**Community-Made Selves**

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***Abstract***

*Conventionalists hold that the sorts of events that one survives—such as teletransportation, or a brain transplant—is at least partly determined by our attitudes. But if Conventionalism is true, whose attitudes determine whether one survives? Do the individual's attitudes do all the work, or do the community's attitudes also factor in? The former answer is the more popular one—held, for example, by David Braddon-Mitchell and Caroline West (2001), Mark Johnston (2010), Dean Zimmerman (2012), and David Kovacs (2016, 2020). But I argue that the reasons in favor of the view are weak; I instead explain why Conventionalists should hold that the community's attitudes crucially factor into the determination of one's survival.*

**1. Introduction**

What sorts of events could I survive? Suppose I enter a teletransporter which records all my physical and psychological features, breaks me down into my component atoms, and then creates an exact duplicate of me in a distant machine out of completely different molecules. Would I be the duplicate? Conventionalists believe that the answer to this depends on our attitudes concerning what people are ("p-attitudes" for short). Such attitudes might be our beliefs about who we are, or attitudes of prudential concern, moral responsibility, property ownership, etc.[[1]](#footnote-1) For instance, suppose the "Organism Community" believes they don't survive as the duplicate, fear teletransportation in the same way that they fear death, treat the duplicate as not being responsible for the commitments the pre-teletransporter made, etc. The "Psychology Community", on the other hand, believes they survive, see teletransportation merely as a form of fast-speed travel, treat the duplicate as responsible for the commitments that the pre-teletransporter made, etc. Conventionalism implies that members of the former community do not survive teletransportation, whereas the members of the latter do. And Conventionalists take this to be an intuitive result, for both communities seem justified in their practices.[[2]](#footnote-2)

But, assuming that Conventionalism is true, *whose* attitudes are relevant? Private Conventionalism says that an *individual's* *own* p-attitudes determine what sorts of events that particular individual survives, whereas Public Conventionalism says that the *wider community*'s p-attitudes play a crucial role. Private Conventionalism seems to be the more popular view. David Kovacs (2016; 2020) explicitly holds the view; and Dean Zimmerman (2012) advocates for it, conditional on the truth of Worm-Theory. And others hold views that seem to imply it. For instance, Mark Johnston (2010, ch. 5) argues that those who are good have the sort of p-attitudes that imply that after they die, they survive as those who are open to goodness (by virtue of becoming a 'higher-order' entity). And this seems to assume Private Conventionalism; for presumably Johnston doesn't want the survival of a good person to depend on whether or not the person is surrounded by good people.[[3]](#footnote-3) Braddon-Mitchell and West (2001, 82) argue that life-changing decisions—such as whether Jane should take a high-paying job if it implies moving to a country and adopting a lifestyle that Jane takes to be dull and unappealing—are so difficult and intractable because it's indeterminate whether one survives it.[[4]](#footnote-4) But this seems to assume Private Conventionalism. For presumably on their account, the intractability of Jane's decision relies only on Jane's attitudes, rather than depending on whether or not the rest of the community would take the job without reservation. On the other hand, it's harder to find those who are committed to Public Conventionalism, whether explicitly or implicitly (though Stephen White (1989) identifies as such).

In this paper, I will explain why I think Public Conventionalism is the more appealing view. I begin by evaluating arguments for Private Conventionalism, giving reasons for taking them to be weak or unconvincing, before turning to my own reasons for preferring Public Conventionalism and explaining what I take the view to specifically imply. I should also clarify that I intend my arguments to apply to Conventionalists of various stripes. For instance, some Conventionalist views—those of Kovacs (2020), Zimmerman (2012) and Johnston (2010)—assume a permissivist metaphysic, such as a rich Worm Theory view on which, not only do objects persist by having temporal parts, but also any set of temporal parts composes a further object. On their view, the work of our p-attitudes is to determine which of those objects our "I" refers to. Other Conventionalists—such as Braddon-Mitchell and West (2001) and Braddon-Mitchell and Miller (2004)—think p-attitudes can bring objects into existence; more specifically, they hold a Worm Theory that says, at least for most worms, the existence of the worm logically depends on our p-attitudes. Kristie Miller (2013), on the other hand, suggests that "I" needn't even refer to an entity, holding instead that whether a claim about one's persistence is "felicitous" is independent of the question of ontology. I don't intend my arguments in favor of Public Conventionalism to depend on one of these views over another.

**2. The Case for Private Conventionalism**

The arguments for Private Conventionalism that I'm aware of in the literature come entirely from Kovacs (2016; 2020) and Zimmerman (2012).The arguments stem from a problem facing a rich form of Worm Theory. On Worm Theory, objects persist through time by having temporal parts. But Worm Theorists are often attracted to Unrestricted Composition, which implies that *any* set of temporal parts compose an object. Thus, for each person, not only is there a worm composed of temporal parts that extend, roughly, from that person's birth to death, but there are numerous other worms overlapping it, such as one that is composed only of temporal parts in that person's adult life. We then get a "Problem of Overlappers": how can I know, for example, that I once was a child, given that I might be one of those worms that lacks child temporal parts?

Zimmerman and Kovacs both think the Worm Theorist can get out of the problem by drawing an attractive analogy between "I" and impure indexicals such as “that” or "here". For when we point in the direction of, say, a body of water and utter “that”, though one's finger inevitably simultaneously points to a number of different things—the inlet, the bay of which the inlet is part of, the ocean of which the bay is a part of, etc.—one’s intentions determine which of the things one is referring to. And this suggests the following response to the Problem of Overlappers: we can hold that "I" is likewise sensitive to one's attitudes, thus if those attitudes are directed at the worm (or worms) that include child temporal parts, so one's "I" refers to such a worm. In this way, we can know that "I was once a child" is true since the "I" refers to the right sort of worm. But this also gives us a motivation for Private Conventionalism: given that "I" is sensitive to one's own attitudes in this way, Private Conventionalism is true. (Kovacs (2016, 1080-5; 2020, sect. 2) also presents the fact that this solution to the Problem of Overlappers dovetails with other principles of rationality and provides a solution that is superior to competitors as additional reasons to favor his Private Conventionalist view.)

Though Kovacs and Zimmerman run this line of argument as a reason in favor of Private Conventionalism, both also recognize that the Public Conventionalist could run the arguments to support their own view. As Kovacs says

one might think that the arguments from impure indexicals and constitutive rationality could be turned on their heads and used to support conclusions contrary to DSV. Suppose I intend to use ‘I’ for an intrinsically eligible candidate, but everyone talking to me is using ‘you’ for another. Doesn’t an analogy with ‘there’ imply that the people around me are referring to an object different from the one I believe myself to be? And don’t considerations of constitutive rationality favor interpreting *them*, who vastly outnumber me, as being right? (Kovacs (2020, 355); see also Zimmerman (2012, 121))

I agree that this sort of objection shows why Kovacs' and Zimmerman's arguments don't really give us reason to prefer Private Conventionalism over Public Conventionalism. But Kovacs (*ibid.*)responds by first pointing to the following Asymmetry Thesis:

When we use second- and third-person pronouns, it’s part of our referential intention to use them for something that is disposed to use the first-person pronoun self-referentially; we aim to zone in on the centers of the first-person attitudes entertained in their immediate vicinity….

By contrast, our use of first-person pronouns shows no such deference; it’s no part of our referential intention to use them for what *others* use their second- and third-person pronouns for.

He (*ibid.*) supports this thesis with the following thought experiment:

Imagine that an entity whom you’ve been addressing with ‘you’ is the exoskeleton of an insect-sized alien controlling it from within. Plausibly, once you learn this, you have a semantic obligation to start using ‘you’ for the alien inside. The alien on the other hand doesn’t have to adjust to your use. She won’t acquire any obligation to start using ‘I’ for her exoskeleton, even if all humans whom she encounters use ‘you’ for it.”

I don't find this example convincing. I agree that it’s compelling for us to adjust our “I” usage so that it refers instead to the alien inside. But I don’t think this need to adjust has to do with recognizing the alien’s own attitudes (in fact Kovacs’ own explanation doesn’t even mention them). Rather, I think we feel compelled to adjust because the inner alien appears to be the more *natural* referent. For we might initially think that the alien-exoskeleton relationship is similar to the relationship between a human and the human's skin—thus we are initially drawn to use "you" to refer to the exoskeleton-alien composite much as we are drawn to use "you" to refer to a human-skin composite. But once we discover that the exoskeleton is a mere vehicle of the inner alien controller, much as a car is a mere vehicle of the inner controlling human, we are drawn to using "you" to refer to the inner alien—just as we use "you" to refer to the human in the car rather than the human-car composite. Thus I agree that discoveries about the physical facts of the alien—such as its chemical or biological makeup—can give us good reason or an obligation to revise what we use "you" to refer to. But this fails to show us that we should adjust our "you" usage simply because the "I" user's p-attitudes are incompatible with our own. The alien thought experiment therefore fails to motivate the Asymmetry Thesis or Private Conventionalism.

So I think the arguments that have so far been given for Private Conventionalism in the literature are quite weak. Nonetheless I think there's another kind of argument having to do with prudential concern that implicitly attracts people to the view. The idea is that, in situations where one is asking, for example, "will I survive teletransportation?" out of a sense of concern for one's own well-being, it’s intuitive that one’s *own* attitudes, rather than the community’s, determines the reference of one’s “I”. For instance, if I believe teletransportation implies my death, but my friend tries to assure me that teletransportation doesn't kill me, whose attitude should determine my "I"? It might seem intuitive to say that since it's *my own* well-being that's at stake, it should be *my* attitudes that matter most and should play the reference determining role.

I think this line of reason has much more force than the arguments that have previously been put forward in the literature. But one reason to doubt it is that others' well-being could also depend on one's own well-being. Suppose I tell my mother that I'm going on a trip via teletransportation, but she vehemently objects. Though she knows that teletransportation will leave her with a perfect psychological and physical duplicate of me (one that will love and provide for her just as well and in the same way as I would) she is deeply concerned for my own well-being believing it implies my death, and she would be profoundly psychologically affected were I to take the trip. If the motivating principle of the argument from prudential reason—that is, that the one who's well-being is at stake is the one whose attitudes determine the "I" reference—were true[[5]](#footnote-5), then since my mom's well-being is at stake, her attitudes should play at least some role in determining the reference of my "I". But this would imply that the reference of "I" in such cases is not a private matter. (I (Author, manuscript) also argue elsewhere that, in response to Anti-Conventionalist arguments, a plausible Conventionalism will be a restricted one which allows for contexts where one's "I" is automatically self-reflexive, rather than being sensitive to p-attitudes. If my view is correct, then we could apply it here to get another response to the argument from prudential reason: the motivating case of prudential concern is in fact one where the "I" is self-reflexive and so isn't sensitive to the individual's own p-attitudes.)

**3. The Case for Public Conventionalism**

I now turn to the case in favor of Public Conventionalism, which I take to be much stronger than the case for Private Conventionalism. I will divide the discussion into two kinds of situations: those where the relevant parties are aware of each other’s p-attitudes and those where they are not.

*3.1. Reference under awareness*

We previously saw Kovacs' attempt to argue that we have a duty to adjust our “you” usage to conform to other people's “I” (though I explained why the argument failed). Here we will see a case where one's "I" should instead be adjusted to another's "you". Begin by considering the following:

Orin grew up in the Organism Community acquiring their p-attitudes. When he turned thirty, he moved to the Psychology Community where he alone had the Organism Community's p-attitudes—everyone else treated teletransportation merely as a form of high-speed travel. One day Orin is found unconscious and, as is customary in such emergency situations, is teletransported to the hospital. After regaining consciousness and realizing that he had been teletransported, Orin’s post-teletransporter believes that Orin had died, and that he, the post-teletransporter, is a mere duplicate of Orin. The post-teletransporter also decides to go by the name “Jurgen”. Eventually Jurgen becomes very good friends with Seika, who has the Psychology Community's p-attitudes. But Seika finds Jurgen to have a very strange sense of humor. Jurgen always insists that he never went to school despite the fact that he obviously did, and that he’s less than a year old.

In this scenario, if Jurgen were to reveals his “I”-beliefs to Seika, this intuitively would give Seika reason to adjust her “you” usage. But would this need to adjust arise from the fact that, as the Asymmetry Thesis would have it, that when we use "you", we intend to refer to what Jurgen believes it does? I don't think so. For here's a reasonable way of continuing the above story:

Eventually Seika realizes that Jurgen's odd behavior stems from the fact that he's from the Organism Community and recently teletransported. She approaches Jurgen explaining "when I talk about you, as in when I ask 'how old are you?' or 'have you ever gone to school?', I mean to be talking about something that survives teletransportation."

Here, contrary to the Asymmetry Thesis, Seika does *not* intend that her "you" refer to what Jurgen believes that his "I" does. Furthermore, when Seika approaches Jurgen in this way, this intuitively gives Jurgen reason to adjust his "I" usage to Saika's "you" usage. So, instead of the Asymmetry Thesis, I suggest this is a much more plausible explanation for the need to adjust our "I" or "you" usage:

**Revelation Thesis**

when someone reveals an intention to use a term a certain way, regardless of what that term is, they are inviting and asking us to join them in that usage.

With this thesis, we can agree with Kovacs that when someone reveals their "I" usage, this gives us reason to adjust our "you" usage. But it also implies (plausibly, given the above situation) that *even when someone reveals their "you" usage*, this gives us reason to adjust our "I" usage.

To give another example in support of the Revelation Thesis, let's slightly change the above situation. Suppose instead that Jurgen first approaches Seika about their different p-attitudes. But he explains to her "when I talk about you, I mean to refer to something that doesn't survive teletransportation. So if I ask you 'how old are you' or 'have you ever gone to school' you shouldn't count what has happened prior to teletransportation." In this situation, Seika intuitively has reason to adjust her "I" usage to Jurgen's "you" usage. And this, again, is contrary to the Asymmetry Thesis, but is as the Revelation Thesis predicts.

But merely revealing one's attitudes or intentions is not the end of the story. That alone doesn't determine the reference of "I" or "you". Instead, it's determined by semantic negotiation. In such negotiation, there are various factors one could point to in an attempt to convince the other party. For instance, in Kovacs' alien case, the alien points to biological facts about the alien's constitution that were unknown to the other party, and this gives the other party strong reason to adjust their "you" usage. But with respect to the case of Seika and Jurgen, such biological facts would be less helpful in the negotiation since both parties are aware of the relevant biological facts. Instead they might point to various psychological facts. They might point to their *own* psychology—for instance, Jurgen might resist using "I" in the way Seika wants since Jurgen is unaccustomed to his own usageit (though Seika might just as well complain that she is unaccustomed to Jurgen's "I" usage, thinking that it too would cause much frustration and confusion). Alternatively, one might point to the psychology of the community, and here Seika would seem to have a distinct advantage. For she might point out "you’re living in our community now and will be here for the foreseeable future, so you should adapt to our way of talking. According to us, you *are* over thirty years old and you *have* gone to school. So stop telling bartenders and potential employers otherwise!” If Jurgen agrees to Seika’s plea, then his “I” in future conversations won’t align with or be determined by his p-attitudes. Alternatively, Jurgen could instead continue the semantic negotiation, trying to persuade Seika to instead adjust her “you” usage. But either way, contrary to Private Conventionalism, it seems clear that the reference of Jurgen’s “I” is not *automatically* determined by his person-directed practices in this scenario.

Given this, I suggest that the following is a more plausible principle concerning the reference of “I” under the awareness of a conflict in usage:

**Awareness Principle**

If *S* is using “I” to communicate with *S\**, then: if S and S\* are aware of a conflict in what they take the persistence conditions of the referent of S’s “I” to be, then the reference of future tokens of *S*’s “I” (and S\*’s “you”) when communicating with *S\** is determined by semantic negotiation (if the conflict is resolved at all).

This negotiation needn’t be a long process. It could simply consist in Jurgen telling Seika how he intends to use “I” and Seika agreeing to that usage (agreeing to use “you” accordingly). But the point in calling such a transaction ‘negotiation’ is simply to point out that the other person has a role to play as well. The "I"-user doesn't have sole semantic authority, rather the issue can only be resolved through the other party's consent.

In this sense, the resolution of “I” happens in much the same way the ambiguity of other terms is resolved. In American English, saying “I had tea today” implies that that you had a beverage. But in British English, it’s instead compatible with only having had a muffin. If Britt, who is British, and Amir, who is American, ask each other about “tea” on a regular basis, but recognize the ambiguity in the term, the issue is not resolved through semantic authority, but semantic negotiation. This example also brings to light different ways of resolving the negotiation. One kind involves having a *unified* usage—either by both using “tea” in the British way, or both using it in the American way in future conversations. This is the sort of resolution we have so far considered in Seika and Jurgen’s case. But another reasonable option (perhaps most reasonable if Britt and Amir live in a non-western country that doesn’t have established norms on the reference of “tea”) is to have a *disunified* usage: agree to understand Britt as using the British phrase and Amir as using the American phrase. Notice that the disunified resolution would occasionally allow Britt to use the phrase in her favored way. For instance, if she initiates the conversation, asking “have you had tea?” then Amir is to answer “yes” even if he only had muffins. But Britt can’t always use it in that way if she agrees to this resolution. For if Amir initiates the question “have you had tea?”, he will be using it in the American way, and so Britt cannot answer “yes” if she has only had a muffin. Such a disunified approach is also available in the case of Jurgen and Seika. This will sometimes allow Jurgen to use “I” and "you" in his favored way. For instance, if he asks Seika “have you ever eaten sushi?” the answer would be “no” even if Seika had sushi prior to teletransporting. But if Seika instead initiates the question asking Jurgen “have you ever eaten sushi?”, then Jurgen would be correct in answering “yes I have” even if only Orin had eaten sushi.

*3.2. Reference under ignorance*

So far we have been looking at what determines the reference of Jurgen’s “I” *after* both parties recognize the conflict and negotiate the issue. But what of those utterances of “I” that occurred *prior* to such a confrontation? When Jurgen would tell Seika “I’m under a year old” when Seika was just first getting to know him, did his “I” at that time refer to something that doesn’t survive teletransportation? It’s obvious that Seika *believed* thatit referred to a teletransportation survivor and Jurgen *believed* that it did not. But if we want to ask, apart from what each party believed about the matter, to what the *fact of the matter* is, it's harder to see what can be said.

Perhaps we can make headway by looking at cases where something of practical consequence rides on the issue.So consider the following example:

Seika moves to the Organism community. She signs an apartment contract knowing the community’s assumptions: they assume the pronoun “I” and proper names (like “Seika”) refer to individuals that don’t survive teletransportation, thus if an individual named on a contract were to teletransport, the contract would no longer refer to the post-teletransporter—neither binding nor protecting that individual. Though Seika recognizes these practices of the community, she herself has the attitudes of the Psychological Community, and she signs the year-long contract intending the words “Seika” and “I” on it to be referring to a teletransporter; but she makes no attempt to mention this to the landlord or intermediaries. Three months later, Seika teletransports. After the landlord finds out, he kicks out Seika’s post-teletransporter from the apartment, giving it to another tenant.

In this case, if Private Conventionalists are right that the reference of the words “Seika” and “I” on the contract are determined by Seika’s attitudes, then after Seika teletransports, the words would refer to Seika’s post-teletransporter. Consequently, the post-teletransporter would have the right, according to the contract, to live in the apartment. But surely this is the wrong result. Seika was aware of the community’s own practices and didn’t attempt to mention her own attitudes or ask for an exception in her case. So it seems quite obvious to me that the landlord, under the contract, has the right to turn the apartment over to a different tenant, in which case the words "Seika" and "I" on the contract are not determined by Seika's attitudes. This suggests the following principle:

**One-Sided Ignorance Principle**

If *S* uses “I” to communicate with *S\** at time *t*, then: if at *t*, *S* is aware that *S\** believes the “I” refers to something with persistence condition *P*, and *S* makes no attempt to make *S\** aware of S’s own attitudes on the matter, then *S*’s “I” at *t* refers to something with persistence condition *P*.

Thus, where S\* is the landlord and P is the persistence condition ‘not surviving teletransportation, even if the process produces a duplicate’, given that Seika makes no attempt to make the landlord aware of her attitudes concerning “I”, the principle implies that the reference of Seika’s “I” on the contract refers to something that doesn’t survive teletransportation. So, again, one’s p-attitudes needn’t align with the reference of their “I”.

What if Seika and the landlord are both unaware of each other’s attitudes? In that case it seems more plausible that neither party is squarely in the right. This judgment is even more plausible if Seika and the landlord both live in a “neutral community”—a community much like our own that hasn’t had exposure to teletransportation technology and hasn’t had time to develop unified practices on the matter. For in that case Seika would have greater justification for being unaware of the landlord’s attitudes. In such a scenario, it seems indeterminate whether the landlord has the contractual right to kick out Seika’s post-teletransporter; and such an indeterminacy seems to indicate that it's indeterminate whether the words “Seika” and “I” refer to the post-teletransporter. Thus, I suggest:

**Two-Sided Ignorance Principle**

If *S* uses “I” to communicate with *S\** at time *t*, then: if at *t*, *S* and *S\** have conflicting beliefs about whether “I” refers to something with persistence condition *P*, and both *S* and *S\** are justifiedly ignorant about the others’ beliefs, then *S*’s “I” at *t* doesn’t determinately refer to something with persistence condition *P* or *P*’s contrary.

It’s worth recognizing that Seika and the landlord could renegotiate the contract, and so specify what the term “I” refers to. But I don’t take that to influence the reference of “I” on the initial contract. (Nonetheless one who prefers to say that the original contract’s “I” can be affected by later negotiation may tweak the principle accordingly.)

The above ignorance principles, like the awareness principle, implies that “I” operates much like other ambiguous terms. Suppose Candy, a Canadian, is renting a room in America from Amir. The rental contract, however, doesn’t explicitly state what the monthly rent of “400 dollars” refers to. Though Candy knows that Amir and the intermediaries believe that it refers to US dollars, Candy instead intends it to refer to Canadian dollars (but doesn’t tell Amir or the intermediaries this). When Candy pays Amir 400 Canadian dollars, Amir is enraged and insists that Candy pay 400 US dollars. In this scenario, it indeed seems that the contract gives Amir the right to make that demand due to the fact that Candy was aware of Amir’s beliefs and didn’t do anything. This therefore suggests that the “dollars” on the contract referred to US dollars. And this judgement precisely parallels what the One-Sided Ignorance Principle implies about “I”.

We can also get a parallel with the Two-Sided Ignorance Principle. For suppose instead that Candy and Amir both instead live in Kenya and Candy signs a contract to rent an apartment from Amir there. But instead of paying Amir Shillings—the local currency—Candy agrees to pay in dollars. But again, the contract doesn’t specify what kind of “dollars” is meant, while Candy assumes it means Canadian, and Amir assumes it to mean US. In this case, after signing the contract, would Amir have the contractual right to demand that Candy pay in US dollars rather than Canadian? Here there seems to be no determinate fact about what “dollars” refers to, and likewise the contract doesn’t settle who is in the right. And this parallels what the Two-Sided Ignorance Principle implies about “I”.

**5. Conclusion**

I have argued that the case for Public Conventionalism is much stronger than the case for Private Conventionalism. In particular, I have argued that when two parties are aware of conflicting attitudes about the referent of "I", the conflict is resolved through semantic negotiation. And when at least one of the parties is ignorant of the conflict, then the "I"-user's attitudes and the referent of their "I" could still misalign; the "I" might instead align with the "you"-user's attitudes or it might fail to determinately refer. Of course, there are still situations in which the referent of the "I"-user's "I" aligns with their p-attitudes—when there is no conflict with who one is communicating with or one is simply talking to oneself. But the principles I give illustrate that, when communicating with others, whether there is such an alignment depends on factors beyond the "I"-user's own p-attitudes.

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1. Conventionalists differ on which particular attitudes are necessary. For instance, Kovacs (2016, 2020) holds them to be “‘I’-beliefs”—which basically are beliefs concerning what one’s “I” refers to. Whereas Braddon-Mitchell and West (2001, 61) emphasize the attitudes of “holding one person-stage responsible for deeds performed by another person-stage, regard the events that will befall some future person-stage in the light of anticipation…., owning and imputing the actions of some past person-stage as one’s own, practices of the transmission of property and many others.” [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Some Conventionalists, such as Johnston (2010, 247-8) and Zimmerman (2010, 242-54), base this judgment on a permissive ontology that includes both entities that do survive and those that don't survive teletransportation. Others, such as Miller (2013, S94) take the judgment as plausible regardless of one's ontology. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Johnston (2010, 13) is concerned to give an account where the good get their just desserts by surviving death, but it would seem unjust if a good person in a bad community were not to survive death due to the attitudes of the wider community. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. On Braddon-Mitchell and West's (2001) account, Janes' current p-attitudes imply that there's an object overlapping her that doesn't survive the transition, while her future p-attitudes imply that there's an object overlapping her that *does* survive it; and which object Jane's current "I" refers to is indeterminate. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Notice that I make no use of such a principle in my own account below. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)