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Alan G. Padgett (2005)

LU XIANGSHAN

(1139–1193)

Lu Xiangshan, also called Lu Jiuyuan, started the idealistic trend in Chinese philosophy. He emphasized the supremacy and self-sufficiency of the mind, contrary to his contemporary Zhu Xi, who stressed the need to discover reason and to acquire knowledge of the external world. He lived in the province of Jiangsi. His father was a respected member of the gentry, and from his early youth Lu was able to devote himself to the study of Confucius and Mencius. He disagreed with the views of the scholar Cheng Yi of the Northern Sung Dynasty.

> Lu Xiangshan is known for the following:
> When a sage arises in the East,
> The mind is the same,
> And so is reason.

The same is true of sages born in the West, the North, and the South and of those born thousands of generations earlier and later. What he meant is that mind is the same the world over and at all times. From this fundamental thesis he drew the conclusions that mind has priority over all things and that reason has a universal validity.

Yang Jian, a disciple of Lu and a submagistrate, asked him, "What is the Original Mind?" Lu quoted the words of Mencius concerning the four kinds of virtues—*ren* (benevolence), *yi* (righteousness), *li* (decency), and *zhi* (knowledge)—and said, "This is the Original Mind." But Yang failed to understand what Lu meant. Some time after, a lawsuit was brought by a salesman of fans for Yang's verdict, and Yang again came to Lu with the same question. Lu answered, "In trying the case of the fan salesman, you were able to judge right that which is right and wrong that which is wrong. This is the Original Mind." Yang was then convinced that the mind is self-conscious and self-evident.

Lu was firmly convinced that there is a universal mind and a universal rationality: "What fills the universe is rationality; what the scholars should search for is to render the idea of rationality clear to all. The scope of rationality is boundless." He also quoted Cheng Hao's words, "The universe is great; yet it has its limitation," and then inferred from them that what is more perfect than the universe is rationality.

Again he said: "Rationality in the universe is so evident that it is never concealed. The greatness of the universe lies in the existence of rationality which is an order publicly followed and without partiality. Man with Heaven and Earth constitutes the triad. Why should one be egocentric and not in conformity with rationality?" Lu's main idea is that since each one has a mind and reason is inherent in mind, mind is reason. Furthermore, he says: "What is the happening of the universe is the ought-to-do-duty of man; what is the ought-to-do-duty is the happening of the universe."

See also Chinese Philosophy; Mencius; Rationality; Reason; Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi).

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Carsun Chang (1967)
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LYING

Lying may be defined as the making of a declarative statement to another person that one believes to be false, with the intention that the other person believe that statement to be true, and the intention that the person believe that one believes that statement to be true. Lying may be distinguished from other forms of intentional deception insofar as it involves the use of conventional signs arranged to make a statement. Intentional deception using natural signs, such as fake smiling, shamming a limp, or wearing a disguise, does not count as lying. Intentional deception using conventional signs that are neither spoken nor written, such as deceptively nodding one's head, sending deceptive smoke signals, or deceptive signaling by semaphore, does count as lying, at least insofar as one is making a statement.

Lying requires that a statement be made; hence that form of deception that consists in withholding a statement from another person with the intention that the other person infer a believed falsehood—sometimes called a lie of omission or a concealment lie—does not count as lying. Exaggerating, being misleading, hedging, or being evasive, with the intention that the other person infer a believed falsehood, also does not count as lying. Lying does not require that the statement that is made is false, but it does require that the statement made is believed to be false rather than merely not believed to be true, or believed to be possibly false or probably false. Lying does not require that the other person is real, only that the other person is believed to be a person and is believed to be real. This does not resolve the questions of whether one can lie to no other person in particular (for example, by publishing a believed false account of an event), or whether there can be intrapersonal lying (for example, an earlier self lying to a later self).

The most important philosophical discussions of lying are to be found in St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Immanuel Kant. Aquinas differed from Augustine and Kant in holding that making a declarative statement to another person that one believes to be false is sufficient for lying; no further deceptive intention is needed. All three held that lying is wrong and that one should never lie; however they distinguished between not lying or being truthful, which is required, and being candid or volunteering believed truths, which is not. Augustine and Aquinas held that some lies, such as lies told to save the lives of innocents or lies told to avoid being defiled, that do not harm the particular person(s) lied to, are less egregious than other lies, such as malicious lies and lies told in the teaching of religion. All three argued that lying is a perversion of the faculty of speech, the natural end of which is the communication of thoughts. Augustine and Kant argued that in telling a lie one harms oneself, and undermines trust in society; hence there can never be a harmless lie. Kant also argued that a person cannot consent to being told a particular lie; hence in lying to another person one is necessarily treating that person as a mere means to one's end.

See also Deontological Ethics; Duty; Kantian Ethics; Moral Rules and Principles; Self-Deception; Virtue and Vice.

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James Edwin Mahon (2005)

LYOTARD, JEAN-FRANÇOIS

(1924–1998)

Born in Versailles, France, on August 10, 1924, Jean-François Lyotard was educated in Paris. As a child, Lyotard wanted to be a monk, painter, historian, or novelist, but settled a career in philosophy. He began teaching philosophy at the secondary school level in Constantine, Algeria, and later at La Flèche, France. From 1954 to 1966, Lyotard was a member of a leftist revolutionary group called Socialism ou Barbarie (either socialism or barbarism), eventually joining a splinter group called Pouvoir Ouvrier (Worker's Power) in 1964. He broke with the group in 1966 after becoming critical of Marxism's tendency toward universalism. He began work as a philosophy professor, and was employed at University of Paris X, Nanterre, during the student protests of May 1968. He gained a full position at the University of Paris VIII, Vincennes, where he spent many years and became an emeritus faculty member in 1987. He was also a founding member of the Collège International de Philosophie in Paris. With *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1979) he achieved international renown, and was guest lecturer at many universities throughout the world. On April 21, 1998, Lyotard died of leukemia in Paris. Lyotard's philosophical influences are diverse,