Broader contexts of non-domination: Pettit and Hegel on freedom and recognition

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This paper compares Philip Pettit's account of freedom to Hegelian ones. Both share the key insight that characterizes the tradition of republicanism from the Ancients to Rousseau: to be subordinated to the will of particular others is to be unfree. They both also hold that relations to others, relations of recognition, are in various ways directly constitutive of freedom, and in different ways enabling conditions of freedom. For example, the republican ideal of non-domination can be understood in light of the Hegelian structure of 'being at one with oneself (*beisichsein*) in another'. Hegelian views converge with Pettit's on non-domination and recognition, although their comprehensive theories of freedom are based on radically different metaphysics. Their biggest difference concerns the relationship between freedom and nature, and there is a further difference between Pettit's (ahistorical) idea of the concept-dependence of freedom, and the Hegelian (historical) idea of the conception-dependence of freedom.

Introduction

This paper compares Philip Pettit's account of freedom to Hegelian theories of freedom, with special emphasis on the role of mutual recognition as a constituent and a precondition of freedom.[1] The Hegelian definition of freedom as 'being at one with oneself *(beisichsein)* in another' is a very broad notion, and mutual recognition between agents is merely one

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constitutive aspect of it.[2] The paper will proceed in light of the question: which aspects of freedom is mutual recognition directly constitutive of? And further, is it of indirect relevance as a precondition of those aspects of freedom that it does not directly constitute?

Pettit and Hegel each defend a broad, comprehensive view of freedom. The basic metaphysical assumptions of what can perhaps be called 'Australian microphysicalism' may seem worlds apart from German idealism, but, perhaps surprisingly, their understanding of freedom – and the role of recognition in it – do not diverge that greatly. This supports the view that theories of personal, social and political freedom are relatively independent of their broader metaphysical context: metaphysical choices do not determine one's account of political freedom.

Philip Pettit's republicanism and Hegel's republicanism share the key insight that characterizes the tradition of republicanism from the Ancients to Rousseau: to be subordinated to the will of particular others is to be unfree.[3] Slavery is the opposite of freedom. They both also hold that relations to others, relations of recognition, are in some sense constitutive of freedom. However, once the key republican insight is embedded in the broader context of further relations of recognition, some differences start to emerge between Pettit and Hegelians. What in the Hegelian approach is a constituent or a precondition of positive social freedom, is for Pettit not an issue of freedom at all – his favoured concept of freedom is a *negative* concept of freedom, whereas Hegelian individual autonomy and social freedom go beyond the ideal of negative freedom.[4] Further, there is a difference between Pettit's (ahistorical) idea of the concept-dependence of freedom, and the Hegelian (historical) idea of the conception-dependence of freedom. And of course, once we focus on the place of freedom in nature, the stark contrast between Australian microphysicalism and German idealism emerges in full. One might assume that with such different starting points, there would be much more significant divergences in the social and political accounts of freedom.

That there are not attests to the relative independence of practical freedom from metaphysical freedom.

1. Pettit and Hegel on freedom and nature

Philip Pettit (1993; 1995; 1996) is a self-avowed microphysicalist, with an account of the supervenience of the higher levels of reality on microphysical elements. Once the sub-atomic level of reality is fixed, so are the other levels of reality – the relationship between lower and higher levels is like that of dots and shapes that consists of the dots. One cannot change the shape without changing the position of the dots. On the other hand, there is multiple realizability: one and the same shape can be realized by different dots, as can be seen by simply changing the place of two qualitatively similar dots with one another. In line with his compatibilism, Pettit believes determinism by the lower levels is no threat to any form of human freedom worth having. But, as witnessed by the prevalence of the debate over free will, many regard determinism as compromising freedom of the will. Furthermore, at least on one reading, there is a key point of contrast to Hegel, who provides a rival account that stresses growing degrees of self-determination, from simple organisms to thinking embodied beings. For Pettit, there are no 'seeds' of freedom in the nature: it is just microphysical goings-on.

What do Hegelians provide in comparison? It would be wrong to see Hegel as a typical libertarian indeterminist incompatibilist. A typical incompatibilist libertarian focuses on the causal history of actions, and claims that there *has* to be a special volition or other inner, mental event causing physical events such as behaviours. Kant's dualism of two kinds of causality is a nice example of the background picture that the typical incompatibilist libertarian works with. Pippin (2006) argues forcefully that Hegel does not accept that incompatibilist picture, insofar as freedom for Hegel does not reside in some inner, mental

events, but is instead a matter of actualizations in shared social and normative space. Pippin therefore concludes that Hegel is a compatibilist. Various other authors have made similar claims, for example Michael Quante (2004), whose Hegel is close to Davidson as a theorist of action.

Such readings of Hegel as critical of typical libertarianism are well taken: Hegel does not share that picture. However, it would also be mistaken to read Hegel as a typical compatibilist. That would be to see Hegel as rejecting, 'abstractly negating', Cartesian and Kantian dualisms, rather than overcoming or sublating them. For Hegel challenges the other side of the dualism, the mechanistic picture of nature, as well: there are degrees of logical development in nature, and mechanism is the lowest degree, superseded by chemical and organistic processes. There are also growing degrees of freedom in nature. So it is more appropriate to see Hegel as a sort of emergentist rather than a microphysicalist: to the extent that we accept the talk of 'levels' of nature, it is clear that for Hegel the higher levels are not fixed by the bounds and 'laws' of lower levels of nature.[5] Hegel clearly held that there is genuine indeterminacy and contingency in nature. Furthermore, to a growing degree animate beings could manifest the capacity for self-determination. And if Hegel was not a determinist, then the question of compatibility or incompatibility of freedom with determinism is no issue. That is why it is misleading to classify Hegel as a compatibilist, despite his criticism of typical forms of incompatibilist liberalism.[6]

Here it suffices to say that Pettit's and Hegel's starting points are indeed worlds apart, but it seems that this will not matter all that much at the higher, conceptually more developed, levels of human reality. Many believe Hegel's metaphysics is in need of naturalization, but it is worth pointing out that there are resources in the Hegelian picture that are of relevance in reframing the contemporary debates on freedom and determinism.

2. Pettit and Hegel on freedom and history: concept-dependence and conception-dependence

Another way in which the role of freedom in the bigger, metaphysical picture differs between Hegel and Pettit concerns the historicity of freedom. Pettit characterizes freedom as a *concept*-dependent property (like friendship or money): one has to possess the concept, master its use to some degree, to be able to instantiate the property. 'In order to be free', he argues (2001 p. 29), 'it is essential that one be in a position to conceptualize freedom. There is no access to the property without access to the concept'. One can (non-parasitically) possess or master the concept only as a participant in the practices of holding people responsible. And being such a participant entails enjoying an ongoing constitutive standing or status (Pettit 2001, p. 133).

Nonetheless, freedom is an objective feature: one can be free, *fit* to be held responsible, whether or not one *is* held responsible (fitness to be held responsible is crucial for Pettit's theory of freedom). Moreover, freedom is an objective property concerning which we can make mistakes: there is a difference between being *fit* to be held responsible and actually being held responsible. That someone is fit to be held responsible (in a given choice) is something we discover, not invent or merely attribute. One can truly discover whether someone is fit to be held responsible from 'the responsibility perspective'; that one cannot do so from other perspectives is neither here nor there (Pettit 2001, p. 26).

In sum, for Pettit freedom is *ahistorical and objective, although anthropocentric*. It is a concept-bound property, and the concept is practice-dependent, but the practice (of holding each other responsible) is universal and deeply rooted for human beings.

So far, so good. The feature of freedom as concept-dependent seems to be presupposed by Hegel and his followers such as Axel Honneth (2011), who stresses the historicist and self-interpretational implications of such concept-dependence. In this case, one can speak

about the historicist *conception*-dependence of freedom.[7] Rival substantive conceptions of freedom are constitutive of rival practices, which actualize different aspects of freedom. One-sided conceptions lead to one-sided practices.

The distinctively Hegelian view is that there are different ideals of freedom, and each of these has its own sphere of validity, with pathologies or misdevelopments resulting when any of them is applied outside its context of validity. Among the most important ideals that are definitive of the modern era are the negative personal freedom to do what one likes (related to the capacity to choose, *Willkür*), the moral autonomy to define what is good and right (related to will, *Wille*), and the 'social freedom' secured via social roles that (objectively) enable personal and moral freedom and constitute or actualize a relational or social aspect of freedom.

Hegelians stress the practical and historical consequences of such substantive *conceptions* of freedom that people possess and which their practices embody. The three notions of negative personal freedom, moral freedom and social freedom are especially crucial to modern thought and modern institutions, although there are tendencies to over-emphasize the role of the former two, and even to overlook social freedom altogether (Honneth 2011).

The Hegelian-Honnethian question is the sociological one of what happens when a conception of freedom which is valid in one sphere of activity is over-extended to other spheres of activity, resulting in pathologies or misdevelopments. Those features termed 'pathologies' are conception-dependent: they result from people interpreting themselves and their social world in light of one conception rather than other conceptions, and acting accordingly. The result is an aspiration to freedom gone astray. They can be called 'pathologies' only from a viewpoint of another conception of freedom, and with the

normative conviction that the other conception would be more adequate in those social realms.

For Pettit, despite general concept-boundedness, there is a certain conception-independence to freedom: specific constitutive understandings (of freedom and responsibility) do not seem to matter as long as the practice of holding each other responsible is in fact in place. Notice that one can possess the property, and the relevant concept, of fitness to be held responsible whether or not one agrees that freedom is essentially fitness to be held responsible. Thus, the various conceptions of freedom may *each* pick out properties which are each concept-dependent, while the debate over which of these is *true* freedom may remain essentially contested.

Both understandings of freedom seem relevant and complementary to each other: Pettit stresses the universal, objective precondition for various practices (the difference between stones and human beings in terms of the capacity and fittingness to be regarded in certain ways), whereas Hegelian historicism stresses that the historically variable practices themselves are necessary for actualized freedom (as opposed to a mere idea or thought of freedom).

3. Pettit and Hegel on the concept and the property of freedom

For Pettit, there are three important connotations of freedom that can serve as guides in theorizing the concept of freedom: 'underdetermination', 'ownness', and 'responsibility'. The first two are, according to him, necessary but not sufficient, and the key connotation is that of responsibility, more precisely that of *fitness to be held responsible*. There is an a priori connection between freedom and responsibility: one cannot have done something freely and not be fit to be held responsible for it.[8]

For Pettit, the concept of freedom is defined functionally. Freedom is whatever 'X' that makes one fit to be held responsible. What, then, is the property 'X' that enables fitness to be held responsible? Pettit (2001, chs. 2-4) discusses *rational*, *volitional* and *discursive control* as rival candidates, and argues that the property 'X' that fulfils the function of fitness to be held responsible is discursive control – not merely rational control or volitional control – in relation to others.

Further, Pettit notes that various things can be free: actions, selves and persons. Pettit's aim is to first offer an account of freedom of the person and, from there, of freedom of the self and, finally, an account of freedom of action – not the other way around. Free action presupposes knowledge of the options available, the resources to evaluate them and the ability to be guided by one's evaluations (Pettit 2001, p. 19). Freedom of the self means the possibility to see what one is doing as one's own action, and to endorse it as such. Instead of being a slave of desires, compulsions or alien thoughts that simply occur in one, one can see oneself as the author of one's actions. And a free person is not subject to pressure and coercion from others.[9]

Being in discursive control has two basic aspects. There is first the psychological aspect, which involves freedom of action and freedom of self and the capacity to participate in collective practices of holding and being held responsible. The second aspect is the social aspect, a relational property that is constituted via recognition (and, by the same token, a relational property that is partly constitutive of freedom in the environment as well; see subsection four below).

As to the political implications for the state, Pettit (1997) argues for a republican conception of freedom as *non-domination*, as opposed to non-limitation or non-interference, which are not adequate conceptualizations of freedom (in his view it is not interference or limitation per se that matters, but rather the fact that the dominating party is in a position to

interfere). However, it is still a negative understanding of freedom that he wishes to defend (see, for example, Pettit (2002)). Further, the legitimacy of the state, for Pettit, depends on citizens advancing claims and arguments based only on common avowable interests, and he sees electoral democracy as a means to ensuring this.

How does all this compare to Hegel? While Hegel shares Pettit's republican stress on non-domination, it is clear that more things get to be called freedom by Hegel than by Pettit, who sees non-domination as a form of negative freedom.

One can interpret Hegel, like Pettit, as offering a functional or structural account of the concept of freedom. Anything that embodies that structure or fulfils that function thereby counts as a case of freedom. For Hegel (1991a, §7Z), the structure of freedom is that of being at one with oneself *(beisichsein)* in another[10]. The intuitive idea is perhaps best seen through criticism of an 'abstract' account of freedom. An abstract account holds that any dependence on another is a limitation of one's autarchy, one's independence, one's freedom. If one holds that all dependence is detrimental to freedom, one must get rid of all others to be truly free: only the absence of others would suffice for freedom. By contrast, Hegel stresses that one *can* be truly free in the presence of others, even while being dependent on them. It is just that the dependence must be of the sort that enables freedom. When others are in the picture, it is only when these others affirm one's freedom, or relate to one in a non-hostile, non-alien, freedom-friendly way, that one is free in relation to them. What is needed is not absence of others, but a freedom-friendly relationship to the other. And the 'other' in question can be anything from nature, one's own psyche, other agents, one's community, one's government, to social structures more impersonally conceived. One can be free in one's relationship to another, but what the freedom consists in depends on what kind of 'other' is in question. The structure of freedom remains the same: being free through others (say, in the case of other persons, having one's freedom willed by these others).

One context in which this structure is evinced is our embodied nature: rather than pre-determined mechanisms, our bodies are under our own control. In human beings, the degrees of self-determination in nature (discussed above) reach the literal, actual level. We can be at home in nature at large, because nature is freedom-friendly.[11] Call this the 'metaphysical' context of freedom.

It is not only outer nature or the material world that can be an 'other' for us: as Kant before Hegel made clear, our empirical motivations or states of mind can also be alien 'others'. In that context, in relation to our own psyche, free self-determination has two aspects. First, we can say 'no' to any inclination or desire, whether naturally or culturally produced, and, second, we can say 'yes' to any one of them and proceed to realize that goal (Hegel 1991a, §5-7). We are not slaves of the passions, but literally capable of self-determination. One is free when one is free from any compulsions, and free to pursue any self-chosen end. Of course, some ends are more worthwhile than others, but it is an aspect of free choice to be able to determine which end one will pursue, and in happy cases one will pursue worthwhile ends. This capacity can be called the 'psychological' context of freedom.

It is in our relation to others that non-domination is central. Human dependence, whether biological or psychological, on others cannot be eradicated, but domination by or subordination to the will of other individuals can, and the 'general will' embodied by the state represents a genuine form of collective self-rule as long as it respects the personal and moral freedom of individuals and realizes the interests of all. Thus, non-domination is a central dimension of the very structure of freedom for Hegel.

Hegel cites friendship and love as paradigms of the structure of freedom in its immediate form. However, it is worth asking whether, though friendship and love are of course important things, we should employ the concept of *freedom* to describe them and to explain their importance. Is friendship or love – or citizenship, or participation and self-

realization in and through meaningful social practices, et cetera – of value because it is a form of freedom?

There may indeed be an element of stipulation in defining freedom in terms of relations to others. Adding that freedom is the most important thing in human life certainly raises the stakes. The Hegelian substantive claim is that, whether you call it freedom or not, it is – over and above having personal rights to protected choices (that is, negative freedom) and possessing moral and cognitive autonomy and self-determination (that is, moral or reflexive freedom) – leading (realizing) one's life via social roles such as friendships and family ties, workplace and market relations, and citizenship in a rational, justifiable arrangement of family, civil society and state (that is, social freedom) that constitutes the most valuable thing for human beings. This constitutes the self-realization of one's essence. It is a further Hegelian claim that these phenomena share the conceptual structure of 'being at one with oneself in another'. This is a central hypothesis of Hegel's *Realphilosophie*, one which is borne out by reflection on the nature and structure of these phenomena as they are experienced in everyday life. And as a name is needed for these phenomena, it is appropriate to call these aspects of self-realization via social roles 'social freedom'.

However, this raises an important question: is social freedom a form of *freedom* because it exemplifies the social dimension of self-determination (or ownership, non-alienation, et cetera) or does the structure 'being at one with oneself in another' make it a form of freedom?

Indeed, there is a question as to how to understand the importance of this structure: in the negative version, it means that I can be who I (truly, in a non-alienated way) am *despite* the presence of another whose choices and plans are likely to interfere with mine, who might even harm me physically and whose attitudes may be negative, and *despite* my dependence on this other for my biological and psychological needs. In the positive version of the thesis, I

can only do and be someone *thanks to* the presence of another. From this perspective, it is only in relation to another self that I can create an open space, a connection, for emotional and communicative interaction (and for free, uninhibited self-exploration), that I can act together with others in an organized division of labour, and that I can have my individual significance and guarantee of non-interference affirmed.

Moreover, there are two ways or modes in which one can be free from interference and domination: in the absence of others, or in relation to others. Only in the latter mode does one enjoy a standing or status (free citizen, instead of slave), but, then again, it is only in that mode that one *needs* such a standing or status as protection against those very same others. Of course, empirically speaking, there is no choice here: we co-exist simply as a matter of fact, like it or not. But the question is: should we like it or not?

Because there are other good things that co-existence enables (from emotional interaction to joint political action, and participation in historically evolved practices), co-existence is arguably to be preferred for many reasons, even after the developmental or genetic phase of childhood. But is it to be preferred because it entails the realization of *freedom?* Hegel clearly thinks so. Societal structures actualize freedom and are of higher importance in themselves over and above 'facilitating' the value of free co-existence. Free co-existence, affirmed by each other in relations of recognition, facilitates all sorts of human activities – for example, Amartya Sen (1999) argues that poverty and world hunger can be eradicated by freedom, even though there is hardly a conceptual connection – but erecting the system of such free co-existence is *itself* the goal, the purpose of history. And even if one does not think that history has a goal or purpose, one can judge that, given the value of free co-existence, people should take it as their highest goal.

Yet there is still something in need of explanation: freedom in relation to others is supposed to be a higher, truer, form of freedom *qua* freedom than freedom in the absence of

relations. For Hegel, freedom partly consists in standing in such relations. Indeed, perhaps the value of freedom is best seen in the value of 'leading a free life', where freedom is a necessary aspect of a valuable whole, a whole which would be of less value in an un-free variant (despite all the experiential quality, or objective success and worthwhileness of a person's specific goals, which each partly explain the value of the free life as well).

This idea of 'leading a free life' also takes us from freedom-from and freedom-to into a significant, undertheorized aspect of freedom, which can be called 'freedom-in'. The freedom *to* make a self-governed choice is a matter of having an opportunity, which precedes and cannot logically depend on exercising that freedom (see Charles Taylor 1979a). It is a fact about one's situation antecedent to one's choice, and whether and how one will use that opportunity is not relevant to one's freedom to choose in the first place: in a straightforward manner, one was free to make the self-governed choice, and nothing one chooses can alter that fact.

By contrast, what Taylor calls the 'exercise concept' of freedom suggests that freedom is realized *in* one's leading a self-governing life (i.e. a free life): the claim is that one is free *in* living the life of self-governed choices and acting accordingly. If one has the opportunity *to* engage in such a life, but chooses not to, one has shied away from freedom.

In the debates on negative and positive liberty, Taylor's well-known distinction between an opportunity concept and exercise concept is misleadingly taken to coincide with the distinction between freedom-from (negative liberty) and freedom-to (positive liberty) (Carter 2012). This is puzzling as opportunities are literally freedoms *to* do something, whereas in the actual exercise, one has gone beyond the freedom-to-do (which one had whether one chooses to exercise that freedom or not) into doing. The structure is, rather, that in the happy cases one is free *in* doing what one does, one actualizes one's freedom precisely

in acting, while in the preceding situation when one is free to do so but has not yet done so, the free activity remains a potentiality.

Compare the claims one is free *to* realize one's fundamental purposes in one's life with the claim one is free *in* realizing one's fundamental purposes in one's life. The former refers to facts about situations, which are not altered by one's choices. The latter refers to different ways of living: one is free *in* living a self-determined life in pursuit of one's most cherished goals, but one lacks such 'freedom-in' if one lives a life of social conformity instead; say, because one lacks the courageous motivation. Hegelians stress that such freedom-in can be actualized through social roles, so the point is not the rebellion against social expectations – rather the point is the conceptual structure of freedom as realized, actualized in some stretches of life. The opportunity concept focuses only on features of antecedent situations, what one is free to do, whereas the exercise concept of freedom-in focuses on the actualization;

Acting autonomously or realizing one's true self is an actualization of freedom. To *be* free is not merely to have an opportunity (to so act or realize), according to the exercise-concept. Some theorists challenge the distinction, and point out that the absence of all factors that could prevent the action *x* is, quite simply, equivalent to the realization of *x* (Nelson 2005). But that is not so: I may enjoy the absence of obstacles to do either x or y, and do only one of these. Exercise goes further than opportunity. Hegel's concept of freedom is an exercise-concept in that sense. It concerns one's ways of being and doing, rather than merely the capability to do and be. For Hegel, such freedom in realizing one's purposes, the self-realization thereby freely and actively brought about, and being at one with oneself in relations to others are intimately related and of highest value.

4. Pettit and Hegel on recognition: a constitutive or an enabling condition of freedom?

Pettit distinguishes freedom 'in the agent' and freedom 'in the environment'. There are different ways of reading the distinction, but it would appear the *metaphysical* and *psychological capacities* concern freedom 'in the agent', whereas *meaningful opportunities* and *leeway from an overly harsh nature* concern freedom 'in the environment'. It is less clear how to classify interpersonal and institutional statuses that are relationally 'in the agent', but also presuppose an environment which is willing to grant these relational statuses (for the right reasons). Presumably, the *relational*, *recognitive* aspects of freedom are at the same time in the agent and in the environment.

We can therefore use a threefold distinction, and distinguish between *freedom in the agent* (which may turn out to be indirectly dependent on recognition from others), *interpersonal and institutional freedom* (which is directly constituted in recognition), and *freedom in the (rest of the) environment* (including harsh natural order and meaningful 'cultural' practices – apart from the attitudes and treatments concerning oneself – which may again be indirectly dependent on recognition). Let us start with the middle category of interpersonal and institutional freedom, where recognition is directly constitutive.

4.1. Freedom in interpersonal and institutional relations

For Axel Honneth (1995), drawing on Hegel, recognition comes in three forms: respect (as free and equal persons), esteem and care. In each of these dimensions, self-relations (self-respect, self-esteem and self-confidence/love), interpersonal relations and institutions are systematically intertwined. For Pettit (2001), two aspects of freedom in particular are essentially relational matters of 'recognition'.[12]

The first is the relational aspect of discursive control (making one fit to be held responsible), which is a matter of interpersonal and institutional standing (and interaction). Discursive control has also a psychological 'ratiocinative' dimension, namely, the capacity to

participate in communication, but the relational aspect of actual communication is dependent on others. Coercion and slavery are compatible with free action and free selfhood, but they directly violate free personhood, which is a discursive status: having 'a voice' and 'an ear' and the equal authority to command respect.[13]

The second key relational aspect of freedom, non-domination, conceived as a guarantee against potential and actual interference, is directly constituted by relations of recognition. One's freedom is dependent on the non-dominating interpersonal and institutional surroundings that grant and sustain one's interpersonal and institutional standing or status. Because, as Pettit stresses, domination does not require actual interference but rather the power, standing, to do so, non-domination is that standing in which no one is in a position to interfere with others on a whim.

Here is an illustration of the directly constitutive social aspect of (un)freedom in a case of domination:

> Jim is a slave. He grew up in freedom, and is as capable of recognising and assessing reasons for action as anyone else, and suffers from no volitional or motivational defects. Though he loathes his circumstances, he respects himself – indeed, that is one reason why he so loathes his circumstances. He takes care of his heavy duties well, and has no problem with his self-esteem; he knows he is capable of much. It is no surprise, then, that Jim is capable of forming a conception of [the] good life for himself within the realities of his society, and a corresponding life-plan. But he has no opportunity to pursue it, since his master has the coercive power to impose his own plans on Jim. And even if Jim's plan were to fall within the limits that his master would tolerate, the master would remain in a position to undo it on an arbitrary whim, regardless of Jim's own judgement (Kauppinen 2011, p. 284).

So far, so good: recognition is directly constitutive of freedom. But is recognition of indirect relevance to other aspects of freedom in the agent or in the environment? Let us take freedom in the agent first.

4.2. Freedom in the agent

The capacities of the free agent include psychological capacities needed for free action, selfhood and personhood, which Pettit views as the capacities required for rational, volitional and (the ratiocinative aspect of) discursive control. Are relations of recognition *indirectly* relevant for these agentic capacities?

First of all, as Charles Taylor (1979b) maintains, human capacities develop in socialization, in loving parent-child relationships, et cetera. Pretty much everyone agrees with this claim that there is a developmental need for recognition. Most crucially, the capacity for autonomy develops only in a culture of autonomy. Moreover, Axel Honneth (1995) argues that positive self-relations are needed for the courage and self-confidence needed to employ one's capacities. Agents need 'second-order capacities' to use their first order capacities, such as the capacity for autonomy, and these second-order capacities are a matter of self-relations, such as self-confidence, self-respect or self-esteem (see also Anderson and Honneth 2005). These self-relations depend in turn on relations of recognition. The development of positive relations to self presupposes experiences of a recognitively non-humiliating or non-denigrating kind.[14]

For Pettit (2001, p. 19), free *action* presupposes (i) knowledge of the options available, (ii) the resources to evaluate them and iii) the ability to be guided by one's evaluations. For Honneth (1995), it is above all (iii), the ability to be guided by one's evaluations, that depends on a positive self-relation that in turn depends on recognition. Without this positive self-relation, one would lack the courage to say 'no' to others, the confidence that one is able to cope with the world, and the sense that it is appropriate to form one's own evaluations, et cetera.

For Pettit, freedom of the *self* is the ability to identify with one's choices, to see oneself as the author of one's actions, as opposed to being the object of compulsions or a bystander to

one's desires, et cetera.[15] This is the ability presupposed by being fit to be held responsible. Being recognized as being fit to be held responsible is directly *constitutive* of free personhood, not of selfhood, but it is arguably a precondition of the abilities that constitute the freedom of the self. Contemporary Hegelians tend to agree. Robert Pippin (2008), in particular, stresses that the ability to identify with one's choices depends on recognition (sometimes giving the impression that recognition is constitutively relevant, and not merely indirectly relevant). One's specific self-conception is not at issue here, but rather the self-interpreted capacity to own one's actions.

4.3. Freedom in the environment

What about the third, environmental category? Freedom in (the rest of) the environment, when freedom-friendly interpersonal and institutional relations are already in place, may include freedom from impersonal limitations (harsh nature, unintended social and institutional consequences, et cetera), as well as options to engage in meaningful practices.

But do relations of recognition also cover institutional side-effects and identified natural limitations that have not been removed? And is the presence of cultural options a matter of recognition? Philip Pettit (2001, p. 133) argues that domination and arbitrary interference (relating to the second category of interpersonal and institutional structures) *compromise* freedom, whereas impersonal limitations (relating to the third category of the environment), by contrast, merely *condition* it. Axel Honneth (2003, 157) has a more demanding program of 'recognition monism'. According to Honneth, a failure to remove the obstacles to well-being or freedom created, for example, by the economy or even perhaps by nature is also a failure of recognition. He took this line in his debate with Fraser on recognition and redistribution (Fraser and Honneth 2003). The jury is still out on which is the better formulation.

Not only the economy, but also culture can be seen in terms of freedom-enhancing resources. Here Honneth's (2011) Hegelian idea of 'actualizations of freedom' is relevant: meaningful options are indeed constitutive of freedom, and they are related to meaningful social roles, which are necessarily constituted in relations of recognition. Here the broader definition of freedom-in (leading a free life, freedom in social roles) is relevant again. Cultural practices are constitutive aspects of social freedom.

Conclusion: Recognition and aspects of freedom revisited

So, to sum up the argument of this paper, freedom in the agent consists of various aspects. Of these, the possible metaphysical underdetermination within human agents is independent of recognition. But recognition is arguably indirectly relevant for the first-order agentic capacities necessary for *self*-determination or suitable control. It also appears indirectly relevant for the self-relations, such as self-esteem, self-respect and self-confidence, needed for exercising first-order capacities and, further, for freedom in the actual exercise of those capacities in adopting goals and acting accordingly, and in forming relations and participating in shared practices.

Second, freedom in interpersonal and institutional relations consists of various things concerning which recognition is of direct constitutive relevance. These include 'horizontal, one-to-one' intersubjective or interpersonal relations (including attitudes, actions and concerns); more broadly social 'horizontal, part-whole' relations, for example between an individual and the social practice of a group; and also 'vertical' institutional relations, including legal and other official roles, such as state citizenship, and the rights, that come with these roles. These aspects of freedom consist in having a status in relation to others, in particular the relational status of enjoying discursive control and non-domination.

Third, freedom in the environment has various aspects as well. These include, first, material or natural resources and opportunities (for example, a hostile or freedom-friendly environment); second, historically developed cultural practices and horizons of significance (that is, the opportunity to engage in meaningful practices and activities); and third, structural obstacles or aids (ranging from the structural barriers thrown up by economic and bureaucratic organization, through the 'colonization of the lifeworld', to the unintended 'systemic fallouts' of the operation of economic or administrative power). Concerning these, recognition from others can be indirectly relevant.

Conceived in the manner I have suggested here, Pettit's and Hegel's theories of freedom and recognition can be seen as illuminating the broader contexts of non-domination. They arrive at their versions of republicanism starting from starkly different views of nature and history. With reference to Skinner (2002), one might want to ask which is the more promising 'third concept of liberty'? Here I have argued that perhaps one need not have to choose. Despite all their metaphysical differences, Pettit's ideal of 'non-domination' captures a crucial aspect of Hegel's understanding of the structure of 'being at one with oneself in another'.

Acknowledgements

Notes

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[1] Schuppert (2013) advances a parallel project, which focuses on Pippin's and Brandom's reading of Hegel, and with welcome weight being given to Pettit's account of discursive control alongside the ideal of non-domination. For various criticisms that Pettit's ideal of non-domination does not cover all of freedom, see, for example, Krause (2013), Markell (2008) and Thompson (2013).

[2] Hegel's theory of freedom has been analyzed and developed further in very fruitful ways recently: See, for example, Franco (1999), Honneth (2011), Neuhouser (2000), Pippin (2008) and Mäki (2013). I will not address here the problem whether there is more to Hegelian freedom than the structure 'being at one with oneself in another' allows. perhaps the highest form of 'absolute freedom' sublates both the self and the other, and is a form of becoming rather than being, that is, is dynamic or processual or productive rather than a static or structural product (as the format 'being at one with oneself in another' would suggest). I thank Arvi Särkelä for the critical suggestion which I cannot deal with here. See also Allen (2006), who discusses the expressive element in Hegel's concept of freedom and compares it to the idea of non-domination.

[3] On Hegel's republicanism, see, among others, Bohman (2010), Buchwalter (1993) and Neuhouser (2000). An anonymous referee rightly pointed out that Pettit has always been rather resistant to recognizing any affinities with Rousseau or Hegel on this score. He objects to the degree of unity required in their respective collective agents (which may be more true of Rousseau than of Hegel). The interpretation of Hegel provided here emphasizes the way in which Hegel leaves room for individual freedom.

[4] For his commitment to a negative characterization of freedom, see Pettit (2002).

[5] Even the picture of emergence can be misleading, as it suggests an air of non-fundamentality at the level of what emerges, leaving the 'base' properties more fundamental. For Hegel (1971, §381), the emergence of spirit from nature is its coming home from its otherness, the 'waking up' of something that is the true essence of nature as well.

[6] Among contemporary Hegel scholars – for example, in Charles Taylor's (1971) debate with Norman Malcolm (1968) on the idea of 'mechanism' – one finds a contemporary expression of this view of nature, with emerging capacities for self-determination. In his essay 'The conceivability of mechanism', Taylor holds that mechanism is conceivable as long as it saves the phenomena of our agency. He makes the important observation as to how we can still be said to be 'governed' by the lower level 'laws', and thus are not 'exceptions' to laws of nature, although human action contains novel causally relevant aspects not found elsewhere in the nature (because the rest of the nature is not suitably arranged for the relevant properties to emerge).

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[7] That said, the natural basis of freedom discussed above is not dependent on our conceptualizations: it is

   concept-dependent at most in the sense in which all nature has a conceptual structure independently of our

   conceptualizations.

[8] Hegel has a rich account of action and responsibility – which cannot be discussed here in detail – but in his

   account the issue of responsibility is linked with 'moral freedom' rather than 'social freedom' or *Sittlichkeit*.

   See, for example, Wood (1990; 2010).

[9] Pettit (2001, p. 19). Note that, for Pettit, collectives can also be free agents. See List and Pettit (2011).

[10] Freedom is a key category in Hegel's system, he discusses it in his logic

1991b (see for example §158), philosophy of nature 1970 (see for example

§250), and philosophy of spirit 1971 (see for example §381Z-382Z), and also

in his lectures on aesthetics, philosophy of right (1991a, §1-32 and passim.),

and philosophy of history. See for example Houlgate 2005, Neuhouser 2000,

Taylor 1975, Honneth 2000.

[11] It is harder to say how Hegel weighs the three key connotations of freedom that Pettit lists. For Hegel, self-

   determination (of which underdetermination is but one aspect) is crucial, as is ownership. Individual self-

   determination is key to moral freedom, whereas ownership (non-alienation, 'being at home') and collective

   self-determination are more relevant to social freedom. Hegel also stresses the connection between

   responsibility and freedom, but he links the issue of responsibility and imputability with 'moral freedom' in

   his theory of action, rather than to full-fledged 'social freedom' or *Sittlichkeit*. For Hegel, there are arguably

   three types, aspects or conceptions of freedom, which are related to forms of recognitive relation: negative

   'personal freedom' (from constraints, to do as one pleases); 'moral freedom' (from inner compulsions as well,

   to do what one rationally wills and not merely happens to choose); and 'social freedom' (to realize oneself in

   and through social roles such as the family, civil society and the state while preserving one's personal and

   moral freedom). As we saw, Pettit, too, stresses negative freedom, but he sees relations of recognition as

   constitutive of that negative freedom. Pettit's line can be thought as capturing those aspects of *Sittlichkeit*,

   which serve to promote or be as preconditions of personal and moral freedom; by contrast, meaningful social

   practices – while 'meaningful' – are not as such actualizations of freedom in any further sense

[12] Other aspects, specifically esteem (which Honneth and others classify as recognition), are discussed in Brennan and Pettit (2004). There Brennan and Pettit distinguish between recognition, understood as inclusion in the class of beings to be esteemed, and esteem proper.

[13] Pettit (2001, p. 71) further examines which is the key feature of freedom. Is it the existence of the relational *standing* (as a power or capacity), or is it its *exercise* in interaction? In his view, the standing suffices for freedom in principle, but there are two complications: i) one can have the standing or power only when the relationship has been in place prior to interaction; and ii) the relationship strengthens with exercise, insofar as learning and habituation lead to a stronger, surer and more robust common awareness.

[14] An anonymous referee pointed out that at least *some* limited social relations exhibiting respect between those involved seem necessary, but these can pertain in the context of a hostile wider culture.

[15] Pettit uses Frankfurt's (1971) account of volitional control in cashing out freedom of the self, whereas Hegelians are likely to endorse self-determination theories.

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