

A History of Habit

*From Aristotle to Bourdieu*

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## Chapter One

# Habituation, Habit, and Character in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*

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The opening words of the second book of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* are as familiar as any in his corpus:

Excellence of character results from habituation [*ethos*]<sup>1</sup>—which is in fact the source of the name it has acquired [*êthikê*], the word for “character-trait” [*êthos*] being a slight variation of that for “habituation” [*ethos*]. This makes it quite clear that none of the excellences of character [*êthikê aretê*] comes about in us by nature; for no natural way of being is changed through habituation [*ethizetai*].<sup>1</sup>

Equally familiar, unfortunately, is the depiction of Aristotle's notion of character formation as a form of habituation or repetition of actions which results in a “habit.” As a nineteenth-century commentator remarked on the passage above, “a mechanical theory is here given both of the intellect and the moral character.”<sup>2</sup> From a Socratic perspective, such a view of becoming good seems hopelessly rigid and unconnected to the intellectual development which knowledge of the good requires.<sup>3</sup> Habit and habituation in Aristotle seem eminently familiar and eminently non-philosophical.

Such a view would be mistaken on at least three counts. First, the notion of character formation (to use the broadest possible term for the phenomenon of habituation) in Aristotle is significantly more complicated than the notion that through habituation one develops good habits which are what we mean by ethical virtue. Although character formation includes the development of proper emotional responses, such as taking pleasure in what is fine and being repulsed by what is shameful, it is equally concerned with cognitive development independent of the intellectual virtues. Second, although Aristotle's

terms for “ethics” (*ēthica*), character-trait (*ēthos*), and habituation (*ēthos*, *ethismos*, or *ethizetai*) are linguistically and conceptually interrelated, his notion of “ethical state” (*hexis*) is both linguistically and conceptually quite distinct from the notion of “habit,” at least as we use that term today. As one Aristotle translator has put it, “A *hexis* is not only not the same thing as a habit, but is almost exactly its opposite.”<sup>4</sup> For Aristotle, a *hexis* is a dynamic equilibrium which, although always productive of virtuous actions, is nonetheless the basis for being virtuous in varied circumstances. Third, once Aristotle’s notion of a character state is retrieved from its false association with “habit” and repetitive habituation, one sees both that its apparent divorce from practical reason is more a fixture of Aristotle’s analytical method and that its connotations of inflexibility or fixedness are in fact antithetical to Aristotle’s description of ethical virtue. Rather than view ethical “character” in its Greek etymological sense as an indelibly fixed or engraved mark or stamp (*ch-actēr*) upon one’s soul,<sup>5</sup> Aristotle’s notion of ethical character (*ēthos*) or virtue (*aretē*) captures the notion of a virtuous who is responsive in an excellent fashion to what reason perceives in particular and changing circumstances.

To support these claims, in my chapter I elucidate three core notions—the nature of character development, an ethical state, and ethical virtue or character—primarily following the expository order of the second book of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*<sup>6</sup> (in which chapters II.1–4 examine the origins of ethical virtue, chapter II.5, the notion of an ethical state, and II.6–9, the general and specific nature of ethical virtue).<sup>7</sup> But before exploring the notions of “habituation,” “habit,” and ethical virtue textually, it is necessary to say a word about the use of Greek terms in my chapter. For clarity’s sake, going forward in my text I transliterate the terms *ēthos* (and its cognate adjective *ēthikē*), *ethos* (and its cognate noun and verbal forms *ethismos/ethizetai*) and *hexis*. Admittedly, transliteration merely postpones conceptual clarification—which is what the three sections of my chapter aim at. But thinking through Aristotle’s notion of character development in terms foreign to his thought seems destined to confuse. The most striking difficulty is that contemporary English uses the term “habit” in two distinct senses whereas Aristotle’s Greek makes use of two different and etymologically unrelated terms for both senses. In English, one may speak about a person’s “habits” (e.g. “punctuality is a good habit”) but also their means of acquisition (e.g. “I learned to swim by habitual practice”). Aristotle, by contrast, uses the term *hexis* (derived from the verb *echein*—to have or possess) for the first sense of habit in English, but he uses *ethos* (and cognates *ethizein* and *ethismos*, all ultimately derived from the verb *ethein*—to be wont or accustomed) for the second sense of habit. Aristotle points to an etymological connection between *ēthos/ēthica* (things of character) and *ethos* (habit or custom), but there

is no etymological connection between either of those two terms and *hexis* (ethical state) like there is between the English terms habit and habituation.

## 1. ETHOS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHARACTER

Character development for Aristotle transforms what scholars have characterized as our “first nature” (for example, our congenital endowments, immature beliefs, natural virtues or temperaments) into a “second nature,” namely, our mature dispositions, beliefs, and full-blown virtues or vices.<sup>8</sup> Aristotle articulates the point well in a quote from the poet Evenus in his discussion of the possibility of character change. After noting that incontinence (*akrasia*) comes about both by nature (*phusis*) and through *ethos* and that *ethos* is easier to change than nature, he then blurs the distinction and claims this is why *ethos* itself is hard to change—because it resembles nature; as Evenus puts it, too:

[*Ethos*] comes, my friend, by practice year on year—and see:

At last this thing we practice our own nature is. (1152a30–33)<sup>9</sup>

The process Aristotle has in mind has several developmental stages, but he is also clear that it never ceases and statesmen should continue the character development of their citizens throughout adulthood (1180a1–5). To even commence mature ethical reflection—the sort occasioned by a reading of the *Nicomachean Ethics*—one must first develop an attraction toward what is fine and a repulsion from what is base “just as,” Aristotle puts it, “one has to prepare soil if it is going to nourish the seed.”<sup>10</sup> What is the nature of *ethos* such that it is able to prepare such a person?

Aristotle regularly presents *ethos* as a mode of human development in contrast to other forms of human development.<sup>11</sup> For instance, Aristotle considers how well-being (*eudaimonia*) comes about, and his candidates include learning, fortune, divine dispensation, and “*ethos* or some other form of training” (*askēton*) (1099b9–11); elsewhere, he considers how people become good, and his candidates include nature, *ethos*, and teaching (1179b20–21). Several character states, for example, bestiality or weakness (1179b20–33).<sup>12</sup> Perhaps most relevant to the understanding of *ethos* and ethical virtue is Aristotle’s claim that although intellectual virtues come about through learning or teaching, virtues of character come about through *ethos* rather than through nature (1103a14–18).

The likening of *ethos* to *askēsis* (the source of our term “ascetic”) captures the standard notion of “habituation” expressed by Aristotle’s repeated claim that we develop ethical virtue through the repetition of virtuous actions (1103b14–22, 1103b31–32, 1114a7–13). Although *askēsis* has a decidedly

marital sense—for instance, the famed *agôge* or military training of the Spartans is an instance of such *askêsis* (*Politics* II.9.1271b6; cf. VII.14.1333b39, VIII.6.1341a8)—it is also the term that Aristotle uses to describe gymnastic training and even, in one instance, child care (*Politics* IV.1.1288b13, VII.17.1336a21). As I will discuss below, a *hexis* (which is the genus of moral virtue) is precisely the state that arises from repeated activities (*energeiai*) and thus is something that cannot come about by nature but only through repetition (1103b21–22). Precisely because such proper training is the difference between virtue and vice, Aristotle praises Plato for insisting on habituation from youth onward and, in his own account of becoming good, he gives the family and the political community fundamental roles in the establishment of virtuous character traits (1104b12–14, 1103b23–25, 1179b30–80a6).

Although *ethos* clearly includes a notion of what we mean by “habituation,” Aristotle also uses *ethos* to describe an aspect of character development which includes a cognitive component. As Hardie points out, Aristotle himself undermines the dichotomy between learning and habituation in that he describes the process of habituation as including verbal instruction, exhortation, and proreptic.<sup>13</sup> But further, when discussing the acquisition of ethical principles (*archai*), Aristotle notes that we “study” (*theôrein*) principles by means of induction, sensation, and the process of habituation (1098b3–5). Such “habituation” produces what Aristotle calls “the knowledge that” (*to hoti*) rather than “the knowledge why” (*to dioti*) and such knowledge consists of a broad array of learned or cultivated behaviors about what is noble and shameful, about what one should take pleasure in and what one should be repulsed by.<sup>14</sup> Although Aristotle juxtaposes habituation and teaching, the notion that the desiderative or appetitive elements of moral development are distinct from its cognitive elements is a view foreign to Aristotle’s notion of rational and non-rational desire as is the Humean notion that reason and desire are distinct and independent of each other.<sup>15</sup>

Aristotle scholars often contrast two different models of ethical habituation.<sup>16</sup> The first model of ethical habituation consists in what Hursthouse has characterized as “horse training” (or even horse breaking), according to which habituation consists of the disciplining and breaking of an unruly natural wildness. For instance, in the *Politics* Aristotle discusses how to habituate children to withstand extremes of temperature; he writes that

It is beneficial . . . to accustom (*sunethizein*) children to the cold right from the time they are small, since this is very useful both from the point of view of health and from that of military affairs. That is why many non-Greeks have the custom (*ethos*) of submerging newborn children in a cold river, whereas many others—for example, the Celts—dress them in light clothing. For whenever it is possible to create habits (*ethizein*), it is better to create them right from the start, but to do so gradually. (*Politics* VII.17.1336a12–20)<sup>17</sup>

Certainly there are times when Aristotle’s model looks non-cognitive, especially insofar as the recipient is younger.

By contrast, Aristotle also presupposes as his model a form of concerted cultivation in which individuals develop specific likes and dislikes through the prescriptions and models which parents provide, including verbal descriptions, weighing of costs and benefits, and delayed gratification.<sup>18</sup> Hursthouse imagines the following example concerning training for temperance which is involved with the right attitude to the pleasure of food:

Surely this starts at least far back as saying to toddlers “You don’t want that nasty thing.” Such a remark can hardly be construed as merely “descriptive,” for the howls of frustration that follow the removal of the bit of cat food, or mud, or what have you show that literally the remark is plainly false; the child precisely does want that thing: it appears pleasant to her. But it does not profess to be purely descriptive; it is, accompanied by the act of removing the thing, normative and descriptive. The child is being taught not to want that sort of thing, and also being taught that the nasty and dirty is as such the undesirable and bad.<sup>19</sup>

As I will examine in the discussion of the nature of ethical virtue, on a very deep level habituation takes the form of persuasion and exhortation because the ethical part of the soul stands in relationship to reason like a child stands in relation to a parent. Ultimately, Aristotle’s notion of *ethos* avoids both Socratic intellectualism that views becoming good as a kind of teaching or acquisition of knowledge and a shallow behaviorism that views humans as creatures of simply negative or positive conditioning.<sup>20</sup> *Ethos* incorporates both cognitive and emotional elements and ultimately develops a specific kind of psychic phenomenon, what Aristotle calls a *hexis*.

## 2. HEXIS AND PSYCHIC ETHICAL STATES

Aristotle illuminates the core notion of *hexis* (*hexeis* in the plural) in the *Ethics* with a minor pun. He defines *hexis* as “that according to which, with respect to emotions, ‘we are having’ (*echomen*) either well or badly” (1105b25–26). The pun plays on the fact that the word *hexis* derives from the intransitive use of the Greek verb “to have” (*echein*) and a *hexis* is a kind of “having” or possession, albeit one which predisposes one adverbially, as it were. *Hexeis* determine not only how we act, but even what we feel.<sup>21</sup> To determine whether one acts from virtue depends on “how an agent holds himself when he acts” (*ho prattôn pôs echôn pratté(i)* 1105a30–31). A *hexis* is simply the reification of such “holding” into a persistent psychic phenomenon. *Hexis* is Aristotle’s generic term for an entrenched psychic condition or state which develops through experience rather than congenitally. *Hexeis*

include not only the psychic state of ethical virtues and vices, but also those of the intellectual virtues and vices and continence and incontinence. Thus, not only is ethical virtue a *hexis proairetiké* or “a state disposed to choosing” (1106b36), but art or *techné* is a *hexis poiêtiké* (“a state disposed to producing” (1140a7–8)), and practical wisdom is a *hexis praktiké* (“a state disposed to acting” (1140b4–5)). Although Aristotle ultimately distinguishes the notion of an ethical *hexis* from other *hexeis*, throughout the second book of the *Ethics* he makes use of the parallels between ethical virtue and the arts—since as *hexeis* both have their origins in experience and practice—and the parallels between ethical virtue and medical states such as health—since as *hexeis* both determine how we are disposed toward actions.<sup>22</sup> What is a *hexis*?

Linguistically, the translation of *hexis* as “habit” arises from the etymological parallel between the Greek term *hexis*—which is derived from the Greek verb *echein*, “to have”—and the Latin term *habitus*—which is derived from the Latin verb for “to have,” namely *habeo*. Although one often finds in nineteenth-century translations and commentaries the term *hexis* translated as habit, more contemporary translations favor the terms “state” (as in mental state) and disposition. Aristotle’s doctrine of *hexis* is one of his most significant and novel doctrines and no English term—whether habit, state, or disposition—will adequately convey its sense of meaning.<sup>23</sup> But habit seems especially problematic insofar as in contemporary English it conveys the notion of a tendency to act in a certain way (e.g., the habit of punctuality). Although one who possesses the *hexis* of justice always acts justly, it does not follow that he always acts in the same way. As Socrates put it in the *Republic*, just because the general rule of justice requires returning what one has borrowed, it does not follow that a just person returns a borrowed weapon to a madman (*Republic* 331b–332a). Although *hexeis* are distinguished from other mental states by their enduring, permanent, or entrenched nature, their permanence is paradoxically dynamic or kinetic rather than static.

Aristotle provides extensive discussion of the general notion of *hexis*, discussing it in the philosophical lexicon of the *Metaphysics* (V.20), the account of quality in the *Categories* (VIII), and the *Physics*; further, he regularly juxtaposes it with other psychic phenomena or faculties such as activities (*energeiai*), emotions (*pathé*), dispositions (*dialtheis*), and capacities (*dunameis*).<sup>24</sup> Several features stand out by means of juxtaposition:

1) *Hexeis* are individuated by spheres of activity: Although a *hexis*—either in the case of an ethical or intellectual *hexis*—is not identical with an activity, a specific *hexis* arises from the repetition of a specific kind of activity.<sup>25</sup> Both the *hexeis* of justice and *techné*, for example, arise from the way one acts within a certain sphere, for instance in the exchanges of goods or the navigation of a ship, and only the *hexeis* of justice/injustice or art/artlessness arise from such activities.<sup>26</sup> In the case of ethical *hexeis*, the

sphere of activity includes both a domain of action and specific feelings. For instance, the *hexis* of courage concerns how we act in the face of death in battle and what feelings of fear or confidence one has toward such death (1115a33–35, 1115b18–21).

2) Individual *hexeis* give rise to specific pleasures: In the same way that ethical *hexeis* arise with respect to a sphere of activities, each sphere of activity gives rise to a specific kind of pleasure the right feeling of which derives from a virtuous ethical *hexis*; thus, the pleasures and pains which one feels are indicative of one’s *hexeis*.<sup>27</sup> Pleasures supervene on *energeiai*, but *energeiai* are specific to *hexeis*.<sup>28</sup> Thus, different pleasures are connected to different *hexeis*, and habituation concerns the development of proper pleasures and pains in different domains of activities.

3) Ethical *hexeis* are unidirectional: Aristotle distinguishes ethical *hexeis* from what the *Metaphysics* calls “rational capacities” (*dunamis meta logou*): whereas the latter admit of opposites (for instance, possession of a *techné* like medicine allows one either to heal or diminish health), the former can only produce one kind of action (1129a11–17; cf. *Metaphysics* IX.2.1046b5–28).<sup>29</sup> Thus, only just actions stem from the virtue of justice and only unjust actions stem from the virtue of injustice.<sup>30</sup> Even in adversity, the virtuous individual will never do unvirtuous actions and always do the most fine actions (1100b34–1101a3).

4) Ethical *hexeis* ground moral responsibility: Since *hexeis* arise from activities, they differ from capacities (*dunameis*)—such as the ability to see or hear—which according to Aristotle exist by nature (1103a26–1103b2, 1106a6–14). Whereas no one is praised for something possessed congenitally, we are praised and blamed for characteristics the development for which we are responsible (1106a6–10, 1114a25–30). Ethical *hexeis* arise through the repetition of actions and according to Aristotle we are ultimately responsible for those actions. “Only an utterly senseless person can fail to know that *hexeis* concerning specific things arise from activities” (1114a9–10, 1114b21–25). Thus, we can be praised and blamed for our ethical *hexeis* because their development is ultimately up to us.<sup>31</sup>

5) Ethical *hexeis* ground the permanence of well-being: A *hexis* is more entrenched and permanent than either a disposition (such as a bad temper or a moment of elation) or a feeling (such as pity or anger).<sup>32</sup> For example, although liking (*philésis*) is a positive feeling or disposition which one may have toward either animate or inanimate objects, friendship (*philia*)—as an enduring part of one’s self—is a *hexis*, one which persists as long as one participates in the activities of friendship with a friend (1157b28–32, 1171b33–1172a8).<sup>33</sup> Aristotle rejects the claim that one’s well-being is dependent upon fortune or chance because he defines happiness as activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and “of all of human functions, none are more firm (*bebaioiétés*) than those activities in accord with virtue”; the virtues—as

*hexeis*—are the basis of enduring and stable activities almost impervious to external impediments (1100b11–12).

All five marks together indicate why Aristotle claims that virtuous people are praised for their ethical *hexeis* (1103a8–10). The contrast which Aristotle makes between the amoral *dunamis* of cleverness (*deinotês*) and the praiseworthy *hexis* of practical wisdom illustrates how the various threads fit together. In his defense of the unity of the virtues in *EN* VI.12–13, Aristotle juxtaposes natural virtue with complete virtue and cleverness with practical wisdom. Both natural virtue and cleverness are proto-virtues (the former is a natural propensity to act in a way that appears virtuous and the latter is the capacity to conduct means/ends reasoning regardless of the end). But unlike complete virtue, natural virtue can be detrimental to its possessor (1144b9–14); unlike practical wisdom, cleverness as a rational *dunamis* can equally determine the best way to rob a bank and to protect against such robbers. Practical wisdom and complete ethical virtue mutually entail each other, and practical wisdom cannot exist without cleverness (1144a28–29), but to become practical wisdom the faculty of cleverness requires a sense of the fine. If the aim which cleverness seeks to promote is fine—something established by the presence of ethical virtue—then cleverness is transformed into the praiseworthy virtue of practical wisdom; if the aim which cleverness seeks to promote is base, then cleverness is simply unscrupulousness (1144a26–28). Habituation, by inculcating a love of what is fine through doing fine activities, transforms simultaneously both the amoral *dunamis* of cleverness into the intellectual *hexis* of practical reason and the natural virtue—for instance natural courage—into complete courage.<sup>34</sup> One can analytically separate the two forms of inculcation, but they are mutually dependent upon one another.

What Aristotle seems to have in mind in the contrast of cleverness and prudence is the paradoxical nature of the “wise villain.” Although Aristotle stands within the Socratic tradition that sees knowledge as invincible and wrongdoing as a kind of ignorance (1147b9–19), his account of cleverness makes clear that ignorance is not the same thing as stupidity. The master assassin or master criminal personify cleverness—and thus personifies what is “*deimos*” or awe-some (in the sense of awe-inspiring) in the capacity of *deinotês*—in that they can find the means to accomplish through careful planning and execution the most evil of goals. Further, their cleverness is, as it were, value neutral like a rational capacity—it is precisely the same sort of faculty of ends/means reasoning which the virtuous person possesses, except that they choose to use it for bad rather than fine ends. Although the virtuous person possesses such ends/means cleverness, precisely because practical wisdom is a *hexis* can it not be used in a value-neutral fashion. The sense of fineness which the person of practical wisdom possesses can only come

about through the process of moral habituation and the simply clever person is ignorant in the sense that he or she has no sense of what is fine.

Although the five marks I have identified distinguish *hexeis* from other states of soul, they do not explicitly address my claim that *hexeis* ought best be understood as a dynamic rather than a static disposition of soul. A central text which has led readers to think of *hexis* as a static state is *Ethics* II.4, wherein Aristotle distinguishes ethical virtue from art (*technê*). As noted above, Aristotle claims that both intellectual and character virtues are *hexeis* and often Aristotle makes use of their similarities—especially with respect to their acquisition—to explain the nature of ethical virtue through analogies to the arts.<sup>35</sup> Although as *hexeis* both art and virtue arise through the practice of activities, Aristotle claims that whereas artistic or technical productions are judged on the basis of the object produced, ethically virtuous actions are judged on the basis of how one who does them “holds” himself (*ho prattôn pôs echôn prattê(i)*, 1105a30–31). More specifically, for an action to be judged as virtuous or done in accord with virtue, it must possess three characteristics: the agent doing the act does so (1) knowingly (*eidos*), (2) choosing the act for its own sake, and (3) if he does so in a “firm and unchangeable” way (*bebaiôs kai ametakinêtôs echôn* (1105a30–33)).<sup>36</sup> Although all three criteria have generated considerable scholarly literature, I would like to focus upon the third claim and probe its relationship to the notion of ethical virtue as a *hexis*.<sup>37</sup>

Aristotle's third criterion generates a dilemma. On the one hand, the phrase “*bebaiôs kai ametakinêtôs*” conveys a sense of fixedness or permanence. The first adverb, *bebaiôs*, derives from the perfect tense of the Greek verb “to stand” (*baiô*), and means something like “steadfast” (for example, like a virtue friendship rather than an association based on convenience) or stable (like the law of non-contradiction or the foundational principles of demonstration).<sup>38</sup> The second adverb, *ametakinêtôs*, is rather rare in Aristotle's writings (it is used only once in the ethical corpus), and etymologically it is close to a transliteration of “unchangeable” or “immovable” (*akinêtôs*), but the insertion of the prefix “*meta*” gives the sense of “moved away from.”<sup>39</sup> Given that Aristotle has described virtue as a *hexis* that results from a repetition of actions and that the virtuous person will always act in a virtuous way, the third criterion has been taken by some commentators to convey that acting from virtue implies an element of fixedness.<sup>40</sup>

On the other hand, throughout the *Ethics* Aristotle emphasizes that virtue provides what Broadie calls an “unconditional preparedness to act,” namely, an ability to act in a way which is responsive to the particular circumstances involved in any particular action.<sup>41</sup> Although Aristotle's doctrine of the mean entails that the virtuous person hits the mean between excess and deficiency with respect to actions and feelings, specifying that mean is always context dependent. He notes that

it is possible to feel fear and boldness and desire and anger and pity and in general pleasure and distress to a greater or lesser extent, and to go wrong in either direction; but to feel such things when one should about the things one should, and in relation to the people one should, and for the sake of things one should, and as one should, is the mean and the best, which belongs to virtue. (1106b16–23)<sup>42</sup>

A person responsive to so many circumstances does not act virtuously by mechanically reproducing the same action in different circumstances based on a fixed rule. The person who does the same thing in every case falls under the description of what Aristotle entitles (with opprobrium) “stubbornness” (*ischurognōmonoi*), namely those unwilling to listen to persuasion and unwilling to change their beliefs or behavior, even standing fast against reason (1151b5–17).

By contrast, the *hexeis* of the virtuous person are characterized by their ability to move and change as circumstances dictate. Aristotle suggests a compelling analogy for such a person in his account of the virtue of *eutrapeliā*, which is usually translated as “wittiness” but which literally means “turning readily from one direction to another.”<sup>43</sup> The virtue of wittiness consists in the mean between the buffoon, who seeks to make a joke in every situation, and the boor, who finds nothing funny. It almost goes without saying that such a person is a master at finding something funny in every situation—much like an improvisational comedian—but as important is the person’s tact or discretion (what Aristotle calls *epidexiotês*) in sensing when the joke he has arrived at is worth stating. Aristotle explains further:

Those who are playful in a fitting way are called witty (*eutrapeloi*)—or supple-witted (*eutropoi*), as it were; for supple moves like these are thought to be ones that belong to character (*êthos*), and just as we judge bodies by their movements (*kinêseis*), so too do we judge people’s characters (*êthê*). (1128a9–12)

Character is judged by the way one’s *hexeis* allow one to move and respond to particular circumstances. Although *hexeis* are not fleeting or transitory like a mood or a feeling, their permanence does not imply an immovability or inflexibility. Although the *hexis* of justice only produces a just action, what that just action consists in will depend entirely on the circumstances of the action, and a *hexis* needs to be sufficiently supple to allow for that range of receptivity or preparedness.

### 3. ÊTHOS AND ETHICAL TRAITS

Having surveyed the senses in which Aristotle uses *ethos* and *hexis*—the two terms sometimes translated as “habit”—we are now in a position to consider

their relationship to *êthos* and more generally the nature of *êthikê aretê*. Aristotle claims that *êthos* arises from *ethos*, and *êthikê aretê* is a *hexis proairetikê* (1103a17–18, 1106b36). These two claims mean that, first, repeated experience with different situations within a specific sphere of activity produces an enduring trait and, second, that such a trait makes one responsive to the variability of action and prepared to act virtuously across a broad range of particular circumstances.<sup>44</sup> To that extent, *êthos* is the sum of one’s character traits and *hexis* is an enduring but flexible state or disposition of soul that predisposes its possessor to act and feel a certain way in specific contexts. What remains to be explained is first what it means to call this sort of virtue *êthikê* or “ethical,” and second, how ethical virtue in general relates to the notion of the virtuous person. The first goal requires discussion of Aristotle’s soul division but the second may help to explain why Aristotle’s notion of “ethical virtue” is sometimes misleadingly depicted as a habit deriving from habituation.

Although the title of Aristotle’s *Ethics* derives from the adjectival form of the word *êthos*, the adjective *êthikê* is used almost exclusively to modify the term *aretê* and usually in distinction to *dianoêtikê aretê*, or “intellectual virtue”; never in Aristotle’s writings does he use the term as a plural substantive adjective corresponding to our word “ethics.”<sup>45</sup> To that extent, the title of Aristotle’s “Ethics” is too narrow: *ta êthikê* means literally “the things concerning ethical character traits” without leaving room for the intellectual character traits that come to the fore in the sixth book of the *Ethics* (and which are elevated as the highest forms of virtue in the last book of the *Ethics*). The ethical virtues are perfections of the “character-bearing” (to use Rowe’s translation) part of the soul, namely that part which although strictly speaking is non-rational, is nonetheless capable of “listening” to reason or being receptive to the guidance which the intellectual virtue of *phronêsis* provides.<sup>46</sup> The “character-bearing” part of the soul is the source of human desires and motivations—both pleasures and aversions—and as we have seen, an ethical *hexis* is one which allows its possessor to feel or experience such pains and pleasures in a fashion consistent with the mean.

Focus upon Aristotle’s account of the “character-bearing” part of the soul—which takes up the first half of the *Ethics*—can mistakenly influence how we understand the relationship between ethical virtue and the virtuous person—or the very notion of Aristotelian ethics in general. Although methodologically, Aristotle separates ethical virtue from intellectual virtue and examines them in two different parts of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (ethical virtue in books II–V and intellectual virtue in VI), both of those analyses operate in a kind of abstraction foreign to the nature of the virtuous person. As Broadie puts it, although Aristotle divides virtue into two kinds, “this division is misleading if it gives the impression that the two can occur apart—an impression unfortunately aggravated by the fact that Aristotle

deals with them in separate parts of the *Ethics*.<sup>47</sup> Aristotle's doctrine of the unity of virtue claims that it is impossible to possess ethical virtue—at least in the fullest sense of the term—without also possessing the intellectual virtue of *phronēsis* (1144a29–31, 1144b13–17). Although there are approximations of full ethical and intellectual virtue which can exist in isolation of each other, namely natural virtue or cleverness (which we examined above), there is no such thing as a fully ethically virtuous person who in any way lacks the intellectual virtue of *phronēsis*.

Thus, when Aristotle examines the courageous person or the temperate person, analytically his focus is upon that aspect of the person's virtue which perfects the appetitive or "character-bearing" part of the soul. Most familiar are the claims that such courage is the result of a non-cognitive habituation process, like an army private being screeched at by a drill sergeant. But the notion that that person's courage could exist in the absence of intellectual virtue is simply false and the belief that such courage could be developed in isolation from intellectual engagement is seriously misleading. At the least, the truly courageous person possesses practical reason; but since courage perfects a non-rational part of the soul capable of responding to reason, the "character-bearing" part of the soul itself, independent of the rational part, must have a cognitive component. The notion that Aristotle's "ethical" teachings consist of a doctrine about the acquisition of ethical habits through ethical habituation is not even half of the story; omitting that those ethical "habits" themselves possess a cognitive receptivity to the rational part of the soul and imply the existence of the intellectual habit of *phronēsis* makes that half of the story a fable.

## NOTES

1. Rowe trans., slightly adapted (*Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002]). Aristotle's etymology most likely derives from Plato's *Laws*, VII: 792c. My analysis is based on Bywater's Greek text (*Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1894]). Although translations in this chapter are my own, they are informed by the translations of Rowe, Taylor, and Irwin.
2. Alexander Grant, *Aristotle's Ethics*, 4th ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1885), vol. I, 482.
3. For instance, in the myth of Er in the *Republic*, Socrates claims that one who becomes good "through habit without philosophy" (*ethēi aneu philosophias*) is destined to fail (*Rep.* X.618cd).
4. J. Sachs, "Three Little Words," *St. John's Review* 44 (1997): 2.
5. Aristotle uses the Greek term *character* only in the sense of "impression" or "stamp" (e.g., *Pol.* I.9.1257a40–41, *Gen. Anim.* V.2.781a28; cf. *Oec.* II.1347a10, 1349b31), although his student Theophrastus composed a work entitled *Characters* which captures our sense of character as a certain way of life (for instance, the bore, the cheapskate, the cheater). By contrast, one finds in Epictetus's *Enchiridion* both the Greek term *character* and its notion as a fixed and unchanging state exemplified by a stubborn and unyielding Socrates. See, for instance, *Enchiridion*, 33.

6. Although there are passages in the *Eudemian Ethics* which parallel the discussions of *ethos*, *hexis*, and *ēthos*, scholars have argued that Aristotle presents significantly different notions of the desiderative part of the soul and the stages in ethical development in the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. See further H. Lorenz, "Virtue of Character in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 37 (2009): 193, and A. J. London, "Moral Knowledge and the Acquisition of Virtue in Aristotle's *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*," *Review of Metaphysics* 54 (2001): 553–54.

7. As several commentators point out, Aristotle's procedure in the second book of the *Ethics* violates the Socratic claim made in the *Meno* (71ab) that one must know what something is (e.g., arrive at its definition) prior to determining its characteristics (e.g., how it is acquired). See, for instance, M. Pakulak, *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 95. If so, it would hardly be the only Aristotelian quibble with the Socrates of the *Meno*; *Politics* I.13 (1260a24–26) rejects the Socratic claim from the *Meno* that virtue is the same for men, women, and slaves.

8. For the language of "first" and "second" nature, see M. Burnyeat, "Aristotle on Learning to Be Good," in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. A. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 74–75; I. Vasilioiu, "The Role of Good Upbringing in Aristotle's *Ethics*," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 56 (1996): 779–81; P. M. Morel, "L'habitude: une seconde nature?" in *Aristotle et la notion de nature*, ed. Morel (Pessac: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 1997), 131–48; and R. Kraut, "Nature in Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics*," *Social Philosophy and Policy* 24 (2007): 207–9, 212–17. McDowell's influential "Two Sorts of Naturalism" is self-consciously influenced by Aristotle's discussion of character development and his account of "second nature" naturalism captures well the sense in which Aristotelian moral development is transformative. See especially J. McDowell, "Two Sorts of Naturalism," in *Mind, Value, and Reality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 169–73.

9. See further cf. *De Mem.* 452a27–8, *MM* 1203b31–2, *Rhet.* 1370a6–7, *Prob.* 879b36–880a5, 949a28–9.

10. *EN* 1179b30–31, 1179b24–26. Aristotle repeats several times that the *Nicomachean Ethics* presupposes a specific audience or "auditor" (or listener). See further 1095a2–11, 1095b4–13.

11. *Ethos* is cognate with *ethismos* (usually indicating the process of *ethos*), the verbal adjective *ethison*, and the verb *ethizein*. A survey of Aristotle's use of these four terms in the *Nicomachean Ethics* shows no differences in meaning, thus throughout this section I will refer to *ethos* including passages that make reference to other cognates of the term.

12. Although Aristotle acknowledges a form of "natural virtue"—certain congenital endowments which resemble virtue—such characteristics fail to consistently produce virtuous actions and can even be detrimental to their possessors (1144b3–9, 1117a4–5).

13. W. F. R. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 99–100; see further *EN* 1103b12, 1180a1–10. Note that Aristotle also claims that the intellectual virtues of *nous*, *gnomé*, and *synesis* come about by nature, although *sophia* and *phronēsis* do not (1143b6–9, 1142a13–21).

14. See further Burnyeat, "Aristotle on Learning to Be Good," 73. Curzer argues, contra Burnyeat, that more important than taking proper pleasure is developing pain at doing what is wrong (H. Curzer, *Aristotle and the Virtues* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012], 340–41).

15. Aristotle recognizes both rational desire (which he calls *boulēsis* or "wish") and two kinds of non-rational desire (*hūmos* or "spiritedness" and *epithumia* or "appetitive desire"). See *EE* 1223a26–27, 1225b24–26; *MM* 1187b37; *DA* 414b2, 421b5–6, 433a22–26; *de Motu* 700b19; *Rhet.* 1369a1–4; *Pol.* 1334b17–25; see further S. Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 106–8, and G. Pearson, *Aristotle on Desire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 170–98. Although Aristotle analytically separates the rational and non-rational parts of the soul, that separation is an analytical contrivance. The fully ethical person is precisely the integration of the two parts into an interconnected whole. See, for instance, P. Gottlieb, *The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 106–11. For Aristotle's rejection of a Humean divide between reason and desire, see R. Hursthouse, "Moral Habituation: A Review of Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Aristotle's Theory of*



*Moral Insight*," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 6 (1988): 203, 206–210, and Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle*, 70–72.

16. See, for instance, Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*, 104; R. Hursthouse, "Moral Habituation," 210–12; I. Vasilou, "The Role of Good Upbringing," 779.

17. For further discussion of this passage, see P. J. Bartok, "Aristotle on Habituation and the Development of Moral Virtue" (lecture delivered at St. John's College (Santa Fe), March 30, 2005, 11–12).

18. I take the term "concerted cultivation" from Annette Lareau's *Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). Although Lareau does not ascribe the term to Aristotle, she does develop it within the framework of Pierre Bourdieu's notion of *habitus*, a concept developed from Aristotle's notion of *hexis*. Curzer contests that Aristotle endorses such a model on the basis that "there is no textual evidence for [such a combination of instruction and habituation] and a fair amount of evidence against it" (Curzer, *Aristotle and the Virtues*, 339–40).

19. Hursthouse, "Moral Habituation," 213. Although a recent article has lamented that contemporary scholars neglect "the process through which an ethically undeveloped human becomes a virtuous person" (N. Bowditch, "Aristotle on Habituation: The Key to Unlocking the *Nicomachean Ethics*," *Ethical Perspectives* 15 (2008): n. 3, 339), there is extensive discussion of Aristotle's notions of ethical education (several of which Bowditch fails to identify in his bibliography). In addition to the previously cited articles by Burnyeat, Hursthouse, Bartok, and Vasilou, see also N. Sherman, *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), chapter 5; G. Verbeke, *Moral Education in Aristotle* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1990); M. Homiak, "Politics as Soul Making: Aristotle on Becoming Good," *Philosophia* 20 (1990): 167–93; C. D. C. Reeve, "Aristotelian Education," in *Philosophers on Education*, ed. A. O. Rorty (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 51–65; R. Kraut, "Aristotle on Method and Moral Education," in *Method in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. J. Gentzler (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 271–90; and H. Fossheim, "Nature and Habituation in Aristotle's Theory of Human Development," *Acta Humaniora*, no. 166, Oslo, 2003.

20. For the contrast between Aristotle's method and behavioralism, see further Bartok, "Aristotle on Habituation," 13–14.

21. See further L. A. Kosman, "Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle's *Ethics*," in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. A. O. Rorty, 103–16 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). For a description of the process by means of which *hexeis* produce *pathē* or emotions, see M. Oele, "Passive Dispositions: On the Relationship between *pathos* and *hexis* in Aristotle," *Ancient Philosophy* 32 (2012): 351–68.

22. For parallels between ethical *hexis* and the arts, see 1103a31–32, 1103b6–14, 1105a8–10, 1106b9–14; for parallels between ethical *hexis* and medical states, see 1104a14–18, 29–30, 1105b12–18. One can find precedents for both uses of *hexis* in Plato's work (see *Theaetetus* 153b, *Laws* 650b, *Republic* 591b) and in the Hippocratic corpus. Burnet (followed by Jaeger) goes so far as to claim that Aristotle's notion of *hexis* derives from medical writings. See J. Burnet, *Aristotle's Ethics* (London: Methuen, 1900), 133; W. W. Jaeger, "Aristotle's Use of Medicine as a Model of Method in his *Ethics*," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 77 (1957): 58; and H. Bartos, "Aristotle and His Hippocratic Precursors on Health and Natural Teleology," *Rhizai* 7 (2010): 41–62.

23. Pakaluk claims that the term "state" does not capture the notion of *hexis*, because *hexis* implies a condition more stable than a "state" conveys, one which is present even when not in use, and which has a persistent orientation (*Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, 107–108). Irwin, by contrast, claims that "disposition" does not capture the notion of *hexis* because it is too transitory and habit fails because a *hexis* is not merely a tendency to behave (*Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, 349). Among modern translators, Taylor, Irwin, and Grant translate *hexis* as "state"; Rowe and Raokham translate it as "disposition"; Sachs translates it as "active condition"; and Stewart and Apostel translate it as "habit."

24. My discussion here follows—in an inevitably more concise fashion—D. S. Hutchinson's *The Virtues of Aristotle* (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), chapters 2, 4, and 6.

25. Aristotle's separation of *hexis* and *energeia* lies at the root of his criticism of his predecessors in the Academy, such as Xenocrates and Speusippus, who claimed that *eudaimonia* was a *hexis* or possession (1098b31–1099a3).

26. See 1098b31–1099a7, 1152b33–1153a1; 1103b21–25, 1103b29–31, 1114a9–10, 1115b20–21, 1121a35–1122b2; 1104a27–29, 1104b18–21. For a good discussion of the "spheres" of virtue, see M. Nussbaum, "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 13 (1988): 32–53.

27. See 1104b3–8, 1113a31–1113b2. As Hutchinson puts it, "virtues and vices are dispositions to find certain things pleasant and certain other things unpleasant. In other words, they are each a disposition to like some courses of conduct and dislike other courses of conduct. What this amounts to is that a trait of character is a taste in an area of conduct" (*The Virtues of Aristotle*, 78).

28. The *Nicomachean Ethics* presents two accounts of pleasure. The clearest articulations of the relationship between pleasure, *hexis*, and *energeia* from *EN* VII are 1153a13–16 and 1153b10–14; cf. X.4.1174b33–35.

29. There is debate about the extent to which Aristotle's account of the unidirectional nature of *hexis* maps on to the discussion of rational potentialities in the *Metaphysics*. See further Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*, 101, and C. Freeland, "Moral Virtues and Human Powers," *Review of Metaphysics* 36 (1982): 3–22.

30. Commentators generally note that identifying virtue as an ethical *hexeis* responds to the classical Socratic dilemma of how to guarantee that the expertise of the virtuous person cannot—like a *technē*—be used to do something unvirtuous. See, for instance, *Rep.* 334bc.

31. Aristotle's claim that we are individually responsible for our character states has generated much scholarly debate. For a recent overview, see P. Destree, "Aristotle on Responsibility for One's Character," in *Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle*, eds. M. Pakaluk and G. Pearson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 285–318.

32. See 1105b28–1106a2. Although *Categories* VIII clearly distinguishes *hexis* and *diathesis*, Aristotle will often use them synonymously in the *Ethics*. See, for instance, 1107b16, b30, 1108a24.

33. For similar reasons, Aristotle denies that shame (*aidōs*) is a virtue because it is a reaction to circumstances rather than the psychic state according to which those reactions take place (1128b10–14).

34. Aristotle's discussion of the interconnectedness of intellectual and ethical virtue in *EN* VI.12–13 has generated substantial scholarly discussion. See, for instance, R. Sorabji, "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue," in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. A. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 201–20; P. Gottlieb, *The Virtues of Aristotle's Ethics*, chapter 5; and N. Bowditch, "Aristotle on Habituation."

35. For further discussion, see T. Angier, *Techné in Aristotle: Crafting the Moral Life* (New York: Continuum, 2011), chapter 5.

36. Aristotle's notion of "acting from virtue" has affinities with Kant's notion of "acting from duty" (*aus Pflicht*). See further R. Audi, "Acting from Virtue," *Mind* 104 (1995): 449–71.

37. For helpful discussion of the problems generated by the first two conditions, see Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle*, 82–89, and Taylor, *Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics II–IV* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 84–92.

38. The most common usage of *bebaiōs* in *EN* is found in Aristotle's description of permanent friendships (see, e.g., 1159b8, 1162a15; cf. *EE* 1236b19, 1238a11, 1239b15). For the claim that the law of non-contradiction is "the most stable" of principles, see *Meta* IV.7.1011b13; cf. *Meta* 1005b11, 1008a16–17.

39. Sachs suggests that the term means "in a condition from which one can't be moved all the way over into a different condition" ("Three Little Words," 4). In his translation of the *Ethics*, Sachs renders the phrase "being in a stable condition and not able to be moved all the way out of it"; in a note he writes, "The last eleven words of the sentence translate A's marvelous adverb *ametakinētiōs*; *akinetōs* would mean in the manner of someone immovable or rigid, but the added prefix makes it convey the condition of those toys that can be knocked over but always come back upright on their own, a flexible stability or equilibrium" (Sachs, *Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics*, 26). Another instance of the term is found in *Physics* IV.4, where place is

said to be immovable with respect to something else—for instance, in the sense that one can say that with respect to a river's current, a boat is "immovable" (if it is not under power), but nonetheless the boat is still moving (212a15).

40. See, for instance, Burnet, *Ethics of Aristotle*, 87, and Grant, *Ethics of Aristotle*, vol. 1, 486, 495. By contrast, Taylor takes the third criterion to mean that acting from virtue implies that one's character state cannot be lost (Taylor, *Nicomachean Ethics Books II–IV*, 93). At 1152a30, Aristotle claims that *ethos* is easier to alter (*metakinésai*) than nature, which appears to support Taylor's claim that *ametakinétōs* marks out that character change is what Aristotle rules out with his criterion. See further G. Lawrence, "Acquiring Character: Becoming Grown Up," in *Moral Psychology and Human Action*, eds. M. Pakaluk and G. Pearson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 271.

41. Broadie, *Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics*, "Philosophical Introduction" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 19. In *Ethics with Aristotle*, she expands on the concept as follows: "every such response at the same time carries the claim that under no manageable circumstances would one voluntarily act otherwise than as the one who in this particular case responds like this. The claim does not assume knowledge of how one would act in other circumstances, but it does assume that a response different from the present one would be different for a reason" (90).

42. Aristotle's claim that action is context dependent is repeated at 1104b25–26, 1109a24–30.

43. Taylor, *Nicomachean Ethics Books II–IV*, 234. For further discussion of the virtue of wit which shows that its domain is far more than simply telling jokes, see S. Collins, *Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 147–65.

44. The exception to this claim is Aristotle's account of "natural character" (*éthos*) which he attributes to different geographical or racial groups in *Politics* VIII.7. See further M. Leunissen, "Aristotle on Natural Character and Its Implications for Moral Development," *Journal for the History of Philosophy* 50 (2012): 507–30.

45. See 1103a4–7, 1103a14–15, 1139a1, 1104b9, 1109a20, 1138b13–14, 1139a21, 1144b32, 1152b5, 1178a16–17. The only exception to the claim that Aristotle uses the adjective *éthiké* in opposition to intellectual virtue is the juxtaposition of *éthiké* and *nomikon* ("legal") friendship in *EN* VIII.13.

46. At 1144b14–15, Aristotle identifies the non-rational part of the soul which is capable of listening to reason as "ethical"; see also 1102b13–14, 1102b25–27, 1102b29–1103a1, 1138b35–1139a1, 1144b14–15. The extent to which the ethical part of the soul is rational (insofar as it is capable of being receptive to the rational part of the soul in the strict sense) has generated considerable recent scholarship. See further J. Cooper, "Reason, Moral Virtue, and Moral Value," in *Reason and Emotion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 253–80; G. Grönroos, "Listening to Reason in Aristotle's Moral Psychology," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 32 (2007): 251–72; and H. Lorenz, "Virtue of Character in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 37 (2009): 177–212.

47. Broadie, *Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics*, "Philosophical Introduction," 17. Sorabji puts the point well: "Someone who reads in isolation NE 2.1 could be forgiven for concluding that Aristotle thinks habituation sufficient to make men virtuous. It is tempting to combine this with the further assumption that habituation is itself an unthinking process" (Sorabji, "Role of Intellect," 214).

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## Chapter Two

# The Roman Stoics on Habit

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The ancient Stoics believed that the cultivation of proper habits is indispensable for making progress toward virtue. They maintained that the goal of life is to live in agreement with nature.<sup>1</sup> For human beings, they insisted, this entails living in agreement with reason. The perfection of reason they understood to be virtue. Consequently, according to Stoic theory, rehearsing rational judgments about what is good, what is bad, and what is neither good nor bad, and consistently applying these judgments in our daily circumstances to decide what to do and how to live, enables us to become virtuous and thereby live happily. But these rational judgments and the appropriate actions that flow from them require vigilant practice and discipline to maintain in the face of life's challenges, which non-Stoics mistakenly believe are debilitating hardships. Such so-called hardships are conceived by Stoics as opportunities to exercise one's virtue(s) by applying the proper judgments to each event that occurs and making the correct decisions in each situation of public and private life. Consequently, the virtues result from disciplining oneself *consistently* to make sound judgments about (a) the actions performed by accountable human agents, (b) the behaviors of children and non-human animals, (c) events uncaused by human beings, and (d) one's personal and professional roles and social relationships. This consistency is manifested in habitually acting in accord with those judgments. For virtually everyone, achieving this takes a lifetime of training, or longer. The Stoics called this rigorous, deliberate, and painstaking training *askēsis* in Greek and *meditatio*<sup>2</sup> in Latin. They compared it to the grueling program of exercises adopted by athletes preparing to compete in the Olympic Games, medical treatment of disease, and the boot camp drills and active duty service of soldiers. In this chapter I will outline the views on habit of three of the four<sup>3</sup>