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Agent causation as the solution to all the compatibilist’s problems

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Abstract

In a recent paper I argued that agent causation theorists should be compatibilists. In this paper, I argue that compatibilists should be agent causation theorists. I consider six of the main problems facing compatibilism: (i) the powerful intuition that one can’t be responsible for actions that were somehow determined before one was born; (ii) Peter van Inwagen’s modal argument, involving the inference rule (β); (iii) the objection to compatibilism that is based on claiming that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition for freedom; (iv) “manipulation arguments,” involving cases in which an agent is manipulated by some powerful being into doing something that he or she would not normally do, but in such a way that the compatibilist’s favorite conditions for a free action are satisfied; (v) the problem of constitutive luck; and (vi) the claim that it is not fair to blame someone for an action if that person was determined by forces outside of his or her control to perform that action. And in the case of each of these problems, I argue that the compatibilist has a much more plausible response to that problem if she endorses the theory of agent causation than she does otherwise.

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Notes

  1. Markosian (1999). For more on agent causation see for example Suarez (1597), Chisholm (1989), Taylor (1966), van Inwagen (1983), O’Connor (1995, 2000), Clarke (1995, 2003) and Turner and Nahmias (2006).

  2. See for example Suarez (1597); Chisholm (1989), Taylor (1966), van Inwagen (1983), Clarke (1995), O’Connor (1995).

  3. See David Lewis (1986).

  4. See Jonathan Schaffer (2001).

  5. More perspicuously: In Fig. 4, since e1 causes e2, which in turn causes e3, there is a single causal sequence that contains both e1 and e2; whereas in the case shown in Fig. 3 (we can suppose) there is no causal sequence that contains both e1 and e2.

  6. It might be thought that if we say there is such an event as e4.5, then we will also have to posit an infinite series of further events, including Imran’s causing e4.5, Imran’s causing that further event, and so on. I think there are two possible ways for the agent causation theorist to go here. Way 1: There is no such further event as Imran’s causing e4.5, since the only event in the example that we should take to be caused by Imran is e5. (According to this line, then, e4.5 is caused by e4, but is not caused by Imran himself.) Way 2: There is such an infinite regress, but it is a benign one, since by causing e5 Imran automatically causes e4.5, as well as all of the other events in the series.

  7. I give such examples in Markosian (1999).

  8. See van Inwagen (1983, p. 93ff).

  9. The definition of ‘N’ that van Inwagen gives in An Essay on Free Will goes like this: Np = df p and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p. There are a number of variations on this definition of ‘N’ that are interesting, and different in important ways. But in order to conserve time and space, the only definition of ‘N’ that I will discuss in this paper is the one given in the text. Although I won’t be able to defend this claim here, I think that the points I will make regarding ‘N’ generalize sufficiently to apply to most other interesting definitions of the operator.

  10. On both kinds of compatibilism, see John Martin Fischer (1983). For more on altered-law compatibilism, see also Lewis (1981).

  11. See for example Taylor (1974, pp. 43–44), Kane (1996, pp. 65–71), Pereboom (2001, Chap. 4), and Mele (2006, pp. 188–195).

  12. Nelkin (2008).

  13. I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to address this objection, as well as the previous two.

  14. As Joseph Keim Campbell pointed out in his comments on the APA version of this paper, all the compatibilist really needs to appeal to, in order to gain the relevant advantage (with respect to (β)-type rules) over standard compatibilism, is the possibility of agent causation. But it seems to me that anyone who thinks agent causation is possible should also believe it to be something that we actually do.

  15. The contextualist analysis of ability is suggested by Lewis (1986).

  16. On Frankfurt examples, see Harry Frankfurt (1969).

  17. What follows is a variation on the four-case argument developed by Derk Pereboom. See Pereboom (2001, Chap. 4).

  18. For some discussion of questions like at least some of the following, see Clarke (1995, 2003); and O’Connor (1995, 2000).

References

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Acknowledgments

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Western Washington University, the 2001 Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, the 2002 Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, Macquarie University, the University of Durham, the 2005 Bled Philosophy Conference, the Australian National University, and Vancouver Island University. I am indebted to members of all eight audiences for helpful criticism. I am also grateful to Andrew Egan, Kris McDaniel, Sarah McGrath, Ted Sider, Ryan Wasserman, Brian Weatherson, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper.

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    Ned Markosian

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Markosian, N. Agent causation as the solution to all the compatibilist’s problems. Philos Stud 157, 383–398 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9654-5

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