

enough to prevent “the closure by which the system contains and sustains itself.”²⁹⁵ The true satisfaction of Whitehead’s system is the intensity of life that, as event, is immanently rational by being *structurally liberated* from the imposition of controlling power.²⁹⁶ In this sense, structure guarantees the system’s aim: the depth of intensity²⁹⁷ that frees from oppression.

In this chapter, I have argued that Whitehead’s speculative system must be read as self-creative event.²⁹⁸ In a reversion of Whitehead’s famous dictum that every actuality is a “system of all things,”²⁹⁹ we can say: every system is an actuality or better, an “organism” comparable to an “entire living nexus” of a “living society” or “person.”³⁰⁰ Hence system is an infinite process of “interpretation.”³⁰¹ Continuing with another of Whitehead’s famous formulations, that “life is robbery” of structures,³⁰² we can say: the system’s event harbors structures to protect the process from oppression of despotizing unity. Hence, in fluent systems, structures only further the process when they generate difference. A fluent structure establishes the dignity of the multiplicity of the living whole.

In view of Whitehead’s invocation of the “Mind of Leibniz” ranging “from divinity to political philosophy,”³⁰³ the ultimate concern of Whitehead’s “fluent system” might be the “Harmony of Harmonies”³⁰⁴ that as the “Final Fact” is “initial Eros,” endlessly initiating the process of “differentiation.”³⁰⁵ But its political importance might be—as with Plato,³⁰⁶ Adorno, Deleuze, and Derrida—to generate a *hermeneutic of difference* for a civilization of persuasion³⁰⁷ over against a barbarism of power and oppression.³⁰⁸

²⁹⁵ KELLER, “Introduction,” 6–11.

²⁹⁶ AI 113.

²⁹⁷ RM 113.

²⁹⁸ Cf. ROLAND FABER, “On the Unique Origin of Revelation, Religious Intuition, and Theology,” *Process Studies* 28, nos. 3–4 (1999): 273–89.

²⁹⁹ PR 36.

³⁰⁰ Cf. PR 104; cf. ROLAND FABER, “Personsein am Ort der Leere,” *Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie* 44 (2002): 189–98.

³⁰¹ PR 3.

³⁰² PR 105–6.

³⁰³ MT 3.

³⁰⁴ AI 296.

³⁰⁵ AI 295.

³⁰⁶ AI 166.

³⁰⁷ AI 296.

³⁰⁸ AI 51.

Schleiermacher between Kant and Leibniz

Predication and Ontology

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In some of his most recent work, Manfred Frank has suggested that Schleiermacher’s *Dialektik* can be interpreted more fruitfully by taking stock of Leibnizian influences on Schleiermacher’s thought. After all, Schleiermacher was a pupil of the Leibnizian Eberhard in Halle; Frank notes that in his correspondence Schleiermacher took sides with Eberhard against Kant in the famous Kant-Eberhard debate.¹ In this paper I take stock of this claim by examining and comparing the larger systematic thought contexts of Leibniz, Kant, and Schleiermacher. My focus will be on the ontological and epistemological commitments of each of these thinkers and their implications for their understanding of predication. More specifically, the question to be explored is the following: does Schleiermacher’s adoption of Leibniz’s complete concept and the theory of predication it entails conflict with his adoption of Kant’s two-source theory of knowledge? I conclude that it does, and that in fact it is this clash between elements borrowed from two very different systematic thinkers that makes Schleiermacher’s *Dialektik* the cipher that it is. The paper will be divided into two parts. First I explore the larger systematic interrelations in Leibniz’s thought regarding his theories of substance and the complete concept. This analysis will show that the theory of the complete concept cannot be so easily divorced from Leibniz’s ontology of independent substance. Second, I will examine the Kant-Eberhard debate in order to make explicit the interconnections

¹ In the Introduction to his edition of Schleiermacher’s *Dialektik*, Manfred Frank notes, “Der Briefwechsel zeigt, daß Schleiermacher sich ganz entschieden auf die Seite Eberhards und gegen Kant und Reinhold stellt (vgl. etwa Brief 128, Z. 262 ff.).” MANFRED FRANK, “Einleitung,” in *Dial2001*, 67.

between a two-source theory of knowledge (presupposing physical influx) and Kant's understanding of the nature of judgments. This controversy highlights the differences between the systems of the followers of Wolff and Leibniz, and that of Kant. The analysis develops further the intrinsic relations between the theory of the complete concept and the idea of independent substances on the one hand, and the two-source theory of knowledge and Kant's extensional logic, on the other.

I. LEIBNIZ AND SCHLEIERMACHER ON SUBSTANCE AND THE COMPLETE CONCEPT

An important point of similarity in the systems of Leibniz and Schleiermacher is that of the complete concept and the theory of predication implied by it. Schleiermacher, following Leibniz, often speaks of the complete concept of a thing containing marks for all its powers and attributes. In the *Dialektik*, Schleiermacher notes that "The particular, the lowest level of concepts, has being; however general concepts are not things, but rather empty marks having their source in abstraction from a mass of judgments."² Two things stand out in this sentence. First, Schleiermacher's identification of a particular with the lowest level of a concept implies that the individual, with all its particularities, can be given in a *concept*. As such for Schleiermacher, as for Leibniz, there is an *infima* species. Second, the sentence is notable for the fact that it fails to distinguish between concepts and things. Since the complete concept contains all the marks for an individual, everything that is true about that individual is already contained in its concept. What ontological implications, if any, should Schleiermacher's adoption of the idea of a complete concept commit him to? In order to answer this question, we must first take a look at Leibniz's development of the theory of the complete concept and its role in Leibniz's larger philosophical system.

According to Leibniz, "The concept of a singular substance is something complete, which already contains potentially whatever can be understood of it A complete concept is the mark [*nota*] of a singular substance."³ In the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, Leibniz writes: "the nature of an indi-

² DialO 225. (All translations from Schleiermacher's *Dialektik* are my own.)

³ The English translation of this passage is from DONALD RUTHERFORD's *Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 110; the passage is originally found in EDUARD BODEMAN, *Die Leibniz-Handschriften*

vidual substance or a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed."⁴ Leibniz's theory of truth is based on concept containment, and this implies that all true propositions are analytic. The hallmark of such judgments is that they are true in virtue of the principle of contradiction; truth is based on the logical relation between *concepts*. For Leibniz the predicate in a true judgment merely reiterates that which is already included in the subject concept or that which is implied by it; to negate such a true judgment would imply a contradiction. This understanding of concepts is principally true of God's ideas on which possibility and truth are founded, but is true of human concepts as well.

What are the systematic interrelations between Leibniz's theory of predication and his ontological commitments? In order to make these clear, we need to explore the interrelations between the idea of the complete concept and Leibniz's understanding of substance.⁵ In fact, I will argue that Leibniz's theory of substance is the driving force behind his whole ontology and theory of predication. Both Leibniz's nominalism and his theory of the complete concept are intrinsically bound up with his theory of substance.

Some of the most important characterizations of substance in Leibniz's theory are the following. First, the being of a substance does not depend on anything outside of itself; hence following Spinoza's characterization, substance is that which can be thought through itself. Second, if substance is truly independent, it must itself be the source of all its modifications. As such, it contains within itself its own entelechy. This principle, along with the first is what leads Leibniz to conceive of his monads as "windowless," that is, they cannot be affected from without. This view of substance is so important that it is worth quoting Leibniz at length on this issue:

königlichen öffentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover (Hannover: Hahn, 1889; reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966), LH IV 7C, Bl. 111-4.

⁴ GOTTFRIED WILHELM FREIHERR VON LEIBNIZ, *Philosophical Essays*, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 41.

⁵ This is a major issue in Leibniz scholarship. The question is whether Leibniz's theory of the complete concept drives his theory of substance, or whether it is his theory of substance that leads him to adopt the theory of the complete concept. Current Leibniz scholarship tends to the latter view, which seems to me to be the correct one. My discussion of Leibniz is indebted to RUTHERFORD's excellent study, *Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature*, cited above.

[From] the notion of an individual substance it also follows in metaphysical rigor that all the operations of substances, both actions and passions, are spontaneous, and that with the exception of the dependence of creatures on God, no real influx from one to the other is intelligible. For whatever happens to each one of them would flow from its nature and its notion even if the rest were supposed to be absent.⁶

Third, a substance persists throughout its changes. Fourth, substance is a true or *per se* unity, that is, all of its attributes should be derivable from a fundamental principle that articulates its essence. The third and fourth conditions of substance are intrinsically interwoven, since insofar as substance is a *per se* unity, it can be said to persist through all its modifications. Lastly, substances are uniquely identifiable. Given this characterization of substance, Leibniz's understanding of the complete concept is uniquely suited to articulate the nature of the intrinsic connection of a substance's attributes to its essence. If substance is truly independent (the monads are windowless), all of its changes must flow from its own spontaneous action. The complete concept expresses the unique essence of individual substance from which all of its modifications flow, since God creates through it. As Rutherford notes, "a complete concept is an appropriate way to conceive of God's knowledge of a being, which is, by its nature, a spontaneous source of change."⁷ In Leibniz's system, the notion of a complete concept is inherently bound up with his notion of substance. It is Leibniz's commitment to independent substance that leads him to the notion of the complete concept.

The Leibnizian understanding of substance has ontological implications that are in turn bound up with Leibniz's theory of predication. According to Leibniz's ontology, only concrete particulars, that is, substances (*substantiva*) that cannot themselves be predicated of other substances, exist. Abstract beings do not exist; they are mere "beings of reason" (*entia rationis*), the product of thought which abstracts them from concrete particulars. Leibniz tells us that the thorniest difficulties puzzled over by the Scholastics disappear "at once if we agree to banish abstract beings and resolve to speak ordinarily only in terms of concrete beings, admitting no

⁶ GOTTFRIED WILHELM FREIHERR VON LEIBNIZ, *Philosophical Writings*, ed. and trans. Mary Morris and George Henry Radcliffe Parkinson (London: Dent, 1973), 79.

⁷ RUTHERFORD, *Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature*, 139.

other terms in scientific demonstrations than those which represent substantial subjects."⁸ He therefore offers a reinterpretation of the scholastic dictum *praedicatum inest subjecto*. This was traditionally understood to refer to the actual inherence of attributes in real subjects; a true proposition reflects this real relation. Since for Leibniz there are no *abstracta*, a proposition cannot be true in virtue of its reflecting the actual inherence of attributes in a subject. Given these nominalist commitments, how then is Leibniz to preserve objective grounds for truth? The answer lies in his theory of the complete concept. Since the divine mind creates individuals through complete concepts, essences of actual particulars have as their counterparts perfect ideas, making it possible to transfer the metaphysical basis of predication from things to concepts. *Praedicatum inest subjecto* no longer refers to attributes inhering in things, but rather to the fact that a complete concept contains simpler concepts within it.⁹ Hence Leibniz notes that "when we say that Alexander is strong, we mean nothing else than that strong is contained within the notion of Alexander, and likewise for the rest of Alexander's predicates."¹⁰

Leibniz's brand of nominalism follows from his understanding of substance. An individual substance is what it is in virtue of all the attributes that are bound up with it. These attributes are inherently tied up with the essence of a substance, that is, the substantial essence implies them. This must be the case if a substance is to qualify as a true or *per se* unity, that is, a unifying principle (its essence) must be the ground of everything that can be truly predicated of it. Hence were it the case that any one of a substance's attributes were different, one would have a different individual altogether. Leibniz notes that "what determines a certain Adam must absolutely contain all his predicates, and it is this complete concept that determines generality in such a way that the individual is reached."¹¹ This means that there are no free-floating *abstracta*, since attributes are always tied to particular substances.

⁸ GOTTFRIED WILHELM FREIHERR VON LEIBNIZ, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, ed. and trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 217.

⁹ See RUTHERFORD's treatment of Leibniz's nominalism in *Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature*, 115–9.

¹⁰ The English translation of the passage is from *ibid.*, 124. The passage is originally found in GOTTFRIED WILHELM FREIHERR VON LEIBNIZ, *Fragmente zur Logik*, ed. and trans. Franz Schmidt (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1960).

¹¹ GOTTFRIED WILHELM FREIHERR VON LEIBNIZ, *The Leibniz-Arnould Correspondence*, trans. Haydn Trevor Mason (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967), 60–1.

As noted above, Schleiermacher often speaks of a complete concept in the *Dialektik*. Given the systematic interrelations between Leibniz's theory of substance and that of the complete concept, two points bear discussion. First, we need to see just how much of Leibniz's ontology Schleiermacher takes over and at what significant junctures he diverges from him. Second, we need to ask whether, given these divergences, Schleiermacher's systematic thought can remain coherent.

The most important point of divergence between Leibniz and Schleiermacher is the following: while Leibniz's monads are windowless, Schleiermacher clearly conceives of self-consciousness as involving both spontaneity and *receptivity*. In a sketch for an 1831 lecture, Schleiermacher notes that in the opposition between subject and object

lies the opposition between doing and suffering in both its members in a twofold way. Namely, when something in the confused manifold effects the split between subject and object, so is what is outside us the active agent and the organism is receptive, what suffers. On the other hand when something is distinguished out of the confused manifold at the behest of the faculty of knowledge, then the subject becomes active and the separated something is posited as that which is thought and as passive.¹²

In the Introduction to *The Christian Faith*, Schleiermacher repeatedly mentions the opposition between our receptivity and our spontaneity: the point of consciousness through which we are conscious of the feeling of absolute dependence is the ground of both.¹³ In the *Dialektik*, Schleiermacher views the difference between being and thinking as reflected in the differences between the organic and intellectual functions. Through the organic function we are *affected* by that which lies outside us; it thereby corresponds to our receptivity. On the other hand, the intellectual function, through which objects are thought, corresponds to spontaneity. This division of the sources of human knowledge closely mirrors Kant's. In fact already in the lectures on *Dialektik* of 1814/15, Schleiermacher notes that "without unity and multiplicity the manifold is undermined; without the manifold the determinate unity and multiplicity is empty."¹⁴ The statement

¹² DialJ 496.

¹³ CF §§ 4–9 (12–44).

¹⁴ Dial(1814/15) 23.

is a striking echo of Kant's famous dictum that "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."¹⁵

Manfred Frank has pointed to Schleiermacher's claim that "We can only think of the antithesis between receptivity and spontaneity as a relative, not as an absolute antithesis. A minimum of power must be posited in receptivity, and both come together in a higher power."¹⁶ In other words, neither source of knowledge can be found in its purity. Frank traces this idea back to Schleiermacher's Leibnizian teacher Eberhard, for whom sensation and thinking were restrictions of one primal power. As such, Frank understands Schleiermacher's project as a kind of re-Leibnizianization of Kant.¹⁷ Against such an understanding it must be remembered that for Leibniz, as for Eberhard, the *content* of perception and thought is the same. The difference between them is merely logical, that is, sensible cognitions lack the clarity and distinctness of intellectual cognitions; they are confused representations of the infinite, and this confusion is due to our finitude and limitation. Each of us perceives the infinite, and as such we are "limited deities." Insofar as we are finite beings, we cannot grasp the infinite, that is, everything that exists and the relations of these finite things to us, in a clear and distinct manner. It must be remembered that for Leibniz, substance cannot be affected by that which is outside it. Rather, each substance "expresses" the universe due to the pre-established harmony between its perceptions and those of all other substances. The ability of a substance to "perceive" is inherently tied to the fact that it expresses the universe. But Schleiermacher, following Kant, links sensation to real receptivity: beings really do affect one another. As such, receptivity is fundamentally different from spontaneity, even though both may spring from, as Kant himself put it, "a common but to us unknown root."¹⁸ Hence Schleiermacher's insistence on the *relative* antithesis between receptivity and spontaneity can hardly be taken as a re-Leibnizianization of Kant, since the fundamental issue here is whether there is a real receptivity at all, and on this point Schleiermacher sides with Kant.

The importance of this crucial point cannot be overestimated. It is, I suggest, the key to understanding whether Schleiermacher can consistently

¹⁵ IMMANUEL KANT, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), A 51 / B 75 (93). (Page numbers are given in parentheses.)

¹⁶ DialO 255–6; see FRANK's discussion of this point in the Introduction to his edition of Schleiermacher's *Dialektik*, 55 ff.

¹⁷ See *ibid.*, 55 ff.

¹⁸ KANT, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 15 / B 29 (61).

adopt Leibniz's complete concept theory while at the same time adopting a Kantian two-source theory of knowledge and a correspondence theory of truth. In order to look into the matter, we must once again probe the interrelations between Leibniz's theory of substance and his theory of the complete concept. Does the theory of the complete concept imply Leibniz's theory of substance, such that to affirm real receptivity implies that the theory of the complete concept is also false? At first blush, this implication cannot be affirmed, since it seems perfectly plausible that, given determinism, God could have such a concept of a subject without this implying that there can be no interaction among substances. What has been shown above, however, is that it was Leibniz's theory of substance that drove him to adopt the theory of the complete concept. If substances do not interact with one another, the complete concept through which God creates provides a useful way of articulating a substance's essence. This essence is the source of both its entelechy and its expression of the whole universe.

While it does not seem that there is a strict implication between the complete concept theory and the rejection of physical influx, there are other implications that the theory of the complete concept carries with it regarding the role of perception in our ability to make judgments. In order to explore these questions, let me now turn to the Kant-Eberhard controversy, which reveals the connections between Kant's theory of the two sources of human knowledge and his rejection of the idea of the complete concept. Taking a look at these interconnections will reveal whether Schleiermacher could consistently adopt Kant's two-source theory of knowledge while retaining the Leibnizian theory of the complete concept.

II. THE KANT-EBERHARD CONTROVERSY AND THE METAPHYSICAL GROUND OF PREDICATION

Johann August Eberhard was the leader of the extensive criticism of Kant's philosophy coming from the right, that is, the defenders of the official Wolffian-Leibnizian philosophy. As is well known, Schleiermacher was his pupil in Halle and was influenced by him. Along with J. G. Maaß and J. E. Schwab, as well as other Wolffians, Eberhard founded the journal, *Philosophisches Magazin* in 1788, whose first volume appeared in 1788-1789. The purpose of the journal was to provide an avenue through which the influential Kantian philosophy could be countered from the Wolffian

standpoint. Kant's reply, *On a Discovery*, was a reply to the objections in the first volume of the journal, and appeared in 1790. The text is important in that it answers many objections that arose as a result of misconceptions of the critical philosophy. Many of these misconceptions were due to Kant's not having fully and properly expounded his views in the first *Critique* and in the more popular work, *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*. The text's importance also lies in the fact that it sets in clear relief the differences between the rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff, and Kant's critical philosophy.

Kant's theoretical philosophy is an attempt to answer the question how synthetic a priori judgments are possible. In his attempt to account for these kinds of judgments, Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy provided a fundamental reassessment of the relationship between knowing and being. As he notes in the Preface to the second edition of the first *Critique*:

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempt to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given.¹⁹

It is important to keep in mind that as he developed his critical philosophy, Kant was in conversation with two separate camps. It was Hume who awoke him from his dogmatic slumbers through his analysis of causation as mere constant conjunction. Hume was, of course, an empiricist; the source of all true knowledge is experience. Hence it is the things themselves and how they affect us, and not our concepts of things (as in Leibniz) that provide the metaphysical ground of predication. The Copernican revolution therefore seems to be primarily directed as an answer to the Humean problem developed in terms of empiricist assumptions. According to Hume, if things are the ground of synthetic predication, they can only be known through how they affect us and hence through experience. We therefore can

¹⁹ Ibid., B xv (22).

have no knowledge of such things a priori. We may, indeed, have knowledge of what it is that is contained in our concepts (i. e., analytic judgments, in which the predicate merely repeats what is contained in the subject). But our concepts are not things. All judgments about things must await the verdict that experience must supply. No amount of experience, however, will yield necessity and universality. Regardless of how many times in all past instances x 's are y , this will not yield the requisite necessity and universality, since uniformity of past instances implies nothing concerning those instances that might be encountered in the future. Hence, Kant concluded, to assume that in experience the mind must conform to things (i. e., where the mind's modifications depend upon how it is affected) is a dead end where synthetic a priori (i. e., necessary and universal) judgments are concerned. The only way that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible is if *things* must conform to the mind. Now things, according to Kant, are given in intuition, but intuition itself contains its a priori forms conditioning the way that objects must be given. While this empiricist context is certainly important in interpreting Kant's Copernican revolution, the Copernican revolution also brought Kant into significant disagreement with the followers of Leibniz and Wolff.

One of the driving principles of Eberhard's attack on the Kantian system was the claim that insofar as it was true, it was a mere repetition of Leibniz, and insofar as it diverged from Leibniz's views, it was simply wrong. Eberhard notes that

The Leibnizian philosophy contains just as much of a critique of reason as the new philosophy, while at the same time it still introduces a dogmatism based on a precise analysis of the faculties of knowledge. It therefore contains all that is true in the new philosophy and, in addition, a well-grounded extension of the sphere of the understanding.²⁰

Eberhard's critique rested on several key interrelated points. First, Eberhard claimed that we could have real knowledge through pure concepts without the need for intuition or experience; as such he was extremely critical of Kant's limitation of knowledge to appearances. Because the cate-

²⁰ JOHANN EBERHARD, *Philosophisches Magazin* I, 289; quoted from HENRY E. ALLISON, *The Kant-Eberhard Controversy: An English translation together with supplementary materials and a historical-analytic Introduction of Immanuel Kant's On a Discovery* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 16.

gories apply only to appearances and not to things in themselves, Kant has failed to show that they were really applicable to things (i. e., possessed objective validity). Eberhard claims:

in the theory of critical idealism synthetic judgments can have no objects outside of the representations; for they cannot relate to anything that is actual apart from the representations, and their logical truth thus consists merely in the agreement of a representation in us with the same representation in us. Thus critical idealism presupposes a theory which reduces the entire discussion to a play with words.²¹

Second, since such genuine knowledge can be had through pure concepts, we can have knowledge of things in themselves. Third, he eschewed the essential role Kant had assigned sensibility in human knowledge. The issues are inherently related with one another. Their significance and interconnections can best be gauged through an analysis of Kant's analytic / synthetic distinction, a key feature allowing Kant to frame the question driving the critical philosophy in the first place: How are synthetic a priori judgments possible? In fact, Kant's analytic / synthetic distinction was a significant point of focus of the Eberhardian attack. In order to grasp the controversy, it is useful to take a look at Eberhard's critique of Kant's understanding of the distinction and how it was grounded in the way he himself understood it.

In the Introduction to the first *Critique*, Kant frames the analytic / synthetic distinction in terms of the relation of the subject to the predicate in a judgment. Hence he notes:

Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgment analytic, in the other synthetic. Analytic judgments are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity; those in which this connection is thought without identity should be entitled synthetic.²²

²¹ EBERHARD, *Philosophisches Magazin* I, 321-2; quoted from ALLISON, *Kant-Eberhard Controversy*, 41.

²² KANT, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 6-7 / B 10-11 (48).

Analytic judgments merely break up the subject concept into its constituent elements, and repeat one of those elements in the predicate. Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, are what Kant here calls ampliative, that is, the predicate contains new information not contained in the subject and which cannot be derived from it. Such judgments are thereby informative.

In his essay "On the Distinction of Judgments into Analytic and Synthetic" in the *Philosophisches Magazin*, Eberhard criticized Kant's distinction as unclear, and proposed his own analysis, one which he believed would expose the ground of its lack of clarity. Moreover, he argued, a proper development of the distinction would show that we do, indeed, have knowledge of things in themselves. His own development of the distinction revolved around the difference between the essence of a thing and its attributes. When the predicate in a judgment is contained in the concept of the essence of the subject, we have an identical judgment that may be partial or complete. In a complete identical judgment, "the predicate contains all of the determinations of the subject by means of which it can always be distinguished from all other things."²³ In a partial identical judgment, the predicate expresses only part of the essence, that is, "it is one with only one or some, but not all the determinations of the subject."²⁴ Both these kinds of judgments are analytic. Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, are ones in which the predicate of the judgment is connected to the subject in virtue of the subject's attributes. These attributes are different from the essence of the subject, but are nevertheless implied by it. Since, however, they are not themselves part of the essence of the subject, the predicate in the judgment does not merely repeat what is already expressed by the subject. Eberhard labels these judgments synthetic and notes that "There are a priori judgments or necessary truths in which the predicates are attributes of the subject, that is, determinations which do not belong to the essence of the subject, but have their sufficient reason in this essence."²⁵ Eberhard believes he has thereby accounted for synthetic a priori judgments (i. e., judgments of metaphysics and mathematics) in a way consistent with the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy. As such, he claims that the tools for answering Hume's quandary are already present in the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff. Kant's distinction, on the other hand, is flawed insofar as it fails

²³ EBERHARD, *Philosophisches Magazin* I, 312–3; quoted from ALLISON, *The Kant-Eberhard Controversy*, 37.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ EBERHARD, *Philosophisches Magazin* I, 314; quoted from ALLISON, *The Kant-Eberhard Controversy*, 38.

to note the difference between the essence of a thing and its attributes. It is this distinction that is the true ground of the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments. Furthermore, charges Eberhard, Wolff and Baumgarten had already identified two classes of judgment, identical and non-identical, basically corresponding to those he describes. Whereas identical judgments are based on the principle of contradiction, non-identical judgments are based on the principle of sufficient reason. Given this fact, Kant's "originality" lay merely in his having changed the name of the two kinds of judgments; moreover, his own formulation of the distinction was plagued with confusion.

In regard to this issue an important criticism of Kant's distinction, first brought up by Maaß, and then raised again by Eberhard, comes up. Maaß develops the criticism in an essay that appeared in the second volume of the *Philosophisches Magazin* entitled, "On the Highest Principle of Synthetic Judgments in Relation to the Theory of Mathematical Certainty." Whereas Eberhard's original criticism of Kant's analytic / synthetic distinction rested on his alleged failure to note the difference between essence and attribute, Maaß questions whether the distinction is at all viable on the grounds that Kant assigns to it. Just how do we identify whether a judgment is analytic or synthetic? The problem, as Maaß sees it, is the difficulty in fixing the subject concept in a judgment. Just how do we know what is contained in that concept, and what is the basis for this determination? This is key, since what is contained in the subject concept determines whether the predicate merely repeats that content or not. When I think of gold, to use Locke's famous example, I may think of something that is yellow and malleable. Not being a chemist, its solubility in *aqua regia* may be news to me. Hence the judgment "Gold is soluble in *aqua regia*," would be a synthetic judgment since it provides me with new information. On the other hand, the solubility of gold in *aqua regia* may be taken for granted as part of the definition of gold by another individual. It thereby seems that a judgment that is synthetic for me may be analytic for another individual. The problem, as Maaß acutely notes, is the psychological basis of the distinction as formulated by Kant: the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments depends upon the relation between the content of the concepts *thought* in a judgment. Given this psychological basis, what is thought in a concept can vary from individual to individual, and the consequence is that the same judgment may be considered both analytic and synthetic. Maaß proceeds to argue that stipulating what is contained in the subject through a *nominal* definition will not work either. On the basis of such a nominal definition, a

triangle can be defined as a figure, the sum of the angles of which are equivalent to the sum of two right angles. However, if a triangle is defined in this way, the judgment that the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees will be analytic and not synthetic. In fact, using the nominal definition to determine what is contained in the concept of the subject can make it such that most of the judgments that Kant counted as synthetic a priori could be understood as analytic. Maaß then notes that the only alternative is to stipulate what is thought in the subject concept through the essence, but doing this will land one squarely back in the Leibnizian camp. The only proper way to distinguish between analytic and synthetic judgments is by distinguishing between the essence and the attributes of a subject, as Eberhard had done. Only in this way can the inherent vagueness in Kant's formulation of the distinction be overcome. Echoing Eberhard, Maaß argued that this showed that everything that Kant wanted to accomplish in the critical philosophy was already contained in the Wolffian-Leibnizian philosophy, only conceived of and articulated there much more clearly.

Schleiermacher voices a somewhat similar critique of the analytic / synthetic distinction in the 1814 / 15 version of the lectures on *Dialektik*. There he notes that:

In a complete concept the accidental [elements] of its possibility and its range must be contained. For when a thing can suffer or do something, the possibility of which is not contained in its concept, then the concept is not complete. Therefore in regard to complete concepts, there are no pure synthetic judgments.

In regard to incomplete concepts that are still being formed, there are no pure analytic judgments. For anything can be left out at a given moment in a concept's history. There can be a concept of a human being in which the predicate mortal has not yet been added.

The difference between analytic and synthetic judgments can thereby not be fixed, and is in general nothing, since identical judgments are nothing but empty formulas when one does not lay the complete concept as a basis, in which each difference is alone grounded.²⁶

Here Schleiermacher, like Maaß and Eberhard, notes the difficulty in fixing the subject concept in analytic judgments. Just what is it that is being

²⁶ Dial(1814 / 15) 33.

thought in the subject concept? We only know the answer to this question, argues Schleiermacher, when we are dealing with a complete concept, and here we are firmly in the Leibnizian camp. Judgments having a complete concept for the subject cannot be pure synthetic judgments, since everything that is true about the subject is already contained in its concept. On the other hand, if we admit that there are incomplete concepts, we will have a hard time fixing what is thought in them, for just what it is that is thought in a concept varies with its history. This is true of both the psychological history of a concept peculiar to an individual and its nominal intersubjectively agreed upon definition. Because of the question of the fixing of the content of an incomplete concept, Schleiermacher argues that in regard to them there can be no analytic judgments. Rather, if the analytic / synthetic distinction is to make any sense at all, it must be grounded in the idea of the complete concept. Judgments containing complete concepts are analytic; *only* judgments containing incomplete concepts can be synthetic. Notice that here Schleiermacher, like Eberhard, is working with what seem to be merely logical criteria for the distinction between analytic / synthetic judgments offered by Kant in the Introduction of the first *Critique*: the basis of the distinction has to do with the content of concepts and their interrelations. Because Kant had not there clarified his distinction further, he left himself wide open to attacks by Eberhard and Maaß that his distinction was vague. Schleiermacher echoes these worries in the *Dialektik* and provides his own account of how the distinction might be more clearly grounded.

Kant's answer to Eberhard's attack in *On a Discovery* exposes many of the misconceptions regarding the analytic / synthetic distinction that lead to the Wolffian attack. Moreover his discussion reveals some of the inherent interconnections between his (Kant's) rejection of the Leibnizian doctrine of the complete concept and the two-source theory of knowledge. In *On a Discovery* Kant argues that the key to the significance of the analytic / synthetic distinction is not the merely logical question of the relation between the subject and predicate in a judgment. The key issue is rather transcendental. As such, it concerns the question of whether the predicate in a judgment stands in a *real* relation to the object. We can begin to understand what Kant means by this through Kant's analysis of the way that Eberhard develops the analytic / synthetic distinction. We then contrast this with what Kant means by a real relation to the object.

For Eberhard (as for Leibniz) a judgment is true in virtue of the relation between *concepts*. In fact, Kant notes, the basis for Eberhard's attempt to distinguish between analytic and synthetic judgments rests on a distinction

between two kinds of concept containment: direct containment and mediate containment, or, implication. Eberhard's analytic judgments are true in virtue of the first kind of concept containment. In these cases a mark contained in the subject concept (presumably expressing an essence) is merely repeated in the predicate of the judgment. In Eberhard's synthetic judgments, the predicate does not merely repeat what is already contained in the subject, but rather affirms something that is *logically implied* by the subject concept. Key here, as Kant is quick to point out, is that the truth of both kinds of judgments depends upon the principle of contradiction alone. Hence even Eberhard's synthetic judgments are true in virtue of concept containment, albeit of a mediate kind. As such, this is a purely intensional logic: the basis of the truth of a judgment lies in logical interrelations among concepts. Even Eberhard seemed to have recognized the inherent similarities between analytic and synthetic judgments as he himself understood them. He noted that "the dispute as to whether a proposition is analytic or synthetic, is in regard to its logical truth, trivial."²⁷

As Kant notes in his 1789 letter to Reinhold, the problem with Eberhard's analysis is that "the logical relation of ground and consequent is mistaken for a real relation Now this distinction of ground and consequent is either merely *logical* (having to do with the manner of representation) or *real*, that is, in the object itself Now it is real distinctness that one requires for a synthetic judgment."²⁸ While an analytic judgment is true in virtue of logical interrelations between concepts, a synthetic judgment is one that is true in virtue of some third thing, distinct from both subject and predicate, to which both the subject and the predicate apply. In a synthetic judgment one predicates something about an object *x* that falls under the subject concept. For instance, when I say "This hat is red," what I am saying is that there is some thing, a particular hat, that stands under the concept hat and which also stands under the concept red. The key question in a synthetic judgment is therefore the material or *transcendental* question of whether the predicate in a judgment stands in a *real* relation to some object. Such real relations have to do with the relation of concepts to *things* or the relation of *things* to one another.²⁹ In *On a Discovery*, Kant notes:

²⁷ EBERHARD, *Philosophisches Magazin* I, 361; quoted from ALLISON, *The Kant-Eberhard Controversy*, 150.

²⁸ IMMANUEL KANT, *Philosophical Correspondence*, 1759–1799, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 138–9.

²⁹ Henry Allison puts the matter quite clearly and is worth quoting: "Thus a logical relation is one which holds between concepts, a logical predicate is simply any concept

It was therefore not merely a verbal quibble, but a step in the advance of knowledge when the first *Critique* made known the distinction between judgments which rest entirely on the principle of identity or contradiction, from those which require another principle through the label "analytic" in contradistinction to "synthetic" judgments. For the notion of synthesis clearly indicates that something outside of the given concept must be added as a substrate which makes it possible to go beyond the concept with my predicate. Thus, the investigation is directed to the possibility of a synthesis of representations with regard to knowledge in general, which must soon lead to the recognition of intuition as an indispensable condition for knowledge, and pure intuition for a priori knowledge.³⁰

In his 1789 letter to Reinhold, Kant affirms that the principle of synthetic judgments has been unambiguously presented in the first *Critique*. It is:

All synthetic judgments of theoretical cognition are possible only by the relating of a given concept to an intuition. If the synthetic judgment is an experiential judgment, the intuition must be empirical; if the judgment is a priori synthetic, there must be a pure intuition to ground it.³¹

Of key significance is Kant's affirmation that the synthetic judgment is true in virtue of some third thing, and his identification of this third something with intuition. Two things are important in this regard. First, it is only through intuition that the mind is *directly* related to objects. The key feature of an intuition is that it is a singular representation (*repraesentatio singularis*), that is, *a representation of an individual*. Concepts, on the other

predicated of another, and a logical essence is merely the sum total of the partial concepts making up a given concept. Rules governing logical relations are purely formal, as they abstract from the content of thought. Real relations, on the other hand, concern precisely the content of thought. They hold between things thought about, or between concepts and things. Moreover, just as a real ground is the ground of a thing, and a real essence the essence of a thing, so a real predicate is a determination of a thing. From this we can clearly see that the defining characteristic of synthetic judgments is that they relate concepts or predicates to objects, while analytic judgments are merely concerned with logical relations between concepts (the predicate and the concept of the subject)" (ALLISON, *Kant-Eberhard Controversy*, 54–5).

³⁰ KANT, *On a Discovery*; quoted from ALLISON, *The Kant-Eberhard Controversy*, 154–5.

³¹ KANT, *Philosophical Correspondence*, 141.

hand, are always representations of representations; they can only stand in a mediate relation to an object. This means that it is always possible that more than one object stand under any given concept, no matter how specific. As such, for Kant, as opposed to Leibniz and Schleiermacher, there can be no *infima* species and the individual can only be given in intuition. Second, in human beings intuition is always sensible. While a divine understanding might have intellectual intuitions and thereby stand in an immediate relation to its object without having to be affected by it, for human beings this is not possible. The only way that we can stand in an immediate relation to an object is by its affecting us. Hence while through the understanding objects are thought, it is through receptivity that objects are *given*.

This discussion has shown the systematic interrelations between a two-source theory of knowledge and Kant's analytic / synthetic distinction. The latter distinction can only be developed on the supposition that our concepts can stand in a real relation to objects. But such a real relation presupposes that *objects* are given to us, that is, that we can stand in an immediate relation to them through our intuition, and thereby through our receptivity. In fact such a real relation is presupposed by a correspondence theory of truth, the theory that Schleiermacher adopts in the *Dialektik*. Schleiermacher notes in the lectures of 1811 that "Knowledge is the correspondence of thinking with being as that which is thought."³² What is significant about Schleiermacher is that he adopts the two-source theory of knowledge while at the same time adhering to a Leibnizian view of predication. The discussion above has shown that the analytic / synthetic distinction implies a two-source theory of knowledge. The question still remains, however, whether a two-source theory of knowledge implies Kant's extensional logic (and thereby the analytic / synthetic distinction). This certainly seems to be the case. If the understanding merely provides functions of unity for our representations, whatever content there is for thought must be *given* in intuition. Hence any real extension of knowledge depends upon intuition, and this implies an extensional logic. Schleiermacher's adoption of a Leibnizian view of predication does not mix well with his adoption of a two-source theory of knowledge and a correspondence theory of truth. Rather, Leibniz's theory of the complete concept is much better suited to an ontology wherein substances do not interact with one another, that is, in which they are completely independent, windowless monads. Much of the

opacity of Schleiermacher's *Dialektik* derives from Schleiermacher's having borrowed elements from two very different philosophical systems. These elements, I have suggested, are impossible to square with one another.

³² Dial(1811) 13.