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CHAPTER SUMMARIES

Introduction [PROJECTED: 5,000 words]

The book begins with a statement of the general goals and methodology of my study, including

a literature review of scholarship on Aristotle's theory of justice from 1990–2020 that documents

(1) the anachronistic elements of Miller (1995), (2) the strengths and weakness of "localized"

scholarship on Aristotle (such as Duke (2020) and Riesbeck (2016)), and (3) the need for a

comprehensive study of justice in both the ethical treatises and the *Politics* that is historically

contextualized (rather than primarily in dialogue with contemporary philosophical debates).

Ch.1: Politics and justice in Aristotle's ethical and political works [WRITTEN: 11,000 words]

This chapter will situate Aristotle's ethical and political writings within the historical and

intellectual climate of 4th C. Greece. The chapter includes three parts: (1) A review of Aristotle's

philosophical context and the contemporaries (especially Plato and Isocrates) whom he engages

in debate in his ethical and political works. (2) An overview of what Aristotle in the *Nicomachean*

Ethics, *Eudemian Ethics*, and *Politics* calls "political science" (πολιτική), including its goals and

methods. (3) A contextualized account of the political and legal world of 4th C. Greece in which

Aristotle embeds his discussion (with a focus upon his definition of a citizen in Politics 3.1). The

first chapter will prepare the reader to enter into an historically contextualized reading of

Aristotle's theory of justice.

Ch. 2: The varieties of πρὸς ἕτερον justice: Lawfulness and equality (*EN* 5.1–4) [WRITTEN:

12,000 words]

This chapter examines general features of Aristotle's account of justice in the *Nicomachean Ethics*

and specific features of the two main kinds of justice he analyzes in the first half of *Nicomachean*

Ethics 5, namely justice as the whole of virtue and justice as a particular virtue. The chapter

includes four parts: Part I examines both what I call Aristotle's vocabulary of justice, namely the

different modes of justice and injustice, such as character traits, actions, acting justly or unjustly,

or being treated unjustly or justly, which he analyzes in different places in *EN* 5 and what I call

the ethical outlook of justice. In the former case, I contrast Aristotle's depiction of justice with the duties-based depiction of justice that one finds in Cicero's *On Duties* (*De officiis*) in order to elucidate what is distinctive in Aristotle's virtue-based approach. Part II of the chapter identifies what I call the Hesiodian and Solonian traditions of justice; the former corresponds with what Aristotle calls justice as lawfulness and the latter corresponds with what he calls justice as equality. Part II explains the origins of both traditions and contrasts them. Part III of the chapter focuses solely on Solonian justice, which Aristotle defines as the virtue of particular justice. Part III shows how Aristotle goes about defining particular justice in *EN* 5.2-5. In Part IV I engage the question of how we should understand Aristotle's "two kinds" of particular justice, namely that which is just in distribution and that which is just in correction. I argue that both kinds of justice are best understood as two different domains of particular justice, domains that correspond with the civic competences of Aristotle's definition of a citizen.

Ch. 3: Reciprocity, commerce, and justice (*EN* 5.5) [WRITTEN: 11,500 words]

Scholars have long puzzled over how to characterize the contents of *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.5, which examines a notion of proportionate reciprocity. My chapter argues against those who seek to find a third aspect or domain of particular justice in *EN* 5.5 concerned with commerce or exchange. The chapter includes four parts: I first examine how Aristotle analyzes the reciprocity that Pythagoreans identify as "unqualified justice" and explain why I think it is wrong to view *EN* 5.5 as providing an account of a third kind of justice, independent from justice in distribution or justice in correction. Secondly, I examine Aristotle's discussion of proportionate reciprocity (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν) within the framework of exchange and explain the place that

Aristotle assigns to exchange within a political community—not as a human virtue, but as a social institution that the πολιτικός needs to understand and even promote insofar as a political community requires resources. Thirdly, I examine Aristotle's inter-textual engagement with Socrates' city of necessity, which I argue provides both the context for Aristotle's discussion of proportionate reciprocity and elucidates the goal of his investigation insofar as it goes beyond what Socrates shows about the relationship between communal exchange and need. In the fourth part of the chapter, I step back from *EN* 5.5 and consider Aristotle's attitude towards commerce more generally within the frameworks of household management political science.

Ch. 4: Political justice, that which is natural, and that which is legal (*EN* 5.6–7) [WRITTEN: 11,500 words]

This chapter argues that in *EN* 5.7 Aristotle eschews both positivism and naturalism, but instead views that which is natural and that which is legal as components or aspects of that which is politically just. Although the notion that Aristotle in some sense combines the nature and convention of the 5th C. sophistic debate concerning φύσις and νόμος has become orthodox in interpretations of *EN* 5.7, I believe that scholars fail to see how Aristotle transforms both terms in the process of unifying them. The chapter includes four parts: I first examine that which is politically just in order to determine its domain, namely the domain in which that which is natural and that which is legal interrelate. In Parts II and III of the chapter I examine that which is natural and that which is legal within the domain of that which is politically just. Part II focuses on Aristotle's example of that which is natural, namely the human characteristic of ambidexterity, and Part III focuses on Aristotle's contested example that which is legal, namely his claim that

"even constitutions are not the same everywhere, although only one is everywhere best in accord with nature" (5.7.1135a3–5). After reviewing the "parts" of Aristotle's account of political justice, in the fourth part of the chapter I provide an account of how the three concepts of my Chapter's title interrelate.

Ch. 5: The puzzles of πρὸς ἕτερον justice (*EN* 5.8–11) [WRITTEN: 11,500 words]

Although I acknowledge that the resolution of puzzles in the second half of *EN* 5 is complicated and often dialectical, I contest the claim that the puzzles of *EN* 5.8–11 are disconnected and disorganized. Indeed, a careful reading of Aristotle's five primary puzzles shows that they truly are what I will call *pros heteron* puzzles, namely intellectual puzzles that derive primarily from Aristotle's definition of pros heteron particular justice. Further, the order in which Aristotle analyzes the puzzles reverses the order of analysis in *EN* 5.1–5, apparently exhibiting the practice of ring composition that Aristotle practices elsewhere in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. To show that Aristotle's analysis of the puzzles of *pros heteron* justice exhibit such coherence and interconnection, this chapter examines each of the five puzzles individually in order to show the puzzle's relationship to *pros heteron* justice, how Aristotle resolves the puzzle, and how the resolution builds upon and contributes to the solution of other puzzles in *EN* 5.8–11.

Ch. 6: Justice in ruling (*Pol* 1.1–7, 3.4, 3.6) [PROJECTED: 11,500 words]

The first book of the *Politics* (especially *Pol* 1.1–7) is primarily concerned with showing that the concept of ruling is heterogeneously differentiated, namely that ruling a slave is qualitatively different from ruling a child, spouse, or fellow citizen. The notion that all ruling is homogenous is

an opinion articulated by other 4th C. political thinkers like Xenophon and Plato (even if attributed

to Socrates). Reading *Politics* 1 as an argument for political naturalism (a phrase Aristotle never

uses to describe his philosophy) ignores the basic structure of his argument. The claim that the

city exists "by nature" is a sub-argument within such an analysis, rather than the main show, as

it were. This chapter will offer a comprehensive interpretation of the justice of rule in the first

book of the *Politics*.

Ch. 7: Constitutional justice and injustice: The debate of *Politics* 3 [PROJECTED: 11,500 words]

Aristotle's *Politics* distinguishes political constitutions according to whether they aim at the

common good or the good of those in power; the former are just (such as polity, aristocracy, and

kingship) and the latter are unjust (such as democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny). But *Politics* 3.6–

18 also presents an extended analysis—really a debate—of the different claims made by different

segments within a political community (for instance, the wealthy, the poor, and the virtuous, all

of whom need to co-exist in most political communities). The result is a far more nuanced and

complicated account of distributive justice than one could imagine based solely on *Nicomachean*

Ethics 5. This chapter will explain what the *Politics* adds to Aristotle's description of distributive

justice.

Ch. 8: Justice, injustice, and revolution (*Pol* 4–6) [PROJECTED: 11,500 words]

Different notions of justice constitute the very structure of different political organizations. Thus,

the statesman's task of understanding, stabilizing, and ameliorating different forms of political

organization is closely linked to an understanding of justice and injustice within political

constitutions. This chapter shows, once again, that the abstract account of justice found in *Nicomachean Ethics* 5 merely begins Aristotle's rich and detailed account. Most of the statesman's most important tasks concern aspects of justice and ruling.

Ch. 9: The limits of justice—international and inter-species justice (*EN* 8–9, *EE* 7, *Pol* 7.1–3)

[PROJECTED: 11,500 words]

In both the ethical treatises and the *Politics*, one finds discussions that provide a sort of limit to Aristotle's notion of justice, namely justice between different city-states (i.e., "international justice") and between human and non-human animals. Although Aristotle recognizes forms of justice and injustice in both cases, both cases also set in contrast the non-limit cases of justice (including justice in the household). The result is an account of justice that is fundamentally different than the sort of community and individual relationship one finds in the framework of political naturalism.

CONCLUSION: Naturalism and Aristotle's theory of justice [PROJECTED: 5,000 words]

The final full chapter of the book brings together the criticisms of political naturalism articulated in previous chapters and considers them alongside a test-case of sorts, namely Aristotle's account of what he calls the "best constitution" (*Politics* 7–8). According to political naturalism, the best constitution is a regulative ideal according to which different political organizations can be ranked in accord with natural justice. My chapter shows the utterly foreign nature of almost all the terms of the previous sentence to what Aristotle in fact does in his account of the best constitution.