s own “releasement” in the enowning event, a *letting* of one’s belongingness to it (being *as* enowning) in contrast to any willing-appropriation (“owning”) of it on one’s part. (B 227/C 161) For being as beyng—uniquely singular<sup>10</sup> in its happening and intrinsically self-hiding as *other*—cannot be conceptually appropriated or grasped, it is neither representable as object nor manipulable as tool. (see

<sup>4</sup> This is Heidegger’s preferred spelling of being in his *Beiträge*, taking *being qua beyng* here as the non-objectifiable and non-entitative “event of enowning” (*Ereignis*).

<sup>5</sup> Indulgence in such word-play however is however not meant obscure the very important distinction in meaning between the “turn” (*Kehre*) and Heidegger’s historical “shift” (*Wendung*) in thinking that I briefly discussed in the previous paragraph. Ontologically the turn is more primordial and cannot be dated. It is the very matter to which Heidegger’s thinking shifts its glance during the 1930s.

<sup>6</sup> GFP stands for Heidegger, *Grundfragen der Philosophie* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1984); and BQP is its English translation, *Basic Questions of Philosophy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1994). This text is of lectures from winter 1937-38.

<sup>7</sup> *Ereignis* is a key word in Heidegger’s thinking of the 1930s. In colloquial use, *Ereignis* means “event”. The term has thus been variously translated as “appropriation”, “the event of appropriation”, or “enowning”, and may be understood as connoting an event that brings something into its “own” or “proper” domain. In Heidegger it designates the fundamental historical occurrence of being in its unfolding, as the emergence of beings into their own. But this event necessarily retains the sense of a uniqueness and singularity of happening that escapes conceptualization in its immediately withdrawal for the sake of what (i. e. beings) it grants. As such it precludes appropriation or “owning” by man. By *Ereignis* Heidegger then does not mean that man “owns” being or “owns” even his own being but rather that man’s being is “appropriated” or “enowned” (*ereignet*) by being in this very event. Etymologically, the term also has the sense of “bringing into view”. Hence for Heidegger *Ereignis* has the sense of an occurrence that brings something into the open, which he often speaks of as the opening of the open. *Ereignis* then is the event of this opening. See Thomas SHEEHAN’s discussion of this topic in his “A Paradigm Shift In Heidegger Research,” in *Continental Philosophy Review*, vol. 34, no. 2 (June 2001), pp. 196-198.

<sup>8</sup> More on truth *qua* openness, unconcealment, and ἀλήθεια; and on clearing in the following two sections.

<sup>9</sup> Martin HEIDEGGER, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis)* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1994, 1989) referred to as B; translated as *Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning)* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1999) referred to as C. We shall speak more on this *aletheic* opening in a section below.

<sup>10</sup> That is, “singular” in the sense of being utterly unique, irrepeatable. “Beyng” in that sense can never be reduced to being a conceptual universal or to something a-temporal and non-spatial.

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B 252/C 178) The shift in thinking's focus to that which is utterly inconceivable in its alterity and singularity then happens not on the basis of man's will but on the basis of, or rather *as*, an "originary" ontological turning that is this very enowning event.<sup>11</sup> In other words it is not really instigated by one's *own* thinking at all. (see RL xviii, xxe) The shift in thinking then must be ontologically grounded upon the turning of enowning. What is underscored here is man's *belonging to beyng*, his thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) into and implacement *within* its opening. This is the sense behind what Heidegger means by "the turn".

Heidegger discusses this originary turning as a relationship of a "counter-turning" (or: "re-turning") (*Widerkehr*). The "counter-turning" is a "turning-relation" (or "reciprocal-relatedness"; *kehriger Bezug*), *between* "the call" (*Zuruf*) or "throw" (*Zuwurf*) of beyng on the one hand, *and the belonging* (*Zugehören*) of the one called or thrown on the other hand. Heidegger also describes this as the reciprocity *between beyng's need* (*Brauchen*) of man and man's *belonging to beyng*. (see B 7/C 6) *Beyng calls to man, throws him, so that his destiny may be accomplished as being-(t)here (Da-sein) and in turn man thus belongs to beyng.*<sup>12</sup> (B 251/C 177, B 407/C 287) That is, beyng as enowning "en-owns" (or: *a-proprieates; er-eignet*)<sup>13</sup> man as the "(t)here" of this very enowning event whereby beings are unconcealed. And in turn man as being-(t)here is "en-owned" (*a-proprieated*), belonging to beyng in its unfolding-enowning. Heidegger thus grasps this enowning-enowned turning-relationship between beyng and man's being-(t)here as a "counter-resonance" (*Gegenschwung*)—between the enowning call (*ereignendem Zuruf*) (*by and of beyng*) and the enowned projecting (*ereignetem Entwurf*) (*by and of being-(t)here*)—happening *in and of beyng as the enowning event itself.*<sup>14</sup> And he calls this reciprocity "the turning in enowning" (*die Kehre im Ereignis*). (B 407/C 286) The term *Ereignis* thus signifies for Heidegger the occurrence („er-“) of a coordination („-eignis“) in the unity of man's being-(t)here and the whole of presencing in a singular transitory spatial-temporal configuration. Man's ownmost mode of being is thus to heed the call of beyng, to be thrown, even as he makes projections, opens worlds, to give meaning to being.

In one's projection (*Entwurf*) that opens up the truth of beyng—i. e., gives form to ontological configurations and shape the world or horizon of meaning —, one's own being-(t)here itself is already *thrown*, thus *enowned by*, and *belonging to*, beyng as this enowning-throwing event. (B 239/C 169, B 304/C 214) Far from being an accomplishment of human subjectivity or of a human appropriation or "owning" of being, the enowning event means that it is man himself who, thrown, is en-owned, a-proprieated, in belonging-to, beyng. Being-ownmost to one's being then is to be en-owned *vis-à-vis* the othermost rather than to own. As mentioned in the introduction, this is a further radicalizing development of Heidegger's anti-subjectivism. The resulting shift in thought, far from "humanizing" beyng or taking being anthropomorphically, understands being as *beyng* explicitly in its *alterity* as en-owning one's self.<sup>15</sup>

Such thinking that responds, in its shift, to beyng's turning hence is no longer transcen- dental-ontological thinking, a thinking no longer limited in its reference by a horizon for the projection of the meaning of being. Instead Heidegger calls it "beyng-historical think- ing" (*seynsgeschichtliches Denken*), a way of thinking that happens in corresponding-reso- nance with beyng in its en-owning event. It is a thinking whose projection—as accompa- nied by its thrownness—is enowned by the enowning-throw (*ereignender Zuwurf*) of beyng *so that it may think beyng*. But what does this mean? The horizon of being is now taken as placed *within* the purview of, encompassed *within*, this very matter of beyng-historical

<sup>11</sup> See Kenneth MALY, Turnings in Essential Swaying and the Leap, in Companion to Heidegger's «Contributions to Philosophy», op. cit., p. 157; and von Herrmann, Wege ins Ereignis: Zu Heideggers »Beiträgen zur Philosophie«, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

<sup>12</sup> On this see Maly, op. cit., p. 158, and also Parvis Emad, On 'Be-ing': The Last Part of «Contributions to Philosophy», op. cit., p. 235.

<sup>13</sup> That is, brings him *into his own*. See above footnote on *Ereignis*.

<sup>14</sup> On this, see von Herrmann, op. cit., pp. 18-19; and also Maly, op. cit., p. 158.

<sup>15</sup> As we shall see in the following sections and especially in the final section, this has implications for the spatiality of human existence as well.

thinking: beyng as *Ereignis* in its turning-relation to man's being-(t)here. Being (or beyng) and its happening encompasses to make-possible the happening of being-human, including man's very thinking of being (*qua* beyng). I believe that we may take the spatial metaphors that appear in Heidegger's works after this shift to beyng-historical thinking—whether the spatiality of the opening of the world on the one hand or of the receptivity of human embodiment on the other hand —, in their variety of expressions, to ultimately refer to this character of the happening of beyng *qua Ereignis*, in its *Kehre*, that relates to man's being.

This turning-relation entails an open expanse or region into which one's being-(t)here is thrown and opened. Into its abyss one is thrown to ground, and in its darkness one is called to clear. Heidegger tells us that, in being thrown, man's being-(t)here is enjoined to play the role of a "preserver" or "herder" (*Wahrer*) as "the grounded grounder of the ground" (*der gegründeter Gründer des Grundes*). (B 239/C 169, B 304/C 214) To ground, in Heidegger's significance, means to build things to shape the space of their opening, to construct the world wherein one dwells—whether it be in art, politics, education, culture, etc. And to do so is to heed one's ownmost destiny and make it happen (*ποιήσις*). In being-enowned one's being-(t)here is enabled and called upon to secure the open, or preserve a place, for the *aletheic* configuration of the enowning event. However in grounding, shaping, building the open, man must face the very excess of an otherness that overwhelms and displaces him from the familiarity of the day-to-day. Grounding can happen only in the face of the ungrounded abyss. Only *vis-à-vis* the excess alterity that unlocks new possibilities, can man's being-(t)here thus serve to ground. Thrown into this abysmal expanse with its overwhelming excess that displaces but summons, man as being-(t)here projects and opens the world to ground as the (t)here of *ἀλήθεια*. Thrown into the open expanse, man is summoned to shape the open into a place of dwelling. All of this occurs in the turning of beyng in its relation to man, beyng's enowning of the human being-(t)here. The shift in thought to beyng-historical thinking would thus be man's reciprocal turning to this turning of beyng. What we notice here on the part of beyng's turning is an intrinsic connection between the alterity of beyng, its abyss, and its spatiality, its excess, that also serves constitute man's own being as spatially finitized. Heidegger discusses this spatiality throughout his later works in terms of "the open" and its "openness". This continues their usage from his earlier fundamental ontology but now accompanied by a heightened ontological sense of a spatiality that is equi-originary to temporality. This ontological spatiality also becomes characterized in terms of clearing and eventually regionalizing. To these spatial motifs we now turn in the following sections.

## 2. OPENING

The shift in thought understood in terms of the originary turning implicates a new view to spatiality, a spatiality uncontainable within its horizontal guidance by time. For the project-horizon of being as time in the earlier (1920s) existential analytic, from the later (1930s) perspective of the *Beiträge*, is inscribed within the *broader* and *deeper* expanse that encompasses *Sinn* in that counter-turning of enowning we discussed above. Later, especially in the 1950s, this becomes further developed in terms of the topological unfoldings of being in place as well as in the "regionalizing" of "region". May we not then perhaps speak of the *Kehre* as the self-inversion of an open expanse that turns man's being-(t)here to that very open, wherein man is implaced as (t)here, thus enabling and calling his being-(t)here to clear it open from out of the dark, to ground and shape its formless abyss? The turning for Heidegger implies this opening that, by withdrawing into obscurity, makes-room and delimits an open space for human dwelling and for the presencing of beings. This opening hence unfolds a spatial thematic in the dynamic of turning-enowning. The turning as a reciprocity implies the spatiality of "the open" and its opening.

Heidegger's shift in thinking was a move away from the focus upon the mortality of human existence as providing the horizon of being and towards a broader view to that open expanse that being-(t)here is called upon to face. This shift that shall led Heidegger to the thematics of

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region and place—but understood differently than in *Sein und Zeit*—was occasioned during the 1930s through a transitional look to “truth” as the very opening of unconcealment. We hear Heidegger describing this shift as having involved three periods or steps when, towards the end of his career, in his 1969 seminar at Le Thor, he takes a retrospective view to the paths he had taken. He comments that the turns and shifts in his thinking has involved three main periods, each with its major themes in the formulation of the question of being *qua* being: the question of “the sense/meaning (*Sinn*) of being”, the question of “the truth (*Wahrheit*) of being”, and the question of “the place (*Ort*) of being”.<sup>16</sup> (VS 344g/FS 46-47) The focus upon the meaning of being in *Sein und Zeit* had to do with the very horizon (a “project domain”, *Entwurfsbereich*) (VS 345/FS 47) of the projection of meanings in our understanding (*Verstehen*) of being. This focus, in its formulation, however tends to turn one's gaze to the subjective and/or the transcendental in a quasi-Kantian (or Neo-Kantian)<sup>17</sup> sense at the expense of the concrete. This was far from Heidegger's own intention and the problem had to do more with the terminology used in the formulation of the issue rather than the matter itself. (see PLW 110/WM 357/PM 271)<sup>18</sup> As Heidegger himself explains, “What is inappropriate in this formulation of the question is that it makes it all too possible to understand the ‘projection’ [*Entwurf*] as a human performance,” so that “projection is...only taken to be a structure of subjectivity... .” (VS 335/FS 40) To overcome subjectivizing and transcendentalizing tendencies that would mis-take what is meant by “horizon”, Heidegger shifts his emphasis from the structure of our human being-(t)here to what he considers to be the very matter of thought itself, the structure of being, its en-owning that opens, enowns, man's (t)here, as we discussed in the previous section above. We may understand this shift in thinking as a move *towards*—and if this shift is understood in light of the originary turning we discussed above, it may be understood as a self-inverting (turning) move *of*—the open, the very (t)here, as the *Sache selbst* (the matter itself), the *Es* (“it”) that gives being. The receptivity of human existence is here highlighted in our implacement within the open in the midst of beings. And so even while retaining the meaning of “projection” as the *opening* of unconcealment, after *Sein und Zeit* in the 1930s, Heidegger replaces the expression of “sense/meaning of being” (*Sinn von Sein*) with “truth of being” (*Wahrheit des Seins*) as the unconcealment that is the openness of being itself (*die Offenheit des Seins selbst*) rather than openness as a sole accomplishment of man's being-(t)here. Heidegger explains this in the 1969 Le Thor seminar as signifying what he means by “the turn” (*die Kehre*). (VS 345/FS 47) He goes-on to tell us, however, that in order to avoid any falsification of its sense, “truth” as the openness of being, in turn, had to be explained by the “locality of being” (*Ortschaft des Seins*), presupposing a comprehension of the “place-being of place” (*Ortseins des Ortes*) or the placiality of being (*Örtlichkeit des Seins*) in terms of a “topology of beyng” (*Topologie des Seyns*). (VS 335/FS 41; see also AED 84/PLT 12)<sup>19</sup> In other words, the openness of unconcealment is topological. Hence the shift from his earlier temporocentrism of the 1920s

<sup>16</sup> „Drei Worte, die, indem sie einander ablösen, gleichzeitig drei Schritte auf dem Weg des Denkens bezeichnen: Sinn – Wahrheit – Ort (τόπος).” “Three words, which while replacing one another, simultaneously indicate three steps along the way of thinking: Sense/Meaning—Truth—Place (τόπος).” (VS 344/FS 47) Martin HEIDEGGER, *Vier Seminare in Seminare* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1986) identified as VS, translated as *Four Seminars* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 2003) identified as FS.

<sup>17</sup> One might say that Heidegger's whole philosophical project from his earliest periods was motivated by his response to Neo-Kantianism (and the thoughts of his Neo-Kantian teachers) and the attempt to overcome the Neo-Kantian hylo-morphic dualism and transcendentalism. Especially the notion of the “meaning” (*Sinn*) of being as opposed to the entitative or the objective (i. e., beings and objects) was a development of, and inheritance from, Neo-Kantian ideas, such as of Heinrich Rickert and Emil Lask.

<sup>18</sup> PLW stands for Martin HEIDEGGER, *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit mit einem Brief über den “Humanismus”* (Bern: Verlag A. Francke AG., 1947) in which *Brief über den Humanismus* appears. It also appears in Martin HEIDEGGER, *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976) [WM], and its English translation “Letter on Humanism” appears in Martin HEIDEGGER, *Pathmarks* (Cambridge UP, 1998).

<sup>19</sup> AED identifies Martin HEIDEGGER, *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 1910-1976* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983), also published as *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1965). The pagination refers to the Klostermann publication. PLT is for *Poetry, Language, Thought* (NYC: Harper & Row, 1971). See also his *Die Kunst und der Raum*, in *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (Klostermann, pp. 203ff), translated as “Art and Space”, *Man and World* vol. 6, no. 1 (Feb, 1973), pp. 3-8.



was a move away from the emphasis on the meaning of being—in terms of projection and the horizon of projection—and instead towards truth as unconcealment and then to place (as well as region), the topology of being. The shift is from the focus on the horizon of being as time to a broader view to the expanse, i. e., “spatiality”, of the opening of being.

With this loosening of temporocentrism, we notice in his later works a variety of spatial motifs making their way into the center-stage of Heidegger’s thinking as he pursues the possibility of thinking being apart from “the sole basis of time”. But even prior to *Sein und Zeit*, in his 1925-26 lectures on logic (*Logik: die Frage nach der Wahrheit*), Heidegger commented: “I do not want to be absolutely dogmatic and assert that one can understand being only on the basis of time. Perhaps someday a new possibility will be discovered.”<sup>20</sup> (LFW 267) This statement is significant in light of the later developments in his thinking and especially in light of his 1962 admission in “Zeit und Sein” (“Time and Being”) of the untenability of his earlier attempt (*Sein und Zeit*, sec. 70) to trace spatiality back to temporality. (ZSD 24/OTB 23)<sup>21</sup> Before this admission of failure to show the foundational temporality of spatiality, Heidegger raises the question of *where* time is and whether time has a *place*.<sup>22</sup> (ZSD 12/OTB 11) And at the end of this lecture Heidegger states that while being and time can each be thought only in their “mutual en-owning”, the relation of space (*Raum*) to the event of en-ownment (*Ereignis*) must also be analogously thought. (ZSD 23-24/OTB 22-23) Heidegger tells us here that we ought to gain insight into and thoroughly think through the origin of space (*Raum*) in light of place (*Ort*). (ZSD 24/OTB 23) “Place” as such—and “region” which we shall discuss below—however is no longer confined to the placiality of the available-handly (*zuhanden*) nor solely founded upon the temporality of being-towards-death as it was in *Sein und Zeit*. Spatiality in its originary significance now appears in its own right together with time as the abysmal *opening* of enowning that Heidegger in the *Beiträge* designates “time-space”.

Heidegger explicates the notion of openness earlier in his *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (“The Essence of Truth”) (from 1930 and reworked in 1943). Man’s standing-open of comportment (*Offenständigkeit des Verhaltens*) involves a reciprocity. On the one hand there is the presencing of beings and their being-set-up against man within “an open opposedness” (*ein offenes Entgegen*) in the sense of an open region (“the open”, *das Offene*). And on the other hand there is man’s receptive engagement *vis-à-vis* those presencing beings, an openness *towards* those things opened within the open. The reciprocity is between these two: the open and one’s openness to it. All comportment (*Verhalten*) on man’s part involves his standing in this open and receptively adhering to what is thus made manifest (or “opened up”) (*Offenbares*) within it. Comportment thus means standing-open to beings (“the opened”) while standing-in the open. (WM 184/PM 141) The very possibility of truth (*Wahrheit*) in the epistemological sense as correspondence (between knower and known, subject and object) then presupposes comportment as such, i. e., one’s being-open (“being-free”) for “what is opened up within an open [region]” (*das Offenbare eines Offenen*).<sup>23</sup> (WM 186/PM 142) The ultimate referent then is the very open wherein correlations are made possible. Heidegger states in 1942 that on the basis of this open, the world *qua* “beings as a whole” is thus opened up to man.<sup>24</sup> (HHI 26g/23e) The “openness of the open” (*die Offenheit des*

<sup>20</sup> „...[I]ch will nicht so absolut dogmatisch sein und behaupten, man könnte Sein nur aus der Zeit verstehen, vielleicht entdeckt morgen einer eine neue Möglichkeiten.” (LFW 267) LFW identifies Martin HEIDEGGER, *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976).

<sup>21</sup> Of course whether that really was the original intent of *Sein und Zeit* sec. 70 may be questioned. ZSD identifies *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1988), which includes the lecture “Zeit und Sein”. The English translation is *On Time And Being*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (NYC: Harper & Row, Inc., 1972), identified by OTB. The lecture is translated as “Time and Being”.

<sup>22</sup> “Wo aber ist die Zeit? Ist sie überhaupt und hat sie einen Ort?” (“But where is time? Is time at all and does it have a place?”) (ZSD 12/OTB 11).

<sup>23</sup> „...Freisein zum Offenbaren eines Offenen.” (WM 186)

<sup>24</sup> HHI with g following the pagination is for, Martin HEIDEGGER, *Hölderlins Hymne „Der Ister”* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1984); and with e following the pagination is for the English translation, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister”* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1996).

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*Offenen*), the open “region”, is what articulates itself or “fits” (*fügt sich*), determines itself, into “a world” (*eine Welt*), and to which the (t)here of man’s being-(t)here is in “a relationship of standing-open” (*offenständiger Bezug*).<sup>25</sup> (EHD 64/EHP 86)

The move away from any semblance of a foundational power ascribed to subjectivity in the structure of human existence is radicalized in Heidegger’s shift towards that openness as the ontological expanse—broader than the project-horizon—that self-withdraws and exceeds human comprehension even as it gives being and draws man into its opening to take-part in shaping its openness. What then happens to the notion of being-(t)here (*Dasein*) so significant to Heidegger’s earlier analytic of human existence? It becomes understood explicitly in light of this open expanse that it is called to shape. The focus is not so much on the temporal horizon of one’s projections as the structuring of one’s *own* existence but rather on the *where* wherein one’s being-(t)here is thrown—the opening of the (t)here as the very site (*Stätte*) of un-concealment (*ἀ-λήθεια*). The important point is that this opening of the (t)here is not the achievement of the spontaneous faculties of subjectivity. Our ownmost being is in that sense *not* really our *own*—for it is we ourselves that are *owned* in the turning of the en-owning event. Being-(t)here is not one’s possession but an occurrence that possesses one as *ex-sisting always already within* the open. In ex-static openness to what is *beyond* one’s self, one’s will, despite oneself, one is broken-out into the open (*ausgebrochen ist ins Offene*). (B 310/C 218) In his *Brief über den Humanismus* (“Letter on Humanism”) Heidegger calls this openness on our part, an “ecstatic standing-in [or: taking-a-stance, inherence] within the truth of being” (*ekstatischen Innestehens in der Wahrheit des Seins*). (PLW 69/WM 325/PM 248) And in his Nietzsche lectures, he calls it an “ecstatic standing-in [*ekstatische Innestehen*] in the open of the locality of being [*Offenen der Ortschaft des Seins*].”<sup>26</sup> (NII 358/n4 218) All of this underscores the spatiality of man’s being-(t)here as standing-out and standing-in in the openness, the (t)here, of being.

Towards the end of his second book-length reading of Kant from 1935-36, a few years prior to working out his *Beiträge*, Heidegger explicates that openness of being-(t)here as the *between* (*Zwischen*) of man and thing, that stretches *beyond* the thing and *behind* its knower. (FND 245-46/WIT 243-44)<sup>27</sup> He explains that the epistemological subject-object connection can be established in cognition only insofar as there is the reaching-out to what is *other* than one’s self in the very *place* where the object (*Gegen-stand*) stands-against (*gegen-stehen*) oneself, in an anticipation (*Vorgriff*) that embraces *beyond* the thing and *behind* ourselves. (FND 245/WIT 243) The ultimate reference here of such anticipation then would have to be the very realm of that encounter, where-into we are *thrown*. And in 1937-38 Heidegger characterizes that opening as an ungrounded space (*ungegründete Raum*), wherein the very distinction between being and non-being becomes decided. (GFP 152-53/BQP 132-33) Opened up therein man finds himself in the midst of beings (*das Inmitten des Seienden*), attuned towards beings and their being.<sup>28</sup> The constitution of a thing’s *this* is founded upon the de-limitation of its individuality *vis-à-vis* others within such a realm or openness of the *between*. Heidegger interprets Kant’s highest principle

<sup>25</sup> EHD refers to Martin HEIDEGGER, *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1981), and EHP refers to its English translation, *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2000). Also see *Existence and Being* (London: Vision Press, 1949) for an older English translation.

<sup>26</sup> „Das ekstatische Innestehen im Offenen der Ortschaft des Seins ist als das Verhältnis zum Sein, sei es zum Seienden als solchem, sei es zum Sein selbst, das Wesen des Denkens.” (“The ecstatic standing-in [or: taking-a-stance, inherence] in the open of the locality of being, as the relationship to being, whether to beings as such or to being itself, is the essence of thinking.”) (NII 358/n4 218) NII refers to *Nietzsche Zweiter Band* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), and n. 4 refers to *Nietzsche* vol. 4 (SF: HarperCollins, 1991, 1982).

<sup>27</sup> FND is for Martin HEIDEGGER, *Die Frage nach dem Ding; zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1984, 1962), and WIT is for its translation as *What is a Thing?*, trans. by W.B. Barion, Jr. and Vera Deutsch (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1967).

<sup>28</sup> See John SALLIS, “Grounders of the Abyss,” in Companion to Heidegger’s «Contributions to Philosophy», op. cit., pp. 183, 188.

of synthetic judgements—"The conditions of the *possibility of experience* in general are also the conditions for the *possibility of the objects of experience...*"<sup>29</sup> (K1 A158/B197)—as pointing to this "between" of knower and known, man and thing, as a "circular happening" (*kreisendes Geschehen*) or reciprocity of the open, wherein objects emerge and experience occurs, delimiting the boundaries of the "thingness of the thing". (FND 186-87/WIT 183-84; FND 244/WIT 242) Being-(t)here as such an intermediary realm of the open then refers us *beyond* any structures that we may call our *own*, to an expanse wherein being unfolds and wherein we are called to delimit and ground. As such the open is the space of the "between" of our thrownness and projection, of our being-enowned and the enowning event that throws, enowns, opens us. As we saw in the previous section, "the turn" designates this reciprocity in the happening of being. As the (t)here projects and opens up the enowning, the enowning event in its self-concealing in *turn* enowns the (t)here's grounding. (see B 247/C 174, B 259/C 183) This takes us beyond fundamental ontology's focus upon the horizon of meaning and towards a focus upon the very opening itself, making such reciprocity—as characterized here in terms of the *between*—possible in its in-turning.

The shift in thinking to the "matter of thought," the turning-enowning of being, as we have seen, entails an awareness of that very open wherein one's being is, and has always been, thrown. This implies then a connection in Heidegger between the shift in thinking and a new appreciation for the "space" that exceeds the horizontal bounds of the *Sinn* of being. Its very matter, the enowning event, attests to this spatiality operative within its very turning, a kind of self-turning of the open as it opens itself *via* its opening of man's (t)here. This spatiality becomes even more explicit in the 1940s, e.g., when Heidegger comes to speak of the "regionalizing" (*Gegnen*) of "that-which-regions" (*Gegnet*) that "releases" us to turn towards it—an idea contrasted with that of the "horizon". But even prior to the 1940s such spatiality is already evident in Heidegger's concept of the open. That primal spatiality of the open is made especially manifest in his characterization of it as a "clearing" (*Lichtung*) from the dark. We now turn to that spatial thematic of the clearing.

### 3. CLEARING

We can see from the foregoing discussions in the previous two sections that the turning-reciprocity to which Heidegger shifts his attention in his later works assumes some sort of a space or region that he calls "the open". The turning as the matter of thought implies the open as its space of occurrence. This open is ontologically more foundational than the formal space constituted by any subjective faculty. Referring to the Greek concept of truth (*ἀλήθεια*) as unconcealment, Heidegger views its openness to be intrinsically related to what he calls the "truth of being". He thus characterizes its spatiality as a "clearing" (*Lichtung*) for the space of beings from out of the darkness of concealment, suggesting that truth *qua* unconcealing is a clearing of space, a spatializing. This truth of being *qua* openness *qua* clearing becomes one of his major themes, especially during the 1930s, taking over the same role occupied in the 1920s by "world." But such room-making is no longer confined to any proto-pragmatism of the available-handly or everyday concerns as it was in *Sein und Zeit*.

Heidegger explains what he means by "clearing" in the lecture, *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* ("Origin of the Work of Art"), from the mid-1930s:

In the midst of beings as a whole there occurs an open site. There is a clearing. It is... more being than [*seiender*: 'being' or 'is in a greater degree than are...'] beings... This open center... the clearing center itself encircles, like the *nothing*... all beings... Only this clear-

<sup>29</sup> "...die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung überhaupt sind zugleich Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände der Erfahrung..." (K1 A158/B197), K1 stands for Immanuel KANT's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1993).

ing grants and establishes for us a passage to those beings that we are not and access to the being that we are.<sup>30</sup> (HW 39-40/PLT 53/OBT 30)

In the next decade, in his 1946 "Wozu Dichter?" ("What are Poets For?"), Heidegger characterizes the open clearing as a spherical circle, a "circle" that *clears* every being in its being. (HW 301/PLT 123/OBT 226) And a couple of decades later in a 1964 lecture, *Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens* ("The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking"), Heidegger further explains the significance of "clearing":

...[T]o clear something is to make something light, something free and open; for example, to make a place in the woods free of trees. The free [space] that results is the clearing... . The clearing is the open [region/space] for everything presencing and absencing [*An- und Abwesende*].<sup>31</sup> (ZSD 72/OTB 65)

During the same period, Heidegger explains that although the clearing itself is not some *spatial thing*, nevertheless as that *wherein* man sojourns or lingers (*aufhalten*), that *wherein* man's being-(t)here holds-itself-open (*auf-halten*), that *wherein* beings presence, spatiality (*Räumlichkeit*) in a certain primal sense does belong to it.<sup>32</sup> (Z 188g/144e, see also 234g/187e) Opening space from out of its dark depths, the clearing provides a "play-room" (*Spielraum*; or "leeway"), a place, for the presencing (and absencing) of beings.<sup>33</sup> (HW 49/PLT 61/OBT 36; see EHD 19/EHP 37) This idea of clearing makes explicit the spatiality of the open. Heidegger variously depicts this spatiality of clearing in terms of truth in the sense of unconcealment out of concealment, strife as an ontological tension that clears that space, and the ontological excess or overflow that must be assumed in such an opening. In this section we shall discuss these spatial characterizations of the open as a clearing.

The open is a clearing accompanied by darkness as de-limiting contours, defining what are present (i. e., beings) via the withdrawal of the not-present (non-being). As is well known, Heidegger takes this primal dynamism of clearing to be the originary meaning of "truth" *qua* unconcealment in the Greek sense of ἀ-λήθεια. It is to the openness of unconcealment that Heidegger, in his 1935-36 reading of Kant, *Die Frage nach dem Ding* (*What is a Thing?*), traces back logical and propositional truth in its more conventional or scholastic sense as *adaequatio intellectus ad rem*, the correspondence between thought and thing. (see FND 46/WIT 47) And it is this openness, rather than any faculty of cognition, that Heidegger here views to be the common root of knowing and being. A few years earlier in his 1930 lecture *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* ("On the Essence of Truth"), Heidegger observes that the ancient Greeks were already thinking in terms of the opened as τὰ ἀλητέα and its openness as ἀλήθεια. Heidegger here translates τὰ ἀλητέα as "the unconcealed" (*das Unverborgene*) instead of "the true" and ἀ-λήθεια as "un-concealedness" (*Unverborgenheit*) rather than "truth." (WM 188/PM 144) In Heidegger's development of that ancient conception, man's openness (comportment) towards the opened (beings) within the open (region) occurs on the basis of an un-concealing (ἀ-λήθεια) whereby beings presence within an open clearing while being defined by an accompanying concealment (λήθη) or absencing withdrawal. So the essence of truth is not in some

<sup>30</sup> „Inmitten des Seienden im Ganzen west eine offene Stelle. Eine Lichtung ist. Sie ist...seiender als das Seiende. Diese offene Mitte...die lichtende Mitte selbst umkreist wie das Nichts,...alles Seiende... Nur dies Lichtung schenkt und verbürgt uns Menschen einen Durchgang zum Seienden, das wir selbst nicht sind, und den Zugang zu dem Seienden, das wir selbst sind." (HW 39-40) HW is for Martin HEIDEGGER, *Holzwege* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977), and OBT refers to its translation as *Off the Beaten Track* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge UP, 2002).

<sup>31</sup> „Etwas lichten bedeutet: etwas leicht, etwas frei und offen machen, z.B. den Wald an einer Stelle frei machen von Bäumen. Das so entstehende Freie ist die Lichtung... Die Lichtung ist das Offene für alles An- und Abwesende." (ZSD 72)

<sup>32</sup> „Räumlichkeit gehört zur *Lichtung*, gehört zum Offenen, in dem wir uns als Existierende aufhalten..." ("Spatiality belongs to *clearing*, belongs to the open, in which we, as existing, sojourn...") (Z 188g/144e)

<sup>33</sup> „...den Spielraum der Offenheit (die Lichtung des Da)..., worin jegliches Seiende in seiner Weise aufgeht." ("...the play-room of openness (the clearing of the '(t)here')... wherein each being, in its own manner, arises." (HW 49/PLT 61/OBT 36)

abstract universality but in this cleared openness of self-concealing disclosure that is always a unique singular occurrence—a singularity that becomes explicated a few years later (in the *Beiträge*) as the enowning event (*Ereignis*). (see WM 200/PM 153) As the clearing is always delimited by the darkness of concealment, un-concealment (*Un-verborgenheit*) or disclosure (*Er-schlossenheit*) is never complete. Its space (the open) is singularized in the configuration of a particular situation that conceals (closes) the implied wholeness of beings forming its contextual background. That is, “truth” as unconcealment always entails its “untruth” as concealment, the “mystery” (*Geheimnis*) of self-withdrawal, the absencing that delimits the clearing of presencing. (E.g. HW 48/PLT 60/OBT 36) While the temporal significance of un-concealment is apparent, the spatiality depicted in such descriptions cannot be ignored. Ἀλήθεια does not merely imply the temporal process of unfolding, for its clearing entails the encircling absence that delimits the space for presencing. Time is through such spacings that delimit presencing-and-absencing. Space is cleared in the en-owning event (*Ereignis*), through delimitation by its concealing-withdrawal that is a “dis-owning” (or “ex-proprietation”) (*Enteignis*).

In *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* of 1935-36, Heidegger depicts this dynamic of clearing-withdrawing in terms of a conflict. That is, the opening of space is won in strife. The diachrony of ontological unfolding as accompanied by the synchrony of de-limitation involves a “spatial strife” in the clearing of space for time. Truth as ἀλήθεια entails this strife. For as we saw above, the open understood as a clearing is a clearing-away of darkness that makes-room for the unconcealing out of concealment, presencing out of absence. Heidegger characterizes this as πόλεμος that opens things up through differentiation from the rest. The space entailed here for presencing is thus a “conflictual space” (*Streitraum*). (HW 48/PLT 60-61/OBT 36) Being as presencing occurs in that very *strife* of disclosure and closure, the contention between “truth” and “un-truth.”<sup>34</sup> (HW 41-42/PLT 55/OBT 31, HW 48/PLT 60-61/OBT 36) This conflict that opens a clearing is also another way for Heidegger to speak of the en-ownment (*er-eignen*) of being, bringing beings into their *own* through the strife of difference from *others*. (see WM 193/PM 148)

Heidegger develops that idea of the clearing or spatializing strife that unfolds ownness via otherness, defines identity through difference, in its relation to excess or overflow. The self-concealing withdrawal delimiting the clearing points to an ontological “*over-flow*” (*Übermass*) of being in its irreducibility to the allotted space of man’s being-(t)here. (see B 249/C 176) The clearing for presencing cannot eradicate the absencing alterity of this irreducible excess. That is, being *exceeds* any comprehension of the ordinary as “*extra-ordinary*” (*un-geheuer*), un-canny (see HW 41/PLT 54/OBT 31); it exceeds its articulation *within* the clearing. And this concealing absence that defines the clearing of presence, in its very *over-flow*, *ex-cess*, moreover attests to the inherent insecurity of what is cleared and present. *Ex-posed* to this *ex-cess*, *im-placed* in the clearing of its *over-flow*, man can never master being. Being can never be of our making or for our representation—for being in its overflow, its alterity, is not subject to human invention, volition, intention, or imagination. (See HW 41/PLT 52/OBT 29) It is not on the basis of human spontaneity or intention that the site of being is opened up. Heidegger contends that it is rather through an anonymous (i. e., non-human) and unexpected irruption or breach of the clearing from out of the dark. (see EM 171-72/IM 162-63/173-74, EM 214/IM 205/219-20)<sup>35</sup> Human existence,

<sup>34</sup> „Die Wahrheit ist der Urstreit, in dem je in einer Weise das Offene erstritten wird, in das alles hereinsteht und aus dem alles sich zurückhält, was als Seiendes sich zeigt und entzieht... [D]urch ihn treten die Streitenden, Lichtung und Verbergung, auseinander. So wird das Offene des Streitraumes erstritten.“ (“Truth is the primal strife in which the open is won, always in a particular way, into which everything stands and out of which everything withholds itself—everything which, as a being, shows itself and withdraws itself... [T]hrough this the striving parties, clearing and concealing, separate from one another. And thus is the open of the conflictual space [or: space of strife] won.”) (HW 48/PLT 60-61/OBT 36).

<sup>35</sup> EM stands for Martin HEIDEGGER, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983); IM stands for the two English translations: *Introduction to Metaphysics*, the first one by Ralph Manheim (New Haven, MA: Yale UP, 1987) followed by the one by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven, MA: Yale UP, 2000).

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in its being-(t)here, then can only be understood in terms of this irreducible and unpre-  
dictable tearing that clears space. It is *in* this space of clearing that we exist. Heidegger  
accordingly takes the (t)here (*Da*) of human being-(t)here (*Dasein*) as the very happening  
of this clearing. (see B 298/C 210) Human nature proceeds in *ex*-posure to being—the  
unexpected, irreducible, uncontrollable, excess—*via* standing-*in* the clearing, the (t)here.  
Human existence, as *ex*-sistence, is to stand-*out* and *into* this clearing. (HW 55/PLT 67/  
OBT 41; Z 223g/178e)<sup>36</sup> "The human being...as the one ecstatically standing-out into the  
clearing, is... himself essentially cleared; and therefore as cleared in such a distinct way,  
he is related to, belongs to, and is appropriated by the clearing as a whole and as such."<sup>37</sup>  
(Z 223g/178e) Towards the end of his life, in 1973, Heidegger states that he would reformu-  
late what he earlier meant by the *ex*-stasis of being-(t)here in terms of this "in-standing  
in the clearing." (*Inständigkeit in der Lichtung*). (VS 384/FS 71; see also VS 390/FS 75)  
Heidegger thus cautions us to not interpret the clearing as an *existentiale*<sup>38</sup> of human exis-  
tence since it is precisely that which is *presupposed* in the very standing-open (and -in) of  
man's being-(t)here. (Z 258g/206e) In one's standing-in the clearing, the (t)here of one's  
being-(t)here is opened and one's being is enowned in the enowning event that is the very  
clearing. In receptivity to this event, opened within the open, standing in the clearing, the  
spatiality of human existence is radically finitized.

As we can see, Heidegger depicts the primal spatiality of the open *qua* clearing in a variety  
of ways throughout his career from the 1930s on, such as in terms of truth as unconcealment,  
the strife that tears open a "conflictual space," the exposure of human existence to being's  
excess and overflow, and man's consequent existential standing-out and -in the clearing. All  
of these characterizations depict the ontological spatiality of the open as a clearing from out  
of an environing dark. This clearing of space that makes-room for the presencing of beings  
eventually becomes thematized in terms of a "regionalizing". In the next section we turn to  
that thematic of the region that becomes prominent especially in the 1940s and '50s.

#### 4. REGIONALIZING

During the 1940s and 1950s, Heidegger develops his understanding of what he had been  
calling "the open" and its spatiality, its clearing, further in terms of region and place. On the  
one hand, the opening of the open becomes explicitly differentiated from his earlier phe-  
nomenological conception of the horizon in its exposition, as the wide expanse of the *region*  
wherein things are gathered and which in its expansiveness extends *beyond* the subjective  
sphere of representation or even the phenomenological sphere of intentionality. And on the  
other hand, the open is concretized in terms of man's *place* of dwelling in an intrinsic rela-  
tionship to the nearness of things as opposed to the neutrality of Cartesian or Newtonian,  
i. e., quantified or measured, space. On the one hand, his discussion of region underscores  
its *alterity* of ontological space; and on the other hand, his conception of place emphasizes  
its *concrete* immediacy and *lived* dimension. For the purpose of this paper, I shall focus in this  
section on region and its "regionalizing" activity that makes implacement possible. One can  
recognize in it a connection to the 1930s discussions of the turning and the enowning event  
that we examined in the first section above. The turning that enowns man's (t)here and the  
excess expanse implied in its opening *qua* clearing become treated during the 1940s and '50s  
in terms of this regionalizing of the region. And while taking the region as prior to, and in

<sup>36</sup> Z refers to *Zollikon Seminar: Protokolle-Gespräche-Briefe* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987). The  
English translation is *Zollikon Seminars: Protocols-Conversations-Letters* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern  
University Press, 2001). The page numbers followed by *g* will refer to the original German edition and  
those followed by *e* will refer to the English translation.

<sup>37</sup> „Der Mensch...als ekstatisch in die Lichtung Hinsausstehender ist...wesensmäßig selbst gelichtet  
und also so ausgezeichnet Gelichtetes der Lichtung als ganzer und als solcher angehörig, zugehörig,  
ihr vereignet.“ (Z 223g)

<sup>38</sup> That is, a fundamental (ontological) characteristic (i. e., an existential structural category) of  
human existence *qua* being-(t)here (*Dasein*) as analyzed in *Sein und Zeit*.

excess of, the horizon, Heidegger explicitly contrasts this from his earlier idea of the horizon.<sup>39</sup> Heidegger's contrasting here of region and horizon encourages us to view his so-called shift in thinking under the light of the importance of spatiality for the matter of thought.

"Region" (*Gegend*) is a theme that emerges and becomes prominent during the period from the mid-1930s to the 1950s in a re-working from its former conception that had appeared in *Sein und Zeit*. Moving beyond its earlier notion as the organizing context for the places of the available handy, "region" is now developed in relation to a renewed understanding of Plato's *χώρα* and furthermore is explicitly distinguished from the phenomenological concept of "horizon". *Χώρα* in Plato's *Timaeus* was the region or place or space where the *Ideas* become concretized into particular things exemplifying them.<sup>40</sup> But in itself it escapes our comprehension. In a 1953 parenthetical remark to his 1935 lectures on metaphysics (*Einführung in die Metaphysik*), Heidegger interprets this Greek concept of *χώρα*—as if in consonance with his talk elsewhere in 1935 (*Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*) of the earth in relation to the world,<sup>41</sup> or of the *λήθη* behind, or rather joined to, *ἀλήθεια*—, as referring to that which *withdraws* to make-room for the presencing of things.<sup>42</sup> (EM 71/IM 66/70) This appropriation of the Greek *χώρα* in an absencing-spatializing function becomes developed to attain full explication in the 1940s in terms of a "regionalizing" (or: "regioning", *Gegnen*) activity. In his summer 1944 lecture on Heraclitus (*Heraklits Lehre vom Logos*) for example, we notice Heidegger associating the Greek *χώρα* with a reworked understanding of *Gegend* ("region") and its old form *Gegnet* ("that-which-regions"), which come to hold the sense of what "surrounds" or a "surrounding region" (*Umgebung, umgebende Umgegend*).<sup>43</sup> (LHL 335) Hence the region is taken to signify both the aspect of surrounding and of the event that makes-room—a making-room through a *surrounding absencing* or *withdrawing*. In distinction from Heidegger's earlier conception in *Sein und Zeit*, region is no longer understood in terms of things available or handy for our concerns. Not only is it differentiated from place as broader than, and anterior to, the immediate locale. This regionalizing activity of absencing into the surroundings entails an *alterity*—in connection with the meaning of the verbal form, *χωρέω*—that *escapes* subsumption under the guidance of our concerns. What then is the significance of "region", now associated with *χώρα* and not only distinguished in its alterity from the mere place of things but also dissociated from its earlier reduction to the contextual space of things handy and available for our concerns? In general, what is called here "region" is associable with what is discussed elsewhere, in its dynamic sense, as "unconcealedness" (*Unverborgenheit*) and, in its spatial sense, as "clearing" (*Lichtung*). Again the focal shift in this change in meaning of "region" from the 1920s to the 1940s is from what centers around human existence and its concerns, to being itself as the very matter of thought.

This idea of "region" is developed in another work, *Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit*, written during 1944-45 shortly after the Heraclitus course (AED 45ff/DT 65ff).<sup>44</sup> *Gegend* here is again understood through an interpretation of its old form *Gegnet* ("that-which-regions")

<sup>39</sup> "Place" has already been the focus of several commentaries on Heidegger, e.g., in Ed Casey's works.

<sup>40</sup> This *χώρα* later becomes interpreted in terms of matter (*ύλη*), such as by Aristotle.

<sup>41</sup> Heidegger in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* discussed the strife that wins a space for clearing, which we examined above, in terms of a conflict between world and earth.

<sup>42</sup> "Könnte *χώρα* nicht bedeuten: das Sichabsondernde von jedem Besonderen, das Ausweichende, das auf solche Weise gerade anderes zuläßt und ihm 'Platz macht'?" ("Might not *χώρα* signify: the self-separating from every particular, the making-away, which in such a way admits and 'makes place' precisely for another?") (EM 71/IM 66/70) For the verbal form of *χώρα*, *χωρέω* means to make room, give way, withdraw, draw back. Especially its sense of withdrawal attests to the alterity of this spatiality in the absencing that makes room for presencing. See also Alejandro VALLEGA, *Heidegger and the Issue of Space* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 2003) on this issue of *χώρα* and alterity.

<sup>43</sup> LHL is for Martin HEIDEGGER, *Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos in Heraklit* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979), lectures from his summer 1944 course.

<sup>44</sup> AED is *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 1910-1976* wherein this work (a fictional conversation between three characters), *Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit. Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken* appears. This also appeared in *Gelassenheit* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), but the pagination will refer to the AED edition. And DT refers to the English translation, "Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking," in *Discourse on Thinking* (NYC: Harper & Row, 1966).

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and in relation to its active gerund *Gegenen* ("regioning," "regionalizing"). Here Heidegger takes *Gegnet*—in its "surrounding" aspect already noted in the 1944 work—as the open, the free expanse (*Weite*), wherein beings may "while" in their presencing-absencing. (AED 47/DT 66) *Gegend* as such is the very open expanse *wherein* beings come and go in their presence, that is, wherein things *are* for awhile in their presencing-absencing. He conceptualizes this opening, wherein all beings appear, in its spatial significance as an "open that *surrounds* us..." (*das uns umgebende Offene*). (AED 46/DT 66) This spatiality is not static but a dynamic happening. *Gegnet*, "that-which-regions", with its verbal form, *Gegenen*, "regionalizing," captures the dynamic sense of this surrounding open in its gathering activity that holds things together (*versammelt*) in a space and unifies a plurality of places. Gathering things into its space, it itself withdraws to make that very space. In its dynamism, this spatializing is paired with a temporalizing movement. Spatially the regionalizing region implies an expanse (*Weite*), while in the temporal sense, it implies the lingering (*verweilen*) of things gathered into its opening. For this reason Heidegger also characterizes "that-which-regions" to be a "lingering expanse" (*verweilende Weite*) which, in gathering and opening, "lets everything emerge into its resting". (AED 47/DT 66) Region thus constitutes things as what they are by providing them a space to where they belong and a time for their "whiling," i. e., their presencing-absencing. Here we get the strong sense that, for the later Heidegger, neither time nor space is to be prioritized at the expense of the other. Rather temporalizing and spatializing belong-together inseparably in, or *as*, the regionalizing of that-which-regions.

Heidegger distinguishes region as such from the concept of "horizon" (*Horizont*), which had earlier occupied the center stage in *Sein und Zeit* as the *Sinn* of being, i. e., as time. Now in the 1940s, Heidegger juxtaposes the two, region and horizon, however to underscore the ontological priority, and *alterity*, of the former. The purpose is to eradicate from the thinking of region any residue of—or at least, any misunderstanding of it under the terms of—a modern representationalism, e.g. as a subject-centered field of reference, that may belong to the concept of the "transcendental horizon" inherited from Husserl's phenomenology. In *Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit*, Heidegger has his characters make the point that "horizon", together with the concept of "transcendence", maintains a representational reference to objects of cognition in relation to the subject. (AED 44/DT 64) As I mentioned above, the opening of regions in *Sein und Zeit* was founded on the basis of the concerns of one's being-(t)here. Those concerns are directed through guidance of the horizon of temporality. By contrast Heidegger now affirms the independence of region—as the open expanse—from horizon. In its new conception region becomes the pre-existing field for (and *as*) the unfolding of being, whereby and wherein, as we stated above, things are gathered and linger. Heidegger stresses the fact that its regionalizing is not something brought-on on the basis of man's subjectivity or intentionality but rather ontologically *precedes* and *exceeds* the subjective. It is neither discovered nor created by us, but rather in its alterity, "comes to meet us", so that we have no choice but to *let* it come and to *receive* it. (AED 46/DT 65) On this basis Heidegger explicates the "resoluteness" (*Entschlossenheit*) of man's being-(t)here in *Sein und Zeit*, in its provision of an horizontal orientation, now as an openness *for* the openness. That is, the opening of the horizon must presuppose the opening of that-which-regions that opens it up.<sup>45</sup> (see AED 63-64/DT 81) And the horizon, having lost its previous phenomenological primacy, is now instead taken explicitly as the *side*—or aspect (*Aussehen*)—*turned toward us* of the region that surrounds us. (see AED 45/DT 64, AED 55/DT 72-73) As its interior aspect, it is encompassed *within* the all-surrounding open region that makes it possible.

What then would be the appropriate human response or comportment in the face of that-which-regions? Rather than any conceptualizing or representational thinking, or voluntaristic willing, Heidegger suggests the attitude of letting, eradicating things of their objective character as represented so as to enable us to enter into an inter-resonance with the "free expanse" (*die freie Weite*). This would be an inter-resonance *via* the finite spatiality of our being *vis-à-vis* the spatial excess or alterity of being. In our next section we turn to such a spatial understanding of Heidegger's concept of letting-be.

<sup>45</sup> I will discuss Heidegger's own reinterpretation of "resoluteness" further in the next section.



## 5. LETTING

Thrown into the regionalizing expanse and called to open it—delimit and shape it—, letting it be in the face of its excess, man's being-(t)here is conditioned and finitized. Human existence is shaped accordingly in receptivity to being as this event that throws, releases, it. For Heidegger these two moments—being in its excess, abyss, and alterity that overwhelms on the one hand, and man in his receptivity *vis-à-vis* being on the other hand—occur in a onefold happening. Focussing upon this reciprocal and yet onefold occurrence of being in Heidegger's works, we notice an originary spatiality (though inseparable from temporality). And on the part of the human being-(t)here, the receptivity implies a spatial finitude. In this final section we shall thus examine human ontological spatiality in this receptivity *vis-à-vis* alterity and excess, a receptivity that Heidegger discusses in terms of "letting" and "releasement". We shall explore what Heidegger means by "freedom" in light of such letting, his contrast between letting and willing, letting's deepest ontological sense as not a human act but being's releasement, and letting as the very *meaning (Sinn)* of being. Heidegger's manifold discussions of letting significantly underscores the spatiality of being-human that is in inter-resonance with the spatializing happening of being.

Man is finitized in his being-(t)here *vis-à-vis* the ontological excess that overpowers and overwhelms. In his mid-1930s course on metaphysics, Heidegger speaks of man's being thrown into the open to face the violence of this excess. He calls this excess, "the overwhelming" (*das Überwältigende*). (see EM 171-72/IM 162-63/173-74) Man in turn exercises his violence against this ontological excess. Yet man is ultimately impotent to completely master it. Even as he attempts to master its ever-changing contours, his (t)here is tossed about hither and thither (*hin und her*) within the opening cleared by the tension between presencing and absencing. (e.g. EM 167/IM 158/168-69, EM 169/IM 161/171-72, EM 171/IM 162-63/173-74, EM 186-87/IM 178/190) Man's (t)here is an "in-between case" (*Zwischen-fall*) that fits into the trans-forming configurations, and that where-into the exceeding violence of being irrupts and unfolds as history. Human existence is constituted accordingly. (EM 172/IM 164/174) Heidegger tells us that man, thrown into this uncanny situation, and as himself the uncanniest (*das Unheimlichste*), therefore can only *let* what overwhelms break-in. (EM 172/IM 163/174) *Letting (lassen)* as such becomes an important term in Heidegger's vocabulary in his later periods. It indicates the radical spatiality of human existence *vis-à-vis* the spatial unfolding of being, i. e. in its alterity and excess.

The *alterity* of concealment—accompanying unconcealment, its overwhelming *excess*—underscores the spatial significance of human existence as finite. For the later Heidegger, to face this is authenticity. Already in the mid-1930s Heidegger emphasized that one authentically finds oneself in being-(t)here *only insofar as* one finds oneself amidst this over-powering of being. (e.g. EM 159/IM 150/160, EM 166/IM 157/167) Despite being's "need" of man as the (t)here of its manifestation (e.g. VS 109/FS 63) or as its "shepherd" or "herdsman" (*Hirt*) (e.g. HW 348/EGT<sup>46</sup> 36/OBT 262) or "herder" (*Wahrer*) (see B 239/C 169, B 304/C 214), there is no sense here that man is in control of, or is the master of, being. The naming of man as shepherd points instead to the receptivity of human existence; *not* to any transcendental spontaneity of the subject in any Kantian (or Neo-Kantian) sense. The "shepherding" of being for Heidegger means *letting* beings presence in unconcealment. This is opposed to the subject's free willing. Man's function is simply to let them presence, and any willing on man's part will fall short of this very presencing-absencing that exceeds human power. This *letting*, in terms of the en-owning event, as man's co-respondence to the en-owning of being, points to what was discussed in the *Beiträge* of the 1930s as a "being en-owned" (*Ereignessein*) and a "belonging" (*zugehörigen*) to enownment. (see B 239/C 169, B 304/C 214, B 252/C 178) Both letting and being en-owned express that human facticity of *belonging* to the open. Hence in discussing the meaning of human existence as being-(t)here, Heidegger in 1959 refers to the holding-open of the open as occurring through our *receptivity* to what is given, our *being-addressed* in virtue of the clearing or "clearedness" (*Gelichtetheit*) wherein things appear. (Z 4g/4e)

<sup>46</sup> EGT is for Martin Heidegger's *Early Greek Thinking* (SF: Harper & Row, 1984, 1975).

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Does this apparent submissiveness of human existence preclude any sense of freedom? What does Heidegger have to say about freedom? Heidegger’s unique understanding of freedom (*Freiheit*) on the part of being-(t)here has to do with that very openness that grounds and ungrounds man’s (t)here. Already in 1930, in *Vom Wesen des Wahrheit*, Heidegger identifies man’s openness as a being-free for what is opened up. Heidegger here identifies “freedom” in the ontological sense with openness *for* what is opened within the open, the receptive letting of what presences as one responds to it in comportment.<sup>47</sup> Freedom here is the ontologically foundational *letting-be* of beings (*Seinlassen von Seienden*), requiring one’s prior engagement with “the open and its openness [*das Offene und dessen Offenheit*] into which every being comes to stand.” (WM 188/PM 144) Its meaning is not volitional or subjective in the sense of “free will” or reason; it is not anthropocentric in any regard. Instead it refers to our ontological condition of being *thrown into* the open region. It has to do with one’s finite receptivity towards the given, on the basis of which one’s comportment is *already* attuned. (WM 192/PM 146) In the understanding of the *Beiträge* a few years later, this in turn would assume the very enowning event that opens one’s (t)here.

Freedom understood in this ontological sense in terms of letting and openness makes manifest the finite spatialization of human existence. For in freedom, in openness, Heidegger states, we are in *ex*-posure (*Aus-setzung*) to beings, as we stand—*ex*-sistent—*outside* of ourselves. (WM 190/PM 145-46) In letting them be *vis-à-vis* their presencing, one is exposed (*aussetzt*) and transposed (*versetzt*) into the open. Freedom as such is intrinsically exposing, whereby we are finitized accordingly. (WM 189/PM 144-45) In this *ex*-posure, letting-be is a withdrawing (*Zurücktreten*) before the unconcealed, making-room for them, hence a spatializing. (WM 188-89/PM 144) In this, man’s opening (*via* letting *qua* self-withdrawal) is in co-respondence with the opening of being (its unconcealing *via* self-withdrawing concealment): being and man make space for one another, “being free” for one another, together as one happening. Such co-responding self-withdrawal can also be said to be the sense behind the “herding” of being discussed above: To act the part of the “shepherd” is to take the attitude of self-withdrawal in the face of unconcealed beings, making-room for them, letting them presence, in an authentic (owning) response to being’s unconcealing (en-owning) that is simultaneously its concealing self-withdrawal (dis-owning). Assuming such an attitude, man is free in response to the freedom of the open expanse. Human *Üßps* must defer to that overwhelming expanse wherein we are exposed—in our freedom, our openness—to the presencing-absencing of beings. Thus in our impacement within the enviring region, in its clearing of space, in the tension of “conflictual space”, there is no guarantee to what we may call our “own”. Amidst the world’s grounding we are under the perpetual threat of ungrounding. Hence the open is *other* and freedom for Heidegger is not quite a human property. It is not that man possesses (owns) freedom. Instead “freedom...possesses man” („die Freiheit...besitzt den Menschen”). (WM 190/PM 145) What Heidegger means by “herding” or acting the part of the “shepherd” of being, would call for a recognition of that finitude on our part—to withdraw any claim to ownership so as to “own” the very *otherness* of being, *letting*-being-be.

Heidegger contrasts such letting from the attitude that assumes a willing, including modern faith in the “spontaneity” of the representational subject, which, in its extreme *hybristic* form, has led to “technological enframing” (*Gestell*). We are told however that ontologically speaking, such scientific (and technological) thought is in poverty. (WM 309-10/PM 236) Its willing, Heidegger suggests, disappears in resignation (*Scheinlassen*; also: “engagement”) and is completely extinguished in releasement (*Gelassenheit*). (see AED 41/DT 61, AED 56/DT 74, AED 59/DT 76, AED 64/DT 81) It fails in its claim to grasp being. We are encouraged thus to refrain from imposing human-contrived determinations upon the unfolding of being. Rather than imposing upon things, we are to *listen* to the

<sup>47</sup> “Die Freiheit zum Offenbaren eines Offenen läßt das jeweilige Seiende das Seiende sein, das es ist. Freiheit enthüllt sich jetzt als das Sein-lassen von Seiendem.” (“Freedom for what is opened up in an open [region] lets a particular being be the being it is. Freedom reveals itself now as letting beings be.”) (WM 188/PM 144).

call or claim (*Anspruch*) coming from behind their presencing. Hence in the 1940s, while explicating the “authentic resoluteness” (*eigentliche Entschlossenheit*) of *Sein und Zeit* to mean “openness for...,” Heidegger also speaks of “authentic releasement” (*eigentliche Gelassenheit*) whereby one *belongs to* and is *owned by* that-which-regions. (AED 55-56/DT 73) The *thinking of being* in essence is not merely a thinking *about* being but a thinking *enowned by* being—the genitive *of* here is twofold. (see PLW 56-57/WM 316/PM 241) This is to say that ultimately, being cannot be grasped in terms of any universal idea conceived by our subjectivity but rather only in our belonging to the “essencing of being” (*Wesung des Seyns*) of which we are *receptive*—a receptivity in virtue of the openness of the open as the domain of relatedness. (B 458/C 322-23; see also WM 184/PM 141) This is, again, the sense behind the turning of enowning we discussed in the first section. It is on this basis that the concept of *Entschlossenheit* (“resoluteness”) can be re-understood in light of the notions of releasement and openness—only if we listen to what it literally says: “un-closedness”. That is, “authentic resoluteness” (*eigentliche Entschlossenheit*) may be read in light of “authentic releasement” (*eigentliche Gelassenheit*) as “un-closedness”, opening, rather than as a mode of willing. In an appended note to his 1935 course on metaphysics (*Einführung in die Metaphysik*) Heidegger remarks that since man’s very relation to being is nothing but letting, all willing, *via* resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) as “un-closedness” (*Entschlossenheit*), must be *based upon* such letting.<sup>48</sup> (EM 23/IM 21/22-23) Again, the finitude manifest in such originary letting underscores the very facticity that the openness of (and to) beings in their presencing-absencing is *not* undertaken by human volition or intentionality. *Nor* is it the consequence of an horizontal projection of understanding. Instead man’s opening is itself opened in the open. Man’s projection that clears being does not *make* being,<sup>49</sup> for the projection is itself a *thrown* projection (*geworfener Entwurf*) into the midst of beings, thrown not by man but by being. (PLW 84/WM 337/PM 257) This is another way of stating that the open itself is ultimately presupposed in all comportment on man’s part: “This clearing... is not the creation of man, it is not man... [I]t is that which is assigned to him... addressed to him... destined to him.”<sup>50</sup> (VS 386-87/FS 73)

Under the light of such receptivity, the focus on the meaning (*Sinn*) of being shifts. The *Sinn* of being is no longer completely up to the horizon of projection, i. e., the temporality of being-(t)here, but refers even beyond that horizon to the clearing of en-owning, first expressed in terms of the *aletheic* open as the essence of truth in the 1930s and then discussed in terms of a placial topology and the regionalizing of the region in the 1940s and ‘50s on. Heidegger eventually comes to clarify this meaning of being towards the end of his life as *letting*. In response (to en-owning, clearing, regionalizing) man can only let-be, be receptive. As we are *pulled into* the open *via* the transient configurations of presencing-absencing, whose secret exceeds, overwhelms, and is withdrawn from our powers, as we are *drawn to it* in reception of what “it” (*Es*) gives and destines to us, we are defined as what and who we are. As I have been repeating, this deep receptivity, letting, testifies to the human finitude of ontological spatiality *vis-à-vis* the alterity of being. That is, in submission to the open, to ἀλήθεια, in *ex*-posure to beings, man’s essence as *ex*-sistence is referred *beyond* itself in correspondence or co-resonance to being as the event of its en-ownment

<sup>48</sup> „Das Wesen des Wollens wird...in die Entschlossenheit zurückgenommen. Aber das Wesen der Entschlossenheit liegt in der Entborgenheit des menschlichen Daseins für die Lichtung des Seins... Der Bezug zum Sein aber ist das Lassen. ...[A]lles Wollen [ist] im Lassen gründen...“ (“The essence of willing is...traced back to resoluteness [un-closedness]. But the essence of resoluteness [un-closedness] lies in the un-veiledness of human being-(t)here for the clearing of being... The relation to being however is letting. ...[A]ll willing [is] grounded in letting...”) (EM 23/IM 21/22-23) The quotation is from Heidegger’s remarks added subsequent to the lecture he gave in 1935.

<sup>49</sup> And here Heidegger’s anti-subjectivism and anti-idealism is certainly a response to Neo-Kantianism (especially that of Hermann Cohen).

<sup>50</sup> „Diese Lichtung...dieses Freie hat der Mensch nicht geschaffen, es ist nicht der Mensch. Es ist im Gegenteil Jenes, was ihm zugewiesen ist, da es sich ihm zuspricht: es ist das ihm Zugeschickte.“ (“This clearing...this free is not created by man, it is not man. On the contrary it is that which is assigned to him, since it is addressed to him: it is that which is destined to him.”) (VS 386-87/FS 73).

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(*Er-eignis*) that is simultaneously a dis-ownment (*Ent-eignis*) in being's self-withdrawal. We can only submit to the allotted *a-letheic* configurations, surrender to the might of dispensation, letting beings presence in their accompanying concealedness.

*Letting* ultimately is, however, a *being-let*. It is not to be construed as an act on man's part at all: "This 'letting' is something fundamentally different from 'doing'." (VS 363/FS 59) Heidegger (e.g. in his appendix to *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* added in 1956) understands ποιησις—as a "bringing-forth" (*Hervor-bringen*)—to really mean a "bringing-as-letting" (*Bringen als Lassen*) so that man's alleged "doing" or "making" (ποιεῖν) is really a "letting". Such *letting* at its ontologically deepest level furthermore is ultimately a "*being-let*." (see HW 70/PLT 82/OBT 52; EM 23/IM 21/23) As John Sallis has made this point in his commentary on Heidegger, even one's own letting-be is always already a *being-let* into the open.<sup>51</sup> In his Le Thor seminar of 1969, Heidegger mentions how his "Zeit und Sein" of a few years earlier (1962) attempted to think "letting" as the "giving" of *Es gibt...* ("There is...", literally, "It gives..."). In this light we can see how letting is not really man's doing but rather this *giving* (*Gaben*) of being, "...which gives only its gift [*Gabe*], but doing so holds itself back and withdraws." (ZSD 8/OTB 8; VS 363-64/FS 59) We can also understand this in light of Heidegger's conception of the enowning event that enowns and opens man's being-(t)here, or of the regionalizing of that-which regions. Letting as such is the releasement (*Gelassenheit*) of being, letting beings be, enowning them, including our own being-(t)here. As *already* being-let, released, one co-responds to being's letting with one's own letting, in receptivity of ἀλήθεια, in acknowledgement of one's dependency. Hence the answer that Heidegger provides to the question of the *Sinn* of being, four decades after *Sein und Zeit*, is that "the deepest meaning of being is *letting*."<sup>52</sup> (VS 363/FS 59)

In receptivity to the "it" (*Es*)—i. e., *Ereignis*—that gives, *vis-à-vis* its very alterity, man is *let-be* within the space opened by its withdrawal. And man is thus spatially finitized in his being. Hence *let-be vis-à-vis* the alterity or excess of beyng/being that overwhelms but wherein he belongs, man is authentic (ownmost) when he takes up the co-responding attitude of *letting-be*. This dynamism of letting and being-let, opening and being-opened, receptivity and alterity, exposure and excess, *vis-à-vis* that which escapes man's conceptual reduction and volitional appropriation, the abysmal expanse that clears and opens, points to a deep ontological sense of spatiality implicit within the later Heidegger. It is the spatiality of that *wherein* and *through which* man finds himself thrown and implaced. Spatiality is thus inseparable from the very *Sinn* of being (beyng). And to beyng as such, man *belongs*.

As seen in the foregoing, Heidegger's shift in thinking from the 1930s-on moves away from any exclusive focus upon the meaning (*Sinn*) of being in terms of the temporal horizon of man's project domain. His inquiries into the "truth" of being as ἀλήθεια understood as unconcealment, with its openness or clearing, and then into the topology of being in terms not only of place but also of region in its regionalizing, manifest attempts on Heidegger's part to think being beyond merely temporal terms through the inclusion of spatial motifs. Being in its overwhelming excess, its self-withdrawing alterity, clears an opening for the emergence of beings, in and as its *aletheic* unfolding. Such temporalizing in its unconcealing is hence also a spatializing in its clearing or regionalizing that opens the (t)here of human being-(t)here, to finitize the place of human existence and dwelling. Heidegger's discussions in his post-1930 works of turning, open, clearing, region, and letting, all manifest the ontological significance of that spatiality in being, no longer relegated to a secondary status in relation to temporality as the horizon of being. And while I have limited myself in this paper to these five themes, there are many other spatial motifs that Heidegger uses from the 1930s up to the end of his life. Of course, this certainly does not preclude the ontological significance of time. Being's temporal unfolding cannot be separated from its spatial clearing. The enowning event of beyng is the happening of "time-space". Heidegger's 1930s shift in thinking was towards the turning of this enowning event, which in turning opens man's (t)here. In any case the spatiality of this open clearing accompanying the temporality

<sup>51</sup> See John SALLIS, *Double Truth* (NYC: SUNY, 1995), p. 105.

<sup>52</sup> "...[D]er tiefste Sinn von Sein das *Lassen* ist." (VS 363).

of unconcealment can neither be denied nor demoted under the guidance of time taken as horizon.<sup>53</sup> As we saw in our explorations above, throughout his career Heidegger explicates this opening-clearing variously in terms of region, expanse, and excess; and as that which is ontologically more primordial than, and *other to*, any conception of the subject or even of an horizon of intentionality or projection. Thrown into the unconcealing contours of the open expanse, man is finitized accordingly, not only temporally but spatially *vis-à-vis* its overwhelming excess and alterity. Released amidst this environing otherness of being that is irreducible to one's own conceptions or designs, one can only let-be. Man's being is hence shown to be spatial in its very relationality *vis-à-vis* alterity. In turn being as the enowning event is spatial as the open's self-inversion (or "turning", *Kehre*), turning itself to open (or: enown) man's (t)here to be open to that opening—i. e., in the shift of thought.

In this global age we notice a plurality of "worlds" and disparate "horizons", coming and going, making noise in attempts to silence others in their clash for validity. Amidst such post-modern spatial confusion, may we then listen to the echo of that abyss, the withdrawing expanse, as their clearing, making-room for them?

#### ABSTRACT

Within the context of Heidegger's claim that his thinking has moved from the "meaning of being" to the "truth of being" and finally to the "place of being", this paper examines the "spatial" motifs that become pronounced in his post-1930 attempts to think being apart from temporality. My contention is that his "shift" (*Wendung*) in thinking was a move *beyond* his earlier focus upon the project-horizon of the meaning (*Sinn*) of being, i. e. time, based on the existential hermeneutic of mortality, and instead *towards* a focus upon the "space"—variously discussed in terms of the open, the clearing, the expanse, the region, etc.—that allows for such horizontal projection. The very matter of thought that becomes discussed in the 1930s *Beiträge* as the "turning" (*Kehre*) of "en-ownment" (*Ereignis*) involves this clearing or opening of a "space" in the strife of unconcealment-concealment. This in turn underscores the alterity from out of which the emission of the *Sinn* of being is possible. In the 1940s and '50s this spacing becomes developed in terms of a "regionalizing" (*Gegnen*) in explicit distinction from the "horizon". I shall also examine the implications for human spatiality, i. e., our receptivity *vis-à-vis* the alterity of *Ereignis* or *Gegnen*, which Heidegger discusses in terms of "letting" or "releasement".

<sup>53</sup> But this also goes for temporality itself. That is the temporalizing of unconcealment, of enowning, in the later Heidegger is in excess of, and irreducible to, temporality as the meaning of being taken as the horizon of projection as analyzed in the existential analytic of 1927.