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Analytical Dispositionalism and Practical Reason

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Abstract

The paper examines the plausibility of analytical dispositionalism about practical reason, according to which the following claims are conceptual truths about common sense ethical discourse: i) Ethics: agents have reasons to act in some ways rather than others, and ii) Metaphysical Modesty: there is no such thing as a response independent normative reality. By elucidating two uncontroversial assumptions which are fundamental to the common sense commitment to ethics, I argue that common sense ethical discourse is most plausibly construed as committed to the denial of metaphysical modesty, and thereby as committed to the existence of a response independent normative reality.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Kings College London, The Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, UK

    Hallvard Lillehammer

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  1. Hallvard Lillehammer
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Lillehammer, H. Analytical Dispositionalism and Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2, 117–133 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009909100383

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009909100383

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