Parfit, Derek. *On What Matters*. Vol. 3.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 488. $45.00 (cloth).

Singer, Peter, ed. *Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity*.
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In 2010, Peter Singer taught a seminar on a draft of Derek Parfit's then-forthcoming *On What Matters*, volumes 1 and 2 (Derek Parfit, *On What Matters*, vols. 1 and 2 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011]). Inspired by the discussion, Singer says, he compiled responses to Parfit. These responses then prompted commentary from Parfit. The result is the simultaneous publication of *Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity*, a collection of articles on volumes 1 and 2 edited by Singer, and *On What Matters*, volume 3, an extended series of responses from Parfit.

A lot happens in the combined 808 pages between Singer's collection and Parfit's volume 3. Singer's collection can be thought of as dividing roughly into three threads. In one thread, several of the contributors, including Frank Jackson, Peter Railton, Bruce Russell, and Mark Schroeder, respond to a variety of objections to different species of Metaethical Naturalism that Parfit develops in volumes 1 and 2. In a second thread, Simon Blackburn and Alan Gibbard tackle Parfit's doubts about Expressivism. The third thread is more frayed, covering issues related to Internalism in Stephen Darwall's views, Andrew Huddleston on Parfit's engagement with Nietzsche, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer on evolutionary debunking arguments, Michael Smith's preferred version of Subjectivism, Sharon Street's species of Constructivism, Larry Temkin's reflections on whether the significance of Parfit's life depends on how these debates shake out, Richard Yetter Chappell also on evolutionary debunking, and loads of topics in between. Volume 3 contains Parfit's responses to all of these contributors in its first three parts (numbered as parts 7, 8, and 9), except for his response to de Lazari-Radek and Singer, who are addressed in the fourth and final part (part 10).

That volume 3 consists mostly of responses and covers a wide range of topics raises the question whether anything distinguishes this volume as a book, as opposed to an author-meets-critics rejoinder that happens to be, together with Singer's collection, roughly seven hundred pages too long for a journal symposium. How can volume 3 be profitably read "on its own," as the dust jacket claims? This question is all the more salient in light of Oxford University Press describing Singer's collection as a "companion" to volume 3, which is something of an understatement, since Parfit tells us that he would have written "none" of volume 3 had it not been for Singer's collection (xiii). Indeed, the dust jackets of these two volumes even share the very same stunning photograph of Palace Square at St. Petersburg, taken by Parfit himself.

The question of what unifies volume 3 also points to another: what could make volume 3 a volume of the *On What Matters* series, while retaining its own identity as a standalone work? We can begin to answer this second question by observing that while Parfit responds to every author in Singer's collection, it is really the first and second threads on Naturalism and Expressivism that receive most of his attention. In particular, Parfit spends the bulk of volume 3 attempting to show

that Naturalists, as represented by Railton, and Expressivists, as represented by Gibbard, agree with Parfit's "Nonrealist Cognitivist" brand of Nonnaturalism in metaethics, according to which at least some normative claims are true in virtue of nonnatural but "nonontological" parts of reality (much more on this below).

It is Parfit's interest in establishing agreement with Railton and Gibbard that gives us a more direct clue as to what binds volume 3 with volumes 1 and 2. Parfit says that he is "deeply worried by disagreements with people who seem as likely [as he is] to be getting things right" (xiii). This is because, according to Parfit, "if we cannot resolve these disagreements, that may give us strong reasons to doubt that we are the people who are getting things right" (371). In light of these statements, it is natural to understand the central concern of volume 3 to be the epistemological challenge of disagreement and the associated threat that it might pose to the possibility of progress in moral philosophy. It is also a worry that has been said to tie together volumes 1 and 2 (Mark Schroeder, "Review of *On What Matters*, Vols. 1 and 2," *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, August 1 [2011]). Since volume 3 picks up on one of the core ideas of volumes 1 and 2, it is easy to understand how it fits into *On What Matters* as a whole.

This answer also helps in addressing the first question of what makes volume 3 a book. In both volume 1 and parts 4 and 5 of volume 2, Parfit's worries about the threat that disagreement might pose to moral progress motivate him to argue that there isn't any deep disagreement among normative ethicists; in particular, Kantians, Consequentialists, and Contractualists are "climbing the same mountain from different sides" (Parfit, *On What Matters*, vols. 1 and 2, 419). But the Parfit of part 6 of volume 2 argues that there isn't any deep disagreement among metaethicists, not because their views capture different aspects of the one true metaethical theory, as he argues is the case with Kantians, Consequentialists, and Contractualists in normative ethics, but because metaethicists lack the relevant concepts to even disagree with his Nonnaturalism, the allegedly true theory.

Volume 3 is a different story from part 6 of volume 2. Parfit says that the articles in Singer's collection "showed" that he had made a number of "bad mistakes" (xiii). Moreover, Parfit is clear about the mistakes he has in mind. In responding to Temkin's criticisms that he does not focus enough on what there is to learn from rival views in volume 2, Parfit writes, "In [volume 3] I try to follow Temkin's advice. When I wrote Part Six of *On What Matters*, I misunderstood some of the people whose meta-ethical views I rejected. Two such people are Railton and Gibbard. I now believe that, as Railton and Gibbard have separately suggested and I shall later try to show, the three of us have resolved our main meta-ethical disagreements. We hope that others will reach similar conclusions" (54).

Instead of showing that his opponents lack the concepts to disagree with his metaethical view in volume 3, Parfit's main task is to reveal the pervasive degree of agreement with it. This has both the stylistic virtue of increasing the thematic unity of the *On What Matters* series, as volume 3 takes the same kind of approach to securing moral progress as volume 1, and the substantive virtue of preserving if not extending the existing level of agreement. We can understand volume 3 as a book in its own right, then, in virtue of it advancing a distinct *meta-metaethical* thesis: it is rational to be optimistic about the possibility of progress in moral philosophy, because there is more agreement concerning the nature of normativity

than has been previously recognized. Since Parfit spends most of volume 3 developing Nonrealist Cognitivism and defending the claim that Railton and Gibbard agree with it, I will focus on these aspects for the rest of this "double" review, beginning with Nonrealist Cognitivism before turning to Parfit's arguments concerning metaethical convergence.

It turns out that the general shape of Parfit's Nonrealist Cognitivism is already deep inside and scattered throughout volume 2. But the significance of it to his overall outlook has not yet caught the attention of many moral philosophers (218). Parfit's hints of the "nonontological" nature of normativity in volume 2, however, take center stage in volume 3. This shift in emphasis to and resulting articulation of Nonrealist Cognitivism is one of the hallmarks of volume 3. Parfit's view is "Cognitivist" in the sense that some normative claims "can be true" but also "Nonrealist" in the sense that "these claims are [not] made to be true by correctly describing, or corresponding to, how things are in some part of reality" (59).

Despite the label and characterization above, Parfit is not describing himself as an Error Theorist, since it is part of his view that at least some normative claims are true. And even though Parfit says that at least some true normative claims are not made to be true in virtue of "some part of reality," he is also not an ordinary Nonnaturalist by another name. Parfit thinks that ordinary Nonnaturalists are committed to the claim that nonnatural, "ontologically weighty" parts of reality make some normative claims true (60). In contrast, on his Nonrealist Cognitivist style of Nonnaturalism, at least some normative claims are true in virtue of a nonnatural part of reality that is not "ontologically weighty."

It will be instructive to focus on an example. In his exchange with Gibbard, Parfit treats the claim that suffering matters as both normative and true (192, 232). Focusing first on what makes it normative, the claim that suffering matters involves the nonnormative concept SUFFERING (small caps denote concepts) and the normative concept MATTERS. It is the involvement of MATTERS, Parfit suggests, that makes the claim normative. Moreover, according to Parfit, the precise sense in which we can understand MATTERS to be normative is the "purely normative, reason-implying sense" (41), which is to say that we can understand MATTERS in terms of DECISIVE REASONS TO CARE (232). This sense of mattering contrasts with several other senses that Parfit articulates, including "ordinary" (41), "response-dependent" (48), and "expressivist" senses (196). Most saliently, it is said to contrast with the "psychological" (45) sense in which suffering matters in virtue of our merely caring about it. On Parfit's view, the claim that suffering matters is normative if we understand it as the claim that we have decisive reasons to care about suffering.

Turn now to what makes the claim true. That we have decisive reasons to care about suffering is made true, Parfit suggests, partly in virtue of SUFFERING picking out the event-type <suffering> (angle brackets denote nonconceptual entities). As for DECISIVE REASONS TO CARE, Parfit suggests that it picks out something like the relation <having decisive reasons to care about>. Since we use SUFFERING to successfully pick out the event-type <suffering>, and since we use DECISIVE REASONS TO CARE to successfully pick out the relation <having decisive reasons to care> obtaining (presumably) between "us" and <suffering>, voilà, the normative claim that suffering matters is true. Following Parfit, I am using less-than-precise

locutions like "make true" and taking the nature of truth to be, as he does, "more-than-minimal" but falling short of "some strong Cognitivist" sense (195). For issues related to truth and Nonrealist Cognitivism, see Jussi Suikkanen, "Non-realist Cognitivism, Truth, and Objectivity," *Acta Analytica* 32 (2017):193–212.

Parfit's picture immediately raises questions about how reference could be secured so easily. His big idea in volume 3 is that at least some normative properties might be "pleonastic" or "description-fitting," in the sense that "they fit the descriptive words or phrases with which we refer to them" (66). It is this nominal sense of normative property that Parfit has in mind when he contrasts his view with ordinary Nonnaturalist views that have "ontologically weighty" commitments (68). On Nonrealist Cognitivism, normative properties are finely individuated by the normative concepts we use to think about them, and hence there are at least as many normative properties as there are normative concepts for picking them out. The upshot is that normative reference and truth come cheap. To support the idea that reference and truth in normative contexts are best understood in terms of description-fitting properties, Parfit leans heavily on analogies with mathematics, logic, and modality. In particular, Parfit suggests that moral philosophy is a partner in innocence with these domains. In discussing normative truths, for example, Parfit writes, "Like some other non-empirically discoverable truths—such as logical, mathematical, and modal truths—these non-natural normative truths . . . raise no difficult ontological questions. Mathematicians need not fear that arithmetic might all be false because there aren't any numbers" (99).

Of course, analogizing moral philosophy to mathematics, logic, and modality is not in itself suspect. It has both historical precedence and contemporary relevance. But analogies only work when we can leverage clear and relatively uncontroversial judgments from the domains of interest. And the problem is that parallel debates in the philosophy of mathematics, logic, and modality are equally unsettled; they rage at a comparable level of intensity. While Parfit is more sensitive to this concern in volume 3 than in volume 2, it's still not clear that he fully appreciates its force. It is not too much to ask to be shown that everything is kosher across these domains, instead of being told that it is so, especially in light of the fact that Parfit has been appealing to mathematics, logic, and modality for at least twenty years (Derek Parfit, "Reasons and Motivation," *Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society* 71 [1997]: 99–130). Parfit's discussions of these issues make it clear that, in response, he would say that it is asking too much for answers to questions that, according to him, are not "clear enough to be worth discussing" (61). But I can think of no better time for serious philosophical intervention than when a domain of inquiry is suffering from the conceptual impoverishment to which Parfit alludes.

Relatedly, another issue with Parfit's support for Nonrealist Cognitivism concerns its compatibility with his further commitment to Primitivism about reason-involving concepts, according to which they are "not helpfully explained in other terms" (165). If Primitivism about normative concepts is true, then how could Parfit justifiably claim that a reason-involving concept like DECISIVE REASONS TO CARE has a count noun structure (involving reasons) and not a mass noun structure (involving reason)? (See Daniel Fogal, "Reasons, Reason, and Context," in *Weighing Reasons*, ed. Errol Lord and Barry Maguire [Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2016], 74–103.) How do we know that it is dyadic or polyadic rather than monadic? Why should it be understood as summative ("decisive") and not contributory? How do we know that one of the fundamental normative concepts really has CARE as a constituent, to say nothing about the Humean scruples that are violated in relating REASONS (and the corresponding <reasons>) and CARE (along with corresponding distinct existence <care>)? To say any of what Parfit wants to say about normative concepts and corresponding description-fitting properties is to abandon Primitivism for something closer to a Neoclassical view in the general theory of concepts, on which it is possible to reveal necessary but not sufficient conditions for their application via analysis. (See Derek Leben, "Neoclassical Concepts," *Mind and Language* 30 [2015]: 44–69.) This might not ultimately be a cost for Parfit, but it is nevertheless worth being clear on.

Enough has been said about Nonrealist Cognitivism to begin evaluating Parfit's core contention that Naturalists like Railton agree with him, before turning to whether Expressivists like Gibbard are also on board. Railton is a proponent of Nonanalytical Naturalism ("Naturalism" from here on), a package of theses consisting in the metaphysical claim that normative properties are identical to natural properties and a pair of claims concerning normative concepts—that at least some normative and natural concepts pick out the same properties, and at least some normative concepts are not fully analyzable in terms of natural concepts.

Traditionally, the dispute between Naturalism and ordinary Nonnaturalism centers on the metaphysical claim that normative properties are identical to natural properties. Naturalists accept it, while ordinary Nonnaturalists reject it. Yet Parfit doesn't consider himself to be an ordinary Nonnaturalist, as we've seen. He thinks that his commitment to nonontological description-fitting normative properties not only distinguishes his view from ordinary Nonnaturalism but also holds the key to securing agreement between him and Railton.

It is easy to understand why Parfit thinks that description-fitting properties secure such agreement. Railton says that, on his view, concepts have "job descriptions" or roles that specify which properties fit them, thereby satisfying their associated concepts (Railton quoted in Parfit, 117). It takes serious philosophical work to figure out which properties fit different job descriptions, and it could turn out that a single property fits more than one job description, hence satisfying more than one concept. Importantly, too, Railton says that he "use[s] job descriptions in much the same way Parfit uses properties in the description-fitting sense" (Railton quoted in Parfit, 117). Railton is up front about why he does not reject description-fitting normative properties. He says that description-fitting properties, like job descriptions, "enable us to make needed distinctions and convey important information . . . without introducing unnecessary elements into our ontology" (Railton quoted in Parfit, 177–78). This is music to Parfit's ears, of course, as he too wishes to avoid introducing such elements and also frequently justifies appealing to description-fitting normative properties on the basis of the claim that they are "informative."

Notice, however, that Parfit and Railton both characterize description-fitting normative properties in thoroughly linguistic or conceptual terms, which isn't exactly a revelation, given the very label "description-fitting." It is none-

theless important, because it strongly suggests that the two of them both assign description-fitting normative properties not to any theoretical task in metaphysics, but rather to the task of explaining phenomena like meaning. Thus, even if Railton allows a place on his view for description-fitting normative "properties," it is a stretch to think, as Parfit often suggests, that he has inspired any significant change in Railton's views about metaphysics.

Parfit's discussion of his metaphysical disagreement with Railton is a missed opportunity. This starts to come into view when we zoom out to the broader landscape of debate. Historically, Nonnaturalists have been on the whole nonchalant about the challenges to their view from many of the so-called core areas of philosophy, especially from mind and language. This has left the door open to Naturalists to insist that we ought to prefer their views over Nonnaturalist views, on the grounds that Naturalist views have an easier time explaining, for example, how we come to think and talk about morality.

Recently, however, on behalf of Nonnaturalists, it has been argued that Nonnaturalists and their opponents might be on a par, at least semantically, since Nonnaturalists can take advantage of, for example, promising Contextualist tools that have been thought only to be available to their opponents (Nicholas Laskowski, "How to Pull a Metaphysical Rabbit Out of an End-Relational Semantic Hat," *Res Philosophica* 91 [2014]: 589–607). Meanwhile, others argue that Nonnaturalists and their opponents might be on a par, at least metasemantically, since some of the most influential views of reference determination, such as Reference Magnetism, are up for grabs, too (Jussi Suikkanen, "Non-naturalism and Reference," *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 11 [2017]: 1–24). One cumulative line of thought that can be read from these authors is that the debate between Nonnaturalists and their opponents ought to play out on the field of metaphysics, right where the modern debate began with G. E. Moore. Against this background, Parfit's interest in the nature of normative properties encourages us to shift our focus to exactly where it should be.

Moreover, much of what Parfit says about description-fitting normative properties even suggests that he might be calling on us to start paying attention to cutting-edge metaphysics. In particular, Parfit sometimes reads as though he sees himself as taking part in the hyperintensional turn that is well under way in metaphysics, where recent investigation into the idea that the substitution of necessary equivalents doesn't always preserve truth has led to renewed and rigorous interest in unabashedly metaphysical tools like grounding—tools that go well beyond familiar intensional resources such as possible worlds and supervenience. It is true that Parfit occasionally looks like he's putting hyperintensional properties to worldly metaphysical work. Indeed, he even uses the word 'ground' on occasion. But the closest Parfit comes to doing so is gesturing toward the thought that we need such properties to make all the distinctions we want to make in contexts of belief-ascriptions (148). He also sometimes suggests that we need them to deal with mathematical examples, but we've already seen that his allusions to mathematics are problematic.

Perhaps Parfit could have convinced Railton to agree that normative properties have sufficient naturalistic essences for the instantiation of further, sui generis normative properties (Stephanie Leary, "Non-naturalism and Normative

Necessities," in *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, vol. 12, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017] , 76–105). Maybe the two of them could have met each other halfway by agreeing with Railton's thought that natural entities "suffice" for all the normative ones, as the two of them explicitly do (108), while also maintaining that the connections between such entities are irreducibly normative (Ralph Bader, "The Grounding Argument against Non-reductive Moral Realism," in *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, vol. 12, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017], 106–34). I don't know. The point is that neither does Parfit. At the end of the day, it is hard to shake the impression that there was an intriguing path to forging a new kind of metaphysical agreement with Railton that wasn't taken in volume 3.

Turning to Gibbard, Parfit defends the claim that the two of them also do not deeply disagree. Gibbard is a Quasi-realist Expressivist, and in his hands Expressivism is the idea of taking a psychologistic approach to the semantics of normative discourse, usually from a place of skepticism regarding full-throated metaphysical modes of explanation. Nevertheless, Gibbard would insist that this doesn't mean he denies that there is a recognizable kind of phenomena in the vicinity of normativity worth explaining. It's just that he doesn't think we could really do more than offer a mentalistic and linguistic characterization of it from "sideways on," or "obliquely," or "indirectly." And as far as I can tell, it is precisely the idea of having a list of things to explain in such a way that makes Gibbard, or anyone else for that matter, a "Quasi-realist" Expressivist. Given Gibbard's focus on the linguistic or conceptual level, it is a natural place to begin sorting out whether he and Parfit agree, and if so, what they agree about. In particular, it is natural to start with two claims at this level where Parfit takes the two of them to agree: "As Gibbard's remarks above unobviously imply, we have resolved our two deepest meta-ethical disagreements. Each of us now accepts some version of the other's main claim. Gibbard believes [Parfit's claim] that there are some irreducibly normative truths. I believe [Gibbard's claim] that much of our normative thinking can be at least partly explained in what Gibbard calls his oblique expressivist way" (224).

Consider Parfit's first suggestion that he and Gibbard agree because Gibbard accepts that there are some irreducibly normative truths. Gibbard is explicit that he has no qualms with irreducibly normative truths in a linguistic or conceptual sense; indeed, he writes, "I now read [Parfit] as not thinking that a non-natural realm figures in further explanations of things . . . but that talk of what's non-natural has a more modest job of indicating *true thoughts*. . . . I am happy with talk of what's 'non-natural' so read" (Gibbard quoted in Parfit, 213; my emphasis). Just as with Railton, Parfit downplays Gibbard's emphasis on the linguistic or conceptual nature of description-fitting properties. Parfit somehow misses, too, that Gibbard isn't even quite sure what to make of description-fitting properties as Parfit intends them. Gibbard writes, "When [Parfit] introduces the term 'description-fitting sense', I don't find that his specific formulation tells me clearly what he means" (Gibbard quoted in Parfit, 214). This is worth stressing: "I'll need to *harp*, though, on a crucial feature of this explanation [of description-fitting properties]: although this characterization of a 'pleonastic' sense of the term 'property' specifies the term's *meaning* sufficiently for some contexts, it doesn't

settle when 'properties' in this sense are identical and when they are distinct" (Gibbard quoted in Parfit, 214; emphasis added).

These doubts clearly lead Gibbard to think that what Parfit really has in mind with description-fitting properties is again something linguistic or conceptual. For as Gibbard goes on to write, "Parfit's discussion seems to fit the reading that by the term 'property in the description-fitting sense' he means what I mean by '*concept* of a property', and by a 'fact' he means what I call a 'true thought'" (Gibbard quoted in Parfit, 215; emphasis added). This isn't to suggest that Parfit and Gibbard do not agree, but rather to clarify the linguistic or conceptual nature of their agreement.

Moving on to Parfit's second suggestion that he accepts Gibbard's claim that it is possible to use Expressivism to explain "much of our normative thinking," Parfit and Gibbard agree that we can understand the concept MATTERS in terms of the "purely normative, reason implying" concept DECISIVE REASONS TO CARE (208–9). But, according to Parfit, Gibbard offers a "purely expressivist" (233) understanding of DECISIVE REASONS TO CARE, on which claims involving it of the form *x matters* express the imperative *weigh x in favor of φ-ing*. Parfit argues that this Purely Expressivist view is problematic for reasons that are hard to parse (233). However, Parfit does say that he and Gibbard would agree if Gibbard were to transform his Pure Expressivism into the "Expressivist Cognitivist" (236) view that when we make *x matters* style claims, not only are we saying *weigh x in favor of φ-ing*, but "we are also claiming that, in expressing this imperative, *we are getting it right*" (233; my emphasis).

In suggesting that Gibbard should embrace Expressivist Cognitivism, Parfit is suggesting that Gibbard adopt the view that claims about what matters can be understood as involving both the claim that *we have reasons to care about x* and the claim *weigh x in favor of φ-ing*. While Parfit is light on the details, he is clearly advocating that he and Gibbard could be in general agreement on a linguistic or conceptual level that at least some normative claims are well understood as having a structure involving both cognitive (e.g., we have reasons to care about *x*) and noncognitive (e.g., weigh *x* in favor of *φ*-ing) elements. This is striking, because the idea that normative discourse involves both cognitive and noncognitive elements is the basic idea of an approach in metaethics known as Hybridism. Rather than converging on a view that "few ethical theorists even considered" (199) in Nonrealist Cognitivism, Parfit and Gibbard might accept the broad strokes of a highly active research program with a long history in metaethics (Teemu Toppinen, "Hybrid Accounts of Ethical Thought and Talk," in *Routledge Handbook of Metaethics*, ed. T. McPherson and D. Plunkett [New York: Routledge, 2017], 243–59).

On a straightforward interpretation of Parfit's exchanges with Railton and Gibbard, it is far from clear that Railton and Gibbard converge with Parfit on any view worthy of the name "Nonrealist Cognitivism" in the sense that he intends it. At one point, however, Parfit suggests a very different picture of what he might be up to in volume 3. He says, "It is a difficult, partly *empirical* question whether most people have beliefs which involve the concept of a purely normative reason" (185; emphasis mine). Together with the observation that Parfit tries to show how Schroeder, Jackson, and several other interlocutors "could" accept

Nonrealist Cognitivism, Parfit might be read as trying to get us to acquire the concept of a reason in the purely normative reason-implying sense, hence generating more agreement as a result. In other words, on a less straightforward interpretation of volume 3, Parfit might be read as engaging in a kind of "metalinguistic negotiation," instead of arguing that more metaethicists than he once thought do in fact already have the concepts to agree with him. (See David Plunkett, "Which Concepts Should We Use? Metalinguistic Negotiations and the Methodology of Philosophy," *Inquiry* 58 [2015]: 828–74.)

There is at least one consideration in favor of this reading. In volume 2, Parfit suggests that if his view were not true, then his life would have been wasted (Parfit, *On What Matters*, vols. 1 and 2, 367). Several of the contributors to Singer's collection, including Temkin and Schroeder, rebut Parfit's claim. But even if these commentators are right, we might still wonder why Parfit thinks that the stakes of this debate are so high.

Parfit rightly observes that most of us don't need any help in caring about our own well-being or the well-being of those we love. If, however, we were to ditch the "ordinary" concept REASONS for DECISIVE REASONS TO CARE, then it might be easier to expand our spheres of concern (41). After all, CARE would be built right into a concept associated with the word 'reasons'—a word that English speakers at least use every day. This might then make it easier to deploy the concept in beliefs about having reasons to care for others. It could then turn out that if we have such beliefs, as Parfit says, they "may lead us to try harder to prevent . . . suffering, either directly or by giving to aid agencies, or both" (190). On a conceptual engineering approach to volume 3, the stakes are so high for Parfit because the aim of moral inquiry is not only alethic but also practical. On this reading of Parfit, we would literally be more likely to make the world a better place if we were to acquire REASONS in the purely normative reason-involving sense.

With all of the exchanges that take place in volume 3 and Singer's collection, readers are likely to come away with the favorable impression that philosophy is a highly collaborative enterprise. Indeed, volume 3 itself even includes a fourteen-page response from Railton and a nineteen-page response from Gibbard to what Parfit has to say about their articles in Singer's collection. This unorthodox decision to include two full replies in the main text has the virtue that it highlights, front and center, how contemporary philosophy does not live up to the stereotype of a solitary thinker, idly musing about the big questions on a remote mountaintop.

Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that all of the thirty-six authors cited in the bibliography are full professors, the majority of the still living of whom are towering figures in the profession with associations to only a small number of prestigious departments (which also tells us far more about the full demographic profile of Parfit's interlocutors than it probably should). Philosophers in the trenches are likely to find this quite striking; anyone with a PhilPapers email subscription can attest to the staggering volume of high-quality work being done by less senior members in the profession all over the world, from Singapore to Mexico City. We need not look further than the many points of contact between Parfit and the philosophers referenced in this very review, the number of which

would easily be ten times higher were it not for space restrictions, to come away with this impression. This strongly indicates that, while our discipline lost a philosophical giant when Parfit passed away shortly before the publications of volume 3 and Singer's collection, moral philosophy has a bright future ahead of it. I would count this as a reason why it is rational to be optimistic about the possibility of moral progress.

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In *The Sources of Normativity*, Christine Korsgaard declared that "Enlightenment morality is true," arguing that all persons have equal moral worth as agents capable of free, rational choice (Christine Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 123). Enlightenment morality, so understood, represents an influential position in contemporary moral philosophy and, more broadly, in our moral and political discourse. Andrea Sangiovanni aims to rebut the core of Enlightenment morality while holding on to some of its more popular ideals. He wants to salvage the idea that all persons are moral equals, endowed with certain basic rights (our humanity), while setting aside Enlightenment morality's foundation for this idea in our worth as free, rational agents (our dignity). What results is an importantly novel and nuanced moral theory that has wide-ranging implications in ethics and political philosophy.

Sangiovanni begins by raising worries about attempts to ground the moral equality of persons in human dignity (chap. 1). He considers and rejects what he calls "aristocratic" and (Thomistic) "Christian" views of human dignity, but he is primarily concerned with Kantian views that naturally fall under the "Enlightenment morality" heading. He divides them into two camps. The "Regress Reading" follows Korsgaard in taking a commitment to the equal moral worth of persons to follow from our commitment as free, rational agents to the value of our chosen ends. The "Address Reading" follows Stephen Darwall and Rainer Forst in taking a commitment to the equal moral authority of persons to be a presupposition of our practices of mutual address and justification.

Sangiovanni's most compelling objection to the Regress Reading is that even if it explains why all persons have some moral worth, it does not establish that they have equal moral worth (46–48). To see why not, start with the problem about moral equality that Bernard Williams brought to light: given that we vary in the degree