

# Resolution in §201 of the *Philosophical Investigations*

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PREPRINT. PLEASE CITE PUBLISHED VERSION.  
*Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 98 (2): 393-402 (2020)

## Abstract

It is widely thought that, in §201 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein reveals himself to oppose a definite view or theory of rule-following. I argue that, due to the self-undermining character of that section, no such interpretation should be accepted. Then I sketch a reading of Wittgenstein's method that accounts for the paradoxical nature of §201, and I show how this methodology is realized in his remarks on following a rule.

## Keywords

rule-following; Wittgenstein; scepticism; meaning; elucidation; nonsense

*The proposition is senseless because we have not made some arbitrary determination, not because the symbol is in itself unpermissible.* [Wittgenstein, TLP 5.473]

Among readers of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, it is popular to think of §201<sup>1</sup> as the presentation of the conclusion of a *reductio ad absurdum* or some related form of argument.<sup>2</sup> On such a view, it is thought that Wittgenstein begins the rule-following dialectic with a certain premise or naïve view, proceeds through a line of reasoning, and finally reaches an absurdity that necessitates a rejection of that starting point. I think that any such reading misses the *form* taken by Wittgenstein's treatment of rule-following. But the form that his treatment actually takes is not generally recognized as a viable interpretive option, since the form that it takes is not generally recognized as a viable form for philosophizing to take at all. This paper is thus a prolegomenon of sorts. It will have achieved its goal if, by the end, the reader is (1) persuaded that such a form of philosophical persuasion is possible and (2) prepared to ask for herself whether it is a good fit for Wittgenstein's remarks on following a rule.

In §201 Wittgenstein seeks to make manifest to his reader the following: what we had previously taken to be a 'premise' having to do with rule-following is not that. Rather, this 'premise', although a seemingly well-formed grammatical sentence, is without meaning. By leading his reader through the rule-following

<sup>1</sup>All references are to Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, 2009 version, unless otherwise noted.

<sup>2</sup>Arguably, Kripke [1982], Baker and Hacker [1984: 61], McGinn [1984: 68], McDowell [1992, 2009], Brandom [1994: 29], Wright [2001: 2–3, 2007], Kusch [2006: 241–3], Wilson [2006: 159], and Horwich [2012: 118] read Wittgenstein in this way. Minar [1994] and Stone [2000] are exceptions.

dialectic and finally to its paradox, Wittgenstein means to remove the veneer of sense covering those words. Since this 'premise' is present from the outset of the investigation into rule-following, indeed a part of its very framing, the absurdity of our utterances is merely revealed to us at the apparent culmination of the rule-following dialectic at §201.

Thus, what we do in working through Wittgenstein's investigation into rule-following is to 'pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense' [PI §464, 1958 version]. This puts the method of later Wittgenstein, at least in so far as the topic of rule-following is concerned, into a genus with what 'resolute readers'<sup>3</sup> take to be Wittgenstein's method in the *Tractatus*. Such readers say that Wittgenstein's aim in that book is one of elucidation: he seeks to show that certain strings of words to which we may be attracted actually have been given no meaning when employed in certain philosophical dialectics. Just so, I say, for Wittgenstein's treatment of rule-following.<sup>4, 5</sup>

When we arrive at §201 and the so-called problem of rule-following, we find ourselves compelled to deny the possibility of rule-following—a denial in which we exercise our capacity to follow rules.<sup>6</sup> Wittgenstein begins §201 thus:

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule. The answer was: if every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule, then it can also be brought into conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.

The denial of the possibility of rule-following appears to be a denial of our ability to use language. For, in order to meaningfully employ a sentence, we must be able to make sense of it as being, very loosely, appropriately or inappropriately used (and for a smaller class of sentences, truly or falsely spoken, for the same reasons). In virtue of *what* can a sentence accord, or fail to accord, with a context of utterance? Not in virtue of anything 'brute': nothing about the bare noises or inky squiggles that form a sentence suffices to determine accord. It is what a sentence is used to *mean* that determines whether an application of it is appropriate or inappropriate, correct or incorrect, and so on.<sup>7</sup> Thus, how a sentence is meant is as a rule for the use of that sentence. Knowing what it would be for the world to accord, or fail to accord, with an

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<sup>3</sup>The term was introduced to print by Goldfarb [1997]. The original and most prominent proponents of this kind of reading have been James Conant and Cora Diamond. See Bronzo [2012] for a review of the literature that has amassed on the topic.

<sup>4</sup>This sort of reading of Wittgenstein's methodology is dubbed 'Pyrrhonian' by Stern [2004]. A non-Pyrrhonian reading, on Stern's terminology, is one on which Wittgenstein is viewed as arguing both for a definite theory as well as against one. As Stern himself reads PI, Wittgenstein means to engage in a dialectic where neither a Pyrrhonian nor a non-Pyrrhonian methodology ultimately prevails.

<sup>5</sup>Cora Diamond [1989], Baker [2004], and Stephen Mulhall [2007] argue for such a reading of the 'private language argument' in PI, sections that follow on the heels of Wittgenstein's remarks on following a rule. <sup>6</sup>The second chapter of Kripke [1982] contains a concise exposition of this point.

<sup>6</sup>The second chapter of Kripke [1982] contains a concise exposition of this point.

<sup>7</sup>Ginsborg [forthcoming] disputes this construal of how the problem of rule-following threatens the very possibility of meaning, arguing that it is accordance not with meaning *per se*, but with past use that determines the correct application of a rule (and so undergirds the use of language).

utterance is to grasp that utterance's meaning; and so uses of language, speakings, are by their very nature such as to sort some contexts into the fitting and the unfitting, the true and the false.

Kripke is clear on the self-defeating nature of this 'conclusion' about rules. On the matter of getting the 'problem' into view, he writes, 'Only *past* usages are to be questioned. Otherwise, we will be unable to formulate our problem' [1982: 14]. And in the fullness of the dialectic, it comes out that we really are unable to *formulate* the problem. Kripke eventually goes on to declare the following [ibid.: 21]:

When we initially presented the paradox, we perforce used language, taking present meanings for granted. Now we see ... that this provisional concession was indeed fictive. There can be no fact as to what I mean by ... any ... word at any time. The ladder must finally be kicked away.<sup>8</sup>

It goes without saying that, even in this later presentation of the 'paradox', Kripke per force uses language. But the ability to use language seems to be precisely one of the capacities denied by the so-called problem of rule-following. So the paradox, whatever exactly it may be, seems that it cannot even be stated—but, of course, it must be stated if it is to be presented or pondered at all.

This philosophical knot is quite different than what one expects to find in, say, a *reductio* argument. Finding that one's assumptions lead to contradiction does not typically undercut one's ability to formulate the problem at hand. Nor is it clear how we might assimilate the point that we have reached at this stage of the rule-following dialectic to a traditional *reductio*. For we have not reached any straightforward contradiction, something of the form 'p and not-p.'

At this juncture, to simply ferret out some premise to reject as false would be inadequate. It would be to proceed as if we were merely led to contradiction, when we are in fact led to what *prima facie* appears to be a different kind of philosophical predicament. What we need is an account of the rule-following paradox that is sensitive to the self-defeating nature of its 'conclusion', one that is not so quick to treat the position we have reached as plainly intelligible or one for which it is clear what sort of response is needed.

I suggest that, when the sceptic denies the possibility of rule-following (and so meaning and understanding), we fail to understand what she, in speaking those words, means. That is, we cannot make sense of *her*. This failure of understanding is not due to our not knowing the meanings of the words she speaks. It is, rather, due to our not knowing what someone using those words on this occasion could be using those words to say. We cannot make sense of how such words are meant to be understood, or of what one's motivation could be in so speaking, and so we cannot grasp what is being said. While the words used may, on the face of it, purport to make a claim, we have no grasp of what it could be.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>See Read [2000] for a discussion of Kripke on this point.

<sup>9</sup>Under the influence of Gricean orthodoxy, it might seem that properly distinguishing between semantics and pragmatics should explain this phenomenon. I think that the power of this distinction to do such philosophical work has been overestimated. See Cavell [1979] and Travis [1991].

We have spoken thus far only of understanding another, of making sense of the words that someone else speaks. But Wittgenstein does not mean his reader to witness the rule-following dialectic as an exercise that someone *else* performs. Each reader of the *Philosophical Investigations* is meant to work through the dialectic and to feel moved by the voices that Wittgenstein sets himself in careful opposition to. Thus, we are supposed to find ourselves, in denying the possibility of rule-following, in the same position that we would be in vis-à-vis hearing another make that denial, but with respect to ourselves. That is to say, we are supposed to find ourselves speaking words of which we cannot make proper sense. It is not that we do not understand what the words used in the denial mean, but that we cannot make sense of our saying, and apparently endorsing, them. What could *I* mean by saying ‘Rule-following, meaning and understanding, are impossible’ or more simply ‘Words have no meaning’—what could I want those words to say?<sup>10</sup>

It is not that there is some nonsensical thought (whatever that would be) that we are trying, but failing, to express.<sup>11</sup> We are not violating a criterion of meaning or transgressing our ‘grammar’ and therefore lapsing into nonsense (*pace* Baker and Hacker [1984]). Nor is it that we are saying something false or outrageous. It is that we do not know how to make sense of someone, potentially ourselves, who, by working through the rule-following dialectic, comes to purport to deny the possibility of a capacity that is plainly exercised in that denial.

An appropriate response to one who ‘asserts’ such a ‘conclusion’ would be to ask what someone who so speaks could possibly be taken to mean.<sup>12</sup> Rather than having seen a premise to be false or a philosophical thesis to have been proven right or wrong, we are more likely to be aptly described at §201 as being left with a feeling of bafflement. Thus Kripke discusses how, in contemplating the paradox, he has often found himself with an ‘eerie feeling’ [1982: 21].<sup>13</sup> Or, as Wittgenstein describes the feeling of philosophical confusion in the Big Typescript, ‘It’s like having a hair on one’s tongue; one feels it, but can’t get hold of it, and therefore can’t get rid of it’ [TBT §87]. One feels there to be a paradox in the vicinity (surely!) but does not know how to rigorously articulate it. One has not yet found the words to express the problem.

§201 cannot be regarded as the conclusion of a traditional argument. Its self-undermining character precludes such a reading. Instead, we ought to regard the relevant proclamations of §201 as failing to mean anything definite. While they appear to make claims, they do not, so there is nothing immediate in them to understand or fail to understand. I will be concerned to show how Wittgenstein’s remarks on following a

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<sup>10</sup>And if I thought that I had achieved philosophical clarity on the topic of rule-following, could such words as these ever be adequate to express it?

<sup>11</sup>I employ no ‘positive’ conception of nonsense, as Diamond [1981] terms it.

<sup>12</sup>Boghossian [1989] and McGinn [2002] suggest that, by claiming a non-reductionist view of meaning and understanding, the rule-following paradox is dissolved. But we can now say why the non-reductionist response is wrong-headed. The non-reductionist imagines there to be a clearly articulable problem, a preposterous claim that needs to be avoided. This betrays a misunderstanding of the form of our predicament. It assumes the appropriate sort of answer to be a head-on one—that is, an answer that presents a solution in the very same terms in which the problem is posed.

<sup>13</sup>See also Kripke [1982: 1, 5].

rule fit this understanding of §201. To do so, I will consider a line of thought that is roughly of the form that I take Wittgenstein's to be. It will function as a model, one meant to demonstrate Wittgenstein's method.

As has been said, I take Wittgenstein to seek to show not that some premise is false, but that a string of words—one that we previously thought to express a clear proposition—has no meaning for us when employed in the investigation into rule-following. Thus, while we might ultimately do something that resembles rejecting a premise, we will not write off any *proposition* as *false*. Instead, we may choose to no longer speak certain words on certain occasions, for it will no longer seem clear to us that there is something to be said in so speaking. As Wittgenstein writes, 'When a sentence is called senseless, it is not, as it were, its sense that is senseless. Rather, a combination of words is being excluded from the language, withdrawn from circulation' [PI §500].<sup>14</sup>

Wittgenstein concludes §201 thus: 'there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But one should only call "interpretation" the substitution of one expression of the rule for another' [PI, 1958 version].<sup>15</sup> Drawing on this passage and others, much of the focus in the secondary literature has been on the term 'interpretation'. Suppose, then, that we take Wittgenstein to be concerned to reject (or 'reject') a premise ('premise')—withdraw from circulation a certain combination of words—that can be enunciated thus: 'Every sign needs an interpretation to determine its meaning.' I take this to engender only a slight revision to 'every action according to a rule is an interpretation' and is close enough for the purpose of demonstrating Wittgenstein's method. Also, given that the focus from Kripke [1982] onwards has largely been on the relationship between rule-following and meaning and understanding, it is helpful to make the connection explicit in the sentence that will serve as our stalking horse.

In our toy-model of Wittgensteinian elucidation, we will consider two ways in which the sentence 'Every sign needs an interpretation to determine its meaning' might be used, and it will be obvious that neither use ought to be accepted as true. To say this, however, is not to reject two different propositions that can be expressed by those words. For in only one use of that sentence does it actually say or mean anything. So, with respect to one use, the sentence expresses a false proposition, and given its other apparent use, it bears no meaning: it is, if you like, 'nonsense'.

The words of the sentence mentioned above are ordinary words combined in an ordinary way; so combined, they have an ordinary meaning. An easy way to get an ordinary sense of these words—and 'interpretation' in particular—into view is to think of being confronted by a foreign language.<sup>16</sup> In such a case, it will be necessary for an interpretation to be given in order for those signs to become comprehensible. But a

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<sup>14</sup>And also '[These words] are excluded from our language like some arbitrary noise, and the reason for their *explicit* exclusion can only be that *we are tempted* to confuse them with a sentence of our language' [PG: 130].

<sup>15</sup>I have slightly modified Anscombe's translation. See also §198.

<sup>16</sup>Finkelstein [2000], in his own discussion of rule-following, invokes a kindred scenario.

case of some German being interpreted for the sake of a monolingual English-speaker does not capture what someone moved by the rule-following dialectic wishes to say, because, of course, no English speaker need have 'rule' interpreted for her. And since an interlocutor engaged in the rule-following dialectic (hereafter 'the interlocutor') is interested in a sense of 'interpretation' of which it is *prima facie* obvious to say 'Every sign needs an interpretation to determine its meaning', this ordinary use fails to capture the philosophical notion that she takes herself to have in mind.

What our interlocutor wants is a sense of the term 'interpretation' that appears to be applicable to all cases of following a rule. Only this could enable her to say 'Every sign needs an interpretation to determine its meaning' and thus begin the search for a regress-stopper that drives the rule-following dialectic. We can imagine this interlocutor responding to the foregoing as follows: 'I grant that there is an ordinary sense of "interpretation" having to do with the substitution of one expression for another. But that is not what I am interested in. What fascinates me—and what motivates the sceptical problem to do with rule-following—is the sense in which *every* expression of a rule needs an interpretation in order for it to be meaningful. After all, signs are not meaningful all by themselves.'

Suppose that an interpreter at the UN is presented with a document in both German and French. She will be translating into English, but it is possible that the party for whom she is translating the document speaks one of French or German in addition to English. So, she asks, 'Do all of the words need interpretation, or only some of them?' To this, it might sensibly be responded, 'Every sign is meaningless until you interpret it. So, you cannot interpret only some of the signs; you have to interpret all of them.' The ordinary uses and meanings of the words employed in that sentence are still the only ones that we have in view. We have not yet managed to capture what someone compelled to claim 'Every sign needs an interpretation to determine its meaning' as a part of a philosophical dialectic wishes to express by her words, words that are the verbal twin of those used in the example.<sup>17</sup> So far, we know (are told) only that it is not what would be meant in the kind of case considered above.

It should be clear that nothing here hinges on our supposedly being unable to generalize the ordinary sense of the word 'interpretation', thereby creating a sceptical problem, because it is difficult to think of a context in which it might be given such general use. The problem is that, when we give a totally general statement about the necessity of interpretation in this ordinary sense of the term, it is just plainly false. If 'interpretation' means what it would for the UN interpreter, or for a stranger in a strange land, then the claim 'Every sign needs an interpretation to determine its meaning' says something false. And the negation of such a sentence gives us a platitude, not a philosophical thesis. Any speaker of a language—so, virtually anyone at all—has abundant counterexamples ready-to-hand. I do not have to *interpret* my mother tongue, and I

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<sup>17</sup>I borrow the term 'verbal twin' from Clarke [1972].

need not be a *philosopher* to know this.

So, our interlocutor is faced with a dilemma. She says, 'Every sign needs an interpretation to determine its meaning.' As an ordinary claim, this is plainly false, as anyone can see. As a philosophical claim, it has not yet been given any clear meaning.<sup>18</sup> Working through the rule-following dialectic is supposed to eventually make this fact clear to us. By demonstrating that there is no stopping the dialectic from devolving into 'patent nonsense'—that there is no way of stopping ourselves from endorsing the manifestly nonsensical strings of words found in §201—Wittgenstein seeks to induce his reader to reflect on the 'premise' that originally frames the inquiry into rule-following. Thus, we return to the initial set-up of the dialectic, and there uncover latent nonsense in the form of our use of the term 'interpretation'.

The sentence 'Every sign needs an interpretation to determine its meaning' is a stalking horse. We have used it to get into view the *kind* of thing that Wittgenstein is up to. And there is not merely one set string of words to which Wittgenstein aims to excise his interlocutor's attraction. The constantly evolving nature of the *Philosophical Investigations* is itself a reflection of the difficulty of putting sceptical disquietude to rest. Since the mood or mindset (or whatever it may be) that gives rise to such a sceptical dialectic cannot be definitively voiced and articulated, it also cannot be definitively or finally refuted. It can instead be treated in the manner described. Whether such a treatment will prove to have lasting effect will have much to do with the reader herself.

These difficulties can be seen in the persistence of certain kinds of suggestions made by various interlocutors in Wittgenstein's work. One perpetual worry is presented by a platonist voice.<sup>19</sup> When Wittgenstein considers and talks through various platonist suggestions made in the rule-following dialectic, he is considering ways in which one might try to give content to the premise 'Every sign needs an interpretation to determine its meaning' by filling out the sense of 'interpretation' here at work. One might want to say that the *meaning itself* is or attaches to the 'interpretation' of a sign. As Wittgenstein describes it, 'What one wishes to say is: "Every sign is capable of interpretation; but the *meaning* mustn't be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation"' [BBB: 34]. He then investigates whether this is something that one moved to speak our 'premise' could accept as an explication of what she means in speaking it, ultimately concluding it cannot be.

Let us briefly examine two examples in the *Philosophical Investigations* that exhibit this sort of method. The first is §139. The §§130s inaugurate a run of passages that take a special interest in the notion of understanding a linguistic item. Wittgenstein muses:

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<sup>18</sup>See Travis [1997: 98] for a related critique of philosophical employments of the word 'know'.

<sup>19</sup>Baker and Hacker [1984: 58], Wright [1989], McDowell [1992], Brandom [1994: 20], and Finkelstein [2000], among others, have observed that a platonist voice plays a major role in the rule-following dialectic.

What really comes before our mind when we *understand* a word?—Isn't it something like a picture? Can't it *be* a picture?

Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you hear the word 'cube', say the drawing of a cube. In what way can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word 'cube'? . . .

The picture of the cube did indeed *suggest* a certain use to us, but it was also possible for me to use it differently.

In this passage, Wittgenstein considers the thought that understanding a word consists in having a picture come to mind. It is clear that one dimension of his response lies in his concern to reject the suggestion. Once moved by the sceptical worries that generate the rule-following dialectic, the suggestion that understanding might consist in having a picture before one's mind will be inadequate. As Wittgenstein points out, a picture cannot ground our general capacity to understand (or mean) any more than can, say, an interpretation.

Yet there is another dimension to his response. It consists in the suggestion that there is nothing wrong, at least on certain occasions, in saying that understanding can consist in a picture coming before one's mind. Wittgenstein responds to the inchoate suggestion that, in understanding, 'what comes before our mind' is 'something like' a picture, by suggesting that it *can* be a picture.<sup>20</sup> This is not to say that mental pictures ground our capacity to mean and understand, but that in light of the entirety of our commerce with linguistic signs, a picture coming before our mind can sometimes be said to be what our understanding a word consists in.

The second section to be briefly discussed comes later in the *Philosophical Investigations*, but still prior to §201's presentation of the rule-following paradox.

193. A machine as a symbol of its mode of operation. The machine, I might say for a start, seems already to contain its own mode of operation. What does that mean?—If we know the machine, everything else—that is the movements it will make—seem to be already completely determined.

We talk as if these parts could only move in this way, as if they could not do anything else. Is this how it is? Do we forget the possibility of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on? Yes; in many cases we don't think of that at all. We use a machine, or a picture of a machine, as a symbol of a particular mode of operation.

This is another section that occurs in a series of passages aimed at unravelling our concepts of meaning and understanding. One might be tempted to think of the meaning of a word (or our understanding of it) as something that, taken on its own, determines precisely how the word may be used on any given occasion. The meaning, it might seem, attaches to the word as the possibility of movement attaches to a machine. Does this provide us with a helpful way of thinking about or articulating how a word and its meaning are connected? (Should this be a guide to how we think of the philosophical sense of 'interpretation' that we

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<sup>20</sup>One inescapable task for any reader of Wittgenstein is to answer whether any particular passage or sentence is meant to express a confusion that Wittgenstein seeks to address or instead constitutes part of his response to some such confusion. Thus, I read 'Can't it *be* a picture?' as responding to, and not strengthening, 'Isn't it something like a picture?'



are after in the rule-following dialectic?) Again, Wittgenstein brings his interlocutor back to earth, pointing out certain facts about actual machines, revealing how we are inclined to use the machine as a symbol—a symbol that is in as much need of grounding as meaning and understanding seem to be.<sup>21</sup> So, there turn out to be actual machines, on which we have a concrete grip but that will not serve our purpose here, and then there is the machine *qua* symbol—but a symbol is not yet an explanation.

These considerations lead to others, and so on. At the end of it all, we have (perhaps) exhausted our interest in such a string of words. We no longer think that there is a way of getting that sentence (our ‘premise’) to say what we want it to say, for, as we attempt to give sense to it, we cannot help being led to the patent nonsense of §201. Finally, after much ado—after following the dialectic through its twists and turns—we find that at the heart of our bafflement there is nothing, no real problem save our own confusion over what-we-cannot-say.<sup>22</sup>

Earlier, I quoted Wittgenstein as saying ‘there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation’, and now we are able to say why he here speaks of there being an ‘inclination’ to speak a particular phrase. It is because he does not take himself to be identifying a proposition, one that can be expressed by the words that we are ‘inclined to say’, but rather merely identifying a string of words that we are *inclined to say*. That is why Wittgenstein follows this observation about our ‘inclination’ with this piece of advice: ‘one should only call “interpretation” the substitution of one expression of the rule for another.’ Wittgenstein is here not legislating how we ought to speak, but is offering sound advice. Having found that we are inclined to think of every word as requiring an ‘interpretation’, something which we have seen to lead to dramatic forms of confusion, it would not be a bad idea, suggests Wittgenstein, if we were to reign in our use of the word ‘interpretation’ to those cases in which we substitute one sign for another. Such cases being the kind where we actually do employ the concept,<sup>23</sup> we would then not run the risk of the word becoming unmoored to the point of unintelligibility.<sup>24</sup>

What would Wittgenstein consider to be a satisfactory response to the paradox? It cannot be that we replace a faulty naïve account—one on which all rule-following is a matter of interpretation, say—with some less naive account.<sup>25</sup> For we have said that there is no such thing as the faulty account in the first place, and so it is unclear what we would be replacing, or what our motivation for introducing a theory of rule-following at this point would be. Nor can we reject a premise as false, affirm its contradiction, and

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<sup>21</sup>This section encapsulates one of Kripke’s [1982] well-known objections to dispositional accounts of meaning.

<sup>22</sup>Wittgenstein writes, in §118, ‘What we are destroying is nothing but structures of air’ (translation from Cavell [1979: xxi]).

<sup>23</sup>There are, of course, other times when we speak of interpretation, but, in the context of giving this piece of advice, the simplification is purposeful.

<sup>24</sup>It is not uncommon for Wittgenstein to give such advice. In §154, he counsels us to ‘[try] not to think of understanding as a “mental process” at all.—For that is the expression which confuses you.’ See also §38.

<sup>25</sup>As Kripke [1982] perhaps thinks that Wittgenstein does.

willingly forego seeking a replacement theory.<sup>26</sup> For there is no premise to be so rejected, and thus no contradictory to be affirmed.

In the *Big Typescript*, Wittgenstein makes the following remark: ‘If I rectify a philosophical mistake ... I must always point out an analogy according to which one had been thinking, but which one did not recognize as an analogy’ [TBT §87]. And this is what we see in the sections just highlighted. In each, Wittgenstein wonders what it is that we are really thinking when we entertain the ‘possibility’ that understanding a word is a matter of a picture coming before our minds or whether meaning attaches to a word like the possibility of movement to a machine. The analogy is unearthed for what it is and thus dispelled. In such passages, we see an application of the following statement of program: ‘What *we* do is to bring [*föhren*] words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use’ [PI §116]. This aptly characterizes the general thrust of Wittgenstein’s treatment of following a rule. We begin the rule-following dialectic with ordinary words combined in an ordinary way. We do not take ourselves to be attempting to say anything extraordinary as we use them. Eventually, though, we come to see that we have gone well beyond the uses of them that are familiar to us. We then try to work out exactly what this special philosophical use comes to—what those words, so used, could mean. Should we become well and truly convinced that there is nothing definite that we want those words to say, we will no longer be tempted to use those words to try to express a philosophical insight. Those words would then return again to the only kind of context in which we have given them definite meaning—that of our everyday lives.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>As McDowell [1992, 2009] arguably reads Wittgenstein. Brandom [1994:29] and Wright [2007] offer readings that are untenable for much the same reason.

<sup>27</sup>Hannah Ginsborg and Barry Stroud have my gratitude for reading different drafts of this paper and making helpful observations and suggestions. Two anonymous referees also provided a large number of comments that led to significant improvements; would that I could thank them in person, but this will have to do.

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